Reasons Contextualism

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Magyar nyelvű absztrakt

Disszertációm a cselekvések és attitűdök indokainak természetéről szól. Az indokokat általánosságban (nem csupán az erkölcsi vitákban) vizsgálva megmutatom, hogy azok fogalmilag prioritást élveznek a racionalitáshoz képest, majd kifejtem és érvekkel alátámasztom saját neointemalista, kontextualista, kvázi-partikularista felfogásomat.

Absztrakt (kivonat) idegen nyelven

My dissertation is an elucidation of ‘reason’ in the normative, practical sense. I relate reasons to rationality, value, and attitudes and show the importance of contextual constraints on reasons. Something is valuable because it has properties that give us reason to value it. This is the buck-passing theory of value (Scanlon). I call my version of it the ‘imbrication version.’ The imbrication version allows that value can give reasons, and vice-versa, but that, in the end, the buck is passed to reasons. Reasons are internal in the following sense: that A could reach in a sound deliberative route a conclusion to tp is a necessary condition of the truth of ‘A has a reason to (p.’ This restriction is necessary if reasons are to be reasons for agnts\this agent-centering requirement is mandatory for any account of reasons. I defend intemalism against criticisms made of it by Parfit and McDowell. There are restrictions other than an idealized, sound connection to A’s current motivations, that are necessary for correct reason ascriptions to A. Why, for instance, it is implausible to say, when A is at a party, that A has a reason to bake bread, even if her motivations could allow her to reach the conclusion to bake bread? My answer relies on explicating the notion of a context, which can place robust, if contestable, constraints on reason-ascription. Our best clues about how to understand those conditions are offered by the consideration of the character of actual deliberation. I relate reasons and attitudes to value by engaging the “wrong kinds of reasons” (WKR) problem. An evil demon threatens to punish me if I do not admire him. It seems I have a reason to admire the demon. The buck-passing account seems to be committed to the claim then, that the demon is admirable, which is rather counterintuitive. I argue, based on a fine-grained conception of attitude individuation, that all putative “wrong kinds of reasons scenarios” are either absurdities or cases of the right kinds of reasons.

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