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The Food-Supply System of the Ottoman Army
in the Light of the Military Campaign in 1658

Theses of the PhD Dissertation

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The goal and object of the research, the sources

The year of 1658 proved to be a turning point in the history of the 17^h century Transylvania, for the leaders and the population of the principality had experienced the ruthless consistency of Gran Vizier Köprülü Mehmed's acts, by which in the fall of 1656 he had begun to consolidate the Ottoman Empire facing with many internal and external hardships.

In 1657 the Principal of Transylvania, György Rákóczi II believed, that allied with the Swedes he was able to attack on Poland and acquire its throne without the permission of the Sultan. The outcome of his deeds: the majority of the Transylvanian army was held captive by the Tatars, and Rákóczi had to resign. The principal did not yield himself and returned, thinking he could reconcile, like he had done many times before, and he would be able to settle the problems. However the tables had turned in Istanbul, and the Transylvanian payed a great price when faced this fact. In 1658 the Ottoman arms turned against them instead of Venice, resulting the yearly tribute nearly doubled, three major fortresses lost, and a new principal, Ákos Barcsai forced upon them. Rákóczi could not accept these consequences, so three years of turmoil came upon the principality.

From the Transylvanian point of view this period is well researched so in general as well as in its details,¹ therefore the goal of our investigations is to give an elaborate overview of these times relying on Ottoman originated documents, now from the Turkish point of view.

¹**B. Szabó** János: II. Rákóczi György 1658. évi török háborúja. in: Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 2001/2-3. 231-278. **B. Szabó** János: Erdély katasztrófája 1658-ban. in: Aetas, 2006/2-3. 204-218. **B. Szabó** János-**Sudár** Balázs: „Independens fejedelem a Portán kívül”. II. Rákóczi György oszmán kapcsolatai. 2. rész. in: Századok, 2013/4. 931-999. **Erdélyi** országgyűlési emlékek. (szerk.: Szilágyi Sándor). XI. k. (1649-1658). Budapest, 1886. 264-284. **Erdélyi** országgyűlési emlékek. (szerk.: Szilágyi Sándor). XII. k. (1658-1661). Budapest, 1887. 3-13. **Gebei** Sándor: II. Rákóczi György lengyelországi hadjárata, 1657. in: Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 1992/2. 30-64. **Gebei** Sándor: II. Rákóczi György külpolitikája (1648-1657). Budapest, 2004. **Kármán** Gábor: II. Rákóczi György 1657. évi lengyelországi hadjáratának diplomáciai háttere. in: Századok, 2012/5. 1049-1084. **Kármán** Gábor: Erdélyi külpolitika a vesztfáliai béke után. Budapest, 2011. **Kunt**, Metin İbrahim: The Köprülü Years: 1656-1661. Princeton, 1971. 90-93. **Németh** István: „Ugyan ott Jenőnél Úr Barcsai Akos Fejedelemmé téteték.” /Ismeretlen magyar nyelvű forrás Barcsay Ákos török követjárásáról./ in: Keletkutatás, 1996 tavasz. 57-80. **Papp** Sándor: II. Rákóczi György és a Porta. in: Szerencsének egyes forgása. II. Rákóczi György és kora. (szerk.: Szabó András Péter-Kármán Gábor). Budapest, 2009. 99-170. **Papp** Sándor: Három török dokumentum Barcsai Ákos erdélyi fejedelem hatalomra kerüléséről. in: Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Szegediensis. Sectio Humana I. (1989-1990). 21-31. **Ráth** Károly: Rédey Ferenc erdélyi fejedelem megbizottjának, Sebesi Ferencnek követsége 1658-ban a budai vezérnél. in: Győri Történelmi és Régészeti Füzetek I. 1861. 1-7. **R. Várkonyi** Ágnes: Erdély és a német-római császárválasztás 1658-ban. in: R. Várkonyi Ágnes: Magyarország keresztútjain – tanulmányok. Budapest, 1978. 157-166. **Szabó** András Péter: Esterházy Pál nádor néhány erdélyi vonatkozású iratmásolata. in: Lymbus 6. (2008). 63-92. **Szilágyi** Sándor: Erdély és az északkeleti háború. II. k. Budapest, 1891. 473-478. **Szilágyi** Sándor: II. Rákóczi György. Budapest, 1891. **Uzunçarşılı**, İsmail Hakkı: Barcsay Akos'un Erdel Kırallığına Ait Bazı Orijinal Vesikalar. in: Tarih Dergisi, 7. (1953.) 51-65. **Uzunçarşılı**, İsmail Hakkı: Ekos Barçkay'ın Erdel Krallığına Tayini Hakkında Bir Kaç Vesika. in: Belleten, 27. (1943.) 361-377.

However in the archives² and the libraries³ of Istanbul it is hard to find relevant material dealing with Transylvania in this period. For example there is a *mühimme defter*, which remained from this year, but it has connection with the war efforts. Probably during the campaign a separate *ordu mühimme* was kept, but this has disappeared or still remains unrevealed.

However two from the many financial (*maliyeden müdevver*) *defters*, the 2998. and the 4576., give us hint about the food supply of the campaign of 1658. The former deals with the plans of the allowances, the latter gives certain details for the distribution of the supplies. Additional information can be drawn from documents handling the incomes from food-allowance (*mevkufat*), applying to the central accounting (*basruhasebe*), and from the ones, which recorded all types of incomes and expenditures (*ruznamçe*). By these, the food supply methods used in the Ottoman Army both during this campaign and in general can be mapped in broad outlines, especially the planning, the acquisition, the finance and the distribution. The works of the Transylvanian (e.g. János Szalárdi, Georg Kraus) and Ottoman (e.g. Naima, Pasha Abdurrahman Abdi) chroniclers, the various diplomatic reports (e.g. Simon Reniger, the Habsburg envoy, and Giovanni Battista Ballarino, the secretary of the Venetian embassy) and even private letters can also provide additional information to the above mentioned sources.

About the logistics of the campaigns lead in the 17th century, especially in its last third, and in the first quarter of the 18th century many works have been released, because the available documentation about this period is more detailed and covering more fields at the same time. In these works the food supply, the whole finance of a campaign, the weapon supply, the maintenance of roads and castles, the amount of the core and auxiliary troops, the acquisition and the provision of other equipment are discussed according to the documents at hand. Regarding this latter condition this study also fits into this scheme.

The structure of the thesis

In the introduction of the thesis, as a historical background, we are going to highlight the main reasons for the military enterprise against Transylvania and also the course of the campaign itself. Relying on the archive sources and from the prospective of the Christian side we have summarized briefly the common knowledge about the period lasting from the

² Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi

³ Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt Kütüphanesi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi

resignation of György Rákóczi in November 1657 to the entitlement of Ákos Barcsai in September 1658.

In the next unit the food supply system of the Ottoman army will be outlined in general. The basic elements of this system were the *menzils*, stations located along the roads in certain distance from each other, which served as well as a communication network for the empire. They were also used as long-term campsites, when the army marched to position, therefore prior to each campaign, in order to fulfill the possible needs, certain amount of food were stored at this places. This amount was determined previously by systematic appraisal.

The food was gathered from the local population as an extraordinary tax, both in kind and in money. This purpose was served by three kind of taxes: the *sürsat*, the *nüzul* and the *istira*. The first was gathered in kind - mainly from the *kazas* surrounding the *menzils* -, and it served chiefly the maintenance of the stations. The *nüzul* was meant to supply the army, and it was requested in kind from the territories close to the theater of war, and in money from the farther ones. This latter *nüzul* assessment was used as a reserve, covering the expenses of *istira*. The *istira* was the sum used to buy food according to the current needs when the army got closer to the theatre of operations.

The most important types of food were the barley, needed for feeding the animals, the flour and the bread made from it, and lastly the meat dishes prepared mostly from mutton. Grease, honey and biscuit - and for the animals hay and straw - were also on the menu. The food was gathered by the local administration lead by the *kadis*, and the meat went to the *ganem emini*, while the others were due to the *nüzul emini*.

The food-distribution was the duty of these aforementioned people. Until now the exact method was unknown, it was revealed by the documents found during the research. The distribution had two kinds: food for free and food for a price. To the first category the highly ranked officials, major functionaries and other prominent individuals were entitled, and their compound strongly depended on the grace of the monarch. The low-rank state officials and the soldiers could obtain food only in exchange for money. Moreover among the armed forces only the core (*kapikulu*) units were supplied centrally, the provincial forces had to solve their sustenance on their own. However there were preferred ones in the second category as well. For example the high-ranking officers of the Janissary eventually received their allowances for free, and according to the favour of the sultan others might also have the opportunity to 'join' them.

Finally, at the end of the chapter we have compared the supply-system of the Ottomans to the methods adopted by the Western armies and the difficulties of these methods. This comparison revealed the fact, that although in the quantity of food had not, but on the field of logistics, planning and organizing the Turkish army had been more advanced than its contemporary Western rivals, who only reached this level later, in the 18th century France.

In the following sections of the thesis the means of food-procurement were detailed keeping the campaign of 1658 in focus, so there can be found separate chapters about the collecting of *sürsat*, *nüzul* and *istira*. The first was collected only from the European part of the empire, so plans and fulfillment reports are available only from the *vilayets* of Rumelia, Buda, Temesvár, Eger, Kanizsa and Bosnia, and this type of tax was spent mainly on the maintenance of the *menzils*.

The *nüzul* was levied not only in Rumelia, but also in Anatolia. In this latter case it was entirely collected as money, and besides the food-supply this sum was about to be spent on other equipment too. Furthermore from the Asian part the *beldar*-money was collected as well which served for the funding of the road-maintenance, for this purpose. This could have had an indirect influence on food supply, for traveling on a good-quality road is less tiring for the troops and the animals. In connection with these two taxes we have detailed data on the planned and the paid-in contribution of the *sandjaks* in the *vilayets* of Anatolia, Sivas and Karaman.

For the purpose of collecting *nüzul* the *vilayet* of Rumelia was divided into three parts based on the direction of the major routes, a center plus a left and a right wing (*kol*). This latter was the closest to the theater of the incoming war, so from here (actually from two *sandjaks*, Silistre by the Danube and Nigbolu) barley and flour were collected, while from the other two territories the contribution was demanded in money. The taxation plans for all these territories are fully remained, but more detailed recordings about the actual amount of tax turned in are available only from the *livas* situated in the vicinity of the Danube. In connection with the other *sandjaks* some data can be gained from the information fragments traceable in the *masraf defters*. In connection with the *nüzul* there can also be found such taxation plans, which estimated the pecuniary contribution of the *vilayets* of Buda and Bosnia, and this tax was probably gathered from the *ejâlets* of Temesvár, Eger and Kanizsa too, but no data is available regarding to this question.

The *istira*, whose character is quite disputed in the international literature, was collected from the territories close to the theater of war. For the purpose of *istira* the two formerly mentioned taxes and the sums coming from the treasury were used. Purchase plans were made for barley and flour to be bought in the sandjaks by the Danube and in the *livas* of the Hungarian and Bosnian *vilayets*, and about the fulfillment of these plans some records have been remained.

Beyond the planned purchases, further rations of barley, flour and wheat for the biscuit, as well as rice were drawn. The acquisition of sheep was also separately laid out, but in the absence of the documentation of the *ganem emini* we barely have information on this field.

In the next unit of the thesis we are going to describe the circumstances of storage for the food yet to be purchased and the ones have been already supplied, as well as the designated storehouses, and the means of transport are also going to be mentioned. The food was ordered to three major places: to Yenipalanka by the Danube, which had a port, to the forts in the *vilayet* of Temesvár, and to Belgrade. However about the actual fulfillment of the stocking we also hardly know anything.

In connection with the shipping the types of the hired wagons and the used animals were mentioned, and the details of water transportation can be explored in greater degree. The grain acquired from the *kazas* by the Danube was shipped to Belgrade and Fethülislam, and from there the surplus was shipped back to the ports close to the Black Sea, and finally sent to Istanbul and to neighboring warehouses. In these cases the ships could be registered according to the name of the shipmasters and the transport charges.

Following this comes the introduction of the people participated the campaign. In this we could greatly rely on the *defters*, which detailed the food distribution, but the register of the officials, who witnessed the appointment records of Ákos Barcsai, also offers further help. The participants were classified into separate groups according to their position held: the ones under the direct rule of the Grand Vizier, the functionaries and officials of the public and financial administration, and the office-holders of the Sultan's palace. Besides these there were the people mentioned without their title, and a couple other person, who were treated as important. The troops of the Sultan's court, the provincial and auxiliary armed forces are also presented separately, but detailed information exists only about the first category. For

example there are available data about the high ranking officers of the Janissary and the number of the court troops, but in connection with the provincial forces only the name of a few *beylerbeyis* and *sandjakebgs* are known.

In the next unit the deployment route of the army and the support given to them by the *menzils* along the route is presented. The campaign started from Edirne on June 24th and the army arrived to Belgrade on July 26th using the route Filibe-Sophia-Nis. From here two paths were designated: the one leading to Dalmatia through Bosnia, and the other, through Temesvár to Lippa and to Yanova. In the first case they would have marched to Isfinar following the Sava, then crossing the river there, and along the river of Vrbas they would have arrived at Banja Luka. From this town the soldiers would have gone on the mountain paths at first to Ihlevne, then to Knin, while the artillery and the heavy equipment would have got to Knin a bit to the west, on a more favorable flat ground. At this point of the plan more objectives were appointed, the Ottoman arms would have threatened Zadar, Split or Klis, moreover a simultaneous assault on all three strongholds were also considered.

Because of the course of events the army finally took direction towards Transylvania. They crossed the Danube at Belgrade on August 7-9th, then they camped on the field by Panchova until August 14th. Following the river Temes they arrived at Temesvár on August 20th. After a four days rest they marched not against Lippa, as originally planned, but against Yanova. They crossed the Maros at Arad, and so they arrived in the vicinity of Yanova on August 27th, where they began preparing for the siege.

We were about to determine the temporal distances between the stations using *menzildefters* originated from later periods. The spatial distances were estimated with the help of a satellite map. The relief on each section of the route was surveyed according to the maps, and we also determined the actual stay of the army at each *menzil* with the help of the available documentation.

The maintenance of the *menzils* were provided from the *sürsat*, namely from barley, flour, sheep, oil, honey and firewood, gathered from the surrounding *kazas*. The needs of the army and the capacity of the territories were measured up before the campaign, and the plans were based on these results. The plans were sent to the *kadis* of each *kaza*, who, together with the commissioned *mübaşir*, were responsible for collecting the tax and delivering it to the appointed *menzil*.

Not only the plan for provisioning the stations between Edirne and Belgrade is available, but the quantities actually collected are also known. According to these with a few exceptions the majority of the *kazas* fulfilled their duty. Although these calculations were ready for the route to Dalmatia too, they remained only plans because of the course of the Transylvanian events. About the route towards Transylvania we dispose over information only on the stations and their estimated provision.

The following unit of the thesis surveys the route of the homeward journey and its supply provided by the *menzils*. This journey consisted of three phases: a distance between Yanova and Panchova, then Panchova-Edirne, finally Edirne-Istanbul. The army reached Edirne in a relatively short time, three and a half week, between September 17th and October 10th. After a ten day long rest the army, now being completed with the Sultan, his household and the other high ranking officials, who had stayed at home previously, continued its way towards Istanbul, where they arrived at on October 30th.

About this homeward journey the records are not at all so detailed, furthermore about the stations from the castle of Yanova to Panchova we can refer only to the, from this point of view quite inaccurate, reminiscence of Johannes Lutsch, the royal judge of Seben, who were brought to Istanbul as a hostage. Until Edirne the *menzils* had not changed, they offered the same supply of barley, flour and bread, as well as hay and firewood. The first two items were usually purchased, while the latter were used up as remainder, and between Edirne and Istanbul hay was also considered.

The dissertation continues with the details of food-allocation. Exceptional apportionments were held between June 24th and October 19th, thus on the route Edirne-Yanova-Edirne, and between October 20-29th on the way from Edirne to Istanbul.

In the first period, according to the data, barley, flour, bread, oil, honey, firewood and hay were given to the beneficiary. This was overseen by the *nüzul emini*, Hassan *agha*. About the distribution of flesh, looked after by the *ganem emini*, Yusuf *agha*, we haven't got any information. Barley and bread were given to the majority, although not everyday. In this 118 day long interval the ration were given out in every one and a half or two days. Daily only the *reisülküttab*, the Grand Vizier and *deftedarpasha* were fed.

The food-allocation was discussed according to the types of food. The barley, the bread and the flour were distributed both for price and for free, so these items were divided

into further units. The beneficiaries were also arranged into groups, so the military units, the employees of the different bureaus, those who held a differentiated office and those who were listed without their title, the otherwise highlighted people as well as the livestock are represented separately.

In the lists of the beneficiaries each person was classified by their rightful daily ration, because this seemed to be the best way to express the relation between position and allowance, and to show how different ranks related to each other in the matter of the food-allotment.

The three third of sum gained from the price of the allotted food were transferred to the treasury, the rest was credited as an expenditure on the barley and bread rations given to the leading officers of the Janissary. Beyond this, for the Janissary and the cavalry troops pecuniary compensation was provided, from which the latter obtained the larger amount, and above all somewhat money were paid back for the lesser officials and other employees of the *Divan*.

On the Edirne-Istanbul route barley, bread, hay, straw and firewood were allotted, and this time the men belonging to the the court of the ruler and the officials sooner left behind in Edirne also received their part from each item. In this case the supply was not the authority of Hassan *agha* anymore, but of a certain *agha* called Mehmed, who was also appointed to the title of *nüzul emini*. Probably the flesh-allowance was still supervised by Yusuf *agha*, the *ganem emini*, though no documentation were remained either on the quantities being in stock or on the ones allotted.

On this part of the journey the majority of the army got barley and bread, and these items were given out almost every day of the ten day long march. Only these two items were allotted, both for price and for free, and many such beneficiaries were obliged to pay for them, who previously during the campaign received the food for free. The rest of the items were given quasi from the grace of the Sultan, and seemingly they were shared only among the senior officials.

Only the 40% of the income from the price of the allotted barley and bread were transferred into the treasury, and part of the remaining sum was used on crediting the rations of the senior Janissary officers, like it happened previously during the campaign. Nevertheless this time the rest was not given to the cavalry units of the Porte, but it was allotted among the low ranking officers of the Janissary and minor state officials.

In the next unit of the dissertation the campaign's original objective was examined with the help of the data originated from the documentation about the food supplying activities. Beyond these the reports of Simon Reniger von Reningen, the resident envoy of the Habsburg Empire in Istanbul, and Giovanni Battista Ballarino, the secretary of the embassy of the Republic of Venice in the Ottoman Empire, offered great help, and we also fell back on the reports of other Transylvanian and Habsburg deputies, who were sent to the Grand Vizier.

As the basis to this examination served the fact, that as far as we know, in the beginning of the year the campaign had been aimed towards Venice yet, and only in the spring, because of the disobedience of György Rákóczi and the orders of Transylvania, turned the Ottoman arms against the principality. According to the documentation of the food supply and particular information in the envoy's reports the Ottoman general staff did not entirely ruled out the intervention against the republic, and it seems so, that the final destination of the Turkish army was doubtful till the last moment.

We followed the course of events from month to month, trying to determine, when exactly was the objective of the campaign finally decided. According to our information in January Köprülü prepared against Venice, especially he wanted a land assault, which would have aimed directly the city-state. This would have been serving to draw the Venetians' attention from the sea, just like in the previous year. However in 1657 minor military actions had taken place against the Venetian interests in Dalmatia, mainly with the units of the Turkish armies in Bosnia and Albania, but these efforts had remained fruitless.

In 1658, the Grand Vizier would have attacked the city-state through the pass at Friuli, so this enterprise would have required a trespassing on Habsburg soil. (This problem had also come to in question in 1657.) The Habsburg permission was asked through Reniger, which request the resident, naturally, tried to evade. He did everything he could to dissuade the Turkish from this, who, however, insisted on the personal answer of the Emperor, so they sent an envoy to Vienna in March.

This question was prolonged till May, but the answer could be nothing, but a rejection. The Ottomans expected this, so they had prepared almost from the start against the Dalmatian strongholds of the republic, mainly against Zara, but an attack on Split, Sibenik and Klisz was also scheduled, so they had plans for assaulting on multiple fronts too.

By April the campaign against Transylvania had emerged as an option, since Rákóczi refused to leave the throne, and the orders also did not do everything they could to hand over the principal, although Köprülü had stripped Rákóczi from their Rumanian allies in late

January and in mid-March. First Constantin Șerban in Wallachia, then Gheorge Ștefan in Moldavia were relieved. Later they found shelter in Transylvania, adding further oil to the fire.

Neither Reniger himself nor Ballarino could decide, who against would be the campaign launched, and it is very likely, that they were intentionally kept in insecurity. For Venice a war against Transylvania would have been suitable, while Reniger worried for the standing peace between the two empires. Besides, for the election for the imperial throne of the Holy Roman Empire was pending, the Habsburgs wanted peace by all means. On the other hand the Turkish were afraid of the possibility, that beyond the political support Rákóczi gets military aid as well from the Kingdom of Hungary, so they did everything to keep up the two diplomats' uncertainty.

From the records it seems, that a double campaign was prepared, namely the main force would have marched against the Venetians in Dalmatia, while with the “problem” of the Transylvanian principal would have been dealt by the new Rumanian voivodes, Mihail Radu, the voivode of Wallachia and Gheorge Ghica, the voivode of Moldavia, the *pashas* of Silistre and Buda with garrisons of a couple Hungarian *vilayets*, and Tatar khan with his army possibly backed with the Cossacks. Parallel with this in May the *pasha* of Buda was ordered to gather his troops, and to move them into the area, into the vicinity of the claimed fortress of Yanova.

The preparations were also hindered by the *jelalies*, for a rebellion broke out in Anatolia lead by Abaza Hassan, the *pasha* of Aleppo, so a part of the Anatolian troops had not arrived at the camp near Edirne. The rebels problem was the Grand Vizier himself, they wanted to remove Köprülü out of power. In the weeks before the departure some of the *spahis* attempted to assassinate the Grand Vizier with the help of the *silahdaragha*, but their plan failed.

The army moved out of Edirne on July 24th and according to a Transylvanian envoy's report not even then did the soldiers knew, who against would they march. In the same time, on July 5th Kenan, the *pasha* of Buda, was defeated by Rákóczi between Lippa and Arad. In the battle among the many Turkish victims several chief men had fallen. The plans of invading Transylvania were made concrete by these news, for the Turkish border troops appeared to be inadequate to solve the problem in Transylvania, particularly because the Tatars were also held back by the infighting of the Cossacks. Hearing about the defeat of the

pasha of Buda the Ottoman army, omitting its usual, several day long rest in Nis, marched straight towards Belgrade, and arrived there on July 26th.

The objective not even then seemed unambiguous, since both the Habsburg envoy sent to the *pasha* of Buda, and his fellow diplomat on his way to the Grand Vizier had seen war preparations in Bosnia, but the final decision, on August 6th, was “brought” by the *kapudjibasi* arrived to Köprülü Mehmed. The Sultan ordered the Grand Vizier to settle the issues as soon as possible, but not later than forty days, and then to return home as fast as he can. The cause of this was the escalating rebellion of the *jelalies*, who threatened to take Istanbul or at least to set the city on fire, if the Sultan did not dismiss the Grand Vizier.

So the Grand Vizier ordered his troops towards Temesvár, marking the castle of Yanova as the objective. At this time he gave the command, that the tax from Bosnia, which meant for military allowance, should be gathered in form of money. The Turkish moved to Panchova around August 8-9th, then marched against the aforementioned castle, where, after a four day long rest at Temesvár, they arrived on August 27th. However no combat took place, the Ottoman army conquered Yanova without raising a sword.

In the final and summarizing part of the thesis we have surveyed the amount of taxes, which were to provision the army, by aggregating the value of the food-items gathered in kind. Parallel to this the value of actually assessed taxes, both in money and in kind, were also determined, and in addition to these the transportation and storage costs, as well as the money coming from the selling of surplus items were taken into consideration.

This summarizing examination was done considering the war indemnity forced upon the Transylvanian. Aggregating the costs of feeding the army during the campaign we can calculate with a value of 45.939.947 *akces*. If we add the food used up between Edirne and Istanbul, the aforementioned sum will be 47.961.217 *akces*. Taking into account a subtotal of the transportation costs spent on livestock (since we don't know, that how many of these animals were actually used for carrying food), the pending instalments of the price of the water shipping, the probable cost of bread-baking and the presumable additional bread- and sheep-purchases, then this sum may reaches 55.000.000-60.000.000 *akces*.

On the other hand by the final settlement of accounts, if we consider the income from the items allotted for price and the items sold, the minimal expenditure is only 39.133.353 *akces*, or if we add the allowance of the other ten days, 41.057.250 *akces*. This would be with the aforementioned costs approx. 48.000.000-53.000.000 *akces*.

After all, when we return to the 500.000 Thaler war indemnity, it can be stated, that, counting with the exchange rate valid in the current part of the empire, which was 1 Thaler equals to 110 *akces* (then the result would be 55.000.000 *akces*), actually this sum would have roughly met the food-supply costs of the army. If we count with the exchange rate of 80 *akces* (40.000.000 *akces*), which were valid in the central provinces, then this sum would have been covered the 70-80 % of the allowance.

The burden of feeding the campaign weighed mainly on the *sandjaks* of the Danube, especially Silistre and Nigbolu. From their *kazas* not only the *sürsat* and the *nüzul* was gathered in kind, but large part of the *istira* was also collected from here. Despite of this, probably because of the lack of operations in Dalmatia, the *nüzul* was hardly used, and only the one third of the *istira* was consumed.

The *vilayet* of Buda also worth to mention, especially its southern part, from where, besides the *sürsat* and the *istira*, large amount of *serbest istira* was collected in kind, too. This could be quite overburdening, for according to the schedule the *nüzul* was to be levied only in money, and in February Reinger as well had such information, that north from Belgrade the prices had greatly risen because of the exploitation. However thanks to the moderate winter little firewood, flour and provender for the animals had to be shipped here, whereas upon the news of the preparations both the Christian and the Muslim population was fleeing from the territory. If this happened not only because of the expected clashes, but also of the increased tax-burden, it shows, that in theory howsoever the capacity of a region was calculated, in fact the majority of the burden fell (or would have fallen) always rather on the lands close to the theater of war, in this case the *kazas* in the *vilayets* by the Danube, Buda and Bosnia.

Results

Though they are incomplete, the available sources give evidence of adequate food-supply for the army, prudent planning and fairly effective implementation, and simultaneously they expose other curiosities too.

These documents disclose the identity of the leading officials in the central and provincial administration of the empire, for they were the beneficiaries of the food-distribution; moreover they provide not only an extensive overlook on the imperial administrative system, but offer a subtle view onto the original objectives of the campaign. However, the long list of beneficiaries is not at all so detailed, that we would be able to find

out the actual number of the troops participating in the campaign. From the armed forces only the strength of the core troops can be estimated to a certain degree.

All in all, with the help of the available documentation we can have a comprehensive overview on not only the food-provision of the campaign in 1658, but of the food-supply system of the Ottoman army too.

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