

University of Szeged  
Doctoral (PhD) Dissertation

Reports & Diplomatic Correspondence of  
A Habsburg Diplomat  
Anselm Franz von Fleischmann  
(1711-1716)

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Szeged

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University of Szeged  
Doctoral School of History  
Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History

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I, Cengiz Ergün, declare that this dissertation was authored solely by me, except where explicitly stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgement, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for degree or professional qualification.

Szeged. August 22 , 2025

Cengiz ERGÜN

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- Table of Contents -

|            |                                                                                          |            |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| <b>1</b>   | <b>Introduction.....</b>                                                                 | <b>7</b>   |
| <b>1.1</b> | <b>Historical &amp; Political Background.....</b>                                        | <b>22</b>  |
| 1.1.1      | An Overview of Early 18th-Century Europe.....                                            | 22         |
| 1.1.2      | Ottoman-Habsburg Relations at the Beginning of the 18th Century.....                     | 23         |
| 1.1.3      | The Great Northern War & The Refugee King of Sweden.....                                 | 26         |
| <b>2</b>   | <b>Fleischmann's First Year of Office in the Ottoman Empire</b>                          |            |
| <b>2.1</b> | <b>Prut River Campaign (1710-1711).....</b>                                              | <b>28</b>  |
| 2.1.1      | Fleischmann's Arrival in Isaccea Military Camp.....                                      | 28         |
| 2.1.2      | Encrypted Correspondence.....                                                            | 29         |
| 2.1.3      | Dimitrie Cantemir's Betrayal to the Ottomans.....                                        | 30         |
| 2.1.4      | The Gifts From the Russians to the Grand Vizier and the Other Officials.....             | 33         |
| 2.1.5      | Encounters of the Ottoman and Russian Armies on the Banks of Prut.....                   | 34         |
| 2.1.6      | The Attacks of the Ottoman Soldiers on the Russian Army.....                             | 38         |
| 2.1.7      | The Ottoman – Tatar Attack & the Siege of the Czar Peter I.....                          | 39         |
| 2.1.8      | The Peace Offer of the Russians.....                                                     | 39         |
| 2.1.9      | Articles of the Prut Treaty.....                                                         | 40         |
| 2.1.10     | Sweden's Political Maneuvers and Correspondence Concerning Ferenc II Rákóczi.....        | 42         |
| 2.1.11     | Charles XII's Endless Demand for Money from the Sultan.....                              | 46         |
| 2.1.12     | Disputes over the Route of Charles XII's Return to Sweden.....                           | 48         |
| 2.1.13     | The Departure of Charles XII from the Ottoman Empire.....                                | 53         |
| <b>3</b>   | <b>The Ottoman-Venetian Conflict (1714-1715)</b>                                         |            |
| <b>3.1</b> | <b>Historical &amp; Political Background.....</b>                                        | <b>61</b>  |
| <b>3.2</b> | <b>Montenegrin Uprising.....</b>                                                         | <b>62</b>  |
| <b>3.3</b> | <b>Sublime Porte's War Decision on the Republic of Venice.....</b>                       | <b>66</b>  |
| <b>3.4</b> | <b>Dulcignotian Raids on Venetian Ports &amp; Kidnapped Imperial Subjects.....</b>       | <b>70</b>  |
| <b>3.5</b> | <b>Fleischmann's Secret Diplomacy &amp; the Sublime Porte's War Preparations.....</b>    | <b>76</b>  |
| <b>3.6</b> | <b>Vienna's Efforts to Prevent War.....</b>                                              | <b>83</b>  |
| <b>3.7</b> | <b>The Declaration of War on Venice.....</b>                                             | <b>92</b>  |
| <b>3.8</b> | <b>Sublime Porte's Request to Send an Envoy to Vienna: Muteferrika Ibrahim Agha.....</b> | <b>109</b> |

|      |                                                                                 |     |
|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 3.9  | The Departure of the Venetian Merchants & the Letter of Hacı Mustafa Pasha...   | 112 |
| 3.10 | Intercepted Imperial Couriers & Recruited Ottoman Troops.....                   | 114 |
| 3.11 | The Question of Alliances in the Peace of Karlowitz.....                        | 123 |
| 3.12 | The March of the Ottoman Army.....                                              | 134 |
| 3.13 | Fleischmann's Departure to Edirne.....                                          | 145 |
| 3.14 | The Sultan's Fear of Rebellion & the New Serasker Çerkes Mehmed Pasha.....      | 151 |
| 3.15 | Reception of Ottoman Envoy Ibrahim Agha by Prince Eugene of Savoy.....          | 153 |
| 3.16 | Supply Shortage in the Ottoman Army & the Cruelty of the Grand Vizier.....      | 156 |
| 3.17 | Advance of the Ottoman Army in Morea & Sultan's Departure from Edirne.....      | 160 |
| 3.18 | Occupation of Morea.....                                                        | 167 |
| 4    | The Road to the War with Austria (1715-1716)                                    |     |
| 4.1  | Warnings about the Turks & Expulsion of the Genoese Ambassador.....             | 178 |
| 4.2  | The Grand Vizier's Return to Edirne & the Death of Valide Gülnuş Sultan.....    | 188 |
| 4.3  | Ottoman Defeat Against Kotorians in Bosnia.....                                 | 194 |
| 4.4  | The Despot of the Sublime Porte: Fleischmann's Meeting with the Grand Vizier... | 198 |
| 4.5  | Preparations in the Ottoman Navy & Efforts of the Ambassadors for Mediation...  | 206 |
| 4.6  | The Letter of Fieldmarshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz von Kolberg.....            | 212 |
| 4.7  | Strict Measures in Sublime Porte and the End of Stepanus Cantecuzenus.....      | 214 |
| 4.8  | Tatar Khan and the Kapudan Pasha's Plans.....                                   | 226 |
| 4.9  | Diplomatic Tensions and Peace Efforts: The Role of Ambassadors.....             | 232 |
| 4.10 | Ottoman-Austrian Tensions: Prince Eugene's Letter.....                          | 240 |
| 4.11 | Mavrocordatos' Dubious Alliance Proposal.....                                   | 253 |
| 4.12 | The Malta Pirates Incident: The Sublime Porte's Ultimatum to the Ambassadors.   | 254 |
| 4.13 | The Report of Merchant Theodor from Petrovaradin.....                           | 256 |
| 4.14 | Fleischmann's Arrest Near Belgrade & New Bridges Over Danube.....               | 260 |
| 4.15 | Reports of Spies and Fleischmann's Effort to Communicate with Vienna.....       | 264 |
| 4.16 | Colonel Petrach's Letter: Plans & Strategies.....                               | 268 |
| 4.17 | Fleischmann's Detention Conditions.....                                         | 270 |
| 5    | Conclusion.....                                                                 | 272 |
| 6    | Bibliography.....                                                               | 281 |
| 7    | Appendices.....                                                                 | 299 |

## 1. Introduction

The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed on January 26, 1699, between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, the Kingdom of Poland, and the Republic of Venice, marked a significant turning point in European political and military history. It marked both the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire's political and military dominance in Europe and profound shifts in the continent's geopolitical landscape. The treaty formally ended the Ottoman Empire's westward expansion, establishing the Habsburg Monarchy as a new hegemonic power in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.<sup>1</sup> The diminishing military superiority of the Ottomans also contributed to substantial shifts in European political dynamics.

The Treaty of Karlowitz was a defining moment for the Ottoman Empire, with far-reaching socio-economic, military, and political consequences. Under the terms of the agreement, the Ottomans were compelled to relinquish significant territorial holdings in Europe, including large parts of Hungary, Transylvania, and certain regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were ceded to the Habsburgs. The magnitude of this territorial loss, consolidated through a single treaty, had profound repercussions on the Ottoman social and administrative structure.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the treaty is widely regarded as a symbolic marker of the Ottoman Empire's transition into a period of decline.

Beyond its impact on the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Karlowitz played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of European history. It constituted a decisive victory for the Habsburg Monarchy, solidifying its military and political influence in Central Europe. Meanwhile, Poland and the Republic of Venice not only gained territorial acquisitions at the expense of the Ottomans but also witnessed a reconfiguration of European power dynamics.<sup>3</sup>

The Ottoman defeat in Europe and the consequent territorial losses precipitated significant transformations in Ottoman domestic politics as well. Political instability had already begun to surface within the Sublime Porte following the death of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in 1661, and in the subsequent decades, the empire continued to experience decline due to a combination of internal and external challenges. It was within this turbulent political climate that Ahmed III ascended to the throne.<sup>4</sup>

The Edirne Incident (Edirne Vak'ası) of 1703 was a pivotal moment in Ottoman history. On August 17, 1703, under the influence of Imam Mehmed Efendi, the Shaykh al-Islam (or the Grand

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<sup>1</sup> Imber 2002; 85-86.

<sup>2</sup> Şenli 2018; 3.

<sup>3</sup> Aksan 2007; 50-55, Lowry 2004; 88-90, Molnár 2013; 26-27.

<sup>4</sup> Faroqhi 2004; 55-58.

Mufti) appointed by the Cebeci<sup>5</sup> corps, the rebels marching towards Edirne<sup>6</sup> (Adrianople) decided to depose Mustafa II and enthrone Ahmed III as new Sultan. Subsequently, on August 22, Ahmed III was taken from the Edirne Palace by Kavanoz Ahmed Pasha, whom the rebels had appointed as Grand Vizier, and an allegiance ceremony (biat) was held the following day. Upon assuming the throne, Ahmed III immediately decreed that his predecessor, Mustafa II, and his children be confined within the Edirne Palace, thereby consolidating his rule.<sup>7</sup>

Having ascended the throne at the behest of the rebels, Ahmed III sought to establish firm control over the state administration during the early years of his reign. To stabilize governance, he reinstated numerous former viziers and scholars who had previously been dismissed or forced into hiding. During the early years of his rule, his appointed Grand Viziers, Moralı Damad Hasan Pasha, Kalaylıkoz Ahmed Pasha, and Baltacı Mehmed Pasha, primarily focused on resolving internal affairs and restoring state authority.<sup>8</sup> However, in the subsequent years, the Sublime Porte became increasingly entangled in conflicts with Russia, the Republic of Venice, and the Habsburg Monarchy, shaping the geopolitical landscape of Ahmed III's reign.

As the Habsburgs fortified their military and political presence in Western Europe and Hungary, escalating tensions with Russia forced the Ottoman Empire to shift its strategic focus northward. By 1711, these hostilities culminated in the Ottoman declaration of war against Russia. Concurrently, following the death of Joseph I and the accession of Charles VI, Michael Talman<sup>9</sup> was appointed Internuntius to inform Sultan Ahmed III and the Sublime Porte of the change in Habsburg leadership. Upon completing his diplomatic mission in Istanbul, Talman was succeeded by Anselm Franz von Fleischmann, who would go on to play a crucial role in Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic relations.<sup>10</sup>

Anselm Franz von Fleischmann's arrival in Istanbul occurred during the early years of Sultan Ahmed III's reign—a period marked by the sultan's efforts to consolidate authority and eliminate the very rebels who had facilitated his accession to the throne. He initially traveled to Istanbul in 1706

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<sup>5</sup> A military sub-unit of the Ottoman artillery corps. For more information about Cebeci, YASEMİN KILIÇARSLAN, "CEBECİ", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/cebeci>, (03.02.2024).

<sup>6</sup> For more information about Edirne (Adrianople), M. TAYYİB GÖKBİLGİN, "EDİRNE", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/edirne#1>. Accessed on 14.12.2023.

<sup>7</sup> In Nusretnâme, it is mentioned that Mustafa II was taken to his apartment where he would be kept under house arrest, saying "*Kul beni tahtdan indirmişler, yerime karındaşım Sultan Ahmed'i pâdişâh eylemişler. Allâh mübârek eyleye (They have dethroned me and made my brother Sultan Ahmed the sultan in my place. May Allah bless him).*", Topal 2001; 628.

<sup>8</sup> M. MÜNİR AKTEPE, "AHMED III", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ahmed-iii>, (20.02.2025).

<sup>9</sup> For more information on Michael Talman's mission on Istanbul, Gezer 2022;1-43. Papp 2004; 68-73. Szabados 2013; 385-419.

<sup>10</sup> Gezer 2022; 4. Spuler 1935; 340-341.

as part of the diplomatic mission led by Quarient und Raal. Due to a severe illness, he was unable to return to Vienna, and he extended his stay in the Ottoman capital.<sup>11</sup>

Quarient recommended Fleischmann to Michael Talman, who was serving as internuntio in Istanbul. When Fleischmann recovered, Talman took him into his residence and took good care of him. After Fleischmann recovered and expressed a desire to stay in Istanbul for a longer period, he was appointed by Talman's personal secretary.<sup>12</sup>

When war broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians in 1711, Talman had to send someone to follow the Ottoman Grand Vizier on the battlefield. Since he could not use his main interpreter Förner for this task, he assigned Fleischmann to do it.<sup>13</sup>

Fleischmann, following previous instructions, delivered a letter from Talman to the Grand Vizier. However, following the victorious battle at the gates near the Prut River and the subsequent peace treaty, Fleischmann did not deliver the Grand Vizier's response to Prince Eugene von Savoyen through Talman. Instead, since the campaign had already ended in battle, he personally traveled back and met with the Prince, and personally delivered the letter. At this time, he had the opportunity to provide detailed information about the battle at the Prut River. By this act, and by exceeding his orders, he tried his luck, and he succeeded. At his request, the Prince appointed him field war secretary and then sent him back to Istanbul to Talman. When Talman became internuntius in 1712, Fleischmann was appointed secretary to him.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *"Fleischmanns-Vorgang seiner Residentens-Stelle zu Constantinople de Anno 713 usque 716 inclusive. Anselmus Franz von Fleischman ist 1706 mit dem Kayl: an die Ottomanische Pforten benahmsten Internuntio hl: von Quarient und Raall, als dessen Canzleÿ verwandter nacher Constple gereißet; Er wurde allda schwer kranck; eben in der Zeit, da Herr v: Quarient sich zu seiner Ruckreÿse nacher Wienn anschicte, also, daß Er die Reiß zuruck zumachen, nicht imstand ware."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 96r-97r.

<sup>12</sup> *"Quarient recommendirte ihne ehennach ihm allda gestandenen Reiß: Residenten hl: Michael von Tallmann, mit ihm Er suchen, wann Er in der gesundheit reschtabiliret seÿn wurde, ihne nachzuschicken. Tallmann nahm den Fleischmann in sein Haus, liesse ihne gut warten, und als Er gänzlich reschtabiliret ware, auch Er einen lust zeigte, sich noch länger zu Constantinople aufzuhalten, nahm ihn Tallmann als seinen Haus Secretarium-zu ..."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 97r.

<sup>13</sup> *"... als aber Anno 1711 der Krieg zwischen der Pforten und Moßcau ausgebrochen muste Tallmann mit dem Gros Vezier jemanden in das feld schicken; weilen Er aber seinen ersten Dollmetsch Förner nicht gerathen kunte, so schickte Er den Fleischmann."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 97r-97v.

<sup>14</sup> *"Der Fleischmann befolgte daß erstere, behändigte dem Gros-Vezier des Schriben; nachdeme aber die vor die Pforten glücklich ausgeschlagene Schlacht beÿ Bruth während der Zeit vorgegangen, und in Instanti der fried gemacht wurde, als hat fleichmann daß in Ruck - Antwort an den Prinzen Eugenium von Savoÿen vom Groß Vezir erlassenes schreiben nicht den von Tallmann eingeschicket, sondern, da die Campagne mit der Schlacht ohnehin sollendet ware, gieng Er selbst in die Christenheit, trafte den Prinzen im Feld-an, und übergabe ihme den Brief persöhnlich, wo Er zugleich imstand ware, eine accurate auskunfft abzustatten wie es mit der Schlacht am fluß Bruth zugegangen ist; durch welchen passum und überschreitung seiner ordres Er dann auch tentirte, sein gluck zumachen, Er gelunge ihme auch; indeme der Prinz ihne auf sein bitten zum Feld-Kriegs Secretarium ernennete, und sodann wiederum nacher Constple zum Tallmann zuruckschickte; als anno 1712 Tallmann internuntius wurde, hat man den Fleischmann als legations*

In January 1713, after the Imperial Resident Michael von Talman departed from Istanbul for Vienna on 9 January, Fleischmann remained as secretary in charge of war and diplomatic affairs by order of the Empire.<sup>15</sup> A copy of the imperial letter appointing Fleischmann to Istanbul is preserved in the Ottoman Archives. This letter<sup>16</sup>, sent by Emperor Charles VI to Sultan Ahmed III, opens with a formal affirmation of friendship between the two monarchs and announces the appointment of Franz Fleischmann—referred to in the document as *Françesko Felişman*—as *Kapı Kethüdası* (Internuntius or Minister Plenipotentiary), to assume the responsibilities of the Habsburg embassy in place of Michael Talman. The letter concludes with a diplomatic expression of hope for the continued amicable development of Ottoman-Habsburg relations.

On August 14, 1714, Fleischmann was officially received at the Ottoman Palace with a retinue of seventy attendants. Before sunrise, the Habsburg diplomat Fleischmann and his entourage of 70 people prepared for the ceremony. He boarded a ship decorated with red velvet and gold embroidery and equipped with 14 oarsmen. The others in the convoy boarded specially prepared vehicles to travel from Galata to the Ottoman Palace.<sup>17</sup> Fleischmann and his entourage were officially welcomed by the Ottoman Palace. He was greeted by high-ranking Ottoman officials in ceremonial dress, who were also the protocol officials of the Ottoman Palace. In addition, 24 sergeants and more than 100 janissaries were present at the ceremony. More than 30 horses brought from the Ottoman Palace, completely covered in silver embroidery and precious fabrics, were prepared for the passage of the convoy.<sup>18</sup>

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*Secretarium beÿ ihme ernennet.*”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 97v-98r.

<sup>15</sup> “*Nachdeme nun auch Er der Kayl:e Internuntius Michael v. Tallmann der 9. Januarÿ dieses Jahrs von Constple nacher Wienn aufgebrochen ist so bliebe Er Fleischmann als Kayl:e feld Kriegs-und legations Secretarius auf Kayl:e befehl beÿ der Pforten zuruck, um die Kayl:e geschäften zuschlichten.*”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 98r-98v.

<sup>16</sup> BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri); Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivleri, Document Code: TS.MA.e / 420 - 43 -, “... bu iki evvel-ü devlet bendinde Karloviçe nam mahalde münakad olan sulh-u selahi sadık ve ihlas ile mer’l ve muhkem tutmak iktiza-ı muradımız olduğun cenab-ı şehryarilerine ifade ve ilam etmek için bundan akdem asitane-i saadetinizde elçilik hıdmetde bittamam aday-ı merasim risalet idüp tarafımıza avdet iden hala bilfiil sefer divanımızda düstur ve meşirimiz müveddetlü mu’temed-i aleyh-i aliye Mihayil Talman’in yerine asitane-i saadetlerinde mukim olmağçün birgayri mahrem-i esrar Kapu Kethüda nasib-üttayin olunmak elzem olmağın haliya ol canibde olub el’an aday-ı hıdmet-i maslahata sa’y-u istikameti ve adab-u erkânı malumumuz olub sefir-ü risalet katibimiz olan müddetlü Françesko Felişman’ı asitane-i saadette kethüdalığımız rütbesiyle müşerref ve kamyab eylemişizdir. ...”. See Appendix 1.

<sup>17</sup> “*An gemeltem Tag vor Aufgang der Sonne begabe sich der Herr Resident mit seiner in etlich und Siebenzig Personen bestehender Hof-Staat Er selbst auf einen mit Kostbahnen von sammet und gold gewürckten Kussen belegten, und mit 14 Ruder Versehenen Schiff, sein Gefolg aber auf anderen hierzu herbeÿgebrachten fahrzeügen von Galata aus jenseits des Canals ...*”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 116r.

<sup>18</sup> “... allwo ihn die Türckische Commissarÿ der Ciauschlar Emini, Ciauschlar Kiatibi, Asas Baschi, Salahor Aga und Verschiedene andere alle mit ihren Ceremonial Kleÿdern angethanen Türkischen Officiers nebst 24 Ciauschen, und einer

The procession proceeded in the following order<sup>19</sup>:

1. Leading Officers: 24 sergeants, in their official ceremonial uniforms, stood in the front row.
2. Household Administration: Fleischmann's private estate manager, dressed in gold-embroidered German clothing, rode a horse.
3. Horses: 5 hand horses, carried by grooms dressed in Ottoman style, carried saddles and blankets decorated with precious stones and gold embroidery.
4. Servants: Fleischmann's cook, butler, surgeon and doctor; dressed in both Ottoman and German clothing.
5. Interpreters: 9 Roman Imperial trainee-interpreters, dressed in Ottoman clothing, rode on horseback.

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*über 100 Mann Starcken Janitscharen Compagnie mit denen aus des Sultans Stall dahin gebrachten all mit Silbernen Zeüg und Kostbahren Schabracken ausstaffirten etlich und 30 Pferden erwartet von dar wurde durch das Stadt-Thor Baghcia Capusi genannt folgende Ordnung gehalten ...", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 116r.*

<sup>19</sup> "Erstlich ritten voraus 24 Ciauschen mit ihren Staats-bundten, und Kleÿdern; als dann kame, andertens des hl:e Residentens Hauß-Hofmeister in seiner Teütscher mit Gold verbramter Kleÿdung zu Pferd, ihme wurden drittens von denen in Carmesin rothen Tuch rothen mit schwarzen Madern Spann breit aus geschlagenen hauben, und gelben bünden auf Türkis: wohl gekleÿdeten Stall-bedienten zu fueß nachgeführt, 5 Hand-Pferd, worvon daß erstere mit einer rothen bis auf die Er den hangenden durch und durch mit Massio Gold und Silber gestickten Schabracken, viertens ritten Cammer-Diener, Koch, Tafel-Decker, Chirurgus, Medicus, Theils in Teütsch, Theils in Türkis:er Kleÿdung. Fünfftens kamen 9 Röml. Kayl:e Sprach Knaben, in feiner Türkis:le Kleÿdung mit Leuth und Peruquen zu Pferd; diesen folgten, sechstens der Hof-Capellan in Geistlichen Habita, und die von dem hl: Residenten proteqirte Missionarÿ Apostolici. Siebentens ritte der hl:r Jost Pfilipp von Fleischmann bruder des hl:n Residentens und auf dessen Seiten hl:r Baron von Hochepped, und Monsieur de Loqe, alle dreÿ in reich verbranter Teütschen Kleÿdung. Achtens der Subaschi mit seinen bedienten. Neuntens der Salahor Aga oder Oberbereitter des Sultans. Zehentens der Asas Baschi oder Obrist über die Janitscharen Leib-Wacht des Groß-Vezirs mit seiner mehr als 100 Mann ausmachenden Oda oder Janitscharen Compagnie, alle mit ihren parade hauben zu fueß. Eilfters der Ciauschlar Emini, und Ciauschlar Kiatibi, als von der Pforten hierzu deputirte Ceremoniarÿ. Zwölffters die von dem hl: Residenten zu seiner Leib-Wacht besoldt und gekleÿdte Janitscharen. Dreÿzehentens zweÿ Röml: Kayl:e Dollmetschen in seiner Türkischen Kleÿdung. Vierzehentens der Secretarius in verbrännter Teütschen Kleÿdung das Röml: Kayl: an den Türcki:en Kayser gestellte Creditiv Schreiben in einem lang abhangenden Silber-Stückh öffentlich auf einem von zweÿ weiß gekleÿdeten Stall-bedienten geführten wohlgezierten Pferd haltend. Fünfzehentens giengen 12 in Türkischen von feinem hell-rothen Tuch mit gelb-seidenen Schnur und Knöpfen besetzten langen Röcken, in gelb mit Chwarzen Mader Spann breit gebrännten Hauben und gelb-seidenen mit Silber gewürckten bünden auf Türkisch wohl gekleÿdete Ciohadarn und Leib-Laquryen. Sechzehentens ritte endlich der Röml: Kayl: Resident hl:r Anselmus Franz v. Fleischmann in einem prächtigen von silber Stuck durch und durch mit Kostbahren Zobel gefütternten Kapanicia oder langen Türkis:le Staats Tallar, worinnen die Groß-Veziers und andere vornehme Paschen in Divan zuerscheinen pflegen, mit hundert und Peruquen auf einem ihme bis an die Anfahrt des Canals aus dem Stall des Sultans entgegengeschickten sehr pretiosen mit einer mit Gold und Perl'n reich gestickten Schabracken und einem mit vielen Smaragd und Rubinen versezten zaum und vorder Zeug, auch mit massiv Silbernen vergoldten-gleichfalls mit rothen Rubinen versezten Steigbügeln aus staffirten Pferd, neben Ihme giengen zweÿ Heÿducken in sein-von gelbem Tuch mit Gold und rother Seiden gewürckten Spangen, Knöpfen und börten, besetzten Kleÿdern ebenfalls mit Gold und rother Seiden gewürckter bünden in ihren mit langen federn besteckten Heÿducken Hauben; Nach diesen giengen 6 Sultanische Stall-bedienten in ihren Parade Kleÿdern.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 116v-117r.



6. Religious Officials: Priests and missionaries working in the ambassador's palace also attended the ceremony.

7. the highly esteemed Jost Philipp von Fleischmann, brother of the resident, and on his side the highly esteemed Baron von Hochepped, and Monsieur de Loge, all three in rich German clothing.

8. the Subaşı<sup>20</sup> (soubashi) with his servants.

9. the Silahdar Agha or chief of the Sultan's arms-bearers.

10. the Janissary bodyguard of the Grand Vizier with his Oda or Janissary company of more than 100 men, all on foot with their parade caps.

11. the Çavuşlar Emini, and Çavuşlar Katibi, as ceremonial deputies from the Porte.

12. the Janissaries, paid and dressed by the honorable resident as his bodyguard.

13. two Roman Imperial interpreters in their Ottoman clothing.

14. the Secretary in German clothing, publicly holding the Roman Imperial letter of credit addressed to the Ottoman Treasurer in a long hanging silver piece on a well-decorated horse led by two stable servants dressed in white.

15. the Çuhadars in Ottoman long coats made of fine light red cloth with yellow silk cord and buttons, in yellow caps with a wide tanned span and black martens and yellow silk bands with silver trim, well-dressed in Turkish style.

16. Finally, the Holy Roman Imperial envoy Anselm Franz von Fleischmann joined the procession, dressed in a large ceremonial caftan to appear before the Ottoman Sultan. This garment was covered with silver embroidery and valuable sable fur. The envoy, wearing a wig, rode on a very valuable horse, specially provided by the Ottoman Sultan's palace, covered with gold and pearls. The stirrups and reins of his horse were completely covered in silver and were decorated with rubies and emeralds.

17. When the procession finally reached the Ottoman Palace, the envoy's entourage stood behind him. There, the protocol for Fleischmann's official reception was completed.<sup>21</sup>

The meticulous protocol applied during the reception of Fleischmann by the Ottoman Sultan is described in great detail. The grandeur of this reception reflected the Sublime Porte's recognition of the strategic importance of maintaining robust relations with the Habsburg Monarchy, particularly during the ongoing conflict with the Republic of Venice. At the same time, it was crucial in that it

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<sup>20</sup> An officer responsible for the security of cities in the Ottoman Empire. For more information about Subaşı (soubashi), MÜCTEBA İLGÜREL, "SUBAŞI", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/subasi>", Accessed on 10.02.2025.

<sup>21</sup> "Siebenzehntens machten den Schluß die unter des hl:n Residentens Schuz Stehende Personen.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 118r.



aimed to show Fleischmann the power and wealth of the Ottoman Empire. This reception of Fleischmann marked a significant turning point in Ottoman-Habsburg relations.<sup>22</sup>

On July 4, 1716, two years after his official reception at the Ottoman court, Anselm Franz von Fleischmann was detained by Ottoman forces in Stari Salankamen<sup>23</sup> while observing Ottoman military preparations. He was subsequently imprisoned, along with his attendants, in Smederevo—first held in a fortress and later placed under house arrest. Fleischmann remained in custody until mid-December 1716, when he was released and permitted to return to Vienna.<sup>24</sup>

This dissertation examines the transcription and interpretation of fifty-two documents authored by Fleischmann, preserved in the Austrian State Archives (Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv – ÖStA), which provide critical insights into Ottoman political and military affairs from 1711 to 1716. Predominantly, these documents consist of detailed reports submitted to the Aulic War Council (Hofkriegsrat). Complementing Fleischmann's records, this study incorporates twenty-four additional documents as supplementary sources, selected for their substantive relevance. These include correspondence from Habsburg frontier commanders, interpreter notes, letters from other statesmen, intelligence reports and writings pertaining to the Ottoman military. The majority of these documents originate from 1716, coinciding with the renewal of the Ottoman-Habsburg conflict and Fleischmann's detention by Ottoman authorities. The *Österreichisches Kriegsarchiv* also contains materials relevant to the thesis's topic. While this study draws indirectly from these documents through secondary sources, a richer study could be achieved by utilizing the aforementioned materials in future studies.

Chapter 2 of this thesis examines Fleischmann's reports from Isaccea<sup>25</sup> (Isakça) dated 1711, during the Ottoman-Russian War. These reports are based on intelligence obtained from local informants and offer critical information on the troop strength of both Ottoman and Russian forces, casualty figures, the terms of the armistice, and the articles of the subsequent peace treaty. Some

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<sup>22</sup> "An gemeltem Tag vor Aufgang der Sonne begabe sich der Herr Resident mit seiner in etlich und Siebenzig Personen bestehender Hof-Staat Er selbst auf einen mit Kostbahnen von sammet und gold gewürckten Kussen belegten, und mit 14 Ruder Versehenen Schiff, sein Gefolg aber auf anderen hierzu herbeÿgebrachten fahrzeügen von Galata aus jenseits des Canals ...", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv. 1, fol. 116r.

<sup>23</sup> For more information about Salankamen (Stari Slankamen), "[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stari\\_Slankamen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stari_Slankamen)". Accessed on 30.12.2023.

<sup>24</sup> "Es dienet zur nachricht, daß der herr von Fleischmann nur noch eine Tag reÿß vom Belgrad gewesen, alß 50 Spahi ihn verarrestiret, vnd zuruckh nach Semendria in einen Thurn geführet, seine Leüthe aber seÿen alle freÿ, vnd wendeten die Türckhen vor, daß wo man ihnen ihren schaden an der Sau bezahlen wurde, solte selber vngehendert seine reyse prosequiren können.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv. 3, fol. 131v.

<sup>25</sup> For more information about Isaccea (Isakça), BOGDAN MURGESCU, "İSAKÇA", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/isakca>", (22.02.2025).

of these documents contain encrypted passages, underscoring the sensitivity of the intelligence. While fewer in number than the other document groups, these sources provide valuable insights into wartime diplomacy and intelligence gathering.

Chapter 3, which constitutes the largest section of the thesis, focuses on documents between 1714 and 1715. This period yielded the highest volume of correspondence and is crucial for understanding the political and military developments leading up to the Ottoman-Venetian conflict. The documents detail the dispatch of Ottoman envoy to Vienna, the Montenegrin Uprising, military preparations on both sides, and territorial gains and losses during the conflict. Particular attention is given to the Habsburg efforts to deter Ottoman advances, undertaken in coordination with their Venetian allies, as evidenced by extensive diplomatic correspondence.

Chapter 4 addresses the events that precipitated the Ottoman-Habsburg War, analyzing the failure of diplomatic overtures and the gradual deterioration of peace. Recognizing Ottoman ambitions to reclaim territories lost under the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Habsburgs repeatedly proposed mediation in the Ottoman-Venetian conflict. When these efforts proved unsuccessful, they concluded that the Habsburg monarchy itself was the next likely target and began mobilizing for war. This chapter critically assesses Fleischmann's warnings to Vienna, his recommendations for preemptive military action, and his observations on the shortcomings within the Ottoman administration and the ineffectiveness of its military apparatus.

Chapter 5 offers the conclusion of the study.

In undertaking a scholarly investigation, it is essential to address the foundational questions of *what* and *why*. This study aims not only to present the content of the selected documents but also to evaluate their historical significance. Specifically, it asks: What new insights do Fleischmann's reports provide? Why are his correspondence important for the historiography of Ottoman-Habsburg relations? These are the central questions this study seeks to explore.

According to Fleischmann's correspondence, three major events dominate the thematic scope of his reports submitted to Vienna during his tenure: the Ottoman-Russian War, the Ottoman-Venetian War, and the events that ultimately led to the outbreak of conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy.

The section on the Ottoman-Russian War draws upon five key documents dated 1711, some of which contain encrypted passages, later deciphered or clarified in editorial brackets. These documents form the foundation of Chapter 2 and provide valuable intelligence on the composition and size of the Ottoman and Russian armies, casualty estimates, the terms of the armistice, and the articles of the resulting peace treaty. In addition to these primary sources, the study also engages

with secondary materials such as the memoirs of Stanisław Poniatowski, Polish commander and diplomat in the service of Charles XII of Sweden. Compiled by Voltaire in 1741 under the title *“Remarques de M. le Comte Poniatowski, Seigneur Polonois, Lieutenant-Général Ci-devant au Service de Suède”*, these memoirs provide detailed observations on King Charles XII’s refuge in the Ottoman Empire, the policies of the Sublime Porte, and the military presence along the Prut River, including interactions involving the Tatar Khanate, the Russian forces, and the Ottomans.

Complementary narratives are found in Voltaire’s *“Histoire de l’Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand”* and *“Histoire de Charles XII”*, both of which are cited and critically examined by Akdes Nimet Kurat in the introduction to his seminal work *“Prut Savaşı ve Barışı”*. While Kurat critiques the limitations of Voltaire’s sources, he affirms the general accuracy of many of his interpretations. Notably, Kurat highlights the significant—though often overlooked—role of Osman Kahya in the peace negotiations, suggesting he wielded greater influence than Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha<sup>26</sup>, a conclusion also supported by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall<sup>27</sup>. Likewise, Hans Uebersberger underscores the Ottoman military victory over Russia, yet emphasizes the missed strategic opportunity due to widespread bureaucratic corruption and the prevalence of bribery.<sup>28</sup>

In addition, I should mention the *“Anecdotes du Séjour du Roi de Suède à Bender”* by Friedrich Ernst von Fabrice, a German diplomat in the Swedish King’s entourage, and the *“Memoires Pour Servir A L’Histoire de Charles XII”* by Willem Theyls, secretary to the Dutch ambassador Jacob Colyer. The first of these is a collection of letters sent by Fabrice during King Charles’s stay in Bender between 1710 and 1714 concerning the relations between the King and the Sublime Porte, as well as matters concerning the Tatars and Russians. Theyls’s work also provides detailed information on the events during King Charles’s stay.

In analyzing the political context that precipitated the Ottoman-Russian War, the defection of the Moldavian voivode Dimitrie Cantemir, who allied himself with Czar Peter-I, emerges as a key factor influencing Ottoman policy. Among the most important sources on this topic are Mihail Kogălniceanu’s *“Fragments tirés des Chroniques Moldaves et Valaques”* and Nicolae Iorga’s *“History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1912”*, both of which offer rich detail and have been utilized extensively in this thesis.

The most extensive portion of Fleischmann’s archival records from the period 1714–1716 pertains to the Ottoman-Venetian War, comprising forty-six individual report and notes. While

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<sup>26</sup> Kurat 1951; 1-2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid; 2.

<sup>28</sup> Ueberberger 1913; 109-110.

these documents address a range of diplomatic and political developments, the war emerges as the most comprehensively documented event within the collection. In addition to Fleischmann's correspondence, numerous other contemporary and near-contemporary sources offer detailed accounts of the events leading up to the conflict and its aftermath. Among these, Volume V of Éléazar de Mauvillon's *"Histoire du prince François Eugène de Savoie (1750)"* is particularly significant. Mauvillon, a French historian, provides critical insights into the motives behind the Sublime Porte's declaration of war on Venice, the diplomatic mission of Ibrahim Agha to Vienna, and the Habsburg interpretation of Ottoman foreign policy.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, the works of Zinkeisen, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı offer extensive analyses of the Ottoman-Venetian War and the events leading to the subsequent conflict with the Habsburg Monarchy. These narratives contribute significantly to the historiography of early 18th-century Ottoman-European relations. Moreover, the second volume of Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha's chronicle, *"Nusretname"* (covering the years 1704–1721), provides valuable information pertaining to this period. However, it is important to approach this source with a degree of caution. Unlike the first volume, which is largely based on firsthand accounts, the second volume reflects secondhand information, as Mehmed Agha was no longer serving in the palace after 1703. Consequently, his accounts of post-1703 events are primarily based on oral reports and hearsay, a factor that has drawn critical attention in modern scholarship.<sup>30</sup> It is also necessary to mention *"Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli"*, prepared by Râşid Mehmed Efendi and Çelebizâde İsmâîl Âsım Efendi. A three-volume transcription of this work, which provides detailed information from the Sublime Porte between 1660 and 1722, has been made by Abdülkadir Özcan and his colleagues.

Hurmuzaki's compilation is among the primary sources consulted in this study. His work is particularly valuable for providing access to archival copies of correspondence exchanged between Ottoman statesmen, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Swedish crown during the period 1700–1750, offering crucial insights into the diplomatic landscape of early 18th-century Europe.

The fourth chapter, which constitutes the final analytical section of the thesis, focuses on the political incidents preceding the outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. This conflict followed the Ottoman victory over Venice and the subsequent reconquest of the Morea, which had previously been lost. The chapter explores the broader geopolitical

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<sup>29</sup> Mauvillon 1750; 1-46.

<sup>30</sup> Kurat 1951; 19.

dynamics involving the Habsburgs, who, as defenders of the Holy League—an alliance formed with Poland and Venice—opposed Ottoman expansion.

Key events examined in this chapter include the Ottoman defeat at the hands of the Kotorian rebels, the dismissal and execution of Stepanus Cantecuzenus from the Voivodeship, Fleischmann's final audience with the Grand Vizier, and his arrest and subsequent imprisonment alongside his entourage. Additionally, this section consists of the intelligence gathered from merchants and the reports submitted to Vienna by Habsburg frontier commanders, which detail military mobilization and strategic preparations in the lead-up to the conflict.

The sources from which we can obtain detailed information about the Sublime Porte's ambitions regarding Venice are Giacomo Diedo's *"Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua Fondazione sino l'Anno MDCCXLVII"*, especially the first chapter<sup>31</sup> of which mentions this subject; Willem Theyls's *"Memoires Pour Servir A L'Histoire de Charles XII - Roi de Suede etc."*<sup>32</sup>, Giralomo Ferrari's *"Della Notizie Storiche della legatratra L'Imperatore Carlo VI e La Repubblica di Venezia contra il Gran Sultano Acmet III"* which is quite detailed about the progress of the Ottoman forces in the Morea and their military activities<sup>33</sup>, In addition, it is necessary to mention George Finlay's *"The History of Greece under Ottoman and Venetian Domination"* published in 1856 about the Venetian domination in the Morea between 1684 and 1718. Especially the 4th chapter of this work is quite explanatory about the Venetian authority in the Morea.<sup>34</sup>

The temporal scope of this study spans the period from July 1711, marked by Fleischmann's first letter from Istanbul to the Vienna War Council, to December 1716. The primary sources underpinning this research are drawn from the Austrian State Archives (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv – OeStA), specifically the Türkei I collection, within folders 179, 180, and 181, catalogued under the title *Turcica*.

The thematic focus of the study is defined by the major events covered in these archival documents: the Ottoman Prut Campaign (1711), the Ottoman-Venetian War beginning in 1714, and the events that culminated in the Austro-Ottoman War, which formally concluded with the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. Political events within the Sublime Porte during this period are also examined, insofar as they are referenced in Fleischmann's reports and, where necessary, supplemented with contextual insights drawn from other contemporary or modern sources.

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<sup>31</sup> Diedo 1794; 1-10.

<sup>32</sup> Theyls 1722; 171-387.

<sup>33</sup> Ferrari 1723; 1-80.

<sup>34</sup> Finlay 1856; 197-277.

By adopting a diplomatic historical approach, this study situates Ottoman-Russian, Ottoman-Venetian, and Ottoman-Habsburg relations within the broader transitional phase between the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) and the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718). The selected documents are interpreted through the lens of diplomatic negotiations, interstate tensions, and the evolving network of alliances that characterized early 18th-century international politics.

Two foundational works have informed the analytical framework of this study: Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj's *"Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (2005)"* and Suraiya Faroqhi's *"The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (2004)"*. Abou-El-Haj's work is instrumental in understanding the structural transformation of Ottoman diplomacy, while Faroqhi's study provides a broader contextualization of Ottoman-European relations, thereby enriching the interpretive lens applied to the archival material.

When analyzing archival documents, it is essential to recognize that the narrative language employed can offer insights not only into the historical context but also into the perspective and disposition of the author. In some instances, rather than relying solely on literal translation, the implicit nuances and rhetorical choices within the text may reveal otherwise overlooked dimensions of meaning. Indeed, Fleischmann's reports do more than recount diplomatic affairs; they also illuminate, with considerable detail, the internal conditions of the Ottoman Empire in the early 18th century—particularly how ongoing political events influenced the state's economic structure, administrative functioning, and social dynamics.

This thesis adopts a social history approach to engage with the finer details embedded in the archival material. Where possible, efforts have been made to gather contextual information about the individuals referenced in the documents—including their roles, character traits, and the regions or cities associated with the events described. Through this method, the study seeks to reconstruct aspects of the social fabric of Ottoman society, offering the reader a more nuanced understanding of the era's lived experiences.

This approach aligns with the historiographical perspective of Fernand Braudel, who in his seminal work *"La Méditerranée, l'Espace et l'Histoire (1977) [Akdeniz: Mekân ve Tarih (1990)]"*, emphasized the importance of integrating spatial and social dynamics into historical analysis. Braudel highlights how, in the context of the 18th-century shift in the European balance of power, the Ottoman Empire, situated along the strategic corridor stretching from the Balkans to Anatolia and from Egypt to Morocco, increasingly came to be perceived as an obstacle—both in the

Mediterranean and in broader European geopolitics—thus contributing to the formulation of what would later be termed *the Eastern Question*.<sup>35</sup>

How a historical document should be interpreted or how a past event should be narrated is very important for a historian. In fact, discussions such as "objectivity", "the role of the researcher" or "the appropriateness of the methodology" have been ongoing for years. From the claim that a historian should narrate what the document says, which was emphasized by Leopold von Ranke, one of the important historians of the 19th century, in the first part of his work "*Ueber die Verschwörung gegen Venedig, in Jahre 1618*"<sup>36</sup>, to the claim that historiography must be influenced by literary narration and the contribution of the author<sup>37</sup>, defended by Hayden White, one of the Postmodernist historians of the 20th century, on the first page of his work "*Interpretation in History*", different discussions on historiography have evolved over the years and reached the present day. In contemporary historiography, we come across the view that "*The historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless.*" This view argues that there is a continuous and endless interaction between the historian and his facts.<sup>38</sup> In addition, it is known that there are approaches that suggest that history should focus on ruptures instead of long periods, on power and practice instead of ideologies<sup>39</sup>, or that civilizations tried to shape each other through historiography.<sup>40</sup> Today's historiography requires all these approaches to be filtered and presented with a refined reality and narrative.

From the perspective of Ottoman historiography, there is not much difference between general historiography and the approaches discussed. According to Ortaylı, although there is a close relationship between History and Sociology, the laws of Sociology cannot be applied to History, if they are applied, History would no longer be History.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, Ortaylı mentions that History is intertwined with language and philology.<sup>42</sup> Ottoman Historiography, on the other hand, cannot be examined by ignoring the lifestyles and changes of both the Ottoman society and other societies around it. When examining the work of a history writer from the Ottoman period, it should not be forgotten that even if he did not see himself as a state official or in a state responsibility, he was a loyal servant of his state.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Braudel 1990; 78-79.

<sup>36</sup> Ranke 1831; 1-2.

<sup>37</sup> White 1973; 281-282.

<sup>38</sup> Carr 1990; 29-130.

<sup>39</sup> Foucault 2002; 6-7.

<sup>40</sup> Said 2003; 201-203.

<sup>41</sup> Ortaylı 2011; 53-54.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid; 153.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid; 84-85.

Another Turkish historian, Zafer Toprak, emphasizes the dynamic nature of historical interpretation, arguing that all aspects of human experience—including cities, societies, cultures, and individuals—are subject to continuous transformation. As individuals evolve alongside shifts in values, identities, and notions of belonging, so too does their understanding of the past. Consequently, it is neither possible nor desirable to maintain a static interpretation of history. Rather, historical perspectives are inherently fluid, shaped by the changing frameworks through which societies view and make sense of earlier events.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the task of the historian is not to impose predetermined conclusions upon the past, but rather to interpret historical phenomena through a critical and reflective lens, while remaining faithful to the content and historical reality of the sources. This study adopts such a methodological approach, prioritizing evidence-based analysis and allowing the documents to guide the interpretation, rather than shaping them to fit a specific narrative.

Cemal Kafadar, a prominent figure in contemporary Ottoman historiography, underscores the critical role of language in historical inquiry. He contends that the interpretation of historical events is inevitably shaped by the narrator's perspective, which is itself informed by their cultural background, lived experiences, and the influences of everyday life. In this regard, Suraiya Faruqi shares a similar viewpoint, emphasizing that historical narratives are not produced in a vacuum, but are deeply embedded within the subjectivities and contexts of those who construct them.<sup>45</sup> Method, Paradigm and Philosophy are the glasses that History uses to see the distant. If a historian wants to be successful in his field, he must take his awareness, experience and outlook on life as his guide rather than documents and methods.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, when viewed from this perspective, it is seen that the language Fleischmann used in his reports sometimes complained about a society he felt alienated from, and about corrupt politicians who seemed inadequate or mediocre to him. However, he did not refrain from praising statesmen with whom he was friendly or who helped him.

This thesis was developed through the application of an integrated methodological approach. In analyzing the information conveyed in Fleischmann's reports, particular attention was paid to his narrative style, lexical choices, and the political context in which he was writing. Within this framework, the Discourse Analysis approach was deemed most appropriate, as it allows for an exploration of how language reflects and shapes the author's perspective. As scholars such as Zafer Toprak, Cemal Kafadar, and Suraiya Faruqi have noted, historical narratives cannot be detached

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<sup>44</sup> Toprak 2007; 1-3.

<sup>45</sup> Kafadar 2010; 406-410. Faruqi 1999; 274-275

<sup>46</sup> Kafadar 2009; 13-15.



from the individual and the environment that produced them. Therefore, at the end of this study, in the conclusion chapter, interpretive reflections are provided on the discursive features of the language used in Fleischmann's documents.

Nonetheless, given that this is a historical study, it was also necessary to examine how the events described in Fleischmann's correspondence were treated in other contemporary sources. Consequently, a Comparative History approach was also employed to contextualize and corroborate the findings.

To ensure transparency and minimize the risk of misinterpretation or bias, full transcriptions of all archival documents analyzed are provided in footnotes. Wherever possible, these texts have been presented in their original form, preserving the author's own language and stylistic preferences. The purpose of this decision is to convey Fleischmann's mindset and attitude toward unfolding events, rather than to impose a purely objectivist or detached interpretation.

Accordingly, Discourse Analysis has been applied through close attention to the language, stylistic conventions, correspondence structure, and formal features of the archival texts. The phrasing in Fleischmann's letters offers valuable insight into the power dynamics between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire in the post-Karlowitz period, as well as the manner in which the Vienna War Council interpreted the intelligence relayed by its diplomatic agents. The primary aim of this study is to contribute to the existing body of scholarship on Ottoman-Habsburg relations through a critical interpretation of these letters and reports.

To avoid repetitive phrasing, abbreviations and alternative titles have been employed throughout the study. For instance, Sultan Ahmed III is often referred to simply as "the Sultan"; Charles XII of Sweden as "the King"; Peter I of Russia as "the Czar" or "the Russian Czar"; and Emperor Charles VI is denoted as "the Emperor," with the Habsburg Monarchy referred to as "the Empire." Place names are used in their modern forms, with their older forms from the archives indicated in parentheses or footnotes (e.g., Edirne [Adrianople], Gdańsk [Danzig]), except for well-known cases such as Istanbul [Constantinople]).

As previously noted, Fleischmann arrived in the Ottoman capital during the early years of Sultan Ahmed III's reign—a period marked by efforts to suppress internal unrest following the Cebeci Rebellion and reinforce central authority within the Sublime Porte. In order to understand the diplomatic strategies of both the Ottoman state and its European counterparts during this critical juncture, a brief overview of the political landscape of early 18th-century Europe is warranted.

### **1.1. Historical & Political Background**

The first quarter of the 18th century was a period of significant socio-economic, political, and military transformation across Europe. These changes were not only pivotal in reshaping the continental balance of power but also generated a series of interconnected developments that reverberated across states. A notable example is the Swedish King Charles XII, who, following a decisive defeat against Russia in the Great Northern War, sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. His presence and diplomatic maneuvers while in exile played a catalytic role in provoking renewed conflicts, particularly in encouraging the Ottomans to attempt the recovery of territories lost to Russia and Poland in the aftermath of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699).

The Ottoman Empire, first engaging in war with Russia and Poland, and later with Venice, initially pursued a strategy based on the assumption that the members of the Holy Alliance could be defeated individually. However, this approach ultimately proved unsuccessful, particularly due to the decisive intervention of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Habsburgs' actions laid the groundwork for the gradual Ottoman retreat from the Balkans, marking a turning point in the region's geopolitical trajectory.

Before delving into these pivotal events, it is important to first consider the broader political landscape of early 18th-century Europe, as such context is essential to understanding the motivations and consequences of the subsequent diplomatic and military developments.

#### **1.1.1. An Overview of Early 18th-Century Europe**

At the dawn of the 18th century, Louis XIV, the longest-reigning monarch in French history, remained on the throne, and Europe was engulfed in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). Louis XIV faced considerable challenges during this period. At one point, the Habsburg commander Prince Eugene of Savoy, one of the most formidable military strategists of the era, posed a direct threat to Paris. However, this danger was ultimately averted, in part due to the military successes of François de Neufville, Duke of Villeroy, a skilled French commander who twice repelled Prince Eugene's forces. The eventual Peace of Utrecht—a series of treaties signed between April 1713 and February 1715—brought an end to hostilities between France, Great Britain, and the Dutch Republic, both of which had aligned with the Habsburg Monarchy. These treaties marked a major turning point in European diplomacy and laid the groundwork for a new political order that would shape the remainder of the century.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 47, 235. Falkner 2022; 37-51.

By the time Louis XIV died in 1715, the financial situation had deteriorated dramatically due to thirty years of War. Louis XV ascended the throne after the King's death and was only five years old. Although Cardinal Fleury<sup>48</sup>, who ruled the country as regent, took care to keep the peace with the Habsburgs for the country's welfare, he could not prevent the Polish Succession War.<sup>49</sup>

During this period, Queen Anne, the final monarch of the Stuart dynasty, reigned over Great Britain from 1702 to 1714. Although she aspired to exercise direct authority, her reign was largely dominated by the influence of her ministers, due to both her limited political aptitude and declining health. The early 18th century in Britain was marked by considerable domestic political instability, with ongoing conflict between the two principal political factions: the Whigs and the Tories. These parties vied for influence over the monarchy, each seeking to assert greater control over the direction of state affairs. Under Queen Anne's rule, Britain adopted a decisively anti-French and anti-Spanish foreign policy, aligning with the Habsburgs and their allies during the War of the Spanish Succession. This stance was instrumental in shaping Britain's role as a rising power in European politics and reflected broader strategic aims to curtail Bourbon expansion on the continent.<sup>50</sup>

With the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Republic of Venice acquired some places on the Morea (or Peloponnese) and Dalmatian coasts. During this time, the Morea was governed by five separate provinces: Corfu<sup>51</sup>, Zakynthos<sup>52</sup>, Cephalonia<sup>53</sup>, Lefkada<sup>54</sup> (also known as Agia Mavra or St. Maura), and the coast of Lepanto<sup>55</sup>. The Morans were not content to be under Venetian rule. For this reason, there were often problems between the Venetian rulers and the local people. The Ottoman Empire cited these problems as one of the reasons for the Morea Expedition in 1715.<sup>56</sup>

### **1.1.2. Ottoman-Habsburg Relations at the Beginning of the 18th Century**

At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the Habsburg Emperor was Leopold I. In the broader European context, the question of Spanish succession had already begun

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<sup>48</sup> André Hercule de Fleury, "<https://en.chateauversailles.fr/discover/history/great-characters/cardinal-fleury>". Accessed on 23.01.2022.

<sup>49</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 235-236.

<sup>50</sup> For more information on Queen Anne and her reign, "<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anne-queen-of-Great-Britain-and-Ireland>". Accessed on 23.01.2022.

<sup>51</sup> For more information about Corfu, "Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2024, September 20). Corfu. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Corfu>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>52</sup> For more information about Zakynthos, "<https://www.greeka.com/ionian/zakynthos/history/>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>53</sup> For more information about Cephalonia (Cephallenia), "Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2024, August 2). Cephallenia. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cephallenia>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>54</sup> For more information about Lefkada (Agia Mavra or St. Maura), "<https://www.greeka.com/ionian/lefkada/history/>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>55</sup> For more information about Lepanto, "<https://romeartlover.it/Lepanto.html>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>56</sup> Uzunçarşılı; 245.

to reshape the political landscape. Charles II of Spain, who succeeded Philip IV—himself the father-in-law of Leopold I—had named Philip of Anjou, the grandson of King Louis XIV of France, as his heir. Consequently, Philip of Anjou ascended the Spanish throne as Philip V even before the death of Charles II, a development that significantly heightened tensions among the major European powers and contributed to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession.<sup>57</sup> The Habsburg Emperor, opposing the provisions of Charles II's will, formed an alliance with England and the Dutch Republic and declared war on France and Spain. The resulting conflict, known as the War of the Spanish Succession, extended through the reign of Emperor Joseph I, who succeeded Leopold I in 1705, and continued even after Joseph's death in 1711, persisting into the early years of Emperor Charles VI's reign. This prolonged conflict played a central role in reshaping the political balance of early 18th-century Europe.<sup>58</sup>

The Habsburg Empire formally entered the War of the Spanish Succession with its declaration of war against France in 1702. However, the same level of engagement is not evident in the context of the Great Northern War. While several northern imperial principalities—notably Saxony, Hanover, and the Duchy of Prussia-Brandenburg—were actively involved in the conflict, the Emperor himself adopted a more restrained, mediatory stance. This suggests a limited direct imperial involvement, with the Habsburgs focusing their military and diplomatic efforts elsewhere during this period.<sup>59</sup>

The active participation of the German principalities in the Great Northern War, in contrast to the non-interventionist stance of Leopold I, may also suggest a perceived limitation or fragmentation of imperial authority within the Holy Roman Empire. While the Habsburg Empire officially entered the War of the Spanish Succession with its declaration of war against France in 1702, no comparable engagement occurred in the Northern conflict. Instead, the Emperor assumed a more neutral or mediatory role, underscoring a divergence in foreign policy priorities between the imperial center and its constituent territories. This divergence reflects the decentralized nature of the Holy Roman Empire and highlights the complexities of imperial authority during the early 18th century.<sup>60</sup>

Throughout his forty-seven-year reign, Leopold I had successfully consolidated imperial authority and enhanced the prestige of the Habsburg monarchy through military resistance against both the Ottoman Empire and France. However, his successors—Joseph I and Charles VI—adopted

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<sup>57</sup> For more information about the War of Spanish Succession, "<https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-the-Spanish-Succession>". Accessed on 24.01.2022.

<sup>58</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 238.

<sup>59</sup> Frost 2000; 226-228.

<sup>60</sup> Ingraio 2000; 107-112.

a different conception of imperial rule, one that was not only reflected in their administrative and political practices but also in their use of imperial iconography and symbolism. Leopold I portrayed himself as a sacral ruler, mediating between earth and heaven, utilizing religious symbolism to reinforce his divinely sanctioned authority. By contrast, Joseph I embraced the imagery of the sun, drawing parallels with Louis XIV of France, thereby suggesting a more absolutist and secular representation of power. Meanwhile, Charles VI employed the Columns of Hercules, a symbol historically associated with Charles V, to project an image of dynastic continuity and imperial strength. While some historians have argued that, for Leopold's successors, the Austrian hereditary lands became increasingly central—possibly at the expense of broader imperial interests—there is no conclusive evidence to substantiate this claim. Notably, such assertions are more frequently associated with the post–War of the Spanish Succession era. What is evident, however, is that efforts by any emperor to reassert centralized authority within the Empire were often met with resistance from the constituent principalities, underscoring the fragmented and negotiated nature of imperial power in the early 18th century.<sup>61</sup>

At the turn of the 18th century, the Habsburg Monarchy found itself simultaneously engaged on multiple fronts: contesting the Spanish throne, managing threats from Northern Europe, and suppressing uprisings in Hungary, all while striving to maintain authority within the fragmented structure of the Holy Roman Empire. In contrast to this widespread instability across Europe following the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire entered a period that may be characterized as relatively calm—at least in comparison to earlier decades marked by frequent warfare. Although localized revolts persisted within Ottoman territories, the early 18th century witnessed a notable degree of tolerance and coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, especially when viewed against the backdrop of previous eras. According to Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, one of the foremost historians of the Ottoman Empire, this period of relative tolerance can be attributed, in part, to the Ottoman elite's increased exposure to and understanding of European political culture and intellectual currents beginning in the 18th century. While Ottoman sultans had long perceived themselves as the custodians of a superior civilization and the epicenter of global diplomacy, the aftermath of the Karlowitz Treaty marked a significant turning point. The treaty not only redrew the geopolitical map of Eastern Europe but also signaled a fundamental shift in the Ottoman Empire's perception of Europe. From this point onward, the balance of power and

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<sup>61</sup> Whaley 2012; 105-106.

the Ottoman political and social outlook toward Europe underwent a profound transformation, challenging longstanding assumptions about cultural and political supremacy.<sup>62</sup>

It would be accurate to assert that the architects of this intellectual and diplomatic transformation included several key figures within the Ottoman administrative elite. Among them was Nicholas Mavrocordatos, a philosopher and physician who served as dragoman of the Sublime Porte during the Karlowitz negotiations, and played a pivotal role in shaping the Ottoman Empire's evolving engagement with European political thought. Similarly, Râmi Mehmed Efendi, renowned for his literary talent and refined intellectual sensibilities, contributed to the emerging cultural openness of the period. Additionally, Köprülü Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha, a prominent statesman from the influential Köprülü family, is remembered for his generosity, open-mindedness, and administrative acumen. Collectively, these figures were instrumental in initiating the ideological and bureaucratic shifts that marked the Ottoman Empire's transition into the 18th century.<sup>63</sup>

In the aftermath of the Treaty of Karlowitz, both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire made discernible efforts to uphold the newly established peace. While the War of the Spanish Succession and the Hungarian revolt led by Francis II Rákóczi initially appeared to offer the Ottomans a potential opportunity to reclaim territories lost under the treaty, such ambitions were ultimately tempered by internal and external constraints. The volatile domestic political climate within the Ottoman Empire, coupled with the emergence of Russia as a growing strategic threat, curtailed any serious pursuit of military retaliation. As a result, the early 18th century was characterized more by diplomatic restraint than by expansionist endeavors, despite the presence of favorable external developments.

### **1.1.3. The Great Northern War & The Refugee King of Sweden**

The Great Northern War (1700–1721) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714)—in which the Habsburg Monarchy aligned with Britain against France—broke out in close succession, ushering in a period of significant transformation in the European balance of power. The Great Northern War was launched by a coalition consisting of Russia, Poland, and Denmark, whose objective was to dismantle Sweden's longstanding supremacy in Northern Europe. This prolonged conflict precipitated a series of territorial and geopolitical realignments across Northern, Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe. The most far-reaching consequence was the decline of Sweden as the dominant northern power—a status it had maintained since the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War—and the concurrent emergence of Russia as the new hegemonic force in the region. By the

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<sup>62</sup> Hammer-Purgstall 1840; 9.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid; 11-12.

early eighteenth century, Sweden's loss of great power status signaled a fundamental reconfiguration of the northern European order and firmly established Imperial Russia as a central actor in continental political affairs.<sup>64</sup> The emergence of Russia as a major European power in the early 18th century constituted a profound geopolitical shift, with far-reaching implications for Sweden, Eastern Europe, Central and Western Europe, and the Ottoman Empire. For Sweden, it marked a strategic and political decline, while for the rest of Europe—and particularly the Ottomans—it signaled the rise of a formidable new actor on the continental stage. From this period onward, the Russian Empire became an increasingly active and influential participant in European political affairs. Russia's growing assertiveness, coupled with its ability to forge alliances with other major European powers, significantly contributed to the gradual erosion of Ottoman influence, especially in Southeastern Europe. This evolving dynamic accelerated the long-term process of Ottoman territorial contraction, ultimately setting the stage for the dismantling of an empire that had governed vast regions across three continents for more than five centuries.<sup>65</sup>

At the onset of the Great Northern War, the coalition of Russia, Poland, and Denmark launched their first coordinated offensive against Sweden, which was then under the rule of Charles XII, a monarch who had ascended to the throne at the age of eighteen. The primary architect of the alliance, Peter the Great of Russia, sought to exploit the presumed inexperience and youth of the Swedish king in order to dismantle Sweden's territorial holdings and redistribute them among the allied powers. In 1700, Sweden was a formidable and affluent kingdom, boasting considerable military strength on both land and sea, and exerting significant control over Baltic trade routes. Its territorial possessions included the North German coastal regions of West Pomerania, Wismar, and Bremen; the Livonian provinces (present-day Estonia and Latvia); Finland; Karelia (on the Finnish-Russian border); and Ingria, encompassing the area that would later become St. Petersburg. Given the vastness and strategic importance of these territories, maintaining effective control over them posed considerable challenges. In this context, Russia's strategy—to draw the young Swedish monarch into a prolonged conflict—was a calculated effort to destabilize Sweden's dominance in the Baltic and to secure access to maritime trade routes, thereby enabling Russia's long-sought expansion westward.<sup>66</sup>

As a matter of fact, some strategic mistakes, the increase in the cost of protracted wars, the loss of talented soldiers and generals, the ignorance of the geography where the wars spread, and

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<sup>64</sup> Esposito 2019; 3.

<sup>65</sup> Kurat 2014; 275-282.

<sup>66</sup> Konstam 1994; 6.



the arrogance and ambition of this young king to win the Greater Swedish Kingdom had to face a terrible defeat.<sup>67</sup> When Charles XII returned to his own country, about five years after taking refuge in the Ottoman Empire<sup>68</sup>, there was a wreckage of his former great Kingdom. In a war with Denmark to reclaim the lost lands, King Charles died at 36 from a bullet hit in the head.<sup>69</sup> Although the Habsburgs were engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession at the time in question, they followed closely the Swedish King's every step. In particular, Fleischmann reported to Vienna in great detail the activities of the Swedish King during the time he spent in the Ottoman lands.

## 2. Fleischmann's First Year of Office in the Ottoman Empire

### 2.1. Prut River Campaign (1710-1711)

#### 2.1.1. Fleischmann's Arrival in Isaccea Military Camp

In a five-copy report dated 9 August 1711, dispatched from Isaccea, Fleischmann recounts that on the 5th of the same month, pursuant to an order issued by the Grand Vizier to a Tatar Agha, he was escorted to the Ottoman military encampment at Isaccea under the guard of sergeants and a cavalry escort.<sup>70</sup>

He mentioned that a tent was set up for him by order of the Porte and that all arrangements were made for his stay.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> The document showing that the Swedish envoy who came to ask for help were received by Yusuf Pasha, the governor of Özi (Ochakiv), and that their requests were accepted is included in the correspondence in the Name-i Hümayun book number 6. "... bundan akdem tarafınızdan ba's olunan nâme-resân ademiniz kıdvetü'l-ümerâ'il-milleti'l-mesîhiyye Martinoş Focbever hutimet avâkibehû bi'l-hayr gelüb asitâne-i sa'âdet-aşiyânemize vâsıl oldukda tellakî-i bi'l-kabûl olunub ve ... mâbeynde musammim olan vedâdın in'ikâdına lâzım olan şerâit ve vesâteti vüzerây-ı ızamımızdan düstûr-i ekrem müşîr-i efram nizâmü'l-âlem bi'l-fiil Özi vâlisi olub hâlâ Bender muhâfazasında olan Yusuf Paşa edâmallahû Te'âlâ iclâlehu ol cânibde tarafınız ile söyleşmek üzere me'mûr ve murahhas olmağla nâme-i hümayûn-ı mülâtafet-meşhûnumuz ısdâr ve irsâl olunmuşdır.", H.1121 / M.1710. BOA. A.DVNS.NMH.d, nr. 6, 191-192; Apil 2022; 57-59.

<sup>68</sup> In Nusretname, the Swedish King was mentioned as a "fiery-eyed, mad-natured, thirty-year-old young man". According to the records, he rebelled and first seized the Polish and Muscovite lands. Then, after conquering Istanbul (Constantinople) and Jerusalem, he dreamed of advancing on Western Europe, but he was defeated in battle by the Muscovite King, who had subjected the Potkal Cossacks to himself. Then he took refuge in the Ottoman lands with his remaining soldiers. Topal 2001; 718-720.

<sup>69</sup> Niskanen et al. 2022; 1-2.

<sup>70</sup> "Gnädigster auch gnädige und hoch gebithende herrn herrn zuffolge dessen waß wieder nach Constantinopl abgegangene Chihai des Groß Vezires zu Sakcia hinterbracht wurde ich den 5.tn hvivs außbefehl des Groß Vezires von einem Tartar Agha in begleithung zweger Tschaussen und convoye zu pferd in daß Türckhische laager abgehohlet allwo ich den 8.tn darauf vormittag anlangte...", aus dem Türkischen Feld laager (Sakcia), Anno 9 then August 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 144r.

<sup>71</sup> "Eine Stundt von dem laager khame mir auß Ordre der Porten ein vornehmer Vezier Agha entgegen welcher mich in die für mich auf geschlagne Zelten geführet und wurden mich auf das höflichste zu tractiren alle anstalten gemacht",



The first observation that drew Fleischmann's attention upon his arrival at the military camp was the evident war-weariness and longing for departure etched on the faces of the Ottoman soldiers—despite their unequivocal victory over the Russian Czar, whose forces had been encircled and left unable to meet even their most basic needs.<sup>72</sup>

### **2.1.2. Encrypted Correspondence**

Three of the five reports that Fleischmann submitted to Vienna in 1711 contained encrypted content. The meanings of the encrypted contents are stated in parentheses on these archive documents. It is understood that these ciphered sections pertain to the peace negotiations conducted with the Russian delegation at the Ottoman military encampment, the financial arrangements involving payments to Ottoman military officials, and the specific terms negotiated in the peace treaty concluded following the Ottoman-Russian War on the banks of the Prut River.

In the first of these documents, Fleischmann expressed the view that the anticipated peace settlement would prove detrimental to the Russian side. He reported that, according to the discussions between the Russian and Ottoman delegations, several fortresses—namely Azov (Assak), Doğan, Dayhan, and other smaller castles in the surrounding region—were to be ceded to the Ottomans. Additionally, the Fortress of Kamenny-Zaton was to be demolished and subsequently handed over to Ottoman control, while the Czar agreed to withdraw his forces from Polish territory. The document also noted that the tribute traditionally paid by the Czar to the Tatar Khan would be maintained, and that the Sultan was to receive a compensation of 1,000 pouches of gold—or 500,000 Thaler—for a period of three years, as restitution for the losses incurred in Moldavia. Furthermore, the status of the Swedish King, Charles XII, was addressed during the negotiations. It was agreed that the King would be free to return to his country by any route of his choosing. Until

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Türkischen Feld laager (Sakcia), 9 August 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 144r.

<sup>72</sup> *“Allhier nahm ich den augen schein der von denen Türcken wider die Moscoviter welcher fast nicht das geeinigste sich gewehert sondern gleich anfangs umb pardon und frieden gebetten erhaltene victorie und erfolgten frieden selbst ein von welchem ich von wegen der Kürtze der Zeit und abgehender gelegenheit vber die von mir in bāy ligende triplicat geforst beschriebenen schlacht für jetzo nur dieses nach unterthänigst melde daß der Czar in Moscau und seinen gantze durch die lange marches und abgang alle nothwendigkeiten sehr abgemattete arméé von denen Türck (?) der gestalten in die Enge getrieben worden, daß er zambt alle denen seinigen ohnfehlbahr denen Türcken zu theill worden wäre...”*, aus dem Türkischen Feld laager (Sakcia), 9 August 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 144r.

the full implementation of the treaty's provisions, the Russian Chancellor and the son of General Sheremetev were to remain in Ottoman custody as guarantees of compliance.<sup>73</sup>

The final topics addressed by Fleischmann in his initial report pertained to his interactions with several prominent Ottoman officials, including the Janissary Agha, the Defterdar (Minister of Finance), and the Kahya (steward or chief aide) of the Grand Vizier, with whom he had established amicable relations. A notable highlight of the report is Fleischmann's account of a dinner he attended with the Grand Vizier's Kahya in Isaccea. During this occasion, Fleischmann extended his congratulations on the Ottoman victory over the Russians. In response, the Kahya delivered an elaborate speech extolling the triumph and subsequently inquired whether the Emperor would receive the news with satisfaction. Fleischmann assured him that there was no reason for doubt, adding that he was confident the Sublime Porte was likewise pleased with the Emperor's own recent successes.<sup>74</sup>

### **2.1.3. Dimitrie Cantemir's Betrayal to the Ottomans**

In 1710, Dimitrie Cantemir ascended to the Moldavian throne as Voivode, succeeding his father, Constantin Cantemir. Upon assuming office, Cantemir held the belief that the Ottoman Empire had entered a period of irreversible decline and was on the verge of disintegration. As tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Russia escalated into open conflict, Czar Peter initiated a military campaign against the Ottomans and Tatars, departing ceremonially from Moscow on 9 March. In this context, Cantemir concluded a treaty with the Czar at Lutsik, formally aligning Moldavia with Russia in opposition to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> "... so fern nicht die Türcken auß barmhertzigkeit bewegt gegenwürtigen wie wohl für die Moscoviter sehr miserablen Frieden accordirt hätten Kraft dessen sie Muscovitro denen Turcken die Vestungen Assak, Dogan, Daihan und andere kleinere orthen im Standt wie sie sich bäfindten zu restituiren die Vestung Caminizaton aber zu rasiren und die artillerie und munitio den Türckhen zu überlieffern verbundten so solle auch der Czar seine Trouppen auß Pohlen ziehen und dem König in Schweden die freye passirung dardurch gestatten dem Tartar Chan aber hat er sich obliker den sonst gewöhnlichen Tribut zu geben und dem Sultan für den in der Moldau verübten shaden 3 jahr hindurch jährlich 1000 beithel geldt oder 500.000 Thaller zu zahlen biß zur exemption alleß dieses aber hat er der Porten seinen kantzler, und nuen Gnrl das schoester Kindt deß Gnrl Schremetvoski welcher alters halber in diesem vershonet worden nebst einigen andern officieren alß geissel der Pforten ein gehändiget." Aus dem Turkischen Feld laager (Sakcia), 9 August 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 145r.

<sup>74</sup> "Gleich bei meiner hiesigen ankunfft khame der zu Wienn gewesene Seifullah Agha selbst zu mir und bewillkhomete mich wie dan mich noch selbigen Tag derjetzige Chihaja des Groß Veziers ein Pferd geschenkhete und mich zu sich abhohlen lassen; ich gratulirte ihme vor allem wegen der erhaltenen victorie worüber er auch ein langes gesprech hielte fragend ob diese Zeitung auch dem Kaiserliche hoffwohl angenehmb sei? Ich anthworthete hierauff: das hieran gahr nicht zu zweiffeln in deme derselbe versichert sei, das auch die Porten die kaiserlich seiths über ihre Feindt erhaltene Sieg mit freudten vernehme." Aus dem Turkischen Feld laager (Sakcia), 9 August 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 145r.

<sup>75</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 73-74. Wiener Zeitung - Wienerisches Diarium, Januar - Juni 1711 / 1711-03-18.

According to Fleischmann's report to Vienna on 14 September 1711, Dimitrie Cantemir had decided to change sides and support the Czar in the War. Moreover, the Sultan, learning of this betrayal, demanded the head of the Voivode from his Grand Vizier. This report was sent in three copies and transmitted from Vienna to the Emperor in Spain.<sup>76</sup>

In Fleischmann's reports, Dimitrie Cantemir's defection from the Ottomans and his alignment with the Czar is only briefly referenced and lacks detailed commentary. As noted earlier, Fleischmann limited his mention of the matter to the Sultan's directive to the Grand Vizier ordering Cantemir's execution. The relative absence of further elaboration on this incident may be interpreted as a reflection of Vienna's expectations—suggesting that such a betrayal was neither surprising nor deemed significant within the broader geopolitical context.

On the contrary, Voltaire's "*Historie de L'Empire de Russie sous Pierre Le Grand*" mentioned this incident in detail. Voltaire mentions that Cantemir also tried to persuade the Hospodar (Voivode) of Wallachia, Brâncoveanu, to take the side of the Russians. Another exciting part of the work is that Cantemir believes it is time to eliminate Ottoman domination. Cantemir wanted independence, so he needed the help of the Russian Czar. The Czar did not see any harm in helping Cantemir, just as the Cossack Hatman Mazeppa, under his protection, supported the Swedish King Charles and the Ottomans.<sup>77</sup>

When General Sheremetev arrived near the Moldavian capital, Iasi, with his troops, Cantemir was greeted with the title *Prince* after his manifesto against the Turks.<sup>78</sup>

Brâncoveanu, on the other hand, refused to betray the Sultan, rejected the Czar's gifts, and chose the Ottoman side. This issue is also mentioned in Voltaire's writing, stating that the people of both Moldavia and Wallachia remained loyal to the Ottomans and provided supplies to the Ottoman army.<sup>79</sup>

Kogălniceanu mentions that when Baltacı Mehmed Pasha became the Grand Vizier, the Sublime Porte suddenly fell into the wind of war. Soldiers were gathering everywhere and great preparations were being made. According to Kogălniceanu, the Venetians thought that all these preparations were made against them, and they rained gold and all kinds of valuable gifts primarily

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<sup>76</sup> "Nachdem der Sultan die nachricht erhalten, daß der Moldauische Fürst Cantemir oglu zu denen Moscovitern übergangen, und der Czaar mit seiner Armee schon allbereiths in gedachtes fürstendhumb eingeruckhet seie, schickhte er dem Groß Vezier gemessene Ordre zue den feind bei verlurst seines Kopfs bald möglichst aufzusuechen und mit demselbenb zuschlagen... .", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 153v-167r.

<sup>77</sup> Voltaire 1780; 15.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid; 15-16.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid; 16.

on the Grand Mufti (or Shaykh al-Islam)<sup>80</sup> and high-ranking officers. The Russians, for their part, placed their confidence in the peace treaty previously concluded with the Ottoman Empire. According to Kogălniceanu, in 1710 Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha convened a council, attended by the Crimean Khan, during which it was resolved—pursuant to the Sultan’s directive—to initiate military action against Russia. In line with this decision, prompt measures were taken: the Czar’s ambassador was swiftly detained and imprisoned in the Yedikule Fortress.<sup>81</sup>

During this period, Constantin Brâncoveanu was accused by Hetman Ivan Mazepa of entering into a clandestine alliance with Czar Peter and making preparations to extricate himself from Ottoman suzerainty. These allegations were further reinforced by the testimony of several Ottoman pashas. In response, Sultan Ahmed III recognized the necessity of securing the integrity of imperial territories before formally declaring war. However, detaining a powerful and widely respected ruler such as Brâncoveanu posed a significant challenge. The Sultan entrusted the resolution of the matter to the Grand Vizier and the Crimean Khan. Rather than launching an immediate attack, the Khan judged it more prudent to destabilize Brâncoveanu indirectly by inciting conflict between him and his neighboring counterpart, the Moldavian Prince. At the time, Nicholas Mavrocordatos, perceived as insufficiently competent to manage such a delicate affair, was dismissed from his position. In his place, Dimitrie Cantemir—whose loyalty to the Ottoman cause had been previously demonstrated—was appointed as Voivode of Moldavia and subsequently as Prince of Wallachia.<sup>82</sup>

In November 1710, Dimitrie Cantemir was dispatched to Moldavia with an imperial mandate to apprehend Prince Brâncoveanu—dead or alive. According to Kogălniceanu, the Sultan had assured Cantemir that, for the duration of his tenure in Moldavia, he would be exempt from all forms of taxation, tribute, and ceremonial gifts. Yet, as Kogălniceanu critically observes, within the Ottoman administrative system, few things proved as ephemeral as imperial promises. Upon his arrival in Moldavia, Cantemir was met with congratulatory letters from both the Grand Vizier and his kahya, Osman Agha. However, these formal gestures were swiftly followed by demands: he was instructed to dispatch tribute payments to both the Grand Vizier and the Sultan without delay, to make logistical preparations for the advancing Ottoman army, and to complete construction of a bridge that had already been initiated. These successive requests, issued in rapid succession, stood in stark contrast to the promises of immunity previously extended to him. This abrupt shift, coupled

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<sup>80</sup> Mufti is an Islamic legal authority who gives a legal opinion (called Fatwa) in answer to an inquiry by a private individual or judge, for more information about Mufti, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "mufti". Encyclopedia Britannica, 1 Oct. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/mufti>". Accessed 28 January 2025.

<sup>81</sup> Kogălniceanu 1845; 168-169.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid; 169-170.

with a breakdown in communication and growing doubts about the reliability of the Sublime Porte, severely undermined Cantemir's confidence in the Ottoman administration. As a result, he resolved to defect and entered into an alliance with Czar Peter-I of Russia. Kogălniceanu poignantly characterizes this decision with the phrase: *“to suffer with Jesus Christ rather than to feed on the false hope of Egypt’s wealth,”* highlighting Cantemir’s preference for hardship in the service of a more trustworthy ally over continued submission to unfulfilled Ottoman assurances.<sup>83</sup>

The French traveler Aubry de la Motraye, who personally visited the Ottoman military encampment, briefly notes that Cantemir entered the service of the Russian Czar with assurances of commanding an army of sixty to seventy thousand troops and access to fully stocked storehouses. According to de la Motraye, the Czar initially received this alliance with enthusiasm, only for this sentiment to later transform into profound disappointment.<sup>84</sup>

#### **2.1.4. The Gifts From the Russians to the Grand Vizier and the Other Officials**

During the Prut Campaign, as the encircled Russian army found itself in a precarious position on the banks of the Prut River, Russian generals were compelled to surrender all valuable possessions within the camp in order to secure the safety of the Czar. In addition to the funds and military treasury transferred to the Ottoman side, substantial payments were distributed to the Grand Vizier and other high-ranking officials. Fleischmann references this transaction in a partially encrypted report sent to Vienna. According to his account, valuables and funds amounting to approximately 1.5 million Thaler were delivered by carriage to the Grand Vizier’s tent under the cover of night. Of this total, 1,000 Thaler were reportedly received directly by the Grand Vizier, while other prominent figures were also allocated portions: 500 Thaler to the Grand Vizier’s chief aide (Osman Kahya), 500 Thaler to the Crimean Khan, 500 Thaler to the Janissary Agha, and 100 Thaler to the Mîrâhur<sup>85</sup> (or Imrahor). Additionally, subordinate officials and attendants were each granted a share of the distributed wealth.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid; 170-171.

<sup>84</sup> Motraye 1727; 13-15.

<sup>85</sup> Mîrâhur, the person in charge of the sultan’s horses. For more information, “ABBAS SABBÂĞ, “MÎRÂHUR”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/mirahur#1>, Accessed on 07.01.2025.

<sup>86</sup> “Türckhischen ministern grösse geld summen zu auszahlung dessen auf noch selbige nacht sechs pi(?) mit gelt beladene wägen aus dem Moscovitischen laager in des GroßVezier Zelt eingebracht worden, von welchen der GroßVezier selbst ein tausent, so chihaja Me. Si (?) fünfhundert der Tartar Chan fünfhundert Me. Si Jänitscharn Aga fünfhundert Me. Si. und dem Bujuka Emir oder obrist stallmaster ainhundert beutel zusamben eine summa von 6. Ma. Ma. anderthalb Million Thaller ausmachend bekhomen haben sollen.”; 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 154v-155r.

As Voltaire noted in his records "*Historie de Charles-XII*," the gifts openly presented to the Ottoman delegation were not enough to please the statesmen. However, Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha thought he had obtained a good agreement.<sup>87</sup>

Hammer-Purgstall, in his book "*Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*," states that Catherine-I (*Yekaterina Alexeyevna*) collected gifts worth two hundred thousand Rubles and sent them to the Grand Vizier's tent in a cart with Chancellor Shafirov. The Grand Vizier shared these gifts with his kahya Osman Efendi and, by consenting to peace, was instrumental in releasing the Russian Czar and his army.<sup>88</sup>

Hans Ueberberger argues that, following the Prut River Campaign, the Ottoman Empire squandered an opportunity that would not present itself again. For an extended period, the Ottomans had the potential to forestall Russia's emergence as a formidable adversary. Despite apprehensions regarding Russia, which shared the same religious affiliation as the Ottoman raiyah (*re'âyâ*), and an awareness of the future threats this posed, pervasive corruption and a propensity for bribery among Ottoman state officials led to the forfeiture of this exceptional strategic advantage.<sup>89</sup>

In the "*Journal de Pierre le Grand*," which chronicles the period from 1698 to the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, no reference is made to the aforementioned bribery incident. The memoir portrays the Russian defeat by the Ottoman army—characterized as comprising disorganized units that repeatedly extended offers of peace—as an entirely unanticipated misfortune. This setback was ultimately mitigated through a Russian ultimatum to the Ottomans, compelling them to choose between accepting peace or facing a resolute fight to the death, bolstered, as the text asserts, by divine providence.<sup>90</sup>

#### **2.1.5. Encounters of the Ottoman and Russian Armies on the Banks of Prut**

According to the document dated 14 September 1711, submitted by Fleischmann to Vienna, the Ottoman army advanced approximately 30 miles upstream along the Prut River over the course of eleven days. Upon reaching this strategically selected location, the army paused for a single night to finalize operational preparations, during which time a bridge was constructed at a suitable crossing point on the river.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Voltaire 1820; 222.

<sup>88</sup> Hammer-Purgstall 1840; 112.

<sup>89</sup> Ueberberger 1913; 109.

<sup>90</sup> Peter I 1773; 374-375.

<sup>91</sup> "...diesemnach wurde den "6" Julj ein halb Stundt von dem jenseiths Sakcia geschlagenen Türckhishen Laager in gegennoorth der mehristen Paschen und andern Ottomanishen officiern ein grosser Kriegs-Rath gehalten worinnen der

On 15 June, the Janissary units arrived in Isaccea, where they established their encampments and began awaiting the arrival of additional contingents led by the provincial governors (beys) of Rumelia and Anatolia. As these units began to arrive sequentially, they were reviewed and inspected in the presence of the Grand Vizier. According to Kurat, the troops under the command of certain beys—such as Yörük Hasan Pasha, the Beylerbey of Rumelia, and Osman Pasha from the Karaman Eyalet—appeared undisciplined and ill-prepared for the impending campaign. As a result, these commanders incurred the displeasure of the Grand Vizier.<sup>92</sup> Meanwhile, the forces scheduled to join the main army from Anatolia were advancing at a slower pace than anticipated. In addition, the Russians were destroying the bridges built on the Dniester River. Some of the bridges built by the Turks on the Danube had collapsed due to the strong water and had not yet been repaired. For all these reasons, the army was delayed in coming together and this delay caused both the gathering of the army and the disruption of the attack plans.<sup>93</sup>

Moreover, the actual number of troops fell significantly short of expectations. Citing Talman's report submitted to Vienna in May 1711, Kurat estimates that the contingent anticipated from the Anatolian Governorate alone was approximately 17,000 soldiers. In reality, only 2,830 troops arrived, highlighting a substantial discrepancy between projected and actual force strength. Nonetheless, the number of Janissaries present was comparatively substantial.<sup>94</sup>

Fleischmann stated that the army had crossed to the opposite side from 30 miles upstream of the Prut River. Kurat mentions that this area was called "*Gura Seretsi*." One by one, the troops that reached this position crossed to the other side of the river.<sup>95</sup>

According to Ottoman military strategy, the army was expected to pursue and directly confront the enemy, with its movements dictated by the advancement of opposing forces. In this context, rather than attacking Bender—where the Swedish King Charles XII was residing—the Russian army opted to invade Wallachia and advance southward. In response, the Ottomans planned a northward advance along the Prut River to intercept Russian forces. This maneuver indicates that

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*Groß Vezier den von dem Sultan erhaltenen sharpffen befehl Rundt- machete(?) worüber sie sammthl: den "9" von der aufzubrechen den Marche Patschakischer seithen neben dem Fluß Bruth gegen jetzo zunehmen, den Feundt aufzutreiben und mit selben sobald immer möglich zuschlagen resolvirt. In 11 Tagen avancierte die Türckhische Armee bis 30 meillen hinaufwerths des gedachten Flusses, und bekamme den 18 den Feundt und zwahr dem Czaar selbstens so eben auf einen Moldauischen seithen dem offgedachten Fluß Bruth angelegenen bergl des Türckhische Laager recognorcirte ins Gesicht...", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 167r.*

<sup>92</sup> Kurat 1951; 273-274.

<sup>93</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Juli – Dezember 1711 / 1711-07-04.

<sup>94</sup> Kurat 1951, 272.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

the strategic recommendations of Charles XII were ultimately disregarded. Upon arriving in Isaccea, Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha extended an invitation to Charles XII to join him at the Ottoman military encampment to discuss matters of war. However, the Swedish monarch declined the invitation, a decision that undoubtedly strained relations between the two figures. Despite repeated appeals by Count Poniatowski, Charles's chief adviser, the King—persuaded by Chancellor von Müllern and several other confidants—believed it improper for a monarch to present himself before a Grand Vizier. This refusal proved critical, as the Ottoman army under Baltacı Mehmed Pasha represented Charles's only realistic opportunity to confront Russian aggression. As reflected in Poniatowski's correspondence, he viewed Charles's refusal as a grave strategic mistake. Notably, the Crimean Khan—himself a monarch—had no reservations about visiting the Grand Vizier's tent, recognizing the Vizier's role as commander of the army and representative of the Sultan. The Grand Vizier's disappointment, coupled with his limited experience in warfare, appeared to translate into a growing inclination to bring the conflict with Russia to a swift conclusion.<sup>96</sup>

Baltacı Mehmed Pasha consulted with the army officers and the Crimean Khan. According to Fleischmann, this consultation must have been made on 6 July 1711. During the military council, the incursion of the Russian forces into Ottoman territory was denounced as an act of arrogance. The betrayal by the Moldavian Voivode, Dimitrie Cantemir, and the potential threat posed by the Wallachian raiyah aligning with Russian interests were also highlighted as serious concerns. In light of these incidents, it was resolved that the enemy should be sought out and decisively defeated, regardless of their position.<sup>97</sup>

On 3 July, the Russian army crossed to the left bank of the Prut River and continued its southward advance. To impede pursuit by the Tatar forces, which shadowed the Russian troops and conducted sporadic attacks, the bridge was dismantled immediately following the crossing of the final Russian units. The Russian vanguard was led by General Janos. At this juncture of the campaign, logistical challenges had escalated significantly. A critical shortage of provisions, compounded by extreme heat, precipitated widespread illness and mortality among the troops. Both soldiers and

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<sup>96</sup> Poniatowski 1741; 98-102.

<sup>97</sup> *"Nachdeme der Sultan die nachricht erhalten dass der Moldauische Fürst Cantemir Oglu zu denen Moscovittern übergangen, vnd der Czaar mit seiner Armeè schon allbereiths in gedachtes fürstenthumb eingeruckhet seÿe; schickhte er dem Groß Vezier gewesene ordre zue dem Feindt beÿ verlust seines kopfs bald möglichst aufzusuechen vnd mit demselben zuschlagen: diesemnach wurde den 6 Julÿ ein halb Stundt von dem jenseiths Sakcia geschlagenen Türckhischen Lager in gegenwarth der mehristen Paschen vnd andern Ottomanishen officiern ein grosser Kriegs-Rath gehalten worinnen der Groß Vezier den von dem Sultan erhaltenen sharpsten befehl Kundtwachete(?) worüber sie sammethl: den 9 von dar aufzubrechen den Marche Patschakischer seithen neben dem Fluß Bruth gegen jetzo zunehmen, den Feundt aufzutreiben vnd mit selben sobald immer möglich zuschlagen resolvirt."*, 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 167r-167v.



pack animals perished in increasing numbers, with numerous cavalrymen left dismounted due to the loss of their horses. In contrast to the Ottoman army, which benefited from specialized water-carrying units (known as *Saka Ocağı*) to sustain its forces, the Russian army lacked comparable logistical infrastructure, rendering it nearly impossible to fulfill even the most basic needs of its soldiers. Consequently, General Janos and his infantry detachment were tasked with foraging crops and securing handmills in the surrounding areas to sustain the troops.<sup>98</sup>

On 4–5 July, General Janos's troops were compelled to separate from the rear guard in search of fodder for the army's animals. According to their orders, the unit was tasked with harvesting grain and producing flour immediately. However, they failed to locate any cultivable fields along their route. This scarcity was largely attributed to an extreme drought in the region, compounded by a locust infestation that year, which had devastated the agricultural landscape on the Prut River's left bank. The severity of the situation was underscored by the fact that even the area where the army had encamped was overrun by swarms of locusts, which leapt among the soldiers and filled the wagons. In the midst of these calamities, Tatar raids persisted, further straining the army's already precarious circumstances. The only available food source consisted of thousands of sheep procured from Moldavia. Under such dire conditions, the Russian troops urgently needed to reach Wallachian territory. At that point, preserving the army's survival had taken precedence over engaging the Ottoman forces in combat.<sup>99</sup>

Between 7 and 18 July, General Janos and his forces resumed their march as the intensity of the daytime heat began to diminish. Upon reaching a location called as *Gura Seretsi* (modern-day Gura Strâmbă), approximately 1.5 miles ahead, they observed what appeared to be a significant assembly of troops near a place called *Serezon* (likely corresponding to Bagul), situated approximately 60 kilometers along the left bank of the Prut River. In response to this incident, General Janos promptly dispatched a messenger to inform Czar Peter that approximately 3,000 Janissaries, accompanied by several cannons, had begun crossing the Prut River by means of two hastily constructed bridges. However, in Czar Peter's later memoirs, this intelligence was revealed to have been inaccurate and to have precipitated a strategic miscalculation. Contrary to Janos's report, the Ottoman army had not yet crossed to the opposite bank of the river. It is likely that General Janos, seeking to avoid direct confrontation, erred on the side of caution. Nevertheless, the misinformation caused the Czar to panic, and rather than instructing Janos to resist the Ottoman advance at all costs,

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<sup>98</sup> Kurat 1951; 437-440.

<sup>99</sup> Kurat 1951; 438-440.

he ordered an immediate withdrawal and instructed Janos to rejoin the main Russian force. This decision, based on flawed intelligence, significantly altered the course of Russian military operations in the region.<sup>100</sup>

#### **2.1.6. The Attacks of the Ottoman Soldiers on the Russian Army**

It was reported that on Saturday, 18 July, the Ottoman army began establishing its encampment near the village of Bagul, along the banks of the Prut River, while the forces under Russian General Janos were positioned on the opposite bank. The Russian camp was situated approximately 2–3 kilometers inland from the river. Following a war council held with the Crimean Khan Devlet II Giray and various provincial beys, Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha resolved to initiate an immediate offensive. Consequently, construction of pontoon bridges across the Prut commenced without delay. In the interim, elements of the Tatar cavalry had forded the river with their horses and launched small-scale assaults on General Janos's forces. Although some troops had successfully crossed to the far bank, the transportation of heavy artillery had initially been delayed due to the belief that the opposite side of the river consisted largely of marshland. Upon closer inspection, it was discovered that only a limited area was affected by swamp conditions. This section was quickly reinforced with stones, enabling the successful passage of the Ottoman cannons across the newly erected bridge.<sup>101</sup>

As Czar Peter-I mentioned after the War, it is certain that General Janos failed to oppose the Ottoman soldiers. Still, if we consider the general state of the Russian army, it is understandable that General Janos wanted to unite with the Russian troops behind rather than jeopardize his unity.<sup>102</sup>

By midnight, the bridge constructed by the Ottoman forces had been completed. The night remained largely calm on both sides of the Prut River, illuminated only by the flickering glow of campfires. However, the stillness was abruptly disrupted by the sound of a gunshot emanating from the riverbank near the Ottoman encampment. The unexpected noise triggered immediate alarm throughout the camp, as many feared it signaled the onset of a Russian night assault. Subsequent investigation revealed that the disturbance had been caused by a Russian soldier on the opposite

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid; 442-443, Peter I 1773; 369.

<sup>101</sup> Kurat 1951; 444-447. Peter I 1773; 367-369.

<sup>102</sup> Kurat 1951; 452-463. Peter I 1773; 369-371.

bank and was not part of a coordinated offensive. Fleischmann documented this midnight episode of confusion and panic in his report dated 29 July.<sup>103</sup>

### **2.1.7. The Ottoman – Tatar Attack & the Siege of the Czar Peter I**

According to Fleischmann, on the morning following the night of unrest, the Ottoman army completed the construction of two additional bridges across the Prut River. With the exception of the Grand Vizier, all remaining Ottoman units that had not yet crossed proceeded to the opposite bank. Later that same day, Ottoman forces launched a vigorous assault on the right flank of the Russian army, commanded by General Sheremetev, near the village of Elmalik. The ferocity of the attack compelled the Russian forces stationed there to retreat, incurring substantial losses. Following the successful engagement, Ottoman troops advanced their artillery to the newly secured position and commenced sustained bombardment of the Russian lines. The Russian army, already debilitated by critical shortages of provisions and manpower, found itself unable to mount an effective counteroffensive or withstand the intensifying Ottoman assaults.<sup>104</sup>

### **2.1.8. The Peace Offer of the Russians**

The day after the attack began, the Czar, already cornered, raised the white flag and ordered the arms to be laid down. The Czar sent General Sheremetev and a few other commanders to the Grand Vizier to discuss the terms of the armistice. The Czar had already informed the Grand-Vizier with his generals that he would accept all the other side's requests and wanted a friendly neighbour relationship with the Ottomans. However, according to the news in Wiener Zeitung dated 16 August

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<sup>103</sup> *"Gnädigster auch gnädige und hochgebithende Herrn Herrn zu folge meines den 8 und er und ...ten(?) huius vnterthänigst abgeschieckten bericht schreiben zoche der Groß Vezier mit der Türckhien armee gegen dem Fluß Brut umb mit denen jenseiths des geflüsses sich verschantzeten Moscovitern zu schlagen, worauff die Türckhen im gesciht der Feindlichen armee über mehr genannten Fluß eine brücken schlugen, in Zwischen schniedte der Tartar Chan und Cara Mehemmed Bascha nebst etlichen schwedischen officieren den feindt die zu fuhr des Prauiantes ab, also das derselbe in eine grosse noth gerathen, angesehen er auch aus der vorhero schon ruinirten Moldau, worauff er sich auff persuasion des Moldauishen fürsten verlassen, nichts ziechen Kundte. den 19.ten in der Nacht hörete man einen grossen von dem feindt erweckten tumult, welches die Türckhen in eine nicht gerungen consternation sezete aus foricht es mögte der feind den Fluss passieren und attaqieren wie den gefolgten morgen aber sachen sie daß die Moscoviter sich etwas zurück gezogen, welches die Turckhen dergestalten angefrischet, dass sie also gleich noch zwei andere bruckhen"; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 147r., Hurmuzaki 1878; 84.*

<sup>104</sup> *"... den gefolgten morgen aber sachen sie daß die Moscoviter sich etwas zurück gezogen, welches die Turckhen dergestalten angefrishet, das sie also gleich noch zwei andere brückhen über oft gemelten Fluß Brut geschlagen, worüber die ganze Türcke armee ausser der Groß Vezier so erst nach der schlacht sich dahin begeben auff die andere seithen passiert und darauf den feind noch selbigen tag bei dem Dorf Elmalik ohn weith dem marckh fleckhen Hohn mit solcher furie angegrieffen, daß sie den von dem Gnrl. Scheremetovitki commandirten rechten flügel völlig überein hauffen geworffen auch in dessen eine harth daran gelegene anhöhe gewunnen und ihre artillerie darauff gepflantzet ...", 29 July 1711, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 147r-147v.; Wiener Zeitung - Wienerisches Diarium, Juli – Dezember 1711 / 1711-08-29. See Appendix 2a.*

1711<sup>105</sup>, when the Grand Vizier attacked the Czar's army several times and suffered heavy losses, he sent a message to the Russian camp to ask for peace in order not to lose his force of about 25000 men. When the camp responded positively, they started negotiations for peace. In other words, it was reported as if the Grand Vizier asked for peace, which does not seem very logical. It does not make sense for the Grand Vizier to ask for peace when he was in an unquestionably superior position, despite his war-worn army and the loss of many men. In fact, Fleischmann stated that according to the news he received from his confidants, it was the Russian side that asked for peace.<sup>106</sup>

### 2.1.9. Articles of the Prut Treaty

The Russian Chancellor, who was received by the Ottoman command to negotiate the terms of peace, was initially brought before the kahya of Baltacı Mehmed Pasha. During this preliminary meeting, he was treated with courtesy and served coffee, in accordance with Ottoman diplomatic custom. While in the company of Osman Kahya, the Chancellor was also afforded the opportunity to engage in individual discussions with other senior Ottoman officials. According to Fleischmann's account, during these interactions, the Chancellor observed a marked inclination toward financial gain among several Ottoman dignitaries, including Osman Kahya and the Grand Vizier himself. That same evening, six carts laden with money and valuables were dispatched from the Russian encampment to the Ottoman camp, evidently as part of the negotiations to secure a peace settlement.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Juli – Dezember 1711 / 1711-08-09. See Appendix 2b.

<sup>106</sup> *"... auch wegen abgang aller Lebens Mitte sich in einem sehr schlechten zuzustand befundene Moscoviter auf daß neue sharpff anzugreifen vnd zubeshiessen angefangen, es taurete aber dieses gefecht nicht langen, angesehen die Moscoviter kurtzen darauf daß gewöhr indergeworffen, weiße Fänhen ausgesteckhet die andere auf die Spitzenvnter sich gekheret beÿ den Türckhen Pardon verlanget vnd das worth Aman oder gnadt in Türckhisher Sprach sehr lamentirlich ausgerueffen, zu welchem Endte auch vom Czaar zweÿ Trompetter vor: nachgehendts aber ein Officier, so sammt: von denen erbittert vnd erhizten Türckhen nidergehauen vnd dann drittens fin obrister so glücklichen arrivirt, zu dem Groß Vezier vbergeshickht worden vmb, Jhme in Nahmen den gedachten Czaars zu proponiren, daß derselbe den Fridten verlange vnd denen Türckhen alle Satisfaction zugeben erbiettig seÿe ...", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 169r.*

<sup>107</sup> *"... so diesen unterhandlungen zugegen ware intercedirte beim Groß Vezier; daß man wenigstens diesen zu der Ottomanischen Portten gekommenen Moscovitischen Cantzler, als einem Gast eine Schallen Caffè reichen wolle; hierauf wurde er Cantzler zum Chihaia geführet des Groß Vezier, allwo er gelegenheit hatte sich in ein vnd andern klährer zuspectoriren vor allem aber nahm er daß einzige und die Türckhen zu allem leichtlich bewegende gelt- Mitl vor die Handt und versprache sowohl dem Groß Vezier als einem Chihaia und allen andern hierzue etwas contribuiren könnenden Türckhischen Ministern grosse gelt-summen, zu auszahlung dessen auch noch selbige nacht Sechs mit gelt beladene Waagen aus dem Moscovitischen laager in des Groß Veziers Gelt eingebracht worden...", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 170r.*

Three conditions<sup>108</sup> that the Ottomans wanted to be fulfilled absolutely and immediately in the Prut Peace negotiations:

- 1) 360 high-ranking soldiers in the Russian army, including Chancellor Shafirov and General Sheremetyev's nephew, will remain hostage in the Sublime Porte until all the conditions of the treaty are fulfilled,
- 2) Azov and its surroundings will be cleared of Russians and left to the Turks;
- 3) The Russian navy will be wholly burned.

Other articles<sup>109</sup> of the agreement are:

- 4) Artilleries in Kamenny-Zaton and Yenikale will be handed over to the Ottomans;
- 5) Dogan Castle will be handed over to the Ottomans;
- 6) The Czar will withdraw his soldiers from Poland and will not interfere in the internal affairs of Poland from now on; the Swedish King will be able to return to his Kingdom with a convoy composed of Turks and Tatars, without any hindrance, on the route he wants;
- 7) Russia will destroy all its existing fleet in the Black Sea and will never have a fleet there again;

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<sup>108</sup> " ... hierauf wurde der Cantzler wieder zum Groß Vezier abgeholt und die ober gehorsambst- angezogene 3 puncta also limitirt; das nehmb! er Cantzler nebst dem Nepote des Scheremetovski und etlichen andern officieren sammt ihren bedienten 360 Persohn ausmachendt bis zur execution dieser verwilligten capitulation bei der Portten verbleiben Anstatt deren Stuckhen und des Gewöhrs so die Moscovitishe Armee beÿ sich hatte die in der zu rahieren zugestandene Vestung Camisaton oder Jenikale befindtliche Artiglerie denen Türckhen behändiget und daß die Moscovitishe Flotta verbrennet werden solle", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 170v.

<sup>109</sup> "1mo solle Assak sammt dem umbligenten Territorio denen Türckhen in standt in welchen es die Moscoviter bekommen ein geraummet worden, 2do verobligirte sich der Czaar Camisaton oder Jenikale zurahiren, vnd die Artiglerie denen Türckhen einzuhändtigen, 3tio verwilligte Moscau der Ottomanischen Portten die Vestung Dogan, in standt wie sie sich befindet zurediren, 4to solle der Czaar seine Trouppen aus Pohlen zurückziehen sich nicht mehr in die Pohlenische affairen einmischen und dem König in Schweden unter einer Türckhischen: und Tartarish Convoe durch selbiges König Reich, doch gegen dargebung deren paahren bezahlung für alles daß so er und seine Trouppen nöthig haben werden die frei und ungehinderte passage in seine landte gestatten. 5to solle die Moscovitishe in daß schwartz Meer ausgeloffene Flotta verbrennetn und ins Häufftig alldorten keine andere mehr von seithen Moscau ausgerüstet werden, 6to solle der Sonsten beÿ der ottomanischen Portten gestandene Moscovitishe Bottshaffter ins häufig sich beÿ dem Tartar Chan aufhalten und alldorten seine erste Instanz haben. 7mo solle der Fürst in Moldau nebst denen Moldauischen Boyären und unterthannen denen Türckhen behändiget werden weillen aber der gedachte Fürst entloften zusein von denen Moscovitern vorgegeben wurde also seint nur die gemelte Bajiren und unterthanen in diesem Articl begriffen, 8mo sollen die Türckhishe gefangene von denen Moscovitern freigelassen und zu der Ottomanischen Armee überluffert werden. 9no solle der Czaar die von der Portten wegen gegenwertigen Krieg aufgewente unkößen wie auch den in dem Fürstentumb Moldau verübten schadten guetmachen, wegen diesen obligirte sich der Czaar anstatt der Moldauer der Portten dem Tribut 3. Jahr hindurch und zarff jährlich 1000 Bruthl oder fünffmahl 500 m. Thler abzustatten. 10mo solle der Moscovitishe Cantzler und Schwesterkindt des General Scheremetovski bis zu entrichter Cron dieser gegenwärtig verwilligten Capitulation als Gaisl bei der Portten verbleiben.", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 170v-171v.

8) The Russian ambassador in the Sublime Porte will now stand at the Tatar Khan and deal with him first;

9) The Moldavian Prince and the Boyars under his command will be handed over to the Turks, and in addition to this article, the Ottoman prisoners captured by the Russians will be released;

10) The Czar will pay for the damage he caused in Moldavia during the War. As a requirement, he would pay either 1000 pouches of gold or 500 million Thaler annually to the Ottomans for three years.

On June 26, 1713, peace was officially declared between the Ottomans and Moscow. Russian officials reached a special agreement with the Tatar Khan and agreed to pay him 250,000 Thalers. On September 11, the Russian ambassador, Demetrius Bestouchef, arrived in Edirne and reported that the peace treaty had been approved by the Czar.<sup>110</sup>

On 13 September, all authorised envoys and diplomats present at the Sublime Porte appeared before the Grand Vizier, together with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Baron Shafirov, General-Major Count Sheremetev, Tolstoy and other officials. On 19 September they were received before the Grand Sultan and presented the ratified peace treaty. At the same time, they presented the authorisation certificates of each minister and the gifts sent by the Czar to the Sultan. These gifts included 3 falcons, 3 foxes, one black and two white, 3 sable and 2 stoat pelts.<sup>111</sup>

#### **2.1.10. Sweden's Political Maneuvers and Correspondence Concerning Ferenc II**

##### **Rákóczi**

Following the agreement reached between Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha and Russian Chancellor Shafirov on the terms of the peace treaty, Czar Peter I and the remnants of his army

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<sup>110</sup> "Den 26 Junij ist endlich der fried zwischen der Pforten und Moscau förmlich erkläret worden, und die Russische Ministri haben sich mit dem Tartar Chan in Separato verglichen, ihme vor seine machende Prætension semel pro semper 500 beutl-esil, oder 250.000 Thaller auszuzahlen. Endlich ist die Sache gänzlich zu Standte gekommen, und wurden. Den 5 Julij die beydertheilige Instrumenta in publicum Divan unterzeichnet, und gegeneinander ausgewechßlet; mit dem Türckischen Instrument auch noch selbige Nacht ein Russischer Rittmeister nacher St. Petersburg an den Czaren abgefertiget worden ist. Den 11 Septembris trafte der Russische bottschafter Demetrius Bestouchef des Russischen Hofs General Kriegs Commissarius zu Adrianople ein, und machte seinen Einzug ...", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 99v-100r.

<sup>111</sup> "Den 13 darauf hatte Er samt allen bey der Pforten vorfindig gewesten Plenipotentiarien und bottschafteren, als dem Russischen vice Canzler Baron Schafirof, General Major hl Grafen Scheremetof, Tolstoi, samt denen übrigen bey dem Groß Vezir und den 19 bey dem Groß Sultan audienz, und überliefferte daß ratificierte friedens Instrument, nebst eines jeden von disen Ministern Creditio Schreiben, auch die für den Sultan von dem Czaren überschickte præsender in 3 falcken, einem schwarzen, zwey weißen fuchs, 3 zobel, und 2 Harmelin-belz bestehend.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 100r-100v.



commenced their return journey. Shortly after the Czar's departure, Swedish King Charles XII arrived at the Grand Vizier's tent, accompanied by a small detachment from his residence in Bender.<sup>112</sup>

The Grand Vizier received King Charles XII with due courtesy; however, the Swedish monarch, incensed by reports that Czar Peter I had been permitted to depart, did not hesitate to confront the Grand Vizier. Charles accused him of acting in defiance of the Sultan's orders. In response, the Grand Vizier firmly rejected the accusation, asserting that all actions taken had been fully aligned with the will of the Sultan. Furthermore, he emphasized that securing the Russian Czar's consent for the Swedish King's return via a route of his own choosing constituted a significant diplomatic achievement. The Grand Vizier also reiterated that the Ottomans had made no commitments beyond ensuring Charles XII's safe passage back to his homeland.<sup>113</sup>

King Charles XII harbored significant expectations from the Ottoman Empire. His reinforcements from Pomerania had not arrived, and he was unable to utilize the financial loans extended by the Sublime Porte in the manner he had intended. Meanwhile, the continued presence of the Swedish monarch and his sizeable entourage placed a growing strain on the Ottomans, generating increasing discontent within the administration of the Sublime Porte. The Ottomans' primary desire had become the King's prompt return to his homeland. Following his discussion with

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<sup>112</sup> "... diese nach bruche der mehrgedachte Czaar noch diesen Nachmittag mit interlassung einiger sagagen und Versenckung viller Stuckh und Gewöhr aus seinem mehr einer todtengrueben als militarishen aufenthalt gleichsehenden laager auf wehrenden Moscovitishen auszug langte der König in Schweden mit wenig leüthen von Bender in größter Eyll in dem Türckhishen laager an.", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 172v-173r.

<sup>113</sup> "... der Groß Vezier und Tartar Chan ritheten ihme entgegen, und wurde hochgemelter König von dem Chihaia des Groß Veziers und andern Türckhishen Ministern in des gedachten Groß Veziers Zelt mit grosser höffligkeit introducirt, allwo ein sessel ohne löhnen, auf welchen sich sonst die aus: ländtische Gristl: reprohenten in ihre und zehn niderzulassen pflegen, gestanden; der König aber begabe sich mit seinen von der räyß sehr übl außsehenden dragoner Stüffeln auf die Saffa, der Groß Vezier hiesse ihm willkommen, und erfreute sich seiner Ankufft, allein der König beantwortete solches mit nichts andern als daß ihme warm seie, und Pienge gleich an dem Groß Vezier mit harten wortten vorzustellen, daß er Groß Vezier allen Militarishen regeln, auf dem von dem Sultan habenden Befehl zuwider gehandelt, indem er daß glückl hatte seinen und des Ottomanishen Reichs-feundt dergestallten in die enge zutreiben, daß er den Czaar selbst gefangene nehmen, und hierdurch daß gantze Moscovitische reich der ottomanishen Portten hette können zinnsbahr machen, welches aber durch diese mit Moscau ohne daß mann ihme mit der Ottomanishen Portten in Allganz stehendten König die geringste nachricht hiervon gegeben, eingegangene Capitulation verhindert worden seye, er König betauere nur, daß er so lange Zeit in Türckhei zuegebracht, und die ihnen sowohl von ihro Röml: Kayl: May's. Allerglorwürdigsten andenckhens, als von Engel: und Hollandt gethanne grosse offeren in ansehen der Türckhen auf deren gegebenes worth er sich völlig verlassen so leichter dinge hette fahren lassen; der Groß Vezier antwortete hierauf, alles dieses mit Befehl des Sultans gethan zuhaben, und hette ausser demselben von seinen verrichtungen sonst keinen rechenschaft zugeben, so hette die Ottomanische Portten auch ihme König nichts anders, als die frei und ohngehinderte passirung in sein Landt versprochen welche dann hiemit durch diese gegenwörtige mit Moscau geschlossene Capitulation fest gestellet worden seye.", 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 173r-173v.

the Grand Vizier, Charles—clearly displeased—declined the traditional offerings of coffee and sherbet, mounted his horse, and left the Ottoman camp, returning to Bender.<sup>114</sup>

After King Charles had left the Ottoman camp, the Grand Vizier asked Poniatowski, the representative of the King, to remind him in a rather harsh and rude manner that the King was still on the Ottoman territory and could not treat the Sultan's representative in this way. King Charles XII's accusations against Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha generated significant unrest among the Ottoman pashas throughout the military encampment. In response, the Grand Vizier dispatched his kahya, Osman Agha, to Istanbul with the task of conveying an accurate account of the campaign's achievements directly to the Sultan. This move was not only a matter of official communication but also a strategic effort by the Grand Vizier to defend himself against political adversaries and the mounting intrigues by the Swedish King. Osman Agha, entrusted with delivering news of the military success, hoped that his service would be rewarded by the Sultan—particularly with an elevation to the rank of pasha, in recognition of his role in representing the Grand Vizier's interests and securing his reputation at court.<sup>115</sup>

Fleischmann, who reported extensively on the residence of the Swedish King in Bender and the Ottoman-Russian War, also referred in his dispatches to Vienna to a meeting between Czar Peter

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<sup>114</sup> *“Er König aber hette der Ottomanischen Portten vershiedene insubistente sachen vorgebracht angesehen weder die solang vertröste Pommerische Trouppen angelanget, weder das Königreich Pollen gegebener versicherung nach sich Stanislaish declariret, und ware der Groß Vezier dermassen rebittert, daß er dem König alle seinetwegen von der Ottomanischen Portten gemachte Speesen vorwurffe mit vermelden, er solte sich nur einmahlen hinweg begeben, er wolte Ihme auch seinetwegen di...(?) gegen restitution empfangene 1000-beitel-gelt-gegebene obligation zuruckheben; der König Stundte hierüber auf, und begabe sich ohne Cahfè Sherbet, oder andere Türckhishe ehrbezeugung genossen zuhaben, leider zu Pferd und rithe, ohne daß er sich ferners in dem Türckhischen Laager aufgehalten gegen Bender zue.”*, 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 173v-174r.

<sup>115</sup> *“Inzwishen aber ware der Groß Vezier sowohl als daß gantze Türckhishe Ministerium wegen der von dem König in Schweden wieder die von der Portten denen Moscovitern verwilligte Capitulation eýferig gemachte einwendung dermassen alteriret, daß er Groß Vezier den wehrendtem Feldtzug beý der Porten angewesßen, und beý der selben in zimmlichen ansehn gestandtenen General Poniatovski zu sich berueffen denselben mit harts: und rauchen worthen angeredet, daß er seinen König nicht informiret, damit selber den Respect des Groß-Veziers besser observirt hette; und obwohl er ein König so seie derselbe doch in dem Türckhischen Territorio, und müsse wissen, daß er Groß Vezier Statthalter der gantzen Türckhischen Monarchi seýe hierauf wurde dem gedachten Poniatovski sein bisdahin von der Portten gereichte unterhaltung abgeschnitten, als daß er in grosser ungnadt sich von der Portten hinweg nacher Bender begeben müeste. Nachdem dieses alles mit Moscau und Schweden sich zuegetragen, wurde der Chihaia des Groß Veziers Otman Agha so bei gegenwärtigen Feldzug die vollige direction führete nach Constantinopl abgeschickht, umb dem Sultan von allen und jeden außführliche Relation zuerstatten auch zugleich als ein selbst interessister die schon vorgesehene wieder den Groß-Vezier anspindende Schwedische Machinationen best möglichst zu contre carisen seinerseiths hoffete er beý über bringung einer so favorablen zeitung von dem Sultan unfehlbahr mit einem Paschalik von drei Schweiffen begnadiget zu werden.”*, 14 September 1711. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 174r-175r.



I and Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi<sup>116</sup>. His archival documents contain a few references to the political activities of Prince Rákóczi. One such document is a letter dated 13 July 1714, addressed to Fleischmann by H. von Müllern, Chancellor to King Charles XII of Sweden, who had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire. In the letter, Müllern informed Fleischmann that Count Johann Talaba von Fogarach, a Transylvanian nobleman in the service of Prince Rákóczi, had recently visited France and Italy to promote Rákóczi's cause and to solicit support. It is known that Prince Rákóczi had previously sent envoys to the Sublime Porte to seek support from the Ottomans in his fight against the Habsburgs.<sup>117</sup> In response, the British had made attempts until 1711 to prevent the Sublime Porte from listening to the offers and encouragements made by the French in favor of the Hungarian rebels.<sup>118</sup>

According to Müllern, Fogarach was also actively seeking a suitable intermediary to facilitate potential reconciliation between Prince Rákóczi and the Habsburg Emperor. The Chancellor concluded his correspondence by underscoring the Swedish court's dedication to maintaining cordial relations with the Emperor, highlighting the importance they placed on peace and diplomatic goodwill with the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>119</sup>

Further insights into Prince Rákóczi's activities are provided in a copy of a letter addressed to the Hofkriegsrat by Count Johann Talaba von Fogarach. Although the letter is undated, its contents offer significant details regarding Fogarach's role and motivations. In the communication, Fogarach explains that he was initially compelled to support Prince Rákóczi at the onset of the rebellion. He

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<sup>116</sup> For more information on the long-term Hungarian independence movement led by the Rákóczi family, Papp 2004; 63-78 ve Papp 2008; 157-180.

<sup>117</sup> For more information, Tóth 2019; 87-106. Benda 1962; 189-209.

<sup>118</sup> The correspondence of the British ambassador Sir Robert Sutton on this matter has been compiled by A. Nimet Kurat. For detailed information, "*The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople, (1710-1714)*, ed. Akdes Nimet Kurat, London 1953", pp. 49.

<sup>119</sup> "*Hohlgeborner hochgeehrter Herr Resident.*

*Denselben mit Gegenwärtigen zu besuchen gibt mir Gelegenheit überbringen dieses ein Untertan von Ihre Käys: Mäyl: Nahmens Talaba, welcher nachdem er sich für ungefähr 10 Tagen aus Frankreich über Italien hier eingefunden, Ansuchung getan in Ihr Königl: Majs: meines allergnädigsten Herrn Diensten Aufgenommen zu werden, es haben aber höchstgedachte Ihre Königl Majs: in Ansehen der Aufrichtigen für seine: Käys: Mäyl: tragenden Freundschaft, von welcher sie bei allen Gelegenheiten, kräftige Proben an dem Tag zu geben gesinnt sein, Bedenken getragen, demselben seiner Unterthänigsten bitte zu Gewehren, zu mahlen Mann in Erfahrung gebracht, dass er wehrender jungl: Unruhe den Fürsten Ragozy gedienet und noch zur zeit deswegen Seeliger: Käyl: Mäyl: gnade und Amnestie mit erhalten hat, Wann nun obermelter Nr: Talaba dieselbe durch des Herrn Residentens Vermittlung und Vorsprache am kaiserlichen: Hofe zu erbitten Vorhabens ist zu diesem Ende auch umb meine Vorschrift an den Herrn Residenten, welche ihm mit abschlagen können, angelegenheitlich ersuchet hat; als ergetet hiermit an dem Herrn Residenten mein Dienstliches gesinnen, es beliebe derselbe dise mir gleichsam abgenötigt Recomendation in soweit bei sich stattfinden zu lassen, als die Sache ihren mir allerdings unbekannten Umständen nach tunlich sein würd. Der ich übrigens mit besonderer Hochachtung und Ergebenheit stetten verharre. Des wohlgebornen hochgeehrten Herrn Residentens, Demitocka den: 13 July 1714". OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv. 1, fol. 12r-12v.*

recounts that, approximately seven years earlier, he had journeyed to France via Moscow and the Ottoman Empire, where he remained until peace was reestablished. Writing in a tone of evident contrition, the Count appeals to the Emperor for clemency, expressing remorse that his early involvement with Rákóczi had drawn him into what he characterizes as a dishonorable enterprise. His plea reflects both personal regret and a desire to distance himself from the insurrectionist cause.<sup>120</sup>

#### **2.1.11. Charles XII's Endless Demand for Money from the Sultan**

Following his humiliating defeat by Russian forces at the Battle of Poltava, King Charles XII of Sweden, along with his entourage, sought refuge in Ottoman territory, where he was received by Beylerbey Yusuf Pasha in the province of Ozi. Upon his arrival, Charles was formally assured—through direct communication from the Sultan—that he would be accorded the dignity and respect befitting his royal status throughout the Ottoman domains. However, despite the Ottoman administration's efforts to honor him, Charles XII declined the residence prepared for him within the inner fortress and refused to accept the ceremonial key to the city of Bender, which had been intended as a gesture of esteem. Instead, he chose to establish his encampment beneath the castle's artillery batteries, electing to reside outside the fortifications in a position of his own choosing. On the banks of the Dniester River, this settlement, which was formed by adding more houses over time, was even called Carlopolis, but when the whole settlement was flooded as a result of the river's overflow, King Charles and his entourage had to settle further north in the village of Warnitza<sup>121</sup>, where the Moldavians lived. The king, along with his advisers and chancellor, arranged for a settlement of barracks to be built here for more than 500 of his soldiers. The honour guard of the

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<sup>120</sup> "Hochlöbl: Kayl: Hoff Kriegs Rath. ss.

*Durchleuchtigster fürst etc Gnädigster auch gnädig und hochgebüettende Herrn. S. Euer durchleucht Excells: und gnaden bin ich bemiessiget untertänigst beizubringen und zu bekennen, dass ich wehrender letzteren hungle. Rebellion anfänglichen zwar eine sehr kurze Zeit in des aufrührerischen Ragoczÿ Diensten nolens volens stehen müssen, vor ungefähr sieben Jahren aber habe ich mich von dannen über Moskau und Türkei in Frankreich begeben und mich Alda den Erfolg eines universal Friedens zu erwarten aufgehalten; nun habe zwar durch dieses, dass bey ereigneter Gelegenheit mich nicht alsogleich auf die Seiten meines rechtmäßigen Lands Fürsten und Herrn begeben der Käysen: Ungnade in etwas mich Theillhaftig gemacht. Weil aber mit dem allerhöchsten bezeigen kann, dass wehrender all dieser Zeit anhero wider Ihro Kayl: Majs: nicht die geringste Waffen geführt, auch wehrender Ragoczÿschen Diensten nichts anderes als die stelle eines Gentilhomme bei ihm vertreten. Als gelangt an euer durchltsen Excellsen und gnaden mein untertänigst flehentliches bitten selbe geruchen Ihro kayl: Majls: angebohrten allerhöchsten milde nach mir durch /: titl :/ der allhier an der Ottomanischen Porthen Subsistirenden Herrn: Residenten eine Amnestie fördersamb gnädigst erteilen zu lassen, vor welche höchste Gnade gegen Ihre Kayl Majs: als meinem allernädigsten und rechtmäßigen Land Fürsten ich in unveränderlicher Submission treu und gehorsam ersterbe zu Gnädigster Gewährung dessen mich untertänigst Gehorsamst empfehle. Euer durchleucht Excellsen und gnaden.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv. 1, fol. 13r-13v.*

<sup>121</sup> Motraye 1732; 137. See, Appendix 3.

settlement consisted of 500 Janissaries<sup>122</sup> from the beginning, and the king and his entourage were given a daily allowance of 500 Thalers, mostly meat, chicken, wine, coffee, sugar, spices, and fodder for horses.<sup>123</sup>

When the Swedish army surrendered to the Czar's soldiers in Perewolocza, the surrender of the army's treasury<sup>124</sup>, along with all the weapons it had, put the King in great economic trouble. Baron Fabrice, in his letter<sup>125</sup> to the Duke of Holstein on June 12, 1710, stated that Charles was adept at negotiating discounts on interest-bearing loans. He tells that after Mazeppa's death, 80,000 ducats were left to the king and that despite all the efforts of the Grand Vizier, who tried to prevent the king, the king earned up to 20,000 ducats from the horses that the sultan gave as a gift. In this way, the king seemed to have overcome his money shortage for a while.

The same information is included in Motraye's memoir<sup>126</sup>. According to Motraye, Madame Woniowski, the wife of Mazeppa's nephew Mr. Woniowski, delivered up to 100,000 ducats to the king a few days before her husband was captured in Hamburg by the Czar's ministers and sent to Petersburg. Madame Woniowski conveyed this money to the King after her husband's death through Mr. Commissioner Evenshold.

Fabrice<sup>127</sup>, Motraye<sup>128</sup> and Poniatowski<sup>129</sup> mentioned many times King Charles's economic hardship and his confidence in Sultan's goodwill. Sultan Ahmed III demonstrated considerable generosity toward the exiled King Charles XII and his entourage during their stay in Ottoman territory. In addition to a regular daily allowance, each official visit to Istanbul—particularly those undertaken by Count Poniatowski and Colonel Funk—was often followed by the presentation of gifts from the Sultan to the Swedish monarch. These gifts varied in form and significance, ranging from substantial sums, such as 20,000 ducats in gold, to more symbolic offerings of 1,000 ducats. Charles XII frequently petitioned the Sultan for financial assistance to complete the logistical preparations for his return to Sweden. However, much of the aid received was diverted to settle his outstanding debts. Notably, the financial support extended by the Ottoman court diminished significantly as diplomatic efforts to reach an accord with Russia progressed. Toward the end of his residence in Ottoman lands, Charles's daily allowance was entirely suspended, and he was ultimately placed under temporary

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<sup>122</sup> Poniatowski 1741; 54-55.

<sup>123</sup> Fabrice 1760; 166

<sup>124</sup> Aulander 1716; 27-28.

<sup>125</sup> Fabrice 1760; 9-10.

<sup>126</sup> Motraye 1727; 303-304.

<sup>127</sup> Fabrice 1760; 29-31.

<sup>128</sup> Motraye 1723; 420.

<sup>129</sup> Poniatowski 1741; 57-63.

detention before being compelled to return to his homeland. Fleischmann mentioned the support offered to the King of Sweden in two documents he sent to Vienna. The first of these is the letter<sup>130</sup> dated August 6, 1714, in which the King of Sweden mentions his meeting with Count Grouthausen, who was in charge of his treasury. In this letter, Fleischmann reports that King Charles had notified Sultan Ahmed III of his intention to return to Sweden via imperial territory. To facilitate this journey, the King requested an additional 1,000 pouches of gold, supplementing the 2,000 pouches previously granted, to cover the necessary logistical preparations for his return. Furthermore, Fleischmann conveyed to Count Grouthausen that the Emperor stood ready to provide any assistance deemed necessary to support the King's safe and orderly repatriation.

In the previous letter<sup>131</sup> of Fleischmann dated July 22, 1714, it is understood that all kinds of help and support were provided to Charles, not only from Sublime Porte but also from France. According to Fleischmann, King Charles intended to traverse imperial territory on his return to Sweden. In support of this plan, the French Chancellor pledged to furnish the Swedish monarch with all necessary assistance and provisions required for his journey.

#### **2.1.12. Disputes over the Route of Charles XII's Return to Sweden**

After King Charles defeated King August II in Poland, he deported him to Saxony and had him sign a treaty<sup>132</sup> in which he acknowledged that he renounced all his sovereign rights in Poland. King

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<sup>130</sup> "Dem 29ten letzt-verflossenen Monats Juli ist der Herr von Grouthausen Obrist und Favorit des Königs in Schweden als extra-ordinary Envoyé mit einer Suite von zweiundsiebzig Personen, worunter der Obrist Rosa und Graf Welk nebst einigen andern Offizieren sich befinden, hier angelanget, noch selbigen Tag ließe er den französischen Botschafter dem venezianischen Bajlo, und mir durch einen bei sich habenden königlichen Sekretarius seine Ankunft notifizieren, der französische Botschafter gab ihm darauf eine privat Visite, welche ich auch den folgenden Tag verrichtet, worauf der Herr Envoyé Grouthausen den 31ten dato mir die gegen Visite abgestattet und darinnen ihrer Königlichen Schwedischen Majestät seines höchsten Prinzipals an meiner gegen seine Minister bezeugenden friedlichen Aufführung habenden sonderlichen Wohlgefallen mit Viellen Expressionen contestiert auch mich versicheret. ... Ingleichen habe von ihm öfters gedachten Herrn Envoyé heraus gebracht, dass sein der Porthen zumachen habenden mündliche Vortrag eine zur Reis nötige, vom Sultan gegen Restitution verlangende, in 1000 Beute bestehende gelt Summa betreffe, wozu er Envoyé von seinem höchsten Schlesien nach Stralsund zu begeben intentioniret an neben auch nicht ungeneigt seie mit Ihre römische kaiserliche Majestät: [zumahlen Selbte sich außer Wien und vielleicht wegen einen ungarischen Landtag zu Principaln beordert ist der Porthen All: verlangen Könnende Versicherung zugeben und zu offerieren; das man über die königliche Obligation bei ihr Porthen solange einen schwedischen Minister zuhalten erbiettig seie, bis diese 1000 Beutel mit denen schon vorher empfangenen 2220 Beuteln entrichtet sein werden, ob nun sich die Türken hierzu verstehen mögen? Wird die zeit geben.", 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv. 1, fol. 56r-61r.

<sup>131</sup> "Post Scribunt: Wie ich jetzt gleich von einem meiner Konfidenten avisiert werde, so hat die Porten dem in denen schwedischen Affären sich brauchen lassenden französischen Kanzler Monsieur de Peruit eröffnet, dass sie zwar dem König in Schweden all tunlichen Vorschub zu leisten, auch ein reiß gelt (so aber nicht so viel, als die Schweden sich einbilden sein wird) zu geben geneigt seie...", 22 July 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv. 1, fol. 44v.

<sup>132</sup> Treaty of Altranstädt (27 September 1706), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Treaties of Altranstädt". Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Sep. 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/treaties-of-Altranstadt>. Accessed 21 May 2023.

Charles' goal was to put a loyal king to himself, Stanislaw Leszczyński, on the Polish throne. Aligned with the Russians, King Augustus chose to repudiate the terms of the treaty previously imposed upon him by Charles after observing the advance of Czar Peter's forces into Poland and recognizing the tenuous position of the newly installed monarch, Stanisław Leszczyński. It soon became evident that Leszczyński lacked the support necessary to maintain his hold on the Polish throne, ultimately forcing him to seek refuge with King Charles in Saxony. Charles XII's broader strategic objectives for Poland were effectively thwarted following his decisive defeat at the Battle of Poltava, which compelled him to seek asylum within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>133</sup>

It is well documented that King Charles XII and the statesmen within his entourage consistently sought to incite the Ottoman Empire against Czar Peter I at every available opportunity. From Charles's perspective, a renewed alliance with the Ottomans would enable Sweden to reclaim its lost territories and restore its influence over Poland. Simultaneously, such an alliance would allow the Ottomans to neutralize the threat posed by the Czar's ongoing activities in the Black Sea region and to put an end to Russian incursions and provocations against the Crimean Tatars. It is therefore evident that Charles's proposed return to Sweden was strategically motivated by this broader geopolitical vision. His repeated insistence on returning via Poland, accompanied by a contingent of Ottoman forces, became a point of contention not only with Russia but also within Ottoman political circles. His frustration escalated significantly when his conditions for repatriation were ultimately rejected, leading to deep dissatisfaction and diplomatic strain.<sup>134</sup>

Fleischmann mentions King Charles's return route in several documents. The first of these is the document of July 29, 1711. In this document<sup>135</sup>, he emphasizes that the Russian Czar guaranteed the Swedish King that he would not be hindered on his way back to his country via Poland.

In his second document<sup>136</sup>, Fleischmann states that the Russians agreed to abide by the conditions stated by the Ottomans and that the Czar would withdraw his troops from Poland and allow the Swedish King Charles to return safely to his country. In Fleischmann's document dated September 14, 1711, the articles of the treaty accepted by Russia after the Prut War were included, and in one of these articles, it was stated that the Swedish King would return to his country via

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<sup>133</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 55-56.

<sup>134</sup> Zinkeisen 1857; 394-395.

<sup>135</sup> *"Alle seine Truppen auß dem Königreich Pohlen abziehen und dem König in Schweden dardurch die frei und ohngehinderte Passirung zu gestatten."*, 29 July 1711, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 148r.

<sup>136</sup> *"... so solle auch der Czar seine Trouppen auß Pohlen ziehen und dem König in Schweden die freie passirung dardurch gestatten ..."*, 9 August 1711, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 144v.

Poland, and Ottoman Sipahis<sup>137</sup> and Tatar forces would convey him.<sup>138</sup> In the continuation of the same document, Fleischmann, in his cryptic writing, states that the King will return to his country via Poland with an Ottoman and a Tatar convoy and that the Turks no longer want to hear anything extra about it<sup>139</sup>. According to him, the Swedish King's intention was only to drag Sublime Porte into war in Poland. If he entered Poland with Tatar and Turkish troops, his enemies could cause riots, and thus a new war could be ignited.<sup>140</sup> In the interim, logistical preparations were undertaken to facilitate the prompt departure of King Charles XII and his entourage. The requisite horses, carriages, and provisions were procured from the Romanian territories to ensure a smooth and secure journey. Serasker<sup>141</sup> Hasan Pasha was appointed to lead the escort convoy, which comprised approximately 2,000 Sipahi cavalry and 8,000 Tatar auxiliaries. In accordance with this directive, Hasan Pasha arrived in Bender with his Sipahi forces on August 13 to oversee and coordinate the King's departure.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> For more information about Sipahi, "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/sipahi>". Accessed on 13.01.2024.

<sup>138</sup> "4.to Solle der Czaar seine Trouppen aus Pohlen zuruckh ziehen, sich nicht mehr in die Pohnische affairen ein mischen und dem König in Schweden unter einer Türckhisch: und Tartarischen Convoye durch selbiges Königreich, doch gegen dargebung deren paren bezahlung für alles daß, so er, und seine Trouppen nöthig haben werden, die frey und ungehinderte passage in seine lande gestatten." ; 14 September 1711, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 155v, 170v-171r.

<sup>139</sup> "... aigentlichen die Porten anjezo mit dem König in Schweden seiner ruckhkehr halber Zuthuen gesinnet seye und vernambe daß derselbe mit zuegebung einer Türckh: und Tartarischen convoye durch Pohlen in sein Land abgeführt werden solle, beÿ sogestalter beschaffenheit. er mangelte ich nicht absonderlich da der König und dessen anhang beÿ denen Türckhen kein gehör mehr hatten ...", 14 September 1711, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 161r. Baramova 2013; 369-370.

<sup>140</sup> "Verschiedenen Ministern welche mich ihne ruehmb zu melden wohl leiden mögen Discours weiß und ohne geringster bewirckhung oder fassender impegno vor zustellen daß wie sie wohl wissete fast das einzige intent des Königs in Schweden bis dafür geworfen seye daß Königreich Pohlen mit der Porten in ein Krieg einzuwicklen und wäre also zu für often daß er beÿ erhaltener obgedachten convoye durch üebung ein oder andern excess Alldorten nicht einneues kriegs feÿer erwecken und seÿe Porten mit Pohlen wider ihre intention in ein neue misshelligkeit bringen möchte...", 14 September 1711, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 161r.

<sup>141</sup> Serasker (or Seraskier) is a title formerly used in the Ottoman Empire for a Vizier who commanded the army, and later for the National Minister of Defence. "<https://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-serasker>". Accessed on 12.01.2024.

<sup>142</sup> "... Inzwischen wurden alle zur baldisten abraiß des König in Schweden nötlige anstalten vorgekehret und die hiezue erforderliche vospann, Wägen, und Proviant aus der Wallacheÿ beschriben auch der die in ungekähr 2000 Spahi und 8000 Tartarn bestehende Convoÿe commandiren sollende Seraskier Hahsan bahsa Begler Pegh von Romanen nach bender zu gehen beordert allwo er schon würcklich den 13. Augl: mit seinen Spahi angelangt, und sollen sich auch alda die Schweden dermahleins zum aufbruch rüsten, darbeÿ aber groÿsen wider willen wider die Türckhen verspürren lassen ...", 14 September 1711, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 162r-162v.

Furthermore, Fleischmann reports that the Grand Vizier received a direct imperial order from the Sultan stipulating that King Charles XII and his entourage were not to be permitted to cross the Danube until the Russians had fully complied with the terms outlined in the peace treaty.<sup>143</sup>

A document indicating that the Czar, after the peace treaty signed with the Ottomans, consented to King Charles's return to his country via Poland is also found in the Name-i Hümayun records.<sup>144</sup>

Willem Theyls, translator & secretary to Jacob Colyer—the Dutch consul-general in Istanbul—corroborates Fleischmann's account. In his memoirs, Theyls recounts that, following the Ottoman army's significant victory at Prut, King Charles XII of Sweden addressed a letter to Sultan Ahmed III. In the letter, Charles affirmed that although he had been granted permission to return to his homeland via a route of his choosing, he would not depart until he was provided with the number of Tatar and Ottoman Sipahi troops he had previously requested from the Sublime Porte as an escort. Furthermore, the Swedish King accused the Grand Vizier and his steward of avarice, alleging that they had allowed the Russian Czar to escape in exchange for inadequate concessions. He asserted that this so-called victory should not be a source of pride, but rather one of shame, due to the missed opportunity to decisively weaken Russia.<sup>145</sup>

According to Theyls, Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha was dismissed from office and subsequently exiled following the Crimean Khan's endorsement of the accusations contained in King Charles XII's letter. His chief aide, Osman Kahya, met a more severe fate, reportedly executed by being cast into the sea. This political upheaval within the Ottoman capital clearly worked to King Charles's advantage. Although he had been granted the opportunity to return to his homeland via Poland, as he had long desired, Charles chose to delay his departure, opting instead to remain in his encampment at Bender in anticipation of a renewed opportunity for war.<sup>146</sup>

Following the dismissal of the Grand Vizier and the successful persuasion of the Sultan by the Crimean Khan that Czar Peter I had failed to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Prut, the Ottoman

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<sup>143</sup> "... und darfften Sie Schweden so fern der Groß Vezier durch die genaue Vollziehung der Moscovitischen Capitulation, vor welcher völligen Execution, und abraiß des Königs in Schweden, gemessenen von Constantinopel erhaltene ordre gemess. Er die donau nicht passiren solle, sich beÿ dem Sultan manuteniren wird, noch mehrer mortificiert werden.", 14 September 1711, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 162v.

<sup>144</sup> "... ve taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyyemizden dahi temessük verilüb ve sizin Leh memleketi içinden dostluk tarîkiyle selâmet ile vilâyetinize gitmeniz husûsu cenâb-ı emâret-meâb eyâlet nisâb sa'âdet iktisâb bi'l-fîl Kırım Hânı olan Devlet Giray Hân dâmet me'âlihuya nâme-i hümayûn-ı şevket-marûnumuz ile ...", H.1123 / M. 1711-1712. BOA, A.DVNS. NMH. d., nr. 6, 244-245.; Apil 2022; 59.

<sup>145</sup> Theyls 1722; 18-21.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid; 21, 32.

Empire formally renewed its declaration of war against Russia. However, the ensuing optimism of King Charles and his representative in Istanbul, Count Poniatowski, proved short-lived. Their aspirations were soon undermined by the diplomatic intervention of the British ambassador, Robert Sutton, and the Dutch ambassador, Jacob Colyer, who acted swiftly as mediators in an effort to reestablish peace between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The Russian ambassador Tolstoy and his entourage, who was thrown back into the Yedikule dungeons<sup>147</sup> after the declaration of war, used Sutton and Colyer to communicate with the Grand Vizier in response to any provocative moves by the French ambassador Des Alleurs.<sup>148</sup>

The newly appointed Grand Vizier, Ağa Yusuf Pasha (also known as Gürcü Yusuf Pasha), held a critical stance toward the continued presence of King Charles XII in Ottoman territory. He regarded the financial burden imposed by the maintenance of the Swedish monarch and his entourage as excessive and unwarranted. In light of reports from frontier commanders indicating that Russian forces were evacuating border fortresses and adhering to the stipulations of the Treaty of Prut, Sultan Ahmed III ultimately abandoned plans for renewed hostilities. During the subsequent negotiations to reaffirm peace, one of the key Russian demands was the swift removal of King Charles XII and his retinue from Ottoman lands. According to the revised treaty terms, Charles would be permitted to travel to the Polish frontier accompanied by a designated number of Ottoman and Tatar escorts. The Russian Czar, having already withdrawn his forces from Polish territory, pledged not to interfere with the King's return. However, the treaty also included a proviso stating that, should Charles instigate any provocation upon entering Polish territory, Russian forces would be entitled to engage the Swedish contingent without prior consultation with the Ottoman Empire and without this being considered a breach of the peace. The immediacy with which this provision was to be implemented—and the accompanying directive instructing King Charles to prepare for immediate repatriation—deeply frustrated the Swedish King, whose longstanding ambition to incite renewed Ottoman aggression against Russia had once again been thwarted.<sup>149</sup>

The memoirs of Motraye, who was in King Charles's camp in Bender and was aware of all political events, also confirm the information in Fleischmann's documents. Moreover, Motraye also shares the correspondence between Sultan Ahmed and King Charles. In the letter<sup>150</sup> dated 21 April 1712 (14 Rabi'al-Awwal 1124) sent by the Sultan to the King, it is mentioned that peace with Russia

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<sup>147</sup> For more information about Yedikule (Seven Towers) Fortress," <https://pbase.com/dosseman/yedikule>". Accessed on 06.12.2023.

<sup>148</sup> Theyls 1722; 57-62.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Motraye 1727; 113-114.



was restored with the mediation of the British and Dutch ambassadors. In his correspondence, Sultan Ahmed conveyed that the Czar had fulfilled the obligations outlined in the Treaty of Prut and that King Charles was now permitted to return to his homeland via Poland, as he had personally requested. Of particular note in the Sultan's letter is the assurance that all necessary logistical support for the journey—including horses, monetary provisions, and carriages—would be provided by the Sublime Porte. However, Sultan Ahmed also issued a firm caution: neither the King nor his accompanying forces were to undertake any actions that might endanger the fragile peace established in the region during their passage through Polish territory. To this end, the Sultan explicitly urged King Charles to issue clear and binding instructions to his entourage to ensure full compliance with this directive, thereby safeguarding the diplomatic equilibrium recently achieved.

In his letter<sup>151</sup> dated 8 May 1712 in response to Sultan Ahmed's letter, King Charles expresses his gratitude to Sultan Ahmed for his generosity and mentions that he will leave the Ottoman lands to return to his country next winter after all the necessary preparations have been completed (all the assistance promised by the Sublime Porte has been provided). King Charles expressed his anticipation of returning to Sweden via Poland, in accordance with his original request, and emphasized the importance of being accompanied by a sufficiently sized escort. In the subsequent portion of his letter, the King offered a subtle critique, implying that the renewal of peace with Russia had effectively alleviated pressure on Czar Peter—an outcome that, in his view, necessitated his prompt return home to organize his Kingdom's defenses against potential aggression. Concluding his letter, Charles noted that he had entrusted a specific task to his envoy at the Sublime Porte and would initiate preparations for his departure once that task had been accomplished. While not explicitly stated, it is readily inferred that the nature of this task pertained to the acquisition of financial resources required to facilitate his return.

### **2.1.13. The Departure of Charles XII from the Ottoman Empire**

The restoration of Russian-Ottoman relations and the preference for peace disappointed the war supporters at Sublime Porte and the representatives of the Swedish King. According to Fleischmann, in the document dated 27 June 1714<sup>152</sup>, the Sultan, in a formal letter to King Charles,

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid; 114-115.

<sup>152</sup> "... zum auf die hiesige Staats neuigkeiten und beforderist auf des Königs in Schweden dermahligen zuestand zuschreiten hat die Porten unlängst selbigen eröffnen lassen, daß Sie die biß dâhin zu der durch Pohlen nemben wollenden passage begehrete convoÿe alß eine unthuenliche und wider die mit Ihren benachbahrten vollständig zuhalten verlangende freindschafft lauffende sache ansehe, mithin er König in Schweden von Ihr Porten kein anderen alß den mit der gueten freindt und nachbahrschafft übereins stimmen könnenden succurs zu hoffen, und selbiger

urged the Swedish monarch to reconsider his planned return route through Poland in favor of an alternative path. This request was made in the interest of preserving amicable relations and safeguarding the recently established peace. As indicated in the correspondence, the Sublime Porte perceived the King's insistence on traversing Polish territory with a substantial military escort as a potentially destabilizing action that could endanger regional stability. The Sultan further expressed his willingness to accommodate the King by offering him the option to remain in Dimetoka for an extended period, should he prefer to delay his journey. This gesture reflected both the Sultan's commitment to diplomatic prudence and his continued respect for Charles as an honored guest of the Ottoman Empire.

In the continuation of the same document<sup>153</sup>, Fleischmann states that King Charles accepted the idea of returning to his country through German territory, which was previously offered to the King by him. The King had, of course, been given a guarantee of security for this passage beforehand. It is also stated in the document<sup>154</sup> that the King had been in financial difficulty and that Sublime Porte was asked asked to borrow again for current debts and preparations for return.

Fleischmann added a note<sup>155</sup> to the aforementioned report, stating that according to his own reliable sources, the Porte had informed the French embassy secretary & dragoman Monsieur de Brué that the King Charles had been given the necessary assistance for his repatriation and even a

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*sofehrn er seine zumachen habende proposition nicht schröfflich einschicke, mit dem wenig geniessende Tain oder unterhalt sich noch so lang er wolle, zu Timatoka aufhalten könne.*", 26 June 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 28r.

<sup>153</sup> *"Worauf er höchstgedachter König in Schweden, nachdem Er sich wie ich von gueter hand versichert worden, durch Teütschlandt haimbzugehen sich entschlosse ..."*, 26 June 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 28v-29r.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 3, fol. 106r-107v.

<sup>154</sup> *"... und der Porten anwiderumb notificieren lassen, daß Er nunmehr bey so thauer beschaffenheit andere mesuren zunehmben und sich selbst zuhelffen bemüessiget seye; dahero verlangete er von Ihr Porten nichts anderes alß eine zur abzahlung deren hier gemachten Schulden zuelängliche gelt: Summa und einen gewöhnlichen Ferman auß disen Landen in die Christenheit ohne den weeg zumelden gehen zukönnen ..."*, 26 June 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 28v-29r.

<sup>155</sup> *"Wie ich jetzt gleich von einem meiner Confidenten avisiret werde, so hat die Porten dem in denen Schwedischen affairen sich brauchen lassenden französ!en Cantzler Monsr: de Peruit eröffnet, daß sie zwar dem König in Schweden all thuenlichen vorshub zulaisten, auch ein Reis Gelt {so aber nicht so vill, alß die Schweden sich einbilden, seyn wierdt zugeben genaigt seye, allein gezimbete es sich daß er König in Schweden die zumachen habende propositiones in einem an den Sultan gestellten schreiben in gezimbenden terminis anfüege, und sich des zu seiner rückraiß nehmenden aigentlichen wegs näher expliciere, wann nun der höchst berührte König wie zuglauben, sich hierzue resolviren dörfte, selbiger in kurzem von Dimatoka aufbrechen, und seine route durch Ihro Röml: Kayl: vnd Catholl:e Mayl: Lande zwar der apparenz nach, umb die zu Bender zurückgelassene Schweden desto leichter an sich zubringen, über Sibenbürgen und Hungarn nehmen bevor abr doch zweifels ohne bey dem Kayl:en hof hierüber daß gehörige anbringen lassen."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 44v.

small amount of travelling money. Fleischmann points out that the financial assistance given by Porte was well below the expectations of the Swedes. In addition, the document states that the King would soon return to his country by passing through the Imperial territory and that the goods (weapons, etc.) left behind in Bender would be taken via Transylvania and Hungary.

In his report<sup>156</sup> of 22 July 1714, Fleischmann states that the French dragoman Monsieur de Brué, who acted as a kind of intermediary in Sultan's relations with the King Charles, asked the Swedish Chancellor Herrn Baron von Müllern to write a request for a departure permit for the King, including the date of departure and the route to be followed on the way back. King Charles accepted this request but thought that it would be better to send the departure request to the Sultan through a Swedish envoy from Dimetoka, rather than through Monsieur de Brué. Thereupon, on the 9th of the month, on behalf of Grand Vizier (*Silahdar*<sup>157</sup> *Damat Ali Pasha*), the representative Reis Efendi asked the Swedish dragoman Pondt whether the King was sure about the date and route of his return. Pondt delivered King Charles's letter to the representative.

Additionally, Fleischmann noted that King Charles had not been granted permission to return to his homeland via any alternative route, nor had the requisite authorization—similar to the departure approval requested from the Sublime Porte—been secured for transit through the imperial territories that the King intended to traverse on his repatriation journey. Although this route had, at an earlier stage, been proposed by the Imperial envoy, Fleischmann emphasized that no formal request for passage had subsequently been made to the relevant Imperial authorities.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> *“Nachdeme unterthänigst berichtermassen die Porten dem alhier stehend und sich in denen Schwedischen affairen brauchen lassenden französischen Canzler Monsieur Brüe auf sein wegen der abraiß des Königs in Schweden von Ihr Porten verlangte permission in Nahmen des Königlichen Premier Ministri und Hof Cantzlers Herrn Baron von Müller eingeraichtes memorial geanthwortet: daß sie zwar dem König in Schweden all Thuenlichen Vorschub zulaisten genaigt seie, allein gebührete es sich, daß er höchst gemelte König in Schweden seines aufbruchs halber zumachen habende proposition in einem an den Sultan gestellten Schreiben in gezimbenden terminis anfüege, und sich des zu seiner rückhraiß nehmenden weegs näher expliciere ...”*; *“... den folgenden Tag als den 9ten diseß liesse der Reis Effendi selbst den zu sich berueffenen dollmetsch Pondte mir hinterbringen, und sich in Nahmen des groß-Veziers anfragen ob Ihro Kayl: Mayl: in fahl der König in Schwedischen durch die Kayl:e Lande zuruckh zu gehen willens sein solte, dise passage billeihete?”*, 22 July 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 47r-48v.

<sup>157</sup> For more information about Silahdar, “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/silahdar>”. Accessed on 10.02.2025.

<sup>158</sup> *“Worüber der Reis Effendi dem mehrgedachten Monsieur Brüe in Nahmen des Groß-Veziers hinterbracht, daß obwohlen der König in Schweden der Porten die aigentliche route seiner haimbraiß nicht offenbahret, selbige dennoch aller apparenz nach durch kein andere alß durch des Römischen Kayßers Lande genohmen werden dörfte, dahero hätte Sÿe Porten für guet befunden, in die angesuechte permission sowohl von den Türckh:en Landen aufzubrechen, alß einen Schwedl:en Envoÿe hieher an Sÿe schickhen zu können, ehe und bevor nicht einzuwilligen, biß selbige von mir alß Ihro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: anwesenden Residenten versicheret seÿe: daß Ihro allerhöchst erwehnte Röml: Kayl: Mayl: dise des Königs in Schweden durch die Kayl:e Lande nehmende passage zuelasse, gestalten Sÿe Porten zu nichts anlaß geben*

In the continuation of the document<sup>159</sup>, Fleischmann reports that Monsieur de Brué visited him to request that all necessary assistance be extended to King Charles and his entourage during their passage through the Habsburg Empire. According to Brué, the political and strategic condition of Sweden required the King's prompt return to his homeland. The report further indicates that King Charles' formal request for permission to depart was personally delivered to the Sublime Porte by Count Grouthausen. It is also noted that the date and route of the King's return had been definitively determined and finalized at the time of this correspondence.<sup>160</sup>

In his report<sup>161</sup> of 6 August 1714, Fleischmann provides a detailed account of Count Grouthausen's arrival at the Sublime Porte in his capacity as envoy extraordinary. According to the report, Count Grouthausen, accompanied by Colonel Rosa, Count Werk, and a delegation of 72 individuals, visited the Ottoman court with a threefold purpose: to convey King Charles's formal expression of gratitude to the Sublime Porte; to oversee the preparation of the necessary imperial edict and travel documents required for the King's departure<sup>162</sup>. Motraye stated that the King's

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*wolte, welches Ihro mehr allerhöchst gedl: Röml: Kayl: Mayl: einen Mißgefallen, weniger Zwischen disen zweyßen grossen Reichen einige imbroglie verursachen könne ", 22 July 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 47v-48r.*

<sup>159</sup> *"Worauf alsogleich der offtberühete Mons:r Brüe zu mir gekommen, und mir alles vorbeýgegangene weithläuffig erzehlet, mich in ständigst bittend daß weillen nun die in denen Schwedischen affairen vorgestoffene difficultet bloß allein von der Kayl: seithen konnte gehoben, und zu der Königl:en Rückhraiß geholffen werden, Ich mich hierinnen interponiren möge; worüber Ich ihn versichert: daß Ich sovill mir möglich zu dem behueff des Königl: Schwedischen interesse beýtragen vnd auf allerweiß trachten werde, die von Ihro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: meinem allergnädigsten herrn gegen Ihro Königl: Schwedische Mayl: segende hoch achtung und frdthschaftl:e zuenaigung in allen fällen eclatiren zu machen", 22 July 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 47v-48r.*

<sup>160</sup> *"Unter einstens vernehme daß der Königl: Schwedl:e Obrister Und favorit herr v: Grouethausen alß Envoye hieher gehen, und die von dem König in Schweden an den Sultan und Groß Vezier welchen lezteren Er biß dato einmahls zu schreiben wollen gestelte brief ýbergeben werde, alß dann wierd sich endlich des Königs in Schweden zu seiner haimbraiß gefaste resolution, weeg, und arth vollständig müsseren; welches Ich so gleich euer drhl: Excell: und gnaden unterthgst: zu berichten ohnermanglet bin ...", 22 July 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 50r-50v.*

<sup>161</sup> *"Dem 29ten letzt-verflossenen monaths Julý ist der Herr von Gronthausen Obrist, und Favorit des Königs in Schweden alß extra-ordinari Envoye mit einer Suite von zweý und sibenzig Personen, worunter der Obrist Rosa, und Graf Welk nebst einigen andern officieren sich befinden hier angelanget", 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 56r.*

<sup>162</sup> *"Nun aber seye er König resolviret aus Türckheý durch Hungarn vnd andere dem Römische Kayser zuestehende Lande [durch welche man ihme etlichmahlen die passage offeriret] zurückh in seine Lande zugehen dahero hette er hiemit ihme Sultan dises durch seinen extraordinari Envoye Obristen von Grouthausen in freündtschafft zu-wissen machen, und Ihme umb den hiezue benöthigten auch bereiths versprochene Ferman oder PasßPorth ersuechen wollen, Seinen gedachten Envoye aber die vollmacht entheillet daß mehreren seine abreiß betreffende der Porthen mündlich vorzutragen", 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 57r-57v.*

representatives had requested an additional 1,000 pouches of gold from the Sublime Porte to enable the King to finalise his preparations before departure.<sup>163</sup>

Fleischmann's report goes on to mention the change of attitude on the Swedish side, which now favoured better relations with King August of Poland.<sup>164</sup> Other noteworthy details in the document include the strengthening of relations between Poland and Russia<sup>165</sup> and the marriage of Princess Ulrika, sister of King Charles, to Frederick, Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel. Fleischmann stated in the document that if the marriage of the princess would be realised, Landgrave would give 6000 men to the King's service.<sup>166</sup>

Fleischmann's documents reveal that King Charles and his representatives in Istanbul persistently sought to incite the Sublime Porte against Russia, attempting to cultivate a renewed climate of hostility up until their final preparations for departure. Even during his last audience with the Grand Vizier, Baron von Grouthausen—Swedish envoy and one of the King's most trusted men—asserted that Russia was allegedly planning to forge new alliances with the intent of launching another assault on the Ottoman Empire. On this basis, Grouthausen emphasized the necessity of preserving and strengthening the bond of friendship and cooperation between Sweden and the Sublime Porte.<sup>167</sup>

At the same time, it is evident that King Charles and his entourage were experiencing a significant financial crisis. Despite receiving substantial aid from the Sublime Porte, the King had

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<sup>163</sup> Motraye 1727; 124.

<sup>164</sup> *"Indessen scheinet der Königlische Schwedische Hoff, wie es mir der gedachte Envoÿe in aller geheimb verthrauet dâhin zuincliniren sich zuvor umb diese seine heimbreyß zufacilitiren, mit dem König Augusto zuverstehen, und mit ihme einen abseithigen friden zuschliessen."*, 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 58r.

<sup>165</sup> *"Ubrigens die Pohlen, vnd Moscovitische affairen betreffend seÿnd Selbe in dem jüngst vnterthänigst beschribenen zuestand"*, 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 59r.

<sup>166</sup> *"Sovill ich penetrirte dörrfte der Erb Prinz von Hessen Cassel, obwohln er umb die Schwedische Prinzessin Ulrica inständigst anhaltet, vnd beÿ erfolgender vermählung auf seine Kösten 6000 Mann zu des Königs in Schweden dienst herzugeben"*, 6 August 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 59r.

<sup>167</sup> *"Inzwishen hat der Schwedishe Envoÿe Herr Baron von Grothausen den Ersten diß beÿ dem Groß: Vezier eine lange Conferenz gehabt, worinnen er Envoÿe Vorderist angemeldet von seinen hohen Principalen ordre zuhaben, der Porten vorzutragen, daß selbiger beÿ seiner in der Christenheit beshehender zuruckhkonfft den Krieg wider Moscau Continuiren, und möglichst dahin Trachten werde, auf daß diser sein: vnd der Porten durch die in seiner abwesenheit gemachte progressen intolerabl wordene allgemeine feind in die vorige shrancken getriben werden möge, der gântzlichen zuversicht, es werde auch dir Porten zu einen so heÿl samben, und zur sicherheit beeder Reichen erforderlichen werckhe daß jehrige gern beitragen, worauff der Groß Vezier in anthwortt angereget: daß zwar die Porten mit Moßcau den friden Stabiliret, und Krafft selbigem keine öffentliche frindserligkeit verüeben könnte..."*, 22 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 97r.

accrued considerable debts—not only to local merchants but also directly to the Sultan. The financial strain became so acute that, without the loans extended by France (20,000 Thaler) and the British merchant Cook (approximately 40,000 Thaler), the King's situation would have become untenable. Meanwhile, the Sublime Porte continued to exert increasing pressure on Charles to expedite his departure and return to his homeland.<sup>168</sup>

According to a letter<sup>169</sup> dated 26 September 1714 from Adam Vener of the Imperial Embassy (Sprachknab), King Charles would leave Dimetoka on 1 October to return home via Bucharest and Braşov<sup>170</sup>, but he was still waiting for horses and carriages to be sent to him by the Porte. In his accounts, particularly those detailing the life of King Charles, Motraye notes that during the King's exile in Ottoman territories, Czar Peter achieved uncontested dominance over Sweden across multiple domains. In Poland, the Czar's ally, Augustus II, successfully retained the throne, while Charles's personal wealth and royal assets had largely fallen into Russian hands. In the King's absence, Czar Peter relocated skilled artisans from the Swedish cities he had conquered to St. Petersburg, thereby enhancing Russia's technical and cultural infrastructure. Simultaneously, Sweden's economic power, commercial capacity, and international prestige had been severely diminished. Motraye further records that over one hundred thousand Swedes had been forcibly relocated into Russian territories, while a comparable number had been sold into servitude among the Turks and

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<sup>168</sup> *“Annebns hat der beüherte Schwedische Envoÿe dahin getrachter, beÿ der Porten durch derleÿ Ihr sehr anständige Discursen die benevolenz zuerwerben, damit Sÿe desto leichter die gegen gebender Königl: obligation angesuechte Tausent beuthel accordieren mögte, allein hat selbiger mit allem disem hierinnen nicht reussiren, vnd nicht ein mahl etlich hundert beuthel erhalten khönnen, allermassen der Sultan sich keines weegs darzue verstehen, vnd für den König in Schweden nichts anderes alß die erforderliche Pferdt, und Wagen nebst dem Tain oder nöttige verpflegung biß an die Kayl:e gräniz anbefehlen wollen, also das selbiger gegen zahlung eines ungemainen Interesse von der hier traficierenden französischen nation: 20000 vnd von dem Engelländishen handelßmann Cook 40000 Thaller zu herschaffung deren nöttigen equippage vnd raißgelt aufzunehmen bemüessiget worden, worzue der Defterdar mit erlaubnuß des Sultans dem besagten Cook 70 beuthel oder 35000 Thaller mit diser bedingnuß vorgestreckhet, daß selbiger dafür innerhalb 8 Monath an die Türckhl:e Cammer 1000 Centuer Zimmlifferen solle.”*, 22 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 97v-98r.

<sup>169</sup> *“Nachdem Lauth relation auf ordre Ihro gnaden des Kayßerlichen Herrn Residentens mich den 22ten dieß von Constantinopel nacher Adrianople begeben, umb mich beÿ denen in Selber gegendt einquartierten wohlbemelten Hern Residentens gueten Freündten des aigentlich bescheiden sollenden aufbruchs des Königs in Schweden zuerkundigen, habe ich beÿ meiner den: 24ten darauf bescheidenen ankhnfft von obbemelten freünden nichts positions in erfahrungheit bringen können, alß das, weillen höchst bemeltem König auf sein selbst starckhes urgiren von denen Ihme von der Porten adjungierten Kapuci Baschalar: vnd Aghalarn versprochen worden, biß nächsten sambstag alle zur bagage benötigte pferdt vnd wägen herbeÿ zushaffen, so werde der aufbruch mehr höchstbemelten Königs in Schweden von Dimatoka nacher Bukarest, Cronstatt vnd soforth in die Christenheit den Montag alß 1:ten Octobl: Vnfählbahr aber selbige wochen noch, dafern die in der relation angemerckhte präsenten vor bemelten Tag zu Dimatoka nicht ankommen solten...”*, 26 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 106r.

<sup>170</sup> For more information about Braşov (Cronstadt), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Braşov”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 26 Mar. 2012, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Brasov-Romania>. Accessed 20 January 2025.

Tatars. Against this backdrop of national decline, King Charles undertook a perilous and clandestine journey. After sixteen days of travel—risking recognition along the way—he arrived at the gates of Stralsund at midnight on 21 November 1714, having passed through Hungary, Moravia, Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, the Palatinate, Westphalia, and Mecklenburg.<sup>171</sup> Disguised to avoid being recognized, Charles was able to meet with the city's governor, General Duker, after barely persuading the guard at the gate. General Duker did not recognize his king at first and thought he was an emissary sent by his king. Indeed, later Charles took her arm and asked, "*Has my most loyal subject forgotten me?*" he reproached, and it was only after these words that the General recognized him.<sup>172</sup>

The news of King Charles's return spread rapidly throughout the city that night, prompting widespread public jubilation. According to Motraye, the streets quickly filled with citizens who gathered in celebration outside the governor's residence. The city was illuminated by thousands of torches, and the festivities were marked by exuberant scenes, with wine reportedly flowing freely through the streets. Such was the profound admiration and affection for the King that even rural youth—previously uninvolved in military affairs and engaged solely in agricultural pursuits—flocked to enlist in the army upon learning of his return, reflecting the enduring strength of his popular support.<sup>173</sup>

King Charles's return to his homeland via Transylvania is also mentioned in the Nusretname. Returning to his homeland via Hungarian and German lands, Charles was initially not recognized even by his own soldiers, but later, the city held large celebrations in his name.<sup>174</sup>

Baron Fabrice, one of King Charles's closest friends, stated in his letter<sup>175</sup> to Baron von Görtz, who was the King's financial adviser, on September 17, 1714, that the King would set out the following week via Wallachia, Transylvania and Braşov, as suggested by the Imperial representative Fleischmann. In the letter, it was also stated that the King wanted approximately 1 million ecu from Sublime Porte and that Porte did not give any money. Instead, the merchant Mr. Cook provided the King with a loan of 100,000 ecu.

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<sup>171</sup> Motraye 1732; 303, 313-314.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid; 305-306.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid; 306, 314.

<sup>174</sup> “.. Erdel ve Macar içinden geçüp Budun'a ve ândan Beç'e varup bir gice yatdı kimse kendüyü bilmedi ve kangı bölükde olduğunu kendi askeri bile bilmez idi ve bölükleri uğradığı şehir halkının su'âl idenlerine "kralımız gemiye girüp ve gemi ile gitdi" deyü cevâb iderler idi bu minvâl-i meşrûh üzre üç nefer kapudânlarıyla vilâyetine varup azim şenlik ve şâd-mânlık eylediği haberi geldi.”, Topal 2001; 816.

<sup>175</sup> Fabrice 1760; 330.

In a note<sup>176</sup> of Fabrice dated October 1, 1714, it is reported that 6 Sergeants, 300 horses and 60 chariots were ready to accompany the Swedish King. The note further indicates that, prior to his departure from Dimetoka, King Charles declined the repayment demands of various groups—including Janissaries, members of the Jewish community, and others—who had allegedly exploited the Swedes' vulnerable situation to issue loans under coercive or inflated terms. The King asserted that he would only consider repaying such debts if the creditors agreed to adjust the sums to reflect their true value. He went so far as to state that, should the officers and cavalry accompanying him demonstrate fairness in their claims—avoiding, for instance, demands of 100 écus for loans originally worth only 10—he would ensure the debts were honored upon his return to Sweden.<sup>177</sup>

Fabrice notes that the Sublime Porte promptly issued directives to supply the Swedish delegation in Bender with the requisite horses, carriages, and logistical support for their departure. These orders were executed without delay. On the morning of October 2, 1714, at approximately 10 a.m, the Swedish contingent commenced their journey under the leadership of General Sparre—deviating from the original plan, which had designated Serasker Abdi Pasha, the Vizier of Bender, and Ismail Pasha to oversee the escort. The Ottoman administration had also committed to covering all travel-related expenses until the Swedish party reached the border. Consequently, the Swedish forces stationed in Bender set out toward Wallachia to reunite with King Charles.<sup>178</sup>

The information given by Fleischmann on this subject coincides with that of Fabrice. On October 1, the Swedish King Charles left Dimetoka with his 130-person entourage and more than 50 creditors. On the same day, the gifts sent by the Ottoman Palace were delivered to him in Demirtaş. On October 2, he continued his journey by crossing the Danube River and planned to reach Târgoviște in 21 days. There, he aimed to unite with the Swedish troops coming from Bender and reach the Transylvanian border in four weeks.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Ibid; 337.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid; 337.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid; 338.

<sup>179</sup> *“Den 1, Octobris ist endlich der König in Schweden samt seiner in ohngefahr 130 Persohnen noch bestandenen Hof-Staat und mehr als 50 Creditorn, worunter 20 Janizaren, so alle in Schweden, um allda daß ihnen schuldige Geld zuempfangen, gehen wollen, von Dimotica aufgebroche; Den 2 sezte Er ferner seine Reyß gegen der Donau fort, in Hoffnung den 21 Tag zu Tergoviz einzutreffen, und sich mit seiner von Bender dahin gegangenen Schwedischen Mannschafft conjugiren, und sodann vom Tag seines Aufbruchs in vier Wochen die Siebenbürgische Graniz erreichen zukönnen.”*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 3, fol. 108r-108v, 116v.



### 3. The Ottoman-Venetian Conflict (1714-1715)

#### 3.1. Historical & Political Background

The Second Siege of Vienna resulted in a significant defeat for the Ottoman Empire, and the substantial territorial losses formalized in the Treaty of Karlowitz delivered a profound shock across the Ottoman lands. This resounding defeat at the hands of Christian European powers served as a stark manifestation of the pervasive inefficiency and systemic corruption that had gradually infiltrated all levels of the Ottoman administrative apparatus.<sup>180</sup>

During this period, significant political transformations were also unfolding in Russia. Following the death of Czar Feodor Alekseyevich (Fyodor III), the Russian throne was jointly inherited by his two half-brothers, Ivan and Peter, sons of different mothers. Due to their youth and Ivan's fragile health, their elder half-sister, Sophia Alekseyevna, was appointed regent. The unprecedented situation of two co-ruling tsars from different maternal lineages, coupled with Sophia's efforts to assert her own authority over the nobility and military, precipitated an intense struggle for power between the competing dynastic factions.<sup>181</sup>

This power struggle led an uprising, also known as the *Streletsy Uprising*<sup>182</sup>, which resulted in Sophia and her supporters taking total control over the state administration. Because her two siblings were young, Sophia had the opportunity to rule Russia as she wished.

As Peter matured and attained the age at which he could independently govern, the necessity for Sophia's regency diminished. Despite her determined efforts to sideline Peter and retain power, she failed to garner the backing of either the clergy or the military elite. A contributing factor to this lack of support was Russia's participation in the anti-Ottoman Holy Alliance beginning in 1686, which yielded little military success against the Ottoman forces. This failure undermined Sophia's position and further weakened her authority within the state apparatus.<sup>183</sup>

The death of Peter's half-brother, his attainment of the legal age to assume full authority, and the regent Sophia's inability to demonstrate any substantial success in the ongoing war collectively eliminated the principal barriers to Peter's consolidation of power. These events paved the way for him to ascend as the sole sovereign on the Russian throne.<sup>184</sup> When Peter I assumed sole authority over the Russian Empire, the state was already engaged in hostilities against the Ottoman Empire as

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<sup>180</sup> Inal 2008; 338.

<sup>181</sup> Hughes 1990; 210.

<sup>182</sup> O'Brien 1952; 39.

<sup>183</sup> Kurat 2014; 249-250.

<sup>184</sup> O'Brien 1952; 125-126.

part of the Holy Alliance. Czar Peter I recognized that access to international trade routes was essential for securing the wealth required to modernize and strengthen his empire. The two primary maritime gateways for Russia were the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. However, the Baltic route was dominated by the powerful Kingdom of Sweden, then ruled by the young King Charles XII, who had recently ascended to the throne at the age of fifteen.<sup>185</sup>

The previous chapter examined the Great Northern War and the Battle of Prut—marked by the geopolitical struggles among Russia, Poland, and the Kingdom of Denmark against Sweden—and analyzed the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in this broader conflict through the lens of archival documents authored by Fleischmann.

Russia's strategic ambition to secure access to the Black Sea—then encircled by Ottoman territories—represented a critical aspect of its expansionist agenda. Contemporary documents and archival sources from the period reveal that Russia, often in concert with its Western allies, systematically incited insurrections among Christian populations in the Balkans. These efforts aimed to destabilize Ottoman authority at a time when the Sublime Porte was already grappling with internal revolts, fiscal insolvency, and a weakened military apparatus.<sup>186</sup> The rebellion of the Montenegrins while the Ottoman-Russian and the Ottoman Venetian Wars were continuing should be evaluated in this context.

### **3.2. Montenegrin Uprising**

Czar Peter I's Russia achieved fewer gains from the Wars of the Holy Alliance compared to its allies. The primary acquisition was the Fortress of Azov, secured through the Treaty of Karlowitz. This strategic stronghold provided Russia with a crucial foothold on the Black Sea coast. To solidify control over Azov, it was imperative to address the persistent threat posed by the Crimean Tatars, who frequently conducted raids into Russian territories. Recognizing the importance of destabilizing the Ottoman Empire, which dominated the surrounding Black Sea regions, Czar Peter I sought to incite uprisings among the Ottoman's Christian subjects in the Balkans. He positioned himself as the protector of Orthodox Christians, including Serbs, Wallachians, Moldavians, and Montenegrins, aiming to foment dissent and weaken Ottoman authority. Despite being aware of Peter's intentions, the Ottoman administration was reluctant to engage in renewed conflict with Russia. Sultan Ahmed III, cognizant of the empire's vulnerabilities following the substantial losses incurred under the Treaty of Karlowitz, instructed Crimean Khan Devlet II Giray to withhold assistance from Swedish King Charles XII, who was seeking support against Russia prior to the Battle of Poltava. During this period,

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<sup>185</sup> Kurat 2014; 252-255.

<sup>186</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 241.

Czar Peter I also disseminated crosses bearing his image throughout the Balkans under the guise of trade, further attempting to galvanize the Orthodox populace against Ottoman rule.<sup>187</sup>

Situated between the Ottoman provinces of Shkodra (modern-day Shkodër) and Bosnia within the Sanjak administrative framework, Montenegro occupies a mountainous territory on the Balkan Peninsula in Southeastern Europe. The region's rugged and elevated terrain offered the Montenegrins considerable natural protection, particularly during the Ottoman military campaigns in Bosnia and Albania. Although the Ottomans began levying taxes in Montenegro as early as the sixteenth century, the region consistently resisted centralized control, remaining one of the most challenging areas for the empire to fully assert its authority.<sup>188</sup>

Since the time of Danilo I, no ruler from the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty. Shortly after ascending to power, Danilo I reinforced this defiance through a violent act in which the Muslim population of Montenegro was massacred in a single night during Christmas of 1702. This event, known and commemorated in Montenegrin historiography as *the Montenegrin Evening Prayer*, holds a symbolic place in the national memory. Despite multiple military campaigns launched by the Ottomans to suppress the Petrović-led resistance, these efforts proved largely ineffective due to the region's formidable geography and a martial tradition deeply rooted in a heroic yet often ruthless ethos.<sup>189</sup>

In 1706, following a series of uprisings in which Montenegrin forces launched assaults on neighboring villages and towns, Seyfullah Pasha, then-governor of the Herzegovina Sanjak, was assigned additional military forces and dispatched to the region to suppress the unrest. Although Seyfullah Pasha intended to relocate the insurgent Montenegrins as a punitive measure, his efforts ultimately fell short of achieving the desired outcome.<sup>190</sup>

Czar Peter, who was planning the war with the Ottomans, supported the Montenegrins in an uprising along with other Christian subjects in the Balkans during the war. Danilo I<sup>191</sup> (also known as Danilo Šćepčević), the spiritual and political leader (Vladika) of the Montenegrins, pursued an aggressive policy against Ottoman territories with the backing of the Russian Czar. His incursions into Bosnia and Herzegovina were marked by violence and forced conversions, during which segments of the Muslim population were compelled to embrace Christianity, while those who resisted were

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<sup>187</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 70.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid; 72.

<sup>189</sup> Gölen 2011; 503.

<sup>190</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 71.

<sup>191</sup> For more information about Danilo I, (Metropolitan of Cetinje), "<https://alchetron.com/Danilo-I,-Metropolitan-of-Cetinje>". Accessed on 07.11.2023.

executed. Although reports of these atrocities reached the Ottoman court, they were not initially met with serious political action. As a result, Danilo I continued his campaigns with impunity, and the scope of the rebellion expanded. The Ottoman state's inability to swiftly suppress the Montenegrin uprising significantly hampered its military operations during the Prut Campaign, presenting a serious internal challenge amid broader geopolitical tensions.<sup>192</sup>

In 1711, while the Governor of Bosnia was engaged in the Prut Campaign alongside other provincial commanders of the sanjak, an individual named Mihail—originally from Russia—arrived in Montenegro accompanied by his two brothers. Upon reaching the town of Cetinje, they held consultations with the Vladika (Danilo I) and began organizing efforts to incite an uprising among the Christian populations of both Montenegro and Shkodër against Ottoman rule. With an armed force estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 men, they succeeded in capturing several towns in the region and laid siege to Onogošt (known in Ottoman sources as Onogošta), subjecting it to sustained artillery and bombardment over an eight-day period. Ultimately, Ottoman reinforcements arrived in the area, repelled the assault, and compelled Mihail and his rebel forces to withdraw to Cetinje.<sup>193</sup>

One of Mihail's allies, the commander of the Cernica Fortress (known in Ottoman sources as Çerņiçe), entrenched himself on elevated terrain near the Ottoman-Ragusan (Dubrovnik) border alongside Christian insurgents from Herzegovina. From this strategic position, he incited the local Christian population to rebel against Ottoman authority. Villages that refused to join the uprising were subjected to plunder, and their inhabitants were brutally massacred. Upon receiving alarming reports from fortress commanders regarding the escalating violence, the Ottoman central administration responded by appointing Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of Bosnia, as serasker (commander-in-chief) in April 1712. He was dispatched to the region with reinforcements drawn from the sanjaks of Shkodër, Dukagjin, and Prizren.<sup>194</sup> Indeed, in a report published in the *Wiener Zeitung* on June 4, 1712, based on information from Dalmatia, it was reported that the Montenegrins had inflicted heavy losses on the Ottoman forces.<sup>195</sup>

Following the Ottoman victory in the Prut Campaign, a portion of the now-redundant troops was redeployed under the command of Ahmed Pasha. These forces launched punitive expeditions against the fortified positions of the Montenegrin insurgents, compelling the principal instigators of the rebellion, Mihail and Vladika Danilo, to flee the region. Upon the successful suppression of the uprising, Ahmed Pasha withdrew his forces but issued a stern ultimatum: should the Montenegrins

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<sup>192</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 72.

<sup>193</sup> Rastoder 2003; 115, Uzunçarşılı 2011; 98.

<sup>194</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 98, Roberts 2007; 141-142.

<sup>195</sup> *Wiener Zeitung- Wienerisches Diarium*, Januar – Juni 1712 / 1712-06-15.

engage in rebellion again, all individuals above the age of seven would face execution. This warning underscored the Sublime Porte's intent to enforce order through decisive and uncompromising measures.<sup>196</sup>

Following the departure of Ahmed Pasha from the region, the Venetians actively encouraged the Montenegrins to initiate another rebellion. After the uprising failed, the Vladika sought refuge in Venetian territory, where he organized a renewed revolt with financial backing from Venice. During this insurrection, Muslims from nearby settlements, as well as Christians who refrained from supporting the rebellion, were massacred and their properties looted. When warnings and threats from the Sublime Porte proved ineffective, a new military campaign was launched. In May 1714, Köprülüzade Numan Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, was appointed serasker and tasked with suppressing the rebellion. The mobilization of a substantial military force drawn from various surrounding sanjaks under Numan Pasha's command reflected the gravity with which the Ottoman government viewed the Montenegrin revolt. The uprising of the Montenegrins and Numan Pasha's attempts to suppress the rebellion are also included in *Târîh-i Râşid*.<sup>197</sup>

A decree sent to Numan Pasha emphasized the urgency of swift and decisive success, explicitly stating that failure would not be tolerated. Notably, the decree also instructed that all efforts be made to prevent the rebels from fleeing into Venetian territory and warned against pursuing them across the border should they escape. Emboldened by Venetian support, the Montenegrin rebels fortified themselves in steep, inaccessible terrain and launched their attacks from these defensible positions. Although some rebels were defeated during Numan Pasha's relentless pursuit, many—including the Vladika—managed to find refuge once more within Venetian borders. Despite earlier assurances to the Ottoman Empire that it would not shelter the rebels, Venice granted asylum to both the Vladika and his followers and subsequently rejected the Ottoman demand for their extradition. This breach of trust provided the Ottoman Empire with a *casus belli*, ultimately leading to the declaration of war against Venice.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Uzunçarşılı 2011; 99.

<sup>197</sup> “İskenderiye sancağında vâki’ Karacadağ re’âyâsı dâimâ şekâvet ü isyân üzre olup civârlarında vâki’ Venedik keferesi tarafından kendülere takviyet verildiğinden yevmen feyevmen kuvvetleri izdiyâd ve hıyânetleri iştîdâd bularak, ol havâlîde vâki’ bilâd-ı müslimîne îsâl-i mazarrat u hasâretten hâlî olmamalarıyla Bosna Vâlîsi Vezîr-i mükerrem Numan Paşa hazretleri ale’l-umûm Bosna eyâleti ve ba’z-ı mîr-i mîrân ve ümerâ-i etrâf eyâletleri askeriyle kefer-i mezbûreyi kahr u tedmîr içün ser’asker nasb ü ta’yîn olunmuşıdi.”, *Târîh-i Râşid* II, Özcan 2013; 885-886.

<sup>198</sup> Özdem 2012; 69-70, Uzunçarşılı; 99-101.

Fleischmann also shares information about the Montenegro rebellion in the report he sent to the Vienna Aulic War Council. In his report<sup>199</sup> on September 22, 1714, he mentions that Köprülüzade Numan Pasha completely cornered the Montenegrin rebels. The Montenegrins had agreed to obey the Ottoman government again and knew that they would have to pay tribute if they rebelled again.

In another report<sup>200</sup> by Fleischmann dated October 19, 1714, it is mentioned that Köprülüzade Numan Pasha took action against the rebels in Montenegro with a force of approximately 20,000 people. The report further indicates that Numan Pasha dispatched a letter to the Sublime Porte, in which he claimed to have dismantled the defensive positions of the Montenegrin rebels with a force of 4,000 troops and eliminated the insurgents. According to his account, the Montenegrins, having been decisively defeated, would henceforth remain loyal to Ottoman authority and resume the payment of the customary tribute. Fleischmann notes that the Ottoman government instructed Numan Pasha to ensure the complete eradication of the rebel forces. This directive aimed not only to prevent any future alliance between the Montenegrins and the Venetians but also to allow for the redeployment of Numan Pasha's now-unoccupied forces to the Dalmatian coast.

### **3.3. Sublime Porte's War Decision on the Republic of Venice**

After reaching an agreement with Russia and convincing the unwelcome guest, the King of Sweden, to return to his country from his long and eventful stay, the Sublime Porte could finally concentrate on its efforts to regain the lands it had humiliated and lost nearly 15 years earlier. It would not be wrong to say that the self-confidence gained from the Prut victory over Russia undoubtedly played a large part in this goal. Preparations for the campaign began, but at first, it was not known for whom these preparations were made. Even in the Ottoman Court, there were different ideas about the direction of the campaign. Some thought that an expedition to Podolia

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<sup>199</sup> "... wie dann auch der Kuprulu ochlu Numan Bahsa dergestalten die Montenegriner in die enge getriben, daß selbige der Porten ins Künfftig gehorsamb zu seyn, und den sonst bezahlten tribut wider abzuführen angelobet haben.", 22 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 104v.

<sup>200</sup> "Von dem gegen die Montenegriner mit ungefähr 20000 Mann zu feld gegangenen Kuprulu Oghlu Numan Bahsa langte abermahlen ein expresser hier an, mit welchem gedachter Bahsa der Porten berichtet daß er mit 4000 Mann die sonst vorhin unbestriglich gehaltene gebürge penetrirret, und die sich darein geflüchte Montenegriner umbringet hätte, worauf selbige sich unterwürftig, und sambtlich dem Sultan ins künfftig treu zu seyn, auch den gewöhnlichen tribut zuzahlen angelobet, also daß nun mehro ihr Porten frey stehe mit selbigen Leuthen zuthuen was sie wolle; hierauf wurde gestern ihme Numan Bahsa in antwortt die ordre zuegeschickht Sie mehrgedachte Montenegriner Völlig nider zuhauen, und außzurotten, zweifels ohne auß forcht daß selbige in dem vorhabenden Krieg nicht etwa aufs neue aufstehen, und sich mit denen Venetianern conjungiren, der mehr gedachte Bahsa aber nach der execution diser berührten ordre seine unterhabende Troupen gegen Dalmatien wendten möge.", 19 October 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 119r-119v.

(also known as Kamianets-Podilsky) was the best idea because the Kingdom of Poland was busy with a lot of internal problems, the castles were not fortified, and it was vulnerable due to the plague epidemic. Moreover, it lacked the capacity to resist the Ottoman army after Russia withdrew its soldiers from the country. Another opinion in the Sublime Porte was that a campaign should be organized for the Habsburg lands, Transylvania, and Hungary, which had just emerged from the war. Because of the war, the empire's treasury was empty, and the people were dissatisfied with their ruler. Moreover, the castles were still not fortified. However, as soon as the emperor heard about the preparations of a campaign in Istanbul, he sent troops of 50,000 experienced soldiers to Hungary and Transylvania, and the Sublime Porte gave up on this idea. Following these events, it was claimed for a while that preparations for the campaign were made against Malta, but in the end, it was understood that the target was actually Venice. If Azov, lost to the Russians, could be taken back, the Peloponnese, lost to Venice, could also be taken back. In the Ottoman court, a group led by Shaykh al-Islam and Valide Sultan (Sultan's mother) thought that declaring war on Venice was dangerous. In their opinion, there was no sufficient and just reason to declare war on Venice. This situation was contrary to Ottoman state practices. Moreover, a war declared against Venice could bring the Christian powers of Europe together again. The involvement of the Habsburgs and the Russians in the war could have resulted in a disaster similar to Karlowitz. Moreover, in such a war, Azov, which had been recaptured from the Russians, could also be in danger.<sup>201</sup>

Grand Vizier Damat Ali Pasha and other war supporters were of the opinion that war with Venice was necessary. According to them, the Ottoman treasury was in good condition; their ammunition was full. Moreover, compared to Venice, the Ottoman army was perfect enough to challenge even the powerful leaders of the Christian world. It would not befit a great power like the

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<sup>201</sup> "... Sobald nun gemelter Capitain Bahsa hier wierd eingeseget seyn, so werde destwegen die weithere instanz machen, vnd all: meine aüsseriste Cröfften ausfannen, dises Kaiserlichen sambe werckh der habenden allergnädigsten Kayl:en instruction gemäsz zum gewünschten ende zubringen, sofern nur die gegenwärttliche wider Venedig gar zu Clar anscheinende neüe conjuncturen nichts widriges in weeg legen. Allermassen hier, vnd in mehristen anderen Ottomannischen Provinzen die grosse Kriegsanstalten zu wasser vnd zur Land ohne vnterlaß continuirt, vnd bereiths zur Salonik, Candia, Negroponte, vnd Lepanto [welche lezttere orth auch wider den Carlowitzl:en friden fortificiert wierd] grosse magazinen angeleget, ingleichen vershiedene Janitschären Trouppen: weiß, doch nur etliche Tausent Mann außmachend, hin: vnd wider auf die kleine Insul transportieret werden, in Summa es wierdt nichts vnterlassen, waß zur gedachten Krieg erforderlich seyn mag, welcher all meiner Confidenten ein stimmigen aussag nach, so bald nur der oben berüehete Capitain Bahsa welcher die anthwortt wegen denen an Venedig machenden prætensionen mitbringet, angelanget, publicieret werden solle; Ich erwartte dahero ewer durchl: Excell: vnd gnaden die zu disen bereiths vor vier Monathen gründlich penetrierten, vnd vnterthänigst berichteten conjuncturen nöttige Instructionen mit grossem verlangen, vnd wird die zuruckhtreibung dises von der Porten gegen die offtgemelte Republic Venedig wüerckhlich beschlossenen Kriegs vmb so härter halten; alß man mit einem übermüethigen, vnerfahrenen vnd keine raison anzunehmen gewohnten gouverno zuthuen hat. Der güettige Gott wende alles zu der lieben Christenheit, insonderheit Jhro Röml: Kayl: Majl: bestem ...", 7 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 127r-128r. Hammer-Purgstall 1840; 161-170. Zinkeisen 1857; 463.

Ottoman Empire to be afraid of the Republic of Venice, which consisted of a handful of people. They felt that the unjust loss of the Morea was a great humiliation for the Empire. They also claimed that the Habsburgs, who had just come out of a tiring war, would not want to confront the Ottomans before they could recover, and that the Russians were still busy with the Swedes.<sup>202</sup>

The loss of Morea to Venice was like a dagger in the hearts of Muslims. According to the Sublime Porte, it could only be a pathetic thing to hesitate to enter into a conflict with a state like Venice, which could never cope militarily with the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the people of the Peloponnese were never happy with Venetian rule. In his narrative, "*Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*", published in 1794, Diedo mentions that Venice, which had just signed peace with the Spanish Monarchy, was caught unprepared for the Ottoman aggression. According to him, Morea, which cost a lot of money and blood, was always a thorn in the hearts of the Ottomans.<sup>203</sup>

In the report<sup>204</sup> that Fleischmann sent to the Aulic War Council on October 15, 1714, it is stated that the Sublime Porte, among those who brought him information, accelerated the preparations for war. Along with the Grand Vizier, Sultan Ahmed III was also personally involved in supervising the war preparations. According to the report, the Republic of Venice was facing a greater danger of war day by day. He also mentioned in his report that a pasha (Moralı Hasan Pasha) was appointed for the war preparations on the Ottoman side and that the Sublime Porte asked him to complete the war preparations by March 20 at the latest. It is understood from the report that the preparations in question include 24 merchant ships capable of carrying at least 60 cannons, 36 galleons, 100 galleys, 150 lifeboats, and 8 warships carrying 16 large cannons of 200 cents each. Many Kapıcıbaşı and experts were assigned to complete these preparations on time.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid; 464.

<sup>203</sup> Diedo 1794; 52-53.

<sup>204</sup> "Sonsten wachsen die vor mehr alß 2 Monathen von meinen hin und wider gestelten Confidenten mir angedeuete, und schon damahlen unterthänigst beschribene der Republic Venedig von hier aus vorstehende Kriegs gefahr von Tag zu Tag mehr an, gestalten man den in ausrüstung der sie macht biß dahin bezeügten fleiß nicht allein continuiert, sondern selben wohl verdoppelt, und daher der Groß Vezier, so nebst dem Sultan selbstn öffters zweimahl des Tags ins Arsonal gehet, und die allda vornehmende Schüffarbeith besichtigt, den 21ten passato den Tershana Emini oder Arsonal Aufseher seines nicht genugsamb vorgekehrten eifers ab", 15 October 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 109v-110r.

<sup>205</sup> "... und den Hassan Aga einen Moreer, welcher sowohl alß alle andere aus Morea gebürtige Türckhen, unter welchen der vice Admiral Gianuni chozja, und verschidene in dem Seraglio sein, zu diesen wider Venedig vorhabenden Krieg grosse instanz machen, eingezet, mit der ihme gegebenen gemessenen ordre all möglichen fleiß anzuwenden, auf das längstens den 20ten Marti sechzig grosse Kriegs-Schüff, worzue 24 Kaufferthei-Schüff deren indes wenigstens Sechzig Canonen traget, verfertigt werden, Sechs und dreißig Galleren, einhundert galleatzen, und einhundert fünffzig Feluquen, auf denen jeden sich biß achtzig Persohnen imbarquieren können, ausgerüstet, mit allem nöthigen versehen, und zum auslaufen fertig sein, worzue man über die Kleinere noch 16 Grosse Canonen, ein jedes von 200 Centner umb stein Kugel darauszuwerffen, in hiesigen Zeüg hauß giesset, worvon acht der grössern Kriegs Schüffen jedes mit zwey



The British ambassador Sutton mentioned in his letter dated October 7, 1714 that the Sublime Porte was preparing for war against Venice. In his letter dated October 26, Sutton stated that according to the intelligence he received, the French were promising support to the Ottomans if Austria joined the conflict after the Sublime Porte declared war on Venice.<sup>206</sup>

Fleischmann also reported that the war preparations were undoubtedly made against Venice, as he learned from the Büyük Mîrâhur, whose friendship he stated he gained by giving expensive gifts. It was known that when the preparations were completed, the Sultan would accompany his army to Thessaloniki<sup>207</sup> in next spring.<sup>208</sup>

In the same document, Fleischmann also mentioned that Köprülüzade Numan Pasha was ordered by the Sublime Porte to suppress the rebellion in Montenegro. After the rebellion was relatively suppressed, Numan Pasha's forces, consisting of sixteen companies, were sent to Thessaloniki. According to Fleischmann, announcing that war preparations were being made against Malta or the Kingdom of Sicily<sup>209</sup> was to catch the Republic of Venice unprepared, which was already unwanted by the people of the Morea.<sup>210</sup>

According to the memoirs of Dutch embassy secretary Theyls, the Sublime Porte was trying to keep secret who the war would be fought against, even after the weapons depots and

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*versehen werden sollen ...*", 15 October 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 110r-110v.

<sup>206</sup> Büyükaksoy 2023; 1131-1132.

<sup>207</sup> For more information about Thessaloniki (Salonik), "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thessaloniki>", Accessed on 11.12.2023.

<sup>208</sup> "... zweybackh zuverfertigen von hier gegen obgedachte orth die berückhen und weeg zu verbessern vershidene Capuci Bahsa und andere Expresse expediret worden; vor etlich Tügen liesse mir der Bujuk Emirachor oder Obrist Stahlmeister des Sultans, dessen genuß Ich mit vershidenen geschanckhnussen erkhauffet, hinterbringen, das an dem gegen Venedig vornehmenden Krieg nicht zu zweiflen, und der Sultan fast resolviret seye sich nechstkünfftiges früh Jahr in Persohn bis nach berührtes Salonik zubegeben.", 15 October 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 110v.

<sup>209</sup> For more information about the Kingdom of Sicily, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Kingdom-of-Sicily>". Accessed on 13.12.2023.

<sup>210</sup> "... so seynd auch an etliche insonderheit an den Kinperlioglu Numan Bahsa ordre ergangen ihre Troupen zusamben zuziehen, vnd zwar der letztere unter dem prætext mit selbigen wider die Montenegriner, so zwar Theills capituliret, allein sich doch nicht sambtlich unterworffen, zugehen; von denen zu Chotzim gestandenen Janitsharen seind würckhlich Sechzehn Oda oder Compagnien im marche begriffen gegen Salonik, in denen über diesen vorhabenden fridensbruch beÿ der Porten gehaltenen conferenzen wurde unter andern proponiret, das man sich zwar mit aller macht wider Venedig rüssten, allein vorgeben solle, das solches wider daß Königreich Sicilien, und Maltha angesehen seie, damit also die gedachte Republic von der Ottomannischen Macht auf einmahl überfallen und bemüßiget werde nicht allein die in der von Jhr Republic ohne ihr Sach gegen die unternommenen leztern fridens ruptur unrechtmässiger weiß abzwagten Lande unter andern des Königreich Morea (dessen Innwohner wegen deren Venetianer harten tractantent sehr übl zufriden, und die darinnige Miliz hauffen weiß desertire, zurestituiren ...", 15 October 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 111r-111v.

preparations in the shipyard were completed. Yet, an Ottoman preacher at that time was dismissed from his post and exiled after asking his audience during worship to pray to God for the success of the Sultan and his army in their war against the Christians.<sup>211</sup>

### 3.4. Dulcignotian Raids on Venetian Ports & Kidnapped Imperial Subjects

Under Islamic law (sharī'a), the act of invasion may constitute a legitimate *casus belli*, provided that specific legal and ethical conditions are met. For a war to be considered lawful, it must satisfy several criteria, including a clear defensive justification, the protection of non-combatants, proportionality in the use of force, the formal declaration of hostilities, and the pursuit of justice throughout the conduct of warfare.<sup>212</sup> Therefore, the occupation of Venetian lands by Ottoman forces was expected to cause justified objections in the Sublime Porte. Even though it could be conclusively proven that the Venetian governor-general (*Provveditori Generali*) in Dalmatia, had not only refused the protection of Montenegrin fugitives but had refrained from any action that would violate the peace, it became the most important trump card in the Sublime Porte for declaring war. Venetian ships and some minor frictions on the borders remained in the background. Again, before the war was officially declared, Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha<sup>213</sup> authorized the people of Dulcigno<sup>214</sup> to commit piracy, with the knowledge of the Sultan. In this way, it was aimed at causing discomfort and insecurity in Venetian trade as soon as possible. The complaints of the Venetian Bailo Memmo regarding this issue were ignored, saying that the Grand Vizier did not know about the happenings.<sup>215</sup>

Fleischmann mentioned in several of his reports the raids of the Dulcignotians (with the permission of the Sublime Porte) on the Venetian coast and merchant ships. In his report<sup>216</sup> dated

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<sup>211</sup> Theyls 1722; 175.

<sup>212</sup> Buğda 2021; 196.

<sup>213</sup> For more information about Canım (also known as Canum, Janum or Djanum) Hoca Mehmed Pasha, Setton 1991; 428-442. "[https://archive.org/details/bub\\_gb\\_XN51y209fR8C/page/427/mode/2up](https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_XN51y209fR8C/page/427/mode/2up). Accessed on 15.11.2023.", Accessed on 20.06.2025.

<sup>214</sup> For more info about Dulcigno (Ulcinj), "<https://www.visit-montenegro.com/destinations/ulcinj/info/history/>", Accessed on 07.11.2023.

<sup>215</sup> Theyls 1722, 173.

<sup>216</sup> "... und sodann den 10ten darauf beÿ dem Groß-Vezier audienz genohmen, in welcher ich ihme Groß-Vezier in gegenwarth seiner Chÿhaja, des Reis Effendi, und Mechtubci angezaiget, daß mir durch einen vor 3 Tagen ankombenen Currier von dem Kaylen Hoff wegen deren von denen Dulcignoten an Ihro Römische Kayserliche und Cathollische Majestat Unterthannen außübenden feindseeligkeiten zuegeschriben, und gnädigst anbefohlen worden seÿe, solches Ihr Porten vorzutragen, worauf, Ich alles bevorderist den wegen deren auf der ohnweith dem Kayserlichen Porto gelegenen Insul Bremuda hinweckh genohmenen sibenzig Kayserliche Spänische Officiers, Schüff, Patron, und Poots Knechten eraigneten, dem Carlowitzischen frieden zuwider lauffenden Casum umbständlich und zwar in so guet und nachtruckhlichen terminis vorgestellet, daß er Groß-Vezier dise Strassmässige facta ohne seiner und der Porthen vorwissen von denen Dulcignotischen Raubern vorgegangen zuseÿn betheürend gleich versprochen dem Kayserlichen Hoff durch restitution deren abgefuehrten Leüthen und sachen eine billiche Satisfaction zurgeben, wie er dann yber den

November 19, 1714, he mentioned that he was informed about the raids of the Dulcignotians through his courier and that the subjects of the Habsburg Empire were also affected by these raids. Moreover, some people were kidnapped and captured by the Dulcignotians. Fleischmann told the Grand Vizier that this situation was against the peace provisions of the Treaty of Karlowitz, and the Grand Vizier sent a decree to the Dulcignotian pirates through Reis Efendi, asking for the immediate release of the captured Imperial subjects and the return of their confiscated belongings to them. Meanwhile, Fleischmann states that the Dulcignotians acted early and promised the Imperial authorities that they would not take any actions that would disrupt the peace. However, in the Wiener Zeitung, in a news report dated 23 April 1712, based on a letter from Venice, it was reported that the Dulcignotians were also raiding and robbing around Otranto at that time.<sup>217</sup>

In another report<sup>218</sup> dated September 16, 1714, Fleischmann states that the translator Joseph Pondt was assigned to obtain information from the Ottoman authorities about the Imperial subjects kidnapped and captured by the Dulcignotians and to ensure their release along with their confiscated goods. The duties given to Pondt and the demands made of him are explained in 13 articles. These are:

1) Joseph Pondt must not shy away from the effort, diligence, and devotion required by his duty and must diligently perform every duty that may be necessary for the subjects of his Roman Imperial Majesty. He will assume serious responsibility in the event of a negative situation.<sup>219</sup>

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*auf mein destwegen Küertzlich und zwar den 19ten Octobris unterthänigst berichter massen gethanne Instanz schon dahin geschickhten Ferman in meiner gegenwarth dem Reis Effendi ernstlich anbefohlen, die sache ad notam zunehmen, darüber zu entlassung deren zur Slaven gemachten leüthen und abgeraubten Sachen scharffe ordre zu formiren, und zu deren exequirung einen gescheidt und vernünfftigen Mann außzufinden, damit aber gedachte ordre desto klar und nachtruckhlicher aufgesezet, und die sache desto geschwinder...”, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 140r-141v.*

<sup>217</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Januar - Juni 1712 / 1712-05-04.

<sup>218</sup> “*Was der Kayserliche Dollmetsch Joseph Pondt in der ihme anbefahlenen Commision wegen Übernehmung deren von denen Dulcignoten hinweckhgeführten und jetzo dem von der Porthen erhaltenen Ferman nach heraus zugeben habenden Kayserlichen Unterthanen, und Sachen zubeobachten.*”, 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142r.

<sup>219</sup> “*1.mo Solle Er Joseph Pondt sich seiner allerunterthänigsten Pfligh erinnern kheine mühe, fleiß, und arbeith sparren, sondern alles, was zu ihrer Römische Kayserliche Mayestat Unterthanen besten geraichet, embsig verrichten, in widrigen fall wurde er ein schwähre verantwortung auf sich ziehen.*”, 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142r.

2) The decrees and orders sent by the Sublime Porte through the Çavuşlar Emini must be fulfilled meticulously. In addition, one should act with good, firm, and careful intentions and not neglect any duty due to selfishness.<sup>220</sup>

3) This is why Çavuşlar Emini needs to be taken into consideration. It must be ensured that none of the poor, captured Imperial subjects are left in slavery.<sup>221</sup>

4) Rescued Imperial subjects and their possessions can be used to investigate other things and other people, and Pondt can act accordingly.<sup>222</sup>

5) Based on the information given to him, Pondt made every effort to locate a Spanish officer, shipmaster, and consular employee who was captured on the island of Bermuda (Otok Premuda), not far from Fiume (also known as Rijeka-Croatia), on September 5 of this year.<sup>223</sup>

6) In this regard, all imperial subjects held captive by sea or land from Puglia, Calabria, or other provinces belonging to His Roman Catholic Imperial Majesty should be released with their confiscated property, specified in the edict, without leaving anyone behind, and a careful investigation should be made in this regard.<sup>224</sup>

7) If the kidnapped persons are dispersed within the country, the perpetrators of the persons who brought the persons in question to Dulcigno must be arrested or detained. There should be

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<sup>220</sup> "2.do Hat selber von allem auf den von der Porten zur execution ihres Fermans oder Befelchs abschickhenden Chauschlar Emini gute genaue und Vorsichtige obsicht zutragen, damit selbiger den bedeüten Ferman auf das genaueste vollziehe, und nicht etwan auß Aigennuzigkeit saumbseelig seÿe, dahero solle er ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142r.

<sup>221</sup> "3.tio dem gemelten Chauschlar Emini scharff auf die hauben gehen, auf daß selbiger nicht annehme die gefangene verdushe, und sodann die arme Kayserliche Unterthannen in der Slavitet gelassen werden.", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142r-142v.

<sup>222</sup> "5.to Kan er durch die liberirte Kayserliche unterthannen welche er am ersten zu handen bekombet von denen andern, auch denen gehabten sachen nachfrag thuen, und sich also darnach richten. Über dises solle er ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142v.

<sup>223</sup> "4.to hat Er Dollmetsch sich eüsserist dahin zubefleissen, ohnverzüglich die den 5ten September dieses Jahres auf der Insul Bremuda ohnweith Fiume nach der ihme mitgegebenen information gefangene Spannische Officiers, Schüff Patron vnd Pootsknecht aufzutreiben.", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142v.

<sup>224</sup> "6.to Nach allen denen von einiger Zeit hero entweder zu Wasser, oder zu Land aus Puglia, Calabrien, oder andern Neapolitanischen Ihro Römische Kayserliche und Cathollischen Mayestat Zuestehenden Provinzen in die Gefangenschafft geführte Kayserliche unterthannen embsig fragen, und selbige nebst ihren sachen Crafft des mithabenden Fermans ohne das einer zuruckhbleibe, sich auslifern lassen Im fall ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 142v-143r.

judges who can make fair decisions and secret investigations should be conducted about these people. This issue should never be left to the initiative of the Turks.<sup>225</sup>

8) Especially the Pasha in Shkodër should not be trusted. The Sublime Porte also accepted that the crimes committed by the Dulcigno people against the Imperial subjects were against the peace between the two great empires and the injustice of the situation. That's why he sternly ordered compensation to be paid.<sup>226</sup>

9) When the captives are rescued and the confiscated goods are taken back, where they will be sent should be considered in detail. They should be ensured that they reach a place under Imperial sovereignty, or their homeland, most conveniently and comfortably. It must be decided whether they should be sent to Giovanni Vlachi in Ragusa.<sup>227</sup>

10) Therefore, as soon as Pondt arrives in Dulcigno, he should send a letter on the subject to the Consul in Ragusa and receive an answer to his letter as soon as possible.<sup>228</sup>

11) He should be less present in Vienna, or similar nearby places, except when required by imperial services, and instead should handle the matter diligently, faithfully, and carefully. He should

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<sup>225</sup> "7.mo die gefangen genommene unterthannen im Land hin-und her zerstreüter, und verkhaufft seyn solten, so ist sich destwegen an die Thätter welche nemlich die gedachte Persohnen zu Dulcigno eingebracht, zuhalten, und selbige entweder durch arrestirung, oder andere mit dem obberührten Chiauschlar Emini und dasigen Richtern ausfindenden mitlen dahin zuvermögen, auf das Sie selbstn die Leüth widerumben zusamben bringen, Er Pondt aber solle disem ohneracht doch nicht vnterlassen diser Leüth wegen selbstn unter der hand eÿfrige nachfrag zuthuen und sich auf kheine weiß auf die Türkhen verlassen, sondern villmehr ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 143r.

<sup>226</sup> "8.w denen Türkhischen Richtern insonderheit dem Bahsa zu Scudari, an welchen Er den mitbringenden brief zuüberliferen hat, gebührenden terminis vorstellen, das diese von denen Dulcignoten an denen Kayserlichen unterthannen verübte, dem zwischen denen zweÿen grossen Reichen vorseÿenden Friden zuwiderlauffenden, der Ottomannishen Porthen auf alle weis mißßfallen dahero selbige der Sachen unbillichkeit selbstn erkennenet, die restitution, so sharff anbefohlen, was man nun in exequirung des hierüber ertheilten Fermans saumbseelig seÿn solte, so wurde man von Kayserliche seithen beÿ der Porthen mehrmahlige instanz machen, und sich über die, so schuld daran waren, nachrücklich verklagen, also das beÿ solchen erfolg ville nicht geringen gefahren exponirt seÿn dörfen.", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 143r-143v.

<sup>227</sup> "9.no Er Dollmätch die Leüth und sachen genau zusamben gebracht, also daß von kheinem mehr waß zuhören, oder keine apparenz mehr wäre, daß aldorthen noch einer mehr zubekhomben seÿe, so hat er sich wegen der abfüehrung deren Leüthen umbzushauen, wie nehmlich die leüth auf daß sicherst und bequemblichste an einen Kayserlichen orth zubringen seÿen, oder weillen Ragusa nahet, ob selbe nicht etwa an den alda sich befindenten Neapolitanischen Consul Giovanni Vlaichi ÿberschickhet, und von dannen weither nach Ihrem Vatterland befördert werden können ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 143v-144r.

<sup>228</sup> "10:o gleich beÿ seiner ankunfft zur Dulcignot daß ihme mitgebende schreiben angedachten zu Ragusa stehenden Neapolitanische Consul ÿberschickhen, und ihne ersuechen, ihme die anthwort hierüber baldigst zu communicieren.", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 144r.

not impose unnecessary expenses on the imperial court; he should assume the success and responsibility of his duty; and he should return here as soon as the problem is solved.<sup>229</sup>

12) Pondt must carefully and meticulously follow the orders he received from the Aulic War Council via Ragusa regarding the abductees.<sup>230</sup>

13) As soon as he reaches Dulcigno, Joseph von Pondt must make every effort and submit his report to the Aulic War Council.<sup>231</sup>

In his report<sup>232</sup> dated November 19, 1714, Fleischmann mentions that after discussing the captive issue with the Reis Efendi and the Grand Vizier, he deemed it appropriate to accompany an officer to the Agha whom the Sublime Porte would send to Dulcigno. This officer was assigned to receive the prisoners and their belongings mentioned in the edict from the port there.

Additionally, the Grand Vizier told Fleischmann that the Kapudan Pasha (the grand admiral), the most knowledgeable and authoritative person on the subject, would meet with him. It was also stated in the report<sup>233</sup> that some ministers from the Sublime Porte would hold meetings with

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<sup>229</sup> "11:mo Solle Er Ponde auf keinerley weiß ausser da es der allerhöchste Kayserliche dienst erfordert es der allerhöchste Kayserliche dienst erfordert eine stund weegs hinaufwerths, oder auf die seithen für seine plaisier Thuen, weniger etwa gegen Neapl, Wienn, oder derley orthen herumb vagieren, sondern ernstlich daran seyn, daß er die Sache embsig, treu, und Vorsichtiglich richte, dem Kayserlichen Hoff kein vnnöttige Spesen mache, selbigen mit genauer verzichtung seiner commission aller vnterthänigst contentiere, vnd beÿ erfolgenden widrigen fahl keine veranantwortung auf sich ziehe, auch weillen seine gegenwarth hier nöthig, sobald die sache gerichtet, den kürzern weeg sich wider hieher begeben im fahl aber ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 144r-144v.

<sup>230</sup> "12:mo ihme Pondt von einem hochlöbl: Kayl:en Hof Kriegs-Rath etwa über Ragusa wegen Verreren Verhalt, vnd sonderlich wegen überlifferung deren gefangenen ordre zuekhäme, so hat Er sich nach denen selbigen genau vnd embsig zuhalten ...", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 144v.

<sup>231</sup> "13:tio Er Joseph von Pondt auch sich befleissen solle, gleich beÿ seiner ankunfft zu Dulcigno, vnd soforth einem höchstbenannten Kayl:en hof Kriegs, Rath von seiner obhabenden commission den vnterthänigsten bericht abzustatten.", 16 September 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 144v.

<sup>232</sup> "Exequiert werden mögte, habe dem bedeuten Reis Effendi zur -Information daß hier gehorst beÿligende schon beÿ mir in beraithschafft gehaltenes behändiget, und mit dem Groß-Vezier weither es dahin abgeredet, dem von der Porten nach Dulcigno expedierenden Agha von meiner seithen einen officier zuezugeben welcher der folglaistung des ertheillenden Fermans selbst zugewogen seyn, und die zu restituiren anbefohlene leüthe und Sachen übernehmen solle.", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 146r.

<sup>233</sup> "Weither meldete der Vezier daß man auch so bald der Capitain Bahsa [alß welcher hiervon am besten informirt] hieeingeseglet seyn wird, in denen zwischen mir und einigen Ministern der Porten hierüber anstellenden Conferenzen Trachten werde, dergleichen inconuenienzin ins Könfftig zuverhinderen, seiner des seines kopffs genauist zu exequiren, allein von meiner seithen habe zwar den hier seÿenden älteren dollmätsh Forner diese verrichtung anbefohlen, Es hat aber selbiger sich wegen einigen ihme von Zeit zur Zeit zurstoffenden leibb-Schwachheiten excusieret, und dargethan ausser Standt zuseyn, diese räÿß zuverrichten, also daß ich bemüessiget worden, den jungen dollmetsch Pondt hierzue zunehmen, welcher auch vorgestern alß den 17ten huis mit dem berührten Ciauschlar Emini zweÿ Chiauschen, vnd Sechs Chiohadaren von hier nach offft angezogenen Dulcigno abgeraiset ist.", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 146r-146v.



Fleischmann to prevent such problems between the two empires from recurring. During the meetings, the young translator Pondt was assigned instead of the Imperial translator Ferner, who was now older and in poor physical condition. On the 17th of the same month, Pondt set out for Dulcigno with the Çavuşlar Emini, two Çavuş (sergeant), and six Çuhadars<sup>234</sup>.

In the continuation of his report<sup>235</sup>, Fleischmann stated that he provided Pondt with comprehensive written instructions regarding his mission. Nevertheless, he appealed to the Vienna War Council to designate an Imperial officer to accompany and support Pondt in the execution of his duties. This officer would be responsible for receiving the liberated captives, facilitating their transfer to Imperial territory, and ensuring Pondt's safe return upon the completion of his assignment. Fleischmann emphasized that, in this context, it would be more appropriate for a trustworthy officer to be appointed directly by the Imperial authorities rather than by the Sublime Porte. In addition, Fleischmann mentioned<sup>236</sup> that the issue of captives with the Sublime Porte was resolved in a way that could not have been better. He also emphasized that the current good relations will continue as long as those who come from the Spanish Monarchy respect the Treaty of Karlowitz with the Sublime Porte. Although it was said that the increasing danger of war between Venice and the Sublime Porte emerged, it was thought that the Sublime Porte would not pose a

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<sup>234</sup> For more information about Çuhadar, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/cuhadar>".

<sup>235</sup> "... so lasse ich dannoch ewer drhl: Excell: vnd gnaden in vnterthänigkeit anheimb gestellt, obdieselbe nicht etwa von dir nächst angelegenen Kayl:en gräniz einen vernünfftig: vnd der sachen wohlerfahrenen officier [welches besagten dollmätsh mit gueten rath an die hand gehen, auch die loßgemachte leüth von Jhme dollmätsh übernehmen, vnd in sicherheit führen könnte] abschicken, vnd zugleich obgedachten dollmätsh Pondt nach vollzogener verrichtung wider hieher, alwo Jch seiner nöthig gnädigst beordern wollen, doch weillen die Porthen da Jch eben Jhr vorgetragen von daraussen jemandt so die Kayl:e gefangen genommene ..." 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 148r.

<sup>236</sup> "Dann nachdeme ich bey der Porten alles sovill nur möglich zuthuen gewesen, verrichtet, und die sache dem allerhöchsten seye danck ohnerachtet deren darunter khombenden verwirrten Coniuncturen in einen fast nicht besser winshen könnenden stand gesetzet, khommet alles amizo auf die execution, und da nun der bewüerckhte oben gehorsambst beýgelegte Sultanische Ferman eben daß jenige in sich begreiffet, so man durch den vorhabenden incorporations tractatzu effectuiren suechet, dann Crafft selbigen haben all die Ihro Römischen Kayserlichen und Cathollischen Mayestat von der Spänischen Monarchie zuegefallene, und annoch zuezukhomben habende Erb-Königreich und Lande respectu des Ottomannischen Reichs all ruehige sicherheit ins Künfftig so lang nemblich der Carlowitzische friden Thauet, zugemissen, Disemnach stehe ich nicht umbillich an, ob Ich wegen der obberührten incorporation weither waß vornehmen, und nicht zu vor den außgang der besagten execution erwarthen solle dazumahlen über die wegen Venedig Vorstehende Kriegs gefahr gründlich zubeförchten, es mögte bey der Porten, wan selbe siehet, daß man erst jetzo, und nicht zuvor über die von Ihro Römischen Kayserlichen Mayestat besitzende, und annoch zubesizen habenden Spänischen und Italianischen Landen Conferiret, wegen denen herauß zugeben habenden leüth und sachen einige Difficultet setze, und hat eben dises mich bewegeet, daß ich das mir hierüber gnädigst eingesaüdetes mandatum Specificum zuruckh gehalten, und daß werck a satisfacione aut restitutione Captivorum angefangen habe.", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 148v-150r.

danger to the Spanish and Italian lands under the administration of the Empire. He also expressed his happiness that the issue of prisoners was resolved.

### 3.5. Fleischmann's Secret Diplomacy & the Sublime Porte's War Preparations

In his report to the Imperial War Council, dated September 10, 1714, Fleischmann noted his ongoing engagement with the proposal submitted to the Grand Vizier concerning Ottoman-Venetian relations and the Vizier's response. He expressed his hope that the incidents would not result in harm to the Republic of Venice and affirmed his commitment to exerting every effort and utilizing all available means to that end. As part of this effort, Fleischmann sent a diplomatic gift to Hacı Ali Agha, the Vizier of the Tatar Khan, who was then present at the Sublime Porte. Fleischmann observed that Hacı Ali Agha regularly attended sessions of the Imperial Council, and he hoped the Vizier would grasp the significance of the alliance between the Emperor and the Republic of Venice, as well as the inadvisability of initiating hostilities. According to Fleischmann's account, Hacı Ali Agha distinguished himself from other Viziers through his extensive experience and forthright demeanor, describing him as an independent-minded figure not easily swayed.<sup>237</sup>

According to the report<sup>238</sup>, Hacı Ali Agha was quite surprised that this alliance was not mentioned in the Karlowitz Peace Treaty, but the conditional surrender articles were mentioned not once but in many places. There was not even the slightest trace of the alliance in question in all the records of the Sublime Porte, especially in the writings of the fully authorized Ottoman

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<sup>237</sup> "Weillen selbige durch andere gelegenheit zu expediren bereith hielte, gehorsambst beyligenden relation mit mehrers gnädigst zuersehen gerurht haben in waß aigentlichen zuestand gegenwärtig des Türckhische weesen bestehe, vnd wie orgoleos der groß-Vezier auf der Jhme von wegen des wider die Republic Venedig ausheinenenden Kriegs auß dero gnädigsten befelch gemachte proposition geanthwortet habe, indessen vnterlasse doch mit meiner allergnädigsten instruction, wie das nemblich zu winschen wäre, daß der berührten Republic Venedig von hierauß nichts vngleiches beuor stehe, allerunterthänigst inhæirend: alle in derley fählen waß außgebende Mittel, doch zu dato ohne fassenden impegno an die hand zunehmen, dahero habe den 20ten gedachten Monaths den hier stehenden, vnd in allen Consilys von der Porthen gebrauchten Vezier des Tartar-Chans Hagili Ali Aga welcher alß ein alt erfahrener vnd dem absezen nicht so vnterwürffige Mann freyer alß andere reden khan, ein præsent geschickhet, zu seiner glickhlichen anhero khonfft complementieren vnd ihme Discours weiß die zwischen Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: vnd der Republic Venedig vorsehende bündnuß mithin daß auß einem mit der Republic Venedig vornehmend Krieg erwachsenden ingebüehrlichen terminis zuuerstehen geben lassen.", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 164r-164v.

<sup>238</sup> "Er verwunderte sich sehr daß dise Allianz nicht dem Carlowizischen friden inseriret, vnd selbige fridens Capitulation nicht in einem sonderen mehrern Separirten Instrumenten verfasst seye, weither meldent man hätte bey der Porten in allen shrüfften in sonderheit den von dem zu Carlowitz gestandenen Türckhl: Plenipotentiaro Rami Bahsa verfassten Diario nachgesuechet, allein nicht daß geringste von diser besagten Allianz gefunden, es seye sehr wunderlich daß die Porten alß selbige Jhren feind, welcher Jhr villes vnrecht zuefüeghet, Jhre vnterthannen plünderte, Jhre Schüff weg nehmet, Jhren Rebellen vnterschlaiff gebete etc etc zubekriegen gedenckhe, Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: Jhren freünd angreiffe, wan es mit diser bündnuß also so seye seine mainung gar nicht mit Venedig in Krieg außzufallen, sondern villehr die sache mit selbiger in der güette beyzulegen.", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 164v-165r.



representative Rami Pasha in Karlowitz. It was a very strange situation to attack the friends of the Emperor, who had already suffered many injustices, whose ships were taken away and whose subjects were plundered. According to Hacı Ali Agha, it was necessary not to go to war with Venice and to resolve the issue tactfully.

Several days later, Fleischmann once again sought to obtain information regarding the deliberations of the Sublime Porte from Hacı Ali Agha, this time by offering a gift in exchange. In response, Hacı Ali Agha advised Fleischmann not to take offense at the Grand Vizier's arrogant and dismissive demeanor, attributing such behavior to the Vizier's lack of administrative and diplomatic experience. Hacı Ali Agha further noted that the issue concerning Venice was being approached quite differently within the inner circles of the Ottoman administration. He expressed his personal disapproval of the Sublime Porte's plans for war against the Republic of Venice, yet acknowledged the prevailing reality: all were subject to the authority of a Grand Vizier who buoyed by the accumulation of financial resources, naval vessels, armaments, and military equipment, believed himself capable of global conquest.<sup>239</sup>

Fleischmann continued his report<sup>240</sup> by stating that the Ottoman Empire was not like the old days but that it had the power to resist His Imperial Majesty's forces. In order for the Grand Vizier to understand the seriousness and importance of the statement made to him and for it not to go unnoticed by the Sultan (who might have learned it from somewhere else), on the 25th of the same month, Fleischmann sent a gift to the Shaykh al-Islam and requested a meeting with him. He

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<sup>239</sup> "... alß ich nach einigen Tagen wider vnter der hand mein in derley fählen brauchenden vertrauten Menschen zu Jhme Hatschi Ali Aga schickhte, vnd Jhme ein nahmhaffttes præsent versprechen lassen, hat Er sich yber das heüntige Türckhl:e vnerfahrne Guverno sehr beklaget, anergend: beÿ der Porten vernohmen zuhaben, daß der Groß Vezier mir in der beÿ Jhme neulich gehabtten audienz gar insolent, vnd vngereümbt geanthworttet hätte, ich solte mich aber nicht daran kehren, sondern es villmehr seiner hochmüethigen vnerfahrenheit zueschriben, die sache seÿe ganz anderst, alß wie man Sÿe beÿ der Porten nehme, es müesten nothwendiger weiß dise leüthe, oder das Ottomannische Reich præcipitiret werden, mich versicherend daß Er disen mit Venedig vorhabenden Krieg auf keinerley arth approbiere, allein hätte man mit einem Guverno so glaubet mit dem zu samben gebrachten gelt, Schiff, Stuckh vnd Kriegs geräthschafften die ganze Welt zubezwingen] zuthuen ...", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 165r-165v.

<sup>240</sup> "...ohneracht jedermäniglich wohl wisse, das gegenwärttig das Ottomannische Reich nicht ein stand seÿe Jhro Röml: Kayl: Maÿl: Macht zu widerstehen mit mir wolle er die angefangene freundschaft forth pflegen, vnd wan es möglich darvon einige probe geben. Damit nun der Groß Vezier der Jhme gethannen erklärung ernst vnd wichtigkeit erkenne, vnd selbige vmb so weniger dem Sultan [alß welcher es von anderwärttig erfahren khonnte] Verfälle, habe mich auch den 25:ten dito beÿm Muffti durch ein Jhme zuegesänders præsent insinuiren lassen, allein es ware selbiger von seinen in gleicher zeit ins exilium nach Sinapi vnd Trapesont verwisenen ante-Cessoren dem Ebesade vnd Ata Effendi so eben wider den vorhabenden Krieg geredet] also erschreckhet, daß selbiger vneracht Er die präsenten angenommen, vnd alles zuthuen, auch mich zu sich all incognito kommen zulassen versprochen, auf ein mahl resolviret sich nicht das geringste darin zu mischen", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 165v-166r.

accepted the gifts, but he was so afraid of Ebezade Abdullah and Ataullah Mehmed Efendi, who were exiled to Sinop and Trabzon at that time, that he only agreed to meet secretly and talk about the Venice issue. However, he also stated that he would not intervene in the slightest despite this permission.

Fleischmann reported that the ongoing secret negotiations and strategic maneuvers were beginning to yield results. According to the intelligence he had gathered, the Kapudan Pasha informed the Sublime Porte that the successful recapture of the Morea would be feasible primarily through naval power. This strategy, he argued, would allow the remainder of the Ottoman military to remain positioned to counter any potential engagement with Imperial forces. The Kapudan Pasha arrived in the capital on November 26, accompanied by sixteen galleons, notably without transporting any military supplies. It was subsequently learned that he would remain in the capital with two of these vessels and would oversee the execution of the planned operation. The Sublime Porte intended to initiate a formal rupture in relations with Venice through the arrest of the Venetian Bailo (resident ambassador), using this act as a pretext to publicly declare war.<sup>241</sup>

It is stated in the report<sup>242</sup> that a letter was sent to Venice by Kapudan Pasha before the war was announced to the public and a satisfactory answer to this letter was expected. However, all necessary preparations for the war against Venice were continuing uninterruptedly. Captains, mostly Peloponnese, had already been assigned to the warships and were ordered to arm themselves. A few days ago, approximately 15 barges were loaded with war ammunition and sent to Eğriboz<sup>243</sup> and

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<sup>241</sup> "... haben doch dise vnd in anderen verschidenen orthen gemachte bewegungen gefruchtet, daß, obwohlen der Capitain Bahsa [welcher die Porten versichert allein mit der See: Potenz Jhr Morea zuliffen, also, daß Jhr mit der ganzen übrigen Ottomannischen Macht gegen den Kayser zustehen frey seyn wird] schon den 26:ten Novembl: nun mit 16 Gallern ohne Kriegs-Schüff welche ausser zweyen diß Jahr daraussen verbleiben, vnd nebst noch einigen anderen diser Tagen von hierauß seeglenden provision führen sollen, hier angelanget, vnd man gleich nach seiner ankunfft nach all meiner confidenten aussag dise wider Venedig vorhabende ruptur mit arrestierung des hier anwesenden Venetianischen bailo zu publicieren gedachte ...", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 166r-166v.

<sup>242</sup> "... es dato dannoch vnter dem prætext daß man zuvor die auf daß von Jhme Capitain Bahsa der verlangenden Satisfaction halber nach Venedig geschickhte schreiben gebende antwortt erwartte, vnterblichen allein die præparatorien, vnd alle anderer zum Krieg wider obgedachtes Venedig erforderliche anstalten werden vnaußhörtlich Continuiert wie dann bereiths auf die Kriegs Schiff vnd Tshaickhen die Capitain so mehrerthails in Morea gebüerthig, benennet, vnd sich zum rüsten beordert, auch vor etlichen Tagen abermahlen gegen 15 mit geträydt, vnd Kriegs munition beladene barquen nach Negroponte vnd Candia abgegangen seynd, alwo man sowohl, alß zu Salonik, jungischeher vnd anderen gegen Morea gelegenen orthen die aufgereichte grosse magazinen anzufüllen, die haltbahre orth zurepariren, vnd nach und nach mit Trouppen zubesezen beschäfftiget ist ...", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 166v.

<sup>243</sup> For more information about Eğriboz (Negroponte or Chalkida), MACHIEL KIEL, "EĞRİBOZ", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/egriboz>". Accessed on 11.12.2023.

Crete<sup>244</sup>. The aim here was to fill the large warehouses in Thessaloniki, Yenişehir and other places overlooking the Morea, to repair the areas where they were needed and to gradually fill these places with soldiers. Likewise, tents and other equipment necessary for the expedition were also repaired here. In addition, the mules, camels, and cars necessary for the Sultan's departure for the expedition that would take place at the beginning of January had already been provided. In any case, it was now time to move the troops from the ports, and although the Egyptian militia had already been called in, the crews serving on the ships would also assemble there. In addition, it was planned to repair the great tower in Galata<sup>245</sup>, which was in ruins from the time of the Genoese, to place a large garrison there and to strengthen the city walls of Istanbul.<sup>246</sup> In response to the Grand Vizier's insolent and dismissive demeanor during their meetings, Fleischmann undertook an investigation to determine whether the Sublime Porte had begun deploying forces along strategic fronts, specifically Belgrade, Timișoara, and the Hungarian border. He was informed, however, that no military preparations had been initiated in those regions up to that point. In fact, no formal orders had been issued by the Ottoman administration concerning the Imperial frontier. Intelligence provided by several of Fleischmann's informants—referred to in his reports as *confidants*—indicated that the Sublime Porte did not anticipate an immediate intervention by the Emperor on behalf of Venice. From the Ottoman perspective, the Habsburg Emperor would be unlikely to engage in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire until the restoration of his realm's strength, which had been significantly diminished by the recently concluded Wars of the Spanish Succession against France.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> For more information about Crete (Candia), "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crete>", Accessed on 11.12.2023.

<sup>245</sup> For more information about Galata, İlber Ortaylı, "GALATA", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/galata#1> (12.12.2023)".

<sup>246</sup> *"Jngleichen werden alhier wüerckhlich die Zelter vnd andere zum Veldtzug gebrauchende geräthschaffen außgebesseret, auch bereiths schon die zu dem anfangs nächstkünfftigen Monaths Januarj fest gestellt seyn sollenden aufbruch des Sultans nöthige Maulthier, Camel, vnd wägen beschriben, in Summa ermanglet nichts, alß die oben bedeüthe Kriegs Declaration, welche sich doch nunmehr auch bald müsseren mueß: allermassen es ander Zeit daß von der Porten die ferman zu berueffung deren Trouppen expedieret werden; ob zwar schon die ægyptische Miliz beordert, auch die zu Schiff diennende Mannschafft hin: vnd wider versamlet werden. Über dises thuert an den noch von Zeith der Genueser zu galata stehenden ganz zerfallenen grossen thuern repariren, alwohin ein guarnison gesezet, auch die Constantinopolitanische Statt: Mauren verbessert werden sollen"*, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 166v-167v.

<sup>247</sup> *"... allein auf die mülich mir von dem Groß-Vezier gegebene insolent vnd hochmüethige anthwortt habe vor allem invigiliret ob nicht etwa von der Porten gegen Belgrad, Temeswar, vnd den es Hungarl:en gränzen waß veranstaltet werde, finde aber, daß aldorthin waß vngewöhnliches vorzunehmen dato kein befelch ergangen seye, vnd dises wie mich etliche meiner confidenten versichern, der ursachen halber: weillen die vnerfahene Porten nicht glaubet, daß Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: fogleich denen Venetianern Succuriren, sondern erst nach einigen Jahren da Sye Jhre in dem mit franckreich gehalten schwären Krieg abgemattete Krafftten wider erhollet, sich in dem gegen Venedig anfangenden Krieg wuerden einmischen können."*, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 167r-167v.

In the meantime, the Sublime Porte devised a comprehensive strategy to launch a large-scale invasion of the Republic of Venice, which it perceived to be in a weakened and vulnerable state. The primary objective was the reconquest of the Morea, a region that had acquired considerable strategic and symbolic value for the Sultan. By acting swiftly—before His Imperial Majesty could respond—the Ottomans aimed to capitalize on their initial advantage, with the intention of either negotiating a favorable peace settlement or, if circumstances permitted, advancing further into Hungary. Fleischmann also reported that France, along with other European powers engaged in commerce in the Eastern Mediterranean, sought to encourage the Sublime Porte in its campaign against Venice, viewing the conflict as beneficial to their own economic and geopolitical interests.<sup>248</sup>

According to Fleischmann, the motives behind France and other powers encouraging the Sublime Porte to take action against Venice and the Holy Roman Empire extended well beyond a mere desire to restore their diminished commercial interests. Notably, the French had recently regained favor at the Sublime Porte by permitting, for the first time, the export of oil—an act that significantly enhanced their standing within Ottoman political circles. Additionally, a group of Greek informants from the Morea had secretly arrived at the Sublime Porte approximately eight days prior. They provided intelligence regarding the unfolding situation in the region, suggesting that the Morea could be easily conquered, thereby reinforcing the Ottomans' confidence in the viability of a successful campaign.<sup>249</sup> Furthermore, on the 22nd of the previous month, the aforementioned Greeks dispatched a courier to the Sublime Porte, delivering a forceful complaint intended to serve as a future justification for action against Venice. According to their account, the Venetians had not only instigated the Montenegrin rebellion but had also defied Ottoman authority by sheltering a significant number of the insurgents, in open disregard of the Empire's demands. Fleischmann also reported the recent arrival of Yusuf Agha, a former sergeant, in the capital. Known for his close

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<sup>248</sup> "... Indessen hoffet die Porten die berührte Republic (welche Ihrer mainung nach sehr schwach, vnd nicht im Stand deresistere) mit einer vngemainen macht zu Wasser vnd Land zu yberfallen, vnd bevor sich allerhöchst gedacht Jhro Kayl: Majl: regen, von Jhr wenigstens daß dem Sultan sehr ins hertz gewachsene Königreich Morea zueroberen, nachdeme aber entweeder mit dem erhaltenen Vortheill Friden zumachen, oder sich ebenfalls gegen Hungarn zuwenden, in welcher mainung die Porten auch von der franzüßl:en vnd anderen in Orient trafficierenden Nationen ...", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 167v-168r.

<sup>249</sup> "... in welcher mainung die Porten auch von der franzüßl:en vnd anderen in Orient trafficierenden Nationen, welche dise gegen venedig vorsejende ruptur villnicht nicht so vill auß antrib einiger Staatsraison alß hoffnung dardurch Jhr sehr gefallenenes commercium zurestabliren, zubeförderen suechen, gestärckhet wierd, wordurch in sonderheit die erstere sich aufs neüe beÿ der Porten so beliebt machet, daß Jhr die Vorhero niemahls zuerhalten gewesene außführe des öhls kurzlich erlaubet worden; auch die in Morea wohnhatte Griechen vnterlassen nicht destwegen alhier verschidene instanzen zumachen, wie dann vor acht Tagen ersteinige derenselben mit brieffen worinnen der völlige zuerstand, vnd leichte erobeung des Königreichs Morea beschriben ...", 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 168r.

association with Numan Pasha—who had led a force of 30,000 troops against the Montenegrin rebels and was expected to play a key role in the forthcoming campaign against Venice—Yusuf Agha was presumed to be delivering intelligence regarding the Republic of Venice and its activities directly to the Sublime Porte.<sup>250</sup>

Mentioning that war was inevitable despite all these happenings, Fleischmann stated<sup>251</sup> that he would do his best to disrupt the plans of the Ottoman side and at least postpone the declaration of war with the permission of the Emperor. In addition, his report stated that (God forbid) the Kingdom of Sicily or any other Imperial territory would be affected by this break planned by the Sublime Porte against Venice, with its naval force consisting of more than fifty warships, thirty galleys, more than eighty frigates and nearly two hundred transport ships. He was also asking what he should do in such a situation. Stating that the letters sent by Stainville, Count of Transylvania, to the Aulic War Council, sometimes came via Wallachia, Fleischmann also wanted to know whether he could send his reports via this route in the future, based on the offer of the current Wallachian prince.

In his report, Fleischmann asked whether or not the Sublime Porte should have been prevented from sending an envoy to Vienna, as it did just before the war with the Russians. Taking into account the 3000 francs he had secretly given to meet the Sultan, he stated that, considering

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<sup>250</sup> “... über dises hat der wider die Montenegriner zu feld gestandene Numan Bahsa, welcher seine vnterhabende biß 30.000 Mann außmachende Mannschafft vmb Sÿe ins könfftige wider Venedig zugebrauchen beÿsamben halten solle, den: 22:ten præteriti einen expresen hieher an ie Porten geschickhet, vnd sich nachtrücklich wider die Venetianer beklaget, vorgebend, daß selbe Republic nicht allein dise Montenegrinische Rebellion fomentieret, sondern auch beÿ ieziger dämmffung villen derselbigen Rebellen die hand geraichet, vmb sich in das Venetianische Territorium Salviren zukhönnen, auch der dem berührten sehr zum Krieg wider Venedig inclinierenden Numan Bahsa adjungierte vormahls Tschaus Bahsa gewesene Jusuf Aga ist selbst vorgestern hier angelanget, vmb von allem so sich mit der Republic Venedig vnd Montenegrinern zugetragen der Porten auß führlichen bericht abzustatten.”, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 168r-168v.

<sup>251</sup> “Obwohlen zwar auß all disem Clar erhellet, daß wo nicht vnmöglich, doch sehr hart seÿei die Porten von Jhrem zu bekriegung der Republic Venedig gemachten dehsein abzuhalten, werde dannoch all eüsseristes andurch allerhand doch in kein impegno führende weeg vnd mittel dises Türckhl:e vorhaben, wo nicht zu vnterbrechen, doch wenigstens die Kriegs Declaration, vnd andere nicht zu redrehieren seÿende passus so weith zuuerschieben, biß ewer drhl: Excell: vnd gnaden mir das ferrere gnädigst anzubefehlen geruehen werden, wie dann auch annebends in vnterthänigkeit gewärttig bin waß im Fahl sÿe Porten dasselbig wider alle gegenwärttige apparenz mit der Göttlichen hilff von diser gegen Venedig resolvirten ruptur abgehalten wuerde, mit Jhrer auß rüstenden in mehr alß fünffzig Kriegs-Schüffen, dreÿssig Galleren, über achtzig fregaten, vnd biß 200 transport Schüff bestehen sollenden See-Macht etwan gegen daß Königreich Sicilien, oder anderwärttig hin wenden solte zuthuen seÿe? Vnd da die an des Kayl:en in Sübenbürgen Commandierenden Gralens herrn Grafens von Stainville Excell:en von Zeit zu Zeit über Wallacheÿ ein sändente brief wohl einlauffen, vnd der iezige Wallachl:e fürst sich zu dergleichen beförderungen etlich mahl offeriret, ob Jch mich nicht ins könfftig, zumahlen beÿ gegenwärttiges ombrageusen Zeiten die Post-Commandementen hart zuhaben seÿn werden, die vnterthänigst einschickhende in Ziffer versezte relationes auch wider durch disem weeg expediren dörrfe?”, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 168v-169v.

the danger of the current situation, no Turk would do anything useful or even dare to open his mouth without gaining a great benefit.<sup>252</sup>

In the continuation<sup>253</sup> of his report to the Aulic War Council, Fleischmann mentions that he had to make some expenses in order for things to continue as the council wanted and that he had debts for these purposes. In addition, it appears in the report that His Majesty the Emperor considered it very important and necessary for him to be able to travel to Edirne, Thessaloniki, and Yenişehir which Fleischmann had previously mentioned, and therefore requested that the necessary money be sent to him. His request, as well as that of the Imperial translators and linguists in the capital, was that the six months' wages, which were already overdue and needed, be sent to them as soon as possible. From the contents of the report it appears that Fleischmann asked the council not only for his overdue wages, but also for money to be used for intelligence and to lend money to prisoners (600 Thaler) and other subjects, some of whom were still in slavery.

In the report<sup>254</sup> he sent on December 6, 1714, Fleischmann stated that due to the good relations he had gained in the Sublime Porte before the chaos of the war, he was allocated a

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<sup>252</sup> *“Ingleichen da etwa die Porten wie es bey jüngst vorgewesener Moscovitl:e ruptur beschehen, eine gehandtschafft nach Wienn schickhen wolte, ob ich sovill in mir ist, selbige beförderen, oder verhindern solle? Weillen auch die zu geheimben ausgaben vnd wegen der beym Sultan erhaltenen audienz versprochen vnd abgestattete præsenten empfangene 3000 F: in gehorst beyligenden berechnet vnd bey iezigen sehr gefährlichen conjuncturen sich kein Türckh ohne grossem interesse daß mau aufzuthuen, weniger eine nuzliche bewegung zuegetrauet ...”, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 169v.*

<sup>253</sup> *“... ewer drhl: Excell: vnd gnaden von selbstn die höchste nothwendigkeit zuseyn ersehen, daß ich bey vorsehend ponderosen Zeith vnd affairen zu deren besserem fortgang man hin vnd wider Spesen zumachen hat, zu disem ende wider nächstens mit waß gelt versehen, vnd zugleich in stand gesezt werde, die vorstehende rayß nach Adrianopel, vnd weiters nach Salonik vnd Jengischeher verrichten zukönnen, yber dises ist mein vnd deren hier stehenden Kayl:en Dollmätsh: vnd sprachknaben vnterthänigst gehorstes ansuechen auf daß ewer drhl: Excell: vnd gndn gnädigst geruehen vnser bereiths verflossene vnd bedörffte halbe Jahrs gebuehr nebst denen bey gehalten gastereyen gegeben: vnd empfangenen Solemn visiten deren Ambassadeuren auch nach gehorst beyligender lista anticipierten Rittgeltern esistens gnädigst herein schickhen zulassen der vnterthänigsten zuuersicht: Es werde auch ein hochlöbl: Königl: Spänischer Rath wenigstens ad interim etwaß von dem gnädigst vertrössten gelt bald herein ybermachen, auß das die zu denen bereiths erkauffe, Theills nach hauß geschickhte, Theills auch bey mir noch habende Neapolitanl:e gefangene angewendte vnd gegen schwären interehse aufgenommene gelten [so sich biß iezo auf 600 Thaller belauften] abgezahlet, vnd denen anderen ybrigen in der Slavitet sich noch befindenten derley vnterthanen nach vnd nach mit einem erleydentlichen Lytro geholffen werden möge.”, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 169v-170r.*

<sup>254</sup> *“... ich aber habe bey der Porten durch meinen bey Ihr vor gegenwärtigen Kriegs Confusion erworbenen gueten Credit es dahin gebracht, daß selbige mir nicht allein schon vor 2 Monath einen an dem Canal des weissen Meers Constantinopolitanischer seithen gelegenen. Vor disem denen Moldauischen fürsten zuegehörigen Pallast mittels eines Ferman zu beständigen quartier deren Kayserlichen Residenten ein raumben, sondern denselben auch aus aigener bewegung auf ihre Speesen repariren lassen, welchen ich nun zwar vor etlichen tagen bezogen, von dorth auß ich mit der Porthen und denen Türckhen zum behueff des allerhöchsten Kayl:en dienster weith besser alß anderwärtig zu comunicieren die gelegenheit habe, allein dörfte ich bey gegenwärtigen weith aussehenden Kriegs zeiten schwärlich lang darinnen ruehig sizen bleiben.”, 6 December 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 170r.*

settlement on the canal of the Mediterranean on the Istanbul side. According to Fleischmann, permanent residences were granted to Imperial ambassadors and diplomats by a decree in front of this palace, which belonged to the Moldavian princes. Fleischmann had it repaired at his own expense and moved here a few days ago. As a matter of fact, he also states that he had the opportunity to communicate much better with the Sublime Porte and the Turks from other places. However, he added in his report that he could sit quietly away from the current war atmosphere.

### **3.6. Vienna's Efforts to Prevent War**

In his report dated November 19, 1714, Fleischmann noted that the Kapudan Pasha was stationed in the Dardanelles, signaling that the declaration of war against the Republic of Venice had become increasingly imminent. The arrest of the Bailo was, by that point, considered merely a matter of timing. Fleischmann further reported that the Imperial Council had instructed him to take all possible measures to prevent the escalation of hostilities, as both the formal declaration of war and the detainment of the Bailo risked provoking public unrest and acts of hostility against Venetian nationals. In response to this growing tension, a meeting with the Grand Vizier was requested for the 10th of the month, during which the Emperor's displeasure with the unfolding situation was communicated to the Sublime Porte. The report also noted that the Republic of Venice had not issued any formal statement or diplomatic overture to the Emperor regarding the matter, and there remained a belief that the prevailing misunderstandings could yet be resolved. Fleischmann concluded by suggesting that it might be prudent for the Emperor to appoint a dedicated envoy to mediate the disputes between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice, in hopes of averting further deterioration in relations.<sup>255</sup>

During his audience with the Grand Vizier, Fleischmann conveyed a message from the Emperor, expressing the view that the ongoing tensions with Venice could potentially be resolved through diplomatic means, including mediation if necessary. This overture, however, was met with

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<sup>255</sup> *"Weillen nun an deme daß gleich beÿ einlauffung deß schon beÿ denen Dardanellen stehenden, vnd nur auf veränderung des windes warttenden Capitain Bahsa der vom Sultan gegen Venedig resolvierte Krieg publicieret, vnd der von seithen selbiger Republic hier stehende Bajlo arrestieret werden möge, alß habe an der Zeit zuseÿn vnterthänigst erachtet, ewer durchl: Excell: vnd gnaden wider dise ruptur zumachen mir gnädigst anbefohlenen pahsum vnterthänigst, vorzunehmen, vnd dem Groß-Vezier in der beÿ Ihme den 10:ten huis gehabtten obgemelten biß zweÿ stund gethaueten audienz glimpf vnd manierlich vnter einsten vorgetragen, anfänglich meldend, wie daß Ihre Röml: Kayl: vnd Catholl:e Mayl: Meinen allergnädigsten Kayßer vnd herrn zu ohren khomben wäre, alß ob die Porthen gegen die Republic Venedig ein Mißvergnügen hätte, auch solche gar in eine offentliche feindseeligkeit außbrechen solte, es wären zwar Ihre allerhöchst besagte Kayl: Mayl: von der bedeüten Republic Venedig annoch nicht requirieret worden, noch von der aigentlichen ursach einer Mißverständnuß informiret, hoffeten jedoch daß zu erhaltung der fried: vnd freündlichen verständnuß sich noch güettliche mittel finden Sie auch ihre officia zu interponiren sich offerirten ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 150r-151r.*

a sharp and hostile response. The Grand Vizier, visibly agitated, demanded to know how the Emperor had obtained such information and accused the Venetians of deliberately inciting the Emperor against the Sublime Porte, emphasizing that no formal declaration of war had yet been issued. Fleischmann responded by asserting that the information was no longer confidential, having already been disseminated through newspapers widely circulated across Europe. The Grand Vizier replied that a definitive decision regarding war or peace with Venice had not yet been made. He went on to accuse the Republic of Venice of repeatedly violating the peace by engaging in provocative actions against the Ottoman Empire. According to the Grand Vizier, Venetian forces had seized Ottoman merchant vessels, plundered certain settlements, taken local inhabitants captive, and provided protection and material support to insurgents rebelling against Ottoman authority.<sup>256</sup> This information Fleischmann provided in his report is consistent with that in *Târîh-i Râşid*, which mentions the necessity of war with Venice due to their support for Montenegrin rebels and their piracy against Muslim ships in the Mediterranean.<sup>257</sup>

According to the Grand Vizier, the Sublime Porte had made many concessions to the Venetians, but the Venetians had committed such great injustices to the Sublime Porte that peace could be re-established if the fair and satisfactory demands of the Sublime Porte were met. For this reason, the Kapudan Pasha was assigned to convey the demands of the Sublime Porte to the Venetian administration and receive a definitive answer from them. Therefore, according to the answer given by him, the Sublime Porte would determine its policy regarding Venice.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> *"Groß Vezier entrüstete sich über disen Jhme gethanen Vortrag über allemassen, vnd fragte in lauter zorn, woher, vnd von weme Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: dises hätten, es müesten die Venetianer, so sich wegen Villen der Porten Zuegefüegten vnbilden nichts guetes bewust, es zu wienn angebracht haben; Jch anthworttete nicht zuwissen, von weme es Mein allergnädigster Kayser aigentlich her hette, dochaber seÿe es kein so gehaimbe sache, Jndeme Jch mich erinnere, selbiges in etlichen nicht zu Wienn, sondern anderwerttig getruckhten öffentlich ganz Europam außlauffenden Zeithungen gelesen zuhaben, hierüber replicierte er Groß-Vezier selbsten nicht zuwissen, ob die Porten mit Venedig Krieg oder friden haben werde, gestalten die Venetianer sovill wider den friden gehandelt, vnd Jhr Porten durch hinwegnehmung verschidener Türckhishen vntertannen, Sciffen, außraubung einiger orthen, Jhren Rebellen gegebene hilfflaistung q so grosses vnrecht angethan ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 151r-151v.*

<sup>257</sup> *"Devlet-i Aliyye ile sulh üzre olan Venedik keferesi bir hilekâr ve gâyet mekkâr tâife olup, vakt-i sulhdan bu ana gelince sulha mugâyir nice harekât-ı şen'ası zuhûr etdiğinden mâ'adâ bu yakınlarda Karacadağ re'âyâsından firâr edenleri uhde-i himâyetine alup ve kalyonları etrâf-ı Bahr-ı Sefid'de korsanlıkla nice sefâin-i müslimîni ahz ve ale'l husûs ... Venedik keferesi üzerine sefer vâcib olduğu cümle ittifâkıyla imzâ ve du'â vü senâ olunup tedârük-i esbâb harb ü peygâra karâr verildi.", Târîh-i Râşid II, Özcan 2013; 886-887.*

<sup>258</sup> *"... daß Sÿe von Jhnen Venetianern hierüber billiche Satisfaction zubegehren hätten, dahero wartte Selbe nur biß der Capitain Bahsa [so der Jhme gegebenen ordre nach von Venedig eine Categorische anthwortt mitbringen müesse] hier angelanget seÿn wierdt.", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 151v.*



Despite the insistence, the Grand Vizier did not explain what kind of concessions the Sublime Porte had made; he merely replied angrily that they would continue their duty to keep the peace with His Imperial Majesty and that there was no mention of an agreement between the Empire and Venice. In the continuation of his speech, the Grand Vizier stated that it was under the law to define those who wronged them as enemies and to fight against them with all their might.<sup>259</sup>

In his conversation with Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier asserted that, under the prevailing circumstances, it was no longer feasible to reverse the course of war preparations against the Republic of Venice, declaring that conflict had become inevitable. He further emphasized that the Sublime Porte possessed the capability and resolve to confront any power that might come to Venice's aid. According to the Grand Vizier, both the Venetians and any of their potential allies would face consequences comparable to those suffered by the Russians. He referenced Russia's prior occupation of Ottoman territories, noting that although the Russians had achieved temporary gains, they ultimately paid a significant price by the conclusion of the conflict.<sup>260</sup>

Fleischmann, in response, conveyed that His Imperial Majesty had no desire for the Sublime Porte to be harassed or threatened by its adversaries. Nevertheless, he remarked that the current circumstances suggested a markedly different reality. As their conversation progressed, the Grand Vizier posed a rhetorical question to Fleischmann: when a physician learns that someone is ill, does he not immediately attend to the patient, or must he first determine whether the illness is fatal? Fleischmann replied that a competent and well-trained physician would render assistance regardless

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<sup>259</sup> *"Ich insitierte etlichmahl mir zu eröffnen, in waß doch dise von der Porthen an Venedig machende præensiones aigentlich bestunden, Versicherend, daß eben ihro Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat dem Rechten beistehen, und im fall was wider die billichkheit, und Carloviczishe friden vorbeýgangen seýn solte, solches vermittlen wolten, allein er Groß Vezier thatte sich auf kheinerlaý weiß expliciren, vnd nur voller zorn, vnd grimmen melden, daß die Porthen mit ihro Röml: Kayl:en Maýt: im friden stunde, Ihr worth halte, allein selbiges nur an einem orth gegeben, vnd nicht auf die zwischen ihro Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat vnd Venedig vorseiende bindnuß zureguardiren hette, sondern Sie seie obligiret, nach ihrem gesaze die ienige, so Jhnen eine vnbild zuefügen, alß feinde zuerkennen, und mit all: ihrem vnzahlbahren Kriegs-herr, vnd Machten zuüberfallen, Sýe Porthen werde sich von denen vorgenommenen Kriegs zuerüstungen mit nichten verstöhren lassen", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 151v-152v.*

<sup>260</sup> *"... Sýe Porthen werde sich von denen vorgenommenen Kriegs zuerüstungen mit nichten verstöhren lassen, ia vill mehr selbige vergrösseren, der gänzlichen zueversicht allen, so sich darwider setzen wollen, gewachsen zuseýn, mit denen Venetianern wolte nun Sýe machende præensiones zuegestehen, oder aber ob Sýe Porthen selbige werde bekriegen müssen, in solchem fall wurde die Porthen sowohl denen Venetianern, als allen anderen so Jhnen ahsistieren, auf den faß gehen, es seýen auch die Moscoviter in die ottomannishe-Provinzen eingefallen, allein brave darauß gepeitschet worden ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 152v.*

of the prognosis, implying that support and intervention were warranted in all circumstances of distress.<sup>261</sup>

Later in the conversation, Fleischmann specifically stated to the Grand Vizier that the decision to be taken regarding Venice would also concern the Emperor.<sup>262</sup> The Grand Vizier, on the other hand, mentioned that they were careful to preserve their relations with His Imperial Majesty during his war with France and that they even refused to help Prince Rákóczi during his rebellion for this reason and even offered him to give up his rights over Transylvania.<sup>263</sup> Fleischmann reminded that the Sublime Porte had an obligation, in accordance with the Treaty of Karlowitz, not to help either Thököly or Rákóczi for Transylvania, which they could never own.<sup>264</sup> This time, the Grand Vizier stated that the Emperor needed the friendship of the Ottoman Empire, not the Venetians', whom he described as a handful of fishermen, and asked why the Emperor did not advise the Venetians on this issue. During his speech, he often got angry and said that the Venetians were plundering for no reason, the islands were taken from them, and therefore they could fight and punish them.<sup>265</sup>

Fleischmann's report on his audience with the Grand Vizier reveals a notably tense and shifting dynamic in the conversation. The Grand Vizier's agitated demeanor is particularly striking, and the tone of the exchange evolved significantly over the course of the meeting. Initially, the Grand

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<sup>261</sup> "... ferner zuesezend dises seÿe von Ihrer Kayl:en Maÿt: khein freundschafts: Stuckh in dem Sÿe Jhr Porten die hande binden, vnd von Jhren Feinden allerhand vnbuilden zuübertragen zuemuethen wolten, dises wäre eben daß, alß ob der Jene, so dem andern giff zutrinckhen gibt, freünd zunennen seÿe, Ich antworthete, daß es ganz ein andere beschaffenheit hette, vnd gar ein grosses freündstuckh seÿe, wan einer dem andern daß im trunckh verborgene giff offenbahre hierauf zoge der Groß Vezier folgende gleichnus an, daß ein berühmten Medicus, wan er einen Kranckhen Menschen wisse, nicht gleich zu ihn gehe, sondern sich vorhero erkundige, ob die Kranckhheit Tödtlich, oder noch curabl seÿe? Dann im ersten fall, sofern der Patient stirbt, so wurde der Medicus sich prostituiren, vnd die medicin vmb sonst anwenden, hierüber gabe ich ihme antworthlich zuverstehen, daß ein Stipendierten Medicus in allen fall zugehen verbunden ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 152v-153v.

<sup>262</sup> "... vnd solches seÿe auch in Ihrer Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat wegen der mit Venedig habenden bindnuß zubetrachten ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 153v.

<sup>263</sup> "... er offtgedachter Groß Vezier gabe weither vor, daß die Porthen wehrenden letzteren französischen Krieg wegen Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat sehr grosse consideration gehabt, und niemahln dem Ragoczÿ ohneracht er hefftige instanzien gemacht, ja Sibenbürgen zugeben offeriret, assistiren wollen ...", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 153v.

<sup>264</sup> "Ich meldete, das die Porthen Crafft der Carlovizischen fridens-Capitulation hierzue verbunden, und nicht sehe, wie er Ragoczÿ Sibenbürgen, so selbiger niemahln besessen, versprechen es jhme wohl, alß wie dem Teköly ergehen können", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 153v-154r.

<sup>265</sup> "der Groß Vezier fuhr weither forth, sagend, es seÿe ihre Römische Kaiserlichen Majestat die freundschaft der Porthen nöthiger, alß deren Venetianern, welche nur ein Hand voll Fischer wären, warumben Selbte nicht auch ihnen Venetianern widerrathen, alß sÿe jüngstens mit der Porten ohne ursach den friden gebrochen, ihr ein Statt, und Insul nach der andern abgenohmen, etlichmahl ganz zornig widerhollend daß Sÿe Porthen nach ihren habenden gesätzen gienge, wohl den ersten, anderten, und dritten bekriegen, und züchtigen könnte", 19 November 1714, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 154r.

Vizier appeared reluctant to explicitly confirm that the ongoing military preparations were directed against Venice. However, upon hearing the information Fleischmann presented, he shifted his position, increasingly emphasizing the strategic necessity of war with the Republic. At one point, the Grand Vizier even adopted an intimidating posture, asserting that the Sublime Porte possessed sufficient strength to confront any power that might choose to support Venice. Nevertheless, his remarks were interspersed with repeated affirmations of the Ottoman Empire's desire to maintain amicable relations with the Emperor. He went so far as to suggest that it would be more advantageous for the Emperor to count a strong Ottoman Empire among his allies, rather than rely on the support of a weakened Venice. Taken together, these statements suggest that the Grand Vizier's rhetoric was, in large part, a calculated attempt to dissuade the Emperor from intervening in support of Venice, thereby preserving a degree of diplomatic balance while advancing the Sublime Porte's strategic objectives.

Fleischmann states that although he heard that troops were being dispatched to Hungary from many parts of the Empire and that fortifications were being built in some places, the Grand Vizier did not seem to be disturbed by this news.<sup>266</sup>

The Grand Vizier emphasized that they had complied with the agreement they made with the Emperor regarding the Dulcigno people and that they had not done anything contrary to the agreement, while Fleischmann stated that his purpose of being there was to inform the Emperor of what was happening. In his report, Fleischmann wrote that he considered his service to the Empire very sacred and that neither death nor being thrown into Yedikule dungeons like the Russians could prevent him from fulfilling his duty. Because even the Russian prisoners in Yedikule were sharing everything they heard and learned with their Czar. Additionally, he was there to observe both countries, not to spy. At least the Grand Vizier should have believed so.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> "... obwohlen Sÿe von verschidenen orthen h re te das ville Kaiserliche Trouppen in Hungarn einquartieret, und etliche Vestungs-Bau angeleget worden seien, so kehrte sÿe sich dannoch nicht daran, und machete es ihnen nicht die geringste ombrage, angesehen Ihr Porthen wohl bewusst ...", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, T rkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 154r-154v.

<sup>267</sup> "... Ihr Porthen wohl bewusst, nichts wider den mit Ihre Kaiserlichen Majestat geschlossenen Friden gehandelt zuhaben, wie es dann auch aus der wegen denen Dulcignotischen raubereÿen jetzt gleich anbefohlenen Satisfaction erhellet, mich wahrnend wohl aihung zugeben, da  diese Ihre allerh chst angezogene R mische Kaiserliche Majestat zu ohren gekombene Sache nicht von mir herr hre, und solte an denen in Siben Thurmen gesessenen Moscovitern, welche auch alles, so sie hin und her aufgeklaubet, an den Czaar berichtet, ein exempel nehmen, hier ber versicherte Ich ihn Gro  Vezier antworthlich wohl zuwissen, was mein allervnterth nigste pflicht, und der von meinem allergr  m chtigsten Kay ser, und herrn mir allern digst aufgetragene dienst mit sich bringe, und wurde mich weder durch deren Moscovitern exempel, noch den Todt selbstn darvon abhalten lassen er Gro -Vezier solte sicherlich glauben, da  ich nicht hier seie einen Spionen abzugeben, sondern deren beeden Reichen wohlfarth zubeobachten", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, T rkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 154v-155v.

Fleischmann emphasized that he remained fully cognizant of his mandate from the Emperor, which was to mediate the tensions between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice—or more precisely, to prevent the Sublime Porte from formally declaring war. Accordingly, during his audience with the Grand Vizier, he sought to temper the Vizier's hostile tone and to identify a potential foundation for diplomatic compromise. Fleischmann recognized that an uncontrolled emotional outburst could have precipitated a serious diplomatic incident. In an effort to ease tensions, he attempted to explain the dynamics of alliances among Christian states, hoping to contextualize European political alignments in a manner that would foster mutual understanding. The Grand Vizier, who gradually adopted a more composed demeanor, sought to justify his earlier anger by attributing it to the offenses committed by the Dulcignotians against Imperial subjects—acts that, he claimed, had occurred without the knowledge or consent of the Sublime Porte. Fleischmann responded that such indignation was understandable and could be viewed as an expression of a deeply rooted sense of justice.<sup>268</sup>

According to his report<sup>269</sup>, Fleischmann was now sure that the Sublime Porte would declare war on Venice after his speech with the Grand Vizier, which he described as arrogant and barbaric. He added that he had already had some doubts that this war would break out for several months. A few days after the meeting, in order not to waste time and to put all the emphasis, he sent the Imperial translator Pondt to Reis Efendi.

Fleischmann explained that his decision to send the translator Pondt to meet with the Reis Efendi was motivated by a desire to ascertain whether the message he had previously conveyed regarding the Venetian matter had been clearly understood. Through this intermediary engagement, he aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of his initial communication. Furthermore, Fleischmann wished to inform the Reis Efendi that he remained available to meet with the Grand Vizier once

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<sup>268</sup> “... worauf er Groß-Vezier auch wider zu sich kommen, und sich endlich excusiret, dass er von denen Dulcignoten ohne Vorwissen der Porthen an denen Kaiserlichen Untertanen begangene müsset hatten ihn am mehristen zum Zorn bewegt hätten ich widersetzte, dass im selbigen Fall kein Zorn, sondern ein Justiz-eiser seie, worauf ich mich noch in der Güte von ihm geschieden.”, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 156r.

<sup>269</sup> “Allein, da ich aus all diesen mit mir gehabtten hochmütigen und barbarischen Diskursen genugsam abnehmen könnte, dass die Sache mit Venedig auf die Spitze kommen und der Krieg waran ich zwar von etliche Monaten nicht mehr gezweifelt, mit selbiger Republik ganz gewiss seie, habe um kein Zeit zu verlieren, und all möglichen Nachdruck zugeben den folgenden Tag den Kaiserlichen Dollmätisch Pondt zu dem Reis-Effendi geschickt”, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 156r-156v.

more, should there be any ambiguity in the message or if the Sublime Porte desired further clarification of His Imperial Majesty's position on the issue.<sup>270</sup>

The Grand Vizier responded by noting that he, too, had much to express, but due to the inclement weather, he requested that Fleischmann transmit his message discreetly in Latin within two days. However, Fleischmann judged that delivering the message in written form would be inappropriate and potentially ill-received, and therefore refrained from doing so. Additionally, Pondt conferred with the Reis Efendi, explaining that he was not authorized to deliver a written communication without the prior knowledge and approval of the Imperial Council. Indeed, had the Council desired such a formal submission, it would have issued the appropriate instructions. Under these circumstances, it was deemed necessary to rely solely on verbal communication to maintain the propriety and discretion of the diplomatic exchange.<sup>271</sup>

Fleischmann shared in his report<sup>272</sup> that to make sure that the message of the Imperial Council regarding Venice was sufficiently understood by the Sublime Porte, he would meet with the Grand Vizier, Reis Efendi or Kahya, either secretly or openly, depending on the situation. After that meeting, Fleischmann emphasized that he would inform the Aulic War Council about the Sublime Porte's answer because he did not want to be found guilty in a negative situation.

According to the same report, Reis Efendi explained that the Grand Vizier was in a different mood and that he did not request anything in writing from Fleischmann because the Sublime Porte

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<sup>270</sup> "... und all möglichen Nachdruck zugeben den folgenden Tag den Kaiserlichen Dollmätſch Pondt zu dem Reis-Effendi geschickt, ihn befragen lassen, ob der Groß Vezier das ihm in der verflossenen Tagen gehabtten Audienz wegen der Republik Venedig vorgetragenes wohl verstanden hätte, widrigen Falls, zumahlen es der Porthen selbst viel daran gelegen sein sollte, wollte ich noch einmal zu ihn Groß Vezier kommen, und es ihm wiederholter bedeuten", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 156v.

<sup>271</sup> "... hierauf lieſſe der Groß-Vezier mir hinterbringen, dass er sich für dem Volk fürchtete, gestalten selbiges ohne dem wegen der bei so ungestimmen Wetter [da in der Wahrheit ich sambst denen meinigen bei Passirung des Kanals in der größten Gefahr unterzugehen ware] gegebenen Audienz viel Redens habe daher sollte ich ihm die gemachte proposition in Lateinischer Sprach nach zwei Tagen schriftlich unter meiner hand-und Pettschaffts-fertigung zuschickken, allein habe es aus consideration, es möchte die Sache von dem jetzigen wunderlichen Türkischen Gouverno übel genommen oder auch Sinistre interpretiert werden, nicht getrauet zutun; als aber durch dem besagten Dollmätſch an den bestimmten Tag dem mehrgemelten Reis Effendi hinterbringen lieſſe, dass ich ohne Expressen kaiserlichen Befehl nichts schriftliches von mir geben könnte und so fern der Kaiserliche Hof haben wollte, dass es der Porthen schriftlich überreicht werde, so hätte er ihr es selbst zugeschrieben, und nicht mir, sondern den mündlichen Vortrag anbefohlen", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 156v-157v.

<sup>272</sup> "Meine Meinung seie, Dass ich im Fall es die Porthen nicht genugsam verstanden, noch einmal zum Groß Vezier, Reis-Effendi oder Chihaja, wir Sie es verlanget, cognito oder inkognito gehe, und dass jenige, so ich aus aller gnädigsten kaiserlichen Befehl wegen der Republik Venedig der Porthen vorzutragen habe, wiederholter melde; wann sie es aber schon wohl kapiert, so solle der mehrberührte Dolmetsch sich anfragen, was ich hierüber dem Kaiserlichen Hof für ein Antwort einschicken solle daß sodann im Fall was unanständiges daraus erfolge, man mir keine Schuld beymessen möge", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 157v-158r.

believed everything Fleischmann said without any doubt. He also shares that the Grand Vizier understood the messages given to him about Venice very well. Fleischmann states that there was no need to explain the issue further because it was understood that the Grand Vizier could not answer the question of war or peace with Venice, even if they met ten more times.<sup>273</sup>

According to Fleischmann, large expenses were being made for the advantages and benefits that the Sublime Porte was able to obtain from the Russians and hoped to obtain from the Venetians. The construction of a large number of warships and other preparations, unprecedented in the Ottoman Empire until then, had caused a great deal of expense. Ministers, ulama, and other high officials who had the slightest objection to these expenses were immediately strangled and some were also sent into exile.<sup>274</sup> Moreover, Fleischmann observed<sup>275</sup> that, should the Grand Vizier choose not to inform the Sultan of their meeting—perhaps in an effort to preserve his own position—and nevertheless persist in pursuing the current course of action, he risked exposing the Ottoman Empire to significant long-term detriment. The Grand Vizier faced a precarious dilemma: if he were to advise abandoning the impending war with Venice, he might be accused by the Sultan of offering poor

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<sup>273</sup> *“Er Reis-Effendi fielle gleich dem dollmätchen in die rede sagend der Groß Vezier hette sich anderst besaunen, und verlangte nichts schriftliches von mir, auch wurde es wider meine Ehr seyn, da doch die Porthen allen deme, was Jch Jhr vortrage, vngewisselten glauben beylege, der Groß Vezier hatte den Jhme wegen Venedig gethannen vortrag wohl verstanden, vnd verbleibe es bey der damahls gegebenen antworth, welche ich dem Kaiserlichen Hof in höflicheren, oder in eben selbigen terminis berichten könnte, dahero seye es nicht nöthig die Sach mehr zuexpliciren, vnd wan Jch auch in diser materia noch zehen-mahl kombete, könnte er nichts anders antworthen über dises so wuste die Porthen selbsten nicht, ob es mit Venedig Krieg oder frid seyn werde.”*, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 158r-158v.

<sup>274</sup> *“Dieses ist eigentlich daß, was ich wegen der offtgemelten Republic Venedig allhier bey der Porthen vorgenommen, war aus euer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden derselben gegenwärtig, oder künfftig zuerwarthen habenden zuestand selbsten gnädigst zuersehen belieben; Weillen aber der von denen von Moscau erhaltenen, und von Venedig zuerhalten hoffenden Vortheillen, vnd progrehen, ingleichen von der aniezo sehenden niemahls in dem Ottomannischen Reich gestandene Zahl-reiche Kriegs-Schüffe, vnd anderen geraithschafftten auch zusamben gebrachten gelt-summen höchst aufgeblasene Sultan in disen wider Venedig resolvirten Krieg sehe incapriciret, und verschidene darwider nur das geringste eingewend habende Ministros insonderheit ville Ulema oder Gesätz: gelehrte theillß stranguliren, theillß ins exilium verweisen lassen ”*, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 158v-159r.

<sup>275</sup> *“... dörfte der Groß Vezier aus horcht sein Kopf zuverlieren diese von mir ihme über den Venedig vorhabenden Krieg gethannen vortrag verdushen, und selbigen, und selbigen nicht dem Sultan referieren, sondern vill mehr die sache auf daß eüsserste komben lassen, ja lieber daß ganze Ottomannische Reich den zuekhünfftigen untergang alß seinen Koeffh der gegenwerttigen gefahr exponiren, dann entweder hat Er Groß Vezier zu disem Krieg gerathen oder abgerathen, im ersteren fall wird Er des übl gegeben, und nicht gut ausgeschlagenen Raths beschuldiger im andern fall aber wird Er auf diesen nicht genug gehaltenen Secret wegen, und vor der Zeit kundgemachten dessein von Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat machenden, und seiner des Groß-Veziers meinung einstimmenden passum Suspect werden, also das nun alles dahin ankommt, wie man diesem dem Sultan beibringe, ob man nemblichen es ihme Sultan durch ein von daraussen herein schickhen des, und der Porthen öffentlich übergebendes an ihn immederate oder den Groß Vezier gesteltes schreiben khonnte Thuen, oder ob ich den öffters gemelten Vortrag schröfftl: verfassen, vnd ihme Sultan da Er in die moscheen reithet, yberraichen lassen solle?”*, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 159r-160r.

counsel. Conversely, if it were later revealed that the Grand Vizier had met privately with Fleischmann and that His Imperial Majesty had received advance knowledge of Ottoman intentions, the Grand Vizier could fall under suspicion for failing to safeguard a critical state secret. Ultimately, Fleischmann noted, the entire situation hinged on whether the Sultan became aware of these developments through unofficial channels. This raised a delicate question of diplomatic protocol: should a letter be sent directly to the Sultan, or would it be more effective—and less provocative—for Fleischmann to discreetly deliver a written note to the Sultan during his entrance to the mosque?

Furthermore, Fleischmann noted that if the second scenario were to materialize—namely, the Sultan learning of the situation through unofficial channels—his relationship with the Grand Vizier would likely suffer significant deterioration. Under such strained circumstances, he expressed doubt as to whether future negotiations could proceed effectively without the involvement of third parties to mediate or facilitate dialogue. In his report, Fleischmann added that he was awaiting further instructions from the Emperor regarding the appropriate course of action. In the meantime, he would explore the possibility of delivering a message or offering something directly to the Sultan in person, should such an opportunity present itself.<sup>276</sup>

Towards the end of his report, Fleischmann stated that there is not much information about the Sublime Porte's large-scale war weapons. Every day, large mortars were being built, bombs were being prepared, tested and loaded onto ships. He also stated that the Sublime Porte would send a few more ships to continue the blockade that winter. Three warships were now ready to deliver 3600 bombs and several thousand shells to Eğriboz and then pick up the militias from Egypt and Aleppo.<sup>277</sup>

Hacı Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier of the Tatar Khan, came to the capital without any order from the Sublime Porte. However, the Janissary Agha in Edirne set out for Lepanto Castle with 500 janissaries. All preparations in Edirne were completed for Sultan's campaign to Thessaloniki and

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<sup>276</sup> *"in welchem letzteren fahl Ich mich mit dem Groß Vezier sehr imbroglieren, und sofern Er nicht über ein hauffen geworffen wird, mit Ihme mehr waß zu negotiren ausser stand sezen wuerde, oder aber ob man auch deren sachen ernst durch andere darauß vorkherende mittel der Porten capiren machen wolle? Welches alles ewer durchl: Excell: vnd gnaden vnterthänigst anheimb stelle, vnd bey sothanner der sachen beschaffenheit deroselben ferner ordre in vnterthänigkeit erwarthe."*, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 160r-160v.

<sup>277</sup> *"Nun von denen weitheren grossen Kriegs zuerüstungen der Porten waß wenigens zumelden, so werden täglich stuckh Mörser, vnd bomben gegossen, probiert, vnd eingeschüffet, vnd dörrften disen Wintter einige Schüff außlauffen Moream blocquierter zuhalten; wüerckhlich stehen dreÿ Kriegs Schiff Seegl fertig welche 3600 bomben, nebst etlich tausent gläseren granaten nach Negroponte bringen, vnd sodann von Gran Chairö vnd Aleppo die Eÿptische Miliz abhollen sollen"*, 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 160v.

Yenişehir, as he did at other times and in such a case, Fleischmann shared in his report that a difficult and costly journey awaits him.<sup>278</sup>

Finally, Fleischmann called much of the information attributed to him by foreign palaces about the Sublime Porte and Venice as speculation and requested that they not be relied upon. He also underlined that he would never undertake such actions without the approval and order of the Imperial Council. However, he also stated in his report that if there was an urgent situation, he would not hesitate to report it. Additionally, he explained that he could not send the janissaries under his command because he was too busy with the Dulcigno issue, and stated that Courier Luca would be leaving within two weeks. Therefore, he wrote that it was important for an Imperial Courier to be there and advised to stay.<sup>279</sup>

### 3.7. The Declaration of War on Venice

It is evident that, during the preparations for war against the Republic of Venice, the Sublime Porte undertook considerable efforts to prevent the Habsburg Monarchy from becoming involved in the conflict. This intention is reflected in the conduct of the Dulcignotians, who, during their assaults on Venetian ports and commercial vessels, refrained from harming the lives or property of Imperial subjects. The Sublime Porte's deliberate restraint and attentiveness in this regard further underscore its aim to avoid antagonizing the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, despite these efforts at discretion, once it became apparent that the war preparations were indeed directed against Venice, the Ottoman leadership acted swiftly. The dispatch of an Agha to Vienna and the accompanying expression of a desire to preserve peace with the Emperor are documented not only in Fleischmann's reports but also corroborated by various sources.

Finally, on December 8, 1714, Sultan Ahmed's Kapıcıbaşı had the Venetian ambassador Bailo Andrea Memmo kidnapped and brought to the Grand Vizier. In the presence of the Grand Vizier, it

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<sup>278</sup> "... der Groß Vezier des Tartar Chans Kugi Ali Agha durch welchen alß meinen vormahligen bekannnten ich auch waß tentieren will ist diser Tagen berueffener hier angelangt, zweiffels ohne die seinem Principalen beÿ gegenwärttigen läuffen zuekhombende ordre von der Porten zuempfangen. Der Jänitschären Aga zu Adrianopel aber ist diser Tagen mit 500 Jänitschären nach der fotificierenden Vöstung Lepanto abgegangen, vnd weillen zu gedachten Adrianopel bereiths zu der dahin khonfft der Porten all nöthiges veranstaltet wirdt, alß wierdt der Sultan wie Er es andere Zeiten gethan, urplötzlich dahin aufbrechen, vmb von dorth gegen Salonik, vnd Jengischerer zuerheben vnd in solchen Fahl auch mir eine schwere und gelt bedürftige Reiß vorstehen", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 160v-161r.

<sup>279</sup> "Schliesßlichen hätte Ich zwar gegenwärttigen Jänitschären, sofern mich nicht die Dulcignotische affairen zu sehr occupiert, etliche Tage früeher abgeschickhet, den hier stehenden Luca aber werde nach herauß gebrachten Ferman innerhalb vierzehnen Tagen waß ehender oder Späther, wie es die wichtigkeit deren sich eraignenden vorfallenheiten erfordert, von hier rispedieren, vnd ist es in allem fahl guet einen Kayl:en Currier alß welche so leicht nicht aufgehalten, werden, hier zuhaben, wormit mich dero allstäthen höchsten huldten vnd gnaden vntherthänigst gehorst empfh: verharre ewer durchl: Excell: vnd gnaden", 19 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 161v-162r.



was reported to the ambassador that the Republic of Venice provided ammunition and money to the Montenegrin rebels, and that, despite their commitment to the Ottoman Empire, they protected the rebel Vladika of Montenegro and his entourage and refused to surrender them to the Ottoman forces, and therefore the ongoing peace between the two states was disrupted. The ambassador was also informed that the Sublime Porte had requested the Morea from the Republic of Venice and that no sacrifice would be spared for this cause. The Grand Vizier told the Bailo that he must leave Istanbul within three days and that the Venetians must leave Ottoman territory within 21 days at the latest. He asked him to inform the Senate of these developments, and he was imprisoned in a house near Tophane, guarded by Janissaries.<sup>280</sup>

A few days later, the Kapudan Pasha was dismissed from his post; He was replaced by Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha, and he was ordered to complete all preparations by working day and night in the shipyard, if necessary, in order to start the war strong, as the war would be fought with the Venetians both on land and at sea. Thereupon, Habsburg Emperor Karl VI's Resident to Istanbul, Fleischmann, delivered a harsh memorandum to the Grand Vizier. In this memorandum<sup>281</sup>, it was mentioned that the Emperor was aware of the preparations for war and that a war declared against the Republic of Venice would harm the existing peace order. The Emperor also mentioned that the Republic of Venice and the Habsburgs had an alliance agreement, that this alliance had recently been renewed, and that they would not be responsible for the blood of the innocents that would be shed as a result of the war.

In his response<sup>282</sup> to Fleischmann's memorandum through Reis Efendi, the Grand Vizier emphasized that they did not violate the Karlowitz Peace Treaty in any way because there was no mention of a Venetian-Habsburg alliance in the treaty. According to the Grand Vizier, Venice had violated many articles of the peace treaty and the Ottomans hoped that the Emperor would not protect this state that violated the peace. The Emperor should have done best not to get involved in this matter; Otherwise, the Sublime Porte would not hesitate to protect itself and its interests. In his response, the Grand Vizier referred those who violated the peace to God's justice. Fleischmann's other objections were also dismissed. Grand Vizier Damad Silahdar Ali Pasha stated that the declaration of war was fair and that the Sultan was determined to take back the unfairly occupied Peloponnese.

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<sup>280</sup> Theyls 1722; 175-176.

<sup>281</sup> Zinkeisen 1857; 465, Theyls 1722; 177-178.

<sup>282</sup> Theyls 1722; 178.

It is seen that Fleischmann informed the Habsburg commander of Translyvania, Count Stephan von Steinvill<sup>283</sup>, about the war preparations at the Sublime Porte with his report dated 3 November 1714. In this report<sup>284</sup>, it is mentioned that the information that the great preparations in the Ottoman shipyards were made against Venice has become evident and that all preparations for the war to be waged both by land and sea are about to be completed. Fleischmann also expresses his disappointment with these preparations made by the Ottoman side. It also states that Köprülüzade Numan Pasha, who took action against the Montenegrin rebels a few days ago, ordered the complete destruction of the rebellious people in the region.

In his report<sup>285</sup> dated November 7, 1714, Fleischmann mentions his meeting with the Grand Vizier. In this meeting, they talked with the Grand Vizier about the previous war and the benefits of the current peace situation. Fleischmann told the Grand Vizier that the people of Dulcigno were plundering the Imperial subjects on land and at sea and that this was against the provisions of the Treaty of Karlowitz. The Grand Vizier was very surprised by this situation and said that he was not aware of these looting incidents. Afterwards, he gave strict orders to those around him, promising

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<sup>283</sup> Count Steinvill was a Habsburg commander who was assigned the task of controlling the Wallachian border along Translyvania, as well as cooperation with the other border commanders of Arad, Szeged, Petrovaradin, and the districts between the Mureş and the Tisza in 1716. For more information, Nemeth & Papo 2023; 156.

<sup>284</sup> *“Meinem jüngstern setze sovill zue, das sich die von der Ottomannishen Porthen zum Krieg wider Venedig höchende intention mehr und mehr eüssere, gestalten sowohl allhier alß all andern See Porten des Ottomannishen Reichs zu Wasser, und Land die also zuenöthige præparatorien vorgekehret bereiths in etlichen orthen die Magazine angefillt, die Troupen beordert, und die Flotta aus gerüstet werden. Unseren Hof kan es kheine neüe sach seÿn, indeme ich selbigem dises Türckhishe intent schon anfangs auch positive berichtet, recht aber erwarthe mit schmerzen die mir in solchen conjuncturen nöthige Instruction zu gott hoffend alles dises werde endlich zu den besten ausschlagen, vor einigen Tagen wurde dem wider die Montenegriner zu feld stehenden Numan Bahsa ordre zuegeschickhet gedachtes Volckh, so er umbringet, völlig nidezuhauen.”*, 3 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 122v-123v.

<sup>285</sup> *“... Nachdem der Groß-Vezier wenigst den aüsserlichen schein nach hieran ein sonderlichen gefallen zuhaben erzaiget, finge er über den vorgewesenen Krieg, und nunmehr zugenüessen habende fridens fruchten ein langes und sehr freündliches gespräch an, worauf Ich ihm dann auch Verrer Discurs Weiß zuverstehen geben, wie daß die Dulcignoten an denen Neapolitanischen und verschidenen anderen Kayserlichen Unterthanen zu Land und Wasser mit außraubung einiger orthen, auch hinwegnehmung viller fahrzeüg und leüthen grosse insolentien verüebeten; der Groß-Vezier betheürete anhwortlich daß dises ohne Consens der Porten vill weniger mit selbiger ordre geschehen, ja Sÿe in gegentheill anbefohlen hätte, aller orthen die Kayserliche land und Leüthe alß freünd zu tractiren, auch die Kayserliche flaquen besstens zu respectiren, mithin nicht fassen könnte, wie sich einige Türckische unterthanen hiezuesolten erkhüenet haben. Etliche Täge darnach liesse er mir bedeüthen dises von mir angebrachte mehrer überleget, und für guet befunden zuhaben, dessen verrerre vornehmung biß zu ankunfft des nächstens erwartenden Capitain Bahsa [so hierinnen einige erfahruß hätte] zuverschieben, indessen hätte er wüerckhlich gleich nach meiner audienz durch einen aigents abgeschickhten Ciaushen denen gemelten Dulcignoten scharff anbefohlen Ihrer Röml Kayl und Catholl Majl Küsten und Flaquen zu respectiren. Sobald nun gemelter Capitain Bahsa hier wierd eingeseglet seÿn, so werde destwegen die weithere instanz machen, und all meine aüsseriste Cräfften ausfannen, dises Kayserliche sambe werckh der habenden allergnädigsten Kayserlichen instruction gemäsß zum gewünschten ende zubringen, sofern nur die gegenwärttge wider Venedig gar zu Clar anscheinende neüe conjuncturen nichts widriges in weeg legen.”*, 7 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 126r-127v.

that they would definitely put an end to these actions of the plunderers against the subjects of the Empire. Fleischmann wrote in his report that the Kapudan Pasha would change and that he would receive a promise from the new Pasha, who would arrive a few days later, to end these plundering incidents. Meanwhile, intensive preparations were being made for the war to be waged at sea and on land in many provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Fleischmann stated<sup>286</sup> that support forces were being brought from Thessaloniki, Crete, Eğriboz, and Lepanto and that efforts were being made to ensure that nothing that might be necessary for the war was left out. Finally, in his report, he stated that he would exert all his efforts to prevent the declaration of war against the Venetians, despite the challenges posed by an arrogant, inexperienced governor who is unyielding and frequently provokes rumors.

In his report<sup>287</sup> dated December 10, 1714, Fleischmann wrote that he received the news that a great council would be held on the 8th of the month, but since everyone learned this news late, the meeting was delayed by a few days. On the day of the meeting in question, the Grand Vizier, the Shaykh al-Islam with ulama, the Janissary Agha with the Odjak corps, Kaptan Pasha, Reis Efendi, the Defterdar, the Grand Vizier of the Tatar Khan (Ali Agha), and all other officials who had made it a custom to be present at such ceremonies were present at the meeting. According to Fleischmann's account, the Grand Vizier came just to be seen there rather than to seek advice from them. At the beginning of the meeting, the Grand Vizier immediately ordered Numan Pasha, who was a supporter of the war, to send a report through the newly arrived Yusuf Agha.

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<sup>286</sup> *"Allermassen hier, und in mehristen anderen Ottomannischen Provinzen die grosse Kriegs anstalten zu wasser und zur Land ohne Unterlaß continuirt, und bereiths zur Salonik, Candia, Negroponte, und Lepanto grosse magazinen angeleget, in Summa es wierdt nichts unterlassen, waß zur gedachten Krieg erforderlich sein mag, welcher all meiner Confidenten ein stimmigen aussag nach, so bald nur der oben berüehete Capitain Bahsa welcher die anthwort wegen denen an Venedig machenden prætensionen mitbringet, angelanget, publicieret werden solle; ich erwartte dahero euer durchlauchtigen Excellenzen und gnaden die zu disen bereiths vor vier Monathen gründlich penetrierten, und unterthänigst berichteten conjuncturen nöttige Instructionen mit grossem verlangen, und wird die zurucktreibung dieses von der Porten gegen die oftgemelte Republic Venedig wüerckhlich beschlossenen Kriegs umb so härter halten; alß man mit einem übermüethigen, unerfahrenen und keine raison anzunehmen gewohnten gouverno zuthuen hat."*, 7 November 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 127v-128v.

<sup>287</sup> *"P.S: Da eben all: gehorsambt: vorgemeltes zupappier gebeacht erfahre, daß den 8:ten dises ein grosser rath bey der Porthen angestellet werden solle, dahero habe dise expedition biß hieher verschoben, an gemeltem Tag früh vor aufgang der Sonnen funde sich der Groß Vezier, Muftti mit denen gesätz-gelehrten der Jänitscharn Aga mit denen Otschaken, Capitajn Bahsa, Reis Effendi, Defterdar nebst all: andern in derley functionen zugegen zuseyn pflegenden Officiers des Tartar Hans GroßVeziers Alÿ Aga allein mehr zum eüsserlichen anschein alß von Jhnen einen rath zuhollen bey der Porthen ein, der berührte Groß Vezier befahle gleich, daß von dem in meinem vorhergehenden unterthänigst angezogenen zum Krieg sehr inclinirenden Numan Bahsa ertheilte durch eben von bemelten kurtz von dar gekommenen Jusuf Aga überbrachten bericht ..."*, 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 172r.

The Pasha asserted that Venetian support for the Montenegrin rebels was not intermittent but consistent and sustained, often accompanied by financial assistance and assurances. He further claimed that, since the conclusion of the Peace of Karlowitz, the Venetians had committed numerous transgressions against the Ottoman Empire. These included offenses against Ottoman subjects, the unlawful seizure of livestock, ships, and other property, and the detention of individuals who traveled to Venice to lodge formal complaints. Additionally, the Venetians were accused of failing to respond to legitimate and reasonable diplomatic overtures. In the Pasha's view, rather than pursuing amicable relations with the Sublime Porte, Venice had deliberately chosen a path of enmity. Framed within a religious and political narrative, the Pasha declared that the Sultan, empowered by divine will and the guiding principles of Islamic law, had resolved to take up arms against those who refused submission. In preparation for this undertaking, funds were raised, and the Ottoman navy was outfitted with exceptional care, achieving a level of readiness that was, according to the Pasha, unmatched elsewhere in the world. As a result, consensus was reached to formally declare war against the Republic of Venice, which was held responsible for ongoing hostilities and provocations. That same day, at noon, it was decided that a Kapıcıbaşı and two sergeants would summon the Venetian Bailo Memmo to appear before the Sublime Porte.<sup>288</sup>

When Kapıcıbaşı and two sergeants arrived to summon the Venetian Bailo on behalf of the Grand Vizier, they informed him that he was requested at the Sublime Porte. The Bailo responded courteously, stating that he would promptly change his attire and invited them to take coffee during the brief delay. Throughout this time, Kapıcıbaşı maintained visual contact with the Bailo and followed him to his apartment, where the envoy made his preparations. Once dressed, the Bailo was escorted from his residence on foot, accompanied by only a small number of his personal servants;

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<sup>288</sup> "... in welchen Er Bassa dargethan, daß die Venetianer die Montenegrinerische Rebellion nicht allein von Zeit zu Zeit unterhalten, selbigen mit gelt, und gewöhr an die hand gestanden, sondern auch bei jetziger dämpfung ihnen mit schüffen Succuriret, vnd ville deren entlossenen in ihr territorium aufgenommen hetten, vorzulesen, darauff stellte Er selbsten vor, daß sye Venetianer von Zeit des Carlovitzishen fridens ville selbigen widerstrebende facta begangen, die Ottomannische Vnterhannen gekränckhet, selbigen öftters ihr Viech, Schüff- vnd andere habschafften hinweckhgenohmen, die destwegen nach Venedig sich zubeklagen gegangene Leüth aufgehalten, und niemahln auf die verlangte billiche Satisfaction geantworthet, mithin mit der Porthen mehr feind-als freündlich vmbgangen seÿe, also das etlich der Sultan aus antrib des Mahomedanischen gesazes sich bemüset befinde dise ihme, vnd denen unergebenen anthuenden vnbild mit dem schwerd zurechnen, worzue ihme dann Gott gnugsamb Kräfte verlihen, vnd Er eben zu disem ende, daß in seinem orario befindende gelt gesamlet, auch bereiths schon die gehörige Kriegszuerüstungen insonderheit zu Wasser in einen in der ganzen welt nicht besser zufinden seÿenden stand gesetzt etc. hierauf wurde von allen der Krieg wider die oft berührte Republic Venedig beschlossen daß in solchem fall übliche gebett verrichtet, und gegen mittag ein Capici Bahsa mit zweÿ Tschaussen den von seithen Venedig hier stehenden Bajlo Cavalliere Memmo zur Porthen zufollen abgeschickhet.", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 172r-173r.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 119r-119v.

the remainder of his household staff quickly dispersed. Upon his departure, the Bailo was transported by boat across the canal, where Kapıcıbaşı had been instructed to wait. After a delay of approximately two hours, he was mounted on horseback and brought to the Sublime Porte. During the journey, he was subjected to verbal abuse by onlookers. Upon arrival, the Bailo was denied access to the customary location designated for foreign diplomatic representatives to dismount. At the entrance to the courtyard, both he and the servants who attempted to assist him were physically assaulted. He was then forcibly separated from his entourage and, accompanied only by an interpreter, led to the Council chamber—a space in which diplomats were typically not required to wait. He remained there for over thirty minutes, visibly distressed, humiliated, and reportedly trembling with fear. Eventually, he was brought before the Grand Vizier. In a significant departure from established diplomatic protocol, the Bailo was seated on a chair positioned eight steps away from the Grand Vizier, highlighting the symbolic and political severity of the moment.<sup>289</sup>

According to Fleischmann's report<sup>290</sup>, the Grand Vizier shouted furiously at Bailo and said that the Republic of Venice had been acting as if it had a relationship of friendship and peace with the Ottoman Empire for a long time, but in fact everything was different. In the presence of the Kapudan Pasha and Reis Efendi (Reis Efendi was holding a large sheet of a paper containing complaints against Venice and the Sublime Porte's justifications for war), the Grand Vizier stated that the Venetians had done what only the greatest enemy could do, inciting the rebels and robbing

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<sup>289</sup> *“Alß nun der berührte Capici Bassa mit zweÿ Tschaushsen dem Bajlo angedeutet, daß der Groß Vezier Jhn beÿ der Porthen verlange, vnd Er Bajlo geantworthet gleich seine Kleÿder zuändern, vnd sich fertig zumachen alda zuerscheinen, Er solte indessen einen Cafe trinckhen, liesse der gedachte Capici Bassa Jhn nicht mehr aus seinen seinen augen, und folgte ihme biß in sein apartement, alwo Er sich gekleÿdet, hierauff führete Er ihn in grosse præcipitanz zu fueß mit nur etlich wenig seiner Domestiquen, wervon die übrige sich gleich verlossen, vnd mehrere Theillß sich in daß französische Palatiumretiriret, an den Vefer des Canals, über welchen Er mit ihme in einem Shüff gesetzet, ienseiths desselben brachte Jhme Capici Bahsa ein Tschauss ordre biß auf weitheren befelch vor dem Constantinopolitanischen Stabthor zuwarthen, entlich aber nach zweÿ stunden wurde Er Bajlo zu Pferd gesezet mit villen Türckhen vmbgeben, vnd in vnaufhörlichen injurien zue Porthen gebracht, allwo ihme nicht zu dem orth, wo sonst die Repræsentanten abzusteigen pflegen, zureütten erlaubet, sondern gleich im eingang des Hofes vom pferdt gerissen, von seinen leüthen, deren ville insonderheit die ihrem herrn vom pferd helfen wolten, mit schlägen tractiret, Separiret, vnd nur mit einem dollmätsch biß in den Divans-Saal, in welchen sonst die außländische Ministri nicht zuwarthen pflegen, geschleppt worden, allwo Er mehrmahln über ein halbe stund in stetter verstott: vnd verhöhnung verweilen müssen, von daraus man Jhn in daß zimmer, worin der GroßVezier gewesen, geführt, vnd auf ein gegen die gewohnheit biß acht schritt weith vom Groß Vezier gestelten Sessel gesezet”, 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 173r-174r.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 113v-114v.*

<sup>290</sup> *“... der vor Zorn entzündete Groß-Vezier redete ihm Bajlo in Gegenwart des Captain Pascha und Reis Effendi [welcher letztere die wider Venedig vorwendende klagen und Kriegsmotiven auf einen großen Papier in Händen hielte], also an das es schon eine geraume Zeit, dass seine Republik mit dem Ottomannischen Reich eine Freundschaft und Frieden zuhaben vorgebetet, in der Tat aber all: dassjenige tette, was nur der größte feind tun könnte, sie fomentiere ihre Rebellen, sie beraube ihre Kaufleute und Untertanen auf die deswegen an sie Republik machende Anforderung aber gäbe sie nicht einmal die gehörige Antwort ...”, 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 174r.*

Ottoman merchants and subjects. Moreover, he said that instead of taking any steps regarding the requests for a meeting with the Venetians on this issue, they did not even respond to the requests.

Although the Kapudan Pasha made an effort to approach the situation diplomatically by dispatching envoys in the Morea to the Venetian General Provveditore, these intermediaries were denied an audience and were summarily turned away without any response to the letter they had delivered. Numan Pasha—renowned throughout the Ottoman Empire for his reputation as a paragon of justice and a devout Muslim—had previously voiced strong objections regarding Venetian involvement in the Montenegrin rebellion. He consistently maintained that the insurrection was sustained solely through the support of the Republic of Venice. According to his reports, the Montenegrin rebels had received not only military supplies, but also financial assistance and provisions from the Venetians. Furthermore, many among them were directly subsidized by the Republic. During the suppression of the rebellion—an outcome attributed by Numan Pasha to divine providence—numerous Venetian flags and other identifiable symbols of Venetian origin were discovered in the possession of the insurgents.<sup>291</sup>

Bailo, who was about to die of fear and dread, wanted to start speaking, but the Grand Vizier interrupted him and said that the Republic had not been sincere in its relationship with the Sublime Porte for a long time and that the relations had gone astray. Moreover, according to the Grand Vizier, the Venetians never really intended to maintain peace with the Sublime Porte. They would fight to the last drop of their blood to punish Venice for violating the peace and usurping the Peloponnese and other places that God had bestowed on the Ottoman Empire. The Grand Vizier had said that they would use all their strength to take back these lands from the faithless dogs and subject them to their rightful power. They would fight for this cause, whether for two years or twenty years. The Grand Vizier said that due to the situation, Bailo would have to leave the capital and other Ottoman lands with all his household and nationals within twenty days. If a Venetian citizen was found within the state border after this period, his belongings would be confiscated, and he would be made a slave of the sultan. After this meeting, the Grand Vizier demanded that the Bailo be removed from

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<sup>291</sup> „... wie dann der zugegen seÿende Capitajn Bahsa einige Leüth in Morea an den Venetianischen General Proveditor abgeschickhet, ihme aber dises Rund gemacht, und die Sache in der gütte beÿzulegen sich offeriret, allein man hette gemelte Leüth ohne Sÿe vorzulassen zuruckhgeschickhet, vnd die mitgehabte brief dato noch mit einmahl beantwortet, beforderist aber hatte der im ganzen Ottomannischen Reich alß ein Gericht vnd wahrhaffter Musulman erkante Numan Bahsa sowohl aniezo alß andern Zeiten sich beklaget, daß die Montenegrinerische rebellion bloß durch die Venetianische intriquen, vnd ihnen Rebellen leistende ahsistenz Subsistiret, wie dann Sÿe von ihnen sowohl mit Kriegs-munition alß gelt, vnd andern provisionen versehen, ia so gahr deren mehriste haubter von der Republic Stipendiret gewesen seÿen, auch hette man beÿ der mit göttlicher hülff vollzogenen dämpfung verschiedene Venetianische gewöhr, fahnen, und andere Kennzeichen gefunden“, 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 174r-174v.



his presence and ordered him to be imprisoned not in his apartment but in a remote Ottoman house belonging to the deposed Topçubaşı<sup>292</sup>, without anyone of his own nationality (many French people secretly entered and left, although they had no small part in these happenings). From that moment on, the Bailo would have his belongings and those of the Venetian citizens brought to two Venetian ships in the capital, intending to return to Venice next day or the day after.<sup>293</sup>

Fleischmann continued his report<sup>294</sup> and stated that it was a great chance for Bailo to leave the country. Because he mentioned that the Venetian subjects were in fear of another Turkish treachery. Allegedly, some Ottoman merchants and butchers submitted a petition to the Grand Vizier and asked for the arrest of all Venetians in the Ottoman Empire until the Ottoman subjects in Venice returned. According to what is known, the Grand Vizier has not yet responded to this petition.

At that time, the Sublime Porte was making every effort to recruit soldiers by decree in great secrecy. Thus, on the occasion of the Eid festival that would take place in the spring, horses could appear, tents could be set up at a place called *Davudpaşa*<sup>295</sup>, an hour away, and thus the Sultan and

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<sup>292</sup> Topçular was an Artillery unit in the Ottoman Army. See, "<https://anabilgi.anadolu.edu.tr/?contentId=206125>". Accessed on 20.01.2025.

<sup>293</sup> "... der vor Furcht und Schrecken mehr Tod als lebendige Bajlo wollte zwar zureden anfangen, allein der Groß Vezier fiele ihm gleich darein meldend, seine Republik hätte lang genug die Porthen hinters liecht geführt, und niemahls mit ihr recht den Frieden gehalten, Sie Porthen hätte nun die Augen aufgetan, die ihr anthuende Ungerechtigkeiten nach ihren heiligen Gesätzen zurechnen, und seine Republik zubestraffen entschlossen, als welche ohne dem dem Ottomannischen Reich durch einen Friedensbruch Morean, und andere ihm von Gott gegebene Lande abgezwicket, jetzo wolle Er Groß-Vezier seinen letzten bluts tropfen daran strecken diese Lande von denen unglaublichen hunden zurainigen, und dem rechtmäßigen Gewalt zuunterwerffen; zu welchem Ende man ein zwei ja zwanzig Jahr Krieg führen werde, Er Bajlo solle demnach mit all: seinigen domestiquen, und hier oder anderwärtig stehenden nationalen innerhalb zwainzig tügen daß Ottomannische Gebieth raumben, und im fall man nach verflossenen Termin noch einen finde, so wurde Er des Sultans Slav gemacht und seine Sachen confisciret werden. Hierauf befahle Er Groß Vezier ihn Bajlo von seinem Angesicht hinweg zustoßen und in der ruckschleppung nicht in seiner Wohnung, sondern in einem mit weit davon gelegenen Türkischen dem abgesetzten Topci Pascha gehörigen Haus, ohne jemand anders als seine nationalen [worunter sich doch viele Franzosen, ohneracht sie an dieser ruptur nicht wenig teil haben, einschleichen] zu ihm zukommen bis zu seiner imbarquirung scharf zuarrestiren. Von dieser Zeit an lasset der Bajlo seine, und der hier trafficirenden Venezianischen Nation habschafften auf die zwei hier seiende Venetianische Schiffe bringen, willens sich morgen oder übermorgen selbst zuimbarquieren, und nach Venedig zurückhuseeglen", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 174v-175v.

<sup>294</sup> "... dieses sollte wohl vor ihn Bailo, und all die dass größte Glück sein, sofern nur kein andere türkische Falschheit darunter stecken möge, welches um so mehr zubeförchten, als schon gestern die an einige Venezianische Untertanen prætension machende türkische Kaufleute und Fleischhacker dem Groß Vezier ein Supplik, worauf noch kein Antwort erfolgt, überreicht und darinnen gebeten, die hier seiende Venezianer solange zuarrestiren, bis die türkische Untertanen auch von Venedig zurück und kontentieren wären", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 175v-176r.

<sup>295</sup> For more information about Davutpaşa Barracks, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/davud-pasa-kislasi>". Accessed on 20.12.2023.

the Sublime Porte could set out for Edirne, regardless of the difficulties of the winter ahead. They planned to go on an expedition to Thessaloniki and Yenişehir in the spring of the following year.<sup>296</sup>

Fleischmann wrote that despite all the massive war preparations it made, the Ottoman Empire had never been weaker and more poorly governed than it is now. According to him, all the policies of the Ottomans were nothing but childish and ostentatious. Fleischmann stated that at the time he wrote his report, among the books of the decapitated Wallachian Prince were brought to the capital was book called *Sachsischen Artilleria Leüthenandens*, published by Johann Hofmann in Nuremberg in 1685 and belonging to Sigmund Buchner. He also added to his report the information that the Sublime Porte had ordered the section called *Theorie Praxis Artilleriæ* in the said work to be interpreted secretly immediately. They intended to practically encourage the formation of other doctrines in the hope of having the best engineers this way. Moreover, according to report, the Grand Vizier believed that His Roman Imperial Majesty would be discouraged and unable to intervene in this preliminary war, and therefore the Venetians would willingly offer the Peloponnese to preempt a war they could not win.<sup>297</sup>

At the end of his report<sup>298</sup>, Fleischmann, as in his previous report, reminded that he was in a dangerous period and stated that he needed help from the council in providing money to be used

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<sup>296</sup> "... bei der Porten aber werden die ferman zu berueffung deren Troupen in gröster geheimb, dahero nur von einem geschriben, vnd alle anstalt gemacht, damit auf daß den 1ten dises fallende kleine Bajram-fest die Rosßschweiss ausgesteckhet, die Zelter an dem eine Stund von hier gelegenen orth Dawud Bahsa genant aufschlagen, vnd so dann ohneracht der vorseÿenden rigorosen Winters Zeit der aufbruch des Sultans, vnd der Porthen nach Adrianopl geschehen möge, allwo sye nechstkünfftigen frühling ihren pferden die gewöhnliche wayde zugeben, vnd darnach ferrer nach Salonik vnd Jengischeher zumarchiren intentioniret seÿnd.", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 176r.

<sup>297</sup> "Gewiß ist, daß dises Ottomannische Reich niemahln schwach: vnd übler alß iezo regieret worden, ihr ganzes weesen ist nichts alß ein Kindisch: und aufgeblasenes verfahren; diser Tügen haben sye unter des enthaubten Wallachischen fürsten hieher gebrachten büchern daß sogenante buch Theoria praxis Artilleriæ dises Sigmund Buchners Sächsischen Artilleria Leüthenandens zu Nürnberg Anno 1685 in verlegung Johann Hofmanns gefunden, vnd es gleich aller still zu interpretiren anbefohlen, der vngezweifelten hoffnung dardurch die beste Ingenieur-vnd Constabler zuwerden, allein seÿe dörrften in der practic sowohl in diser alß in andern sich formirenden lähren einbildungen, beforderist, da sye glauben, daß Ihre Allerhöchst: besagte Röml: Kayl: Mayt: allzusehr abgemattet, vnd sich in disen vorseÿenden Krieg nicht einmischen können, wie auch das Jhnen zu abwendung des Kriegs die Venetianer von selbstn Moream offeriren werden, zimlich betragen werden.", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 177r-177v.

<sup>298</sup> "Worbeÿ denenselben in unterthänigkheit vnverbergen solle, das ich alß ein anfänger beÿ denen dem allerhöchsten Kayl: Decor gemäß verrichten Solemnen Functionen ferbeÿgeschafften, vnd nunmehr ein halb Jahr hinaus it so villen Leüthen geführten würtschafft allhier in verschwigenen orth was gelt aufgenommen, welche beÿ dem obigen erfolg, wo mit vor meiner hiesigen, doch Adrianopolitaner abreÿß zubezahlen gedenckhen muß; worbeÿ ich zugleich unterthänigst erwarthe, was eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden beÿ dermahl veränderten Zeiten meiner verhaltung ferrers anzubefehlen gnädigst geruhen wollen", 10 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 177v-178r.



for the journeys requested from him and the items deemed necessary for these journeys. He added that he needed a certain amount of money to be used for accommodation as well before his departure for Edirne.

The report<sup>299</sup> Fleischmann sent on December 16, 1714, asked whether it would be possible to send future reports to the council via Wallachia and Transylvania by the Imperial courier Luca. Because, as he stated in his previous reports, he had to be cautious in ensuring that his reports reached the council safely due to the war environment.

In his report<sup>300</sup>, Fleischmann noted that two merchant vessels of the Republic of Venice were engaged in loading operations at the port, this incident was promptly contested by the port authorities. Taxes were levied on the aforementioned ships; however, their departure was prohibited pending the repatriation of Ottoman citizens residing in Venetian territory. The Venetian Bailo, Memmo, was confined to an Ottoman residence alongside ten compatriots—excluding those associated with the French embassy—and housed in a confined chamber with his servants. The Sublime Porte was compelled to tolerate his presence until the return of the Ottoman nationals from Venice, resulting in his placement under house arrest. Furthermore, Fleischmann observed that the majority of the ships in the harbor were primarily engaged in facilitating the assembly of Venetian merchants and their partially concealed goods. Additionally, he reported that plans were under consideration to order the detention of Venetian merchants and consuls in other ports across the empire.

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<sup>299</sup> "Obwohlen ich mich mit dem vor 6 Tagen gehorst expedirten Currier Luca bey euer durchleichtigen, Excellenzen und gnaden unterthanigst befraget, ob ich mich ins künfftig wider des weegs über die Wallachei, und Siebenbürgen bedienen darfte?", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 180r.

<sup>300</sup> "So bin ich doch der inzwischen gekommenen Impotenz halber bemüessiget, dass hier beiliegende Duplikat über gedachten Weg untertänigst einzusenden und dabei gehöret zu berichten, dass zwar der von Seiten der Republik Venedig hier anwesende Bailo Kavalier Memo der ihm vom Groß Vezier den 8ten dieses gehorsamst berichter masßen getanen intimierung nach seiner eigene und der Venezianischen Nation habschafften auf die von gemelter Republik von einigen Monaten hero in hiesigen hafen liegende zwei Kauffarthei Schiff zu imbarquieren angefangen, allein es wurde dieses von der Porten gleich contramandiert, von denen gemelten Schiffen die Steuer Kurden gehoben, selbige requestiret, und der berührte Bailo nicht in seinem: sondern in dem neulich besagten ellemden Türkischen Haus mit all seinen Domestiquen [außer einigen, so sich zum Französischen Botschafter salviret] Er selbstn nebst zehen deren seinigen in einem schlechten kleinen Zimmerl, unter dem vorwandt, man müsse die Türkische zu Venedig, Morea, und anderen Venezianischen Gebiet sich befindlichen Türkischen Untertanen zuvor erwartnen, sehr kümmerlich arrestiret, also dass Er schwerlich von los werden, wohl aber in dem ellenden Verhaft verbleiben durfte, wohin es gleich anfänglich um nur die verlossene Venezianer mit ihren schon mehrnen, teils versteckten Gütern wider zusammen zubringen, angesehen zu sein scheinen gestalten auch an alle Türkische Seehafen ordre ergangen, die in selbigen stehende Venezianische Fahrzeug Kaufleute, und Consules zu verarrestiren.", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 180r-180v.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 115r-115v.

In the continuation of his report, Fleischmann noted that on the 12th of the month, he extended holiday greetings to Hacı Ali Agha, the Vizier to the Tatar Khan, and presented him with a distinguished gift consisting of a piece of Persian fabric and fur. Through this gesture, Fleischmann gained access to valuable information regarding recent deliberations within the Sublime Porte. Hacı Ali Agha disclosed that a high-level council meeting had taken place, attended by prominent officials including the Shaykh al-Islam and his Kölemens, the Janissary Agha and his corps, the Reis Efendi, and the Defterdar (Minister of Finance). Hacı Ali Agha himself had also been present. According to his account, the Grand Vizier initiated the session by immediately calling for the formal registration of 17 grievances against the Republic of Venice, the most serious being its alleged support for the Montenegrin rebels. Other accusations included the transport of goods looted from Ottoman merchants aboard Venetian vessels, the failure to pay 20,000 ducats owed to Bosnian Turks, and financial deposits made to the Venetian Republic by the Prince of Wallachia. Without further consultation or elaboration, the Mufti issued a fatwa legitimizing war against Venice based on eight primary justifications, chief among them being the Venetian support for the Montenegrins. However, Hacı Ali Agha voiced his objection, arguing that any decision to initiate war should first consider the potential reaction of neighboring powers, particularly the Holy Roman Emperor, and assess the likelihood of external intervention. The Grand Vizier, dismissing such concerns, asserted that there was nothing to fear on that front. Fleischmann inferred from the Grand Vizier's confident stance that the views of His Imperial Majesty, the Holy Roman Emperor, regarding the possibility of war had not been communicated to the Sultan. Had the Sultan been aware of the Emperor's position, Fleischmann surmised, the Grand Vizier would likely have adopted a more cautious tone.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> *"Sonsten habe den 12ten dito dem hier anwesenden Tatarischen Vezier Hagi Ali Agha zu dem bevorstehenden Bairam fest gratulieren und ihm ein ansehnliches in einem Stuck Persianischen Drapdor, und Pelz bestandenes præsent zugeschickt, worbei Er mir vermelden ließe, wie dass den 8 dießes bekantermassen der Mufti mit seinem Calem, der Janitscharn Aga mit denen Otschaken, der Reis Effendi, Defterdar etc und auch Er zu der bei der Porthen gehaltenen Raths Versammlung beruffen worden wären; der Groß Vezier befahl gleich die wider Venedig habende in 17 Punktes bestehende klagen [worunter die denen Montenegrinern geleistet haben sollende Assistenz die größte, alßdan seien die in denen Venezianischen Schiffen von denen Malteser hinweg genommene Türken, die von denen Venezianern denen Türkischen Kaufleuten in verschickene fählen abgeraubte güetter, denen Bosnakischen Gräniz Türken für hergegebenes Reich ausstehende und nicht bezahlende 20000 Ducati, dass von dem walachischen Fürsten bei ihr Republik depositirte Geld] vorzulesen, der Mufti gabe ohne der anderen anwesenden Rath zu fordern, noch die Sach zu examiniren, aus acht deren gemelten mehreren Theils wegen denen besagten Montenegrinern angesetzte puncta sein Fetwa oder gesätzmäßigen Aufbruch warmach der Krieg wider besagte Republik Venedig beschlossen worden seie, Er Tartarische Vezier aber hätte eingewendet, dass, zuvor wann einen Krieg vorzunehmen gedenke, wann wohl die Benachbarten Potenzen betrachten und beförderst wissen müsse, ob der Römische Kaiser sich nicht diesen nun resolvieren Krieg mischen werde; der Groß Vezier antwortet und versicherte, dass man von selbiger Seiten hinher, und das geringste nicht zubefürchten habe. Disemnach könnte man nicht anderst glauben, als das Er Groß Vezier die ihm von mir vorgetragene intention Ihrer Römische Kaiserliche Majestät etc dem Sultan entweder gar nicht eröffnet oder ihm aus ein andere Ort beigebracht habe.", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 180v-181v.*

Fleischmann stated<sup>302</sup> that he was very surprised that the Grand Vizier underestimated the Emperor's stance regarding a possible Venetian War and the message he conveyed to him, and wrote that this childish action of the Grand Vizier would destroy him and his followers. In his opinion, the Emperor would quickly show this arrogant Ottoman Vizier how serious he was. In addition, at the council meeting where Hacı Ali Agha was present, the Grand Vizier requested that the Crimean Khan also come to the Sublime Porte, but according to Fleischmann's narration, Hacı Ali Agha prevented this, fearing that another harm would come from this Turkish presence that brought them nothing but evil.

According to Fleischmann, the Sultan sent a sword and a robe (Kılıç & Kaftan) to the Tatar Khan on the 12th of the month. Because of the Khan's meritorious behaviour and also because he had ended the disputes with both Russia and Poland following the Sultan's wishes, he was told that he could return to Crimea. Fleischmann stated that the Grand Vizier was no longer making speeches and discussions about the Venetian War secretly but rather with great recklessness and blindness, ignoring many of his advisors, whom Fleischmann also respected.<sup>303</sup> On the 11th of the month, Reis Efendi Süleyman left his post and Mektubcu Hacı Mustafa Efendi was appointed in his place. Fleischmann congratulated Mustafa Efendi, whom he described as his cultivated friend of 5 years and one of the advisors of the Grand Vizier. He also asked him to re-explain (several times if it was not well understood) the proposal made to the Grand Vizier at the request of the Emperor regarding the Republic of Venice and to consider its importance. Fleischmann reported that he had sent the exact answer that previous Reis Efendi sent to him through the translator to the Imperial Palace and was now waiting for the new answer. However, he wrote that since no one in the Sublime Porte dared to say anything to the Grand Vizier in the current situation, he sent a written message to Reis Efendi to better emphasize the seriousness of the issue and to remind the Emperor's thoughts.

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<sup>302</sup> *"Woraus zusehen, dass diese von dem heüntig Kindischen Governo angefangene Sache ganz und gahr ohne fundament, und dem ohnfehlbahr folgenden ruin exponiret seie, auf Türkische Ort Schwörend, dass im fahl ihre Römische Kaiserliche Majestät nur geschwind diesem aufgeblasenen Türkischen Governo den Ernst zeigen wurden, noch alles zurückgehen, und die hieran Teil habende leichtlich præcipitiret werden könnten, wozu ferner forth treulich zu helfen verspreche, meldend, der Groß Vezier hätte auch seinen Herrn den Tatar Chan hieher verlanget, allein Er Hazali Aga verhinderte es aus forcht es mögte auch sein Han aus dieses nichts als übels mit sich bringen Könnendes Türkisches dessein gezogen warden ...", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 181v.*

<sup>303</sup> *"... es mögte auch sein Han aus dises nichts alß übels mit sich bringen khönnendes Türckisches dehsein gezogen werden, dem allerhöchsten seye nun gedanckht, daß gestern alß den 12ten dises der Sultan Ihme Tartar Chan ein Kilitisch Kaftan zuegesendtet, und bedeuthet, daß weillen durch des Tartar Chans rühml:e conduite die mit Moscau, und Pohlen gehabte zwistigkeiten mit seiner das Sultans zufriedenheit geendiget, und von selbiger Seithen alles ruehet, alß solte Er Tartar Chan sich wider zurukh in Crimea begeben", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 181v-182r.*

However, Fleischmann stated that Reis Efendi told him that he could not give a different answer than the one given before and that the Sublime Porte was ready to do everything in line with the decision taken. In his message to the Sublime Porte, Fleischmann stated that recently the Dulcigno people had attempted to invade Calabria<sup>304</sup> from the Empire's territory and that they had returned to their old rulelessness and tried to enslave almost three thousand imperial subjects. He also adds that Reis Efendi promised him and stated in the most certain way that the kidnapped people would be returned together with the previously taken subjects.<sup>305</sup>

In the continuation of his report<sup>306</sup>, Fleischmann mentions that Büyük Mîrâhur, who captured the fugitive Prince of Wallachia, was made a pasha with three banners (tuğ) on the 11th of the month

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<sup>304</sup> For more information about Calabria, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Calabria-region-Italy>". Accessed on 26.12.2023.

<sup>305</sup> "... auß all disen, insonderheit auß der vom Groß Vezier ingehabten Consilio gegebene mir auch von anderen zuwissen gemachte versicherung ist nebst der von mir gleich anfangs apprehendirte vertuschung genuesamb abzunehmen, wie blind, und ungescheuth das iezige Governo ohneracht all: denen meiner gnädigsten Instruction gemäß hierüber gemacht: und noch machende pahsus sich in den Krieg gegen Venedig verwickhle, da indessen eben den 11 hujus der Reis Effendi Suleiman ab und an seine stelle der Mektubci Hagi Mustafa Effendi [so von 5 Jahren hero mein cultivierter freund, und einen von des jezigen Groß Veziers Consiliarijs ist] eingesezet worden, habe ihme zu diser erhaltenen Kürde gratuliren, Krafft selbiger mich an Jhne addressirend Jhn aus antrib meines zur allgemainen wohlfahrt hegenden eÿfers nachtruckhsamb ersuechen lasßen, man möge doch aus die in Nahmen Ihro Römische Kaiserliche Majestat meines allergnädigsten Kayßers, und Herrns in seiner gegenwarth neulich dem Groß Vezier wegen der Republic Venedig gethanen proposition [welche, sofern man die nicht wohl verstanden, mehrer zuexpliriren etlich mahl angehalten] Jhrer wichtigkeit halber re flectiren, die mir gegebene antworth hette ich, wie es mir der vorige Reis Effendi durch mein Dollmetsch widerholte bedeuthet, an den Kayl: Hof geschickhet, und stehe nun daß darauf ferner erfolgende zuerwarthen. Weillen aber heutiges Tags kheiner dem Groß Vezier was vorzutragen sich getrauet, alß habe umb der Sachen einen besseren Nachtruckh zugeben all dises von Wortt zu wortt Jhme Reis Effendi zugleich auch schrifflich behändig lassen: Er liesse aber mir antwortlich hinterbringen, an khönte hier khein andere alß bereiths gegebene antworth geben, die Porten wüsste wohl, waß sie thette, und seÿe zu allem bereith; zu gleicher zeit habe der Porten vorstellen lassen, daß die Dulcignoten der khürzlich zwahr nicht von dem Kayl: Ho, sondern anderwerthig her erhaltenen Nachricht gemäß sich unterstanden in Calabrien in meines allergnädigsten herrn Land einzufallen, und mehrmahl biß 3000 Kaiserlichen unterthanen zu Slaven zumachen, nachtruckhsamb insistirend daran zuseÿn, auß das dise nebst denen vormahls hinweg geführten Kayl: unterthannen genauist restituiret werden mögten, welche Er Reis Effendi mir auch zugesaget ...", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 182r-183r.

<sup>306</sup> "Obwohlen übrigens den 11 bereiths schon der den fürsten in der Wallacheÿ gefangen genohmene Bujuk Imrahor zum Bahsa mit dreÿ schweiffen gemacht, und zum Rikiab Kaimacam oder obrist: Statthalter benennet worden, so darrffte doch der aufbruch der Porten den codem darüber gehaltenen Rath gemäß noch auß etliche Monath verschoben werden, indessen ist der vice Admiral Tschnum chotscha hier angelanget, und alle Türckhische Kauffartheÿ Schiff, denen biß 50 an der Zahl seÿend, und ein jedes wohl 60 Stuckh feühren khan, von Alexandria, und anderen Türckhischen Porten sich hier einzufinden rauch 6 biß 7 Jänitscharen oda beordert worden sich fertig zuhalten nächstens nach Bellgrad, und Temeswar gehen zukhönnen, dem hierstehenden französÿl: Botschaffter Monsieur des Alleurs aber solle die Porten haben bedeuthen lassen, daß Sie, wie Er es ohne dem wisse, den Krieg auß erheblich: und gnugsamben nächstens ihme communiciren werddenden ursachen wider venedig resolviret, und hoffete, sein König werde sich darbey alß ein freund der Porten verhalten, auch dem Römische Kayser werde man durch einen aigens nach Wienn schickhenden Agha die beweg-ursachen kund machen, allein gleichwie die franzosen [von welchen die Türckhen schon etliche Ingenieurs verlangt haben sollen] eben an diser Venedig declarirten fridens-ruptur grossen theill haben, alß wird derenselben Botschaffter auch ein mehr die Sach beförderen alß einstellen khönnende antworth gegeben haben. Über die gehorst obgedachte Janitscharen oden ist dato gegen die Hungarische gräniz khein andere veranstaltung

and was appointed as Rikab Kaymakam (Deputy Grand Vizier). Following deliberations in the council convened on this matter, it appeared probable that the Sublime Porte's planned expedition would be deferred for a few more months. Fleischmann further reported that Canım Hodja had arrived in the capital, accompanied by fifty Turkish merchant vessels summoned from Alexandria and other Ottoman ports. Additionally, six to seven Janissary odjaks received urgent orders to prepare and proceed to Belgrade and Timișoara. Fleischmann also relayed intelligence indicating that the Sublime Porte intended to formally notify Monsieur Des Alleurs, the French ambassador in the capital, of the impending declaration of war against Venice, along with its justifications. The Sublime Porte anticipated that France would maintain its amicable relations with the Ottoman Empire. However, Fleischmann noted that the French ambassador lacked the influence necessary to forestall the conflict, particularly as the Ottomans had already requested French engineers to support the Venetian campaign. Furthermore, the Sublime Porte planned to dispatch an envoy to Vienna to elucidate the rationale for the expedition. Fleischmann also observed that no significant activity was reported along the Hungarian frontier, though he assured Vienna that he would promptly report any incidents, however minor.

In the article that Fleischmann added to his report, according to the information he received from his confidants in the Sublime Porte, he learned that some of the ulema<sup>307</sup> went to the Grand Vizier and, with great anger, demanded to know who sent Ebezade Abdullah and Ataulah Mehmed Efendi into exile, whose names Fleischmann had recently heard of. The Grand Vizier met them with great surprise and told them that the Sultan had made such a decision upon the recommendation of the current Shaykh al-Islam (Imam Mahmud Efendi).<sup>308</sup> Thereupon, the ulema shouted together

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*vorgekehret worden, worauß ich sowohl, alß auß all: anderes mit offenen augen auß der huet stehe und daß vornehmende alsogleich gehorst zuberichten ohnermanglen werde", 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 183r-183v.*

<sup>307</sup> Ulema (or Ulama) are the learned of Islam, who possess knowledge of Muslim sciences and teachings. For more information, "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/ulama>". Accessed on 29.02.2024.

<sup>308</sup> *"disen augenblickh notificiren mir meine beÿ der Porthen stehende Confidenten, daß die ulema oder gesätzen: gelehrte sich disemnachmittag beÿ dem Groß Vezier eingefunden, und mit grosser ungestimde zuwissen verlanget, wer die neulich: gehorst gemelte zweÿ vormahls gewestene Muffti alß den Ebesadi und Atta Effendi, so alle beyde durch ein Sturmb-wind zu grundt gegangen, und ersoffen seÿend, ins exilium geschickhet hette? Der Gros Vezier meldete voller schrockhen, daß solches der Sultan aus ein rathung des iezigen Muffti gethan; hierauf rueffeten Sie Ulema einstimbig, wir verlangen disen Muffti nicht; der Groß Vezier vertröstete Sie zu contentiren, und wurde gleich darauf der gemelte Muffti Mahmud Effendi ab: und an seine Stelle der Rumeli Kadiasker Mirsa Effendi ein gewesener Slav eingesezet, Wormit utim Literis der abgränderte Muffti aber wider die gewohnheit villeicht umb ihne desto gemächlicher zustraffen, zum Bahsa mit dreÿ schweiffen ernennet, deßgleichen erfahre ich, daß die Porten dem iezigen Wallachischen Fürsten anbefohlen nach Belgrad: 60 beüttel geld zulifferen, umb darmit einige Provisiones herbeÿ zuschaffen, und solle der Porten intention seÿn nächst khünfftige Campagnia ein starckhes Corpo in selbige gegend zuschikhen, umb die Teutsche observiren, auch denen Venetianern seÿnd disen Nachmittag die Steuer: Ruder wider*

that they did not need this mufti and argued with the Grand Vizier. Immediately after this incident, the aforementioned Shaykh al-Islam was dismissed and contrary to traditions, Mirza Mustafa Efendi<sup>309</sup> (the Kadiasker<sup>310</sup> of Rumelia) was appointed.<sup>311</sup>

Fleischmann also learned from his confidants that the Porte wanted 60 pouches of money to be delivered to Belgrade in order to receive some commissions from the Wallachian prince. In addition, the Sublime Porte intended to send a strong force to observe the German border. In the capital, the Venetians were ordered to gather and go with the disbanded ships of their merchant fleet, but Venetian merchants were still hesitant to trust this permission. The Kapıcıbaşı was preparing to sail to Tunisia and Algeria. The purpose of his visit was to inform the Berbers of the war declared against Venice and to benefit from their power at sea. In the report<sup>312</sup> he wrote on December 27, 1714, Fleischmann mentioned that three Ottoman warships were pulled into the port of one of the archipelagos previous summer by a Tartane<sup>313</sup> carrying the Anjou passport and pennant. On the 24th of the month, Kapudan Pasha İzmirli Süleyman resigned from his post, and Canım Hoca

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*gegeben, und angedeuthet worden; daß die Kauffleüthe sich mit ihren habschafften imbarquiren, und nach hauß fahren khönnen, der Baijlo aber solle mit seinen Domestiquen hier verbleiben, allein es wollen doch die gedachte kauffleüthe diser Türckhischen erlaubnuß noch nicht recht thrauen, auf einer französischen Tartanen aber Stehet ein Capici Bahsa seegelfertig umb nach Tunis, und Argier zugehen; selbigen Barbaresquen den wider die Republic Venedig declarirten Krieg zu notificiren, und ihnen ihre See: Macht darzue a lesto zumachen, den befelch zuüberbringen.”, 16 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 184r-184v.*

<sup>309</sup> Contrary to Fleischmann's claims, Mirza Mustafa Efendi was not a slave; he was the son of Batumlu Abdürrauf Efendi. He was educated at the Enderun (the Palace School). For more information about Mirza Mustafa Efendi, MEHMET İPŞİRLİ, "MİRZA MUSTAFA EFENDİ", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/mirza-mustafa-efendi>", (06.06.2025).

<sup>310</sup> For more information about Kadiaskeri (or Kazasker), "<https://belleten.gov.tr/tam-metin/2435/tur>". Accessed on 28.12.2023.

<sup>311</sup> The dismissal of the previous Shaykh al-Islam Mahmud Efendi because of Ebezade Abdullah and Ataulah Mehmed Efendi, and the appointment of Mirza Mustafa Efendi in his place was also mentioned in Târîh-i Râşid. For more information, Târîh-i Râşid II, Özcan 2013; 888-889.

<sup>312</sup> *"Solle ich über mein untern 16den gehorsamst erlassenes, hier in Duplikat beiliegendes ferner untertänigst berichten, dass den 17den dieses drei von denen den verflossenen Sommer im Arcipelago gesegelten Türkischen Kriegsschiffen mit einer hinweg genommenen des Verzuges von Anjou Passport und Flaquen geführten Tartana in hiesigen Porto eingeloffen, und sodann den 24den darauf der Capitain Bahsa Suleiman Chogia ab und an seine stelle der Gianum Chogia, welcher zu Moton in Morea gebürtig, mithin zu der vorhabenden Türkischen Entreprise vor andern tauglich gehalten wird, eingesetzt worden seie, dass man auch den Halil Pascha vom Belgrad nach der von denen Moscovitern in der Pruthischen Kapitulation herausgegebenen Festung Jenikala genant beordert und an seinen Platz den vor vier Jahren gewesenen Groß Vezier Kurprulu Oglu Numan Pascha Sohn des zu Salankament gebliebenen Groß Veziers Kurprulu Mustafa Pascha, welcher in Türkei für einen großen Santone passiert, Seraskier zu gedachtem Belgrad Obsicht zutragen, und von allem der Porthen gründliche nachricht zugeben. Ingleichen hat der Sultan dem den König in Schweden bis an die Siebenbürgische Gränitz begleiteten Capici Bahsa Mustafa nebst zwei Tughen oder Roßschweiben dass Paschalik zu Bender, und daß zu Chotzim dem Damad Mehemed Pascha anvertrauet ...", 27 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 186r-187r.*

<sup>313</sup> For more information about Tartane (or Tartana), "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tartane>". Accessed on 30.12.2023.



Mehmed Pasha, who was a native of Morea and therefore thought to be more suitable than the others for the planned Ottoman operation, was appointed. Halil Pasha from Belgrade was also assigned to Yenikale, which was conquered from the Russians,<sup>314</sup> and Numan Pasha, the son of the former Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who was in charge of Salankamen four years ago, was appointed in his place. The Sublime Porte's expectation from him was to report fully what was happening in the region to the capital. Likewise, the Sultan assigned the position of Pasha of Bender to Kapıcıbaşı Mustafa, who accompanied the King of Sweden to the Transylvania border, and the Pasha of Khotyn<sup>315</sup> to Damad Mehmed Pasha.

Meanwhile, the Grand Mufti Imam Mahmud Efendi, who had recently been dismissed, was still detained at his residence in the Black Sea. The Mufti Efendi was accused of exiling his two predecessors, Ebezade Efendi and Ataullah Efendi, one of whom had been shipwrecked in the Black Sea and the other had been condemned to a miserable life. The current Mufti, Mirza Mustafa Efendi, seemed to be a very tough man and was more likely than the others to be able to cope with the Grand Vizier, if he remained in his post. Moreover, this Mufti was against the war and was the person who, as Kadiasker, convinced Sultan Mustafa to make the Peace of Karlowitz. He was an important person who warned the ulama and other scholars of the time about the dangerous situation the Ottoman Empire was in. According to Fleischmann, the Mufti Mirza Efendi, as an eighty-year-old man with great experience of the past, could perhaps help them in the war waged by the Sublime Porte against the Venetian Republic.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> Both Theyls and Motraye stated that, according to the terms of the Treaty of the Prut, the Yenikale (Samara), Taganrog and Kamenny-Zaton fortresses would be demolished, no new fortresses would be built on their site, and all weapons in these fortresses would be handed over to the Ottomans. Therefore, Fleischmann's claim that Yenikale fell to the Ottomans after the Battle of the Prut and Halil Pasha's appointment there appears to be incorrect. Theyls 1722; 135, Motraye 1727; 20.

<sup>315</sup> For more information about Khotyn (Hotin), [https://www.worldhistory.org/Khotyn\\_Fortress/](https://www.worldhistory.org/Khotyn_Fortress/), Accessed on 30.12.203.

<sup>316</sup> "... allein der kürzlich abgeänderte Muffti Mahmud Effendi wird noch in seiner an dem Canal des Schwarzen Meers gelegenen Wohnung gefänglich verwahret, weillen ihm die schuld, daß die zwei vor ihm gewesene Mufti der Ebezade Effendi und Ataullal Effendi als zwei alte gut-und unschuldige exiliert, im Schwarzen Meer Schiffbruch gelitten der eine ertrunken und der andere sich kümmerlich salvieret, von dem Sultan und Groß Vezier umb sich beÿ dem Volk zu excusiren, beigelegt wird; der heüntige Mufti Emirza Effendi scheint ein ziemlich haediter Mann zu sein, und dürfte selbiger, sofern er sich in seinem Posto manteniret, dem jetzigen governo, in Sonderheit dem Groß Vezier mehr als andern die Zähn weisen gestalten er, wie ich es von guter Hand habe, mit dem vorgenommenen Krieg nicht allerdings zufrieden seÿn solle, und ist dieser Mufti eben der jenige gewesen, so als Kadiaskier den Sultan Mustafa zum Carlovizischen Frieden bewaget und denen übrigen Uleminen, oder Gesätz-gelehrten dem damals vorgewesenen gefährlichen Zustand des Ottomannischen Reichs zu Gemüt geführt hat, mithin wird er als ein achtzigjähriger und von dem verflorbenen große Experienz besitzender Mann vielleicht auch den jetzo gegen die Republik Venedig entschlossenen Krieg reüffer zuüberlegen Anlass geben, ich habe ihn bereits zu dieser erlangten würde komplementieren lassen werde auch sobald ich nur die von euer durchlauchtigen Exzellenzen und Gnaden nun stündlich in Untertänigkeit erwartende zu diesen vorgekommenen Konjunkturen nötig habende gnädigste Instruktion

Fleischmann wrote in his report<sup>317</sup> that he was waiting for instructions from Vienna and that he would still see if something peaceful could be achieved regarding the Sublime Porte. Additionally, he stated that the Grand Vizier was determined to send an Agha to Vienna with a letter regarding the noble war declared against Venice. The Sublime Porte hoped that the Imperial Palace could be brought to justice with this message. Fleischmann mentioned that the Sublime Porte's aim was to prevent the Emperor from getting involved in the Venice issue, just as it was in the conflict with the Russians four years ago. Meanwhile, the decision of the Grand Vizier to the Venetian ambassador, stating that the Bailo and the subjects of the Republic of Venice should leave the lands of the Ottoman Empire within 20 days, had undergone some changes. The Bailo and his servants would be detained in Topçubaşı's residence, and the Venetian merchants would leave the Ottoman capital with the Venetian trade ships in the port. Sublime Porte promised to provide the necessary permits and passports in this regard. By providing the permits and passports, the Sublime Porte would be able to prove that the ships returning to Venice had left the port in good condition. What would happen to the Bailo depended on what the Sublime Porte wanted to do. At the end of his report<sup>318</sup>, Fleischmann mentioned that the brother of the Voivode of Wallachia, who was in the capital at that

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*werde erhalten haben, mich ferners an ihn adressieren, und sehen, ob wider die dato vorseiende apparenz noch was friedliches zueffectuiren sei.*", 27 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 187r-187.

<sup>317</sup> *"Sonsten scheint die Porthen völlig resolviert zusein einen Aga mit einem von dem Groß-Vezier an euer hochfürstlichen durchlauchtig erlassenden schreiben, worinnen "vornehmend Krieg" selbiger den wider Venedig kundmachtet, nachher Wien abzuschicken, der gänzlichen Hoffnung durch diesen Passum den Kaiserlichen Hof, gleichwie es vor vier Jahren zu Zeiten der Moskowitzischen Ruptur geschehen, uneracht ich die mit der Republik Venedig seiende ganz andere Beschaffenheit ihr vorgestellt von der befürchten den Hilfsleistung abzuhalten, ich aber bin unermangelt auf das weither zu invigiliren und euer durchlauchtigen, Exzellenzen und Gnaden den Fernern unterthänigsten Bericht abzustatten. Übrigens hat sich die Sache wegen der vor 19ten Tügen dem Venezianischen Botschaffter vom Groß-Vezier angekündten innerhalb 20 Tagen zutun habende Vermeidung des Ottomannischen Gebiets von selbiger Zeit hero etlichmalen verändert, gegenwärtig bestehet es in diesem dass er Botschaffter, welcher mit seinen Domestiquen in des Topci Pascha Behausung nach fort verarrestirt wird, allhier verbleiben, seine national Kaufleute aber sich hinweg begeben, und auf die hier seiende zwei Venezianische Kaufmanns Schiffe imbarquieren, er Bailo aber bürg sein solle, das gedachte zwei Venezianische. Schiffe in ihrer hinreiß ein etwa rencontriren des Türkisches-Schiff oder Fahrzeug nicht feindlich attaquiren mögen, welches er Baylo auch zutun sich anerbotten, doch mit dem zusatz, dass die Porthen etliche Chancen denen mehrgedachten zwei Schiffen nebst denen gehörigen passporten zugebe, auf das selbige bei ihrer Rückreise worzu ihnen von Seiten der Republik Venedig all sicheres Geleit versprochen worden, der Porthen die Stipulirte Verhaltung deren oftgedachten zwei Schiffen attestieren können. Nun stehet es daran, ob die Porthen dieses eingehen oder was sie sonst noch mit dem Venezianischen Podtschaffter oder dessen nationalen weither tun wolle."*, 27 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 187v-188v.

<sup>318</sup> *"Schließlich hat mich der hier stehende Bruder des jetzigen Walachischen Fürsten wider all seine vormals mir getane Offerte ersucht, das weilen dass gegenwärtige Türkische governo sehr hainklich, und sein Bruder der Fürst durch die auf-und ablaufende Brief leichtlich in ein verdacht kommen könnte, ich ins künftig keine Brief mehr durch selbigen Weg schicken möge, dahero bin ich nun bemüßiget die völlige Korrespondenz über Belgrad und Peterwardein zuhaben. Womit mich der höchsten hulden, und gnaden untherthänigst gehorsambst empfehle verharrend."*, 27 December 1714, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 188v-189r.



time, said that the Voivode could no longer be the intermediary in the letters sent to Vienna because the Ottoman governor there was a very cautious person and might suspect them due to the letters sent and received. He also stated that for this reason, he would send his reports via Belgrade and Petrovaradin<sup>319</sup> for a while.

### 3.8. Sublime Porte's Request to Send an Envoy to Vienna: Muteferrika Ibrahim Agha

In his report written on January 5, 1715, Fleischmann stated that the Reis Efendi informed him on December 31 that the Grand Vizier had written a letter to Prince Eugene of Savoy. According to what he learned from Reis Efendi, the Grand Vizier would send an envoy named Ibrahim Agha<sup>320</sup> to Vienna within a few days. In his reply to Reis Efendi in return, Fleischmann stated that he was sorry for not being informed about this envoy dispatch by the Sublime Porte and that he also wanted to send a messenger to the Grand Vizier and get information about the issue. Reis Efendi, on the other hand, told Fleischmann that this effort would be unnecessary, that sending an envoy had been on the Sublime Porte's agenda for a long time and that he already would leave later than planned. Reis Efendi added his note to Fleischmann that Ibrahim Agha would first leave the capital and go to Belgrade and that he had no doubt that he would receive the necessary order to continue his journey without the protection of the commander in Petrovaradin until he got there.<sup>321</sup>

Fleischmann reported that, in the days that followed, the Grand Vizier issued an order for Ibrahim Agha to visit him at his residence prior to the latter's departure. The stated purpose of this visit was to inform Fleischmann of the mission Ibrahim Agha was to undertake on behalf of the Sublime Porte in Vienna. According to Fleischmann's report, Ibrahim Agha conveyed that his official duty in Vienna was solely to deliver a letter from the Grand Vizier to Prince Eugene. However, based on intelligence received from his confidants within the Sublime Porte, Fleischmann learned that

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<sup>319</sup> For more information about Petrovaradin (Peterwardein), "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/varadin>". Accessed on 31.12.2023.

<sup>320</sup> For more information about Muteferrika Ibrahim Agha, ERHAN AFYONCU, "İBRÂHİM MÜTEFERRİKA", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ibrahim-muteferrika>", Accessed on 06.06.2025.

<sup>321</sup> "Entlich hat mir der Reis Effendi in nahmen des gros Veziers den 31:ten Decembris bedeuthen lassen, das Er berührter groß-Vezier Ihro hochfürstl: durchl: dem herrn Prinzen Eugeni von Savoyen Ihro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: etc. Hof Kriegs-Raths Præsidenten einen brieff geschriben und selbigen bereiths einem Vezier Aghasi namens Ibrahim Agha behändiget hätte, mit welchem diser Agha nächster Tagen per posta gegen Wienn abgehen werdte. Worauf ich ihme Reis-Effendi in antworth hinterbringen lassen, daß es mir leyd seye dise absendung nicht ehender gewust zuhaben, umb es dem Kayl:en hof gehorst: berichten, und vordessen von hier beschehenden aufbruch die antwort von deroben erhalten zukönnen, ich wolte doch alsogleich einen expressen dahin abfertigen, und hiervon, die gebührende parte geben; Er Reis-Efendi meldete alles dises sehr guthen allein unnöthigen zuseyn, daß der berührte Aga sich noch so lang alhier verweille, sondern derselbe wurdte inzwischen von hier gegen Belgrad aufbrechen, bis zu seiner alldasigen ankunfft werde zweifels ohne der Commandant zu Peterwardein die gehörige ordre seiner fehleren passage halber empfangen.", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 1r-1v.

Ibrahim Agha had been entrusted with additional, unofficial responsibilities. Chief among these was the task of conveying the Ottoman rationale for the declaration of war against the Republic of Venice. The letter reportedly outlined the justification for hostilities, emphasizing that the war was both lawful and necessary within the framework of Ottoman legal and political principles. Importantly, the Sublime Porte expressed a strong desire that the Emperor, remain uninvolved in the conflict, underscoring the Ottoman objective of limiting the war to a bilateral dispute with Venice.<sup>322</sup> However, the opinion of the Empire was that Venice kept all its promises and acted under the laws of peace. The other task given to Ibrahim Agha was to investigate in detail the garrison units, arsenals and other things necessary for the war in Petrovaradin and other imperial cities and fortresses, and to report to the Sublime Porte, especially about the mines laid by the Germans.<sup>323</sup>

According to the report<sup>324</sup>, another task that the Sublime Porte gave to Ibrahim Agha was to investigate when and to what extent the Emperor's intervention in the war that the Sublime Porte

<sup>322</sup> "... bi'l-cümle hayr-hâh Devlet-i Aliyye-i sâ'ibü'l-âra ile irâde-gûş müşâvere olundukda Venedik Cumhuriyeti öteden berü şerâ'it-i sulh u salâha mürâ'ât itmediler ve sözlerinde durmadılar. Mukaddemâ dahi esnâ-yı sulhda işgâl-i Devlet-i Aliyye'yi rikkât-i fırsat add idüp Mora cezâresin gasb u istilâ vel-yevm vücûh-ı şenî ile nakz-ı ahdda ictirâ itmekle kurb-ı civâr-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'den tard u ib'âd itmek farz-ı ayn olmuşdur deyü bi-ecma'in re'y ü ittifâk idüp ve muktezâ-yı şer'at-i izz üzre müte'addid fetvâlar virilmekle hâlâ işbu sene-i mübâreke Venediklâyı kurb-ı civârımızda vaki' mülk-i mevrûs-ı pâdişâh-ı İslâm olan Mora cezâresi istinâd-ı fevz ü Nusret-i Rabbü'l-ibâd ile tard u ib'âd ve berren ve bahren şurû-i mazarratları ibâd u tüccâr-ı bilâd üzerlerinden def' itmek niyetine sefer-i nusret-eser muhakkak ve mukarrer olduğu siz muhabbetlû dostumuzun dahi ma'lûmları olup hareket-i asker ve tertîb-i levâzımât-ı seferden kat'â mülâhaza-i diğer hâtıra huzûr-ı itmâmın için akl-ı Hudâdâd u cibillet mâder-zâdınızda merkûz olan sebât ve devâm ve hüsn-i sülûk musâlahat-ı irtisâm üzre Devlet-i Aliyye ebed-peyvendimle hürmetlû haşmetlû Çâsâr Bavkar hazretleri mâbeyninde mün'akd ve müstahkem olup mu'teber ve istivâr olan esâs-ı rasînü'l-erkân sulh u salâh ber-vechle halel-pezîr inhidâm olmaya ...", 21 Zilkade 1126 (28 Kasım 1714), BOA. A.DVNS.NMH.d, nr. 6, 340-343; Ercan 2022; 96. For the copy of the letter sent by Grand Vizier Ali Pasha to Prince Eugene by Ibrahim Agha, see Appendix 4.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 119r.

<sup>323</sup> "Ihme Ibrahim Aga hat der Groß Veziar anbefohlen, mich in meiner wohnung heimbzusuchen, und mir selbst von seiner obhabenden Comission nachricht zugeben, disemnach kambe selbiger vorgestern zu mir, von welchem ich discussweis vernohmen, das er ausser der überlieferung des obbemelten vom Gros Veziar an Ihro hochfürstl: durchl: gestelten brieffs nichts mündlich vorzutragen, werden ordre hâlte seine abfertigung zubeschleunigen noch zuverschieben, von hier aus vill er heütnoch mit etlich und zwainzig bedienten zwar per Posta, doch was langsamb gegen Belgrad aufbrechen, der hoffnung auch von dorth aus also ferner seine rais bis Wienn forthzusezen allein von meinen Confidenten erfahre ich, daß der Groß Veziar in dem mehrbesagten brieff Jhro hochfürstl: durchl: erkläre, wie Er die Porten aus Villen bewegen: Vrsachen nach ihren gesäzen die Republic Venedig zubekriegen bemüessiget wordten, hingegen aber wolte selbige den frieden mit Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayl: etc. heilig, und in allem unterbrüchlich conserviren, wie Sie sich dan völlig an dero gegebenes worth hielte, und nun beÿ anfangenden Krieg dero angränzende lande, und leuthe denenselben anvertreuthe. Über dises solle er Ibrahim Aga instruction haben so wohl zu Peterwardein, als in anderen Kayl: orth undt Vestungen die alda Stehende guarnison vndt Troupen, etwa aufrichtende Magazine oder andere vorkherende Kriegs-anstaltungen genauist zuerforschen, und deren Teutschen auf den gegen Venedig unternehmenden Krieg machende Minen wohl zuobserviren, insorderheit zusehen ob?", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 1v-2v.;

<sup>324</sup> "Wann und wie sich ihre römische Kaiserliche und katholische Majestät etc darein mischen, und der berührten Republik Venedig succurrieren könne; über dieses ist die eigentliche Intention dieser Absendung dahin gerichtet allerhöchst gedachte Römische Kaiserliche und Katholische Majestät etc, wo nicht völlig von dem Krieg abzuhalten,

would start with Venice would occur. If the Emperor could be prevented from getting involved in the war, the Sublime Porte could first capture the Venetian Morea and then direct its forces to the real target, the Imperial forces. Fleischmann also stated<sup>325</sup> in his report that the message of "*preserving peace and friendly relations*", which was the content of the letter the Grand Vizier wrote to Vienna, was far from reality. As Fleischmann reported in his previous letters, the arrogant and angry attitude of the Grand Vizier during his meeting with the Grand Vizier was not intended to preserve peace and good relations. On the contrary, the Grand Vizier threatened Fleischmann by telling him that the Sublime Porte was ready to make any sacrifice for Morea.

Fleischmann reported<sup>326</sup> that Ibrahim Agha, who would be sent as an envoy, was an manageable person and that he had previously served as the former Grand Vizier Elmas Mehmed Pasha's seal-keeper (*mühürdâr*) and held other positions. Consequently, Fleischmann recommended that, upon Ibrahim Agha's arrival in Vienna, he be received courteously and hosted for a period, at least until the contours of the impending conflict became clearer, to ensure the safety of Fleischmann himself and other German subjects in Ottoman territory. This precaution was deemed necessary, as any escalation of hostilities would likely provoke the Sultan's ire against them.<sup>327</sup> Despite these incidents, Fleischmann noted that the Sublime Porte exercised considerable discretion to maintain secrecy, such that no individual dared to disclose even minor incidents. Nevertheless,

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*doch wenigstens also zu amüsieren, dasselbe sich nicht nächstkünftige Campagna darein melieren; und Venedig assistieren möge.*", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 2v.

<sup>325</sup> "*Indessen hoffet die unvorsichtige Porthen von Venedig Moream abzureissen, undt so denn im Standt zusein ihre völlige macht auch wider Ihro mehr allerhöchst berührte Römische Kaiserliche und Cathollische Majestat etc wenden zukönnen, allermassen eben diser iezo mahende passus mit der mir neulich gegebenen unterthänigst überschribenen insolenten antworth des Groß-Veziers gar nicht übereinstimmet.*", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 2v-3r.

<sup>326</sup> "*Sonsten ist der mehrbesagte Ibrahim Aga welchem auf sein belangen ein unterthänigstes recommendation - schreiben an euer durchlauchtigen Excellenzen und gnaden behändiget, ein zimlich guth: tractable, und dirigibler Türck, und ware des zu Senta gebliebenen Groß-Vezier Sigil verwahrer, auch von selbiger zeith hero beÿ Porten in verschidenen verrichtungen gebraucht worden, dahero ersuche euer durchl: Excell: vnd gnaden unterthänigst-gehorsbt: dieselbte geruhen wenigstens seine particular- Persohn wohl tractiren zulassen, beÿ dessen respedirung, und etwan machende Kriegs-Passus aber auf mich, und all mit mir hier stehende Tetsche, sofern es der allerhöchste Kayl:e dienst erleÿdet gnädigst zureflectiren, gestelten der ietzig: Barbarische, und grinnige Sultan Seinen zorn am ersten an vums ausgiessen, und sich revangiren dörrfte; über dises werdet in solchem fall, wie, und durch vms die allerhöchste Kayl:e reputation der furie des alhiesigen unbändigen Pövels exponiret seÿn, obwohlen übrighen beÿ der Porthen gegenwärtig alles sehr secret gehalten, und niemand ohne grossen Interesse das geringste zu avisiren sich getrauet, so habe dannoch meine mit stetten geben erhaltene Confidenten die in neulich gehaltenen grossen rath wider Venedig angetragene puncta, und declarirten ruptur bewogene ursachen bekommen ...*", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol.3r-3v.

<sup>327</sup> OeStA/KA, Zentralstellen (ZSt), HKR, Hauptreihe (HR) Akten 125, Exp. 1715 Mai, 408, Ercan 2022; 658-659.

he affirmed that he had successfully obtained intelligence from trusted confidants regarding the Sublime Porte's plans for a significant offensive, described as a "great rupture," against Venice.

### 3.9. The Departure of the Venetian Merchants and the Letter of Hacı Mustafa Pasha

On December 31st, three Ottoman warships conducted multiple voyages to transport military supplies to Eğriboz, from where they were to proceed—with additional vessels—to collect troops stationed in Egypt. Concurrently, intensive work continued around the clock on the naval fleet still docked in the capital. Ten of these ships were scheduled to be launched imminently, alongside the outfitting of additional galleys, frigates, and feluccas. The strategic objective was to consolidate the Ottoman naval forces in preparation for a major campaign against Venice in the coming year, with the operational theater extending over three hundred nautical miles. The projected composition of the fleet was formidable: approximately fifty large warships, eighty galleys, over fifty frigates, and a considerable number of feluccas. The required manpower for this fleet was to be sourced through the forced conscription of Christians from the islands, as well as the deployment of an estimated 4,000 individuals to be brought from the Barbary States to the capital. Fleischmann further reported that the commencement of the naval campaign had been postponed until early March to allow for a more favorable display of force in the presence of the Sultan and his court. In addition, logistical preparations were underway, including the issuance of orders for the procurement of camels, horses, and transport carts to support the mobilized army. Fleischmann stated that the Sultan intended to personally take the horses to Edirne (the assembly point of the troops) and from there to Larissa<sup>328</sup> via Thessaloniki, to be close to the operations carried out in the Morea. On January 5, 1715, the Wiener Zeitung published the news that the Turks were carrying provisions to Larissa with 100 camels.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> For more information about Larissa (Yenişehir), MACHIEL KIEL, "YENİŞEHİR", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/yenisehir>", Accessed on 25.03.2024.

<sup>329</sup> "Den 31:ten Jüngst: Verfloßenen Monath Decembris seynt mehrmahlen dreÿ Türkhische Kriegs-Schiff ausgeloffen, vmb Kriegs-Munition nacher Negropontte zuführen, undt von dorth aus nebst andern die ægyptische Trouppen abzuholen; Ingleichen wird Tag undt nacht an denen noch hier ligenden Kriegs: Schiffen [worvon nächstens wider zehen aus lauffen sollen] (Galleern, Fregaten, undt Feluquen gearbeithet, also das die nächstes fruhe Jahr wider Venedig versamlende Türkische Flotta in mehr dan dreÿhundert Seeglen, worunter ungefehr funffzig grosse Kriegs-Schiff, etlich und achtzig Galleern, über Fünffzig Fregaten, und eine grosse anzahl Feluquen bestehen wird, die darauff erforderlich Mannschafften werdtten über die von denen Insuln mit gewalt hinweg-nehmenden Christen hin: undt wider einrolliret, auch von der barbaria 4000 darzue hieher gebracht; des Sultans, und der Porthen abrais aber ist bis anfangs nächst eintretenden Monaths Martÿ vmb indessen durch seine gegenwarth alhier die Seemacht in besseren Standt sezen zutönnen, verschoben wordten, undt seynt schon diser Tagen die befehl ergangen, daß zu selbiger zeith die nöthige Cameln, Pferd undt wägen hier eintreffen sollen, undt ist die gegenwärtige intention des Sultans die Pferd zu Adrianopl [alwo auch der Sammelplatz deren Trouppen ausgeschriben] wäyden zulassen, undt von dar sich über Salloniß biß Larissa, umb denen in Morea machenden operationen nahe zuseÿn, in Persohn zuverfüegen.", 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 3v-4v.; Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Januar – Juni 1715 / 1715.01.05.

At the end of his report<sup>330</sup> dated January 5, Fleischmann mentioned that the Venetian merchants in the capital, who were already in great fear, were finally allowed by the Sublime Porte to return to Venice with their passports on the ships that had been kept in the port for several months. He also reported that they did not receive this permission from the sergeants on duty. In addition, he stated that the Venetian merchants left the port the day before by boarding their commercial ships waiting in the port without any concern. Bailo, as previously mentioned, was being held captive in a house. At last, he stated<sup>331</sup> that Ibrahim Agha set out for Belgrade with his eight servants. Fleischmann also demanded payment of the accumulated salaries of himself and his servants and money for his confidants at the Sublime Porte, who had provided him with crucial information.

In the letter<sup>332</sup> sent from Szeged to the Vienna War Council by Ernst Graf von Herberstein, dated January 15, 1715, he wrote that the Pasha of Timișoara wanted to send a letter to Vienna with an Agha and a Sergeant on the 14th of the month. Herberstein wrote that he did not agree to give the necessary permission to Turks to go to Vienna, as they had nothing to convey verbally other than the letter. Instead of giving permission, Herberstein wrote a polite letter to the Pasha, requesting that the letter that the Pasha wanted to send to Prince Eugene be delivered to him, and he

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<sup>330</sup> *“Die Sach mit denen hier stehenden Venetianischen Kaufleuthen ist dahin ausgeschlagen, daß selbe von der Porten einen Passport, nicht aber die angesuchte Tschauschen, welche zaignus geben sollten, das diese Venetianische Schiffe in ihren hin einrais nichts wider die Türckische Fahrzeug verüebet, erhalten, mit welchem Sie sich auf die zwey von etlich Monathen hero hier gestandtene Venetianische Schiffe, doch mit nicht geringer apprehension des daraussen noch zubefahren habenden anstöss embarquirt, und gestern gegen Venedig von hier abgeseeglet seynt, allein der Baylo muss mit seinen Domestiquen in einem schlechten Türkhischen haus verwahrter hier verbleiben. Schliesslichen ersuche euer durchl: Excell: undt gnaden abermahlen gehorsambst, dieselbe geruhen mich mit der nun völlig verflossenen halb jahres gebühr, und andern ausgelegten geldern nebst einigen zu unterhaltung meiner Confidenten höchst nöthigen geldmitln ehstens gdst versehen zulassen, angesehen man beÿ gegenwärtigen Zeithen man stetts die handt in sack zuhaben, vndt vilfältige extra ausgaaben zu machen hat. Wormit mich zu allstetten höchsten hulden vndt gnaden unterthl: empfhls: verharre Euer durchl: Excell: undt gnaden etc.”*, 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 4v-5r.

<sup>331</sup> *“P.S: Jetzt gleich ist der nach Wienn abgesandte Jbrahim Aga mit acht Persohnen, deren übrige Er unter weegs, und zu Belgrad aufzunehmen gedenkhet, von hier abgeraiset wormit verbleibe.”*, 5 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 5r-5v.

<sup>332</sup> See Appendix 5. *“Hochlöbl. Kayl:er Hoff Kriegs Rath etc. Es hat den 14.ten huius der Bahsa aus Temeswar einen Aga nebst noch einen Tschaussen expresse anhero geschickhet, nebst behändigung eines brieffs, von welchen die Copia gehorht beÿschliessen wollen, vnd da bemelter Aga befelchet worden mit einem schreiben an S:e hochfürstl:e dhrleicht den Prinzen Eugenium gar nacher Wienn zuegehen, mündlichen aber nichts vorzubringen hette, alß der inhalt des briefs lauthet, vmb widerumben eine anthworth darauf zuruckh zubringen, dannenhero habe nicht vor nöthig erachtet, beÿ diser Zeit Sÿe Türckhen gar nacher Wienn gehen zulassen, sondern selbe mit aller manier persuadiret, vmb mir dises schreiben zubehändigen, so auch geschehen, vnd ich entgegen ihnen an den Bahsa eine hoffliche gegenantwort mitgegeben, vnd wider zuruckh selbe abgeferttiget, also per Staffettam dise beförderung des briefs verordnet, vnd hiemit schuldigster massen einschickhe, Jch habe indessen gedachtem Bahsa einer schleinigen antworth vertröstet. In erwartung dero fernern gnädigsten befelch mich zu hohen beständigen gnaden empfehlend.”*, 15 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 7r-7v.

persuaded the Pasha. Herberstein also reported that he had ordered his servants to deliver the letter to Prince Eugene.

In his letter<sup>333</sup> Herberstein references a letter authored by the Pasha of Timișoara Hacı Mustafa Pasha, at the request of the Grand Vizier, dated January 11, 1715, with its translation transmitted by Andreas Schmid on January 20, 1715. In the letter, Hacı Mustafa Pasha commences by affirming his amicable relations with Prince Eugene and extolling the Holy Roman Empire as a protector of Christendom. The letter extols the prevailing peace between the Ottomans and Habsburgs and expresses optimism for the perpetuation of cordial relations. However, the primary focus of the missive is the disruption of this peaceful environment by the Venetians, who harbored thieves responsible for plundering merchants at sea and whose mercenaries engaged in acts of malfeasance. Hacı Mustafa Pasha asserts that the Sultan and the Sublime Porte adhered strictly to existing agreements, ensuring that those who violated the law were subjected to impartial judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, he contends that the Ottomans faced numerous deceptions and stratagems perpetrated by the Venetians. In accordance with tradition, the Shaykh al-Islam issued a fatwa, declaring the necessity of war against the Venetians. Hacı Mustafa Pasha notes that the letter was conveyed through Ibrahim Pasha, emphasizing his amicable ties with both the Grand Vizier and Prince Eugene. The Pasha expresses his conviction and hope that the military expedition planned for the spring would not jeopardize the peace, friendship, or cordial relations between the two empires. Concluding his letter, Hacı Mustafa Pasha underscores the security of trade and merchants traveling between the two empires, as well as the mutual enjoyment of peace by their respective populations, reaffirming his commitment to preserving these relations.

### **3.10. Intercepted Imperial Couriers and Recruited Ottoman Troops**

In his report<sup>334</sup> dated February 12, 1715, Fleischmann stated that Janissary Musa, who set out with the Imperial courier about seventy days ago, did not return and that he also could not

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<sup>333</sup> 20 January 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 8r-12v. See Appendix 6.

<sup>334</sup> *“Hochlöblicher Kaiserlicher Hof Kriegs Rath Gnädigster auch gnädig und hochgebieltende herren herren etc, Ich kan nicht fassen, was doch eigentlich die ursach seyn müsse, daß mein den 10ten Decembris verflossenen Jahres mithin schon vor etlichen und Sibenzig Tägten mit dem Currier abgeschickte Jänitschar Musa, auch der den 5ten letzt-abgewichenen Monaths hier expedirte Jänitschar Mustafa nicht weniger ein-beÿ gegenwärtiger alhier vorgekommenen so notablen conjuncturs: veränderung, und von der Porthen wider die Republic Venedig declarirten Krieg zweifels ohne von eüer durchlauchtigen Exzellenzen vnd Gnaden mit der jetziger Zeit höchst-nöthiger Instruction abgefertigte Currier dato allhier nicht angelanget seÿe, westwegen Ich unermanglet aller mögliche nachforschung zuthuen, vnd weillen Ich nicht ohne fundament, argwohne, es möchte der malitiose Groß Vezier vmb daß auf seine mir den 10ten Novembris gegebene insolente antworth von daraus beförchtendes ...”, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 18r-18v.*

understand the reason why Janissary Mustafa was sent on the 5th of the month. Fleischmann also mentioned that there were some cyclical changes in the Ottoman capital due to the war declared by the Sublime Porte against Venice. For instance, he wrote that the courier sent from Vienna, from whom he expected his majesty to convey his orders, did not arrive, and he did not receive any news about him either. He thought that the malicious Grand Vizier had a hand in these happenings. As a matter of fact, the Grand Vizier was quite arrogant towards Fleischmann during their meeting on November 10. On the other hand, a report published in the Wiener Zeitung on January 30, 1715 stated that the situation on the Ottoman-Austrian border seemed normal and friendly, but that the Turks were observed to be fortifying their castles.<sup>335</sup>

Serasker Halil Pasha in Belgrade, like the Vizier of the Tatar Khan before, had warned the Sublime Porte that German troops were increasing in Hungary and were in a position to move wherever they wanted at the first order from His Majesty the Emperor. According to Fleischmann, Halil Pasha, as an experienced Ottoman Pasha, stated that his views should be taken into account and that a dangerous war should not be entered into with the Germans, who were now relieved on all sides. In his report, Fleischmann stated that this recommendation of Halil Pasha was received so badly by the arrogant Grand Vizier that Halil Pasha was removed from office and replaced by Köprülüzade Numan Pasha, who was always ready for war.<sup>336</sup>

In the continuation<sup>337</sup> of the report, Fleischmann reported that Halil Pasha was no longer obligated to send reports or dispatch envoys to the Sublime Porte while stationed in Belgrade.

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<sup>335</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium Januar – Juni 1715 / 1715.02.13.

<sup>336</sup> *“... dahero habe ich vor anderen an den noch hier seÿenden mit mir in guter verständnuß lebenden Vezier des Tartar-Chans addressiret, welcher mir wissen lassen, daß, nachdeme der gewesene Seraskier zu Belgrad Halil Bahsa vor etlich monathen verschidene mahlen der Porthen was nachtruckhlich berichtet, daß die Teütsche Trouppen sich in Hungahrn vermehreten vnd in sehr guten stand bereith seÿen, auf die erste ihnen von Ihro Römischen Kaiserlichen vnd Cathollischen Majestat bekommende ordre, wohin man wolte, sich wendten zukönnen, dahero wäre seine alß eines experimentirten ottomannischen mitglides mainung sich wohl in obacht zunehmen, daß man sich mit denen von allen seithen nun in ruhe stehenden Teütschen in kheinen gefährlichen Krieg verwickhle; disee des gedachten Bahsa gethanne erinderung wurde von dem heüntigen hochmüthigen vnd vnerfahrenen Türckhischen Guverno dergestalten übl aufgenommen, daß er Halil Bahsa meisten Theillß diser ursach wegen von dem Bellgrader Seraskierlik ab und an seine Stell der iederzeit zum Krieg inclinirte Kinprulu Oghlu Numan Bahsa eingesetzt worden ...”, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 18v-19r.*

<sup>337</sup> *“... mit dem von der Porthen ihme Halil Bahsa zuegeschickhten gemässenen befelch solang er sich noch zu oftgedachtem Belgrad aufhalten werde, von daraussen weder bericht, noch sonst Jemand hieher an die Porthen mehr zuschickken, dahero wird [wie der Tartarische Vezier weither meldet] aller apparenz nach der Groß Vezier unter einstens auch anbefohlen haben, kheinen meiner hinaufgeschickhten Leüthen herunter zulassen, der zurversicht seinen wegen der mir gegebenen ungereimbtten von allen verständigen des Ottomannischen Reichs disapprobirte antworth der vnentgehentlichen gefahr exponirten Kopff etwa noch einen monath länger zutragen, sowohl auf dises alß auf andere habende gründliche argwohnungen dazumahn man auch vor zweÿ Wochen einen von Bukarest gekommenen Wallachischen Currier allhier biß aufs hemmbet durchsuehet, ob er kheine seembde briefschafften beÿ sich hette; habe mich den ersten dises beÿ dem neüen mit mir von fünff Jahren hero bekhtanten Reis-Effendi unter dem vorwandt Jhn*



Furthermore, according to information relayed by the Tatar Vizier, the Grand Vizier was said to be exercising the necessary diligence in managing affairs. Nevertheless, due to prevailing tensions and internal dissent among the more prudent members of the Sublime Porte, the Grand Vizier reportedly prohibited the departure of couriers sent by Fleischmann, as well as the arrival of any addressed to him, fearing that such exchanges might expose him to considerable risk for at least another month. Indicative of the heightened atmosphere of suspicion, a courier from Wallachia arriving from Bucharest had been subjected to a search two weeks earlier on suspicion of carrying a clandestine message. Fleischmann also attempted to meet with the newly appointed Reis Efendi, a figure he had known for five years. However, after consulting the Grand Vizier, the Reis Efendi responded in an unusually dismissive and defiant manner, stating that he was too preoccupied to grant an audience and that any requests from Fleischmann should be submitted in writing. In response, Fleischmann indicated his willingness to comply with this instruction. In his report, Fleischmann characterized these incidents as deeply regrettable and expressed concern that the Sublime Porte had yet to fully grasp the gravity of the unfolding crisis. He further lamented the persistent breakdown in communication, noting that for some time he had been unable to receive any correspondence via Belgrade, nor had he received acknowledgements for messages he himself had dispatched. He admitted that the cause of this disruption remained unclear to him.

When Fleischmann stated that the detention or arrest of Imperial couriers with the knowledge or order of the Sublime Porte would be interpreted everywhere as a clear sign of hostility, Reis Efendi replied that the Sublime Porte had not received any news from Belgrade for a long time and that he was in no way responsible for this situation. He stated that he could not be held responsible. To prove this, he even sent a messenger a copy of a letter sent by the Grand Vizier to Numan Pasha (in which the letter ordered the subjects of the Habsburg Empire to enter and exit safely and unhindered). Fleischmann, on the other hand, stated that he sent aide Joseph, whom he

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*heimbzu suechen, vnd über ein-vnd andere wichtige vorfallenheit zureden, ansagen lassen, Er Reis-Effendi aber, nachdeme Er destwegen mit dem Groß Vezier gesprochen, liesse mir folgende vngereimte antworth zuruckh sagen, daß Er wegen gahr zugrossen occupationen kheine Zeit hette mich anzuhören, noch materia wuste, worüber Ich mit ihme reden wolte, wan Ich doch was anzubringen hette, solte es ihme schriftlich zueschickken hierauf meldete Ich von Ihro Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat meinem allergnädigsten herren kheine ordre zu haben die vorkombende geschäften mit der Porthen schriftlich zutractiren, was die materi belange, so seÿe selbe beÿ gegenwärttigen zeithen nur gahr zu important, vnd destwegen vmb so mehr zubedauren, daß man von seithen der Porthen so wenig darauf reflectire, wan man mich also nicht anhören wolte, müste Ich es geschehen lassen, vnd darbey durch den dolmetsch ihme Reis-Effendi nur sovill klagen lassen, daß Ich von einer geraumben Zeit hero nichts von der Kayl:en Gränitz über Belgrad empfangen auch meine vor ein vnd zweÿ monath iedesmahln mit einem von der Porthen erhaltenen Post-Commandement dahin abgeschickhte Expresse nicht zuruckh anlangen, Ich kunte die ursach dessen nicht aus finden ...”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 19r-20r.



trusted more than his Janissaries, to Petrovaradin to see whether the situation was as described by Reis Efendi.<sup>338</sup>

Fleischmann also noted that about two weeks ago, Reis Efendi sent him a letter regarding the release of the Turks captured in the Nafplion region under Imperial administration. Although it was not sure whether these Turks were captive or not, Fleischmann drew attention to the existence of imperial subjects who were held captive in many regions of the Ottoman Empire, contrary to the friendship and peace relations of the two empires.<sup>339</sup>

In Fleischmann's report, regarding the state affairs and war weapons planned by the Turks, they were transporting soldiers, ammunition, provisions, and other necessary war materials from Istanbul and other Ottoman places to Crete, Eğriboz, Thessaloniki, and other places in the Morea. They sent 24 warships to protect Ottoman islands and ships from enemy invasions. In addition, 12 to 15 warships were still in the port.<sup>340</sup>

The Sublime Porte had anticipated that the Barbary regencies would contribute to the Ottoman naval campaign by dispatching a fleet comprising twelve to fifteen warships, along with several hundred slaves and experienced ship captains. However, Fleischmann reported significant shortcomings in the condition and composition of the Ottoman naval and merchant vessels. He noted that many ships were partially constructed from unseasoned, or green, timber, rendering their

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<sup>338</sup> *"Ich kunte die ursach dessen nicht aus finden,weniger glauben, daß man irgentswo dise meine Leuth mit vorwissen oder Befelch der Porthen anhalte, gestalten eine sothanne verarrestirung, und Verwahrung der mit meinem Hoff jederzeit zupflegen habenden correspondenz aller orthten für einen öffentlichen feindschafft-passum ausgedeutet werden wird, hierauf betheürete er Reis-Effendi, daß die Porthen selbst von langer Zeit von Belgrad nichts gehöret, und jhr auf kheine weiß die schuld beßzumessen seýe, dises zuerweisen wolte Sýe mehrmahlñ einen Post-Ferman nebst einem von dem Groß-Vezier an den Numan Bahsa gestelten in Copia unterthänigst einschliessenden brief [worinnen er Ihme die sicher-und vngehinderte auf-und ablassung meiner Leüthen anbefihlet] ertheillen mit welchem Jch dann hiemit meinen Tschohadar Joseph, an den ich mich in disem fall mehr, alß auf die Janitscharn verlassen kan, von hier biß Peterwardein pr. posta abfertige ...", 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 20r-20v.*

<sup>339</sup> *"Eben der Reis-Effendi schickte mir vor 14en Tågen daß gehorsambst beýligendes die loslassung deren in der Neapolitanischen vnterthanen handen sich befinden sollenden Türckhischen gefangenen betreffendes schreiben zue, worvon eüer dhrl: Excell: vnd gnaden unterthänigste parte zugeben ihme versprochen, doch mit disem beýsatz nicht zuwissen, ob dergleichen Türckhische gefangene sich beý denen Kayl:en vnterthannen befindeten, alhier aber, vnd in andern Ottomannischen orthten seýen noch ville Kayl:e von etlichen Jahren hero wider die zwischen beeden Reichen versirende freündtschafft entführte Kayl:e vnterthannen anzutreffen, so man der billichkeit nach zurestringiren hette.", 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 20v-21r.*

<sup>340</sup> *"Nun auf die vorseýende Staats-Sachen, und Kriegszuerüstungen der Porthen zuschreiten, so hat selbige bereiths aus hiesigem hafen 24 Kriegs-Schüff ausgeschickhet, sowohl von hier, alß andern Ottomannischen orthten Truppen, munion, Proviañth, vnd andere erforderliche Kriegs geraithschafften nach Candia, Negroponte, Salonik, vnd andere Morea angelegenen Plåzen zutransportiren, auch sodann die Türckhische Jsulen, vnd fahrzeug von denen feindlichen invasionen zubedecken; ýber dises dörrften noch in hiesigen Arsenal 12 biß 15 Kriegs-Schüff [von welchen doch dato sich nicht mehr alß zweý allhier befinden, vnd etwa sovill Kauffartheý Schüff über die iüngst-beschreibene Galleren, Fregaten etc. ...", 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 21r-21v.*

hulls structurally weak and ill-suited for extended voyages. Of particular concern, according to Fleischmann, was the lack of maritime experience among the fleet's personnel. He observed that the captains, soldiers, officers, and servants assigned to the ships possessed virtually no familiarity with naval operations, and the vessels were largely manned by individuals unaccustomed to life at sea. Fleischmann warned that, should the crews remain unaffected by disease brought on by prolonged exposure to sea air, and thus avoid compromising the operational integrity of the fleet, the Ottomans could nonetheless muster a moderately effective naval force composed of determined but inexperienced men to engage the Republic of Venice. Nonetheless, he cautioned that the Turkish fleet remained vulnerable to disruption, particularly during the late summer months of August and September, due to the potential onset of disease and logistical difficulties, including shortages in supplies. Ottoman naval strategy, as described in the report, involved dividing the fleet—comprising galleys, frigates, and smaller vessels—into three distinct contingents: one tasked with landing troops in the Morea, another directed toward the entrance of the Gulf of Venice, and a third charged with defending Turkish-held islands and safeguarding commercial and military shipping routes. On the land front, Fleischmann noted that troop mobilization was proceeding gradually. On January 20th of the previous year, the unpopular Grand Vizier ordered the deployment of approximately 3,000 Sipahis and Serdengeçti<sup>341</sup> from among the assembled forces.<sup>342</sup>

<sup>341</sup> For more information about Serdengeçti, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/serdengeçti>". Accessed on 14.01.2024.

<sup>342</sup> "... vnd den von denen Barbaresquen hoffenden auch in zwölff biß fünffzehen Kriegs-Schüen etlich hundert Sclaven, vnd Poots-Knechten auch einigen Schüff-Capitain bestehenden Succurs ausgerüstet werde, also daß sye Porthen zwar ein seegreiche Flotta ins Meer sezet, allein solle ich darbey eüer dhrl: Excellenz, vnd Gden unterthänigst anfügen, daß die gemelte Türckhische Kriegs-vnd Kauffartheÿ-Schüff verschidene sich bey eraignender gelegenheit zaigen werdende fähler an sich habe, angesehen selbe mehrern Theillß vor gruenen Halz erbauet, durch daß lähr stehen ruckhbrüchig mithin zum accuraten seeglen untauglich seÿn worbey man auch die Canonen dermassen eng zusamben gesezet, daß wan selbige einmahl gelöset, in einem treffen fast ohnmöglich mehr geladen werden können. Das merckhwürdigste aber ist, daß der Admiral selbst, noch die Capitajns officiers biß auf die gemaine Soldaten vnd Poots Knecht [deren Sÿe zwar hier und anderwertig anwerben, alle ein schlechten zuelauff haben] was taugen oder die geringste experienz haben, also daß die obberührte Schüff schier durchgehends mit lauther vnerfahrenen, und des Meers nicht gewohnten Leüthen, so zweifels ohne leichtlich, wan auch die Pest nicht unter Sÿe kombet, wegen der Meers-lufft, vnd ungemach erkrankhen, vnd dardurch die Flotta schwächen werden besezet seÿnd, dahero ist nicht ohne fundament zuhoffen, daß im fall von seithen der Republic Venedig nur ein mittl: mässig allein mit brav vnd resoluten leüthen ausgerüste See-Macht wider selbige auslauffet, sye Türckhische Flotta leichtlich zumahln gegen den Monath Augusti vnd September, da selbige durch Kranckheit vnd abgang deren frischen lebensmitlen abgemattet, in confusion gebracht auch gahr überhauffen geworffen werden könne, sovill dato zupenetriren, solle der Türckhen intention dahin gerichtet seÿn ihre obgedachte Flotta zuzertheilen, nemblich mit einer, worzue die Gälleren Fregaten, vnd kleine fahrzeüß stossen, in Morea anzulendten, mit der andern gegen den eingang des Venetianischen Golfo zuseglen, vnd mit der dritten die exponirte Türckhische Insuln vnd hin-vnd her seeglende Khauffartheÿ, vnd Transport-Schüff zubedecken. Zu Land aber last Sÿe Porthen die Trouppen nach vnd nach defiliren, wie dann den 20ten iüngst verflossenen monaths Jaunary etlich tausent Spahi, vnd Serdengetschedi vmb das Volckh, vor welchem sich daß heüntige vnbeliebte Türckhische governo fürchtet, zuvermindern, dahin abgeschickhet, also daß bis iezo in selbiger gegend über 3000 Mann versamlet seÿn werde ...", 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 21v-22r.

Fleischmann reported that the mobilization of militias from both Asia and Europe was anticipated following the issuance of official circulars. He noted that the Sublime Porte had instructed the Tatar Khan to remain prepared in the event of an urgent military requirement. In the interim, only one Tatar Khan had been dispatched to the Morea with a contingent of approximately 10,000 men. The Egyptian militia, meanwhile, was designated for redeployment to the region of Calea. Fleischmann also observed that the general departure of Ottoman forces had been temporarily suspended due to the commencement of the month of Safar, which had begun roughly seven days earlier. Among the official military units assigned to accompany the march were the Janissaries, the artillery corps, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions of the Cebeci corps, and the eighth division of the Sultan's Sipahis. According to Fleischmann's account, the troops were expected to first advance to Davudpaşa, and from there, after a two-week interval, to proceed toward Edirne. This progression was intended to synchronize with the acceleration of naval operations. However, the Sublime Porte appeared to be exercising strategic caution, choosing to await the return of Ibrahim Agha—the envoy dispatched to Vienna—before finalizing its military posture and implementing any additional measures related to the impending war.<sup>343</sup>

Fleischmann stated<sup>344</sup> that the Porte, whom he described as *“the blind Turks and the scheming enemies of the Austrian Empire”*, believed that they were in a bad situation due to the weakening of the Empire's forces due to the last war and that the Turks did not believe that the Emperor could really defend Venice quickly and decisively this year. For this reason, although they

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<sup>343</sup> *“die übrige Europeisch, vnd Asiatische Miliz werde nach denen außgesändten Circular schreiben erwarthet, vnd hat der Tartar Chan ordre für sich selbstn biß zu erheischender noth zuruck in bereithschafft zubleiben, vnd indessen allein einen Tartarischen Sultan mit 10000 Mann nach Morea zusändten, die ægyptische Miliz aber solle in Calea verleget werden, alldieweillen die Türckhen in ihren gegenwärtigen vor sibem Tågen angefangenen monath Safer aus einer habenden unglückhl: Suspicion nicht aufzubrechen pflegen, als ist der öffentliche aus zug der Ordern oder der Armée folgenden Suite den ersten deren Jänitscharn, den Tschebetzi, den viertenten deren Topci, den 5ten deren Tschebetzi, den sechstenten endlich deren Spahi, den achten des Sultans, vnd der Porten selbstn von hier nach Daud Bahsa festgestellet, von dar Sýe sodann nach verflossenen 14ten Tågen weithers gegen Adrianopl aufbrechen werden der gänzlichen hoffnung indessen sowohl ihre Flotta expediren, alß ihres nach Wienn geschickhten gesandtns rückkhufft erwarthen, vnd sodann ihre mesures recht nehmen zukönnen ...”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 23r-23v.

<sup>344</sup> *“... gestalten Sýe blinde Türckhen, weillen Jhnen die intriquierende feinde des Allerdurchleichtigsten Ertzhauß von Össter Reich so sicherlich vorstellen, daß Ihre Röml:e Kayl:e vnd Cathollische Mayt: wegen abgang deren gelt mitlen, vnd deren beý lezteren Krieg geschwächten Kräfte in schlechten Stand seýen, nicht glauben wollen, daß Sýe allerhöchst-besagte Kayl:e Mayt: so geschwind, vnd zwar dises Jahr nach mit nachtruckh Venedig Succurriren können; dahero Sýe zwar die Probiarthäuser zu Temeswar und Belgrad mit dem in selbiger gegend zusamben bringenden Haratsch oder Steür gelt versehen, allein sonst die beý einer von dar beförchtenden feindlichen attaque gehörige anstalten dato nicht vorkehren, vnd ist gegenwertig der Sultan intentionirt sich von Adrianopl nach dem so genannten zwischen Salonik, vnd Jscopia gelegenen orth Despositioli zuverfügen, umb von dorten aus mit einigen beý sich behaltenden Asiatischen Troupen auf deren Teütschen bewegungen ein wachtsambes auge zuhaben.”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 23v-24r.

had brought together the surveillance points in Timișoara and Belgrade in the same area, and the necessary tribute and taxes were collected, the planned preparations had not yet been made against an attack that could come from there. Fleischmann had reported that the Sultan planned to move from Edirne to a place called Despositialisi, located between Thessaloniki and Shkodër, with some Asian troops he kept with him, in order to monitor the movements of the Germans.

He also noted that he had learned from his confidants that the Grand Vizier, who did not seem very ready for war and wanted to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca for no reason, would take action against the Venetian forces at the head of the main army in Morea. Moreover, the inexperienced but ambitious Grand Vizier had to prove to many people that he could successfully end this conflict that had started thoughtlessly.<sup>345</sup>

Fleischmann expressed concern that, despite the passage of considerable time, the Sultan—whom he characterized as evasive and hesitant—may still have remained unaware of the communications concerning Venice that had been reported to the Grand Vizier under the directive of the Emperor on November 10. Fleischmann had received confirmation of this transmission from multiple sources by November 19 of the previous year. He further noted that his envoys had been deliberately obstructed by the Grand Vizier, that his repeated requests to confer with the Reis Efendi had been twice rejected, and that the window of opportunity for diplomatic engagement on the matter had effectively closed. In his report, Fleischmann speculated that, had he independently submitted a letter directly to the Sultan without awaiting formal instructions from the Emperor, he might have succeeded in undermining the Grand Vizier's influence—who at that time still enjoyed considerable prestige—in the eyes of the Sultan. This, he believed, could have provoked the Sultan's anger and potentially averted the outbreak of direct hostilities. However, Fleischmann also acknowledged an alternative and more troubling possibility: that the Sultan was, in fact, aware of the Emperor's message but chose to remain silent, thereby tacitly endorsing the war. In such a case, he argued, the Sultan would be guilty of misleading both the court and the public. To preserve his authority and deflect accusations of weakness, the Sultan might then dismiss the Grand Vizier and

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<sup>345</sup> *“Der zum Krieg sich wenig schickhende, vnd nach aussag etlich meiner Confidenten aniezo zweifels ohne ausforcht eine wahlfarth nach Mecca zuthuen verlangende Groß Vezier aber solle mit der haubt-Armée in Morea wider Venedig operiren, allein biß zur selbigen Zeit dörrfte dem wahrlich heünt zu Tag von ambitioser vnerfahrtheit ganz thumb, vnd tollten Türckhischen Gouverno daß concept zimblich verruckhet ... ”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 24r.

subsequently, albeit belatedly, seek out a neutral party to mediate peace with Venice—mirroring his recent diplomatic resolutions with Russia and Poland.<sup>346</sup>

Fleischmann stated<sup>347</sup> that if the Sultan, whom he described as uneasy, emerged from this war unpunished, he would try to distract the Emperor in one way to get him into trouble.

On the other hand, he also stated<sup>348</sup> that the Emperor now had the desired opportunity not only to defeat the Turks, who were in a very bad situation and great confusion due to the absence of intelligent and experienced statemen but also to expel them from Europe in a few campaigns without any difficulty. However, Fleischmann also mentioned that in the event of a conflict between the Imperial forces and the Turks, the Ottoman envoys in the Empire should not be allowed to leave before he left the Ottoman territories. Because this was the only way he could save himself from the cruelty of the angry Turks in the event of a possible war.

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<sup>346</sup> “... und der aus einer auf eine so vnbesonnene weiß angefangenen fridens ruptur entstehende erfolg mehrers gezaiget werden, zumahl ich, wie schon untern 19ten längst verflossenen monaths Novembl: lezten Jahrs mit villen vmbständen unterthänigst berichtet, noch immerdar zweifle, es möchte der arglist, vnd forchtsambe Groß Vezier von dem ihme aus gnädigsten befelch eüer dhr! Excell: vnd Gnaden den 10.ten dito wegen Venedig gethanen Vortrag dem Sultan kheine oder wenigstens verfälschte nachricht gegeben haben, dahero er Groß Vezier meine hinauf geschickhte Leüthe zuruckzuhalten, und die schon zweymahl verlangte erlabnus mit dem Reis Effendi zureden zuversagen, mithin alle gelegenheit von der sache zusprechen abzuschneiden scheinet. Ich hette nicht ermanglet dem Sultan entweder durch eine Ihme zugebrachten schrifft oder durch andern Canal die gehörige remonstracion zumachen, sofern ich nicht auf dero hierüber angesuechte gnädigste instruction gewarhet, und vor allen beförchtet hette, ich möchte den noch zur zeith bey ihme Sultan in grossen Credit stehenden Groß Vezier nicht übern hauffen werffen, sondern dahin irritiren können, daß hierdurch der von hier auß Jhro Röml:en Mayt: indirecté vorstehende Krieg wider dieselbte hette directé gezogen werden können, vnd also anstatt die feinde in der Flanke zuattaquiren, selbe a fronte gehabt hette, doch aber wird dises nicht allzeit verborgen bleiben, sondern es endlich der Sultan, sofern er es nicht schon weiß, sodann mit dem Groß Vezier eines ist, vnd daß Volckh zuhinterführen suechet, erfahren müssen, alß dann dörrfte aller wahrscheinlichen apparencz nach er wanckfelmüthige, und forchtsambe Sultan die sach mit absezung, vnd Strangulirung des Groß Veziers beylegen, vnd villeicht zuspatt trachten wollen, disen wider Venedig vorgenommenen Krieg, dessen ursach er völlig dem Vezier beylegen wird, gleichwie er es iüngstens mit Moscau, vnd Pohln practiciret, zuvermitteln der vngezweifelten mainung allzeit imstand zuseyn mit seinem nach beliebigen irritirenden Nachbahrn nachgefallen friden zumachen”, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 24r-25r.

<sup>347</sup> “... allein werden eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz vnd Gnaden von selbstn gnädigst erachten, daß der heüntig-unruhige Sultan, im fall Er sich auch disßmahl aus disem wider Venedig anfangenden Krieg ungestraffter wickhet, ins khünfftig gewißlich Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en, vnd Cathollischen Mayt: sobald sye nur sich mit einer oder andern Potenz engagiren oder sonst eine anderwerttge Diversion haben solten, zubeunruhigen unterstehen werde ...”, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 25r.

<sup>348</sup> “... wo hingegen Ihre allerhöchst-besagte Kaiserliche Majestät anjetzo die erwünschte Gelegenheit haben, die wegen Abgang verständig und experimentierte Leuten in einen sehr schlechten Zustand und größten Konfusion seiende Tücken nicht nur allein merklich zu straffen, sonder Sie auch wann es nur dero allerhöchster willen ist, ohne große beschwährniss in wenig Kampagnen aus Europa zu jagen. Ich aber ersuche euer durchlauchtigen Excellenzen und Gnaden untertänigst, sofern daß allerhöchste Kaiserliche Interesse wofür ich jederzeit Leib und Leben zu Sacrificiren schuld und erbietig bin nicht ein widriges erfordert, dieselbe geruchen den daraussen seienden türkischen gesandten ehender nicht zurückzuschicken, biss ich von hier avocieret, und also bey einem daraussiger seith vornehmenden Kriegs-Passu gewisslich exponierten furiosen Türkischen Grausamkeit gerettet seyn werde.”, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 25r-25v.

Furthermore, Fleischmann reported<sup>349</sup> that as previously noted, he was unable to obtain critical instructions from the Imperial War Council during a period of considerable difficulty. He indicated that the messengers he had dispatched had been absent for approximately sixty days, resulting in a complete lack of communication from Petrovaradin. In response to these challenging circumstances, Fleischmann mentioned that his çuhadar (or his aide) sent a courier to the Imperial Commander in Petrovaradin with the ferman he received from the Sublime Porte so that he could send someone to Fleischmann whenever he wanted.

In the meantime, Fleischmann noted that on the 22nd of the previous month, the Tatar Khan dispatched three individuals from among the Kalmyk Tatars—who were under the protection of the Russian Czar—to the Sublime Porte. These individuals had been accused of engaging in acts of robbery and plunder within Nogay Tatar territories. While the Khan lodged a formal complaint implicating Russian involvement, he notably refrained from referencing the issue of the annual tribute. According to Fleischmann, the Sublime Porte offered no response to the Khan's grievances.<sup>350</sup>

In the rest of his report<sup>351</sup>, Fleischmann mentioned that Reis Efendi called the Dutch embassy secretary Theyls on the 28th of the month and asked him for some maps, and that the deposed and exiled Tatar Khan, Devlet II Giray, had been moved to the island of Chios. He also stated that the

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<sup>349</sup> *“Indessen fallet mir unbeschreiblich hart bei gegenwärtigen schwähren Zeiten von denen selben keine so höchst-nöthige Belehrung zu bekommen, noch wegen Ausbleibens meiner abgefertigten Leuten von etliche und sechzig Tagen was von Peterwardein gehört zuhaben. Mit meinem jetzt expedirenden Chiohadar schickte des Herrn Feldmarschall Leutenants und Commerdants zu Peterwardein Exzellenzen einen von der Porthen erhaltenen Post Ferman zu auf das Er sich selbiges im Fall der Not bedienen, und allzeit jemand hieher fertigen könne.”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 25v-26r.

<sup>350</sup> *“Übrigens hat der Tatar Chan den 22ten verflossenen Monats drei dem Czaar in Moskau unterthänige Calmukische Tatarn, weil sie in der Nogaischen Tatarei mit blindern, und rauben einige Feindseligkeit begangen, hieher an die Porthen geschickt und sich deswegen Zweifels ohne um seiner wegen prætension einen jährlichen Tribut an Moskau machender prætension einen mehrmaligen Nachdruck zugeben sehr wider den Czaar beklaget, allein es wurde nicht darauf reflektiert, und nur die gedachte gefangene auf die Galeeren gesetzt.”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 26r.

<sup>351</sup> *“Den 28ten dito hat der Reis-Effendi den Holländischen dollmätsch theillß zu sich berueffen, ... und vom Scio die Nachricht gebracht worden, dass der abgesetzte alda in Exilio gelebte Tatar Chan Dewlet Kiraj ..., ...der in einem Türkischen Haus verarrestirte Venezianische Bajlo wird von einigen Tagen hero enger eingeschlossener gehalten, weillen dass von Smyrna zurückgegangene Kauffarthei Schiff Sankt Paulo genant im heimseeglen ein Türkische Tscheika hinweg genommen haben solle.”*, 12 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 26r, 27r.

Venetian Bailo, who was kept under house arrest, was now being followed more closely because a merchant ship named Saint Paulo returning from Izmir took a Ottoman Chaika<sup>352</sup> with it.

In a summary of a letter<sup>353</sup> sent by Freiherrn von Löffelholz (*Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz von Colberg*) from Petrovaradin to the Imperial War Council on February 26, 1715, the author noted that he saw no need to supplement the information already relayed to him by Fleischmann concerning incidents in the East. He further reported that he had inquired of the Çuhadar—a figure frequently referenced in earlier correspondence—regarding the whereabouts of the Ottoman envoy Ibrahim Agha, who was en route to Petrovaradin with his delegation. The Çuhadar confirmed that they had encountered Ibrahim Agha in Sofia, but expressed doubt that the envoy would be able to reach Petrovaradin in the near term, citing severe weather conditions, including heavy snowfall and waterlogged roads, which rendered travel particularly difficult. Moreover, the Çuhadar had also received information from other Ottoman sources in Sofia indicating that Ibrahim Agha might be required to remain in place until further instructions were received through an imperial directive.

### 3.11. The Question of Alliances in the Peace of Karlowitz

In his report dated March 8, 1715, Fleischmann reported<sup>354</sup> that the Imperial courier Theodor Constanz had arrived in Istanbul on February 22, delivering a sum of 1,000 Thalers as salary

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<sup>352</sup> For more information about Chaika, "[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Chaika\\_\(boat\)](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Chaika_(boat))", and "<https://web.archive.org/web/20190606124013/https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/gemi>". Accessed on 17.01.2024.

<sup>353</sup> See Appendix 7, "*Aus dem an den Kaiserlichen Hof Kriegs Rath von dem Freiherrn von Löffelholtz untern 26 Februar 1715 aus Peterwardein erlassenen schreiben. Was sonst dermalen in Orient neues passiert werden euer durchlauchtigen Exzellenz meine gnädigst, gnädig und hochgebiethende Herrn sondern Zweifel aus denen zwei Fleischmannischen Relationen mit mehreren zu entnehmen geruhen, daher ich auch vor unnötig und überflüssig erachte, von den Neuigkeiten, so mir huldigen Resident von Fleischmann berichtet etwas beizufügen; im Mittels habe den oft gemeldeten Tschohodarn befraget, ob er den in ablegation an des huldigen etc Kriegs Präsidenten hoch fürstlichen durchlauchtigen herauf kommenden Ibrahim Aga nicht unterwegs angetroffen, worauf er mir gemeldet, dass er denselben zu Sophia gelassen, und glaubte er nicht, dass selbiger so gar geschwind dahier eintreffen dürfte, weilen wegen des gar villen Schnees und großen Gewässers dermalen sehr schwer fortzukommen, auch der Aga, so viel er von dem Türken zu Sophia vernommen, alda noch auf eine nähere Instruktion und Kaiserlichen Befehl warten müsse.*", 26 February 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 29r-29v.

<sup>354</sup> "*Endlich ist der Currier Theodor Constanz den 22ten jüngst verflossenen Monats Februarÿ mithin in 21 Tägten allhier angelanget, von welchem Jch eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz vnd gnaden gnädigstes rescript vom 2ten dito nebst meiner vnd deren allhier stehenden Kayl:en dollmetsch vnd Sprach Knaben halb Jährigen besoldung, ausgelegte rittgelter, vnd die zu bewürkung deren hier seÿenden außländischen Ministern angewendten 1000 Thallern, wie auch 1000 Specie ducaten zu geheimben außgaben, von welchen geldern die quittungen aniezo, die verrechnung deren berührten 1000 Specie Ducaten aber, weillen solche zwar noch nicht völlig außgegeben doch beÿ gegenwertigen Zeiten ohneracht Jch sovill alß möglich darmit menagire, khein monath mehr glectken werden, mit nechsten folgen solle, in unterthänigkheit empfangen; vor allem habe zur gehorsambsten folglaistung dero mir gegebenen gnädigsten befelch mich vnverzüglich beÿ dem Groß Vezier ansagen lassen, allein er Groß Vezier hat mir die beÿ Jhme angesuchte audienz erst nach sechs Tagen alß auf den ersten huius zweifels ohne vmb indessen hiervon dem Sultan parte geben, vnd sich beÿ denen dem allerdurchleichtigsten Ertzhauß von ÖssterReich sehr wenig affectionirten, vnd sich beÿ der*

payments for him and other staff of the Imperial Embassy. He also noted that the 1,000 ducats in gold allocated for confidential expenditures had not yet been fully utilized. Acting upon his official instructions, Fleischmann initially sought an audience with the Grand Vizier. However, the request was granted only after a delay of six days. He further remarked that the Sultan had not been informed of this meeting, and alleged that the Grand Vizier was actively seeking intelligence regarding the Christian powers from other foreign diplomats—many of whom were reportedly unfriendly toward the Austrian Empire and sought favor with the Sublime Porte through flattery and misinformation. During their eventual meeting, the Grand Vizier expressed reluctance to engage with representatives of the Imperial court. In response, Fleischmann clarified that it was not his intention to trouble the Sublime Porte and that he had merely requested to meet with the Grand Vizier on the date previously agreed upon.

On March 1, upon receiving Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier, at Fleischmann's request, instructed the Agha, the Reis Efendi, the Kahya, and the Kapıcılar Kahyası to withdraw from the meeting, allowing for a private conversation. Addressing the Grand Vizier with the utmost humility and diplomatic decorum, Fleischmann explained that he was present at the Sublime Porte by virtue of his appointment from the Holy Roman Emperor. He emphasized that his primary responsibility was to uphold the peace established between the two empires under the Treaty of Karlowitz. Fleischmann affirmed his commitment to this duty and underscored that, throughout his time in Ottoman territory, he had endeavored to fulfill his role with sincerity and diligence. As evidence of this, he cited his constructive efforts to mediate and promote stability during previous crises, particularly in relation to the Polish and Swedish affairs.<sup>355</sup>

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*Porten durch allerhand schmeichlereyen, vnd unfundirten zeitungen beliebt zumachen suechenden dollmetschen deren hier gegenwärtigen frembden Ministern über den zuestand der Christenheit erkundigen zukönnen, auch zugleich zusaigen daß Er geringe begierd habe, daß von dem Kaiserlichen Hof kömbende anzuhören, zuegesaget, ich wendete dargegen ein, daß ich zwar wünschete daß jenige, so mir mein Groß mächtigster Kaiser und Herr der Ottomannischen Porthen vorzutragen allergnädigst auferlegt, sobald möglich verrichten zukönnen, alldieweillen ich aber ihme Groß Vezier auf keinerlei weiß einiges ungemach zuverursachen gedenkte, alß wollte ich den ihme gelegenen Tag, und stund abwarten.”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 31r-31v.*

<sup>355</sup> *“An gemeltem Tag als den 1ten Martÿ begabe mich zu dem Groß Vezier, und nachdeme Selbiger auf mein begehren denen bei ihme geständenen Aghen, und bedienten ausser dem Reis Effendi, Chihaja, und Capucilar-Chihajasi abzutertten anbefolen, habe ihme Groß Vezier umb allmöglichen glimpf, und beschaidenheit zugebrauchen und ihn etwa dardurch zur raison zubringen, also angeredet, wie daß ich von Zeitan das ihre Römische Kaiserliche und Cathollische Majestat mein alldurchleichtigst Groß mächtigster Kaiser, und herr herr mir die allerhöchste Gnad gethan mich zu dero Residenten an der durchleichtigsten Porthen allermildist zubestellen, und mir die zwischen dero, und dem Ottomannischen Reich vorseiende gut Freündnachbahrliche einverständnuß, beforderist die ferrere ungekränckte beibehaltung des Carlovizischen Fridens allergnädigst aufzuerlegen, habe meiner allerunterthänigsten Pflicht, und dienst gemäß unermanglet all-mein eüsserstes hierzue anzuwenden, und wurde er Groß Vezier von disen meinen zur allgemainen wohl fahrt hegenden eifer bereiths in verschidenen fällen besonders in denen Pohlen, und*



In the continuation<sup>356</sup> of the report, it is mentioned that the Republic of Venice, through its ambassador in Vienna, duly informed the Emperor about the arrest of the Bailo at the Sublime Porte and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire and that the warnings to prevent the events from escalating further were ignored. His Imperial Majesty did not want the Venetians to have to endure any injustice as a result. However, he wanted to offer mediation between the two states so that the Venetians could respond to the Ottomans' reasonable demands without exposing themselves to the uncertainty of war, without shedding the blood of innocent people, and without interrupting the Peace of Karlowitz. The Emperor made this offer both in the name of the continuity of peace following justice, the close friendship blessed by both sides and to maintain the existence of the alliance with Venice and the Kingdom of Poland.

Fleischmann mentioned that, as can be seen from the records of the Ottoman minister Mavrocordatos and other circumstances that occurred during the Peace of Karlowitz, the Habsburg Empire, the Kingdom of Poland and the Republic of Venice were in an eternal alliance against each other to maintain the Treaty of Karlowitz and that neither side could be attacked without the other. However, Fleischmann asked the Dutch Ambassador, Count Colyer, a few months earlier whether the alliance mentioned had been mentioned at the Karlowitz Peace Talks. In his answer, Count Colyer said that not the slightest mention had been made of it. So that he could easily answer the Turks about it in the event of a request being made to him. However, later Fleischman had just asked the

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*Schwedischen affairen mehrere proben gesehen haben, ja ich seie bereith denen entstehenden flammen, so die zwischen diesen zwei Reichen versirende einigkeit ergreifen, und zertennen könnte, mit meinem eigenen Bluth so fern es möglich, zulöschen, mit disem zum derseithigen bessten jederzeit tragen den gemüth solle ihme Groß-Vezier den von Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestat mir allergnädigst anbefohlenen vortrag in dero allerhöchsten nahmen machen nebst dem meiner seithigen belangen selbigen mit gedult anzuhören, und darauf zureflectiren.”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 32r-32v.*

<sup>356</sup> *“Nachdeme die Republic Venedig Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayt: durch dero zu Wienn anwesenden herrn Bodtschaffter die arrestirung ihres bey der Ottomannischen Porthen stehenden Bajlo nebst der zugleich bestehen Kriegs declaration auf gezimende weiß bekant gemacht, so hatten dieselbte sich nicht entziehen können die vorige freündliche officia zu abhinderung aller ferrern weithschichtigkeiten durch mich hiemit mehrmahln zuverneuern, worbey Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayt: kheineswegs gemainet wären, daß die Porthen hierdurch eine ohnbilichkeit zuertragen hette, sondern dieselbte wolten allein Jhre vermittelung eben destwegen zur güttigen beylegung anerbothen haben, daß die Porthen daß ienige, was sye mit billichkeit an Venedig zufordern haben möchte, ohne sich der vngewisßheit daß Kriegs außzustellen, auch ohne vergießung so villen vnschuldigen Menschen-Bluts, und unterbrechung des Carlovizischen fridens erlangen, mithin mit denen darinnen verbundenen Mächten in stetter guter ruhe, und freündschafft leben kunte, allermassen Jhre Röml:en Kayl:en Mayt: zur billichen Vergnügungs Verschaffung all-Jhre Kräfte anwenden, vnd die Republic Venedig aller muthmasßung nach von der billichkeit sich nicht entfernen wurde, zu diser anbietenden freündlichen vermittelung aber seye Jhre mehr-allerhöchst-berührte Röml: Kayl: Mayt: sowohl durch die mit beeden theillen segende genaue freündtschafft, alß auch veranlassung der nebst dem König Reich Pohn mit Venedig habenden bindnuß, vnd dem gemeinseben Carlovizischen friden selbst verbunden ...”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 32v-33r.*

Ottoman chief interpreter, who told him that the alliance was mentioned in detail in his father's protocol and was not unknown to the Turks.<sup>357</sup>

Fleischmann reported<sup>358</sup> that when he conveyed the Emperor's emphasis on the alliance between Venice and Poland to uphold the Peace of Karlowitz, the Grand Vizier reacted with indignation, abruptly rising and imperiously asking whether the Roman Emperor had declared war on the Sublime Porte. Fleischmann felt that the Grand Vizier solely expected a response regarding the Emperor's intentions—whether war or peace. He noted that the Emperor explicitly disavowed any desire for conflict with the Porte, instead proposing amicable mediation and equitable satisfaction with the utmost respect for diplomatic decorum. Through this approach, Fleischmann suggested, the Grand Vizier could secure the concessions rightfully anticipated by the Sublime Porte from Venice, thereby avoiding significant loss of life or the burdens of a protracted, long-distance military campaign. He also mentioned that the Emperor sincerely wanted to continue the good neighbourly relations with the Sublime Porte, that he thought that this uncertain war with Venice,

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<sup>357</sup> "... gestalten schon zur zeit der Karlovizischen Friedens Handlung, wie es aus dem Protokoll des selbiger Zeit zugegen gewesenenen Türkischen Minister Mavrocordato auch anderen dabei vergangenenen Umständen Clar abgenommen werden kann, Ihre Römische Kaiserliche Majestät, dass Königreich Polen, und die Republik Venedig zu dass Karlovizischen Friedens festhaltung einen ewiden Bund gegen einander verfangen und ein Teil ohne dem andern nicht angegriffen werden mag; dass aber ich mich nicht auf daß Engelland und holländische Mediations- Protokoll bezogen ist die Ursache, weil den der noch hier stehende holländische Botschafter Herr Graf Collier, als ich ihn schon vor etliche Monaten Discoursweiß befraget, ob man von der gemelten Bindnuss oder defensiv Allianz zur Zeit des Karlovizischen Friedens nichts geandtet? geantwortet, dass dazumahl nicht dass geringste dar von gemeldet worden seie, also dass er gar leichtlich eben dieses der Porthen bei einer etwa an ihn beschehenden Antrag wurde antworten, hingegen habe eben darüber den ober Dolmetsch der Porten sondiert so mir gestanden, dass diese Bündnis ganz ausführlich in dem Protokoll seines Vaters angezogen und denen Türken nicht unbekannt seie ...", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 33r-33v.

<sup>358</sup> "... ingeleichen habe um den Vortrag desto glimpflich und den Groß-Vezier desto traktabler zumachen erstlich von der billichmässigen Satisfaktion – Verhelfung, und letzters von der zur Festhaltung des Karlovizischen Friedens zwischen Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestät dem Königreich Polen und der Republik Venedig vorseienden Bündnis gehorsamst angezogener massen geredet, dessen doch uneracht ist der Vermessen, und insolente Groß Vezier gleich aufgefahren mich voller Zorn und Furie fragend, ich sollte nur mit wenig Worten sagen, ob Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestät der Porthen den Krieg ankündige, es bleibe bei der vormals mir gegebenen Antwort, ich sollte nur genau aussagen, ob der Kaiser Fried oder Krieg haben und also ich denselben deklarieren wollte? Ich meldete hierauf von Ihre Römische Kaiserliche Majestät keine ordre zuhaben der Porten den Krieg anzukündigen sondern derselben in dero allerhöchsten nahmen einen freundlichen Vermittlung, und billiche Satisfactions-verhelfung anzubieten, also dass sie Porthen dasjenige so sie mit recht von Venedig prætendiren mag ohne vergiessung vieles Menschen Bluts und ohne sich der Ungewissheit eine große weitleüffigkeit mit sich führenden Kriegs zu exponieren erhalten möge, und seie eben dieser durch mich beschehende Passus kein Kriegs Erklärung, sondern vielmehr ein unstrittiges Kennzeichen, dass Ihre Römische Kaiserliche Majestät mit der Porthen die biss hero unterhaltene gute Nachbarschaft, beforerist aber den Karlovizischen Frieden noch Ferrers ungekränkt fortzusetzen aufrichtig gemeint seien, hier widersetzte der Groß Vezier, dass eben dieses, so ich jetzt ihm vortrage, schon neulich gemeldet hätte, ich wendete dagegen ein, dass indessen der damals noch ungewiss gewesene und nicht bekannte Krieg mit Venedig sich geeüßeret, und jetzo an dem seie die entstehende Kriegs-flammen durch eine göttlich ...", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 33v.

the cause of which was not fully known, could end without further escalation through negotiations, and that the responsibility in this regard belonged to the Grand Vizier.

Despite Fleischmann's conciliatory tone during their discussions, the Grand Vizier responded with marked indignation, affirming that the position communicated in their previous meeting remained unchanged. He declared that all Muslims were united in seeking retribution for the hardships inflicted by the Republic of Venice. The Sublime Porte, he stated, was resolute in its objective to reclaim all formerly lost territories and would not abandon its struggle until these aims were fulfilled. Furthermore, the Grand Vizier warned that any power aligning itself with Venice or offering assistance to the Republic would share in its fate. He also asserted that the Ottoman military retained the capacity to shift its forces toward the Hungarian frontier with ease, should the need arise. Fleischmann observed that the Sublime Porte appeared firmly committed to the continuation of hostilities, rejecting all diplomatic overtures and warnings. He expressed skepticism that the Ottoman position would be altered, even if the Imperial Majesty were to dispatch multiple emissaries or if Fleischmann were to engage the Grand Vizier in further rounds of negotiation. In closing, Fleischmann stated that if the empire continued its policy of preventing further bloodshed and ending the current war, the Venetians would be forced to retreat and the advancing Ottoman forces would be able to seize all the lands they could reach.<sup>359</sup>

During their meeting, Fleischmann remarked to the Grand Vizier that, up to that point, the Sublime Porte had lodged no formal complaint with the Empire concerning the actions of the Republic of Venice. Nevertheless, he suggested that it would be prudent to investigate whether Venice had engaged in any conduct that might constitute a breach of the existing peace agreements.

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<sup>359</sup> *“Auf eine gleiche ort werde man all-denen jenigen, so sich der Porthen widersetzen, und ihnen Venezianern zu assistiren getrauen, begegnen mit dem Kayser gedenke sie Porthen Frieden zuhalten wollte aber selbiger mit Ihr in den Krieg ausfallen wurde auch sie ihm den Kopf bieten, die Truppen seien beordert, und Kunten selbe so leicht gegen Ungarn, als anderst wohin geführt werden, die Porthen tette sich an dieses trockene vermittlungs-geschwänz nicht kehren, und bleibe ein für alle mahl bei ihrer gefasten Resolution den Deklarierten Krieg solange zuführen, biss man die abgenommene Länder wider bekomme der Kaiser solle sich und denen seinigen nur keine Mühe mehr geben, es seie alles um sonst, ich möchte zehenmahl in dieser materi zur Porthen gehen, auch der Kaiser selbst an selbige brief oder neue Gesandtschaft schicken, Er Groß Vezier oder ein anderer werde mit einem unzählbaren, und erschrecklichen Kriegs Herr gegen Venedig ins Feld ziehen und die erlittene unbilden mit dem schwers rechnen, Ihre Kaiserlichen Majestät wann sie doch vermitteln wolten, sollten denen Venezianern andeuten, dass sie sich in all-denen Orten, wo die Ottomannische Macht hinkommen werde, zeitlich zurückziehen, und dass Land abandoniren, auf ein solche, und kein andere weiß wurde die vergiessung des Bluts können vermittelt werden, wann Ihre Kaiserliche Majestat diesen wider Venedig vornehmenden Krieg zuverhindern verlangen, so hätten dieselbe daran sein sollen ...”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 34r-34v.*

Fleischmann emphasized that such an inquiry should be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Sublime Porte, reflecting its commitment to maintaining diplomatic stability.<sup>360</sup>

Additionally, Fleischmann asked the Grand Vizier to have the courtesy to convey his complaints against Venice to him. The Grand Vizier stated that Venice's violations were now known to everyone and therefore it was unnecessary to talk about the reasons again and again. They would bring justice against Venice with fire and sword, and as they said before, they would not stop until they regained the lands they lost, and he added that the Emperor had to decide whether to be friends or foes with the Sublime Porte.<sup>361</sup>

Fleischmann emphasized that, under the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz, it was impermissible to provide support—whether overt or covert—to those previously engaged in plundering activities. He stressed that the Emperor recognized no Hungarians in need of assistance beyond his own subjects. Acknowledging that even if proposals for mediation were accepted, resolution would not be immediate, Fleischmann nonetheless sought to defuse tensions with measured and conciliatory language, attempting to dissuade the Ottoman leadership from initiating hostilities along the Imperial frontier. Following this speech, the Grand Vizier appeared to recognize that he may have spoken with undue harshness and extended an apology. However, his temper soon flared again as he denounced the perceived treachery of the Venetians, whom he accused of initiating hostilities, plotting the invasion of Bosnia, and profiting through unjust means while spilling the blood of innocent Muslims. In an impassioned outburst, he reiterated his vow that the Ottoman Empire would wage war against Venice with full force and would strike down any who obstructed its path. Despite this rhetoric, Fleischmann reported that the Grand Vizier continued to express a desire to maintain peaceful relations with the Emperor. He cited, as evidence of this intent, the recent

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<sup>360</sup> "... hier wider setzte ich, dass man sich von seithen der Porthen niemals bei Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestät wider Venedig geklaget, vnd eben der von mir vormahlß, vnd iezo der Porthen zuthuen anbefohlene vortrag dahin angesehen seÿe, damit die von seithen venedig etwa wider den vorseÿenden friden verüebte Thättigkeiten untersuecht, mit einer der Porthen verschaffender billichen vergnügung abgethan, vnd ins khünfftig gesteuert werde ...", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 35r.

<sup>361</sup> "Worbeÿ ich vmb ad Speciem zukomben ihn Groß Vezier ersuechet die güttigkheit zuhaben, vnd mir die wider Venedig habende beschwäurnussen zucommuniciren; hierauf anthworthete Er vnnöthig zuseÿn dise gravamina von ihme zuhaben, indeme selbige der ganzen statt bekhandt, vnd nun an deme seÿe sÿe mit feÿer, vnd Schwert an Venedig zurechnen, mehrmahln mit grossen eÿfer, vnd schwur widerhollend daß die Porthen nicht ehender werde die Waaffen widerlegen, biß sÿe all-ihre verlorrne Länder recuperiret haben wird, der Kayser solte nur freÿ an Tag geben, ob Er der Porthen freind oder feind seÿn wolle, man wäre im stand ihme in allem fall zubegegnen.", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 35r.

dispatch of Ibrahim Agha to Vienna, a gesture meant to sustain diplomatic dialogue even as the broader conflict with Venice escalated.<sup>362</sup>

Fleischmann added in his report that the Grand Vizier stated that the friendship between the two empires should continue. Fleischmann paid him his usual compliments since the Grand Vizier would be leaving the capital soon. Additionally, Fleischmann requested that the Grand Vizier grant him the opportunity to follow the operation in question by issuing the requisite documentation. The Grand Vizier assured him that such an opportunity would be provided, in accordance with customary practice in such circumstances. Fleischmann reported that, following a discussion lasting approximately one hour and a half, which encompassed matters such as the departure and journey of the Swedish King in Wallachia and several other unrelated topics, and then he took his leave from the Grand Vizier's presence.<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> "... vnd wie es ihme gefallen wurde, wan die Porthen denen Hungarn wider denselben beÿstehen wolte, ich replicirte hierauf von kheinen andern Hungarn alß von denen Käyl:en vnterthanen waß zuwissen, welchen khein hülf, vnd beÿstand nöthig, noch solchen von jemanden begehrten, denen vormahls herumb vagirten Raubern hette man ohne den Carlovizischen Friden zukränckhen weder öffentlich noch heimlich an die hand gehen können, damit aber, zumahl alle vermittlungs anerbietung vmb sonst die sache nicht auf einmahl zur extremitet gelange, vnd vor der Zeit die Türckhen gegen die Käyl:e Gränitzen verlaitet wurden, habe ich ihn Groß Vezier mit glimpf, vnd linden worthen widerumb zubesänfftigen gesucht, also daß er endlichen sich excusiret, meldend, daß er villeicht ein oder anderes hart-und unfreündliches worth möge geredet haben, allein hette er sich über die vnglaublich-Treulose vngerechtes gut abnehmende, vnd vnschuldiges Bluth deren Musulmannern vergiessende Venetianer [welche so gar sich unterfangen iezo die erste hostilitet zubegehen vnd in Bosnien einzufallen] erzühret, also ein hiziges gespräch machete, ich erwehnete, daß es fast eine natürliche sache seÿe sich über die feind zuereÿfern, allein auf den in nahmen Ihrer Röml:en Käyl: Majt: ihme gethannen freündt nachbahrlichen vortrag wolte sich allerdings auch eine freind einstimmige antworth gebühren, hierauf fielle er mir gleich wider in die rede, sagend, es bleibe beÿ der ein für allemahl gegebenen antworth, vnd die Porthen fest entschlossen wäre Venedig mit aller Macht zubekriegen, die von selbiger erlittene unbild zurechnen, die verlorne lande zurecuperiren, und allen, so Ihr was in weeg legen wollen, gleichmässig auf den Kopff zuschlagen. Nachdem ich mehrmahln den Discours versüßet, habe Ihme Groß Vezier weithers vorgetragen von eüer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden unter einsteins gehorsambst vernahmen zuhaben, wie das dieselbte abschickung des nach Wienn expedirten Ibrahim Aga als ein Kennzeichen der unterhalten wollenden friidfertigen einverständnuß anseheten und ihme Ibrahim Aga all-freündliche bezeügung vnd willfährigkeit angedeÿen lassen werden.", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 35r-36r.

<sup>363</sup> "... hierauf gabe Er zuverstehen, daß dises die zwischen zweÿen Reichen versirende freundschaftt erfordere vnd er einmahln daran gezweifelt hette; hiernechst machte ich ihme Gros Vezier wegen seiner nächstens nehmenden abreÿse daß gewöhnliche compliment mit dem beÿfügen, daß weillen die Porthen in procinctu stehe inner kurzen von hier abzugehen, vnd ich beÿ derselben von meinem allerhöchsten Principaln bestellet seÿe; alß ersuechete ich ihn mir durch außfertigung deren bedürfftigen Fermanen die gelegenheit zumachen Ihr Porthen folgen zukönnen; Worauf Er antworthlich meldete, in denen prothocollen nachsehen zulassen, was andere Zeithen in derleÿ fällen gebräuchlich gewesen seÿe, weither fragend ob? vnd wie der König in Schweden in seinen Landen angelanget seÿe, Nachdem ich dises gebührend beantwortet, fragte ich ihme Groß Vezier, daß mir wegen des höchst-berüchrtten Königs in Schweden beÿ seiner neülichen hinausreÿß in der Wallacheÿ gemachten aufenthalt gnädigst anbefohlene discours weiß beÿ, über welches er Groß Vezier replicirte daß der König in Schweden ville gedanckhen im Kopff, mithin wohl ursach gehabt hette sich eine Zeit lang zubesinnen, nachdem ich noch ein-vnd anderes indifferentes gespräch gehabt, vnd biß anderthalb stund beÿ ihme zuegebracht, habe mich nach genossenenen gewöhnlichen ehrbezeügungen von ihme beurlaubet.", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 36r-37r.

Another important point that Fleischmann wanted to point out was that after Prussia gained a separate status, the Sublime Porte intended to attack Hungary as soon as its dealings with Venice were completed to recapture all the lands it had lost in the last great war. Moreover, according to what he stated in his report, the grand vizier neither wanted to talk about the Peace of Karlowitz nor did he want to hear anything about it in order to attack Hungary. He had a great objection to this peace treaty, which was against the Ottoman Empire, and for this reason, in his meeting with Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier tried to put the treaty on a different basis. In addition, Fleischmann pointed out that the Grand Vizier again behaved arrogantly towards him during the meeting and never referred to the Sultan as his master. He explained the reason for this as either because he had the power to influence the Sultan or because they were both of the same mind in the ongoing war.<sup>364</sup>

Relying on their longstanding acquaintance, Fleischmann sought a meeting with the Reis Efendi to discuss the possibility of halting the escalation of hostility encouraged by the Grand Vizier. However, the Reis Efendi declined the meeting and conveyed that both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were firmly resolved to pursue war. He emphasized that no mediation or compromise would be considered until all previously lost territories were recovered. In his report, Fleischmann expressed disappointment at what he perceived as the inability of the Ottoman statesmen—characterized in his words as “*arrogant and inexperienced barbarians*”—to recognize the gravity of the situation and avert the conflict. Nevertheless, he interpreted these developments as potentially indicative of a divine message. Drawing parallels to past military defeats such as those at Poltava and near the Prut River, Fleischmann speculated that the Ottoman forces might similarly falter in the forthcoming campaign. He concluded by asserting that the Imperial Majesty now possessed a

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<sup>364</sup> “Hier solle noch unterthänigst beifügen, aus denen mit mir habten insolenten discursen des Groß Veziers abgemerckht zuhaben, daß wahrhafftig die durch die Pruthische begebenheit vnerträglich aufgeblasene Porthen, wie ich es schon im verflossenen Monath Octobr: gehorsambst berichtet, intention seye alle die im lezten Krieg verlohrene Länder zu recuperiren, und sobald sye mit Venedig fertig, auch Hungarn zu attaquiren, worbey Er Groß Vezier, so offft ich ihme von Carlovitzischen friden [welchen Er seiner seiths niemahln nennen noch gelichsamb hören wolte, meldung gethan, durch seine geberdten sovill angezaiget, alß hette Er wider disen dem Ottomannischen Reich nachtheilligen Carlovitzischen friden einen grossen abscheüen, vnd trachte dahero eben selbigen auf ein anderen Fueß zu setzen; vnd weillen annebends der offftberührte Groß Vezier sowohl beÿ disem alß vormahls beschehenen vortrag so insolent, vnd positivé geantworthet auch sich niemahln auf den Sultan seinen herrn bezogen, alß scheint, daß Er Groß Vezier [so vermuthlich dises ganzen Kriegs primum mobile est] entweder den Sultan völlig besize, oder Sye beede in disen aus hoch vnd über muth unternehmenden Krieg ainß seÿen, welches mir unter andern auch der Reis-Effendi bekräftiget, indeme selbiger, alß ich vnd alles nach meinen zutentiren, vnd nicht daß geringste, so zur göttlichen beÿlegung gedeüen mag, zu unterlassen, ihme nach der gehorsambst beschribene audienz durch einen seiner, vnd meiner guten freunden unter der hand vorstellen lassen, ob es dann nicht möglich seÿe? Mit ihme Reis Effendi über die vorseÿende wichtigkeit sprechen, die beÿm Groß Vezier nicht verfangende raisonen mehrers erwegen vnd die bevorstehende weithschitigkeiten verhindern zukönnen, mir bedeüet, daß alles vmb sonst angesehen der Sultan, vnd Groß Vezier gänzlich entschlossen Krieg zuführen, alle die verlohrene Länder wider zum Ottomannischen Reich zubringen ...”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 37r-38r.

significant opportunity to reclaim territories from Ottoman control—territories held, in his view, by those who had disturbed the regional peace and posed a continued threat to Christian populations through acts of injustice.<sup>365</sup>

After his last meeting with the Grand Vizier, Fleischmann stated that all hopes for peace were lost and that this rupture of the Sublime Porte against Venice seemed to turn into a comprehensive war. For this reason, he added that he would no longer be consulted by the Sublime Porte and that there was no situation to negotiate anyway. In the rest of his writing, Fleischmann stated that His Majesty the Emperor would be in a suitable position to confront this dangerous and threatening enemy in time and requested his evacuation from the Ottoman territory as soon as possible. He also mentioned that he gained a lot of experience in the Ottoman lands, where he stayed for about 10 years, especially during the last campaign of the Sublime Porte against the Russians. Moreover, according to him, his farewell message to the Sublime Porte could perhaps open the eyes of the “*blind and reckless Turks*” and help them understand the seriousness of the issue.<sup>366</sup>

Fleischmann posited that the obstinate stance of the Sublime Porte regarding the war with Venice was influenced by representatives of other nations engaged in trade with the Ottomans, particularly Monsieur Brué of the French embassy. These representatives, according to Fleischmann,

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<sup>365</sup> “... und auf kheinerleÿ weiß, wie ich es selbstn gehöret eine vermittelung oder beÿlegung zuacceptiren, dahero wurde weder Er Reis-Effendi noch ein anderer wider den willen seines herrn was zu unternehmen sich gethauen; Meines allergering-sten orths muß ich schmerzlich bedauern, daß ich die mir gnädigst anbefohlene göttige verhandlung ohneracht all-eüsserstes angekehret, nicht zum gewünschten effect führen können, gestalten ich mit aufgeblasen insolent-intractablen, vnd vnerfahrenen Barbaren, so nicht zur raison zubringen, zuthuen, vnd darbeÿ iederzeit eine Göttliche verhängnuß gespühret hatte, krafft welcher ihnen orgoillos, vnd vnerträglichen Türckhen gewißlich die von andern in der Ukraina beÿ Pultava, vnd in der Moldau an deme Fluß Bruth erfahrene Straff, Ihro Röml:en Kayl:en Mäÿt: aber die bequemblichste gelegenheit bevor stehet nicht allein Ihre Land, vnd Leüth von denen durch dise treülose fridens brecher über kürzt oder lang vorgenommen seÿn wurdenen feindlichen einfällen zurötten, vnd hingegen dise hoffärtig vnerfahrene, vnd beÿ ersten verlust sch völlig verlohren, vnd confus werdende Türckhen aus denen mit unrecht, vnd unterdreuckhung deren Christen besitzende Länder zuruckhzuiaigen.”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 38r-38v.

<sup>366</sup> “Da nun, wie euer durchlauchtigen Exzellenz und Gnaden von selbstn gnädigst abnehmen, all-die zur friedlichen Beilegung übrig-gewesene Hoffnung völlig verloren und die von der Porthen wider Venedig unternehmende Ruptur allen Ansehen nach in einen universal Krieg ausbrechen und ich von der Porthen in dieser Materia nicht mehr gehöret werde, mithin außerstand allhier Ferrer was zu negotiren gesetzt bin, und daraussen man sich in die gehörige Positur stellen werde, diesen gefährlich und viel widriges androhenden Feind zeitlich zu begegnen gelanget hiermit an euer durchlauchtigen Exzellenzen und Gnaden mein unterthänigst-gehorsambstes ansuchen die Sach Ihre Römischen Kaiserlichen Majestät dahin vorzutragen, auf das dieselbe allergnädigst geruhen mich nächstens von hier zu avocieren, der allerunterthänigsten Hoffnung denenselbten ins Künftig, sofern ich daß Glück habe mich von diesen Barbaren loßzuwickeln, daraussen durch die in meinen bereits hiesigen zehen jährigen Aufenthalt sonderlich in dem wider Moskau gefolgten Türkischen Feldzug erworbene Erfahrungheit in ein und anderen fahlen nützliche Dienste alleruntertänigst leisten zu können, und wann noch wider all-gegenwerttge apparenz in der Güte was zurichten wäre, so dürfte als dann durch diese meine Abschieds Nehmung denen völlig blind und dollen Türken vielleicht die Augen geöffnet, und der Sachen ernste Clärer gezeigt werden ...”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 38v-39r.

were conveying to the Ottomans various negative or misleading reports concerning Austria, grounded in ill-founded arguments. Notably, Brué, in a recent audience with the Reis Efendi, had presented a report asserting that the Swedish King, upon returning to his country, had received three million from the French King. This sum, Brué claimed, enabled the Swedish monarch to secure the allegiance of various princes under Imperial rule and to amass sufficient support and strength to invade Saxony. Additionally, Fleischmann reported that the annual tribute demanded from the Czar via Tatar intermediaries remained unpaid. According to intelligence provided by Tatar Vizier Hacı Ali Agha—an official with whom Fleischmann maintained favorable relations—10,000 Tatar cavalrymen were expected to accompany the Ottoman army during its march at Edirne.<sup>367</sup> Meanwhile, the report mentions that the Sublime Porte continued to launch bombardment ships, each of which could carry two mortars<sup>368</sup>. However, according to the information obtained by Fleischmann, these ships, which were built day and night in the shipyards, began to decay even before the war. In addition, as stated in previous documents, the assigned crew consisted of poorly equipped, inexperienced, and poorly paid men. Except for a few armed lifeboats from this fleet, they would depart from Thessaloniki within a month, stay in the Potialasi region via Rhodes and observe the movements of the Germans. The Ottoman forces were planning to attack Nafplion with the main army to gain a foothold. But Fleischmann was surmising that the poor, undisciplined Turks, who had neither engineers nor captors, could never have captured a well-equipped and organised fortress, considering how they fought in Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> “... allermassen die hier stehende übl-gesünnte, unter welchen der französische Canzler Bruit, und fast aller trafficirenden nationen dollmetschen sich befinden, denen Türckhen stetts mit allerhand dem allerdurchleichtigsten Ertzhauß von Össterreich nachtheilligen aus denen über die Kayl:e Gränitz gehenden Zeitung, vnd correspondenzien mit üblen fundament ziehenden discursen in ohren ligen, wie dann erst kürzlich der berührte Bruit dem Reis-Effendi nachtruckhsamb vorgestellt, daß bereiths der König in Schweden in Pommern wider ein Armee von 30.000 Mann beÿsamben, vom König in Franckhreich dreÿ millionen gelt empfangen, durch dises gelt verschidene fürsten des Reichs an sich gezogen, mithin mehrmahl zuelängliche Kräfte hette in Sachsen einzufallen ..., ... von mir damahls vnterthänigst berichten versprechen gemesß Moscau durch die Tartarn unterm prætext des vom Czaar verlangenden noch nicht zur richtigkeit gekombenen Jährlichen tributs zu divertiren; Worauf doch dato nichts positives geantworhet, vnd dörrfte daß mehriste auf des nach Adrianopl beschribenen Tartar-Chans parere ankomben; Indessen ist schonden 13ten expirirten monaths der eine Zeit lang allhier, vnd mit mir in guter verständnus gestandene Tartarische Vezier Hagi Ali Aga zu seinem Principaln zuruckhgegangen, daran zu seÿn, auf das die neulich gehorsambst gemelte 10.000 Tartarn zeitlich der Türckhischen Armee folgen vnd die übrige auf ordre der Porthen sich bereith halten sollen.”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 40r-40v.

<sup>368</sup> Mortar is portable, short-barreled, muzzle-loading artillery piece. For more information about Mortar, “<https://www.britannica.com/technology/mortar-weapon>”. Accessed on 08.06.2025.

<sup>369</sup> “... zuverwöhren monaths man zweÿ 40 Schueh lang, vnd 20 braith iedes zweÿ Mörsel tragende-Bombardier Schüff ins wasser gelassen, an welchen sowohl alß all-andern insonderzeit der Capitana so fast völlig verfault gewesen, vnd in vnd auswändig verfaultes 120 stuckh tragendes Schüff ist, Tag, vnd nacht gearbeithet, also daß dise mit sehr wenig schlecht erfahrenen, vnd übl bezahlten Leüthen versehen, mithin kaumb halb armirte Flotte zu welcher wegen abgang



Fleischmann noted<sup>370</sup> that the issue of provisioning and securing necessary supplies for the Ottoman army had not yet received significant attention. The provisions loaded onto ships navigating near Demirkapı had been procured the previous year. However, both Belgrade and Timișoara were experiencing shortages in this regard. In the future, it was anticipated that both locations would undoubtedly be reinforced with additional food supplies, munitions, and several Janissary units for garrison duties. According to Fleischmann, the Ottomans were, in that year, incapable of conducting either defensive or offensive military operations. This was primarily because they had been thoroughly misled by the obsequious and duplicitous assurances of ill-intentioned foreign Christian representatives. These assurances led the Ottomans to harbor an unwavering confidence that the Emperor, hindered by ongoing conflicts, diminished forces, financial constraints, and other exigencies, would be unable to swiftly intervene in the Venetian war. Consequently, the Ottomans believed they would seize a favorable and advantageous opportunity that year to achieve significant military advances.

In the concluding part<sup>371</sup> of his report, Fleischmann mentioned that one of his trusted confidants had told him that the day before he had had a long and cordial conversation with the Reis

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*der nöthigen besetzung nur etliche armirte Feluquen stossen, vnd die andere dahier verbleiben sollen, längstens in einem monath auslaufen wird; ... Salonik auf dem gebürg Rodope gelegenen des potialasi zuverbleiben, und mit einem bey sich behaltenden Corpo die Teütsche bewegungen observiren, mit der haubt-armeé will man Neapoli di Romania attaquiren vmb in gedachtem Königreich ein desto Vesteren Fueß zusetzen, ich aber kan nicht sehen, wie dise miserable weder in Ingenieurs noch Constabler, weder anführer noch exequirer habende vndisciplinirte Türckhen eine regulirte wohl versehene Vestungen hinwerckh nehmen mögen, was die gegen Hungarn, vnd Sibenbürgen dato Vorkehrende Kriegsverfassungen betrifft ...", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 40v-41v.*

<sup>370</sup> *"... seÿnd selbige noch von kheiner oder geringen consideration, gestalten die iüngstens auf denen zu Vipalanka angekomenen, vnd andern ohnweith Demirkapu eingefahrnen Schüffen geladene provisionen schon vorm Jahr angeordnet gewesen, vnd Belgrad nebst Temeswar einen abgang daran leydet, ins khünfftige wird zwar zweifels ohne so wohl ein alß der andere orth mit mehreren lebensmitlen, munition, vnd etlichen Janitscharn Compagnien zur besazung versehen werden, die Türckhen aber dises Jahr kheines weegs in dem stand seÿnd gegen selbigen seithen einen defensiv, weniger offensiven Kriegs führen zukönnen, allermassen Sÿe Türckhen durch die schmeich vnd heüchlerische versicherungen der hiesigen übl-gesündten außländischen Christen dergestalten præveniret, daß dieselbige der vngezweifelten zueversicht leben Ihre Röml: Kayl: vnd Cathollische Mayt: seÿen wegen noch hin vnd wider habenden diversionen, geschwächten Kräfte, abgang des gelts, vnd anderen nothdurfften ausser stand sich so geschwind in den Venetianischen Krieg mischen zukönnen, dahero werden dieselbe vmb so besß vnd leichter gelegenheit haben noch dises Jahr considerable progressen zumachen, worzue ich den himlischen seegen in tieffester unterthänigkheit anwünsche.", 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 41v-42r.*

<sup>371</sup> *"Da ich eben dises zum schluß brachte, liesse mir einer meiner fürnehmen Confidenten wissen gestern eine geraumbe Zeit mit dem Reis Effendi über den zuzustand verthreulich gesprochen, und unter andern vernohmen zuhaben, daß die Porten 20.000 Türckhen vnd etlich tausent Tartarn unter anführung des vormahlß Defterdar oder Cammer Præsidenten gewesenenen nunmehr zweÿ Ross-schweif habenden Mustafa Bahsa nabst 36 Stuckhen in Bosnien wider Venedig beordert hette, vnd die Porthen gegenwärtig nicht gemaint seÿe die geringste veranstaltung gegen die Kayl:e granitzen zumachen vmb zusaichen, daß sÿe sich völlig auf ihrer Kayl:en Mayt: worth und habenden friden, in*

Efendi, and that while they were discussing various matters he had learnt the following: The Sublime Porte had decided to send 20,000 Ottoman troops and a few thousand Tatars, together with 36 cannon, under the command of Mustafa Pasha, formerly Defterdar and then a horsetailed (tuğ) pasha, to Bosnia against the Venetians. Meanwhile, the Sublime Porte did not intend to make the slightest preparations for the Imperial frontiers, showing that they relied entirely on the word of the imperial Majesty and the existing peace. However, it was believed that if this peace was broken, it was always punished and those who were unjustly attacked were supported. Finally, the Grand Vizier had given Fleischmann permission to pursue. Fleischmann therefore began to make the necessary preparations for the journey, which would be quite arduous and, due to the large number of people involved, quite costly. He was taking care of the necessary tasks in order to be ready for the Sultan's journey, which would begin in 8 to 10 days, and to be able to follow him as far as he was authorised. Fleischmann stated that he was awaiting orders sent to him via a courier, which was scheduled to arrive from Edirne in the near future, and that he would continue to follow these instructions in the most faithful manner. He also stated that he was sending Theodor Constanz, the courier carrying this report, as soon as possible, accompanied by a janissary.

### 3.12. The March of the Ottoman Army

In his report<sup>372</sup> dated March 26, 1715, Fleischmann noted that he had received a letter dated February 20, delivered by the courier Theodor via his aide Joseph, who had returned from

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*ermanglung dessen aber auf die hülf gottes, so wie die erfahruß gebe, die fridens-brüche iederzeit straffet, vnd denen vnschuldig angegriffenen beÿstehe, verlasse. alldieweillen Schliesslichen der Groß Vezier mir bedeüten lassen der Porthen folgen zukönnen alß bin ich bereiths daran die zu diser beschwärrlich, vnd wegen so grosser mänge Volckhs sehr Kostbahren reiß erforderliche notdurfften herbeÿ zuschaffen vmb in stand zuseÿn 8 biß 10 Tag nach dem Sultan von hier aufzubrechen, vnd ihme, so weith mir es zuegelassen, nachzugehen der unterthänigsten hoffung durch ein nechstens etwa zu Adrianopl erwartenden Currier eüer dhrl: Excell: vnd gnaden beÿ gegenwärttig völlig geeüsserten conjuncturen gnädigst zuertheillen beliebenden entlichen instruction gehorsambst zuerhalten, vnd selbiger ferrers in unterthänigkheit nachzuleben. Inzwischen habe überbringern dises den Currier Theodor Costanz, sobald es nur thuenlich gewesen mit zuegebung eines meiner Jänitscharen gehorsambst respediren, vnd die baldmöglichste beschleinigung seiner ruckhreÿß bestens einbindem sollen.”, 8 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 42r-43r.*

<sup>372</sup> “... untren 20ten verstrichenen monaths Februarÿ erlassenes gnädigstes rescript habe durch mein den 12ten dieses von Peterwardein revertirten Tschohadarn Joseph in unterthänigkheit erhalten der ohngezweifelten zueversicht der den 8ten zuvor von hier respedirte Currier Theodor werde daß ihme commitirte gehorsambste berichtschreiben bereiths auch unterthänigst überlifert haben, nun bin ich zwar möglichst beflissen, eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden von denen alhier sich eraignenden vorfallenheiten öffters den vnterthänigsten bericht zuerstatten, allein seÿnd iezo die conjuncturen so beschaffen, daß mir die gelegenheiten hiezue von Tag zu Tag mehr entgehen, gestalten die argwohnische Türckhen die Post-Fermanen hart mehr heraus geben, vnd sich der Wallachische fürst [dessen hier stehender Agent doch gegenwerttigs zubestellen angenommen hat] waigert beÿ iezigen gefährlichen lauffen, wo man ihn zuentsetzen allerhand; ia die geringste ursachen aufsuechete, die correspondenz ferner forth zubefördern, über dieses seÿnd die strassen wegen denen hin vnd her marchirenden vnbendigen Ottomannischen Trouppen welche so gar in hiesiger haubt vnd residenz statt von vierzehnen Tügen hero die handels gewölber schliessen machen, ville ausgeplindert, vnd verschidene sowohl Türckhen alß Christen ermordet, so vnsicher daß sich khein reisender ohne

Petrovaradin on the 12th of the same month. However, he emphasized that the prevailing conditions in Istanbul had rendered the dispatch of correspondence virtually impossible. Increasing Ottoman suspicion surrounding the transmission of letters had led to significant restrictions, and the process was further hindered by deteriorating security. Fleischmann reported that the Prince of Wallachia, who had previously assisted with the safe transmission of mail, had now declined further involvement due to the heightened risks. Compounding the situation, the Ottoman army had begun mobilizing, and the advance of troops had effectively sealed off many routes, making overland communication and travel exceedingly difficult. He further observed that the deteriorating conditions had resulted in considerable violence, with casualties reported among both Turks and Christians. The roads had become so perilous that it was rare to encounter a traveler who had not been robbed or, at a minimum, lost his horse—testimony to the widespread insecurity and chaos in the region.

As stated in Fleischmann's report, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha, who had long postponed his decision to come to the capital out of fear, initially preferred to flee, but eventually unexpectedly arrived in the capital on the 9th with a letter of assurance personally approved by the Sultan. However, this assurance would be as useful as the assurances given to Hasan Pasha (the Beylerbey of Rumelia), who had been strangled, and to the former Grand Vizier Çorlulu Ali Pasha. On the same day, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha was appointed as the Rikab Kaymakam. On the same day, the army began to gather; on the 11th of the month, six thousand two hundred and twenty-six janissaries under the command of sixty-four commanders or Chorbaji (Çorbacı)<sup>373</sup>; on the 12th, two thousand nine hundred young Cebeci; on the 13th, one thousand nine hundred and fifty servants; on the 14th, the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, the Shaykh al-Islam, two Kaymakams, the Reis Efendi, the Defterdar, the Aghas, and the Emirs from the descendants of Prophet Muhammad, accompanied by a ceremony in which the flag of their “false” prophet was carried with great respect wrapped in green silk cloth, carried by the Naqib al-ashraf<sup>374</sup> or leaders, accompanied by about a Deliler<sup>375</sup> or Bosnian cavalry

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*ausgeraubt zuwerden, oder wenigstens sein pferd zuverliehen darff blickhen lassen.*”, 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 44r-44v.

<sup>373</sup> The squad commanders of the Janissary and Novice Corps were called Chorbaji. For more information, “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/corbaci>”. Accessed on 03.02.2024.

<sup>374</sup> An authorized person who oversees matters related to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. For more information, “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/nakibulesraf>”. Accessed on 03.02.2024.

<sup>375</sup> A light, front-line cavalry unit in the Ottoman army. For more information, “<https://www.belgelerletarih.com/deliler-osmanlinin-cesur-suvarileri/>”. Accessed on 03.02.2024.

guard of about 200 men a foot guard of 500 men and a paid cavalry of about 800 men, set out for the camp set up at Davudpaşa.<sup>376</sup>

News reached the Sublime Porte that the Ottoman merchants in Dalmatia, while retreating, had been attacked, plundered and most of them massacred by the Venetian Morlachs<sup>377</sup> in the vicinity of Split<sup>378</sup>, contrary to the assurances given to them and the policy of peaceful and unhindered return implemented by the Sublime Porte towards the Venetians trading in Ottoman territory. This plunder and attack incident was reported in the Wiener Zeitung dated February 13, 1715, as the Morlachs from Cetina, which was under the rule of Venice, attacked Ottoman territory, plundered about 3,000 cattle and returned with 20 Turks' heads.<sup>379</sup> Fleischmann stated that the Venetian Bailo had to pay the price for that massacre. On the 13th, several hundred Levents (or naval soldiers) entered the house where Bailo was detained, seized his belongings, and, with great cruelty, dragged him out of the house with only a servant and a cook, without giving him any translator or another servant who knew Turkish. They took him out and brought him to an Ottoman warship on the seashore. Two days later, he was first held in shackles at the Dardanelles and then thrown into a prison where the worst murderers were kept.<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> *“Nachdeme der iüngst zu Ceuta gestandene Cerkes Mehemed Bahsa, welcher aus forcht seine hieher begebung lang nicht resolviren, vnd sich anfänglich lieber flichten wollen; endlich auf eine vom Sultan aigenhändig unterschribene versicherung, so ihme doch villeicht so vill alß vorhin dem strangulirten Hassan Bahsa von Sophia, vnd gewesen, auch erwürgten Groß Vezier Ciorlu Alÿ Bahsa helfen dörfte, den 9ten dises vnversehens dahier angelangt, wurde er noch selbigen Täg Caimecam oder Statthalter zu Constantinopl ercläret, an eben gemelten Tag ist die ordu oder handwerckhs zunfften den 11ten die Jänitscharn Sechs Tausent zweÿhundert sechs vnd zwainzig Mann starckh unter Commando vier und sechtzig Tschorbatzi oder haubtleüthe, den 12ten die in zweÿtausent neünhundert vier vnd vierzig Mann bestandene Gebetzÿ oder Zeügdienner, den 13ten die aintauesent neünhundert fünffzig Mann ausmachende stuckh Knecht, vnd den 14ten der Sultan, vnd Groß Vezier selbstn nebst dem Muffti, Gesätz- Gelehrten, zweÿ Caimecamen, Reis-Effendi, Defterdar, Canzleÿ-bedienten Agaen, vnd denen von dem Muhamed herstammenden Emiren, vnd ihren Nakib Uluscheref oder Oberhaupt [beÿ welchem die in einem grienen seÿden Zeüg eingewickhlete fahn ihres falschen Prophetens mit gröster ehrerbietigkeit getragen] unter beglaitung deren vngefähr in zweÿhundert bestandenen Deliler oder Bosnischen Leibwacht zu pferd, ingleichen der Steümb fünffhundert Mann starckhe, Leibwacht zu fueß, vnd deren etwa auf achthundert Mann beloffenen Lukisphi oder besoldten zu pferdt in daß zu Davud Bahsa aufgeschlagene Laager ausgezogen ...”, 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 44v-45v.*

<sup>377</sup> Dukić 2003; 132. Slavic-speaking, Eastern Orthodox or Roman Catholic local mercenaries used by both Venetians and Ottomans. For more information, “<https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/52695>”. Accessed on 03.02.2024.

<sup>378</sup> For more information about Split (Spalato), “<https://www.britannica.com/place/Split-Croatia>”. Accessed on 03.02.2024.

<sup>379</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium Januar – Juni 1715 / 1715.02.13.

<sup>380</sup> *“... indessen erhielte die Porthen die nachricht, daß die in Dalmatien gestandene Türckhische Khauffleüthe in ihrer zuruckziehung disseiths Spala wider die gegebene versicherung, vnd die von der Porthen allhier anderwertig gegen die in Türkckheÿ traffიცierende Venetianer angestellte fridsambe, vnd ohngehinderte heimblassung von denen Venetianischen Morlaken feindlich angegriffen, ausgeplindert, vnd mehreren Theillß massacrirt worden seÿen, dises alles muste der allhier in verhofft stehende Venetianische Bailo engelten, indeme den 13ten huius aus befelch der*

According to the information<sup>381</sup> obtained by Fleischmann, Bailo's seventy-year-old priest, his secretary, and his entourage, who served as translators, were also imprisoned in the Yedikule dungeons without the slightest subsistence.

According to Fleischmann's report, on the 20th of the month, the Kapudan Pasha intended to sail from the Black Sea with 19 warships, including the Capitana with 112 guns (eight 100-pounder guns in the lower battery, 54-pounder guns in the middle battery and 20-pounder guns in the upper battery), 11 galleys and 24 frigates from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean with ease, using the current. However, since two gunpowder ships and various necessary supplies were missing, the Kapudan Pasha would only sail with these ships to the Dardanelles on the following Monday. There he would have to wait for about 20 days to fully equip his fleet (which would be joined by other ships and galleys already outside). In the meantime, news had arrived that four merchant ships carrying Egyptian troops and war supplies had arrived in Eğriboz. Fleischmann added that two new warships, which were not yet fully ready and were expected to be equipped and ready for sailing, were also in the harbour shortly. Thus, the Ottoman fleet, excluding the small boats and transports and the Barbary pirates (of whom there was no news at present), consisted of 42 warships, 28 galleys, 24 frigates, 4 powder ships and 2 bombardment ships. As Fleischmann repeatedly recalled, all these ships were very poorly equipped. Moreover, the majority of the sailors were accustomed to agricultural work, did not understand seamanship and were easily affected by water. There was not a single officer fit for duty. In fact, a chieftain or ship captain he met in those days confirmed to Fleischmann that the cannons were fired without any target as soon as they were loaded and that there was no experienced gunner who could fire accurately at the enemy.<sup>382</sup>

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*besagten Porthen etlich hundert Leventen oder Schüff Soldaten in daß hauß, allwo Er verarrestiret ware, einfiellen seine habschafften ausraubten, vnd Ihne Bottschaffter nebst nur einen Page, Cammerdiener, Kochi vnd einem Laquey ohne Ihme einen dollmetsch, oder sonst Jemand der Türckhischen Sprachkündigen zuezulassen, mit gröst vnd vnerhörter grausambkheit aus dem hauß eine gute viertl stund durch die gässen an daß Vefer des Meers in ein Türckhisches Kriegs Schüff geschleppt, nach zweyßen Tāgen in ein kleine Feluquen gesezt, vnd nach denen Dardanellen, wie mich einige versicherten, gefesselter geführet, alda aber in die gefangnuß Kamlukuin oder bluets brum genant [worinnen die ärgiste mörder verwahret werden] geworffen haben ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 45v-46r.*

<sup>381</sup> "... allein seine von ihme Separirte hoffstatt vnd bediente, alß der etlich-sibenzig jährige Caplan, Secretarien, dollmetschen wurden in die Siben thurn, vnd alda ohne den geringsten unterhalt zuhaben, vnter der Er den ellendiglich gefangen gesezt ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 46r.

<sup>382</sup> "... den 20.ten dises ist der Capitajn Bahsa oder Türckhische Admiral mit 19 Kriegs Schüffen, worunter die von aussen vergolte Capitana, so 112 Stuckh, vnd zwar in der untern Batterie acht von hundert, vnd die übrige von 54 in der mitlern von 34, vnd in der obern von 20 pfund traget, aylff galleren, vnd 24 Fregaten aus dem Canal des weissen in den Canal des schwarzen Meers gefahren, vmb von dar desto gemächlicher durch den current in daß weisse Meer ausseeglen zukönnen, alldieweillen aber sowohl denen gedachten Kriegs-Schüffen alß denen zuruckhgeblibenen wer breloten, vnd zwey Bombardier-Schüffen noch verschidne erforderlichkeiten abgehen, alß wird Er Capitain Bahsa mit

One of Fleischmann's trusted confidants told him that in order to more easily capture the Morea and other Venetian lands, the Sultan had ordered the Kapudan Pasha to seek out and attack the Venetian fleet as soon as it set sail. But he reported that even if there was an enemy fleet, there was not a single experienced officer who could fire at them. Despite this, the Turks were so confident that they were blinded by their arrogance. Moreover, they thought that they would achieve victory and get everything they wanted in this war with the Venetians, both on land and at sea, without encountering the slightest resistance and without a single Muslim loss.<sup>383</sup>

Fleischmann stated<sup>384</sup> that while the French would help the Sublime Porte increase its power in this conflict, they would also try to undermine Austria's power. The French were telling the Turks, who wanted nothing but flattery, that the Emperor could not help Venice in any way and could not intervene in this war due to his weakened power. Fleischmann also stated that the Dutch consul's translator & secretary, Theyls, who was a Turk rather than a Christian, supported this break against Venice as much as possible.

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*selbigen erst nechstkünftigen Montag von hier gegen die Dardanellen ablauffen, allwo selbige sich wohl 20 Tag vmb seine unterhabnde Flotta [zu welcher alda auch die schon daussen befindliche Schüff, vnd Galleren stossen sollen] völlig mit ein und anderer abgänglichkeit zuversehen, aufzuhalten haben wird, indessen ist die nachricht komen, daß vier Khauffartheÿ Schüff mit denen Egÿptischen Trouppen, vnd Kriegs-provisionen bereiths zu Negroponte angelanget, welche man nächstens all hier umb mit denen zweÿen neÿen in hiesigen haafen ligenden vnd noch, vnd noch nicht gar verfertigten Kriegs-Schüffen zum auslauff armiret zuwerden, erwarthet, also daß die Türkische Flotta ohne dinen kheinen fahrzeügen, vnd transport Schüffen vnd denen Barbaresquen [von welchen man dato nichts höret] in 42 Kriegs-Schüff, 28 Galleren, 24 Fregaten, 4 Bruloten, vnd 2 Bombardier-Schüff bestehet, worbey ich mehrmahl unterthänigst beÿfügen solle, daß alle dise fahrzeüg sehr schlecht beannet, vnd mehren theillß mitgezungenen, auch mehr des ackherbaw, alß der Seefarth kündigen, vnd zu Wasser leicht erkrankhen werdenden Leüthen besetzt, vnd darbey khein einziger officier seÿe, so seinem Posto gewachsen, wie dann mich diser Tügen ein bekhanter Reis-oder Schüff Capitajn versichert daß sÿe die Stuckh, sobald sÿe geladen, ohne ein absehen zunehmen loßbrennen, vnd nicht einen erfahren, vnd ein schuß dem feind anzubringen vermögenden Kunstabler hetten ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 46r-47r.*

<sup>383</sup> "... disem doch ohneracht der Capitajn Bahsa meiner glaubwürdigen Confidenten aussag nach vom Sultan gemessene ordre gleich beÿ seiner aus seeglung die Venetianische Flotte aufzusuechen, vnd zu attaquiren, vmb beÿ derselben sich gänzlich einbildender vermichtung sich desto leichter Morea, vnd andere Venetianische länder unterwerffen zukönnen; vnbeschreiblich ist die confidenz, mit welcher die Türckhen sowohl zu Wasser, alß zu Land wider die Republic Venedig zu feld ziehen, daß sÿe blind, Thor-vnd hochmüthige Ottomanner persuadiret dise republic durch ihre doch mehr in lährer einbildung alß in der Thatt bestehende macht so zuschreckhen, daß Sÿe selbige ohne den geringsten widerstand, vnd verlust eines Musulmanns übergewältigen ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 47r-47v.

<sup>384</sup> "... vnd von ihr, was sÿe nur wollen, bekhomben werden, beÿ welcher extravaganten, vnd zweifels ohne deren Türckhen untergang mit sich führender mainung die franzüsen Sÿe möglichst zusteiffen, vnd forderist die Macht der Porthen zuerhöchen, hingegen deren Christlichen Potenzen, insonderheit des alldurchleichtigsten Ertzhauses von Össterreich zu verkleinern, auch darbey sich befleissen denen Türckhen, so ohne dem nichts liebers alß flattieren anhören, weiß zumachen, daß Ihre Röml:e Kayl:e Mayt: wegen abgematten Kräfte kheines weedes Venedig Succuerieren, vnd sich in disen Krieg meliren können, vnd weillen der Moscovitische hoff wie Jch es von sicherer hand habe, dem hier stehenden, vnd selbige affairen menagirenden an sich mehr Türckh alß Christlich-gesinten Holländischen dollmätschen Telÿes befohlen seiner seiths sovill möglich die ruptur wider Venedig zuunterstutzen, alß unterlasset Er auch nichts, was die Türckhen wider diese offtbessagte Republic ansetzen ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 47v-48r.



Fleischmann mentioned in his report<sup>385</sup> that many states supported this declaration of war by the Sublime Porte against the Republic of Venice. They hoped to gain something for themselves from this war. Fleischmann reported that even the Ragusan Consul hoped that the Sublime Porte would increase trade with Ragusa instead of Venice due to the war.

When the Janissaries asked to be given the akçe, or 1000 aspers, which are usually given to each Janissary at the beginning of a war, the Sultan wanted them to march to Edirne with the artillery and Cebeci corps within two weeks. Fleischmann also stated that the Janissaries committed various acts of disorder and insolence on the road and caused a fire in Silivri that consumed some of the Sultan's provisions. As a matter of fact, Fleischmann added that these incidents by the Janissaries could be the beginning of a rebellion in future. The report mentions that in those days, some craftsmen went to Crete and strengthened the fortifications there and that preparations were made to build some arsenals around Niš and Belgrade, starting with Fleischmann's first meeting with the Grand Vizier. However, it was stated that there was no sign of danger to the Hungarian borders. Fleischmann reported that the Asian troops were in a very weak situation due to poverty and their numbers were less than expected. In his opinion, the march of the army would be delayed as soon as the Kapudan Pasha left with his fleet, and the Sultan was not willing to spend any money on soldiers and other needs, regardless of this war and the profit he hoped to obtain.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>385</sup> "... alß unterlasset Er auch nichts, was die Türckhen wider dise offtbefohlene Republic ansetzen, vnd den Krieg, aus welchen öffters ville allerhand nuzen hoffen, befördern mag, ia es ist fast niemand der nicht vmb sich wenigstens bey der Porthen einzuschmeicheln ein gleiches Thue, sogar der Raguseische Consul villeicht vmb daß Venetianische commercium vnter seiner Republic Flaquen zubekomben, ist beeÿfert auch daß seinige beÿzutragen ...", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 48r.

<sup>386</sup> "... weillen die Janitscharen bey dem Sultan angehalten, damit ihnen daß verwaigerende bostal-akcia, oder die bey anfang eines Kriegs einem jeden Jänitscharen zugeben gewöhnliche 1000 Aspers geraichet werde, als hat der Sultan selbige gleich von sich entfernet, vnd sie nebst den Topgi, vnd Gebetci schon von 14<sup>en</sup> Tügen nach Adrianopl marchiren lassen, da selbe unter weegs verschidene vnordnungen, vnd insolenzien verüebet, auch zu Silifria einen brand, so einige reÿß-vorrath des Sultans verzöhret, verursacht haben sollen, welches ein vrsach des ins khünfftig bey nicht erfolgenden guten Success ohnfehlbar zu erwarthen seÿenden aufstands genohmen werden kan; diser Tügen seÿnd verschidene handwerckhs-Leüth nach Candia vmb selbige Vestungen zuverbessern abgegangen, von Zeit an meiner den ersten dits bey dem Groß Vezier gehalten audienz werden anstaltungen zu aufrichtung einiger Magazinen zu Nissa, vnd der gegend Belgrad vorgekehret, worvon euer dhrleicht Excell: vnd gnaden von dasiger Gränitz aus zweifels ohne daß mehrere zuekomben wird, mit den Trouppen aber ist ausser denen guarnisonen dato khein sonderliches absehen gegen die Hungarische Gränitz, vnd will verlauthen, daß die Asiatische Mannschafft wegen der armuth sich in einem sehr ellendlichen stand befinde, dahero deren anzahl geringer alß man vermeinet, und ihr marche zimlich spatt seÿn dörfte, sobald der Capitain Bahsa mit der Flotta von hier abgeseeglet, so gedencket auch der Sultan, welcher ohneracht dises Krieg, vnd zumachen hoffenden progressen weder der Soldatesca noch zu andern erforderlichkeiten gelder ausgeben will, seine abreÿß gegen Adrianopl anzutretten, ich aber werde sowohl von hier noch, alß von dar aus euer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden von allem, was ich erfahren kan, den unterthänigsten bericht abzustatten möglichsten beeÿfert seÿn.", 26 March 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 48r-49r.

Fleischmann stated<sup>387</sup> that a major disagreement arose before going to the expedition because the Janissaries who arrived in Edirne insisted on receiving the *postal akçesi* or the 1000 aspers (coins) that were customary to be given to each of them by the Sultan. He shared the information that on the 30th of the previous March, a meeting was held at the camp in Davudpaşa on the subject of how to resist the rebellion if the Janissaries attempted to revolt. It was decided that the Janissary Agha, who was hated by the people for his harsh temperament and likely to be beaten by his own men, would first divide the Janissaries under his command in Edirne, send most of them to the Morea, and then march with the Grand Vizier and the rest of the militia without wasting any time. However, in order to show that he only moved from one residence to another, and avoid having to accept the *postal akçesi*, the Sultan had to separate himself from the Grand Vizier and set out slowly towards Edirne with the servants of the Sultan's palace and several hundred Sipahis.

Fleischmann reported that the next day, on April 26, the Kapudan Pasha sailed towards the Mediterranean from the Dardanelles, with warships and galleys on the Black Sea coast, while the Sultan was watching and anchored again at the islands closest to it. That same evening, a lifeboat secretly returned to Istanbul. Thus, the four brigades, together with the two newly built battleships and two bombardment ships, were to sail as quickly as possible through the Dardanelles to Foggia<sup>388</sup>, where they would join up with the expected Barbary and other Ottoman ships. The Turks, however, lacked a crew, and they did not doubt that they could carry out their duties in the Morea without the Berbers, with warships numbering only forty and with insufficient soldiers. They were going to set out the cannons on the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts to defend the Dardanelles, but they decided that the remaining merchant ships would not be equipped for war. It was obvious that the Capitana, on which the Turks made a great show, could easily be defeated at sea, as it began to take

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<sup>387</sup> *“Nachdem die nachricht eingeloffen, daß die zu Adrianopl angelangte Jänitscharen mit grosser ungestimmigkeit darbey verharreten, vom Sultan daß sogenannte postal ackciasi oder die einem iedem derenselben wan Er Sultan in Persohn zu feld ziehet, zugeben gewöhnliche 1000 asperl zuhaben, wurde den 30.ten iüngst verflossenen monaths Martÿ in de vnweith hier zu Daud Bahsa genanten orth aufgeschlagenen Laager rath gehalten, wadiesem übl vnd dem daraus beförchtenden vnruhigen erfolg ohne daß Sultanische ærarium anzugreifen, zubegegnen seÿn? Warinnen man beschlossen, daß vor allem der wegen Strengigkeit vom Volckh verhaste Jänitscharen Aga [so in einer nicht geringen gefahr gestanden von denen seinigen widergehauen zuwerden] die unter sich habende, und bey Adrianopel befindliche Jänitscharen Zertheillen, die mehreste voraus gegen Morea schickhen, und sodann Er mit dem Groß Vezier, vnd überrest der Miliz ohne verlust der geringsten Zeit folgen, der Sultan aber vmb zuzaiagen, daß Er nur von einer Residenz Statt zur andern, vnd nicht ins feld gehe, mithin daß Postal Ackciasi zugeben nicht schuldig seÿe, sich von ihm Gros Vezier Separiren, und allein mit denen zu der Sultanischen Hofstatt gehörigen Leüthen, vnd anwerdenden etlich hundert Spahi langsamb gegen Adrianopl aufbrechen solle ...”, 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 50r-50v.*

<sup>388</sup> For more information about Foggia, “<https://bestinpuglia.com/de/foggia>”. Accessed on 09.02.2024.



on heavy water and its confused crew, rather than its large parts becoming unusable due to the depth of the water.<sup>389</sup>

According to the information<sup>390</sup> Fleischmann obtained from some of his confidants, this Ottoman main ship had to either be left on the islands or it would be exposed to the danger of sinking. Therefore, it was deemed appropriate for the crew to be led by the newly appointed Pasha of Smyrna and the brother of the current Belgrade serasker, Köprülüzade Abdullah Pasha. According to the report, the Sultan handed over the Prophet Muhammad's flag to the Grand Vizier with the usual ceremonies on March 31. Thus, it was understood that the Grand Vizier would command the Ottoman troops. Fleischmann added that the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were to leave Istanbul with their troops on the first day of April and march first to Küçükçekmece and then to Büyükçekmece. Subsequently, the Grand Vizier, with the assembled troops, was to march immediately to Larissa via Edirne. In the meantime, preparations were to be made to prevent enemy attacks from there, both on the Morea and Bosnia. The Sultan, on the other hand, would march slowly towards Edirne, and in the meantime, taking into account the discontent of his army, he would decide whether to stay there or not.<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> "... disemnach ist zwar der Capitain Pascha den folgenden Tag mit denen untern 26ten passato gehorsamst berichter massen an den Kanal des schwarzen Meers ausgeführten Kriegsschiffen und Galeeren unter Lösung deren Stucken und zuschauung des Sultans in dass weiße Meer gegen die Dardanellen ausgeseglet, allein bei denen nächst hier gelegenen Inseln wiederum geankert, und selbigen Abend noch auf einer Feluquen al'incognito hier zurück angelanget um durch seine Gegenwart daran zu sein, damit die zwei neu erbaute Kriegs und zwei Bombardier Schiff nebst denen vier brandiers baldigst ausgerüstet werden mögen, also dass Er Capitain Pascha, so sich defacto allhier an seinem habenden S: V: Bruch sehr incommodiret befindet, schwerlich inner einem Monat aus denen Dardanellen nach Foggia, allwo Er sich mit denen aldorth erwartenden Barbaresquen, und darauf sich befindlichen Türkischen Fahrzeugen konjungieren solle, einzulaufen im Stand sein dürfte, dieweilen es aber denen Türken an Stucken und Mannschaft ermanglet, alß haben sie [zumahlen man schon aus Not, und Abgang die am Vizier des weiß und schwarzen Meers zur Defension des Kanals gestandene Canonen mehrern Theils imbarquiert] entschlossen ihre übrige Kauffartei Schiff dieses Jahr nicht mehr Krieg ausrüsten zu lassen, der ungezweifelt zuversicht, mit denen auslaufenden übelbemannten und mit lauter untüchtigen Leuten und Offizieren versehen ohne denen Barbaresquen kaum vierzig an der Zahl seienden Kriegsschiffen denen Venezianern genugsam gewachsen und im stand zu sein ihr Dessein auf Morea ausführen zu können, da doch im Gegenteil mehr Apparenz ist, dass diese Konfuse Leute zu Wasser gar leichtlich werden können geschlagen werden, sinthe mahln die Capitana, wovon die Türken ein grosses weesen machen als nur etliche und nicht zwar die größte Stuck, so wegen tieffe des Wassers nimmer mehr brauchbar sind, gelöset worden schadhasfft zuwerden, und heüffig wasser zunehmen anfangen ...", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 50v-51v.

<sup>390</sup> "... also, dass dieses Türkische Hauptschiff, wie mich etliche meiner Konfidenten versichern, entweder werde auf denen Insuln müssen zurückgelassen werden, oder der gewissen gefahr exponiret sein zuversinken, die auf der Celota imbarquirte Mannschafft sollen von dem neü angesetzten Pascha zu Smirna, und Bruder des jetzigen Belgraderischen Seraskiers Kuperli Oglu Abdilah Pascha angeführet werden. An gemelten 31ten Martý übergab der Sultan dem Groß Vezier die Mahumedanische Fahnen mit gewöhnlichen ceremonien, so ein zeichen, dass Er Groß-Vezier von ihm abgehen, und also die Ottomannische Truppen commandiren werde, diesem zu folge ist der Sultan, und Groß Vezier mit ihren Hofstätten und Mannschaften den ersten April von hier aufgebrochen, und der erste zu Kucuk Cekmece vel Ponte piccolo, der andere aber in dem vier stund mehr hinauf gelegenen Bujuk Cekmece oder Ponte Grande über Nacht ...", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 51v-52r.

When the letter from Vienna, dated March 13, was delivered to Fleischmann by a Janissary returning from Petrovaradin, the Sultan had only recently departed from Istanbul. In his report, Fleischmann noted the sluggish pace of the Ottoman envoy Ibrahim Agha's journey to Vienna, emphasizing that Agha had remained in Belgrade for fourteen days without formally declaring his intention to proceed. Fleischmann had previously recommended that, in accordance with the request of the Sublime Porte, appropriate preparations be undertaken in Vienna to receive Ibrahim Agha in a manner befitting diplomatic protocol. He also expressed his willingness to assist in ensuring that Agha would be received with due courtesy. However, he acknowledged uncertainty regarding the envoy's anticipated length of stay in Belgrade and the timeline of his continued journey. According to Fleischmann, at the behest of the Porte, Ibrahim Agha was trying to buy time for the Porte by prolonging his journey.<sup>392</sup> At the Aulic War Council on February 2, 1715, it was decided that the officers who had previously been responsible for Seyfullah Agha's visit would be reassigned to meet Ibrahim Agha and his delegation at the border and to escort them to Vienna.<sup>393</sup>

Fleischmann emphasised that no special preparations for war were made by the Sublime Porte for the Hungarian frontiers, except for some supplies. On the contrary, four hundred wagons had been allocated, especially by Belgrade, for the army sent against Venice. He had learnt from a reliable source that the French among the Imperial troops in Hungary were planning to desert and

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<sup>391</sup> "... also dass er Groß-Vezier mit denen antreffenden Truppen ohne sich aufzuhalten über Adrianopel nach Larissa gehen, also denen Pferden die wäydt geben, und inzwischen von dar aus sowohl gegen Morea als Bosnien wegen denen von selbiger Seiten befürchtenden und leichtlich ihr ganzes Vorhaben zernichten könnenden feindlichen Einfallen vorzubiegen die gehörige Veranstaltungen vorkehren der Sultan aber langsam gegen Adrianopel marchiren, und indessen sehen solle, ob Er nach der Ausführung der seines Geütz halber unzufriedenen Miliz alda verbleiben oder seinem Vorhaben gemäß nach Despotiaailasi verfügen könne ...", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 52r.

<sup>392</sup> "... da eben der Sultan von hier aufgebrochen, erhalte durch einen von meinem von Peterwardein zuruckhangelangten Jänitscharn eüer dhrl: Excell: nd Gnaden untern 13.ten Martij erlassenes gnadigstes schreiben, vnd ersehe mehrmahln gehorsambst, daß der in ablegatione von hier nach Wienn geschickhte Ibrahim Aga seine reiß dahin sehr langsam verrichte, auch nach anderwertiger nachricht sich bereiths schon 14.Täg zu Belgrad ohne Jhro Excellenz dem Kayl:en Herrn Commendanten zu Peterwardein seine aldortige ankhunfft und ferner gedenckhnde forthsetzung seiner reiß gehörige khundt zuthuen, wie ich Strackhs anfangs unterm 5.ten Jenner unterthänigst berichtet von der Porten fördersamb umb den Kayl: Hof dardurch zuamusiren angesehen ist, alß sezet zweifels ohne diser ursachen halber Er Aga auß befelch der Porthen so langsam seine reiß forth, dardurch Zeit zugewinnen ... man gemäß der mir bedeüten abreiß des gesandten bereiths schon von oben zu dessen freündtlicher receptirung die veranstaltung gemacht, nicht allerdings wohl stehe, daß Er Gesandter zu Belgrad sich solang aufhalte ...", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 52r-53r.

<sup>393</sup> OeStA/KA, Wiener Hofkriegsrat (HKR) Protokollen (P) 495 (Reg. 1715), 179-180, Ercan 2022; 657.

come to Ottoman territory via Belgrade with the help of a Jew who was there under French protection. Ten of them had even reached the capital.<sup>394</sup>

Another noteworthy detail<sup>395</sup> in the report is that Fleischmann again points to the Porte as the reason for the much slower than expected journey of the envoy Ibrahim Agha. His arrival in Vienna had been delayed under various excuses. Because it was thought that the Imperial Court would not take action against the Turks before receiving the Grand Vizier's letter (by which time the Ottoman army would have captured Morea), the envoy's arrival in Vienna was delayed to gain time. Ibrahim Agha's departure from Istanbul and his subsequent journey to Edirne were swift. Since Numan Pasha, the Serasker of Belgrade, did not inform the commander in Petrovaradin of the arrival and departure date of the Agha contrary to the customs, it was thought that this delay was a strategy of the Porte.

Fleischmann stated that when the French, British and Dutch ambassadors visited Kapudan Pasha to offer their congratulations, in accordance with the traditions of the Sublime Porte, Kapudan Pasha replied that the Venetians should not be provided with ships, money or military support. Moreover, the Greek Patriarch had to send letters to everywhere to encourage all Greeks to remain loyal to the Sublime Porte. The previous summer, the rebellious Treasurer of Rami Pasha, who had served during the Treaties of Karlowitz, was found in his hiding place since the deposition of Sultan Mustafa, captured and handed over to the Sublime Porte. The Bailo of Venice, imprisoned miserably with five of his servants in an old fortress in the Dardanelles, fell ill and requested a doctor, but this

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<sup>394</sup> *"Indessen werden gegen denen Hungarischen Gränitzen ausser anschaffung einiger lebens-mitlen dato kheine sondere Kriegs veranstaltungen gemacht, vnd im gegentheill von selbiger insonderheit Belgradischer seithen vierhundert wägen zu der wider Venedig gehenden Armée beordert, auf daß ins khünfftig vornehmende werde möglichist invigiliren, vnd darvon, so oft es nur möglich, den unterthänigsten bericht erstatten, von guter hand aber bringe ich in erfahrung, daß die unter denen in Hungarn stehenden Kayl:en Trouppen befindliche franzosen vorgehomen zudesertiren, vnd sich über Belgrad, allwo der alda unter französischer protection sich befindliche Jud ihnen hiezue an die hand gehet, hieher zuretiriren, wie dann deren schon biß zehen angelangt.", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 53v-54r.*

<sup>395</sup> *"... biß Sÿe mit der Türckhischen Armée in Morea eingetrungen, und demm höchst-gedachtem Kayl: Hof kheine Zeit mehr übrig seÿe dises Jahr wider Türkheÿ was unternehmen zukönnen, wohin auch sein so gähling von hier beschehener aufbruch, vnd gleich sarauf zu Adrianopl, und anderwerths unter verschidenen prætext gemachte verweillung abgezihlet, vnd weillen auch der iezig-seltsambe Seraskier zu Belgrad Numan Bahsa wider den bißhero observirten Gränitz gebrauch Jhro Excell: dem berührten herrn Commendanten zu Peterwardein seine gelangung zu dasigen Seraskierat, vnd ankunfft nicht wissend gemacht, so dörfte wohl auch dises zur verzögerung des mehr bemelten Ibrahim Aga was beÿtragen können, ich aber hette ohnermanglet, so fern die Porthen nicht schon von hier aufgebrochen, dem Reis-Effendi hierüber einige ich auf aigenwilliges ansuechen der Porthen Eür dhrl: Excellenz, vnd Gnaden gehorsambst berichtet, daß selbe eine gesandschafft an Jhre hochsürstl: dhrleicht den herrn Prinzen von Savoÿe abzuschickhen resolviret, und man gemäÿß der mir bedeüten abreÿß des gesandten bereits schon von oben zu dessen freündtlicher receptirung die veranstaltung gemacht, nicht allerdings wohl stehe, daß Er Gesandter zu Belgrad sich solang aufhalte etc, sobald Ich nun beÿ der Porthen wider angelanget, vnd von des offtgemelten Ibrahim Aga bestehen übernehmung noch nicht vergwisset seÿn werde, bin ich vnernanglet disen passum beÿ Ihr vorzukehren", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 52v-53v.*

request was refused by the barbarians. Likewise, almost all of his entourage, imprisoned deep underground in the Yedikule dungeons and fed only on bread and water, were in a similar condition. In the end, it was likely that these miserable conditions would make death a salvation for most of them.<sup>396</sup>

In the last part of his report, Fleischmann mentioned that the widow of the dethroned Wallachian Prince, his daughter, his son's children and some of his daughters along with their husbands, were exiled to Kütahya.<sup>397</sup> However, they should have been freed in exchange for 100 pouches of gold or 50,000 Thaler, as previously agreed. He thought that in this incident, the current Wallachian Prince, who was in danger of being dethroned due to the intense requests of the Mavrocordatos family, had influence. The last thing he mentioned in his report was that he planned to go to the Rikab Kaymakam, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha, and after recommending and informing him about his home, the people under his protection, and those left behind, he planned to set out for Edirne within a few weeks at the latest. He stated that he would be busy procuring horses and carriages, which were scarce at those times, for that journey. In order to deliver his report to Petrovaradin as soon as possible, he added a copy dated March 26 and stated that he would hand-send it via courier to Belgrade.<sup>398</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> "... alß die hier stehende Bottschaffter der Französisch, Engelländisch, vnd Hollandische den gebrauch nach den Capitain Bahsa complimentiret, hat selbiger Jhnen aus befelch der Porthen angedeütet ihren hohen Principalen zuhinterbringen, daß selbige denen Venetianern mit Schiff, gelt, vnd Mannschafft nicht Succueriren mögen, wie dann auch der Griechische Patriarch alle Griechen zur beständigen treü gegen die Porthen durch ausgeschickhte circular schreiben exhortiren müssen; der Chÿhaja, Hasnadar, vnd andere hieher gefänglich gebrachte officier des in verflossenen fruch-Jahr wider die Porthen in Asia aufgestandenen, auch der Hasnadar des beÿ denen Carlovizischen tractaten gewesen Rami Bahsa alhier, allwo Er sich von Zeit der dethronisirung des Sultans Mustafa versteckhet gehalten, aufgetriben, vnd der Porthen nachgeschickhet; der in dem alten Castel deren Dardanelln Abine genant mit fünff deren seinigen ellendiglich unter der Er den sizende Venetianische Baylo ist schon erkrankhet, vnd hat einen Medicum, so ihme aber von denen Barbarn abgeschlagen worden, verlanget, ingleichen zuestand befinden sich fast all-seine in denen Siben Thurnen auch tieff unter der Erden gefänglich ligende, vnd mit blossen wasser vnd brod geführte Suite, also das wohl endlich die mehriste mit dem Tod disem ellend ein end machen dörrften", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 54r-54v.

<sup>397</sup> For more information about Kütahya, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Kutahya>". Accessed on 17.02.2024.

<sup>398</sup> "Vor dreÿ Täggen hat man die Wittib des enthaubten Wallachischen fürsten nebst Jhrer Tochter, Sohnes Kinder, vnd einigen Tochtermännern ohnrachtet Sÿe mit der Porthen vmb 100 Beüthl gelt oder 50.000 Thaller die Freÿheit haben sollen, tractiret, vnd die gedachte Summa würcklich auszahlen lassen, nach Kudahaja in Anatolia exuliret, worzue der gegenwerttge Wallachische fürst, so selbst aniezo wegen der Starcken Sollicitirung der Mavro Cordotischen Familie in grosser gefahr abgesezet zuwerden stehet, nicht wenig beÿgetragen haben solle; Nachdeme ich leztlichen schon sen anderten dits beÿ dem hiesigen Caimakam oder Statthalter Cerkes-Mehemed Bahsa gewesen, ihe gewöhnlicher massen zu seiner würde complimentiret, mich beurlaubet, und zugleich meine wohnung, vnd unter meiner protection stehende vnd zurucklassende Leüth recommendiret, so bin Ich nunmehr beschäfftiget die zu meiner abreÿß bedörrftige iezo hart zubekommen seÿende pferde, vnd Wägen aufzutreiben, der hoffnung längstens nechst khünfftigen mitwochen von hier gegen Adrianopl aufbrechen zukönnen. Schliesslichen schickhe gegenwartiges unterthänigstes bericht-schreiben unter der hand durch einen Expressen von hier biß Belgrad ab, mit der veranstaltung von dar vnverzüglich nach Peterwardein gebracht zuwerden, welchem auch ein Duplicat von 26.ten Martÿ gehorsambst

In the note<sup>399</sup> appended to Fleischmann's report, it was stated that the Sultan had ordered the payment of half of the *postal akçesi* in order to pacify the restless Janissaries in Edirne and prevent the feared uprising, and at the same time requested that the Janissary Agha depart from Edirne to Larissa on Thursday, April 2, but he mentioned that he stopped this march due to the news coming from the Bosnian border. The Sultan would stay in Silivri for a few days to inspect the fleet that had passed several times and reinforce it as much as possible. It was stated that this situation would also delay his departure from the capital. Because, according to the information that received from a good confidant if the Kapudan Pasha could not meet the Venetian fleet in the Morea and the fleet retreated, he was planning to return to Corfu and carry out the attack there, or to unite with other Albanian troops and land and defeat the Venetians in that way. According to Fleischmann, the most important thing to do was to confront these barbarians bravely from the outset and not to embolden them by retreating, as had happened at the Prut.

### 3.13. Fleischmann's Departure to Edirne

In his report<sup>400</sup> dated April 28, 1715, Fleischmann stated that he left Istanbul on 12 April and arrived in Edirne on the 21st, after having procured the mules, donkeys and carts necessary for the journey with great effort and expense. On Monday, the Janissary Agha departed with the janissaries under his command (of which 15 rooms, i.e. approximately 2000 people, were to be sent to Bosnia). On Tuesday and Wednesday, the Topçubaşı and the Cebecibaşı set off with ammunition and only

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*beylege, vnd mich dero allstätten hohen hulden und gnaden unterthänigst empfehlend verharre*", 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 54v-55r.

<sup>399</sup> See Appendix 8. *"disen augenblickh erhalte die nachricht, daß der Sultan denen Jänitscharn zu Adrianopel umb Sÿe zubefridigen, vnd die beförchtende aufruhr zuevitiren, die helffte des bostalakciasi auszuzahlen anbefohlen, und zugleich den Janitscharn Aga beordert mit denenselbigem den 2ten dits von gedachtem Adrianopl gegen Larissa aufzubrechen von denen Bosnischen Gränitzen aber seÿen verschidene expresse angelanget, so vmb Succurs vor selbige seithen anhalten, der Sultan solle sich etliche Tag zu Silibrea vmb die alda vorbeÿ seeglende Flotta mehrmahln in augenschein zunehmen, vnd vmb selbe so behänder ergänzt zumachen, aufzuhalten gedencken, welches auch wohl meine von hier nehmende abreÿß was verzögern dörrfte, der Capitajn Bahsa ist, wie mich ein gewisser guter freündt versichert, intentioniret, im fall Er die Venetianische Flotta gegen Morea nicht antreffe, vnd selbige sich retiriren werde, sich vnversehens nach Corfu zuwenden, alda entweder mit ihr zuschlagen, oder mit beÿhiff deren Albanesern sich aufs Land zusezen, umb dardurch denen Venetianern zuverwöhren sich mit ihren erwarthenden Succurs conjungiren zukönnen, also daß das mehriste dahin ankombet, daß man disen Barbarn gleich anfangs herzhafft unter die augen gehe, vnd Ihnen nicht durch eine nehmende retirada, wie es beÿ Pruth geschehen, den mueth wachsen mache."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 55v-56r.

<sup>400</sup> *"Nachdeme ich die zu meiner abreÿß nöttige pferd, Maul, Esel, vnd Wagen mit großser mühe, vnd vnkhosten zusamben gebracht, bin ich den 12.ten dits von Constantinopl abgangen, vnd den 21.ten allhier angelanget, von dar den Montag zuvor der Jänitscharn Aga mit seinen unterhabenden Jänitscharn [ worvon 15 oda oder ohngefähr 2000 Mann in Bosnien geschickhet werden ] den Dienstag, vnd mitwochen der Topci, vnd Gebeci Bahsa mit der munition, vnd nur etlich dreÿssig stuckhen, deren überrestzu Wasser dahin gebracht wird, vnd entlich den Donnerstag der Groß Vezier mit ohngefähr 5000 Spahi seiner hofstatt, Leibwacht, vnd bedienten der Porthen nebst 8 Canonen aufgebrochen willens in 48 Marchen über Sereseh und Larissa den eingang von Morea zuerreichen", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 57r.*

about thirty cannons; the remaining cannons were to be transported by sea. Finally, on Thursday, the Grand Vizier, together with about 5000 Sipahi, courtiers, guards and servants of Porte, accompanied by 8 cannons, set off via Serres<sup>401</sup> and Larissa, intending to reach the Morea in 48 hours.

Another issue that Fleischmann touched upon was that the troops coming from Anatolia attacked Nafplion instead of attacking the Morea directly via Gallipoli (Gelibolu) in order not to cause any trouble for the Sultan. As Fleischmann had previously stated, the Turks and Greeks had been in communication for a long time and hoped to gain a great advantage from this attack, but in the whole Ottoman army, which was more of a mob than a warrior, there was not a single man who could lead an attack, direct artillery, or do anything else necessary for a siege. The Turks are therefore in no way capable of capturing by force of arms an organised, well-equipped fortress with no deficiencies. If the Venetians attack Bosnia with a considerably braver force and succeed in frightening the Turks from there, the Turks can easily be thrown into disarray, their plans in the Morea can be disrupted, and their warfare can even turn from offensive to defensive. The Turks are therefore in no way capable of capturing by force of arms an organised, well-equipped fortress with no deficiencies. If the Venetians attack Bosnia with a considerably braver force and succeed in frightening the Turks from there, the Turks can easily be thrown into disarray, their plans in the Morea can be disrupted, and their warfare can even turn from offensive to defensive. Moreover, perhaps the Grand Vizier could be accused as the initiator of the war, if not the Sultan himself. However, *“the blindly arrogant and insane”* Turks, despite the various suggestions of malicious agents, had an unshakeable confidence that it was impossible for the Emperor to support the Venetian Republic or to take any action against the Turks that year because of their weakened power, lack of financial resources and other preoccupations. For this reason, no special preparations were made for the Hungarian frontiers, apart from the supply of some provisions for the garrisons in Belgrade and Timișoara [from which region the 205 wagons already mentioned with respect have arrived, and together with another 1000 wagons from Sofia and Plovdiv<sup>402</sup> had been sent to transport supplies to the Morea, the reinforcement of the Timișoara garrison with a few hundred janissaries sent from the region of Ruse, and the provision of the necessary food. This is because the Turks had planned to confine this campaign entirely to the Morea<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> For more information about Serres (Serez), “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/serez>”. Accessed on 21.02.2024.

<sup>402</sup> For more information about Plovdiv (Philippopolis or Filibe), “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/filibe>”. Accessed on 21.02.2024.



According to Fleischmann, the Ottoman leadership regarded victory in the Morea as assured, provided there was no intervention from the German side. The prevailing sentiment among the Turks, he reported, was that once their conflict with Venice had been resolved, they would be positioned to advance toward the borders of the Holy Roman Empire in the following year, with the aim of reclaiming territories lost during the previous war with the Germans. Fleischmann argued that it was therefore imperative for the Imperial Majesty to act decisively and preemptively in order to avert the potential devastation that an unchecked Ottoman advance might bring. He maintained that, through timely and strategic intervention, the Ottomans could be forced to relinquish their holdings in Europe, particularly if they were made to suffer initial territorial losses. This, he asserted, could lead to a negotiated peace under terms favorable to the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>404</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> *"Indessen sollen sich auch die aus Anatolia kombende, vnd vmb dem Sultan khein ombrage zumachen nicht hieher, sondern geradt über Galipoli gegen Morea marchirende Miliz conjungiren hoffend gleich anfangs Neapoli di Romania zu attaquiren, vnd durch die mit denen in dem Königreich Morea angesessene, vnd wie ich gehorsambst berichtet, von langer Zeit hero mit denen Türckhen corespondirenden Griechen habende verständnus grossen vortheill zugewinnen, ohneracht beÿ der ganzen Türckhischen wider mehr besagtes König Reich ruckhender ohne deren Kauf-vnd unbewahneten Leüthen ungefähr einem lümpen gesindt, alß Streittbahren Leüthen gleichend ausmachender Armée nicht ein einziger anzuterffen, welcher eine attaque zuführen, die Artilleria zudirigiren, oder sonst daß, was zur belagerung nöthig, zuthuen Tauglich, mithin Sÿe Türckhen auf kheine weiß im Stand seÿnd eine regulirte wohl besetz und sonst kheinen abgang leyðende Vestung mit force deren Waaffen zueobern, und wan man Venetianischer seithen durch ein nahmhaffttes tapferes Corpo Bosnien anfallen, und von dorth denen Türckhen einen schrockhen einiagen wurde, so könten Sÿe leichtlich in confusion gebracht, ihr concept auf Morea verruckhet, ia villnicht gar der Krieg ihrer seiths anstatt offensive, defensive geführet, vnd vor allem, wo nicht der Sultan selbst, doch sein Groß Vezier tanguam author belli amoviret werden, vnd da die vor hoch vnd übermuth blind, und dolle Türckhen auf die villfältige vorstellung deren üblgesündten noch immerdar der ungezweifelten zueversicht leben, es werden Ihre Röml: Kayl:e Maÿt: wegen ihrer mainung nach abgematten Kräfte, geltmangl, vnd anderwertig habenden occupation diß Jahr ohnmöglich der Republic Venedig Succurriren und was wider sÿe Türckhen unternehmen können, dahero selbe dann auch gegen die Hungarische Gränitzen ausser ausschaffung einiger deren guarnisonen zu Belgrad vnd Temeswar [von welcher gegend die neulich unterthänigst gemelte 205 Wagen bereiths hier angelang, und nebst andern 1000 von Sophia vnd Philipopel angelangte mit provision gegen Morea abgeschickhet worden seÿnd, nöthig gewesenenen lebens mitlen, und versterckung der Temeswarischen besatzung durch die von der gegend Ruscik dahin beordnete etlich 100 Janitscharen khein sonderliche veranstaltung verkehren der ganzlichen mainung dise Campagna mit Morea fertig ...", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 57v-58v.*

<sup>404</sup> *"... vnd khünfftiges Jahr im Stand zuseÿn nicht allein denen Teütschen unter die augen gehen, sondern auch von selbigen im leztern Krieg verlorne Länder recuperiren zukönnen, also, daß dises Jahr noch dem Ottomanischen Reich von selbiger seithen ein so vnvermutlich alß empfindlicher Streich wurde können beÿgebracht, dardurch denen von disen treülosen fridensbrechern denen Kayl:en Gränitzen über kurtz oder lang zubefahren seÿende vnheill zeitlich gesteuert, vnd Sÿe Türckhen in einer gar geringen Zeit in Stand gesezet werden weder nach verlust ein vnd anderes Landes mit erlegung deren angewendten Kriegs-Spesen, vnd andern Jhro Röml: Kayl:en Maÿt: Favorablen conditionen den friden accestiren, oder die in Europa habende Landschaften zuverlassen.", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 58v-59r.*

Fleischmann stated<sup>405</sup> that some time before, Mustafa Pasha in Bosnia [a Turk who had been brought up in the Defterhâne<sup>406</sup> (the Ottoman chancery) and had never had any experience of warfare] had been ordered, together with the Bosnians and other troops joining him in the region, with 10,000 Tatars who had recently left for Bosnia below Belgrade, not only to defend this region from enemy attacks, but also to use these Tatars to manoeuvre the enemy into a diversion. However, according to later reports, Mustafa Pasha was dismissed and replaced by Köprülüzade Numan Pasha, who was known as a soldier and who, as the Turkish circulars clearly stated, had made a great contribution to the war against Venice, was sent from Belgrade to Bosnia.

Later in his report, Fleischmann noted that there was still uncertainty about the timing of the Sultan's participation in the campaign. This seemed to depend both on the advance in the Peloponnese and on the developments on the Imperial side in Hungary, about which the voivode in Wallachia and the Pashas in Belgrade and Timișoara frequently reported. The Sultan was accompanied by about 800 miserable Sipahi and 5 Janissary quarters of about 600 men. Almost every day the Sultan spent time in tents pitched in Demirtaş, half an hour away. On the 18th of the month, to celebrate the birth of the prince Selim, born in Istanbul to a Russian concubine, he organised several days of festive displays with floodlights. It was also planned that his other son, who had turned eight, would soon be circumcised in grand ceremonies. With regard to the troops, however, the Sultan had agreed that if he decided to leave for the campaign, would pay them the full amount of *postal akçesi*, known as campaign money.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> "Obwohl bereits vor einiger Zeit der in Bosnien befindliche Mustafa Pascha [so ein bei der Kammer auferzogener und niemals im Krieg geübter Türkhist beordert worden, mit denen Bosnaken und andern in selbiger gegend zu ihm stoßenden Truppen auch denen neulich untertänigst berichtermassen nächstens unterhalb Belgrad in Bosnien gehenden 10000 Tataren nicht allein dasiges Lande von denen feindlichen einfallen zu defendieren, sondern auch ihnen durch die berührte Tataren eine Diversion zumachen, so will es dennoch verlauten, als wann er Mustafa Pascha anjetzo abgeändert, und anstatt seiner der Kiprulu Oghlu Numan Pascha Zweifels ohne weillen er in Türkei als ein Soldat passiert, und wie es in denen Türkischen circular-schreiben öffentlich beigesezt-gewesen, zu diesen wider Venedig vorgenommenen Krieg viel beigetragen, von Belgrad nach Bosnien gehe ...", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 59r-59v.

<sup>406</sup> For more information about the Defterhâne, "ERHAN AFYONCU, "DEFTERHÂNE", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/defterhane>". Accessed on 11.06.2025.

<sup>407</sup> "Sonsten ist des Sultans von hier weither nach Despotiaailasi nehmende abreiß dato noch vngewiß, und scheint selbige sowohl von denen gegen Morea machenden progressen alß denen in Hungarn Kayl:er seiths fürkehrenden bewegungen, worvon der iezige fürst in der Wallacheÿ, und die Bahsa zu Belgrad vnd Temeswar öfftere bericht abstaten, zudependiren, allhier bey ihme Sultan stehen nicht mehr alß vngefähr 800 miserable Spahi, vnd 5 etwa 600 Mann ausmachende Janitscharn oda, Er findet sich fast Täglich unterdeme ohnweith dem ein halbe Stund von hier gelegenen orth Demidesch aufgeschlagenen Zeltern ein, vnd hat die einem ihme von einer Russischen Concubin den 18.ten dits zu Constantinopel zur weld gebracht, vnd Selim benambsten Prinzen allhier etlich Täg hindurch illumination, vnd freüdens bezeügungen machen lassen vnd soll sein anderer ins acht Jahr gehender Sohn nechstens mit grossen Solemniteten beschnitten werden, mit denen Trouppen aber hat Er selbsten sich dahin verglichen, daß sye, im fall er



The Kapudan Pasha was still in the Dardanelles with the fleet under his command and was seriously ill. So much so that the Sultan sent his own personal surgeon to him urgently. Meanwhile, new orders were issued: The Ottoman merchant ships, of which there were two in Istanbul and ten in Alexandria, were ordered to prepare for war, in addition what had been done before.<sup>408</sup>

The Venetian Bailo Memmo remained imprisoned in harsh conditions at the Fortress of Abydos (also known as Kanlı Kuyu), and Fleischmann reported that the continued neglect of his welfare posed a serious threat to his life, given his already fragile health and deteriorated physical condition. Prior to his departure Istanbul, Fleischmann conferred with the French, British, and Dutch ambassadors, urging them to express their concern to the Sublime Porte regarding the Bailo's imprisonment. However, as he had previously observed, these diplomats appeared reluctant to address the issue with the seriousness it warranted. Fleischmann expressed particular surprise that both the current and former Venetian Bailo had continued to place their trust in French diplomatic support, maintaining close ties with the French despite their precarious circumstances. In his report, he also noted that a Venetian secretary by the name of Columba had recently traveled to Izmir aboard a British vessel with the intention of joining the French ambassador in Istanbul. He further observed that Monsieur Brué, continued to advise the Sublime Porte in a manner favorable to Ottoman interests. On the other hand, Fleischmann stated that the French interpreter and secretary Brué set out to accompany the Grand Vizier in the field, to give good advice to the Sublime Porte, as he had done so far, and to reveal the situation of the Christian world. For this journey, the French embassy and the Turks paid him an extra 2000 pieces Otto.<sup>409</sup>

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*von hier weither aufbreche, sÿe daß Bostalackiasi oder Campagne gelt völlig haben sollen.*", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 60r-60v.

<sup>408</sup> *"Der Capitain Bahsa befindet sich mit der ihm untergebenen Flotte annoch bei denen Dardanellen und liegt wegen seinen bruchschnitts sehr krank darnider, also dass der Sultan dieser Tågen ihme seinen Leib Chÿrurgum per Posta zuegeschickt, indessen sind aufs neue Ordre ergangen die Türkische Kauffartheischiffe, deren über die vorige zwei zu Constantinopel, und zehen zu Alexandria sich befinden, zum Krieg auszurüsten."*, 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 60v.

<sup>409</sup> *"Vbrigens sizet der Venetianische Bailo Cavalier Memo noch sehr ellendiglich in dem Castel Abidos gefangen vnd wird Er, sofern es in der länge dauert, seiner schwachen Disposition vnd Leibs Kräfte halber schwährlich daß leben conserviren, Ich habe denen Französisch, Engländisch, vnd Holländischen Bodschafttern beÿ meinem zu Constantinopl von ihnen genohmenen abschied hierüber beweglich zuegeredet, auf das sÿe dises alß causam communem ansehen, vnd wider dises ungezimmende tractament der Porthen die gehörige vorstellungen machen möchten ob sÿe mir es zwar versprochen, so wird doch im werckh der ernst ermanglen, gestalten sÿe, insonderheit der erste zu disen feüer selbstn holz getragen, und ist sich zuverwundern, daß deme ungeacht sowohl der arrestirte, vnd vorige Baylo alß die Venetianer sich an dise nation halten vnd ihr interehse anverthrauen, wie dann erst kürzlich wider ein Venetianischer Secretarius namens Columba auf einem Engelandischen Schiff zu Smirna angelanget vmb in cognito nach Constantinopl zum Französchischen Bodtschaffter zugehen, vnd die Venetianische correspondenz zuführen, hingegen folget der Französische Dollmätsch, vnd Secretari Bruit dem Groß Vezier ins feld nach vmb der Porthen, wie Er biß dahin*

The Dutch ambassador persistently raised objections concerning a ship that had been seized from the Barbary corsairs by a Dutch captain approximately five years prior. In response, The Turks from the Sublime Porte, who were interested in this matter, decided to go to the Netherlands and carry out the proceedings there. Fleischmann also reported that the Polish Royal Envoy Extraordinary, Baron von Golz—who had been in Istanbul the previous year—had dispatched his translator, Mr. Lumaca, to meet with him. Lumaca was known for his prior service to Mr. Talman in the Aulic War Council, where he had proven himself a valuable intermediary. Fleischmann noted that this person also arrived in Edirne and continued to correspond with his principal office across the Imperial frontiers.<sup>410</sup>

Another important point that draws attention in Fleischmann's report is the change in the attitude of the Sublime Porte towards Fleischmann after he informed the Grand Vizier about the Emperor's opinion in case of a possible war between Venice and the Ottomans. Fleischmann stated that he had been treated very differently since the war was declared against Venice and that he was disturbed by the behaviour he encountered at the Sublime Porte. Housing, horses, carriages, etc., which had been provided to him free of charge in Istanbul a few months before, he was asked to pay an unusual amount for these usual expenses. Fleischmann requested payment of his salary from the Council for the following year in addition to the 1000 ducats sent to him.<sup>411</sup>

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*gethan, mit gutem rath an die hand zustehen, vnd den zuestand der Christenheit zuentdeckhen, zu welcher reiß ihme der Französische Podtschaffter vnd dieselbe nation 2000 Pezzi der Otto extra ausgezahlt ...", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 60v-61v.*

<sup>410</sup> "... der Hollandische Bottschaffter hat wegen einem von einem Hollandischen Capitajn vor fünf Jahren denen Barbaresquen hinweckhgenohmenen Schiff mehrmahln anstoß, und seynd die interehsirte Türckhen resolviret, wider in Holland zugehen, vnd aldorten ihren procehs auszuführen, der vorm Jahr hier gewesene Königl: Pohlnische extraordinari Envoÿe herr Baron von Golz hat mir seinen hier gelassenen Dollmetsch namens Lumaca [welcher vor disem in des Kayl:en HoffKriegs Rath herrn von Talmann diensten gestanden, vnd ein dem Kayl: interesse sehr affectionirter mensch auch sich in verschidenen occasionen nuzlich gebrauchen lassen] anrecommendiret; da nun selbiger auch hieher nach Adrianopl koben, vnd mit seinen principaln über die Kayl: Gränitz brief wechßlet, alß habe solches eüer dhrl Excell: vnd Gden unterthänigst anzuzaiigen vnermanglet.", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 61v.

<sup>411</sup> "Ingleichen solle denenselben gehorsambst beÿfügen, daß die Porthen von Zeit an Ich ihr den von eüer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden wegen der Republic Venedig gnädigst anbefohlenen vortrag gethan, gegen mich ganz anderst alß vorhero verfare, vnd wo sÿe nur kan, mir verdriesslichkeit verursache, unter andern hat sÿe sowohl die mir zu Constantinopl etlich monath zuvor mit eine Ferman alß ein freÿes quartier gegebene wohnung, alß in einer hieher-reiß die pferd, maul Esel, vnd Wägen wider den iederzeit geübten gebrauch auch so gar mein hauß alhier vmb einen ungewöhnlichen preÿß mich Zahlen machen, weillen aber daß mehriste nur aufs gelt ankommen, alß habe es auch darmit gerichtet, und nur alß eine schlechte sache angesehen der gänzlichen hoffnung nechstens auf daß mit iüngsteren Currier gehorsambst abgeschickhte, vnd hier in Duplicat beÿligendes meines ferrern verhaltens halber von eüer dhrleicht Excell vnd Gnaden den gnädigsten befelch in unterthänigkeit zuerhalten, Indessen solle die verrechnung deren empfangenen 1000 Species ducaten nebst der Specification deren anticipirten rittgeltern gehorsambst einsändten unterthänigst ersuchend selbiges mir, da wahrlich aniezo hart zu subsistiren ist, mit meiner nechst verflissenden halten Jahrs gebühr, und Campagne geltern gnädigst übermachen zulassen.", 28 April 1715,

Finally, Fleischmann stated<sup>412</sup> that Reis Efendi, who was recently the Defterdar in Belgrade and whom Fleischmann had known before, confirmed the information that Köprülüzade Numan Pasha had left Belgrade and had been replaced by Çerkes Mehmed Pasha, who had been removed from his position as Rikab Kaymakam in Istanbul. However, the Sublime Porte was not happy with Numan Pasha's behaviour towards the Imperial Commander on the border at Petrovaradin, which Fleischmann had secretly hinted at. Therefore, the new Serasker of Belgrade, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha, would be given a strict order to behave peacefully, courteously and like a neighbour towards the Germans on the frontier as he passed through there. When he arrived in Edirne, Fleischmann noted that he would recommend him peaceful and friendly relations in an appropriate manner.

### 3.14. The Sultan's Fear of Rebellion & the New Serasker Çerkes Mehmed Pasha

In his report dated May 9, 1715, Fleischmann reported that on the 28th of the previous month, the Sultan's Surgeon (Cerrahbaşı) returned to Edirne from the Dardanelles and that the Kapudan Pasha's illness was incurable. Despite this, he was determined to sail from the Dardanelles at the head of his fleet, enduring all kinds of difficulties.<sup>413</sup>

According to another report received by Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier would reach Serres on the 6th, where he would give the horses a rest of ten to twelve days. During this period, the Kapudan Pasha was expected to land the heavy artillery at Thessaloniki and to meet again with the Grand Vizier [to whom the Sultan had sent a handsome tent as a gift two days earlier] about the

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OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 62r-62v.

<sup>412</sup> "Entlichen hat mich jetzt gleich der vor etlich monath zu Belgrad Deffterdar gewesene mir vorher bekhante vicé Reis-Effendi versichern lassen, daß der Kiuprulu Oglu Numan Bahsa von Belgrad ab, vnd an seine stelle der veränderte Caimecam zu Constantinopl Cerkies Mehemed Bahsa gesezet, vnd täglich hier von Constantinopl erwarthet werde, weillen man aber bey der Porthen mit des berührten Numan Bahsa auf der Gränitz gegen Jhro Excell: dem Kayl: herrn Commendanten zu Peterwardein vorgekehrte, vnd von mir uner der Hand insinnirte conduite übel zufriden, alß solle ihme neüen Belgrader-Seraskier Cerkies Mehemed Bahsa bey seiner durhreiß alhier gemessener befelch gegeben werden sich auf der Gränitz gegen die Teütsche fridsamb, höf vnd nachbahrlich zuverhalten, auch ich bin vnermanglet ihme Cerkies Mehemed Bahsa bey seiner hiesigen ankunfft die fridnachbahrliche freündtschafft gehörig anzurecommendiren.", 28 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 63v.

<sup>413</sup> "Vber mein gehorsambst in Duplicat beyligendes den 28ten verflossenen monaths durch meinen nach Peterwardein expedirten Janitscharen Bekier solle eüer durchleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden mittels eines von dem hiesigen Rekiab Caimecam erhaltenen und interpretirter einsendenden Pahsports umb sich dessen in allen gelegenheiten gebrauchen zu können, über Sibenbürgen ferrer unterthänigst berichten, daß an gedachtem Tag gegen abend der Sultanische Tscherrah Bahsa, oder Leib Chyrurgus von denen Dardanellen wider zuruckh hier angelanget, meldend, daß der Capitajn Bahsa an seinen Salvo respectu bruchsnitt incurabl, und schwährlich wegen dem sich schon ansezenden brand dise Campagne dauren könne, dessen doch vneracht seÿe Er resolviret gewesen ohnfehlbah den zwainzigsten dito mit seiner unterhabenden flotta [worvon die von meinem Confidenten erhaltene Lista gehorsambst einschliesse] von denen berührten Dardanellen ins Meer auszulauffen.", 9 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 65r-65v.

planned operations in the Morea. The Grand Vizier had with him only three to four hundred sipahis, together with his courtiers. The Janissary Agha was advancing in front three days' journey, Cebecibaşı two days' journey, and Topçubaşı one day's journey. However, several thousand men, together with foot troops from Anatolia, were already on their way to the entrance to the Morea, and it was expected that they would make a significant attempt when they arrived there. As for the troops, although a considerable number were arriving from Asia, they were in an indescribably wretched condition due to poverty and had little allegiance to the existing government. On the other hand, the Sultan was still at Edirne and had only a few hundred Sipahis and Janissaries for protection. According to Fleischmann, it seemed unlikely that he would take more soldiers with him because of fears of a rebellion. Therefore, the planned journey was also suspended; therefore, it was decided to send the collected provisions to the army. In particular, a few days earlier, a small Venetian ship had landed at Megara<sup>414</sup>, 28 hours from Edirne, and captured five Janissaries. The Sultan, alarmed, immediately sent some of his men there to investigate the situation. In Istanbul, the Turks hired a French ship several times, loaded it with 1,500 quintals<sup>415</sup> (or centner) of gunpowder and several thousand grenades and sent it to Cyprus.<sup>416</sup>

Fleischmann reported that, a few days prior to submitting his account, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha—the newly appointed Serasker of Belgrade—had arrived in Edirne. Upon his arrival, Fleischmann extended his congratulations on the Pasha's new promotion and expressed his hope

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<sup>414</sup> For more information about Megara, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Megara-Greece>". Accessed on 29.02.2024.

<sup>415</sup> A unit of weight equal to 100 kilograms, "<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/quintal>". Accessed on 29.02.2024.

<sup>416</sup> *"Inzwischen wird der Groß Vezier erhaltener nachricht gemess den 6ten dits zu Seres angelangt seyn, und in selbiger gegend denen pferdten zehen biß zwölf Tag daß groß geben, wehrender Zelt aber solle Er berührte Capitajn Bahsa zu Salonik eintreffen die schwähre Artilleria aufs Land sezen, und sich mit ihme Groß Vezier [welchem der Sultan vorgestern ein schönes Zeit zum præsent nachgeschickhet] über die gegen Morea vornehmende operationen nochmahln abouchiren; ernenter GroßVezier hat nebst seiner Hoffstatt nicht mehr alß dreiß biß vier-hundert Spahi beÿ sich, und gehet der Janitscharen Aga dreÿ, der Gebecci Bahsa zweÿ, und der Topci Bahsa ein Marche vor ihme vor aus, worvon doch bereiths schon etlich tausent Mann nebst denen aus Anatolia anmarchirenden fueß Volckhern gegen dem eingang von Morea entfernt zuseÿn, alß von seiner ankunfft aldorten was nahmhaffttes zuunternehmen; was die Troupen belanget, so sollen selbige zwar in zimlicher anzahl aus Asia im anmarche seÿn, allein wegen armuth in einem vnbeschreiblich elendigen zuestand, und darbey dem heüntigen Governo sehr wenig affectioniret seÿn. Sonsten befindet sich der Sultan annoch all hier, und hat zu seiner bedeckung nur etlich hundert Spahi vnd Jänitscharen beÿ sich, dörfte auch aus forcht einer aufruhr mehr nicht zu sich komben, und unter andern eben diser ursach halber seine weithere nach Despotiaailasi vorgehabte reÿß ins steckhen gerathen, daß aldort versamblete Prouianth aber zur Armee führen lassen. Zumahln alß vor etlich tagen ein khein Venetianisch Fahrzeug in dem 28 Stund von hier am Meer gelegenen orth Meigra angeländet, vnd fünff Jänitscharen erhaschet, Er forchtsambe Sultan es also apprehendiret, daß Er in aller eill einige seiner Leüth dahin geschickhet, der sachen beschaffenheit nachzusehen; Zu Constantinopl ist mehrmahln von denen Türckhen ein Französisch-Schüff gemietet, vnd mit 1500 Centner Pulfer, vnd einig tausent granaten nach Cÿpern geschickhet worden."*, 9 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 65v-66r.

for the continued maintenance of peaceful and cooperative relations along the frontier. He also formally requested that his incoming and outgoing correspondence be allowed to proceed without interference or obstruction. In response, Mehmed Pasha assured him that he would issue instructions for the German forces along the border to be treated with courtesy and that he intended to cultivate amicable relations with the Imperial general stationed at Petrovaradin.<sup>417</sup>

Another piece of information<sup>418</sup> Fleischmann obtained was that Numan Pasha was planning to move to Belgrade with his considerable entourage soon. But the Sultan and the Grand Vizier first wanted him to destroy the robbers in Asia. The ulema and the people wished that Pasha would go to Bosnia to prevent a possible invasion. Therefore, it was still unclear where Numan Pasha would go.

### **3.15. Reception of Ottoman Envoy Ibrahim Agha by Prince Eugene of Savoy**

Ibrahim Agha, sent from Istanbul by the Grand Vizier as envoy to Prince Eugene, arrived in Vienna on 2 May with his entourage and his arrival was reported to the Prince. Thereupon, Prince Eugene gave Ibrahim Agha an appointment for a reception ceremony on 13 May. Then, just after 11 a.m., a carriage belonging to the Prince, drawn by six splendid horses, was dispatched, accompanied by six reserve horses, decked in Turkish cloths with gold and silver trimmings, and several servants, conspicuous in their red uniforms embroidered with gold. Ibrahim Agha was taken from his lodgings near *Schlagbrücke* for the reception ceremony by the interpreter of the Imperial Court, who had arrived in the specified carriage and was fluent in oriental languages. Ibrahim Agha immediately departed to attend the ceremony with the following arrangements.<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> "Schliesslichen ist vorgestern der abgeänderte Caimacam zu Constantinopl, vnd neüe Seraskier zu Belgrad Cerkes Mehemed Bahsa hier arriviret, welchem ich zu diser Seraskierats-würde gratuliren, und all fridliche nachbahrschafft, in gleichen die bald-und vngehinderte beförderung deren auf vnd abgehenden expressen anzurecommendiren unermanglet; Warauf Er neüe Bahsa zu Belgrad mich versichern lassen von dem Sultan seinem Herrn gemessene ordre zuhaben sich auf alle weiß mit denen Teütschen auf der Gränitz freündt-nachbahrlich aufzuführen, vnd werde sein erste sorge seÿn, mit Jhro Excellenz dem Herrn General zu Peterwardein in guter nachbahrlichen verständnuss zuleben.", 9 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 66r-66v.

<sup>418</sup> "Heünt noch wird selbiger mit seiner ansehentlichen Suite gegen Belgrad aufbrechen, Wohin aber so dann der Numan Bahsa gehen solle, ist noch vngewiß, gestalten der Sultan, und Gros Vezier Jhn in Asia vmb die Rauber auszutilgen, vnd die Ulema nebst dem Volckh zum Seraskier in Bosnien, umb von selbigen Land die beförchtende einfähl abzuwenden haben wollen.", 9 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 66v.

<sup>419</sup> "Wie und auf was weis ap.. 1715 den 13 May Jhro höchfürstliche durchleucht Prinz Eugenins von Savoyen die Audienz, dem von dem Türkische Groß Vezier Allipasha dahier angelangten Ibrahim Aga, öffentlich gegeben haben. Nachdeme der auß Constantinopl an Jhro hochfürstl.durchls. Prinzen Eugenÿ von dem Türckhischen Groß Vezier in gesandtschafts abgefertigte Aga sambt seinen grfolg den 2ten May dahier ankommen und dessen ankunfft Jhro hochfürstl.durchl.zu wissen gemacht worden wäre; So hatten dieselbe gedachten Aga den 13ten May zur audienz

1) 4 Hartschiers<sup>420</sup> from the local guard,

2) Sergeant-Lieutenant of the Guard, Honourable Captain Rudolph von Rosenfold,

3) 26 men from the guard,

4) The captain of the royal guard, who, when the Agha arrived, took over from the captain of the Dragoon<sup>421</sup> regiment and had to take care of him in his quarters.

5) Agha Derviş Mehmed Efendi was accompanied by the Ottoman Chief Interpreter from Belgrade who followed him on horseback.

6) The Agha Kahya or Hofmeister Süleyman<sup>422</sup>, was clearly carrying the power of attorney in his hands. On his right side was a Janissary of Hacı Ali, and on his left was a lieutenant of the Ottoman border regiment, Mehmed Bölükbaşı (the troop's head), but the horse was led by two regents of His Excellency.

7) His Excellency's carriages arrived with six horses, and the Agha sat at the top, and the Imperial Palace interpreter who was sent to pick him up sat opposite him. On each side of the carriages were two laquaia<sup>423</sup>, an Ottoman pasha, and four laquaia.

8) There were also two Ottoman officers carrying weapons.

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*bestimmt, folglichen ihm nach 11 Uhr eine dero fürsstl. Kutschen, mit 6 prächtigen Pferdten bespannet, nebst 6 handtpferdten, die sammentlich mit gold und silbern Türckhischen zeugen aus staffieret waren, in begleitung einiger in dero gewöhnlich schöner mit gold bordirten rothen liberey gekleiten bedienten yüberschickhet, und gedachter Aga aus seinem über der Schlag brückhen gelegenen Quartier, durch den in besagter Kutschen hinaus gefahrnen Kayl: Hoff Dolmetsch deren orientalischen Sprachen, zur berührten audienz abhollen lassen; zu welcher jenner dan alsobald auch in nachfolgender ordnung sich verfueget.”, 13 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 69r.*

<sup>420</sup> Members of the Bavarian King's bodyguard. "<https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Hartschier>". Accessed on 04.03.2024.

<sup>421</sup> Dragoon (or Dragoon), in late 16<sup>th</sup>-century Europe, a mounted soldier fought as a light cavalryman on attack and as a dismounted infantryman on defence. For more information, "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/dragoon>". Accessed on 04.03.2024.

<sup>422</sup> Educators and masters of ceremonies at courts; Tutors in aristocratic and upper-middle-class families. "<https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Hofmeister>". Accessed on 04.03.2024.

<sup>423</sup> Lackey. For more information, "<https://www.lalanguefrancaise.com/dictionnaire/definition/laquais>". Accessed on 04.03.2024.

9) And finally, 26 men from the city guard came to the end of the journey. The car carrying the envoy crossed the Danube branch, passed through *Schlagbrücke*, the Red Tower, and reached the palace through the street of Himmelpferd, up Kärntner Street.<sup>424</sup>

Agha got out of his car and went up the stairs. Prince Eugene was seated under a red canopy decorated with gold braid on a red backrest and armchair, wearing a red dress with gold embroidery and a hat. On his right was the vice president of the Aulic War Council, along with the members according to their rank, and on his left was Refrendarius.<sup>425</sup> As soon as the Agha sat down, he performed the ceremony by touching the power of attorney three times and then handed it to Refrendarius, taking off his hat heavily. As he sat down again, Prince Eugene pointed out for him to sit on the low armchair with a red velvet back, and then the Agha and the Prince chatted for a while. Then, when the Agha asked permission to leave, his excellency, contrary to custom, took him under his arms, and he took off his hat and returned to his high council.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> "... (1) Giengen 4. Kundt hartschier von hiesiger Statt gardi

(2) Sitte, als Wachteneister Leütenant, der Statt gardi; hauptmann hl. Rudolph v. Rosenfold.

(3) Marchiren. 26 Mann von der Stattgardi, mit beÿ sich führend doggelten spiel, welches aber nicht gerühret.

(4) Rütte der Statt gardi hauptmann hl: Kreiniz welcher auch den Aga beÿ seiner ankunfft von dem haupt-mann des bayreithischen dragoner Regts yber-nommen, vnd in seinen Quartier weiters zu besorgen hate.

(5) Rütte des Aga Dervis, Mehomet Effendi, dan der Türckhische granz Dollmetsch von Belgrad Gehnh aga, vnd nach ihm folgte auch zu Pferd

(6) des Aga Kihaya oder hoffmaister Suliman, der daß Creditif auf beÿ den handen öffentlich getragen zu dessen rechter Seiten ein Janitscharn .en-derich Hatschy Halÿ, und zur lünckhen ein leute-nant von der Türckhl: Gränz Reutereÿ Mehomet Boluk Bahsi gangen, daß pferdt aber von 2 Reu-tuechten Ihrer hochfürststl: dhl: geführt worde.

(7) kam Ihrer hochfürststl: dhl: kutsche1 mit 6 pferdten bespannet, darinnen der Aga oben an: und gegen über der zu seiner abhollung abgesendte Kayl: hoff dolmetsch gesessen; auf ieder seithen der kutschen gingen, von Jhro hochfürststl: dhrl: 2. Laqueÿen, ein Türckhl: Baschÿ, und 4 Türckhl: Laqueÿen.

(8) Ritten 2 Türckhl: Cammerdiener als waffen trägt.

(9) vnd leztlich machten den schlus abermahlen 26 Mann von der Statt gardi, der gug beschahe längst des Donau-arms über die schlachbrucke durch dem Roten thurm nach dem lubect, und ferners dem Stock in Eÿsen vorbeÿ, durch die Carntnersterffen hinauf, bis in die himmelpferdt gassen ...", 13 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 69v-70r.

<sup>425</sup> A trainee solicitor/attorney; Referendar. For more information, "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Referendar>". Accessed on 04.03.2024.

<sup>426</sup> "... in dem hochfürstl: Palast, in welchen der Aga hinein fuhre, darin aus stige, und giengen die treppa hinauf, alwo er von 2 Hoff Kriegs Raths Canzleÿ verwantenals hl: Kiese und hl: Registranten Kraider in nahmen Jhro hochfürststl: durchl: complimentiret, sodan beÿ der ersten anticamern von Jhro hochfürststl: durchl: Stallmaister hl: Obristen Baron Wildenfels und hoffmaister hl: Barterre empfangen und bis in das audienz zimmer beklaidet wurde. Jhro hochfürststl: durchl: sassen vnter einem rot-sammeten mit golden borten bebrammten balachin auf einem rotsammeten rucken und armb lehnsessel in einem roten mit gold gestickten kleÿd mit gedenckten huet, auf der rechten seithen waren Jhre Excell: Hoff Kriegs Raths vice præsidet sambt dem hochlöbl: Kayl: Hoff-kriegs Rath nach dem Rang. und auf der linckhen seithen der geheimbe Referendarius gestand. Sobald der Aga Jhro durchl: sizend sache, macht er seine ceremonien mit dreÿmachliger berührung des bundts, und yberreichte deroselben sein creditif stehend, welches auch Jhro hochfürststl: dhl: stehend den huet ein wenig abnämwend, solches dem Kayl: hl: Referendario sogleich behändigten, als dann aber sich alsogleich wider niedergelassen, und ihm aga mit der hand das zeichen gegeben, auf ein zuruckh gestelt-rotsammeten ruckhen Lehnsessel sich nider zu sizen, Jhro hochfürststl: durchl: hatten hierauf mit ihm aga eine Zeit geredet. Vber welch alles der aga sich beurlaubet, und sich nach der Thür kehrete, da ihn dann die seinige

Subsequently, the Agha was escorted to the staircase leading to the first floor, formerly occupied by the Second War Chancellery, and from there he was conducted to his carriage, in accordance with the established protocol. The Imperial Bureau of Finance (Hofkammer) had rented the mansion where Ibrahim Agha would stay for 80 Gulden per week.<sup>427</sup> A generous weekly budget of 800 Gulden was allocated for the mansion's expenses.<sup>428</sup> On behalf of Prince Eugene, both the Agha and his entourage were received with the utmost courtesy and hospitality, reflecting the formal respect accorded to his diplomatic status.<sup>429</sup>

Following his meeting with Ibrahim Agha, on May 16, 1715, Prince Eugene received information from the Venetian ambassador Grimani and the envoy extraordinary Morosini that Ottoman forces might be heading towards the Hungarian border following their successful campaign against Venice. Therefore, Prince Eugene informed the Emperor of the necessity of accepting the defensive alliance offered by Venice, which the Emperor accepted.<sup>430</sup> Indeed, the Habsburgs, having failed to achieve their desired outcome in the War of the Spanish Succession, were searching for a way to compensate for the loss of prestige they had suffered. Prince Eugene, the architect of the 1697 Zenta Victory, believed this compensation could be achieved by entering the war on the side of Venice.<sup>431</sup>

### 3.16. Supply Shortage in the Ottoman Army and the Cruelty of the Grand Vizier

In his report to the Vienna War Council dated June 5, 1715, from Edirne, Fleischmann noted that the Grand Vizier had convened a high-level meeting in Thessaloniki on May 21 with the Kapudan Pasha—who had been previously summoned and was reportedly in improved health—and with Serasker Köprülüzade Abdullah Pasha, who had recently been appointed to command the units in the fleet. These discussions centered on strategic plans for the forthcoming campaign against the Morea. Following these consultations, the Grand Vizier personally reviewed the Ottoman naval

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*wider gebräuchlichermassen unter die armb nahmen, wornach Ihro hochfürstl: durchl: den huet abgethan, und sich zu der hohen versammlung gewendet.*", 13 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 70r-70v.

<sup>427</sup> OeStA/Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv (FHKA), Alte Hofkammer (AHK), Hoffinanz Österreich Akten (HFÖ) Akten 2021 (26 Nisan 1715), Ercan 2022; 660.

<sup>428</sup> OeStA/FHKA, AHK, HFÖ Akten 2022 (3 Mayıs 1715), Ercan 2022; 660.

<sup>429</sup> *"Nachdem wurde der Aga, wie anfänglich von denen 2ten Kriegs Canzleÿ verwandten, bis an die erste staffel der stiegen wider begleitet, über welche sich derselbe ferners in die Kutsche, sofort mitls voriger ordnung nach seinem Quartier begeben; daselbsten, nahmens Ihro hochfürstl: durchl: sambt seinem ganzen gefolg auf das herlichste gastiret word."*, 13 May 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 70v-71r.

<sup>430</sup> OeStA/KA, ZSt, HKR, HR Akten 125, Exp. Mai 1715, 410, Ercan 2022; 663.

<sup>431</sup> OeStA/KA, ZSt, HKR, HR Akten 126, Exp. Juni 1715, 474, Ercan 2022; 666.



forces. He ordered the deployment of artillery, ammunition, and provisions to the shore, and instructed the Kapudan Pasha to lead the fleet to Eğriboz without accompaniment. Furthermore, the fleet was to unite with the Egyptian militia and, without delay, advance into enemy waters to engage and defeat the Venetian fleet. This aggressive maneuver aimed to eliminate any possibility of Venetian reinforcement and thereby facilitate the conquest of Nafplion and the broader Morea region. To implement this plan, the Grand Vizier departed Thessaloniki on May 22 and arrived in Larissa on May 28. His intention was to launch full-scale military operations in the Morea and to commence the siege of Nafplion no later than the 10th of the following month.<sup>432</sup>

Meanwhile, a significant portion of the Albanian troops under the command of Mahmud Bey Oğlu, who were stationed in the same region, were deployed as vanguard forces. Fleischmann reported that, in anticipation of potential logistical shortages, the Ottomans had begun organizing the construction of large supply depots in Nafplion. This initiative was prompted by concerns over sustaining an army that, although numerically large, was in poor condition in the Morea—many of its soldiers driven to fight not by loyalty or duty, but by poverty and the hope of material gain. Despite the dispatch of supply ships to the Morea at intervals, Fleischmann noted that famine continued to plague the Ottoman forces. According to Ottoman assessments, operational progress in the Morea proved difficult, as the region had already been extensively plundered and offered little sustenance. While the local Greek population had not launched any open rebellion, the increasingly despotic conduct of the Grand Vizier—particularly his summary executions—fueled resentment both within the army and among the civilian population. His uncompromising demeanor, including the beheading of those who resisted his authority, contributed to growing dissatisfaction and hostility. According to Fleischmann, very few leaders had exercised such absolute authority and seemed to have taken the Sultan captive. A few days earlier, on the orders of the Grand Vizier, Kara

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<sup>432</sup> "Mit meinem gegenwärtig pr Posta nach Peterwardein expedirenden Janitscharn Musa Bascha solle eüer dhrleicht, Excell vnd Gnaden unterthänigst berichten, daß nachdeme der Groß Vezier den 21ten verflossenen monaths zu Salonik mit dem gehorsambst berichter massen dahin berueffenen Capitain Bahsa [so sich widerumb etwas besser befindet] und mit dem über die auf der Flotta befindliche Trouppen bestelten Seraskier Kiuprulu Oghlu Abdullah Bahsa über die disß Jahr gegen Morea vorhabende unternehmungen mehrmahln gesprochen sich selbst auf die Flotta begeben, selbige besichtiget, die darauf imbarquirte Artilleria, munition, und Prouianth aufs Land gesezet, vnd Ihme Capitain Bahsa die leztern ordre vngesaumbt nach Negroponte zuseeglen, die auf denen mitführenden barquen geladene provision in selbige Magazin zulähren, hingegen die alda angelangte ægyptische Miliz darauf zu imbarquiren sich mit denen alda stehenden Barbaresquen zu conjugiren, vnd ohne Zeit verlust in die feindliche wasser auszulauffen, die Venetianische Flotta aufzusuechen, selbige zuattaquiren, end zuschlagen, mithin dardurch den Succurs abzuhalten, und die eroberung Neapoli di Romania, vnd des ganzen KönigReichs Morea zufacilitiren, ertheillet, ist Er Groß Vezier den 22ten von Salonik hinweg, vnd den 28.ten zu Larissa angelanget, willens längstens den 10ten dises auf dem Venetianischen boden zustehen, in Morea zupenetriren, vnd mit der belagerung der berührten Vessung Neapoli di Romania seine Kriegs-operationen anzufangen.", 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 80r-80v.

Mustafa Agha, the Sultan's *Başhaseki*, had been chained and taken to the Grand Vizier's camp without informing the Sultan or obtaining his permission. Similarly, Mahmud Efendi, who was forcibly taken from the Grand Mufti's tent, and Ali Pasha, who was in Belgrade four years ago and later in Konya, were treated in a similar manner. Ali Pasha, an elderly and inexperienced man, had never approved of this war; under the pretext of bringing insufficient troops, the banner (*sancak*) was taken from him, and he was exiled. Additionally, he had Ayvaz Pasha, Yusuf Agha, Bekir Pasha, and many others strangled and their heads brought to Edirne.<sup>433</sup>

In his report<sup>434</sup>, Fleischmann also reported that, based on information obtained from interpreters who spied on behalf of the Turks through correspondence with the Christian world, the Grand Vizier learned that the Venetians were planning a diversionary manoeuvre from Dalmatia to Bosnia. The troops gathered in Bosnia, numbering approximately twenty to thirty thousand, were reinforced with twelve janissary regiments. Half of the 10,000 Tatars were sent to Bosnia, and the other half to Morea; it was expected that these troops would soon reach both regions.

Fleischmann noted in his report that a few days ago, Süleyman Efendi, who was formerly Reis-ül Küttap<sup>435</sup> and had been left behind due to supplies sent with the fleet in Istanbul, arrived

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<sup>433</sup> *"Ihndessen schikhet Er bereiths die mehriste Troupen vor aus, vmb unter anführung deß Albanesischen, vnd in selbiger gegend practicirten Mahmud Beeg Oghlu vor seiner ankunfft die pabsage in gedachtem Königreich zuöffnen; Weillen aber die Türckhen beförchten, es möchte für Ihre sich zwar zimlich zahlhafft allein in einem ellenden Stand versamlende Armee [worzue sich ville armuth halber, und in der hoffnung was zuerbeithen schlagen] in Morea die nothwendige Subsistenz ermanglen, alß haben sye es zwar dahin veranstaltet, auf das zu Negroponte allwo man grosse Magazine aufgerichtet, auf denen kheinen transport Schüffen von Zeit zu Zeit die provisionen nach Morea, oder wo man sye bedörffet, verführet werden, allein dessen ungeacht dörrfte wohl daß Türckhische Kriegs heer mangl leyden, und nicht so leichtlich in dem ihrer mainung nach schon in Sackh habenden Königreich Morea [sofern nur die Vesstungen recht besezet, und etwa die aldortige Griechische Vnterthanen kheine verrätherey angefangen.] progressen machen; sondern vill mehr, sobald sye nur einen widerstand brieffen, und den Kopf was anstossen, unter sich selbst eine confusion erweckhen, zumahln sich der Groß Vezier durch seinen ungemainen geiz, abscheülichen hochuth, vnd Tyrannische proceduren von Tag zu Tag beym Volckh verhasster machet Gewiß ist, daß wenig Vorfahrere sich eines so absoluten gwalts bedienet, und den Sultan, wie Er besessen haben. Erst vor etlich Tügen liesse Er auf seine ordre, ohne dem Sultan die Ursach zuschreiben, weniger von ihme erlaubnus zunehmen, den Sultanischen Baschhaseki Kara Mustafa Agha mit ketten geschlossener von hier zu sich ins Laager bringen. Ein gleiches geschahe dem aus der Zelt deß Muffti gewaltiger weiß abgeholtten Mamud Effendi, auch dem vor vier Jahren zu Belgrad, vnd iezo zu Cunia geweseenen Ali Bahsa, so alß ein alt und unerfahrner Mann disen Krieg gar nicht approbiret, welchem, unterm prætext zu wenig Mannschafft mit sich gebracht zuhaben, die Kosßscweiff genohmen, vnd Selbter exiliret den Aivas Bahsa, Arabaci Bahsa, Jusuf Aga, Matemhalfasi Mehemed Effendi vnd Bekier Bahsa aber hat Er stranguliren, vnd ihre Köpff hieher beigen lassen.", 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 80v-81v.*

<sup>434</sup> *"Sonsten hat Er Groß Vezier auf benachrichtigung deren ausländischen durch ihre in die Christenheit führende correspondenz denen Türckhen alß Spionen dienenden Dollmätschen alß die Venetianer aus Dalmatien gegen Bosnien ein Diversion zumachen intentioniret seyen, die in Bosnien versamlende etwa auf zweyßzig bis dreysßig tausent Mann sich belauffende Troupen mit zwölf Jänitscharen Oden renforciret, die 10000 Tartarn aber halb dahin, und die andere helffte nach Morea beordert, welche auch beedes orths nechstens anlangen werden.", 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 81v-82r.*

<sup>435</sup> Chief of the clerks who handled correspondence in the Ottoman bureaucracy; Secretary of state in the Ottoman Empire. For more information, <https://ottoman.ahya.net/konu-1935-ns3.html>. Accessed on 27.12.2024.

Edirne. After giving a verbal report to the Sultan regarding his duties, he immediately continued his journey to the Grand Vizier. During the two days he spent there, he told a prominent Turk with whom Fleischmann had a good relationship that the Ottoman Empire had never been as powerful as it was now, that it was abundant in terms of people, money, ships and war preparations, and that they had unwavering hope that they would definitely bring the Kingdom of Morea under their rule this time. He then stated that they would head towards the Hungarian borders and could resist the Emperor.<sup>436</sup>

Fleischmann observed that the Ottoman leadership—whom he characterized as inexperienced and overly confident—might reconsider their aggressive stance should their ongoing siege efforts fail or their naval forces suffer a significant defeat. The Ottomans, he noted, were eagerly awaiting the arrival of French military engineers to assist with the siege operations. A recent incident further heightened their anxiety: a Maltese vessel had reportedly captured an Ottoman boat returning from Cairo, which was carrying pilgrims returning from Mecca as well as up to 200 pouches of money. Already in a precarious and unsettled position, the Ottoman leadership viewed this event with alarm. Fleischmann emphasized that, despite these concerns, the most sensitive issue for the Sultan remained the avoidance of a broader conflict with neighboring powers—especially the Holy Roman Empire. To this end, orders had been issued to Ottoman governors along the imperial frontier—including those in Belgrade, Timișoara, Khotyn, Bender, Azov, Ochakov, and Yenikale—strictly instructing them to refrain from any actions that might endanger the fragile peace. Maintaining peaceful relations with the Emperor was considered vital, not only to prevent military confrontation but also to safeguard Ottoman territorial integrity and avoid unnecessary loss of life.

Fleischmann reported that the Sultan was scheduled to depart on Monday, the 17th of the month. According to information provided by a trusted informant, the Sultan had recently presented the Grand Vizier with a ceremonial sword and shield, as well as sable furs—symbols of imperial favor and trust. However, before departing, the Sultan awaited further assurance that the Grand Vizier was capable of securing a decisive victory, even if the complete conquest of the Morea had not yet been achieved. The strategic plan outlined by the Ottoman leadership envisioned the capture of

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<sup>436</sup> *“Vor etlich Tügen ist der vormahlß Reis-Effendi gewesene, und wegen dem Schiff armament, und abgeschickhten provisionen zu Constinopl zuruckgeblibene Suleiman Effendi hier ankomben, und hat, nachdeme Er den Sultan von siner verrichtung mündlichen bericht abgestattet, gleich seine reiß zum Groß Vezier fortgesetzt, wehrender seiner zweytägigen allhiesigen verweilung aber hat Er sich gegen einen vornehmen mit mir in guter verständnus lebenden Türckhen herausgelassen, daß das Ottomannische Reich niemahln besser alß iezo gestanden, Leüth, gelt, Schiff, Kriegs bereithschafften in überfluß, mithin ohnfehlbare hoffnung hette noch dise Campagne daß Königreich Morea unter ihre bottmäsßigkeit zubringen, alß dann werde man sich auch gegen die Hungarische Gränitz wenden, vnd Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en vnd Catholischen Maýt: begegnen können ...”, 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 82r-82v.*

Nafplion, to be followed by military operations targeting Yenişehir and Larissa by September. The Sultan intended to participate in the anticipated victory celebrations and subsequently return to Edirne alongside the Grand Vizier.<sup>437</sup>

Fleischmann reported<sup>438</sup> that since the Sultan had only a few hundred Sipahis and a few chambers of Janissaries with him, he could easily have been caught off guard by a group experienced in the region in Despotialasi. In addition, in his report, Fleischmann asked for help in obtaining the necessary things, such as a horse carriage, tent, etc., to follow the Sultan on his journey.

### 3.17. Advance of the Ottoman Army in Morea & Sultan's Departure from Edirne

In the note<sup>439</sup>, that Fleischmann added to his report, he stated that the route of the Sultan's journey to Despotialasi, which was planned to last 24 days, was determined. The Sultan would reach Plovdiv from Edirne in 8 days and stay there for 10 days. From there, it would take 2 days to travel

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<sup>437</sup> "... vnerfahne Ottomannische Gouverno componirende Türckhen, sofern Sÿe aber entweder in der unternehmenden belagerung [warzue sÿe die neulich unterthänigst berichtete aus Franckreich beschribene Ingenieurs hefftig erwarthen] nicht reusciren, oder auf dem Meer einen verlust leyden solten, werden sÿe ohne deme von natur mehr insolent alß herzhaffte Türckhen bald auf andern gedanckhen komben, sinthemahln die kürzlich erhaltene nachricht, daß die Malthesen eine von Gran Cairo gekombene Türckhische Tschaickhen [worauf verschidene von Mecca zuruckh geraiste vornehme Türckhische bilgram, und 200 beütel baares gelt gewesen, hinweckhgenohmen den vnbeständ vnd forchtsamben Sultan nicht wenig consterniret, am empfindlichsten aber solte ihme gegenwärtig ein von denen benachbahrten Potenzen, insonderheit von Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en vnd Cathollischen Mäyt: entstehender Krieg vorkomben, zu dessen abwendung aber Er Sultan gnug zu seÿn glaubet, daß Er iüngstens resolviret, an alle Gränitz Bahsa alß den zu Belgrad, Temeswar, Chotzim, Bender, Afsak, Usu, Jengikala gemessene befelche zuschickhen, auf ihren Posten ruh-und fridsamb zustehen, mit denen angränzenden eine freündt-frid-vnd nachbahrliche verstandnus zuunterhalten, und insonderheit den mit selbigen habenden friden auf daß beste vnd genauiste zu handhaben, auch alles, so zu einer weithleüffigkeit anlaß geben kan, beÿ verlust leib-und leben zuvermeÿden. Vbrignus ist des Sultans abreÿß nach Despotialasi auf nechstkünfftigen Montag über acht Tag, das ist den 17ten dits, sofern, wie hiesiger orthten offtzugeschehen pfeget, nichts darunter kombet, festgestellt, seine des Sultans mit diser habenden intention solle meiner Confidenten außsag nach dahin gehen, daß weillen Er Sultan gänzlich persuadiret, daß sein Groß Vezier [welchen Er gestern ein Kilitsch Kafftan, oder einen Säbel und Zoblbelt zum præsent geschickhet] dise Campagna ohnfehlbahr, wo nicht ganz Morea, das Neapoli di Romania übergwaltigen, vnd andern considerable progrehen machen werde, selbiger sodann gegen den monath September sich von gedachtem Despotialasi nach Jengischeher, vnd Larissa begeben, von denen erhaltenen victorien Theill nehmen, vnd mit dem Groß Vezier triumphirend zuruckh gehen wolle ...", 5 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 82v-83v.

<sup>438</sup> "Der Sultan wird zu seiner bedenkh, und convoÿirung nur etlich hundert Sphahien, vnd einige oderen Jänitscharen haben, also daß Er leichtlich in dem mehrberührten Despotialasi durch eine wohlberittene, vnd der gegend erfahrene Partheÿ könnte überrumpelt, vnd abgeführt werden beÿ solcher beschaffenheit bin auch ich bemüssiget gewesen die zur Campagne erforderliche nothwendigkeiten alß pferd wagen, Zelter etc. machen, vnd ainkhauffen zulassen der mainung dem Sultan etliche Täg nach seinem aufbruch zu folgen, hoffend, es werde indessen der von oben erwarthende Currier so wohl mit der gehörigen instruction alß einigen beÿ iezigen Zeithen höchst-bedörfftigen geltmitlen allhier anlangen.", 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 83v-84r.

<sup>439</sup> "Jetzt gleich erfahre, daß der Sultan in seiner march-routte nach Despotialasi Vier-und Zwainzig Täg ausgesetzt, nemblichen acht Tag reÿß von hier nach Philipopel, zehen Täg aldort zuverbleiben, von dar einen march nach Stanomaka, wider zweÿ raÿßtäg, vnd von dar dreÿ march nachgedachtes Despotialasi. Vor seiner abreÿß will Er noch die öffentliche gebetter für den glücklichen fortgang seiner Waaffen allhier halten.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 85r.

to Stamna<sup>440</sup> and then 3 days to reach Despotiaailasi. Additionally, the Sultan stated that he wanted the people to pray to avoid any trouble and to have good luck before leaving Edirne.

The Grand Vizier (unlike his previous actions, he was now generously rewarding the bravery of his militia) arrived in Stivos<sup>441</sup>, 12 hours away from Istmo<sup>442</sup>. On Thursday, the 8th of the month, with the Ottoman army under his command, he had to order the opening of hundreds of wells to obtain water. On the 20th of the month, he passed to the mentioned Istmo. Fleischmann stated that the Grand Vizier and his army occupied Corinth<sup>443</sup> in the following days and entered the Morea without encountering a single armed Venetian. At the end of the same month, it was planned to capture Nafplion, without wasting much time or people. Meanwhile, news came to the Sultan on the 24th of the month that Kapudan Pasha was caught in a big storm in Andros, but the damaged ship was repaired. He later defeated the Venetians, who numbered more than 1000 in the fortified castle on the island of Thino<sup>444</sup> with very few casualties, and the Venetians surrendered with 500 Turks trapped in the castle. Thereupon, the Pasha took the Venetian garrison, which surrendered to him, to a safe place, and the entire island, including the castle, was occupied by the Turks (who were also invited by the Greek residents). Likewise, an Ottoman fleet captured the Venetian island of Cerigo. The Kapudan Pasha was supposed to do his best to surround and defeat the Venetian fleet, but if the fleet did not appear, another action was planned. With the help of the barricade prepared in Lepanto, a landing would be made on the island of Corfu. The island would be conquered and the Venetians would be prevented from passing to Morea. Thus, the conquest of both Morea and Cephalonia, Lefkada, Zante, Souda<sup>445</sup>, and other lands belonging to Venice would be facilitated.<sup>446</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> For more information about Stamna (Stanomoka), "[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stamna,\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stamna,_Greece)". Accessed on 25.03.2024.

<sup>441</sup> For more information about Stivos (Stivo), "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stivos>". Accessed on 25.03.2024.

<sup>442</sup> For more information about Istmo (Isthmus of Corinth), "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Isthmus-of-Corinth>". Accessed on 25.03.2024.

<sup>443</sup> For more information about Corinth, "[www.worldhistory.org/corinth](http://www.worldhistory.org/corinth)". Accessed on 25.03.2024.

<sup>444</sup> For more information about Thino (Tinos), "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tinos>". Accessed on 24.04.2024.

<sup>445</sup> For more information about Souda (Suda), [www.kastra.edu](http://www.kastra.edu), Accessed on 15.09.2024.

<sup>446</sup> *"Obwohln der Gros Vezier [welcher iezo wider sein voriges naturel die sich tapfer zaigende Miliz reichlich beschenckhet] mit der unterhabenden Türckhischen Armée bereiths den 8ten dits zu Hivo 12 Stund von Istmo angelanget ist, so hat Er dannoch aus abgang des wassers, zu dessen beÿbringung man etlich hundert brunnen gegraben, erst den 20ten darauf den gedachten Istum passiret, Corinthum besezet, und ohne einziggewaffneten Venetianer gesehen zuhaben in Morea eingeruckhet, willens, noch vor ende dises monaths vor Neapoli di Romania zugehen, vnd disen importanten orth [so auch nicht zum besten versehen seÿn solle] ohne grossen Zeit und Leüth verlust zuerobern. Indessen hat der Groß Vezier durch einen den 24ten huius hier angelangten Chahseki dem Sultan die ihm sehr erfreüliche Zeitung zugeschickhet, daß der Capitajn Bahsa, nachdeme Er die iüngstens von einem grossen Cengewitter beschädigte Schiff zu Andro repariret, den 11.ten dises in der Insul Thino aufs Land gestigen, die in selbigen considerablen Castel gelegene über 1000 Mann ausgemachte Venetianer mit wenigen verlust dahin bezwungen, daß sÿe den 14ten darauf capituliret, und ihme gedachtes Castel nebst 500 darin gefangen gelegenen*

According to Fleischmann, reports received from the Kapudan Pasha significantly boosted the morale of the Sultan, reinforcing his optimism that the Venetian conflict would soon be resolved in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan had been postponing his departure for Despotialasi, awaiting favorable news from the Morea before proceeding with his expedition. On the 27th of the month, a military display was held in which 400 Janissaries and 50 regiments paraded publicly, likely intended to bolster both domestic morale and the perception of imperial strength. Although Maraşlı Demir Halil Pasha had arrived from Anatolia with a contingent of 700 troops on the 13th, the Sultan chose not to retain him at the court. Instead, he instructed Halil Pasha to depart Edirne with his forces on the 17th and proceed to Bosnia to take up his assigned command. In preparation for the campaign, the Sultan traveled with a limited entourage, bringing only six of his concubines, his daughter (married to the Grand Vizier), and his eight-year-old son. Other members of the royal household, including his additional consorts, the Valide Sultan<sup>447</sup>, and the remaining princes, were left in Edirne. Additionally, Sirke Osman Pasha, who had arrived on Thursday the 12th, was appointed as Rikab Kaymakam, assuming administrative responsibilities during the Sultan's absence.<sup>448</sup>

According to the information Fleischmann obtained from some of his confidants, the Sultan, who was uneasy about things going wrong, set out on this journey largely out of impatience. In fact, the Sultan was waiting for the Grand Vizier to advance in the Peloponnese and was planning to join

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*Türkchen eingeraubet haben; Worauf Er Capitajn Bahsa die Venetianische guarnison der mit ihr entrichteten capitulation gemäß in sicherheit bringen, hingegen das mehrberührte Castel mit Türkchen besezen, und die ganze Insul [dessen Griechische Inwohner die Türkchen zu diser Descente invitiret haben sollen] in die possession nehmen lassen; Ingleichen habe eine Türkische Squadra die Venetianische Insul Cerigo dem Ottomannischen gwalt unterwürffig gemacht, mit befügung, daß Er mehrbesagter Capitain Pascha all-mögliches anwende, die Venetianische Flotta aufzutreiben, und zuschlagen im fall aber selbige nicht zum vorschein komben solte, seie Er intentioniret mit zuthuung deren zu Lepanto zu diser unternehmung verfertigen Barquen auf der Insul Corfu ein Disbarco zu-machen, und durch die erobrung diser Insul denen Venetianern den cours nach Morea zuverhindern, mithin die emportirung sowohl von bemelten Morea alß Cephalonia, St: Maura zante, Suda, und andern der Republic Venedig zugehörigen Ländern zufacilitiren ...", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 88r-89r.*

<sup>447</sup> For more informartion about Valide Gülnuş Sultan, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/gulnus-emetullah-sultan>". Accessed on 03.11.2024.

<sup>448</sup> " ... dise Zeitung hat dem Sultan über die massen erferüet, und ihne vor allem in seiner hoffnung mit denen Venetianern bald fertig zusein gestärckhet, welchemnach Er Sultan seine bis dahin verschobene reiß nach Despotialasi festgestellet, und selbige, nachdeme Er den 27ten dises den öffentlichen auszug gehalten, vorgestern angeretten, zu seiner bedeckung hat Er nebst seiner mehr zum bediennen alß zur wöhr tauglichen Hofstatt nur ungefehr 800 Sphahi, 400 Jänitscharn vnd 50 Regiments- Stückhet mit sich geführt, und obwohln den 13ten dits der zwey schweiff führende Demir-Halil Bahsa von Marasch aus Asia mit seiner gegen 700 Köpff ausmachenden Mannschafft angelanget, hat Er selbigen doch nicht bei sich behalten, sondern ihme ordre ertheillet, mit seiner gedachten Miliz in Bosnien zugehen, allwohin Er bereiths den 17ten dits von hier aufgebrochen; Ingleichen hat Er nur sechs Concubinen, seine mit dem Groß Vezier vermählte Tochter, und acht Jährigen Sohn bei sich, die übrige Weiber nebst der Valide, vnd denen Ottomannischen Prinzen hat Er allhier, vnd bei Ihnen den den 12ten dits allhier angekommenen, und drei Roßschweif führenden Sirke Osman Bahsa alß Caimecam gelassen.", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 89r-89v.

the campaign only after a great advantage was gained against Venice and it was certain that he and his Grand Vizier would return victorious via Larissa. He also stated that the necessary permission for Fleischmann to follow the Sultan was conveyed to him through Reis Efendi.<sup>449</sup>

Eight days before the Sultan's departure, Fleischmann went to the Reis-ül Küttab and informed him that the Sultan was preparing to travel somewhere and that he wished to accompany him in accordance with old traditions, requesting that the necessary passports and permits be prepared. The Reis-ül Küttab forwarded this request to the Rikab Kaymakam, who in turn forwarded it to the Sultan. In response to Fleischmann's request, it was reported that the Sultan was going to a rural area to hunt and have some fresh air and would return shortly thereafter. This was because such a situation would not be appropriate in a rural area where the Grand Vizier was not present and the Rikab Kaymakam did not have authority.<sup>450</sup> On this matter, Fleischmann went to Rikab Kaymakam Pasha on the 25th and explained in detail that, as someone appointed by the Emperor, he believed it was part of his duty to follow the Sultan, who was preparing to leave Edirne very soon. In this way, he would be ready to continue peaceful correspondence between the two empires and resolve any issues that might arise.<sup>451</sup>

During the course of the meeting, Rikab Kaymakam Pasha began outlining in detail the measures undertaken by the Kapudan Pasha against the Venetian forces. Fleischmann, however,

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<sup>449</sup> "... die meinung einiger meiner Confidenten ist, daß der unruhige, und auf die von seinen Groß Vezier machende progressen warthende Sultan dise reiß mehrentheils aus ungedult vorgenommen habe, und leichtlich seyn kan, daß Er Sultan bey Ferrern über Venedig erhaltenden Vortheillen sich von dort aus gegen Larissa wenden dörrfte, umb mit seinem Groß Vezier triumphirlich zuruckzugehen ...", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 89v.

<sup>450</sup> "... Meiner seiths liesse acht Tag vor dem Sultanischen aufbruch dem Reis-Effendi hinterbringen, daß nachdeme ich von Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en Maýt vnd meinem Großmächtigsten Kayser,vnd Herr bey Jhro Maýt: dem Sultan zu fortpflanzung der zwischen beeden Maýtt:en versirenden frid-freünd Nachbahrlichen verständnus angestellet, und der Sultan nun in procinctu stehe von hier ab-und anderst wohin zugehen, ich bereith seye selbigen dem alten herkommen nach nachzufolgen, dahero man mir den gehörigen passport ertheillen wolle, hierauf liesse Er Reis Effendi, nachdeme Er es dem Rikiab Kaimakam Bahsa, vnd diser zweifels ohne dem Sultan communiciret, antworthlich melden, daß der Sultan nur für ein kurze Zeit der Jagt und feischen lufft zugeniesen sich aufs Land zuverfügen vnd bald wider hieher zukommen intentioniret, mithin unnöthig seye, daß ich mich von hier, und mit selbigen begeben, gestalten sich ohne deme nicht wohl reimmete, daß man auf dem Land, zumahln der Groß Vezier nicht zugegen, und der Rikiab Kaimekam kheine Vollmacht hette, die affairen, welche gegenwärttig, da der frid zwischen denen beeden Kayl:en Maýtt:en so fest gestellet, von kheiner grossen wichtigkeit, und pressance wären ...", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 89v-90r.

<sup>451</sup> "... abhandte auf dises habe mich nach vorhero beschehener ansagung den 25.ten huius selbstem zum Rikiab Kaimekam Bahsa verfüget, vnd ihme vmbständlich vorgestellet, wie daß ich meiner schuldigkeit zuseyn erachtet, mich darzubieten dem Sultan, bey welchem ich von Meinem Großmächtigstem Kayser, und Herrn zustehen angewisen bin, bey seiner nunmehr von hier nehmenden abreiß zu folgen, umb bey hannden zu seyn, sowohl die zwischen disen beeden Reichen vorsehende fridnachbahrliche correspondenz zuerhalten als die etwa sich eraignende geschäften abzuhandeln ...", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 90r-90v.

reported that he received the information with indifference and concluded the meeting after offering a courteous remark congratulating the Kaymakam on the Sultan's forthcoming hunting expedition. Fleischmann noted that, according to his informants within the Sublime Porte, the Grand Vizier had issued explicit instructions to the Kaymakam Pasha not to engage in foreign affairs during his absence. As a result, any attempt by Fleischmann to transmit correspondence via courier was subject to prior approval by the Grand Vizier. This procedural requirement, he reported, created significant difficulties, as few were willing to risk incurring the displeasure of the Grand Vizier, whose authoritarian and severe demeanor was widely feared.<sup>452</sup>

Moreover, many of the Turks in the Sublime Porte were greatly afraid of the Grand Vizier's successful advance. If the Grand Vizier was successful in the campaign and conquered at least Nafplion, he would remove those who caused him trouble, execute the old pashas, appoint his own men to their positions, and thus achieve tremendous power. In the war against Venice, the Grand Vizier had already made a start by informing the Sultan about Grand Mufti Mirza Efendi, who opposed him. He persuaded the Sultan to dismiss this peace-loving mufti on the 25th of the Hijri month and replace him with Abdurrahim Efendi, a former Rumelian Kazasker (or Chief Judge) who appeared to be more dead than alive. Serasker Halil Pasha, who had recently been in Belgrade, was strangled on the 17th and his head was publicly displayed, largely because he did not take part in the current war council. This unfortunate event also affected former Janissary Agha Mustafa and Kızlarağası Süleyman.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>452</sup> "... Vber dises fienge Er an mir die oben gehorsambst beschribene von dem Capitajn Bahsa gegen die Venetianer gemachte progressen vmbständlich zuerzehlen, welches ich indifferent angehöret, und mich, nachdem ich ihme zu der vorhabenden iagt-lustbahrkheit gratuliret, beurlaubet habe. Es wollen mich meine mehriste gute freünd verscihern, daß der Groß Vezier dem offtgedachten Rikiab Kaimacam Bahsa gemessene Ordre gegeben, sich auf kheinerleÿ weiß in die ausländische affairen zumischen, sondern selbige alle an Jhn zu remittiren, dahero dörrfte auch ich, da mir mit dem augenblicklich von oben erwarthenden Currier ein Vortrag zumachen gnadigst anvefahlen wurde, grosse difficulteten haben selbigen ohne durch den canal dises entfernten Gross Veziers dem Sultan beÿzubringen, gestalten nicht zusagen, wie sich ein jeder vor disem hochmüthig, und Tÿrannischen Groß-Vezier [überdessen progressen die mehriste Türckhen sich nicht sovill erfreÿen, alß bestürzen] förchte ...", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 91r-91v.

<sup>453</sup> "... Tÿrannischen Groß Vezier [überdessen progresen die mehriste Türckhen sich nicht sovill erfreÿen, alß bestürzen] förchte, und sofern selbiger dise Campagne glücklich, vnd wenigstens Neapoli di Romania erobert, so wird Er noch manchen, so ihme ombrage verursacht, aus dem weeg raumben, die alte Bahsen hinrichten, an ihrer statt seine Creaturen einpflanzen, und sodann dardurch seine ohne dem ungemaïne pouvoir merckhlich vergrösseren, angesehen Er schon an dem ihme in disem wider Venedig unternommenen Krieg zu-gegen gewesenen Muffti Emirza Mehemed Effendi den anfang gemacht, indeme Er Groß Vezier den Sultan, der ihme eben unterthänigst angezogene vom Capitajn Bahsa über Venedig erhaltene Vorthell notificiret, dahin persuadiret, daß Er den 25.<sup>ten</sup> huius disen fridliebenden Muffti ab-vnd an seine Stell den vor alterthumb mehr Tod alß lebendigen vormahls Rumeli Kasiakier oder Ober Richter in Rumelien gewesenen Abdurrahim Effendi [so sich in allen nach des Sultans, und Groß Veziers willen conformiren wird, eingesetzt, den kürzlich zu Belgrad gewesenen Seraskier Halil Bahsa aber hat man mehrentheills eben der ursachen halber, weillen Er nicht zu gegenwärttigen Kriegerathen, stranguliret, und allhier den 17.<sup>ten</sup> huius seinen Kopf



Fleischmann reported<sup>454</sup> that Janissary Bekir, who had returned from Petrovaradin on May 3, delivered his resignation letter dated May 29. Additionally, he noted that the letter of credence for Chevalier Sutton, His British Majesty's ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had also been forwarded to Istanbul. Fleischmann further stated that he had informed the British and Dutch ambassadors of his intention to include in his correspondence the letter he had composed in an effort to mediate the disputes between the Republic of Venice and the Sublime Porte, along with their respective responses to his report.

In the latter part of his report<sup>455</sup>, Fleischmann noted that the Rikab Kaymakam had advised that any proposals or recommendations concerning the Venetian conflict should first be submitted in writing and then forwarded directly to the Grand Vizier for consideration. Despite this procedural guidance, the two ambassadors—both of whom had advocated for a peaceful resolution—were ultimately marginalized by the Sublime Porte. They were subjected to humiliating treatment by the Sultan and subsequently exiled to their residences in Belgrad village, where they had initially intended to spend their spring recess. Fleischmann characterized this episode as a serious diplomatic misstep, suggesting that such treatment only served to further inflame tensions with the Ottoman leadership. He remarked that, should the Ottoman campaign ultimately fail, these mediation efforts

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*offentlich exponiret, ein solches unglückh betrafte auch den vor disem Jänitscharn Aga gewesenen Mustafa, und den Kizlar Aga Soleiman.*", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 91v-92r.

<sup>454</sup> *"Sonsten habe eüer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden gnädigstes rescript untern 29.<sup>ten</sup> Maÿ von meinem den 3.<sup>ten</sup> huius von Peterwardein reverlirten Janitscharn Bekier Bahsa in unterthänigkheit empfangen, vnd daß gnädigst beÿgeschlossene Creditiv für Jhro Königl: Groß Britännischen Maÿt: beÿ der Ottomannischen Porthen anwesenden Podtschafftern Cavallier Sutton augenblicklich durch einen expresen nach Constantinopl überschicket, mit welchen ich untereinstens sowohl Jhme Engelländisch, alß Hollandischen Herrn Podshafftern über die aus befelch Jhrer höchsten Principaln beÿ der Porthen in favorem der Republic Venedig zu beÿlegung der obwaltenden strittigkheiten anzuwenden habende officia zuegeschriben.*", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 92r-92v.

<sup>455</sup> *"Worauf ich die von dem einen, vnd dem andern erhaltene antworth gehorsambst beÿlegen sollen, anderwärttig aber erfahre, daß der Constantinopolische Caimacam ihnen Podtschafftern gerathen, ihren gemachten Vortrag Zweifels ohne, weillen Er es zuthuen nicht gethrauet, schriftlich zuverfassen, und dem GroßVezier einzuschicken, allein scheint, daß wie schon neulich unterthänigst berichtet, auf die von disen ohne deme wegen den mehrbesagten fridens-werckh beÿ der Porten verhasst, vnd suspect auch vor allem beÿm Sultan in ungnad gekombene Herren Bodtschaffter, so alle beede von dem Constantinopolischen Kaimakam kurtz vor der beÿ ihme gehabtten audienz von dem dorff Belgrad, alwo Sÿe die frühlingsslust geniessen wollen, schändlicher weiß hinweg, und nach Hauß getriben worden, zuthuen habenden vermitlungs-vortrag khein fundament zumachen, weniger was nuzliches zuhoffen seÿe, dann erstlich ist es beÿ schon angefangener Campagne ganz aus der Zeit, und wan alß dann selbige für die Türckhen wohl ablauffet, so dörfte dises nur öhl ins feuer gegossen, und sÿe Türckhen dardurch zu weitheren unternehmungen angefrischet seÿn, schlägt es aber denen Türckhen fähl, so wurden selbige ohne derleÿ öfters beeden Theillen nicht gleich vorthellhafte Mediation von sich selbst zum friden incliniren, und sÿe darzue die erste passus machen, dazumaln dise gemelte Herren Podtschaffter ohne denen mit denen Türckhen aus forcht ihrem Comercio zupräjudiciren gar zuglimpflich vmbgehen ..."*, 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 92v-93v.

would prove inconsequential, as the Empire would lack the leverage to retaliate against the envoys involved. Nevertheless, Fleischmann observed that the Sublime Porte found it relatively easy to assert pressure over these diplomatic representatives, in part because the ambassadors' respective states had not yet challenged Ottoman trade privileges or commercial interests.

Fleischmann further noted that he had exercised considerable restraint in response to the arrest and treatment of the Venetian Bailo, refraining from any actions that might be construed as provocative. He reported that he had recently made a series of earnest and emotionally charged appeals to Rikab Kaymakam Pasha, one of his most trusted interlocutors. Although Fleischmann raised concerns that the Bailo's detention was inconsistent with principles of Islamic law, the Kaymakam responded that he lacked the authority to intervene and that without explicit instructions from the Grand Vizier, any attempt to assist the Bailo would be impossible. Fleischmann also emphasized that he remained attentive to any indications of Ottoman hostility along the Imperial frontier. However, up to the time of his report, he had not observed any actions that would threaten the existing peace. He acknowledged that while infrastructure projects such as bridge construction over the Sava and Morava rivers, as well as ship repairs in Belgrade, were underway, they did not, in his assessment, indicate immediate military escalation. This was particularly so given that a substantial number of troops, war materiel, and transport equipment had already been redirected to Bosnia and the Morea. The Prince of Wallachia alone, at his own expense, sent 2000 men for the fortification to Achaea<sup>456</sup>, 1000 men to Sochos<sup>457</sup>, and 1250 carts with four oxen each for the Grand Vizier. The Prince of Moldavia had to send 250 carts for only the Sultan's departure. One of the two groups commanded by the Tatar Khan and his brother had reached Bosnia with approximately 6,000 men and 10,000 Gurres, while the other group of the same number landed south of Plovdiv and was about to march towards Morea.<sup>458</sup> Fleischmann reported that, on the previous day, five deserters

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<sup>456</sup> For more information about Achaea (Chatzi), "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Achaea>". Accessed on 19.04.2024.

<sup>457</sup> For more information about Sochos, "<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sochos>". Accessed on 19.04.2024.

<sup>458</sup> *"... wie es dann bereits aus der für die Persohn des ellendig arrestirt-und iezo übel aufseÿenden Venetianischen Bajlo, sovill mir ohne nehmenden impegno möglich gewesen, gethan, auch erst-kürzlich beÿ dem Rikiab-Kaimacam Bahsa durch meine beÿ ihme wohlgelittene Confiendten einige bewegliche vorstellungen machen lassen, worüber Er sich zwar antworthlich ausliesse, daß die harte in verhaftnehmung eine dem Mahometanischen gesaz zuwiderlauffende sache, doch aber unmöglich seÿe ohne austruckhlichen befelch des Groß Veziers, alß durch dessen Ordre es geschehen, ihme Bajlo zuhelffen. Vbrigens lasse mir in unterthänigkeit stetts angelegen seÿn Türckhischer seiths gegen die Kayl:e Gränitz hegende absehen gründtlich zu penetriren sovill aber in erfarnus gebracht, und schon von Zeit zu Zeit gehorsambst berichtet, seÿnd dato gegen selbiger seithen kheine sonderlich-vnd ausser ordentliche veranstaltungen vergekehret worden. So scheint auch die zu Belgrad zurepariren anbefohlen seÿn sollende Schiff und beforderist die über die Sau, und morast zuschlagen vermeinte Schliffbruckhen nur ein aus der neüen einsezung deß Belgrader Schiff Beghs herrührendes gericht zuseÿn, da im gegentheill von selbiger gegend ville Leüth, Kriegs-provision,*

had presented themselves to him—four of whom were French nationals who had previously enlisted with the Venetian forces in Dalmatia, and one a German soldier from Petrovaradin. He retained the German soldier in his own service, while the four Frenchmen were directed to Istanbul, where they intended to seek the protection of their ambassador.<sup>459</sup>

In concluding his letter <sup>460</sup>, Fleischmann noted that he had dispatched his report to Petrovaradin via Janissary Mustafa. He also reiterated his ongoing expectation of financial support to cover essential logistical expenses—such as carts, horses, tents, and other supplies—required for accompanying the military expedition.

### 3.18. Occupation of Morea

The information<sup>461</sup> Fleischmann obtained from the one of his confidants serving the Grand Vizier from Thebes<sup>462</sup> or Stivos on June 18, 1715, was that the Grand Vizier inspected the Ottoman troops gathered under his command on the 9th of the same month. This inspection was carried out

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*pferd, wägen etc. nach Morea, vnd Bosnien abgangen, allein der fürst in der Wallacheÿ hat auf seine eigene Spesen 2000 Mann zum schanzen nach Chotzi, vnd tausent zur arbeith nach Soczova und über die pferd 1250 ieden mit 4 Ochsen bespante wägen für den Groß Vezier, und der Fürst in der Moldau dergleichen 250 Wägen für des Sultans abreiß schickhen müssen, die zweÿ von des Tartar Hans Brüdern commandirte Tartarn schwarme, und zwar der eine von ungefähr 6000 Mann, und 10000 Gurren hat bereiths Bosnien erraichet, der andere aber von gleicher anzahl so iüngstens unterhalb Philipopli marchiret, ist im anmarche nach Morea begriffen.*", 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 93v-94r.

<sup>459</sup> *"Leztlichen seÿnd vorgestern fünff Deserteurs, worunter vier Franzosen, so denen Venetianern aus Dalmatien, und ein Teütscher Corgoral, so von Peterwardein durchgangen, dahier angelanget, dem leztern umb beÿ denen Türckhen kheine üble impression zumachen, habe den perdon ertheillet, und zu mir genohmen, die übrige vier Franzosen aber seÿnd ferner nach Constantinopl zu ihren Podschaffter abgangen."*, 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 94r-94v.

<sup>460</sup> *"Schliesßlichen schicke gegenwärttig unterthänigstes Bericht-Schreiben durch meinen Janitschärn Mustafa von hier pr Posta, nach Peterwardein ab, von dar ich nun stündlich einen Currier, und mit Ihme einige beÿ so theüren Zeiten vnd stetten herumbvagiren höchst-nöthige gelt-mitl in unterthänigkheit erwarthe, umb unter andern die auf die vom Reis-Effendi anfangs mir gegebene verträstung zur Campagne durch erkhauffte pferd, wagen, Zelten, gemachte grosse spesen, und darzue aufgenommene gelter wider entrichten zukönnen."*, 30 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 94v.

<sup>461</sup> *"Vor acht Tagen erhalte von einem meiner beim Groß Vezier habenden Confidenten die Nachricht, de dato Thebes oder Stives den 18ten Juni 1715 meldend, daß den 9ten dito der Groß Vezier die unter ihm versamlete Ottomannische Trouppen [welche würckhlich wegen abgang des fiessen wassers zuerkrankhen anfangen, gemustert, und also selbige nach der unterthänigst-beischliessen den Lista in Vierzehn Tausent sieben hundert vier und neünzig zu pferd, und neun-und fünfzig tausent zweihundert zu fueß befunden habe, den 13ten darauf wurde Kriegs-Rath gehalten, und beschlossen, daß der Kara Mustafa Bahsa, und Jusuf Bahsa, welcher erstere gleich darauf zum Seraskier ernennet worden, mit seinem Corpo Jänitschärn und 3000 Spahen [so sich anfänglich ohne daß sogenannte postalakiasi zuhaben den marche anzutreten gewaigert] in daß König Reich Morea einfallen ..."*, 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 96r.

<sup>462</sup> For more information about Thebes, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Thebes-Greece>". Accessed on 07.05.2024.

after the troops started to get sick due to dirty water. According to the list, it was determined that there were 14,794 mounted troops and 59,200 soldiers.

A war council convened on the 13th of the month, during which it was resolved that the corps under Kara Mustafa Pasha and Yusuf Pasha—who was appointed serasker following the meeting—would advance alongside the Janissary forces and a contingent of 3,000 Sipahis. However, these Sipahis initially refused to march until they had received their *ulufe* (postal *akçesi*), delaying the mobilization. Ultimately, the Ottoman army was divided into two separate formations and began its advance from the city of Thebes—located approximately six hours from the Istmo—on the 20th of the month. The strategic plan was to launch a three-pronged invasion of the Morea, culminating in the siege of a fortress along the Gulf of Lepanto. The objective was to achieve military gains without overextending or exhausting the troops. Fleischmann expressed skepticism about the Grand Vizier's decision-making, arguing that a direct assault on the heavily fortified city of Nafplion was premature and strategically unwise. He contended that such an aggressive move, if unsuccessful, could endanger the Grand Vizier's position—and possibly his life. In his view, a more prudent approach would have involved a gradual campaign focused on capturing less-defended territories first to consolidate Ottoman control. He further reported that the Grand Vizier had begun to express concern regarding his standing with the Sultan. Nonetheless, according to intelligence Fleischmann received, a messenger had informed the Valide Sultan the previous day that the Grand Vizier had unexpectedly advanced on Nafplion and initiated a siege. Fleischmann remained cautious in assessing these reports, noting that Ottoman sources often exaggerated military accomplishments—frequently portraying the capture of minor settlements as major victories. Accordingly, he concluded his report by stating his intention to verify the accuracy of these claims through his network of confidants and to forward any substantiated intelligence to the Aulic War Council.<sup>463</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> “... und also die Türckhische Armée in zwei theill vertheilter den 20ten vom gemelten Secht Stund vom Istmo gelegen orth Thebes aufbrechen in drei marchen in daß berührte Morea einbrechen, und sodann erstens eine an der imbocatur des Golfo di Lepante gelegene Vestung [deren nahmen Er nicht anführet] belagern solle, beisezend, daß Er Groß Vezier seinem an marche nicht sonderlich pressire, und wann es bei ihme Stunde, schwährlich Neapl di Romania alß einen sehr Vesten orth, dessen unfruchtbahre belagerung ihn auf einmahl umb den Credit, ia gar umb den Kopf bringen könnte, attaquiren, sondern viel lieber die klein und kheine grosse gegenwöhr thuende Plätze, dise Campagna hindurch nach und nach hinweckh genohmen wurden, sinthemahln Selber bereiths an der gunst seines Sultans zuzweiflen anfangen solle. Vorgestern aber hat ein allhier bei der Valide oder Mutter des Sultans angelangter Expresser mitgebracht, daß der Groß Vezier würckhlich vor Neapl di Romania gezogen, und selbige Vestung zubelagern angefangen hette, weillen aber auf die zeitungden deren Türken, so minmer bei der wahrheit bleiben, undöfters daß geringste dorf für ein grosse Vestung nehmen, sehr wenig fundament zumachen, als erwarthe erst von meinen Confidenten die wahre beschaffenheit der sachen gründlich zuerfahren, und sobald was wichtiges kombet, bin Ich es eüer durchlauchtigen Exzellenzen und Gnaden in unterthänigkeit zuberichten unermanglend, zu welchem ende ich allzeit ein Post-Commandement in bereitschafft zurückhalte ...”, 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 96r-97r.

Fleischmann mentioned that the Venetian and Ottoman fleets were not far from each other around Andros and that they would meet soon and it would be clear who would dominate the sea. According to him, even though the Turks had a navy that they had not had before and from which they had great expectations, they would not be able to swallow the Venetian navy at once, and even if they were not defeated, they would probably hit the land in front of a castle. If such a situation were to occur, the war constitution of the Emperor in Hungary could make a great contribution. Only in such a case could peaceful negotiations begin and these unfaithful heretics could be punished for the good and future of both Venice and the Christian world. According to the report, finally, on Thursday, the 6th of the month, an Agha of the Grand Vizier wrote to the Rikab Kaymakam that the Venetians imprisoned in the Yedikule and the detained Bailo Memmo in the Abydos Fortress, should immediately leave the Ottoman lands. He ordered their release on the condition that they go to. A French ship was rented for this purpose. On the 11th of the month, the exiles were put on the ship, and then the Bailo was taken from the Dardanelles and sailed to Venice.<sup>464</sup>

In the rest of his report, Fleischmann mentioned that Monsieur Des Alleurs requested an appointment with him regarding the Venetians and the Bailo and that after their meeting, Brué made some arrangements in return for his promise.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> "... Ingleichen den mir über die den ersten dits zu Constantinopl entstandene etlich und dreÿssig Stund gethaurte über den vierten Theil selbiger statt consumirte erschröckliche, und von villen Jahren hero vnerhörte feüers brunst erhalten bericht gehorsambst einsändten; Weillen übrigens die Venetianisch und Türckhische Flotta in der gegend Andros unweith von einander stehen alß dörfte wohl mit nechsten von einem treffen was zuhören sein, von dem dann das mehriste dependiren wird, gestalten alles dahin ankommet, wer meister im See bleibet, gewiß ist daß denen Türken, wan Sie auch nicht geschlagen werden, sondern nur mit ihrer zu andern Zeithen nicht gehabtten Flotta [auf welche Sie ihre mehriste hoffnung setzen] nichts haubtsächliches ausrichten, und zu Land etwa vor einer Vestung die nasen anstossen, der mueth entfallen, und Sie mit end diser Campagna [in welcher selbige Venedig auf einmahl zuverschlungen gedachte, andere saidten aufziehen dörfften worzue vor allem die von Ihro Röml: Kayl: Mayt: in Hungarn fürkehrende gute Kriegs-verfassungen daß mehriste beÿtragen mögen, alß dann könnte wider eine fridliche negotiation platz finden, vnd etwa die abänderung deß Groß-Veziers das entzünnte Kriegs-feüer dämpfen; ob zwar wohl für allemaine beste und künfftig beständigen ruhe der Christenheit zu wünschen wäre, daß dise treülose unglaubliche ihrer so schändlicher weiß angefangenen ruptur halber bestraiffet, und dardurch von derlei ihrem gefallen nach vornehmenden fridens rupturen ferrers abgehalten wurden. Entlichen hat den 6ten dits in Aga vom Groß-Vezier den Caimakam Pascha zu Konstantinopel ordre gebracht, sowohl die in denen Siben Thürmen gefangensizende Venetianer alß den bei denen Dardanellen im Schloß Abidos verhaftten Bailo Cavallier Memo selbst den loß zulassen mit der bedeütung, daß Sÿe Venetianer sich alsogleich aus dem Ottomannischen Gebüeth über Meer nach Venedig begeben sollen; dahero selbige ein Französisches Schiff gemürdet, sich, und ihre haabschafften darauf imbarquiret, und bereiths den 11ten dits vom Constantinopel abgefahren umb bei denen gedachten Dardanellen den berührten herrn Bailo darauf zunehmen, und gerath nach Venedig abzuseglen ...", 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 97r-98v.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 120r-121v.

<sup>465</sup> "Wie Ich vernehme, hat der Französische Podtschaffter Meur des Alleurs auf meine ihme unterthänigst berichtermassen gethane bewegliche Vorstellung, und mir darüber gemachte vesprechung durch sein beÿ dem Gros

Fleischmann reported<sup>466</sup> that, for several months, in accordance with directives from the Imperial Majesty, he had endeavored to monitor and respond to developments related to the Ottoman expedition in the Morea. However, he expressed concern that members of the Ottoman administration had begun to level accusations against him before the Sublime Porte. According to a letter received from a trusted informant, the Rikab Kaymakam had been instructed to monitor individuals visiting Fleischmann's residence and to closely scrutinize his activities. In light of these events, Fleischmann emphasized in his report his continued commitment to conducting his diplomatic duties with discretion and diligence, while seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke suspicion or undue interference. He further noted the mounting financial burden he faced in fulfilling his responsibilities under increasingly difficult conditions. He expressed hope that the Imperial courier, expected to arrive shortly, would deliver the necessary funds to enable him to settle his growing debts and continue his service without interruption.

In the concluding chapter of his report<sup>467</sup>, Fleischmann noted, that the Sultan had arrived in Despotailasi eight days earlier. Although the Rikab Kaymakam assured Fleischmann that the Sultan would return within 30 to 40 days, most people believed that the Sultan would go to Yenişehir and Larissa, especially if the Grand Vizier made good progress. Meanwhile, on the 11th of the same month, the newborn prince, Selim, passed away. Serasker Karayılan Oğlu Ali Pasha, who had been in Belgrade four years earlier, was strangled as a rebel for opposing the Grand Vizier's plans.

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*Vezier stehenden dollmätsch Brue [so sich auch bey seiner neulich-hiesigen durchreiß mit mir in diser sache verabredet] gute passus machen lassen.*", 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 98v.

<sup>466</sup> "Wiewohl ich von etlichen monathen hero hier, unten gearbeithet, vnd insonderheit, da es mir von eurer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gden gnädigst anbefohlen worden, hierzue all-diennliche mittel anzuwenden nicht unterlassen habe. Hingegen fangen die Türckhen an meinewegen einige ombrage zusaigen, wie mir dann erst gestern ein verthrauter freündt durch ein billet zu wissen gemacht, daß der hiesige Caimakam Bahsa beordert seye, auf mich, die in meine behausung gehende, vnd mit mir practicirende Leüthe genaue obacht zutragen, dahero selbiger Tägliche verschiedene Spionen unter allerhand prætext schickhete; Meines geringstend orths bin ich alles impegno zuvermeiden, und wie bißhero gethan, mit all-möglichster behuethsambkheit meinen dienst unterthänigst zuverrichten beflissen. Worbey ich aber mit höchstem verlangen den gnädigst vertrösten Currier erwarthe umb mich nach dero mit ihme erhaltenden gnädigsten befelch in allen gehorsambst dirrigiren und mit denen verhoffenden geltmitlen meine wegen denen bey disen Zeiten habende ungemeine ausgaben Tägliche vermehrende schulden Zahlen zukönnen.", 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 98v-99r.

<sup>467</sup> "Schliesßlichen ist der Sultan bereiths vor acht Tügen zu Despotailasi angelanget, vnd ob mich zwar der Rikiab Kaimekam selbstens versichert, daß er innerhalb 30 biß 40 Tügen wider hier seyn wird, so wollen doch die mehriste glauben daß der Sultan, wan beforderist sein Groß-Vezier gute progressen machet, gar nach Despo Jengischeher, vnd Larissa sich begeben werde; Inzwischen ist ihme allhier den 11.ten dits sein neulich gebohrner Prinz namens Selim gestorben. Der vor vier Jahren zu Belgrad gewesene Seraskier Kara ylan Oglu Ali Bahsa aber ist weilten Er dem Groß Vezier in seinem vorhaben den unternommenen Krieg gesucht zu unterbrechen, alß ein Rebell stranguliret worden ...", 18 July 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 99r-99v.

Another piece of information<sup>468</sup> that Fleischmann obtained from his confidants was that on June 25, the Ottoman army under the command of the Grand Vizier reached the shores of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the Corinth Castle. A war council was convened at the site, during which it was resolved that the Fortress of Corinth would be placed under siege. The Beylerbey of Rumelia, Sari Ahmed Pasha, was appointed to lead the operation. On June 27, he departed from the main army with a detachment of 10,000 troops assigned specifically for the siege. The following day, the Grand Vizier dispatched a letter to the Venetian governor of Corinth, offering terms of conditional surrender. The letter assured the governor that, should he and his troops lay down their arms and relinquish the fortress to its rightful owners, they would be treated with clemency and permitted safe passage. However, the letter also carried an explicit warning: refusal to surrender would result in the application of *justice by fire and sword* and all inhabitants—regardless of age or gender—would be subjected to enslavement. In response, the Provveditore replied firmly in writing, declaring that he, his garrison, and the civilian population of Corinth were prepared to defend the fortress with unwavering determination. He urged the Grand Vizier to cease his threats. Following this exchange, the Ottomans initiated a sustained artillery bombardment, commencing the night of the 28th of June and continuing through to July 2. The Ottoman forces, both in terms of military preparedness and numerical superiority, significantly outmatched those of the defenders. Despite their resistance, the Venetian forces were unable to withstand the siege for more than a month.

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<sup>468</sup> *“Ich werde mehrmahl von meinen bekanten benachrichtiget, wie daß der Groß-Vezier mit der unterhabenden Türckhischen Armée den 25.ten Juny an dem Vfer des Golfo di Lepante herwerths der Vessung Corintho zustehen gekomben, darauf wurde Kriegs Rath gehalten, darinnen die belagerung der gedachten Vestung Corintho beschlossen, vnd die vollziehung dem Sari Ahmed Bahsa Begler Beg von Rumelien aufgetragen; den 27.ten hat sich der gedachte Bahsa mit dem Jhme mit einem Corpo von 10.000 Jänitschärn zuegegebenen Zagargi Bahsi von der haubt-armée separiret, und ist gegen die gedachte Vestung zuemarchiret; den 28.ten liesse der Groß Vezier dem Proveditor von Corintho schriftlich andeuten selbigen Platz seinnen vorigen Herrn zurestituiren mit der versicherung daß man Jhn, vnd seine bey sich habende Soldaten nach entrichter capitulation wohl tractiren vnd in sicherheit lifern wolle, widrigen falls werde man alles mit feüer, vnd Schwerd verhöhren, vnd alle Mann vnd Weibs Persohnen Groß vnd klein zu Slaven machen. Der Proveditor antworthete wider schriftlich, wie daß Er Groß Vezier wissen solle, daß Er mit seiner Miliz, vnd allen Jnnsassen von Corintho fest resolviret seyn disen Jhme anverthrauten Platz mit leib, vnd leben zuverthättigen, dahero wurden seine gemachte betrohungen umb so weniger ausgeben. Hierauf wurden einige Stukh aufgeführt, vnd von diser nacht an biß den anderten Tag des monaths Julij Starckh gegen ein ander iedoch ohne sonderlichen schaden canoniret. Indessen verfertigte man Türckhischer seiths ville laüttern, und richtete alles zum Sturm fettig; Warauf alsogleich der Proveditor, so sich mit denen seinigen aller außsag nach wenigist ein monath hette halten können ein weisse fahnen ausgesteckht, vnd zwey Officienz zu obgedachten Sari Ahmed Bahsa hinausgeschickhet; Auf vernehmung dessen sandte der Groß Vezier den Reis Effendi ab, welcher mit dem Proveditor auf folgende weiß capituliret, daß nehmlichen den 3.ten Julij zwey Thor eröffnet, vnd mehrgedachter Sari Ahmed Bahsa, vnd Zagargi Bahsa mit einiger Mannschafft hineingehen, hingegen der Proveditor nebst der Guarnison mit ober-und unter-gewöhr ausziehen, vnd sicher nach Corfu beglaidtet, ingleichen denen Innwohnern all-ihre freyheit, vnd habschafften gelassen werden sollen; alß aber ville Türckhen aus begierd der Beüth über die Mauer hinein gestigen, und durch die mänge des Volckhs das hin und her zerstreüete Pulver per accidens entzündet, vnd dardurch verschiedene Türckhen blehsiret worden haben die Janitschärn es alß eine von denen Venetianern mit fleiß angestellte bößheit ausgeleget, vnd dardurch ursach genohmen die ganze Statt zuplündern einge wider zuhauen, vnd die andern zu Slaven zumachen.”*, 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 101r-102v.

Eventually, the Provveditore signaled his intention to capitulate by raising a white flag. He promptly dispatched two officers to negotiate the terms of surrender with Sarı Ahmed Pasha. Upon receiving this event, the Grand Vizier instructed the Reis Efendi to proceed to the site and oversee the formalities. The surrender was finalized with the opening of the two gates of the Corinth Fortress on July 3. On that day, the two gates of the castle were opened. Sarı Ahmed Pasha and Zağarcı Pasha<sup>469</sup> would enter with a few men, leave with the Provveditore and the garrison upper and lower guards, and be escorted safely to Corfu. In addition, as promised in the negotiations, the castle's residents would be given all their rights, and their freedoms would be ensured. However, when some Turks, with the desire for money and loot, climbed the walls of the castle and accidentally ignited the gunpowder scattered around, an explosion occurred, and many Turks were blown up. The Janissaries perceived this accident as an ambush planned by the Venetians. Thus, the entire town was plundered and destroyed. The residents were made slaves.

Fleischmann stated<sup>470</sup> that there were about 400 soldiers, 300 defence forces, and many women and children in the castle. According to Ferner, the Imperial translator, the Grand Vizier departed from Corinth on July 9 and reached the fronts of the castle with a 5- to 6-day walk to Nafplion, intending to undertake the siege of the same castle. He would attack Xylokaastro<sup>471</sup> with his corps to facilitate the siege by conquering Patras<sup>472</sup>. Still, Fleischmann stated that he had not obtained any reliable information from the army under the command of the Grand Vizier since then.

According to information relayed by Ali Agha, a court official dispatched by the Sultan to the Valide Sultan and who subsequently arrived at the Sublime Porte on the 28th of the previous month, the Grand Vizier's forces had identified several mines along the coastline of Nafplion and had launched a major assault on the fortress. On July 19, the fortress was reportedly captured. Except

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<sup>469</sup> The head of the troop assigned to feed and raise falcons and hounds for hunting purposes in the army. For more information about Zağarcıbaşı or Zağarcı Pasha, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/zagarcibasi>". Accessed on 12.07.2024.

<sup>470</sup> *"In der Vestung waren ohngefähr 400 Soldaten, vnd gegen 300 wöhrhaffte Innwohner mit villen Weib, vnd kindern. Ferner geben frischem nachrichten, daß der Groß Vezier dem 9.ten Julij von gedachtem Corinthe aufgebrochen der mainung, inner 5 biß 6 Märchen vor Neapoli di Romania zukomben, vnd die belagerung selbiger Vestung vorzunehmen; Inzwischen solle ein Corpo Xillocastro attaquieren, vmb durch dessen eroberung die balagerung von Patrasso zufacilitieren. Von diser Zeit an habe ich über dises von der unterm Groß-Vezier stehenden Armeé nichts verlässliches erhalten ..."*, 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 102v.

<sup>471</sup> For more information about Xylokaastro, "[https://web.archive.org/web/20131020073202/http://www.xylokaastro-evrostini.gov.gr/parousiasi-dimou/parousiasi-istoria-ipiresies/dimotika-diamerismata/item/xylokaastro?category\\_id=225](https://web.archive.org/web/20131020073202/http://www.xylokaastro-evrostini.gov.gr/parousiasi-dimou/parousiasi-istoria-ipiresies/dimotika-diamerismata/item/xylokaastro?category_id=225)". Accessed on 10.08.2024.

<sup>472</sup> For more information about Patras, Chasiotis 1974; 320-321.



for the commander and seven senior officers—who were taken captive and enslaved—all remaining defenders were allegedly executed. Fleischmann stated that this information was conveyed to him by the Chief Çuhadar, sent on behalf of the Rikab Kaymakam. However, Fleischmann expressed strong reservations about the reliability of the report, emphasizing that in his experience, the Ottomans surpassed all other nations in their dissemination of misinformation and exaggerated claims. He further noted that the Rikab Kaymakam had previously provided him with detailed accounts of the capture of Corinth and the island of Tinos on June 25, prior to the Sultan's departure. Nevertheless, during his meeting with the Kaymakam, Fleischmann was informed that the Grand Vizier had not yet arrived in the region with the main body of his army. While acknowledging the detailed nature of the information he had received, Fleischmann remained cautious. In his correspondence, he stated that he had been unable to independently verify the reported Ottoman conquests of Cerigo and Nafplion.<sup>473</sup> Fleischmann also added<sup>474</sup> that no one had come to confirm the accuracy of the information he had received from Nafplion until that day. However, he stated in his report that a Tatar who had recently come to the capital from a camp near Nafplion and met with the Rikab Kaymakam had given some crucial information. According to Tatar soldier's sayings, there were German soldiers in the Nafplion Castle, not Venetians, unlike in the Corinth Castle. There had been many violent clashes between the two sides. The Turks were also very shaken by these conflicts. In addition, this time it was starting to be quite costly for the Ottoman army as well. Half a kilo of

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<sup>473</sup> "Von diser Zeit an habe ich über dises von der unterm Groß-Vezier stehenden Armee nichts verlässliches erhalten, allein ein vom Sultan an die Valide geschickter, vnd den 28.ten Pahasato hier angelanger Musahib namens Alý Agha hat die Zeitung gebracht, daß, nachdem der Groß Vezier durch die zu Ihme gekombene Vberlauffer verschiedene minen vor Napoli di Romania entdeckhet, vnd selbiger Vestung mit grossem gewalt zuegesezt, sye den 19.ten Julý mit Sturmender Hans erobert, vnd die völlige Guarnison ausser dem Commendanten, vnd sibem der vornehmern Officers, welche Er zu seine Slaven gemacht, widerhauen lassen; dise Zeitung liesse mir gleich der hiesige Kaimakam Bahsa durch seinen Basch Tschohadar in der nacht wissen, allein habe Ich selbige, so important sye auch ist, eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden zuüberschreiben nicht gethrauet, sinthemahln khein nation auf der welt, welche denen Türckhen in erfindung deren ungegründten Zeithungen, vnd vorgebung deren vnwarheiten kan verglichen werden; Wie dann der Rikiab Caimakam, als Ich ihme den 25.ten Juný vor des Sultans abreýß eine visite gegeben, mir nebst der besiznehmung der Insul Thino die eroberung der obgemelten Vestung Corintho vmbständiglich erzehlet, da doch selbigmahln der Groß-Vezier mit der unter sich habenden armee den gehorsambst überschribenen bericht nach nicht in dasiger gegend angelanget gewesen. Ingleichen will dato eben die von Jme Rikiab Caimakam mir communicirte, auch unterthänigst berichte emportirung der Insul Cerigo dato von kheinem orth confirmiret werden.", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 102v-103v.

<sup>474</sup> "... absonderlich weillen von gedachtem Neapoli di Romania biß heüntigen dato nicht die geringste person dahier angelanget, allein ein diser Täger beým Caimacam zu Constantinopl vom laager vor Neapoli di Romania arrivirter Tartar solle aussagen, daß in oftgedachter Vesstung sich kheine Venetianer, wie in Corintho, sondern Teütsche befundenen, so bereiths etlich scharffe ausfäll gethan, vnd denen Türckhen einen grossen schrockhen eingeiaget hetten, Vber dises seýe beý der Türckhischen Armee grosse theürung, indeme ein halb pfund brod umb zweý groschen verkhauffet wurde, welches umb so glaublicher scheint ...", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 104r-104v.

bread was being sold for 2 Groschen<sup>475</sup>. Fleischmann mentioned that, unlike the information spread from the Sublime Porte, what he heard seemed more convincing to him.

In the report, it was also noted the visible presence of numerous deserters returning from the front, both on foot and on horseback. In response to this incident, the Sublime Porte issued strict orders stipulating that these fugitives—primarily originating from the Asian provinces—were to be denied any right of residence or further movement. Specifically, they were prohibited from entering the capital or traveling beyond its vicinity under any circumstances.<sup>476</sup>

Additionally, it was mentioned<sup>477</sup> that the Pashas of Crete and Chania<sup>478</sup> had been ordered to make some attempts on Spinalonga<sup>479</sup> and Souda. If these castles were captured once, it would have been not be as easy to rescue them as it was thought. Fleischmann reported that he had received no reliable news either from the Ottoman navy, which was crossing the Gulf of Napoli, or from the Venetian fleet, whose entire success in the war depended on a naval battle that was expected to take place soon.

Meanwhile, the prolonged absence of Ibrahim Agha, who remained in Vienna, coupled with the wartime legal measures enacted by the Porte during the conflict with the Kingdom of Hungary, appeared to have generated considerable discontent. Recently, a Janissary Agha had arranged for the transfer of thousands of sick and wounded Janissaries from the Morean front to the capital, indicating the severe toll the campaign had taken on the Ottoman forces. Additionally, new orders were issued for the rapid mobilization of a significant number of Janissaries to be dispatched to key strategic locations, including Belgrade, Timișoara, and other previously designated regions. This

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<sup>475</sup> The Groschen was a type of silvercoin that had been in use since 1266. In the 19th century, 1 silver Groschen was worth approximately 12 pfennings. For more information about Groschen, "[www.ksk-koeln.de/de/home/ihre-sparkasse/geldgeschichte/](http://www.ksk-koeln.de/de/home/ihre-sparkasse/geldgeschichte/)". Accessed on 14.09.2024.

<sup>476</sup> "... alß man von einiger Zeit hero ville Deserteurs sowohl zu pferd alß fueß von Morea zuruckhkommen sihet, dahero man ordre ertheillet kheinen von selben einen aufenthalt zugeben, noch sye, so mehren Theillß Asiatische Völckher seynd, zu Constantinopl über den Canal zuüberführen.", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 104v.

<sup>477</sup> "Sonsten sollen die Bahsan von Candia, und Canea befelchet seyn, ein tentativ auf Spina longa, vnd Suda zumachen, welche entreprise, zumahln, wan gedachten orth wohl besezet, soleicht nicht, alß sye glauben, reusciren wird, allein ist dato weder von der Türckhischen Flotta, welche, wie einige versichern, vor dem Golfo di Napoli kreuzen solle, noch von der Venetianischen was verlässliches zuhören, bey deren zusambenhunfft, vnd etwa erfolgenden See-schlacht daß mehriste von diser Campagne Dependiren wird.", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 104v.

<sup>478</sup> For more information about Chania (Canea), "<https://www.greeka.com/crete/chania/history/>". Accessed on 15.09.2024.

<sup>479</sup> For more information about Spinalonga, "<https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5866/>", Accessed on 15.09.2024.

move reflected the Porte's efforts to reinforce its military presence amid escalating regional pressures.<sup>480</sup>

In the continuation of the report<sup>481</sup>, it was noted that the Sultan had departed from Despotailasi and relocated to Negro Scopia on the 26th of the previous month. He subsequently left that location on the 12th of the current month, expressing his intention to be in Edirne before the end of August in order to spend the holy month of Ramadan at his official residence. In the concluding section of the report, Fleischmann reported that Andrea Memmo, the Bailo of Venice, along with his entourage, departed from the Dardanelles aboard a French vessel en route to Istanbul on July 14. The Sultan had ultimately issued a formal order authorizing the release of the Bailo and his accompanying party.

According to a rather frightening information<sup>482</sup> obtained by Flesichman's confidants, the Grand Vizier and his army had been positioned in Nafplion on July 12, and the Ottoman army under the command of Ahmed Pasha, the Beylerbey of Rumeli, was following him behind. Moreover, Çakırcı (Zağarcı) Pasha from Ahmed Pasha's army, together with an accompanying Janissary corps, had captured two bastions from the Palamidi<sup>483</sup> Fortress and from there they had opened fire on

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<sup>480</sup> "Inzwischen scheint sowohl die so lange ausbleibung des sich annoch zu Wienn befindenden Ibrahim Aga, alß die im Königreich Hungarn vorkiehende Kriegs verfassung der Porthen eine Ombrage zuerweckhen, dahero Selbige kürzlich dem angesetzten Jänitschärn Agha zu Constantinopl, allwo etlich tausent Krankh vnd blessirte Türckhen von der Armée aus Morea angelanget, befohlen, eine gute anzahl Jänitschären zuwerben, umb selbige, sobald möglich nach Belgrad, vnd Temeswar zuschikhen, an welchen erstern orth bereits vor einem monath etliche oden abgegangen.", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 104v-105r.

<sup>481</sup> "Vbrügens ist der Sultan wegen der ihme, und seiner Hof-Statt nicht angeschlagenen lufft beüßiget worden den 26.ten Passato sich von Despot Jailasi nach Negro Scopia zubegeben, von dar Er willens ist den 12.ten dits aufzubrechen, vnd noch vor ende dises monaths hier zuseyn umb den vorstehenden ramasan oder fastens Zeit allhier zuhalten. Entlichen ist der Venetianische Baylo Cavalliere Andrea Memo mit seiner beÿ sich habenden Suite den 14.ten Julij auf einem Französischen Schiff von denen Dardanellen zu Constantinopl abgefahren, wie dann daß zu seiner freÿheit ergangene Sultanische Commardement eüer dhrl: Excell vnd Gnaden hierbei unterthänigst einschickhe.", 8 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 105r-105v.

<sup>482</sup> "Endlich erhalte von meinen Konfidenten die erschröcklich weit aussehende und anfangs unglaublich geschriene Nachricht, dass der Groß Vezier nachdem er den 12ten verflossenen Monats Juli vor Napoli di Romania geruckhet, sich die Türkische Armée unter Kommando des Rumeli Begler Begh Hisari Ahmed Pascha ganz nahe unter die welcher vertranchementiret, der Ciakerci Pascha aber hätte mit einem Corpo Janitscharen an dem so genannten beeg Palamida posto gefasset und gleich den folgenden Tag zwei Bastionen erobert, woraus Sie darauf durch Tag und Nacht gemachtes Feuer der Garnison sehr heftig zugesetzt, auch wehrender Zeit unter gedachtem Berg eine minen verfertigt, welche, als Sie den Samstag das ist den 20tn dito gesprungen, einen solchen Effekt gemacht, daß gleich die Janitscharen durch dessen Eröffnung sturmb geloffen und sieben Festung welcher nach einander einbekommen, welches die belagerte dergestalten erschröckhet, dass sie sich in die Statt zu retirieren angefangen, allein Selbe wurden von denen Jänitscharn verfolgt vnd der vor sye eröffnete eingang von ihnen Jänitscharn behaubtet ...", 11 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 107r-107v.

<sup>483</sup> For more information about Palamidi, "[www.kastra.eu](http://www.kastra.eu)", Accessed on 21.09.2024.

the garrison day and night, causing heavy damage. Simultaneously, explosive charges were being strategically placed at the base of the fortress walls. On Saturday, the 20th of the month, a significant detonation resulted in extensive structural damage, creating breaches through which the Janissary corps launched an immediate assault. Exploiting the openings, they swiftly overran the fortress. The defenders, overwhelmed and gripped by fear, attempted to flee en masse. The Janissaries pursued the retreating inhabitants, and once the main entrance was secured, the primary Ottoman force advanced into the city with little remaining resistance.

In the course of operations, a mine planted near a former Ottoman encampment—where fires had previously been set—was discovered by individuals who had defected to the Ottoman side. Thanks to their warning, the threat was neutralized before any damage could occur. Upon receiving news of the successful assault on Palamidi and the subsequent capture of the city's outer defenses, the Grand Vizier and the main Ottoman army ordered renewed attacks. Following the breach of elite defensive positions, Ottoman forces advanced into the city of Nafplion in two columns, swords drawn. The garrison was largely dispersed, the city was looted, and an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 inhabitants were taken into captivity. Among the captives were numerous Jews, reportedly sold for the nominal sum of two to three thalers each. The Provveditore, known as *Bon*, along with several nobles attempting to flee the city with their valuables, was captured near the harbor by the Kapudan Pasha. Upon apprehension, the Pasha informed him that the Grand Vizier had sentenced him to death. In an attempt to save his life, the Provveditore pleaded for clemency, offering intelligence on the fortifications of other Morean strongholds and promising to assist with the procurement of additional supplies and ammunition. According to reports from confidential sources, the Ottoman forces seized a significant quantity of military equipment during the assault, including 14 mortars and large stockpiles of ammunition from both Nafplion and Palamidi.<sup>484</sup>

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<sup>484</sup> "... alß nun die unten an der Statt eingegrabene haubt Armeé, welcher die durch überlaufer denen Türckhen entdeckte mine, weillen Sýe nächtlicher weill lähre zelten, vnd feüer darauf machen lassen, nicht den geringsten schaden zugefüget, den Success des beegs palamida vernohmen haben sýe etlichmahln auf die Statt gesturmet, und zugleich Zeit, als die Jänitscharen sic des eingangs vom berg-Palamida in die Statt bemeistert, die wähl, und mauren überstigen, also das Sýe Türckhen von beeden seithen mit dem Säbel in der Hand in die Statt Napoli eingetrungen, die mehriste von der Guarnison widergehauen, die Statt ausgeplindert, und die Innwohner [worunter vill Juden, so zu zwey a dreý Thaller verkhauffet werden] zu Slaven gemacht, in der anzahl der besazung komben meine Confidenten nicht über ein, allernaßten einige solche vier, oder fünff und mehr tausent Mann gewesen zuseyn melden, der General Proveditor, dem Sýe den nahmen bon beylegen entfloh vnd setzte sich nebst villen vornehmen der Statt mit ihren besten habschafften auf eine Barquen, wurde aber von dem ausser dem Haafen kreüzenden Capitajn Bahsa gefangen, und dem Groß Vezier überliefert, welcher Jhn General Proveditor zum Todt verurtheillet. Allein solle Er sich mit dem geröttet haben, da er ihme Groß Vezier versprochen alles in dem Königreich Morea zuentdecken, vnd es dahin zubringen auf das Er Groß Vezier die übrige Vessungen leichter dinge erobern könne, über die zimliche anzahl Provianth vnd munion haben die Türckhen in der Statt Napoli vnd monte palamida 147 Stuckh und 14 Mörser bekommen.", 11 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 107v-108v.

Fleischmann reported<sup>485</sup> that he had learnt from his confidants that Nafplion, the capital and fortress of the Kingdom of Morea, which was considered by the Venetians to be unconquerable, soon fell to the Turks. Moreover, Ottoman forces reportedly sustained minimal casualties during the operation. The ease with which they overcame the hesitant garrison at Nafplion was attributed not only to the assurances provided by the Grand Vizier but also to the ideological motivation offered by promises of eternal reward, as framed within the religious justifications advanced for the campaign against Christian forces. Fleischmann attributed part of the Venetian failure to the ineffectiveness and lack of resolve exhibited by the local administrators in Thino and Corinth. With the strategic advantage now firmly in Ottoman hands, the Grand Vizier was in a strong position to extend control over the remaining territories of the Morea. As part of this effort, the Grand Vizier had instructed Defterdar Hacı Mehmed Pasha—who commanded a force of approximately 15,000 troops—to oversee the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in Nafplion and to initiate the conversion of Christian churches into mosques, symbolically reaffirming Ottoman sovereignty over the region. The Ottoman army was subsequently reorganized into three columns and continued its offensive throughout the surrounding areas. Meanwhile, the Venetian fleet remained stationed at Corfu, reportedly unwilling to engage in open conflict. Intelligence suggested that despite the Kapudan Pasha's will, the Grand Vizier was hesitant to initiate a naval engagement due to unfavorable maritime conditions, which were deemed unsuitable for a full-scale sea battle.

Fleischmann recounted that the Sultan had proudly declared his success in reclaiming nearly all the territories lost by his predecessors during the previous major conflict, attributing these gains to a series of relentless military offensives. The Sultan also alluded to the potential expansion of hostilities toward the Kingdom of Hungary and other Imperial domains, suggesting the possibility of further territorial ambitions. Fleischmann, however, offered a more critical interpretation of the

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<sup>485</sup> "Auf eine solche weißt ist des König Reichs Morea hauptstatt, vnd Vestung Napoli [so von denen Venetianern vor unüberwindlich gehalten worden] in einer so kurzen Zeit, vnd mit sehr wenigen verlust deren Türckhen in die Ottomannische hande gerathen, worzue Jhnen Türckhen sowohl die vom Groß Vezier verprochene Leüth alß das denen in Krieg wider die Christen Streüttend vnd bleibenden durch daß falsche Mohamedanische gesatz vergwisserte Paradeÿß als vor allem die ständliche gegenwehr der darin gelegenen Zaghaften besatzung den weeg gebahnet, gestalten meine Confidenten, deren einer mir beÿligendes wegen Thino, vnd Corintho zuegeschriben die poltronerie deren Verkhättigern nicht gnugsamb austruckhen können meldend, daß nunmehr der Gros Vezier gar leichtlich die übrige Plätze übergwältigen, vnd allen ansehen nach noch dise Campagna selbiges ganze KönigReich der Ottomannischen Podtmässigkeit unterwerffen werde, Sinthemahln Er Groß Vezier, nachdem Selbiger die ruinirte werckher von Napoli zurepariren Bäder zubauen, vnd die Christliche Kürchen zu Moscheén zumachen anbefohlen, auch alda den Hatschi Mehemed Bahsa [so Defterdar gewesen und iezo dreÿ schweif bekoben nebst 15.000 Mann zum Commendanten hinterlassen] bereiths aufgebrochen, die Türckhische Armee in dreÿ Corpo zertheillet, vnd die übrige orth attaquiren lassen. Indessen solle die Venetianische Flotta sich nicht gethrauen von Corfu auszulauffen, vnd dörfte selbige wohl mit der Zeit alda selbst an gegriffen werden, worzue der Capitajn Bahsa sehr, der Groß Vezier aber wegen enge des Meers abgenagt seÿn solte.", 11 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 108v-109r.

Ottoman successes. In his view, the progress achieved by the Ottomans was attributable less to their military prowess and more to the perceived weakness and lack of resolve on the part of their adversaries.<sup>486</sup>

In the concluding<sup>487</sup> appended to the report, it was stated that the Grand Vizier, while stationed in Bosnia, had issued orders for coordinated military offensives against Venetian positions across multiple locations.

#### **4. The Road to the War with Austria (1715-1716)**

##### **4.1. Warnings about the Turks & Expulsion of the Genoese Ambassador**

In a note dated October 25, 1715 contained updates on the progress of the Ottoman campaign in the Morea, based on daily intelligence received from a trusted informant close to the Grand Vizier. According to this information, the Grand Vizier had reached Yenişehir on the 14th of the month and intended to return to Edirne at the conclusion of the scheduled 18-day march. In addition, it was reported that the Grand Vizier had issued decrees for the recruitment of several thousand Albanian soldiers in preparation for the forthcoming military campaign. On the 11th of the same month, intelligence was received indicating that the Kapudan Pasha had successfully captured the Souda Fortress following a prolonged blockade and an eight-day siege. The fortress, which had been ceded to the Venetians under the terms of a previous treaty, was lightly defended, housing only 53 soldiers at the time of its fall.<sup>488</sup> Meanwhile, Fleischmann mentioned in his report that he

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<sup>486</sup> "Beÿ derley der sachen betriebten beschaffenheit werden eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz: vnd Gnaden von selbst en gnädigst erwegen, wie daß der Sultan durch das in denen biß hiehero gemachten unternehmungen habendes ausser ordentliches glückh zu voll führung seines von Zeit der Brutischen begebenheit herhabendes vnd etlichmahl unterthänigst berichtes dehsein nemlich all das im lezten Krieg von seinen Vorfahrern verlohnes zu recuperiren mehr vnd mehr angefrischet, mithin die gefähr des angriffes dem Königreich Hungarn, vnd andern Kayl:en Landen nächer vnd nächer werde, allein hoffe zu Gott, daß sye Türckhen deren progrehsen wahrlich nicht sovill ihren valor, alß der Zaghefftigkheit ihren feinden zuezuschreibeni alß dann ein ganz widriges erfahren, ihr concept verruckhet, vnd entlichen ihres biß dahin treülosen wandels halber werden gestraffet werden.", 11 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 109r-109v.

<sup>487</sup> "Jetzt gleich erhalte die nachricht, daß der Groß Vezier in Bosnien Ordre geschickhet auch von selbiger seithen gegen Venedig offensive zuagiren, vnd wo möglich ein und andern Plätz hinweckh zunehmen.", 11 August 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 110v.

<sup>488</sup> "Voici le detail de Sude le 19. le Captain Pasha arriva avec l'ame navale; le Provocateur de la place ne vous pas la remettre ainsi qu'il avoit promis à Alli Pasha: et à Cara Mehmed Pasha: le 22. le Capitan Pasha fit transporter sur une grande navire, qu'il avoit fait faire, ques pieces de canons, et 400 Soldats sur une petite Isle voisine de la Sude pour la battre de là. Le Provocateur y envoya 150 hommes pour les deloger sans Savoir le nombre des Soldats ottomanes. Les Venitiens furent tout taillés en piece, et le Capitan Pasha voyant, que le Provediteur continuait à le defendre, fit mettre quantité des fusiliessur lès huver de son vaisseau, et poussant après de là Sude, lui firent decharger de toutte son artillerie tous les autres vaisseaux à son exemple farent la même chose: mais cela n'ayant rien produit le 24. le

had to pretend to be deceptive for three days-to hide his identity in order not to be insulted by the public. In addition, the island of Lefkada and the castle had surrendered to the Turks due to the lack of soldiers and the inability to meet the needs after a short-October unsuccessful resistance. The captain had also been ordered to attack Spinalonga. So, with the conquest of this place, the expedition carried out by sea and land would come to an end.<sup>489</sup>

Although Fleischmann expressed skepticism that the Grand Vizier would be able to provide a legitimate justification for the war anticipated in the coming year, he acknowledged that the final decision would likely depend on the developments of ongoing military operations, particularly the movements of Imperial forces in Hungary. Nevertheless, according to a reliable source within the Ottoman court, the Sultan—invigorated by the progress of the recent expedition—had resolved to return to Istanbul upon the Grand Vizier's arrival. There, he intended to oversee the comprehensive reorganization of the Ottoman navy, including the integration of vessels currently stationed in Sinop.

The Sultan's strategic aim was to dispatch a substantial force to Dalmatia in the following year. Plans were reportedly being formulated for a naval deployment consisting of approximately 100 warships and an additional 200 transport and auxiliary vessels. The ultimate goal was to expel Venetian forces from Corfu and other remaining territories, thereby severing their lines of

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*Capitan Pasha fit encor transporter les la petite Isle quelques pieces de canons, et mille hommes, que là dessus le Provediteur avoit capitulé, le 25. a remit la place à condition, que lui, et toute la garnison seront transporté sur les terres de l'obéissance de la République, ce que leurs estoit accordé, il y avoit dans la place 250 Soldats Vénitien et quelques Precs, on a trouvé environ 95 pieces des canons.*", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 140r. See Appendix 9.

<sup>489</sup> "... den 7.ten huius ist vberbringer dises der Orientalische Currier Arakiel hier angelanget und hat mir eüer Dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden gnädigstes rescript vom 25.ten des lezt abgeflossenen Monaths Septembris, nebst denen ihme mitgegebenen gelden [deren quittunden gehorsambst beylege] wohl behändiget; vor allem bin ich mit anspannung meiner eüssersten kräfte dahin bedacht, all deme, so dieselbte mir gnädigst anzubefehlen geruhet, in unterthänigkeit genaueste folge zulaisten: Was nun daß so weither in Morea vorgegangen, dessen erobrung unv darauf geendigten feldzug belanget werden eüer Dhrleicht Excellenz vnd Gnaden aus dem so mehrmahln einer meiner bey dem Groß Vezier stehenden der Sachen wohl kundige Confident per modum Diary mir communiciret, mit aller ausführlichkeit gnädigst zuersehen belieben, anderwarttig aber erfahre, daß der berührte Groß Vezier bereiths den 14.ten dises zu Jenischer angelanget, willens von dar ohne denen rasttügen in 18 Marchen hier zuseyn, wehrender seiner hieher reiß solle selbiger etlich tausent Albaneser zu seiner nechstkünftiger Campagne gebrauchen wollender Leib Guardie anwerben. Indessen ist allhier den 11.ten dises die nachricht eingeloffen, daß der Capitajn Bahsa die importante Vestung Suda [worinnen unter andern 50.Stuckh gewesen] nach einer langen bloquirung, vnd achttägigen belagerung, wie aus beyliegenden gnädigst zuersehen pr Accord erobert, vnd würcklich die Venetianer so nur noch in 53 Mann bestanden aus vnd die Türckhen eingezogen seynd, westwegen man allhier dreß Täg hindurch illumination [worzue auch ich vmb von dem Pöfel nicht affrontiret zuwerden] mich verstellen müssen gemacht hat; dise freidens bezeügungen waren kaumb geendiget, langet die Zeitung an das auch die considerable Insul vnd Vestung St: Maura wegen geringer und zaghafter besazung auch mangl deren nothwendigkeiten nach einer kurz und sehr schlechten verthättigung sich an die Türckhen gleichfallß pr accord ergeben hette. Obgedachter Capitajn hat ferrer ordre Spina Longa zuattaquiren, mit dessen überwältigung sich sodann gegenwärtiger feldzug zu Wasser und Land endigen dörfte.", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 123r-124r.

communication and supply to Cephalonia, Zakynthos, and other islands still under their control. The Sultan wanted to invade the Gulf of Venice as far as Venice, and then subject this Republic and Ragusa<sup>490</sup> to his authority and tribute.<sup>491</sup>

Fleischmann stated in the continuation<sup>492</sup> of his report that he believed that the Turks would attack Rome, the capital of the Christians, with all their forces after the Venetians had been completely defeated. According to Fleischmann, the recent string of military successes experienced by both the Grand Vizier and the Sultan had notably elevated their confidence and emboldened their strategic ambitions. He observed that the expansionist aspirations long held by the Ottoman

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<sup>490</sup> For more information about Ragusa, "<https://fee.org/articles/remembering-the-ragusan-republic/>". Accessed on 11.10.2024.

<sup>491</sup> *"Obwohl zwar deren Türckhen auf nächstes Jahr hegen des Kriegs Dehsejn vor ankunfft des mehrbesagten Groß Veziers nicht leichtlich zuergründten, gestalten in denen dazumahl darüber anstellenden berathschlagungen erst die zuekhünfftige unternehmung [welche villen Theillß auch von denen in Hungarn Kayl: seiths machenden Kriegsbewegungen Dependiren wirdet] aigentlich entschlossen werden, so bringe ich dennoch durch meine im Seraglio habende sichere Canalen in erfahrung, daß der von denen sise Campagne gemachte vngemaine prograssen sehr aufgeblasene Sultan dato gänzlich resolviret, sich solbald der Groß Vezier zuruck komben seyn wirdet, nach Constantinopl zubegeben, seine Flotta aufs neü formidabl aus zurüsten, vnd selbige mit denen alda zu Sinopi, vnd anderen orthen angelegten Schiffen biß auf 100 Kriegs Schiff, vnd 200 fahrzeüß zuverstärckhen deß gänzlichen vorhabus khünfftiges Jahr eine Zahlreiche armee zu Land in Dalmatia zuschickhen, vnd die Venetianer von dar zudelogiren, mit seiner gedachtem Flotta aber [so Er, da bißhero die Venetianer in allen orthen sich vor selbiger retiriret, vnüberwindlich zuseyn glauben] Corfu hinweckhzunehmen, vnd dardurch ihnen Cenetianern die communication mit Cefalonia, Zante, vnd andern noch besizenden Insuln abzuschneiden, in den Golfo di Venetia, ia gar biß Venedig einzutringen, vnd sodann dise Republic gleichwie Ragusa seiner bottmässigkeit zuunterwerffen, worzue Er Sultan sich aigentlich folgender worth gebrauchet, insch Allach bujaner le raharaz Küfsar et talem, daß ist mit Gottes hülff will ich dise vnglaubige tributbahr machen.", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 124r-124v.*

<sup>492</sup> *"... Inzwischen werde die Ottomannische Flotta sich gegen die Siciliannische vnd Italiansche küsten wenden, selbige völlig ausplündern, vnd entlich beÿ dem einfluß Tybris anlanden, vnd die Christliche Haupt-Statt Rom mit aller macht attackiren; dises ist wahrlich das, was der Sultan nebst seinem Groß Vezier [so durch disß Jahr gehabte grosse glückh, vnd dem Kriegs Volckh zaigende freÿgebigkeit beliebt zuwerden anfanget für daß nechstkünfftige Jahr im sinn haben, dahero solle dises von mir mehrmahln in der Zeit entdeckte intent deren wegen so villhältig, vnd gleichsamb ohne widerstend über die Christen erhaltene vorthell iezo ganz vnerträglich, vnd zu allerhand unternehmungen angeherzten Türckhen sonderlich in ansehung, daß sye nunmehr durch ihre vor disem mir gehabte, vnd täglich vermehrende Flotta auf der See den meister spielen, vnd die biß dahin sich gar schlecht zum widerstand geschickhte Venetianer fast völlig daraus getriben, beÿ denen, so es angehet, eine nachdenckhlich apprehension erweckhen, vnd sye dahin veranlassen in tempore auf weeg, und mittl zgedencken; wir nemblich disen von dem Erbfeind Venedig, Italien, vnd insonderheit dem Kürchen-Staat und Loreto antrohenden weith aussehenden gefährlichkeiten Zeitlich könne vorgebogen werden. Beÿ sothanner der Sachen beschaffenheit werden Euer dhrl: Excell: und Gnaden von selbstem ermesen, daß die Türckhen, bevor Sye nicht ihr gegen Venedig, Italien, vnd den Kürchen-Staat unterthänigst beschribener massen habendes Dehsejn vollzogen, ex motu proprio schwärlich was gegen Hungarn, vnd andern Kayl:en Ländern unternehmen werden, sinthemahl eine des Ottomannischen Reichs Hauptmaxime ihre benachbahrte Christliche Potenzen nicht zugleich sondern eine nach der andern anzugreifen, zuschwächen, und ihrem gewalt zuunterwerffen. Allein werden Ihre Röml:e Kayl:e vnd Königl: Cathollische Mayt: kaumb biß dorthin warthen, Venedig sambt Italien der Türckhischen grausambkeit exponiren vnd etlich daß Kriegs feuer diser treülosen Barbarn in dero Erblanden selbstem entzündten lassen sondern wie es auch daß ansehen hat, vill mehr denen betrangten Christlichen Mächten Succuriren, Sye von dem völlig gewiß erfolgenden untergang retten ...", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 125r-126r.*



leadership had, through successive victories over Christian forces, evolved into an unrestrained and increasingly assertive determination to pursue their objectives at any cost. Fleischmann further remarked that the steady growth and operational strength of the Ottoman naval fleet had enabled the Turks to effectively expel the Venetians—whom he described as incapable of mounting a meaningful defense—from the Morea. This development, he argued, posed a serious challenge to the prestige and authority of the Holy Roman Empire. In light of the Ottomans' aggressive posture toward their traditional adversaries—namely Venice, the Italian territories, and the Papal States—Fleischmann expressed confidence that the Habsburgs would act decisively in response. While he did not anticipate an immediate Ottoman offensive against Hungary, Fleischmann asserted that the Turks had historically pursued a policy of sequential aggression—targeting and destabilizing neighboring Christian states individually, rather than confronting them collectively. He concluded by affirming his belief that the Emperor would not allow the militant fervor of what he described as *disloyal barbarians* to erode the legacy of the Empire or subject Venice and Italy to Ottoman domination. Rather, he hoped that these oppressed Christian territories would be able to preserve their sovereignty by aligning themselves with the leadership and protection of the Emperor.

As Fleischmann had repeatedly asserted in his previous correspondence, he remained convinced that the recent military successes of the Ottomans were less a result of their own strategic superiority and more a consequence of the inadequacy or unpreparedness of their adversaries, or, alternatively, due to favorable fortune on the battlefield. He applied this interpretation not only to the Venetian campaign but also to the earlier Ottoman conflict with Russia. Fleischmann observed that the Sultan was continuing to amass a substantial military force in preparation for future campaigns. However, he noted a stark contrast in recruitment efforts: whereas pashas had previously been able to assemble forces numbering 6,000 to 7,000 men with relative ease, they were now struggling to recruit even 100 soldiers. Reflecting on his close observations of the Ottoman expedition against Russia, Fleischmann opined that a disciplined Imperial army of 30,000 German troops could have routed the entire Ottoman and Tatar contingent involved in the campaign. Even if they had not been entirely destroyed, he suggested, a significant portion would likely have fled the battlefield. He further argued that the Ottoman advance in the Morea was unsurprising, given that the Venetians were unable to station even 3,000 regular troops in their fortresses to defend the Kingdom of Morea. In his view, a similar pattern could be expected in Italy should the Ottomans turn

their attention there. Fleischmann concluded that the less resistance the Ottomans encountered in their campaigns, the more ambitious and expansive their demands would become.<sup>493</sup>

Fleischmann also mentioned that the envoy Ibrahim Agha, who had been in Vienna for some time, had arrived in Belgrade at the beginning of October and would stay there for a few days due to the Ottoman holiday, which had not yet taken place. During this time, he also planned to send his reports about Vienna to the Grand Vizier by mail. Fleischmann had stated that one of the most important tasks of the envoy was to inform the Grand Vizier on the way back. In addition, the Porte had sent orders to the pashas in Timișoara and Belgrade through the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. These orders were about the all German troops stationed in Hungary, the marching troops there, and how they could be captured. So, the Pashas were already sending many agents there under all sorts of pretexts. But these mentioned princes were also continuing their correspondence with Vienna. The Russian representatives present in Porte also were not hesitating to inform them about what was happening on the Imperial borders and the pro-Venetian articles about the Ottoman Expedition published both in the Netherlands and in the Empire. Again, Fleischmann stated that he was informed by one of his confidants that as soon as the Grand Vizier returned to Istanbul, he would fill the castles in Timișoara and Belgrade with soldiers, arsenals and whatever was necessary in accordance with all the intelligence he had received.<sup>494</sup>

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<sup>493</sup> "... und also denen nach ausführung des obbemelten Dehsejns dero aigenen Landen vorstehenden feindlichen invasion vorkomben wollen, worbey ich abermahln gehorsambst anfügen muß, daß dise vor einigen Jahren wider Moscau vnd wider Venedig gemachte vngemaine progressen wahrlich nicht deren Türckhen stürk- und Tapferkeit, sondern bloß Ihrer feinden zaghaftten gegenwöhr zuezumessen seÿen. Es hat zwar der Sultan abbemelte Summa gewaltthättiger weiß versamlet, allein dardurch sein ganzes Reich, insonderheit die Bahsen [so vor disem mit 6, 7 auch mehr tausent Mann zu feld gangen, aniezo kaumb mit 100 an allen nothleÿdenden Persohnen erscheinen können] dermassen ausgesauget, daß ihme bey entstehenden rechtschaffenem Krieg dises geld mehr præjudiz alß vorthell schaffen wird, hiezue bin ich selbst dem wider Moscau gethannem Türckhischen feldzug zugegen gewesen, vnd kan wohl sagen, daß 30.000 wohl angeführte Teütsche gnug gewesen wären, damahls die Türckhisch und Tartarische Armee [so sich ohne dem mehr die flucht alß den Sieg vorgebildet] zugrund zurichten, so ist auch bekant, daß zur Defension des KönigReichs Morea in denen Vestungen, vnd auf dem Land unter Venetianischen Commando nicht über 3000 regulirte Mann verleget, und darbey die Vestungen mit denen nöthigen Kriegs- requisiten schlecht versehen gewesen seÿen, daß sich nicht sovill über die progressen deren Türckhen zuverwundern, alß zuförchten ist, das selbige gegen Italien eben so wenigen widerstand erfahren, mithin sich desto weither erbraitten mögen.", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 126r-127r.

<sup>494</sup> "Sonsten ist der zu Wienn in ablegatione gestandene Ibrahim Agha bereiths mit anfang dises monaths zu Belgrad ankomben, willens alda wegen den eben eingefallenen Bajaram oder Türkhisches Osterfest etliche Täg zuverweilen, vnd sodann sich gerad pr Posta zu den Groß Vezier zuverfügen, allwo Er bißdato zweifelß ohne angelangeet sein re- creditiv überlifert und vor allen von em, was Er in seiner sowohl hinauf alß herunter-reiß, vnd zu Wienn selbst verkundschaftet, den bericht wird erstattet haben, allermassen dises, wie ich strackhs anfangs unterthänigst gemeldet, eines deren vornehmsten absehen selbiger gesandtschaft gewesen, und eben dahin seine daraussen importum Sollicirte, und unter weegs præcipitos vorgekehrte zuruckheillung hingezihlet hat. Nebst disem ist denen Bahsen zu Belgrad, vnd Temeswar, auch denen fürsten in der Wallacheÿ, vnd Moldau von der Porthen scharff anbefohlen; derselben von allen denen Teütscher seiths in Hungarn fürkehrenden Kriegs anstalten, an marchirenden

In the rest of his report<sup>495</sup>, Fleischmann stated that the Sultan expressed himself in the following words: "*What if the Germans were to disturb the peace? They have no money and have only 40,000 soldiers; in return, I can send 400,000 Turks and 100,000 Tatars against them, invade all of Hungary and Transylvania, and take back my old lands.*" Against these words, Fleischmann reminded that he would fulfill his duties of surveillance and reporting with all the attention and diligence possible against any attempts to be made on the Imperial borders.

Fleischmann expressed his sincere gratitude to his Imperial Majesty for the assurance that neither he nor his entourage would be harmed in the event of a conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. He clarified, however, that any forthcoming war would not stem from direct hostilities between the two empires, but rather from the imperative to support the Republic of Venice and Italy, both of which faced imminent and significant danger. In light of these incidents, Fleischmann emphasized the gravity of the situation, stating that precautionary measures must be taken against potential Ottoman reprisals. He further cautioned that, should a conflict arise, his ability to comply with Imperial directives might be severely restricted due to the likely confiscation of couriers and communications. Even if he managed to evade imprisonment, such circumstances could nonetheless compromise the prestige and credibility of the Empire. Consequently, he proposed that the Empire formally notify the Grand Vizier—either in writing or verbally—of its intention to recall its representative. If the Grand Vizier were to obstruct this process, he should be reminded unequivocally that the Empire reserved the sovereign right to withdraw its representative. Fleischmann added that any Ottoman opposition to such a decision would constitute a breach of peace under recognized principles of international law. By taking these steps,

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*Trouppen, und darunter fangenden vorhaben genaue nachricht zugeben, welches gründlich zuerfahren die Bahsen hin- und wider unter allersand prætext Spionen abschickhen, die gemelte fürsten aber zu Wienn ihre correspondenzen halten, auch die bey Jhr Porthen anwesende Rußländer schüen sich nicht Jhr daß, was sye über die Kayl:e Gränitz bekommen, insonderheit die im Reich, vnd Niederlanden getrunckte Zeitungen, welche von dem in favor der Republic Venedig von Jhro Röml: Kayl:en, vnd Cathollischen Mayt: wider die Türckhen beschlossenen Krieg öffters ausführliche meldung machen, zucommuniciren, also daß sye Porthen in meiner iüngsten hier per Duplicat beyligender relation unterthänigst berichter massen von allem gar wohl informiret, vnd bereiths meiner Confidenten außsag nach entschlossen ist, sobald der Groß Vezier aus dem feld zuruckh angelanget seyn wird, hierüber sich zuberathschlagen, vnd vor allem die Vestungen Belgrad, vnd Temeswar mit mehrerer Mannschafft zubelegen auch die dasige Magazine, vnd Zeügheüfer mit all-nöthigen zuversehen ...", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 127r-128r.*

<sup>495</sup> "*Vber welches sich der orgoglioso Sultan mit folgenden eigentlichen worthen ausgelassen was? Solte es auch seyn, wan die Teütsche den friden brechen, Sye haben khein geld, vnd kaumb 40.000 Mann, wohingegen Jch 400.000 Türckhen, vnd 100.000 Tartarn wider sye schickhen, darmit ganz Hungarn, vnd Sibenbürgen überschwemmen, vnd auch von selbiger seithen wider meine vorige Lande in besiznehmen werde. Auf welches alles, so man gegen die Kayl:e Gränitzen vorzunehmen willens, Jch die kleine Zeit hindurch, so es noch thuenlich seyn wird, mit all-möglichster aufmercksambkheit zuinwiliren, vnd es in der Zeith zuberichten ohnrmangle.*", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 128r.

Fleischmann believed he could avoid immediate danger before the onset of any potential hostilities.<sup>496</sup>

He reported that his most recent journey to Istanbul had incurred substantial personal expenses. Several members of his entourage had fallen ill during the trip, and some—most notably his chaplain—had succumbed to disease. Fleischmann noted that he had accumulated significant debt as a result of expenditures on couriers, horses, and household staff, in addition to the considerable sums required in the form of gratuities and bribes to influential figures within the Ottoman administration, including Rikab Kaymakam, Osman Pasha, Mehmed Pasha, and others. In light of these financial burdens, he respectfully petitioned His Imperial Majesty for monetary support in the amount of 2,000 Gulden to alleviate his indebtedness and enable him to continue fulfilling his diplomatic responsibilities effectively.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>496</sup> "Inzwischen solle eüer dhrleicht Excell: vnd Gnaden unterthänigsten dankh erstatten, daß dieselbe gnädigst geruhet mich widerholter zuvertrösten beÿ einer zwischen Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en vnd Cathollischen Mayt: vnd der Porthen auskumbenden ruptur in rechter Zeit auf mich, vnd meine folge zusorgen, allein da es nun allen ansehen nach auf gedachte ruptur ankommt, nicht zwar daß die Türchen sondern Jhre höchst-besagte Kayl:e Mayt: vmb der betragten Republic Venedig, vnd mit Jhr dem in der eüssersten gefahr stehenden Jtalien zu succurriren, die waaffen ergriffen, alß gelangt an eüer dhrl: Excell: vnd Gnaden mein abermahliges unterthänigst-gehorsambstes ersuechen, auf das dieselbte gnädigst geruhen mögen auf meine avocation zeitlich gedacht zuseÿn, dann wan der mir ohne deme wegen denen ihme gegen seine Dehseins gethannen vorträgen abgenaigte GroßVezier zurukh angelanget, vnd daß Kayl:e Vorhaben nur noch ein wenig erhellet, so werde ich ohnfehlbah der furiosen grausambkheit diser Barbarn exponiret, vnd im fall ich auch durch harte gefängnus daß leben erhalte, doch nicht im Stand seÿn dero alß dann empfangenden ordren nachzukomben, sinthemahln in dergleichen fällen die Currier arrestiret, vnd ihrer haab-und briefschafften beraubt worden, es wude dahero ohne dem durch derleÿ mir, vnd meiner Suite zuestehendes unglückh Jhro Kayl: Mayt: wenig nuzen geschaffet, sondern es villmehr dero allerhöchster reputation præjudiciret, ohne unterthänigste maßgebung am besten seÿn dem Groß Vezier, sobald möglich entweder durch einen an Jhne gestelten brief schriftlich oder durch mich mündlich zuverstehen zugeben, wie das Jhre Röml: Kayl: vnd Cathollische Mayt: allergnädigster willen, vnd befelch seÿe mich alsogleich nach Wienn zuverfügen, beÿ einer von Jhme Groß Vezier hierin einwendenden Difficultet aber zuremonstriren daß in Jhrer allerhöchst-berührten Kayl: Mayt: willkuhr stehe einen Minister, vnd kheine Gaisel an die Porthen zuschickhen, alda zuhalten, oder zuruckhzurueffen; im fall nun sÿe Porthen selbigen wider daß allgemaine Völckher Recht, und fürwehrende freündtschafft aufhalten wolle, so wurde Jhro mehr allerhöchst-besagte Kayl: Mayt: selbiges, wie es auch an sich selbst ist, alß einen öffentlichen fridens bruch ausdeüten etc. auf dise, vnd schwärlich auf eine andere weiß wurde ich mich, wo nicht gänzlich, doch dero ersten Furie, in welche ich sofern sÿe den vorseÿenden Krieg nur noch etwas wenig mehr vermuthmassen, gerathete, entgegen können; Worbeÿ Jch doch eüer dhleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden alle dises vnterthänigst gehorsambst an heimbstelle, vnd mich meiner allerunterthänigsten pflicht gemäß bereith offerire, für das allgemaine beste, vnd allerhöchste Kayl:e interesse nicht allein all-eÿsserstes zuleÿden, sondern auch beÿ erheischender noth meinen letzten bluts Tropfen selbigen zusacrificiren.", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 128r-129v.

<sup>497</sup> "Allein muß Jch eüer durchleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden wehemüthigst klagen, wie daß von Zeit an, da mir die allerhöchste Kayl: affaire in disen Landen allergnädigst anverthrauet werden, die conjuncturen sonderlich meiner æconomic so fatal gewesen, daß ich mit denen empfangenen unterhaltungs-geldern sehr hart habe können auskomben, beforderist hat mich dise leztern abreÿß von Constaninopl sehr empfindlich mitgenommen, gestalten ich alda mit grossen vnkhosten meine wohnung zuegerichtet, mit wein-vnd andern allein aus franckhreich für 516 fl. empfanfene victualien [so darnach vmb halbes geld weckhgegeben, vnd hier andere vmb dopelten preÿß erkhauffen müssen] versehen, wegen stetts vorseÿenden ungewißheiten vnd vom monath May her von oben erwarthen Currier, vnd mit ihme zuhaben geglaubte Ordre dem Sultan zu folgen mit erkhauffung pferd, wagen Zelten, so allein über 1000 Ft. Gekostet, alles habe zum feldzug gerichtet, auch von selbiger Zeit an vmb in allen fall in stand zu seÿn eine reÿß

In the report<sup>498</sup>, Fleischmann stated that he was investigating what Ibrahim Agha would report to the Grand Vizier about Vienna and what consequences this might have. According to him, Ibrahim Agha would not mention his imam who was staying in Vienna and would tell him, as he did in Belgrade, that he was staying behind because that imam was ill. He also learned from other sources that the Sublime Porte was displeased with the death of the King of France and the Russian march through Poland in Pomerania.

Furthermore, on the 12th of the month at approximately 1 o'clock in the afternoon, Angelo Giovi, the Genoese ambassador in Istanbul, reported that although he had twice been summoned earlier that morning to appear before the Rikab Kaymakam, he was unable to comply immediately due to the absence of his attendants and interpreter. Later that day, however, Muzur Agha—or the Captain of Public Security—arrived at his residence accompanied by more than thirty armed guards carrying large sticks. Ambassador Giovi was forcibly removed from his home in a state of disarray,

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*thuen zukönnen, biß auf dise stund etlich-und zwainzig pferd nebst villen Leüthen, dahier wie leicht zuerachten alles theüer unterhalten müssen, über dises kan ich wegen den stetten herumb gehen, vnd vorseýenden Zweifelhafften laüffen nicht den geringsten vorrath machen, und muß darbey noch mehrere Leüth alß Chyurgum, beethen, Stahl und Kuchelbedienten in diensten halten, und da ich mehrmahln vorseýenden Winkher nach Constantinopl werde ziehen müssen, so grauset es mir schon für denen unbeschreiblichen aufschlagenden nothwendigkeiten, nebst disem bin ich wegen dem iezo vngemain Türckhischen Gouverno obligiret allerhand extra Spesen zumachen vnd unter andern für zwey heüser nemblich hier, vnd zu Constantinopl grosse zimß zuzahlen, vnd kan dato von sechs monath hero von der Porthen mein sich auf ein gar geringes belauffenden ordinari Tain oder sogenante verpflegung nicht haben. Vber alldises ist fast Zeit meiner hiesigen anwesenheit unter meine Suite ein solche ansteckhende mit hiz, vnd kält vermischte kranckheit eingeschlichen, daß dato kaumb von allen zwey Persohnen gesund verbliten, wie dann die mehreste noch Kranckh darnider ligen, vnd auch bereiths etliche, worunter mein Caplan gestorben seýnd, welches dann mich in nicht geringe unkhosten stürzet, gestalten nebst denen Kranckhen andern bediente aufzunehmen, vnd allein iezo für die Krankh, vnd gesunde Köch, vnd Kucheldiener monatlich biß 50 ft. An lohn zuzahlen bemüßiget bin, disemnach ist an eüer dhrleicht, Excell: vnd gnaden mein unterthänigst gehorsambstes bitten dieselbe geruhen mich in ansehung diser fatal, theüer, vnd schwären Zeiten vnd conjuncturen für dises Jahr, da mir soville unglückh, vnd extra zu machen gehabte grosse Spesen zuegestossen über das wegen meiner hieher-reýß wenigstens mit einer beýsteuer von zweýtausent Gulden gnädigst zusougaliren, damit ich, zumahln mir nunmehr ohne wo nicht ein grousamber Todt, doch eine schwäre gefängnus übrig, wenigstens die aus eüsserster noth, vnd wegen gehorsambst erzehlten ursachen gemachte sculden noch in der Zeit abzahlen, vnd im stand seýn möge, mir in der vorseýenden avocirung, vnd loßwürckhung, oder beý dessen fehlschlagung in der darauf kömbenden gefangenschafft angesehen dise Barbaren allein durchs geld zubewegen seýnd, in etwas helffen zukönnen, nebst disem hab ich wegen den disß Jahr in Türckheý vorseýenden zertheillungen meine Confidenten beý dem Sultan Rikiab Kaimecam, Sirkie Osman Bahsa Validischen Kaimecam, Mehemed Bahsa Constantinopolitanischen Kaimecam, vnd endlich beý dem Groß Vezier, vnd der Türckhischen Armee, vnd Flotta haben, und cultiviren müssen, also das die zu disem ende hereingeschickhte zweýtausent Gulden zwar biß auf ein gar weniges nicht völlig ausgegeben", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 129v-131r.*

<sup>498</sup> "Ferners bin ich auch ohnermanglet möglichst zuerforschen, was der gehorsabst berührte Jbrahim Aga beý seiner ankunfft dem Groß Vezier weithers beýgebracht, vnd was es für solge haben wirdet, Indessen scheint doch nicht, daß selbiger von seinem zu Wienn zuruck geblibenen Imam villweesens machen, sondern vill mehr, wie Er schon zu Belgrad gethan haben solle, vorgeben werde, das ernenter Imam überkombener Kranckheit halber daroben verweillet seýe, beý einer destwegen eraignender anfrag aber bin ich die hierüber gnädigst anbefohlene antworth zugeben beraith. Sovill ich sonsten vernehme, so will der Porthen daß absterben Ihrer aller Christl: Mayt: des König in Franckreich, wie auch der von denen Moscovitern durch Pohln in Pommern vorgehabte marche nicht allerdings gefallen.", 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 131v-132r.

dressed in a worn and tattered garment, socks with exposed knees, and Turkish slippers. He was publicly paraded through the streets of Pera and Galata and brought to Istanbul. Upon arrival, the Kaymakam ordered him to read an official edict issued by the Sublime Porte and to have it translated by a French interpreter present at the scene. According to Fleischmann, the contents of the edict were as follows:

*"Since the Republic of Genoa has provided ships, men, and military supplies to the Venetians, who are enemies of the Sultan, His Imperial Majesty no longer seeks their friendship. The ambassador is therefore ordered to leave Constantinople immediately, as he is suspected of espionage and of providing intelligence to the enemies of the Ottoman Empire."* Although Ambassador Angelo Giovi denied any knowledge of the allegations outlined in the edict, the Kaymakam maintained that the order was explicit and non-negotiable, and that the ambassador was to depart the capital without delay.<sup>499</sup>

According to Fleischmann, following numerous petitions, Ambassador Angelo Giovi was eventually granted permission to remain aboard a Genoese Tartane<sup>500</sup> anchored in the port of Istanbul. However, he was strictly prohibited from setting foot on land again, a restriction enforced in a manner that Fleischmann described as both severe and inhumane. On the 17th of the month, shortly before his departure, the ambassador was briefly permitted to return to his residence to collect personal belongings. He subsequently departed via the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, the ambassador's misfortunes did not end there. As reported by Fleischmann, Giovi faced the imminent

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<sup>499</sup> *"Vbrigens wurde den 12.ten dises nachmittag umb ein Vhr der zu Constantinopl angeweste Genuesische Podtschaffter Herr Angelo Giovi nachdeme Er in selbigem vormittag zweij mahl durch Tschauchsen zu dem alldasigen Kaimacam berueffen, vnd sich wegen abwesenheit seinr Leüthen, und dollmätschen alsogleich nicht erscheinen zukönnen excusiret, von dem Muzur Aga oder Rumor hauptmann, vnd etlich und dreißig mit grossen prüglen bewaffnetn Türckhen mit gwalt aus seiner wohnung genohmen ganz allein ohne huet in einem alt zerissenen Klejd, abfangenden Strimpfen S: V: Pantoffel von denen Türckhen auf beeden seithen gehaltener unter villen Stosß-und schlägen duch die gassen von Pera vnd Gallata über den Canal durch Constantinopl zu gedachten Kaimecam geschleppt, alda befahle er Kaimecam ihme den von der Porthen erhaltenen Ferman oder commandement abzulesen, und durch einen per accidens alda befundenen französischen Dollmätsch zuinterpretiren, welches aigentlich folgenden inhalts gewesen seyn solle: das weillen die Republic Genua seine unglaubliche Principaln denen Venetianern alß feinden der Porthen verschidene Schiff, Bodts Knecht, vnd Kriegsgeräthschafften zuekomben lassen, alß verlangte der Sultan Jhrer freündtschafft nicht, vnd befehlete an, das er Podtschaffter unverzüglich von Constantinopl [allwo Er ohne dem wegen nichts anderes alß nur zu Spioniren, und die feinde des Ottomannischen Reichs von allem zubenachrichtigen stehe, mit all den seinigen hinweckhbegeben solle, Er Podtschaffter wendete beÿ dem Kaimecam hierüber ein, all dises ihme unnbekhtant zuseyn, warauf selbiger ihme geantworthe, daß auch die Porthen solches glaubete, dahero sÿe ihn auch hinweckhfahren liesse, wo sonsten, da man wuste, das er hierzue daß geringste beÿgetragen, man Jhn Podtschaffter öffentlich hette aufhemkhen lassen."], 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 132r-133r.*

<sup>500</sup> A type of ship with an average tonnage of 70, used mostly for cargo transportation between 16th-18th centuries. For more information, Botcazou 2021; 347-349.

threat of capture and enslavement by Barbary corsairs, who were active in the Aegean Sea at the time and engaged in hostilities against the Republic of Genoa.<sup>501</sup>

Fleischmann reports<sup>502</sup> that he made a detailed investigation into the crimes committed by Ottoman pirates, and especially the Dulcignotians, against ships having the Imperial flag and against Imperial subjects, both on the Adriatic and Nafplion coasts, and the activities of these groups in the areas in question. Fleischmann wanted to speak to the Rikab Kaymakam about the crimes mentioned. However, he was advised to wait for the arrival of the Grand Vizier and discuss the matter with him. He explained this situation by saying that the Grand Vizier was the arch-enemy of the Kaymakam and that he would do everything to have him removed from office as soon as he returned. Because those who informed Fleischmann had warned him that if he did not discuss the matter with the Grand Vizier, he would not be able to achieve any results and that things could even become more difficult. Therefore, he would wait for the Grand Vizier's return, which would be

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<sup>501</sup> *“Endlich nach villen bitten wude ihm erlaubet in einer in dem Constantinopolitanischen Haafen sich befindlichen Genuesischen Tartana [ wohin man ihn auch mit gröster verschümpfung, und vnmenschlichkheit, ohne noch einmahl in seine wohnung gehen zudörffen, abgeführt, und imbarquiert] sich noch was doch verarrestirter aufgehalten, und indessen sein Haußweesen veranstalten zukönnen, also das er Genuesische Podtschaffter gehorsambst beyligenden gemäß den 17.ten dises von denen Türckhen biß an die Dardanellen verwachter abgefahren. Das größte vnglückh aber dörrfte disen guten Podtschaffter [dessen ihm angethanes übles tractament aus einschliessenden gnädigst zuersehen, noch bevorstehen, allermassen Er auf seinen kleinen Schiff in gröster gefahr von denen iezo in dem Archipelago anwesenden, vnd mit Genau in stetten Krieg seÿen Barbaresquen aufgehoben, vnd zum Slav gemacht zuwerden.”*, 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 133r-133v.

<sup>502</sup> *“Nun auf die von denen Türckhischen Corsaren, und in Specie denen Dulcignoten sowohl an dem Adriatischen alß Neapolitanischen Seekhüsten gegen die Kayl: Flaggen, vnd vnterthannen ausgeübte vngebüß, vnd thätigkeit zukomben, habe der sachen reisslich nachgesehen, vnd in unterthänigkeit erwogen, das man ich auch daß ienige, welches mir von eüer Dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden hierüber gnädigst anbefohlen, dem hiesigen Rikiab Kaimacam vortreuge, dise sache ohne deme biß zu ankunfft des Groß-Veziers verschoben werden, mithin ich dardurch wenig nuzen ia mehr schaden verschaffen wurde, sinthemahln ich vor etlichen monathen von meinem bey Jhme Gros Vezier habenden guten freunden in verthrauen gewarnet worden mit gedachten Kaimacam mit nichten was zu negotÿren weillen der Groß Vezier desselben abgesagter feind, vnd auf alle mittel, vnd weeg trachte ihn zurpræcipitiren, alß wurde ich dardurch die zu ihm Rikiab Kaimecam [so ohne deme die geringste ausrichtung nicht zuthuen vermag] nehmende addresse der sache sehr præjudiciren, disemnach kombt es auf die etwan in 20 Tag beschehende ankunfft des Groß-Veziers an, und weillen selbiger Kaumb etlich Täg hier verbleiben, sondern gleich mit dem Sultan sich nach Constantinopl begeben solle, alß wird es wohl gar biß dorthin anstand haben müssen. Inzwischen solle eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden unterthänigst befügen, daß der verschmizt und hochmüthig Groß Vezier dise wegen besagten See - Raubern der Porthen aus dero gnädigsten befelch zumachen habende beschwärrnuß, und neben restitution des abgenommenen an Leüth, Schiffen, vnd waaren anbegehrende Satisfaction allen ansehen nach für ein prætext des wider die Porthen Kayl:er seithen vorhabenden Kriegs ausdeiten, vnd also es sye Porthen nur vor der Zeit allarmiren dörrfte, wobey noch grosse ungewisßheit, ob bey gegenwärttigen Zeiten die forderende zwar billiche, allein da die bemelte Dulcignoten hart zukündigen, vnd die ausgeraubte Leüth, Schiff, vnd waaren ohne zweifel schon verstreuet, schwärere reparation recht werde bewürckhen können, derowegen bin ich, dazumahln die Zeit es zuegibet, mit disem dem Currier sicherheit halber zuegebenden Jänitscharen [so sich solang zu Peterwardein aufzuhalten Ordre hat] dero hierüber zugeben gnädigste antworth gewärttig, gewiß ist es, daß alles von ihme orogoleosen, vnd nunmehr wegen soleicht alß nahmhafft gemachte progrehen intractable Groß Vezier dependiren, wie Er dann den Sultan völlig besitzt, vnd alle, so ihm die geringste ombrage machen, aus dem weeg raumet, vnd von Zeit zu Zeit die abgeschlagene Köpf [worunter deß gewesenen sehr reichen Tersana Emini Hussein Aga Selim Agha, Jänitscharen Aga, vnd des Spailer Agha nur vmb die glori dises feldzugs allein für sich zubehalten, vmbgebracht habe.”*, 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 133v-134v.

around 20 days if the Grand Vizier did not return to Istanbul with the Sultan. Otherwise, his meeting with the Grand Vizier would take a little longer. Fleischmann also stated that the Empire could demand compensation from this impudent Grand Vizier for the plundered ships and stolen goods. However, he also reminded that this situation could be considered as a cause for war against the Sublime Porte. Fleischmann also stated that the Grand Vizier completely subjected the Sultan to himself and made him do whatever he wanted. He would immediately remove from his path anyone who stood in his way or who objected to his wishes in the slightest. He even did not hesitate to take the heads of some (such as the Tersane Emini Hüseyin Agha, Selim Agha, the Janissary Agha and the Sipahiler Agha). He would completely claim the victory over the Venetians as his own and keep this glory and honor for himself.

The final chapter of the report<sup>503</sup> notes that Silahdar Agha returned on the 27th with a communication stating that the Grand Vizier had already departed to rejoin the Sultan and accompany him on his return to Istanbul. Fleischmann further reported that he had received intelligence suggesting that the Sublime Porte was planning to seize a Dutch vessel arriving from Venice. In a related development, the Pasha of Rhodes had allegedly detained an Anglo-Dutch ship without justification. These incidents, he observed, pointed to an increasingly hostile environment for maritime commerce, indicating that foreign nations engaged in trade within Ottoman waters might face greater challenges in conducting business under what he described as the increasingly assertive and arbitrary conduct of the Ottoman authorities.

#### **4.2. The Grand Vizier's Return & the Death of Valide Gülnuş Sultan**

In his report dated 9 November 1715, Fleischmann recorded that the Grand Vizier had arrived in Thebes from the Morea on 9 October, accompanied by the main contingent of the Ottoman army, although a significant portion of the forces had been stationed as garrisons in the newly conquered fortresses. The Grand Vizier remained in Thebes briefly with the intention of conferring with Sarı Ahmed Pasha, the Beylerbey of Rumelia, who was then commanding operations against the Fortress of Lefkada. Reports indicated that Sarı Ahmed Pasha had faced notable resistance from the fortress's

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<sup>503</sup> *“Den 27.ten dises ist in obbemelten Diario des Türckhischen feldzugs angeregte Siligdar Aga allhier [allwo die Valide oder Mutter des Sultans noch sehr gefährlich darnider liget] zuruckh angelangt mit dem bericht, daß der Groß Vezier bereiths in der zuruckhreyß begriffen vmb den Sultan hier einzuhollen, vnd mit ihme nach Constantinopl zugehen von dar ich wie beyligendes unterthänigstes zaiget, die nachricht habe, daß die Porthen ein alda von Venedig angelangtes Holländischen Kauffartheÿ Schiff zuconfisciren willens. Ingleichen hat der Bahsa zu Rhodos ein Engelländisches wider alle gerechtigkeit anhalten lassen, also daß den in Türckheÿ trafficierenden Nation auch hart fallen dörfte ins khünfftig mehr bey denen aufgeblasenen Türckhen zu subsistiren.”*, 25 October 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 134v-135r.



defenders, prompting the Grand Vizier to consider issuing revised instructions. However, on the evening prior to their planned meeting, the Grand Vizier—having received no prior notice—was informed by Sarı Ahmed Pasha that Ottoman forces had already advanced to Vosnizza, approximately four hours from Lefkada. The Venetians, anticipating defeat, had destroyed parts of the fortifications still under their control and had evacuated both the fortress and the island without mounting further resistance. In response, Sarı Ahmed Pasha dispatched Serasker Bekir Pasha to secure the site. The fortress was captured with minimal opposition and was found to contain seven or eight cannon and a single mortar. The retreating Venetian forces, unable to embark on ships in time, were overtaken by Albanian units; some were killed during the pursuit, while others were captured and enslaved. Fleischmann noted that the Grand Vizier received this news with considerable satisfaction, as it suggested the campaign might conclude sooner than initially projected.<sup>504</sup>

The next day, that is, on the 10th of the month, the Grand Vizier ordered the *Sancak-ı Şerif*<sup>505</sup> to be placed in a box covered with a piece of gold with great respect. This also meant that the expedition was ended. He ordered the troops to be ready in Edirne again in April of the next year, 1716, and then they were allowed to return home. The Grand Vizier received a directive from one of the Sultan's viziers stationed in Larissa, instructing him to hasten his return as swiftly as possible due to the deteriorating health of Valide Sultan Gülnuş. In response, the Grand Vizier and his entourage undertook an extremely rapid and strenuous march, which resulted in considerable hardship. A significant number of individuals and pack animals succumbed to dysentery during the journey. On the third day, after traveling for approximately four hours on horseback and an additional three hours on foot, the Janissary Agha and, on the following day, the Grand Vizier

<sup>504</sup> “... den 9ten Octobr langte der Groß Vezier mit der unter sich gehabten Ottomannischen Armée [von welcher Er einem guten theill in dem eroberten orthten zur besatzung zuruck gelassen] aus Morea zu Thebes an, der ganzlichen mainung sich noch eine Zeit alda aufzuhalten, vnd von dorth auß dem gegen St. Maura commandirten, vnd wegen selbiger considerablen Vestung nicht geringe Difficultet anzutreffen habenden Rumeli Begler Beg Sari Ahmed Bahsa die gehörige Ordre zugeben, allein noch selbigen abend erhielt Er Groß Vezier von ihme Seraskier Sari Ahmed Bahsa die sich selbstn zuvor nicht eingebilte nachricht, wie selbiger, nachdem die Ottomanni: Truppen beÿ Vohnizza vier stund von berührten St. Maura zucampiren komben, die Kundschaftt empfangen, daß die Venetianer einige werkher von selbigem Plaz gesprengt, vnd die Vestung mit der ganzen Insul schändlicher weiß abandoniret hetten, Warauf Er Seraskier den Bekier Bahsa dahin geschickhet, vnd selbige Fortez [worinnen nur noch Siben eÿserne Stukh, vnd ein Mörser zufinden gewesen in besitz nehmen, denen auf kheinen Schiff, vnd chaloussen sich geflüchten Venetianern aber durch die Albaneser nachsezen, deren ville niderhauen, vnd andern in die Slavitet führen lassen, dise zeitung ware dem Groß Vezier vmb so angenehmer alß Er selbstn wegen so weith avancirter Jahrs Zeit an reuscirung dises villmehr tentativs alß Dehseins gezweiflet, vnd beÿ der geringsten gegenwöhr schon bereith gewesen selbiges auf nechstkünftige Campagne zuverschieben.”, 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 136r-136v.

<sup>505</sup> For more information about Sancak-ı Şerif, “<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sancak-i-serif>”. Accessed on 02.11.2024.

reached the Sultan's location. Upon arrival, they were received with notable generosity. The Grand Vizier was presented with a ceremonial sword and other costly gifts in recognition of his service. Tragically, however, that same evening, Valide Sultan Gülnuş passed away at the age of 84. The following day, her remains were transported from Edirne to Shkodër, on the Asian side of Istanbul, under the escort of Osman Pasha, and interred in the mausoleum constructed in her honor. Fleischmann noted that her death was a source of deep sorrow for the Sultan. Nonetheless, he observed that Valide Sultan had left behind a substantial estate and considerable wealth, which would relieve the Sultan of many financial burdens in the future.<sup>506</sup>

Fleischmann observed that, aside from routine administrative activities, there had been no notable political or military developments following the Grand Vizier's return to Edirne. The Grand Vizier was chiefly occupied with logistical and organizational matters, including the disbursement of military salaries, the restructuring of the armed forces by retiring elderly personnel, the replacement of cavalry and other mounted units, and the recruitment of new troops to replenish the ranks. However, according to Fleischmann's informants, the Grand Vizier's primary preoccupation lay in consolidating his political position by securing the continued favor of the Sultan. Central to this strategy was the removal of individuals perceived as potential threats to his authority or loyalty in the eyes of the court. As part of this effort, the Grand Vizier reportedly dismissed the disgraced Rikab Kaymakam from his position in Edirne and reassigned him to Istanbul. In parallel, Fleischmann consulted several trusted associates who had accompanied the Grand Vizier on the recent military campaign—individuals who, upon their return, appeared eager to receive accolades and compensation. From these conversations, he learned that preparations were actively underway for the deployment of a substantial naval force, with plans reportedly targeting renewed operations

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<sup>506</sup> *“Den folgenden Tag, daß ist den 10.ten Octobl: befahle der Groß Vezier daß SangiaKischeriff oder der Türckhen einbildung nach von ihrem falschen Propheten Muhamed nach übrige fahne mit gröster ehrerbietigkeit in ein mit einem goldstuckh überzogenen kasten zulegen, und dardurch dem Foldzug für dises Jahr ein end zumachen, denen Trouppen aber nach und nach den anderten Viehe oder fold austheillen, vnd insonderheit denen, so am weithesten gelegen, doch mit dem scharftn befelch anfangs des vorstehenden nechsten Aprilis des 1716, Jahres wider hier zu Adrianopl zuerscheinen, nach Hauß zugehen die erlaubnus zugeben. Zu Larissa erhielt er GroßVezier vom Sultan ordre seine herrejß wegen der sehr gefährlich darnider gelegenen Valide oder Sultannischen Mutter, sovill nur möglich zubeschleinen, worauf selbiger auch so starcke march [in welchem ville Leüth, vnd Viech insonderheit die erstere S:V: an der Dissenteria crepiret] gemacht, daß den 3.ten dises schon der Jänitscharn Aga, vnd den folgenden Tag Er Groß Vezier [deme der Sultan mit seiner ganzen Hofstatt vier Stund weith zu Pferd, vnd dreß schritt zu fuß entgegen gangen, stattlich tractiret, vnd aufs neü mit einem Belz, sabel, und raýgerbusch beschenkhet] hier angelangt, allein noch selbigen abend ist die berüchrt Valide im 84.ten Jahr ihres alters gestorben, vnd den anderten Tag in beglaltung des Sirkie Ossman Bahsa nach Constantinopl in die von ihr selbst Asiatischer seithen zu Scutari aufgerichte Krufft abgeführt worden. Es solte dern Sultan diser Todfall sehr empfindlich seyn, sofern Er nicht durch die von ihr verlassene grosse baarschaften, vnd dardurch ins khünfftig erspahrende unkosten getröstete wurde.”*, 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 136v-137v.

against Venice and potentially extending to the Italian peninsula in the upcoming campaign season. All of his sources corroborated this strategic initiative.<sup>507</sup>

In a separate matter, Fleischmann reported receiving information concerning the return of Ibrahim Agha from Vienna. While the Grand Vizier expressed satisfaction with the respectful reception the Agha had received during his diplomatic mission, Ibrahim Agha himself reportedly conveyed frustration with the stringent austerity under which he had been required to operate. A principal subject discussed during the subsequent meeting between the Grand Vizier and Ibrahim Agha was the increasing flow of armaments into the Imperial territories in Hungary, which appeared to originate from multiple sources. It was understood that the Emperor was closely monitoring developments in Venice and was fully apprised of the Sublime Porte's military posture and intentions toward the Republic. Over the previous year, the Republic of Venice had endured significant territorial losses, including the fall of several strategically important fortresses by land and sea. Among Venetian officials, there was growing apprehension that the Ottoman Empire's next campaign might be directed at Venice itself. During their discussion, both the Grand Vizier and Ibrahim Agha concurred that the future of the Peace of Karlowitz ultimately rested in divine providence and that the unfolding of events was subject to the will of God. From the Ottoman perspective, the Venetians had no viable alternative but to seek the protection of the Emperor if they wished to preserve what remained of their dominion. While the Sublime Porte did not actively seek to disrupt peace with the Habsburg Empire, they made it clear that, should conflict become unavoidable, they were fully prepared to confront the resulting consequences.<sup>508</sup>

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<sup>507</sup> "Sonsten ist Zeit der ankunfft des Groß Veziers allhier nichts sonderliches vorgefallen, vnd selbiger noch geschäfttiget die Troupen völlig aus zuzahlen, vnd unter denen Spahien oder Miliz zu Pferd die alt vnd zum Krieg untaugliche zureformiren, vnd andern an ihre Plätze zuwerben, vor allen aber dahin gedacht, wie Er sich völlig des Sultans versichern, vnd alle, so ihme eine ombrage erwecken, aus dem weeg raumen möge, daher Er gleich den Rikiab Caimacam Bahsa [deme wie mich meine Confidenten aus dem feld gewahrnet, Er gar vnfoldgewesen, von hier entfernt, und nach Constantinopl geschickhet. Ich aber habe vnernanglet, sowohl Jhn GroßVezier, alß alle andere Ministers der Porthen ihrer glücklichen zuruckkhunfft halber gewöhnlicher massen complimentiren zulassen, vnd vor allem meine mit Jhr arrivte gute freünd, und sich wehrendem feldzug wohl verhaltene Confidenten [welche zu Constantinopl rechtschaffen zucontentiren versprochen] über ein und anders genau zuquæstioniren, sodann restlich daß von der Porthen auf nechstkünfftige Jahr wider Venedig, vnd ganz Italien högendes, in meiner iüngstern hier per duplicatum beyligender relation in unterthänigkheit weithleüfftig angezogenes dessein, wohin die Constantinopolitanische reiß, vnd machendes grosse Schiff armament angesehen, einfellig confirmiren.", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 137v-138r.

<sup>508</sup> "Andertens meldeten sige, daß bey ankunfft des von Wienn revertirten Ibrahim Agha dem Groß Vezier die ihme Agha zu gedachten Wienn erwisene höflichkeiten zwar wohl, allein die mit ihm gepflogen seyn sollende strenge einsperung sehr müßfallen haben, vnd nachdeme ihme Groß Vezier er Agha sein recreditiv behändiget, vnd ein vnd anders insonderheit die Kayl: seithen in Hungarn vorkiehrende, von allen orthten erschallende Kriegs zuerüstungen beygebracht, selbiger sich also ausgelassen hette, Wir sehen aus allen wohl, daß der Röml: Kayser sich wegen der Republic Venedig interehsire, selbiger sich annehme, vnd entlich vnß bekriegen wolle, Wir verlassen vns auf sein durch

The Grand Vizier was reportedly well-informed regarding developments in Hungary and fully aware of the Habsburgs's apparent intention to initiate hostilities against the Sublime Porte in the upcoming spring. Nevertheless, he remained cautious not to engage in any actions that might formally violate the terms of the existing peace treaty. His strategy was limited to reinforcing the fortifications at key strategic sites such as Belgrade and Timișoara, without deploying troops to the Imperial frontier—thereby avoiding any moves that could be construed as deliberately provocative. Fleischmann remarked that, according to his informants, it was increasingly difficult to justify or rationalize the severity of Ottoman military conduct, particularly in light of the minimal and largely disorganized resistance mounted by the Venetians. According to them, the Grand Vizier was already willing to withdraw from Nafplion. According to confidants, they were assuring that the Provveditore and other guards and officers at Napoli di Malvasia<sup>509</sup> (where about 200 Egyptian Militiamen had garrisoned) had destroyed the fortress by treachery. In a report submitted several days earlier, Fleischmann noted that the commander of the Venetian navy, despite being aware that the Ottoman fleet was inadequately protected, failed to capitalize on the opportunity to seize several strategically important fortresses in the Morea. Instead, he made no meaningful attempt to engage and withdrew, accompanied by the most capable officers of the Morean Kingdom and his own personnel. Fleischmann also reported that the Ottoman campaign had resulted in the loss of between 20,000 and 30,000 troops. Despite these casualties, the Grand Vizier persisted in his harsh and uncompromising approach, reportedly continuing the execution of numerous civilians—actions that Fleischmann characterized as acts of cruelty and bloodlust. Furthermore, Fleischmann speculated that tensions had arisen between the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman naval commander. The Grand Vizier, he suggested, may have harbored resentment toward the Kapudan Pasha due to the fact that the strategically significant Fortress of Malvasia had surrendered directly to the latter, rather than to

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*den Carlovizischen friden vnd gegebenes worth, vnd beÿ dessen brechung auf Gott, vnd wollen alles dahin ankommen lassen, worbey Er Groß Vezier öffters widerhollet ganz Clar zuseÿn, daß die Venetianer sich auf den Kayser stützeten, vnd anselben ihren hinterhalt hetten, angesehen sÿe Venetianer, nachdeme selbige diß Jahr der Türckhischen macht zu Wasser noch zu Land von weithem nicht ins gesicht zusehen gethrauet, sovill Land, vnd vestungen verlohren, vnd daran seÿe, das nechste Campagna ihre Haupt Statt selbst, vnd all-daß, was sÿe noch besizeten, der Ottomannischen Bottmäsßigkeit unterworfen werde, dennoch kheinen pahsum zum friden machen werden, die Porthen zwar gesinnet mit dem Röml:en Kayser den Friden heillig zuhalten, allein wan selbiger, wie es daß ansehen hette, ihn brechen werde, man auch sehen, wie ihme zubegegnen seÿe ...", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 138r-139r.*

<sup>509</sup> Napoli di Malvasia (Monemvasía), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Monemvasía". Encyclopedia Britannica, 7 Mar. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Monemvasia>". Accessed 29 December 2024.

the Grand Vizier himself. This, Fleischmann believed, might prompt the Grand Vizier to seek the Captain's removal.<sup>510</sup>

During the course of the campaign, the Kingdom of Morea suffered extensive depopulation and destruction, largely attributed to the systematic atrocities perpetrated by Ottoman forces, particularly under the authority of the Grand Vizier. Contemporary accounts estimated that approximately 80,000 individuals were either killed or enslaved over the duration of military operations. In light of the humanitarian toll, the Sultan issued a directive stipulating a compensatory payment of approximately 25 Thalers to each displaced inhabitant of the Morea. This measure aimed to facilitate the repatriation of those who had been forcibly displaced by the conflict. Furthermore, on the 3rd of the month, it was reported that the Fortress of Spinalonga had formally capitulated to Ottoman forces. Fleischmann observed that the earlier seizure of the strategically important Fortress of Souda had significantly contributed to this development, both by undermining Venetian morale and weakening regional resistance.<sup>511</sup>

In the last part of his report<sup>512</sup>, Fleischmann reported that the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were expected to depart for Istanbul by the end of the week. He also noted that new orders had

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<sup>510</sup> "Weither sezen sye Confidenten beÿ, daß er Groß Vezier von allem, was in Hungarn vorgehe, genau informiret, vnd wohl wuste, daß Ihre Röml: vnd Cäthollische Maÿt: intentioniret nechstkünftiges fruh Jahr die Porten zubeziehen, Er wolle aber dannoch ausser der guten besaz vnd reparirung Belgrad vnd Temeswar dato khein andere gegen verfassung, und veranstaltung machen, weniger einige Trouppen an den Kayl:en Gränitzen über winthern lassen vnd zwar dises derohalben umb von seiner seithen kheine ombrage, vnd ursach zur ruptur zugeben. Ferner können meine Confidenten sowohl die zaghaftere gegenwöhr deren Venetianern, alß üble heranstaltungen deren Türckhen nicht genugsamb stelten, mit der versicherung, daß er Groß-Vezier schon willens gewesen vor Neapl di Romania abzuziehen, daß die Provediteurs, vnd Officieurs zu Neapl di Malvasia [in welchem orth nunmehr die Egyptische Miliz biß 200 Mann starckh in Guarnison liget] selbige Vestung durch verrathereÿ, wie auch aus dem neulich gehorsambst eingeschickhten bericht gnädigst zuersehen übergeben, dahero die mehriste von denenselben aus forcht in dem Türkischen Territorio zuruckgebliben, daß der Venetianische Capitajn General sehr übl gethan, daß er nachdem selbiger gesehen der Türkischen Flotta nicht gewachten zuseÿn, nicht wenigstens mit einem theill seines Volckhs die vestungen in Morea besezet, ia im gegentheill aus selbigem KönigReich noch die beste Officier, vnd Leüthe zu sich genohmen; daß die Türckhen etwan an getödt vnd natürlich crepirten 20 biß 30.000 Mann verlohren, daß der Groß Vezier sich in allen fällen sehr blut durstig, vnd Tyrannisch verhalten, vnd überaus vill vnschuldiges menschen blut vergossen hette, Er seÿn auch dem Capitajn Bahsa, weillen Malvasia sich an selbigen, vnd nicht an Jhn ergeben, starkh anfsäzig, also daß er ihn auch wohl aus dem weeg raumen dörfte", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 139r-139v.

<sup>511</sup> "Weillen übrighen daß KönigReich Morea wegen der von denen Türckhen, vnd insonderheit von dem Groß Vezier disen feldzug verüebten grausambkheit angesehen über die massacrte biß achtzig tausent seelen in die Slavitet abgeführt worden, sehr vnbewohnt, alß hat der Sultan scharffe Ordre ertheillet, daß alle vor disem in selbigen Land gewohnt und gebürdige beÿ verlust des lebens zuruck dahin zugehen, vnd zu diser reÿß von seinem ærario 25 Thaller haben sollen. Den 3.ten hat man auch die nachricht wegen übergab Spina longa erhalten, worzue die eroberung der Vestung Sada [dessn particularia gehorst beÿlege] villes contribuiet hat.", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 139v-144r.

<sup>512</sup> "Da schliesßlichen der Sultan nebst dem Groß Vezier noch vor ende nechst antretender woche seine reÿß nach Constantinopl nehmen wird, alß gedenkhe auch ich [meine krankhe leüth, vnd Bagage noch eine Zeit allhier zuruckh

been issued to Belgrade for the construction of a new bastion and for the repair and reinforcement of the fortifications in Timișoara. Fleischmann stated his intention to travel to Istanbul in the coming days, leaving behind his personal belongings and the ill members of his entourage, previously mentioned in earlier reports. His objective was to gather further intelligence on the activities of the Sublime Porte and to continue safeguarding the interests of the Holy Roman Empire. Additionally, he dispatched Coranda, one of the Sprachknaben (interpreting trainees)<sup>513</sup> in his service, to Petrovaradin, accompanied by Janissary Musa, with the specific purpose of requesting disciplinary action against Coranda for behavior described as undisciplined and disgraceful.

#### 4.3. Ottoman Defeat Against Kotorians in Bosnia

According to the summary document<sup>514</sup> translated from the Serbian language into German by a scout from the Turkish Gradiška<sup>515</sup> found among Fleischmann's documents, information had been received that the Arnavut (Albanian) Pasha would arrive at Banja Luka<sup>516</sup>. There were 600 mounted men with the Pasha, and they were from the Sultan's guard corps, known as the "*Beşliler*"<sup>517</sup>. They had also served in the army the previous summer. Meanwhile, the Pasha of Bosnia

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zulassen] vnd in wenig Tügen dahin zugehen, allwo ich daß allerhöchste Kayl:e Jnterehse mit vorkehrenden allmöglichsten fleiß, vnd anspannung meiner eussersten kräfte weither allerunterthänigst zubesorgen, vnd forderist euer dhrl: Excellenz, vnd Gnaden von allen deme, so ich werde bey der Ottomannischen Porthen ferner ergründten können, den unterthänigsten bericht, solang es noch seyn kan, gehorst abzustatten beeÿfriget bin. Inzwischen schikhe überbringern dises meinen Janitscharn Muhsa mit dem sich vnterthänigst berichter massen sehr schänd und leichtfertig verhaltenen Coranda biß Peterwardein ab, dessen so verdient alß vmb andern ein exempel zugeben höchst nöthig weithern bestraffung euer dhrl: Excell: vnd gnaden zubefehlen gnädigst geruhen werden. Wormit mich dero höchsten hulden vnd gnaden unterthänigst gehorst empfehlend verharre. Jezt gleich erfahre ich, daß nach Belgrad ordre ergangen an den dasigen so genannten Bahsa Kioskÿ eine neüe Bastion anzulegen, vnd so wohl alda alß zu Temeswar die Vestungs werkher zurepariren.", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 144r-145r.

<sup>513</sup> For more information about Sprachknabens, Cziráki 2016; 27-44. Cáceres- Würsig 2012; 127-141.

<sup>514</sup> "Eines kundtschaffters von Türkisch Gradiska auß dem Rätzischen ins Teütsche verdolmetschet. Ich habe Nachricht, daß der Turndinski, idest Arnotten Bascha nacher Bania Luca ins Quartier khommen wird, hat zu pferd bey sich 600 Mann, und dise seynd des Türckhischen Kayßers Beshlie, idest eine Orth Quardi, i mirie ludi, und sollen noch heünt zu Bania Luca ankhommen, und das seynd jene, welche verwichenen Sonner unter Sin in feld gewesen, und der Bascha auß Bosnien ist nacher Traunik ins quartier gangen, allein ich glaube, daß er nicht ruehig seyn wird von dem Türckhischen Kayßer, weillen er verwichenen feldzug nicht guet geendet ...", 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142r.

<sup>515</sup> For more information about Gradiška, "<https://web.archive.org/web/20090925090200/http://www.gradiskasela.net/masici/istorija.html>". Accessed on 08.12.2024.

<sup>516</sup> For more information about Banja Luka, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Banja Luka". Encyclopedia Britannica, 18 Apr. 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Banja-Luka>. Accessed on 8.12.2024.

<sup>517</sup> Units of the Ottoman army, tasked with repelling sudden enemy attacks in border fortresses. They got this name because one soldier was selected from every five households. For more information, "<https://anabilgi.anadolu.edu.tr/?contentId=102402>". Accessed on 08.12.2024.

had gone to Travnik<sup>518</sup> to establish an encampment. Fleischmann stated that the Sultan would not give peace to the Pasha because the Pasha had failed to achieve a significant result in the previous campaign.

In the report, it was mentioned that the Turks suffered heavy losses while advancing towards Knin<sup>519</sup>, and their troops remaining in Golubza (Golubica) also suffered serious losses. Fleischmann stated that this information has been verified. 3000 infantry attached to the Pasha of Herzegovina lost their lives, and the Pasha barely saved his life as he was seriously wounded. Very few of the other infantry survived. The Tatar troops retreated with great losses, as did the Turks, and the area in question was still in the hands of the Kotorians.<sup>520</sup>

On the other hand, according to some rumors<sup>521</sup> that came to Fleischmann, a palace was being built in Sarajevo for the Sultan. However, it was thought that this palace was prepared for the purpose of the Grand Vizier residing there until he conquered Dalmatia. It was said that the Turks would attack Zadar<sup>522</sup> first. This fortress had a port close to Knin.

The scout's statement came from Seralia on November 30:

*"First of all, it is not true that a palace was built for the Turkish Sultan; it is said that this palace will be built for the Grand Vizier. The Vizier's Kapıcıbaşı's son, did indeed reach Seralia<sup>523</sup> on the 18th of November. This person will have a wooden dwelling built for the Vizier, and the wooden materials and other necessities necessary for this purpose have been supplied."<sup>524</sup>*

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<sup>518</sup> For more information about Travnik, "<https://english.leipzig.de/services-and-administration/international/twin-cities/travnik>". Accessed on 13.12.2024.

<sup>519</sup> For more information about Knin, "<https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/433063>", Accessed on 13.12.2024.

<sup>520</sup> *"Waß die lezten Nachrichten belanget, daß der Türckhen, alß sie gegen Knin gangen, vill nidergemacht worden, und gebliben beÿ Golubiza ist die versicherte warheit, dann des Bascha von Herzogwine seine fueßgänger seÿnd gebliben 3000 und der Bascha ist selbst schwehr entloffen, von denen anderen Türckhen zu fueß seÿnd auch wenig darvon khomben so haben eben die Tartarn und Türckhen zu pferd vill verlohren, daß also das feld die Cotoraner erhalten."*, 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142r.

<sup>521</sup> *"Sonsten lauffet die Rede, daß vor den Türckhischen Kayserin Seralien ein Pallast zuegerichtet werde, alwo Er solang zubleiben vermeinet, biß der Groß Vezier Dalmatien erobert, und solle es erstlich auf Zader wellisch Zora loßgehen, welche Vestung ohnweith Knin, und mit einem hafen versehen."*, 9 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142r.

<sup>522</sup> For more information about Zadar, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Zadar". Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 Sep. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Zadar>". Accessed on 13 December 2024.

<sup>523</sup> For more information about Seralia (Sarajevo), "<https://jenikirbyhistory.getarchive.net/media/sarajevo-1697-7de4ae>". Accessed on 15.12.2024.

<sup>524</sup> *"Ausßag des Kundschafters so den 30 Novembris auß Seralia ankommen: Erstlich seÿe nichts daran, daß ein Pallast*



*The Sultan will stay in Adrianople, while the Grand Vizier will move as soon as possible. The Turkish navy will carry out a naval siege with all its forces, because this place has a good port. A considerable quantity of rice, rusks, grain, honey and oil has already been supplied for this purpose and transported by camels. It was also ordered to build bridges over the Drina River in Zvornik<sup>525</sup>. These bridges are necessary for the artillery units that are planned to move from Belgrade to this region. They are planning to carry out this operation around the date of Georgi<sup>526</sup> (April 23).<sup>527</sup>*

In addition Mureş Ali Bey, who came from beyond the sea, had arrived in Banja Luka with 600 October. These were the survivors of the 3,000 people that Pasha had brought from beyond the sea. Others had either scattered, died of disease, or been destroyed by the enemy. On the other hand, Kilisli Ali Pasha was stationed in Glamoč<sup>528</sup> with about 1000 men remaining out of 2500 people. Süleyman Pasha, on the other hand, was in Livno<sup>529</sup> with about 4000 men. About 700 of them were Bosnians on horseback and on foot.<sup>530</sup>

The defeat previously mentioned had also been confirmed, in addition, two captains and five agha had lost their lives. Although it is not known exactly how many soldiers were lost, it was

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*vor den Türckhischen Kayser, wohl aber vor den Groß Vezier gebauet werden solle, und ist des Vezier seines Falshaga oder Thürhüetter Sohn mit dem Zelt wircklich den 18 huius in Seralien ankommen, diser soll vor den Vezier eine hölzerne wohnung bauen lassen, wie dan zu dem Ende daß benöthigte Holz, und waß darzue gehörig, herbey geschaffet wird.”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142v.*

<sup>525</sup> For more information about Zvornik (Svornik), “<https://turizamrs.org/en/zvornik-kroz-istoriju>”. Accessed on 15.12.2024.

<sup>526</sup> Georgi (also known as Georgstag or Saint George’s Day) April 23, is the day of commemoration of St. George, which is considered important for agriculture, and is believed to bring about various weather changes and to start grazing animals. For more information, “<https://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyclop.g/g269922.htm>”. Accessed on 15.12.2024.

<sup>527</sup> “*Der Türckhische Kayser soll zu Adrianopl bleiben, vnd der Vezier so frühe alß möglich zu Land Lader; die Türckische Flotta aber mit der ganzen macht zu Wasser belaagern, weill diser feste orth auch einen guten hafen haben solle, es wird auch zu disem ende eine grosse quantitet reiß, zwibach, geträyd, hönig, vnd schmalz bereiths auf sämrossen zuegeführt. Es ist anbefohln, daß zu Svornik auf der Dvina bruckhschiffe gemacht werden sollen, vmb eine bruckhen diser orthen zuschlagen, worüber sye von Belgrad stuckh zu diser expedition zubringen willens seynd, welche expedition sye nah vor Georgi vorzunehmen gedenkhen.*”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142v.

<sup>528</sup> For more information about Glamoč, “[https://web.archive.org/web/20140301075824/http://www.kons.gov.ba/main.php?id\\_struct=6&lang=1&action=view&id=2728](https://web.archive.org/web/20140301075824/http://www.kons.gov.ba/main.php?id_struct=6&lang=1&action=view&id=2728)”. Accessed on 15.12.2024.

<sup>529</sup> For more information about Livno, “<https://www.johnbills.com/dispatches/livno-history>”. Accessed on 15.12.2024.

<sup>530</sup> “*Zu Bania Luca ist nebst der Marosch Alibegh von ienseiths des Meers mit 600 Mann wie schon gemeldet, ankomben, welche alleinig von 3000, so der Bahsa über Meer gebracht, übrig, die andere seynd theillß auseinander gangen, theillß durch Krankhheit, theills durch den feind aufgeriben. Zu Glamoz ist der Ali bahsa von Klis vngefähr mit 1000 Mann so Er von 2500 übrig behalten postiret. Soliman Bahsa stehet mit vngefähr 4000 Mann beÿ Liono, worunter 700 Bosnaken theillß zu pferd, theillß zu fuß gezehlet werden.*”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 142v-143r.



understood that it was less than the number reported in the initial reports. Because many soldiers who were thought to be missing were still not around. Before the defeat, the Turks had found Ostrovica<sup>531</sup> empty and destroyed it. In the same way, they destroyed two trenches in Zatonia, a tower in Roško Polje, a trench in Muško Blato and another position near Bila. These were the places that the Venetians captured from the Turks during the summer.<sup>532</sup>

The trench in the Valka was captured without planning last summer and has now been fortified in a better way. However, the Turks had planned to capture and destroy this place as well. But after losing two of their best and bravest officers, such as Mustafa and Osman Agha from Glamoč (along with 60 ordinary soldiers, and Ali Bey Serdoskoviz from Livno and Mustafa Agha from Mostar<sup>533</sup> were seriously wounded (the latter died of this wound), they had to retreat. Then this defeat happened. However, their forces were not completely united, but divided into two. The son of the gate guard of the Grand Vizier mentioned above brought a large amount of money to the Seraglio (the Sublime Porte) with 13 mules.<sup>534</sup>

In a document dated April 17, 1715, Fleischmann reported that the majority of the Ottoman army, having received their salaries from the Grand Vizier, had returned to their respective regions with instructions to regroup in Edirne in April of the following year. Consequently, it appeared unlikely that any of these forces would be deployed to the Imperial frontier during the winter months. Aside from the ongoing repairs to the fortifications at Belgrade and Timișoara, no other significant military activity was recorded up to that date. However, the report also referenced an order issued

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<sup>531</sup> For more information about Ostrovica (Ostroviza), "[https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ostrovica\\_Castle](https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ostrovica_Castle)". Accessed on 16.12.2024.

<sup>532</sup> *"Die vorhero unterthänigst-gehorst berichtete niderlag bestätigt er gleichfallß mit dem beýsatz, daß 2 Capitains vnd 5 Aga gebliben, wievill eigentlich von gemainen verlohren, wuste Er nicht zusagen, es wäre aber die anzahl nnicht so groß, alß die erste Kundschaftten gegeben, zumahln sich noch vill Leüthe Täglic hervor thetten, so man verlohren geschätzt; vor der Niderlag haben sýe Ostroviza lehr gefunden, und demoliret, welches sýe auch Zatonia 2 schanzen in dem feld Roshko Cole auch eine mit 2 Thurn Musko Blato, item mit einer schanz bey Belaý bewerckhet dise seýnd lauther örther so die Venetianer denen Türckhen in Sommer abgetriben."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 143r-143v.

<sup>533</sup> For more information about Mostar, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Mostar". Encyclopedia Britannica, 19 Jan. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Mostar>". Accessed 17 December 2024.

<sup>534</sup> *"Die schanz Valka, so sýe verwichenen Sommer mit nicht gehaltenen Accord bekommen, vnd welche ietzt besser Fortificiret haben sýe gleichfalls vermainet zubemeistern, vnd zudemoliren, nachdeme sýe aber den Mustafa vnd Ohsman Agha von Glomaz zweý der besten, vnd ihrer außsag nach Tapfersten Officiieren nebst vngefehr 60 gemainen verlohren auch der Alibeg Serdoskoviz von Livno, vnd Mustafa Aga von Mostar, welcher lezte von der wunde crepiret, blehsiret worden, haben sýe sich weither gezogen, vnd sodann erst geschlagen worden. haben sýe sich weither gezogen, vnd sodann erst geschlagen worden, doch ist nicht ihr ganze macht beýsamben, sondern in zweý theill getheillet gewesen. Obbemelter des Vezier Thürhüetters sohn solle eine grosse quantitet gelt auf 13 Maulthier nach Seraglio mitgebracht haben."*, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 143v.

in Bosnia, which indicated forthcoming operations. Specifically, it was planned that Bosnian forces, in coordination with Tatar contingents—expected to be reinforced by several thousand additional troops—would carry out raids into Venetian territory once the rivers had frozen and the winter conditions allowed for such maneuvers.<sup>535</sup>

Preparations had been underway for approximately ten days for the Sultan's return from Edirne to Istanbul, although the precise date of his departure had not yet been confirmed. It was anticipated, however, that the journey would likely commence the following Thursday. Concurrently, arrangements were being made for the construction of a new imperial residence for the Sultan along the seashore in Istanbul. A corresponding residence for the Grand Vizier was also being built directly opposite the Sultan's palace. In addition, plans were advancing for the construction of a bridge across the nearby canal, intended to facilitate more efficient access to the imperial shipyard and improve logistical coordination for naval operations. These infrastructural efforts formed part of a broader strategic initiative, as the Ottomans were preparing to assemble a fleet of one hundred warships in the coming year to support their projected military campaign against Venice and, potentially, the Italian peninsula.<sup>536</sup>

#### **4.4. The Despot of the Sublime Porte: Fleischmann's Meeting with the Grand Vizier**

In his report<sup>537</sup> dated December 3, 1715, Fleischmann stated that he had met with the Grand Vizier in Edirne on November 20 with the help of Reis-ül Küttap, whom he had known for many years

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<sup>535</sup> "Gnädigster, auch gnädig vnd hochgebiettende herrn hern etc. Meiner per triplicat gehorsambst inligender Relation solle noch so vill in vnterthänigkeit beÿsetzen, daß bereiths die mehriste Ottomanische Miliz, nachdem Sie vom Groß-Vezier auf verflossene dreÿ quartal ausgezahlt, und ernstlich befehlet worden, auf nächst künfftigen April wider hier zuerscheinen, noch hauß kehren, also das von denen selbigen schwärlich einige disen Winter hindurch an den Kayl:en gränizen verleget werden, wie dan auch ausser denen zu Belgrad, und Temeßwar anbefohlenen Vestunges: Reparation biß heuntigen Tag nichts sonderliches vorgenommen worden, allein in Bosnien ist ordre ergangen, daß der Bosnae, vndt Tartarn [welche leztere noch mit einigen tausent Mann verstärkhet werden sollen] beÿ ersterem frost, und zuefrierenden flüssen in das Venetianische gebieth einfallen sollen ...", 17 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 148r.

<sup>536</sup> "... Sonsten stehet man von zehen tagen hero in procinctu von hier nach Constantinopl aufzubrechen, ohne dato noch den eigentlichen Tag [so entlich der nächstkommende Donnerstag seÿn dörrfte] zuwissen, an welchem der Sultan seine dahin raiß antretten wolle, indessen wirdt zu berührtem Constantinopl sein an Canal des weissen Meers gelegenes Seraglio oder Sultanl: Palast, ingleichen gegen über eine wohnung für den Groß-Vezier zuberaithet, und anstalten gemacht, in selbiger gegend über den berührten Canal eine Schiffbrukhen zuschlagen; dises darumb, damit sie der Tersana, oder orth, in welchem die Kriegs-Schiff stehen, gebauet, und repariret werden, desto näher seÿn, und daß Schiffweesen mit grösserem eÿser befördern mögen, gestalten sie zu außführung ihres gegen Venedig, und Italien hegenden Dehseins auf Künfftiges Jahr eine Flota von hundert Kriegs-Schiffen in See stellen, Wormit mich dero höchsten hulden und gden vnterthlls: gehorsambst empfh: verharre.", 17 November 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 148v.

<sup>537</sup> "Gnädigster, auch gnädig: und hochgebiettende Herren der mit mir von villen iahren hero bekhante, und iederzeit cultivirte Reis-Effendi hat aus der gegen mich tragenden freündtschafft sovill zuwegen gebracht, daß ich dem Gros

and had formed a friendship with. During his visit, Fleischmann was received with notable warmth by the Grand Vizier. He extended his congratulations on the Grand Vizier's return to Edirne, to which the Grand Vizier responded by expressing his regret for the mistreatment that Fleischmann and his entourage had experienced during the previous summer. Fleischmann noted that the meeting did not include any discussion of military operations or the ongoing conflict with Venice. The Grand Vizier informed him that he and the Sultan were planning to depart for Istanbul within two days and remarked that he believed the climate of the capital would be beneficial for Fleischmann as well. Following the audience, Fleischmann received permission to travel and reported that he began preparations for his departure within the stated timeframe. He left behind a portion of his belongings, as well as members of his entourage who remained ill, in Edirne. He also remarked that, unlike on previous occasions, he was not provided with horses or carriages for the journey. However, he had anticipated this omission and refrained from making any such request, noting his prior experience with the frugality of Ottoman officials.

During the meeting, the Grand Vizier inquired whether there was any recent correspondence or intelligence from Vienna. Fleischmann responded that he had not received a letter for some time; however, based on the latest available information, he was aware that Ibrahim Agha had been received with due respect in Vienna and had been sent back aboard five ships on September 13. The Grand Vizier acknowledged his awareness of the gracious reception extended to Ibrahim Agha, which he viewed as a natural expression of the genuine friendship between the two empires. He further noted that, based on reports from Ibrahim Agha and additional sources, the situation along the Hungarian frontier remained stable and that the Emperor appeared firmly committed to preserving peace with the Ottoman Empire. In turn, the Grand Vizier affirmed that the Sublime Porte

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*Vezier noch zu Adrianopl den 20ten iüngsthin verflossenen monaths November eine Visite geben können, in welcher er GroßVezier [deme ich klosß zu seiner glückhlichen ankunfft gratuliret, ohne daß beederseiths: von denen verrichteten Kriegs operationen, vnd über Venedig gemachten progrehsen was geredet worden seye mich zimlich höflich empfangen, vnd vor allem den üllen Zuestand, in welchen Jch mit meiner Suite disem Sommer gerathen, bedauret mit dem gegebenen Trost das mir hoffentlich die Constantinopolitaner Lufft, alß welcher ich gewohnet wäre; besser anschlagen werde, vnd gedenkhe Er mit dem Sultan innerhalb zwey tügen von berührtem Adrianopl nach Constantinopl aufzubrechen ich kunte dahero mich vor mit oder nach Jhn dahin begeben, warauf ich gemeldet resolvirt zuseyn meine bagage vnd mehriste Suite, worunter sich noch verschidene Krankhe befinden, zurukhzulassen, mich aber den folgenden Tag auf den weeg zuverfügen, welches Er auch approbiret, vnd zwar die gehörige Ferman, allein nicht, wie andern Zeiten gebräuchlich gewesen, die nöttige pferd, vnd wägen, worumb ich wegen den mir schon bekhanen Türckhischen geizigen Gouverno auch nicht einmahl angehalten] ertheillen lassen.", 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 150r-150v.*

likewise intended to uphold peaceful relations and sustain the spirit of mutual goodwill with the Holy Roman Empire by honoring its diplomatic commitments.<sup>538</sup>

The Târîh-i Râsid also mentions that the Habsburgs were alarmed after the Sublime Porte's success in the Morea Campaign. However, the Grand Vizier had conveyed to Fleischmann that the Sublime Porte wished to maintain good neighborly relations with the Habsburgs.<sup>539</sup>

Fleischmann conveyed to the Grand Vizier that the Emperor had consistently demonstrated a sincere commitment to preserving peace and upholding the Treaty of Karlowitz. He emphasized that the Emperor remained firmly resolved to maintain peaceful relations with neighboring states and would not violate the treaty unless provoked by others. Following this exchange and discussion of other matters, Fleischmann concluded the audience by extending courteous wishes for the Grand Vizier's forthcoming journey to Istanbul and offering the customary expressions of diplomatic goodwill. In his report, Fleischmann noted that, despite the formal assurances provided, he discerned a general lack of optimism among the Ottomans regarding the continued maintenance of peace with the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, his trusted informants and associates within Ottoman circles had consistently conveyed their belief that a conflict with the Habsburgs was highly probable in the coming year.<sup>540</sup>

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<sup>538</sup> "Vbrigens fragte er Groß Vezier, was Jch neües von Wienn hette, worüber ich antworthlich anführte von einer geraumben Zeit hero von dar kheine brief, mit leztern Currier aber die nachricht gehabt zuhaben, wie das der alda zu Wienn in ablegatione gestandene Jbrahim Aga mit aller ehr bezeügung empfangen gehalten, vnd endlich nach der beÿ eüer hochfürstl:en Dhrleicht gehabten urlaubs audienz den 13ten 7ber auf fünff für ihn zuegerichte Schiff zurukhgeschickhet worden seÿe; Hierüber meldete er Groß Vezier eben von dem gedachten Ibrahim Aga, daß ihme zu Wienn vnd in seiner auf und abreÿß anethanes Höf-und freündtliches tractament vernohmen zuhaben; vnd hette man niemahl hieran gezweiflet, gestalten die zwischen beeden Reichen vorseÿende aufrichtige freündtschafft es allerdings erfordern, über dises gebeten die sowohl durch Jhn Jbrahim Aga, alß anderwerths her erhaltene nachrichten, daß an denen Hungarischen Gränitzen alles fridlich, vnd Jhre Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: erbiettig seÿen den friden mit der Porthen ferner vngekränckhter zucontinuiren, dahero sÿe Porten sich an nichts anders, sondern bloß an daß Kayl: worth hielte, vnd ihre sorg, vnd gedankhen dahin wende, wie sÿe mit denen Teütschen ein beständig aufrichtige freündtschafft unterhalten möge.", 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 150v-151r.

<sup>539</sup> "Sene-i sâbıkada Venedik tâifesi üzerine sefer-i hümayun vukû' bulup Mora cezâresinin müddet-i yesîrede feth ü teshîri müyesser olduğundan, işbu sene dahi kilid-i memleketleri olan Körfez cezâresi üzerine azm-i sefer muhakkak u mukarrer olmağın, Nemçe tâifesi telâşa düşüp, ... hâlâ Devlet-i Aliyye Nemçe ile sulhü fesh etmek fikrinde değildir.", Târîh-i Râsid II, Özcan 2013; 981-986.

<sup>540</sup> "Disenach stellte auch ich ihme Groß Vezier vor, daß Jhre Röml: Kayl: vnd Cathollische Maÿt: mein Großmächtigster Kayser, vnd herr bereiths in verschidenen fällen dero zum allgemainen besten, vnd beforderist zu conservirung des Carlovizischen fridens segende begierd genugsamb an Tag geleet, vnd gezaiget haben, wie selbste mit allen ihren benachbarten Potenzen den friden, wan nur von andern seithen nichts præjudicirliches vorgenommen wird, vnzerbrüchlich fortzuplanzen genaigt seÿe, nach dise vnd andern indifferenten Discursen machte ich ihme Groß Vezier zu der vorhabenden Constantinopolitaner reÿß daß gebührende compliment, vnd nahme also nach empfangenen gewöhnlichen ehren bezeügungen von ihme abschied. Worbeÿ aber eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden

According to Fleischmann, the Ottomans were well-informed regarding the disposition and activities of Imperial forces in Hungary. He reported that a recent communiqué from Vienna, which had been printed in Bologna and widely disseminated, was promptly relayed to him by his associates within Ottoman circles. In response to perceived regional tensions, the Ottomans were undertaking precautionary measures. These included the reinforcement of fortifications and garrisons in strategic locations such as Belgrade and Timișoara, as well as the replenishment of supply depots. Additionally, a Wallachian contingent of 1,200 men had been tasked with improving the roads leading to these key strongholds to ensure greater logistical efficiency. Fleischmann interpreted these measures as the extent of what the Ottomans could feasibly accomplish during the winter months, given that the majority of their troops had dispersed and returned to their respective provinces. Nonetheless, orders had been issued for their reassembly in Edirne during the forthcoming spring, in preparation for potential military operations.<sup>541</sup>

In the continuation of his report<sup>542</sup>, Fleischmann asserted that the the Grand Vizier was actively working to eliminate any individual or influence that might oppose or obstruct his efforts to

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*unterthänigst anfügen muß, sowohl aus dem mit mir gehaltenen gespräch, alß darbey verspirten meinen des Groß Veziers handgreifflich abgenommen zuhaben, daß Er Groß Vezier an fernerer fortsetzung des mit Jhro Röml: Kayl: Mayt: vorsehenden fridens verzweifelte, vnd hingegen, wie mich alle meine freünd, vnd Confidenten, deren einige selbst Theill mithaben, versichern den Krieg mit denen Teütschen aufs nechstkünftige Jahr für gewiß halte ...”, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 151r-151v.*

<sup>541</sup> “... gestalten die Porthen von allen denen in Hungarn Kayl: seiths fürkehrenden Kriegsverfassung gnugsamb informiret, wie dann selbiger erst kürzlich der articul von Wienn in beyligender zu Bologna getruckhter allhier durch alle Nationen herumb gegangene, und gleich beÿ meiner ankunfft mir von meinen hier habenden guten freinden aufgefangen, vnd mir communicirte gute Zeitung interpretirter zuekommen, dahero Sÿe Porthen bereiths auch auf die gegenveranstaltungen gedenkhet, angesehen selbige über die zu Belgrad, und Temeswar anbefohlene Vestungs reparirungen, vermehrung der Guarnisonen, vnd anfüllung deren Magazine den 20.ten pahasato dem fürsten in der Wallacheÿ ordre ertheillet, durch 1200 Wallachen die weege auf Belgrad, vnd Temeswar ausbessern zulassen, vnd dises ist fast alles so die Türckhen, im fall ihnen auch der Krieg würcklich angekündiget wär beÿ vorseÿender Jahres Zeit vnd sonst geüebter gewöhnheit thuen können, gestalten die Ottomannische Troupen Zertheillet, vnd sambentlich ausser einigen, so in Morea verleget worden, nach Hauß gegangen mit dem scharffen befelch sich nechstkünftiges fruh Jahr wider beÿ Adrianopl einzufinden.”, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 151v-152r.

<sup>542</sup> “Indessen suchet der den Sultan völlig besizende Groß-Vezier alles, so ihme eine Ombrage machen, oder reich zuseÿn glaubet werden kan, aus dem weeg zuraumen, allermassen Er den disem Sommer hindurch beÿ dem Sultan gestandenen Rikiab Kaimacam Mehemed Bahsa nach Bender verwisen, vnd seinem 13 Jährigen Sohn daß vom Sultan durch ein Hadischerift oder Sultanischen decret erhaltene Mutterischlik abgenommen vnd das berührte Decret zerrissen, also das wohl entlich ienes, so mir meine Confidenten von Morea auß geschriben, durch seine ohnfehlbahr zuerfolgen stehende strangulirung verificirt werden mag, allein dem vor dreÿ Jahren gewesenenen Groß Vezier Suleiman Bahsa auch denen Abdurahman Bahsa, Ahmed Bahsa, vnd zweÿ und dreÿssig vornehme Arabier, worunter acht deren reichist vnd ansehentlichsten Beghen, oder fürsten in Aegypten gewesen, ist bereiths schon ein solches tractament widerfahren, und deren Köpf, so vor dem aufbruch der Porten nach Adrianopel gebracht worden, durch deren abgenommen und confiscirten considerablen haabschafften [so blosß die ursach ihres vnglücks] solle der Sultan allein über ein Jahr die Kriegs Spesen bestreiten können.”, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 151r-152v.

bring the Sultan fully under his control. Rikab Kaymakam Mehmed Pasha, who had accompanied the Sultan during the summer, was exiled to Bender, and in addition, the title which was given by the Sultan with a hatt-ı sherif was taken from his 13-year-old son, and that decree was also torn. Based on intelligence from his informants in the Morea, Fleischmann suspected that Mehmed Pasha would likely face execution. This pattern of political purging extended beyond Mehmed Pasha: former Grand Vizier Süleyman Pasha, along with Abdurrahman Pasha, Ahmed Pasha, eight of Egypt's wealthiest and most influential beys, and 32 prominent Arab figures, had all suffered similar fates. They were executed, their heads sent to Edirne, and their properties confiscated. Fleischmann remarked that it was widely believed these confiscated assets alone would suffice to fund the war effort for an entire year.

Even reports from the French embassy, which had supported the Sublime Porte's decision to declare war on Venice, expressed concern over the atmosphere of fear cultivated by the Grand Vizier. Marquis de Bonnac noted that Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha, in his efforts to assert control over the Sultan's mind, systematically removed experienced statesmen who had risen to prominence through their talent and intelligence, confiscating their property in the process. Bonnac further observed that, had the Grand Vizier not been killed in the war against Austria, and had he achieved a victory comparable to his success in Morea, he could have posed a significant threat to the Christian world.<sup>543</sup>

Fleischmann drew a parallel between the prevailing political climate in the Ottoman Empire and the despotic eras of Roman Emperors Nero and Tiberius. He described the atmosphere as one of pervasive oppression and discontent. According to his observations, dissatisfaction with the current administration was widespread across all segments of society, from the youth to the elderly, many of whom expressed their grievances openly and without hesitation. Fleischmann further suggested that the regime's stability was fragile. In his view, should the Empire suffer a significant military defeat from an external adversary, it would likely trigger widespread unrest and internal upheaval, exacerbating the already volatile domestic situation.<sup>544</sup>

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<sup>543</sup> Bonnac 1894; 135-136.

<sup>544</sup> *“Worbeÿ man wohl in der wahrheit sagen mag, daß gegenwärtig in Türckheÿ widerumb die Neronisch-Tiberisch vnd andere Tyrannische Zeiten, hervorgekommen, also das groß vnd klein sehr hart gekränkhet vnd dem heüntigen Governo ganz abgenagt, mithin beÿ ersterer gelegenheit besonders beÿ einem von aussen erleÿdender niderlag in disem Reich vngemaine innerliche, vnd das ganze Corpo selbst destmirte verwirrung zusehen seÿn dörfte.”*, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 151r-152v.

Based on information relayed by the most recent Imperial courier, Fleischmann reported that the Ottoman Empire had finalized its strategic plans to decisively subdue the Republic of Venice in the coming year, with subsequent intentions to initiate military operations against the Italian mainland. According to his sources, all necessary preparations were already underway to support this objective. The Sultan departed Edirne on 23 November, accompanied by the Grand Vizier and other high-ranking officials, and arrived in Istanbul on 2 December, where he was received with a formal public procession. Fleischmann interpreted this relocation as a deliberate move to oversee the strengthening of the Ottoman naval forces in anticipation of the planned campaigns. New warships were reported to be under construction at key shipyards in Sinop, İzmit, Chios, and Rhodes. Additionally, flat-bottomed frigates—likely intended for use on the Danube River—were also being prepared. Fleischmann noted that these vessels were part of broader preparations for the anticipated spring offensive, during which the Ottomans were expected to initiate a coordinated land and naval blockade of Corfu. Several fortresses captured by the Ottomans in the previous campaign were reportedly being repurposed to facilitate transportation and amphibious landings. In closing, Fleischmann expressed a fervent hope that divine providence would protect the Holy Roman Emperor, and the Christian world, and that the expansive ambitions of the Ottoman Empire might be thwarted and turned back upon themselves.<sup>545</sup>

According to Fleischmann, the condition of the Ottoman military forces—both cavalry and infantry—was notably poor and marked by considerable disorganization. This assessment was based on his direct observations in Edirne and during his recent travels. In his view, the state of the troops rendered them wholly incapable of offering effective resistance against the forces of the Holy Roman Empire. Fleischmann further remarked that the deficiencies in the Ottoman military were already evident in the previous war, during which their inability to match the discipline and capability of the

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<sup>545</sup> *“Sonsten bleibet daß mit lezterm Kayl: Currier unterthänigst überschribene auf nechstes fruch Jahr zurvölligen unter druckhung der Republic Venedig vnd darauf erfolgende bekriegung Italien abzihlendes Türckhisches Dehsejn fest gestellet, vnd all nöthiges zu dessen ausführung veranstaltet, sinthemahln eben dises wie schon leztens gehorsambst berichtet, die ursach daß der Sultan in beglaitung des Groß Veziers vnd übrigen Ministern der Porthen den 23.ten Nbris von Adrianopl abgeräyset, vnd gestern als den 2.ten dises seinen öffentlichen einzug allhier gehalten nehmlich vmb die aufs neü ausrüstende See macht durch seine hiesige gegenwarth in einen so formidablen stand zusezen, zu welchem ende bereiths hier zu Sinapi, Nicodemia, Scio, vnd Rhodos neüe Krieg-Schiff angeleget, auch eine grosse anzahl Fregatten mit blatten boden, so allem ansehen noch nicht auf die See, sondern auf die Donau gewidmet seyn schein verfertigt werden, zu folg des obberührten vorhaben gedenkhet die Porthen nechstkünftiges früh-Jahr vor allen Corfu zu Wasser, vnd zu Land [in welcher gegend sye iüngsthin die Vestung Cin erobert haben sollen] zu attaquiren, vnd dardurch alles zu Ihrer vorhabenden transportir vnd anlandung zufacilitiren, allein hoffe zu Gott, das Ihre Röml: Kays: vnd Cathollische Mayt: diser Barbarn weith aussehendes concept verwirren, vnd die der Christenheit antrohende gefahr ihnen selbst zu wachsen werde ...”, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 153r-153v.*

Imperial army had been clearly demonstrated. He concluded that the current state of the Ottoman army was even more deteriorated than in past campaigns, underscoring a significant decline in its overall readiness and effectiveness.<sup>546</sup>

In the concluding section of his report, Fleischmann expressed concern regarding his continued presence within Ottoman territory, emphasizing that the prevailing political and military conditions posed a significant personal risk. In light of these circumstances, he formally requested that appropriate measures be taken to facilitate his recall to Vienna. Fleischmann asserted with confidence that the Ottoman Empire was preparing to declare war against the Holy Roman Empire in the forthcoming year. As such, he anticipated that communication with Vienna would soon become impossible and that this might be the last correspondence he could dispatch. He further noted that, should the Empire issue a formal recall, he would endeavor to contribute to preserving amicable relations between the Sublime Porte and both the Holy Roman Empire and the Republic of Venice, insofar as conditions would allow.<sup>547</sup>

According to the latest news<sup>548</sup> which was mentioned in the report, the General Captain of the Venetian fleet, Delfino, had reached Andros with a fleet consisting of 30 warships and 10 small vessels, capturing the island of Tinos. Several hundred Ottoman prisoners were taken here, and some Greeks were also hanged. Despite this small success, Fleischmann mentioned that the Captain

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<sup>546</sup> "... gewiß ist, daß ihre Miliz sowohl zu pferd alß fueß [welche ich mehrmahln zu Adrianopl vnd absonderlich in meiner her reiß, gestalten ich durch die Topci [ deren Corpo den 22.ten pahsato zu Baba meistens crepirt ] Gebeci, vnd Jänitscharn marchiret genau betrachten in einem sehr ellend vnd verwirrten stand seÿe, also das selbige Oden nicht einer Teütschen Armee widerstehen könne, wie dann ohne dem solches die experienz in lezteren Türckhen Krieg sattsamb gezaiget, worbey noch aniezo daß Türckhische Kriegsweesen über die helfft schlechter alß damahls sich befindet.", 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 153v.

<sup>547</sup> "Beÿ derleÿ beschaffenheit, vnd nechst vorstehender ruptur auch in ansehung, daß ich bereiths ausser stand gesezet bin Jhro Röml: Kayl: vnd Cathollischen Majt: allhier ferner forth allerunterthänigst gehorsambste dienst laisten, und schwärlich über disen noch einen andern bericht abstaten zukönnen, alß unterstehe ich mich mehrmahln, eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden gehorsambst zuersuchen die sach gnädig dahin zuveranstellen, auf das Ihre allerhöchst berührte Röml: Kayl: Majt: mich in der Zeit von hier zu avociren allermildist geruhen mögen, vnd da nun die Porthen oben gehorsambst angezogener massen aufs nechste Jahr den Krieg mit denen Teütschen für gewiß haltet, vnd sich, sovill Sÿe kan, zu selbigem rüstet, alß wird dise avocation selbige nicht mehr allarmiren, ia ich im gegentheill mit dero ordre sÿe dahin persuadiren können beÿ meiner darauszigen ankunfft ihre zum Venetianischen Krieg gehabte bewegursachen vorzustellen, vnd wie ich iederzeit gethan die gute verständnus zwischen disen zweÿen Reichen ferner Porth continuiren zu helfen.", 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 153v-154r.

<sup>548</sup> "Vbrigens geben die leztern nachrichten, daß der Venetianische General Capitajn Delfino kürzlich mit der unterhabenden Flotta [so in 30 Kriegs Schiffen von der linie, vnd 10 geringern bestehend seÿn solle] beÿ Andros sich eingefunden, vnd von dar die Insul Thino angefallen etlich hundert alda gewesene Türckhen zu Slaven gemacht, vnd einige Griechen, so an Verlust diser Insul Theill gehabt, aufgehenkhet, dardurchhaber die gelegenheit verlohren habe etlich Land zwanzig beÿ Scio gestandene in allem übel versehene, vnd sich indessen Salvirte Türckhische Schiff zuattaquiren.", 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 154v.



had missed the opportunity to attack approximately twenty Ottoman ships located on the island of Chios, which were in quite poor condition.

Additionally, according to a report from Edirne, a Swedish engineer recently arrived at the Sublime Porte from France. Approximately fifty years of age, the engineer was reported to have previously served in Hungary and was familiar with several strategically significant regions. He appeared eager to offer his services to the Ottoman administration. In a separate dispatch from Bender, it was reported that a Russian officer had delivered a formal letter of grievance from the Czar. The officer had been sent to present the Russian government's official complaints concerning the conduct of the Crimean Tatars, which was viewed as provocative or objectionable by the Russian side.<sup>549</sup>

Fleischmann mentioned at the end of the report that the ambassadors of Britain and the Netherlands had met with the Grand Vizier and expressed their willingness to mediate in order to end the ongoing war between Venice and the Ottomans. However, reaching a decision for peace under the current circumstances would mean a significant loss for both Venice and the Christian world. Fleischmann stated that he had to pay approximately 2000 Guldens to his informants both at the Sublime Porte and in the Morea in exchange for providing him with information throughout the war. For this reason, he had requested financial assistance from the Imperial Council.<sup>550</sup>

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<sup>549</sup> *"Allhier ist vor etlich monathen von Adrianopl aus gehorsambst berichter massen aus frankreich ein Schwedischer Ingenieur namens Parsonel, so beÿ 50 Jahr alt, vor disem in Hungarn gedienet, vnd seinem vorgeben nach vor allen alldasigen festem Plätzen ein gute erkhanthus haben solle] angelanget, vnd allem ansehen nach willens, wo nicht seinen glauben zunegiren, doch der Porten alß ein Ingenieur zudienen, ingleichen solle zu bender ein Moscovitischer Officier angekommen seÿn, vmb sich mittls eines Czaarischen schreibens beÿ der Porthen wider die einfälle, vnd vnfridliches verhalten der Tartarn zubeklagen."*, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 154v-155r.

<sup>550</sup> *"Endlichen könte es wohl, daß die hier anwesende Holland vnd Engellandische Bottschaffter in der dem Groß Vezier zugeben habenden visite von denen vormahls gethannen fridens oder vill mehr medations pahsibus was melden, auch die Porthen ihrer alten maxie gemäÿß vmb den Krieg zuabbreviren wider was auszuruchen, vnd indessen die eroberte Provinzen einzurichten, einiger massen zu dem friden incliniren, vnd ihnen Bottschafftern gehör geben möge allein ist schwährlich ein anderer frid alß mit zurukhlaffung all-deren disß Jahr verlohrenen Landen, Leüth, Insuln, vnd Vestungen mithin dardurch für die Christenheit wenig nuzliches zuhoffen. Alldieweillen schliesßlichen die zu geheimben außgaben hereingeschickhte 2000 Gulden inligender verrechnung nach schon mit anfang Novembris biß auf 54 ducaten ausgegeben, vnd ich sowohl meine beÿ der in Morea wider Venedig versamlet geweste Türkische Armee gehabt, vnd sich wohl verhaltene Confidenten, alß die hier, vnd anderwerttig gestandene correspondenten annoch zu contentiren habe, alß werden eüer Dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden von selbst den noth zuseÿn erkennen, daß ich fürs lezte mahl mit was umb daß indessen hiezue aufnehmende geld restituiren zukönnen mit dem beÿ anfang oder längstens in der helffte des vorstehenden monaths Januarÿ erwarthenden Currier nebst denen wegen der iezigen schwären conjuncturen stetten hin vnd her Ziehen übertragene Fataliteten, und theüren Zeiten unterthänigst angesuchte zuebueß nach gehorsambst einschliessender Specification deren ausgelegten rittgeldern, vnd dann meine halb Jährige gebühr, wie auch mehrmahln die der iezigen von Adrianopl hiehero gethannen reÿß halber ausgelegte, vnd wegen zertheilter Suite sich vngemain erhöchernde Spesen versehen werde."*, 3 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 155r-156r.

#### 4.5. Preparations in the Ottoman Navy & Efforts of the Ambassadors for Mediation

In his report dated December 13, 1715, Fleischmann noted that no significant political or military developments had occurred since the Sultan's arrival in Istanbul. The court's attention during this period had been primarily directed toward the festivities held on the 7th of the month. However, on December 9, the Kapudan Pasha returned to the capital in a notably understated manner, accompanied by 24 large warships, six smaller vessels, as well as various frigates, galleys, and other components of the Ottoman fleet. According to information obtained from Fleischmann's trusted informants, there was speculation that the Kapudan Pasha would soon be subject to the same treatment as other high-ranking officials, such as the Janissary Agha and Sipahi Agha, who had previously faced criticism or disciplinary action. This expectation stemmed from the Grand Vizier's assertion that the year's military successes—including the conquest of the Morea—were attributable solely to his leadership. He reportedly accused his fellow commanders of negligence and failure to execute their responsibilities effectively.<sup>551</sup>

Following the capture of the Fortress of Napoli di Malvasia, the Grand Vizier reportedly reacted with considerable anger upon learning that the stronghold had been surrendered to the Kapudan Pasha rather than to himself. Fleischmann notes that a prominent resident of the fortress, identified as Linsinioso, had advised the Venetian Provveditori to place their trust in the Kapudan Pasha rather than in the Grand Vizier. As a consequence of this counsel, Linsinioso was publicly executed three days prior—hanged alongside the official patent issued to him by the Republic of Venice bearing the title "*Comte de Morea*." Fleischmann interpreted this act as a clear manifestation of the Grand Vizier's jealousy and resentment toward the Kapudan Pasha, attributing it to the symbolic and political significance of the fortress's surrender to a rival figure within the Ottoman hierarchy.<sup>552</sup>

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<sup>551</sup> "... vber mein per Duplicat gehorsambst beyligendes solle unterthänigst melden, wie daß man allhier von Zeit der Sultanischen ankunfft mehrentheillß mit dem den 7ten dises celebrirten kleinen Bajram beschäfftiget gewesen, den 9.ten aber ist der Capitain Bahsa mit 24 grossen, vnd 6 kleinen Kriegs Schiffen nebst denen Fregaten, Gälleren, vnd andern die Türkische Flotta componirte Fahrzeug ohne pomp hier eingeseglet, nach außsag meiner Confidenten dörrfte disem Capitain Bahsa daß tractament so nach eingenommenen König Reich Morea dem Janitscharn Aga Spahiler Aga, vnd andern widerfahren, wohl auch zu Theill werden, sinthemaln der Groß Vezier, welcher alle disß Jahr erhaltene Sieg allein zu sich zu sich ziehen, vnd die übrige Türckhische häubter ihre schuldigkeit nicht gethan zuhaben bezüchtigen will, mit selbem schon nach eroberung der sich nicht an ihn ...", 13 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 157r.

<sup>552</sup> "... sondern den berührten Bahsa ergebenen Vestung Neapl di Malvasia, deren vornehmster Inwohner namens Linsinioso denen dasigen Proveditorn nicht dem Groß Vezier sondern dem Capitajn Bahsa sich zuverthrauen eingerathen, mit dem von der Republic Venedig alß Comte de Morea gehaltenen Diploma vor dreÿ Täggen allhier öffentlich aufgehengkhet worden, in nicht geringer eÿffersucht lebet.", 13 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 157r-157v.

Fleischmann reported that both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier placed considerable emphasis on the state and readiness of the Ottoman navy. In light of this, naval administration was entrusted to Mehmed Pasha, formerly the kahya to the Valide Sultan, who had more recently served as the Rikab Kaymakam. Demonstrating their commitment to overseeing naval preparations directly, both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier had taken up residence in their palace in Eyüp, thereby positioning themselves in closer proximity to the shipyards and administrative centers involved in the maritime build-up. According to Fleischmann, it was anticipated that the number of Ottoman warships would reach approximately 100 in the coming year. In addition, the number of Barbary corsairs and armed merchant vessels was expected to range between 50 and 60. Within this framework, it was widely believed that such an expansion of naval capacity would significantly facilitate the execution of the Sublime Porte's broader strategic objectives against Venice and, potentially, the Italian peninsula.<sup>553</sup>

In the final section of his report<sup>554</sup>, Fleischmann noted that the Sublime Porte issued a general order to all pashas in the Ottoman Empire and arranged a victory and peace celebration in that would continue for approximately ten days starting from December 11. Fleischmann expressed that regardless of the discomfort these celebrations caused him and other foreign representatives, he felt compelled to partake in them to avoid public insult.

In his report dated 21 December 1715, Fleischmann noted that his Çuhadar, who had departed for Petrovaradin on the 3rd of the month, was only able to advance as far as Edirne due to logistical difficulties. Despite offering to pay, he was denied access to postal horses, a restriction imposed under an order issued by the Grand Vizier. Fleischmann reported that he was ultimately

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<sup>553</sup> "Vbrigens lasset sowohl Er Groß Vezier alß der Sultan sich daß Schiff armament höchst angelegen seyn, dahero sÿe die Direction deren ordinari affairen dem vormahls gewesenen Valide Chyhajasi, vnd von etlichen monathen hero hiesiger Kaimecam Mehemed Bahsa ferner forth commitiret, vnd Sie beede in ihren in der so genannten Vorstatt Ejup habende Pallast einquartiret vmb dem See weesen nächer zuseyn, also das aufs khünfftige Jahr die anzahl deren Kriegs Schiffen, so die Türckheÿ zwar auf 100 hinaus ziehen, wohl ohne den Barbaresquen mit denen bewaffneten Kauffartheÿ-Schiffen auf funffzig biß Sechzig anwachsen, mithin sÿe Türckhen desto leichter in stand seyn dörfkten ihr gegen Venedig, und Italien högendes dessein auszuführen.", 13 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 157v.

<sup>554</sup> "Schliesßlichen hat man zu folge deren noch Adrianopel wegen denen disß Jahr von der Republic Venedig erhaltenen vngemainen vortheillen an alle Bahsen des ganzen Ottomannischen Reichs ergangenen Circular befelch in allhiesiger Türckhischer haubt Statt den 11.ten dises die zehen Täg hindurch wehren sollende illuimation mit öffentlicher freidens bezeügung angefangen, worzue auch ich mich, wie hart es mich auch ankombet, nebst denen andern aus Ländischen Repräsentanten umb nicht von dem Pövel beschimpfet zuwerden, verstehen müssen.", 13 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 158r-158v.

able to overcome this obstacle by securing a new postal decree with the assistance of the Reis Efendi. This intervention enabled his assistant to resume his journey to Petrovaradin.<sup>555</sup>

During this period, the British and Dutch ambassadors were actively seeking to position themselves as mediators in the ongoing conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice. In his report<sup>556</sup>, Fleischmann stated that His Royal Highness of Great Britain, at the request of the Venetian Bailo, had ordered the British ambassador in Istanbul to use all possible means to mediate the war waged by the Porte against Venice. Because Britain, one of the mediators of the Treaty of Karlowitz, was very disturbed by the Sublime Porte's desire to fight Venice. They could guess that Austria, Britain's ally against France, would join the war on Venice's side in such a case. Therefore, the British Government sent an order to Sir Robert Sutton and assigned him to mediate between the Sublime Porte and Venice. Upon this order, Sutton met with the Grand Vizier's office, but was told that it was too late for this and that peace negotiations could only begin after Morea was annexed by the Ottomans.<sup>557</sup> The States General (the Netherlands) had recently ordered its ambassador to do the same, but Fleischmann mentioned that he believed neither country's ambassadors would dare do anything about it.

Fleischmann observed that the ambassador's efforts were unlikely to succeed, as both had lost a considerable degree of credibility in the eyes of the Ottoman leadership due to their perceived alignment with Moscow. According to Fleischmann, their mediation initiatives were driven primarily by a desire to safeguard their own commercial and political interests as established under the Treaty of Karlowitz. As such, their interventions did not appear to be motivated by genuine concern for the

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<sup>555</sup> *"Mein den 3.tn dises expedierte Tschohadar ware bereiths bis Adrianopel avanciret, da er aber alda sich der Postpferden gewöhnlicher maßßen bedienen wolte, wurden selbige wegen einem vom Groß Vezier ergangenen befelch [Krafft dessen im ganzen Ottomannis: Reich die Post nicht aus die alte, sondern neüe, und frischere Ordre gegeben werden sollen] ihme geweigert, mithin ohneracht einer offerirten gelt summa, genöttiget wider hieher zugehen, dahero ich mit zuethueung des Reis Effendi ein frisches Post commandament [so iezo sehr hart heraußgegeben werden] bewürckhet, mit welchem ich mein gehorsambst berührten Tschohadar aufs neu nach Peterwardein abfertige ...", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 160r.*

<sup>556</sup> *"Letztlichen bringe von sicherer hand in erfarnus, daß Ihre Königl:e Majt: von Groß Britanien auf ansuechung des Venetianischen Herrn Podtschaffters durch dero Staats-Secretarium Stanhopp den zu Constantinopl anwesenden Engelländischen Ambassadeur beordert all-mögliches anzuwenden vmb den von der Porthen gegen Venedig unternehmenden Krieg zuvermitteln. Ein gleiches haben auch kürzlich die Herren General-Staaten ihrem Podtschaffter anbefohlen, allein wird sich weder einer noch der andere gegenwärtig hierinnen einen passum zumachen, weniger was zubewürckhen gekhauen. Wormit mich zu dero höchsten hulden vnd gnaden unterthänigst-gehorsambst empfehlend verharre.", 4 June 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 84r-84v.*

<sup>557</sup> For more information about the correspondence of the British ambassador Sir Robert Sutton, on this matter, Büyükkaksoy 2023; 1121-1155.

welfare of the Venetian Republic, nor did they seek to influence the broader dynamics of the war in Venice's favor.<sup>558</sup>

Fleischmann inquired into the actions taken by the ambassadors to obtain a response to the letter that had been submitted to the Grand Vizier several months prior concerning the ongoing conflict. In reply, the Reis Efendi stated that he had not received any communication on the matter and that the Grand Vizier had not conveyed any related information to him. Fleischmann interpreted this as suggesting either a failure in the proper delivery of the letter or the possibility that it had been misplaced or intentionally disregarded. He further noted that the ambassadors intended to pay a formal visit to the Grand Vizier, during which they would extend their congratulations on the recent military successes and subsequently present a series of proposals aimed at initiating or facilitating a peace process.<sup>559</sup>

Fleischmann reported that he had made considerable efforts to obtain insights from the Reis Efendi, a trusted confidant of the Grand Vizier who received his full support, in order to better understand the Sublime Porte's stance on the prospect of peace. According to reliable sources, both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier remained resolute in their intention to continue hostilities against the Republic of Venice and to pursue their broader strategic ambitions concerning Italy—motivated by the substantial military successes achieved over the course of the year. Nevertheless, the potential involvement of the Emperor in support of the Venetian cause, which could lead to a direct confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the German states, was reportedly a source of serious apprehension within Ottoman political circles. As a result, Fleischmann believed it was plausible that the Sublime Porte might pursue a negotiated peace with Venice in order to avoid the complications of a broader conflict with the Habsburg Empire. He further speculated that, under

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<sup>558</sup> "... und darbey noch euer drhl: Excell: und Gnaden unterthänigst berichte, wie daß der Engelländl: und Holländl: Bottschaffter alles anwenden, umb sich bey gegenwärtigen zwischen der Porten, und der Republic Venedig vorsehenden Krieg alß Mediatorez hervorzuthuen, allein dörrften Sie Bottschaffter weillen selbige bey Jhr Porten durch das Moscovitische weesen in einem zimblichen Mißcredit gerathen, hierinnen [worzue Sie doch von Jhren Principalen khein andere Instruction alß die gnädigst bekhante, nemblich zu hand habung des Carlowizischen fridens den entstandenen Krieg zuvermitteln, und von der Republic Venedig gar kheinen Gewalt zutractiren haben sollen] schwährlich renziren ...", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 160r-160v.

<sup>559</sup> "... gestalten Jhnen diser tagen der Reis Effendi, alß selbe bey Jhm die antworth auf die vor etlich Monathen gehorsambst berichtermaßen in diser materi an Groß Vezier geschickhte Rechnung sollicitirten, andeüthen lasßen, von kheinem schreiben waß zuwisßen, und hätte der Groß Vezier Jhme Reis Effendi hievon nichts communiciret, es müesste dahero selbiges nicht wohl bestellet, oder verlohren gangen seyn; allein werden sie Bottschaffter, in denen nächster Tagen bey Jhme Groß Vezier umb Jhme das gewöhnliche compliment über seine glückliche Zuruckh Kunfft zumachen habenden audienzien zu disem vorhabenden fridens werckh zweiffels ohne ein: und andere proposition machen ...", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 160v.

such an arrangement, the Ottoman Empire would likely retain the territories, islands, and fortresses it had captured during the recent campaign, while acknowledging Venice's control over those fortresses lost by the Ottomans in the previous war. Fleischmann also emphasized that, in the event of such negotiations, the Sublime Porte would be willing to consider mediation only if it came directly from the Holy Roman Emperor.<sup>560</sup>

Fleischmann warned about the dangerous consequences of the complete dissolution of the Holy Alliance, established to protect the Karlowitz Treaty, which the Ottomans used as a justification for "regaining what was lost" against Venice, and that this justification could also apply to Hungary and Transylvania. In such a situation, he indicated that it would be inevitable for the Sublime Porte to attack the Empire's territories at an unfavorable time. For this reason, Fleischmann once again requested the Imperial Council to take the necessary actions for his timely recall from his position in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>561</sup>

Fleischmann also reported that the French ambassador, who had been largely confined to his residence due to advanced age, paid a formal visit to the Grand Vizier on the 18th of the month to extend his congratulations on the recent military victories. The Grand Vizier—who, according to Fleischmann, was particularly receptive to praise—welcomed the ambassador's remarks and responded favorably to his request for the restitution of French vessels that had been seized during the capture of Nafplion. Furthermore, the Grand Vizier expressed a desire to consult with the

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<sup>560</sup> "... weillen aber hierinnen daß allerhöchste Kayl: interesse villfältig versiret, alß habe mich eüsßerist bemüehet, der Porten eigentliche inclination zuergründten, und beforderist den Reis Effendi [so vom Groß Vezier geliebt, und zu allem gezogen wirdt] unter der hand durch einen Threu: und verständigen Confitenten hierüber weithläuffig sondiren zulassen, durch welchen canal ich dann auch erst gestern vernohmen, wie daß der von denen disß Jahr gehabten ungemainen victorien zu fernerer progrehsen angefrischte Sultan, und Groß Vezier gänzlich resolviret seÿen, den Krieg wider Venedig zuprosequiren, und Jhr wider selbige Republic, und Italien hegendes unterthänigst beschribene Dessein außzuführen, da man aber von einer Zeithero in grosser apprehension, und gleichsamb ausser zweiffel stehet, daß sich Jhre Röml: Kayl: und Cathollis: Majl: in favor der Republic Venedig declarire, und folglich die Porten in einen Krieg mit denen Teütschen verfallē, alß khönte wohl seÿn, daß man auch Türckhl:en Seiths umb denen wegen dem Sicherlich glaubenden Teütschen Krieg bevorstehenden wechthäuffigkeiten zuentgehen, sich endlich wider mit selbiger Republic [sofern Sie hierzue einen passum machet] in Tractaten einlasßen, und insonderheit mit der bedingnuß, daß der Porten die disß Jahr durch die Ottomannis: Waaffen erobert: und besizende Königreiche, Insuln, und Lande verbleiben, auch selbiger die im vorigen Krieg abgenommene Vestungen restituiret werden, ein friden gemachet werde, wobey aber er sie Republic versichert, daß man in solchen Fall kheines anderen, alß des Röml: Kayßers mediation anzunehmen gedenckhe ...", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 160v-161r.

<sup>561</sup> "... allein werden eüer drtl: Excell: und gnaden beÿ derley läuffen, umbständt, und bewendtnusßen die auß einem mit denen hochmüethigen Türckhen schliesßenden friden erwachsende nachtheilige folge von selbstē gnädig zuerwegen belieben, sinthemahlen dardurch daß zu conservirung des Carlowizis: fridens errichtete foedus sacrum völlig zertrimmert, eben die zu bekriegung der Republic Venedig angeführte raison, nemblich daß verlohrene zurecuperiren, eben auch respectu Hungarn, und Sibenbürgen gelten, und endlich dise threüloße, und fridens brüchige Barbarn in einer ungelegeneren Zeith alß iezo die Kayl: Lande, und Leüthe anfallen werden. Disemnach ist mein abermahliges unterthänigst gehorsambstes bitten auf meine Zeitliche avocation ein gnädigste reflexion zumachen.", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 161r-161v.

ambassador on additional matters in the near future. In turn, the ambassador reaffirmed the longstanding cordial and cooperative relations between France and the Ottoman Empire and offered his assistance in facilitating further diplomatic engagement.<sup>562</sup>

In the concluding part of his report<sup>563</sup>, Fleischmann noted that, although limited in number, several Ottoman military units had been deployed to Bosnia. He added that these forces could be redirected toward the Hungarian frontier should the strategic situation necessitate such a move. Additionally, Fleischmann included in his correspondence a list of Venetian dignitaries and officials who had recently arrived in Istanbul by land, accompanying the Kapudan Pasha. These individuals, many of whom had held administrative or military positions in the former Venetian territories of the Morea, were as follows:

1. *Nobile Vincenzo Pasta Procuratore Estrodiny: di tutto it Regno si Morea,*
2. *N.b: Marco Venier Rettor bella Provincia di Mesenia,*
3. *Nob: Nutio querini fi Pr: della Provincia di Mesenia,*
4. *Nob: Daniel Balbi fi Pr: odr: di Modon,*

*Pietro Pollani Camerlingo di Romania Tenent,*

*Generale Luigi Citadella Sargente*

*Generale Antonia Giansisich*

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<sup>562</sup> "Übrigens hat der französöl: Bottschaffter [so von etlichen Monathen hero seines hohen alters wegen nicht im Standt gewesen außzugehen] den. 18.tn dises beÿm Groß Vezier audienz gehabt, und selbigen über seine glückliche, und victorische zuruckhkunfft complimentiret, welches dem der schmeichlereÿ sehr zuegethanen Groß Vezier sowohl gefielle, daß er Jhme Bottschaffter in seinen wegen loßlassung zweÿer beÿ eroberung Napoli di Romania in dasigen haafen gestandenen, und außgeplinderten französöl: Schiffen gethannenen begehren willfahret, und berührte Schiffe restituiren lasßen, mit dem vermelden, daß er Groß Vezier Jhme nächstens ein: und anderes anzuvertrauen, und hierüber seine Mainung einzufollen hätte, Worzu sich auch der Bottschaffter mit villen beforderist die von so langen Zeithen hero zwischen franckhreich, und der Porten versirende aufrichtige freündliche verständnuß, und höchstnöttige Interesse exprimirenden Worthen offeriret hat ...", 21 December 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 161v-162r.

<sup>563</sup> "... meiner confidenten, außsaag nach solle dises in dem bestehen, daß Er Groß Vezier sich mit Jhme Bottschaffter über den von Kayl: Seiths apprehendirenden Krieg besprechen wolle, gestalten beÿ gegenwärtigen Zeithen ein jeder durch Entdeckung des Kayl vorhabens sich beÿ der Porten meriten machen will. Welches dan unter andern auch anlaß gegeben, daß Sie Porten bereiths verschidene Trouppen [ so doch kheine considerable anzahl außmachen] gegen Bosnien defiliren lasßet, umb selbige in der Noth von dar an die Hungarisl: Gränizen schickhen zu khönnen. ... Wornebends die Lista deren mit dem Capitain Bahsa angelangten: und zu dem vor etlich Monathen über Land gekhombenen: in die Siben Thurn gesezten Nobili Venetiani gehorsambst beÿlege: Nobile Vincenzo Pasta Procuratore Estrodiny: di tutto it Regno si Morea, N.b: Marco Venier Rettor bella Provincia di Mesenia, Nob: Nutio querini fi Pr: della Provincia di Mesenia, Nob: Daniel Balbi fi Pr: odr: di Modon, Pietro Pollani Camerlingo di Romania Tenent, Generale Luigi Citadella Sargente Generale Antonia Giansisich.", 21 December 1715. ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 162r-163r.

#### 4.6. The Letter of Fieldmarshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz von Kolberg

Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz von Kolberg<sup>564</sup> was appointed as a Fieldmarshal-lieutenant in 1707 and entrusted with the Frisian infantry regiment. Later, he was rewarded by a decree issued by the War Council for his long-term struggle against the Turks and rebels in Hungary in 1713.<sup>565</sup> Baron Löffelholz-Kolberg, who was the commander of the Petrovaradin Fortress and Fieldmarshal, sent a letter to the Vienna War Council on January 6, 1716. He stated in his letter<sup>566</sup> that Fleischmann sent a Çuhadar as a courier and that person arrived in Petrovaradin on the morning of the day the report was written. The Çuhadar brought with him several letters and a report addressed to the Aulic War Council. The commander mentioned that although the Çuhadar had set out from Istanbul on December 3, he was unable to use the postal horses upon arriving in Edirne, as these horses were not provided to him due to an order issued by the Grand Vizier stating that the posts should be delivered not by the old methods, but with a new and fresher arrangement. Therefore, the Çuhadar had to return to Istanbul. There, Fleischmann was able to obtain a new postal decree, and only on December 19 could the Çuhadar set out again.<sup>567</sup>

Löffelholz reported that, in light of the delay, Fleischmann had requested that the aforementioned report be dispatched to the Council without further postponement via a çuhadar, a request which Löffelholz personally fulfilled. Fleischmann had also requested that the commander arrange for the çuhadar's return after a brief stay of one or two days. In his correspondence, the commander noted that Fleischmann was, at the time, unaware that one of the two janissaries he had previously sent from Istanbul had died in Petrovaradin, while the other had already been sent back. Consequently, the commander concluded that the Çuhadar should remain in Petrovaradin until further instructions were received from higher authority. The commander further reported that the Çuhadar had encountered the returning Janissary en route near Edirne. Upon arrival in Belgrade,

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<sup>564</sup> Lautenbach 1709; 14.

<sup>565</sup> Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium Juli – Dezember 1713 / 1713-09-09.

<sup>566</sup> See Appendix 10.

<sup>567</sup> *“Euer durchl: Excell: Meine gnädigst: gnädig und hochgebieltende Herrn berichte hiemit gehorsambst, daß heunte Vormitag ein Tschohadar von dem beÿ der Porthen anwesenden Kayl:en Herrn Residenten v: Fleischman aus Constantinopel dahier arriviret, welcher nebst anderen angefügten brieffschafften, auch beÿkommende Relations: Schreiben an einen Hochlöbl: Kayl:en HofKriegs: Rath mitgebracht, und ist nur vermeldeter Tschohadar zwar bereiths den 3:ten Decembris von Constantinopel aufgebrochen, als er aber schon biß Adrianopel avanciret gewesen, und sich alda der Post: pferd gewöhnlicher massen bedienen wollen, hat man Ihme solche gewaigert, weilten der Groß-Vezier erst kürzlich einen befehl ergehen lassen, die Posten nicht auf die alte, sondern neuere, und frischere ordre zugeben, also daß der Tschohadar genöthiget wordten wider nacher Constantinopel zuruckzukheren, woselbst der herr Resident ein neues Post Commendament ausgewürkhet mit welchem diser Tschohadar erst den 19:ten Decembris von Constantinopel wider abgangen ...”, 6 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 179r-179v.*



the Janissary had been received directly and warmly by the Serasker, who extended his personal greetings to the commander. The Serasker had expressed his intention to send a letter and courier, but due to ongoing health concerns, had not yet been able to do so.<sup>568</sup>

Löffelholz reported that, according to information provided by a merchant from Karlowitz, an incident of particular interest occurred during a visit to Belgrade. While accompanied by a colleague who regularly transported goods to Vienna and Venice, the merchant was invited to a local coffeehouse by two Aghas. During the meeting, the merchants were served coffee and questioned on various matters related to geography and transportation routes in the region. The questions posed were as follows:

1. *What is the distance between Zadar on the Dalmatian coast and the Drava River?*
2. *What are the best and most direct routes? Is it possible to cross everywhere with goods and cargo?*
3. *What are the shortest and best routes from Croatia to Styria (Steiermark)? How many miles are there from Graz to Vienna?*
4. *How many miles are there from Vienna via Nagykanizsa<sup>569</sup>, from the Drava? Is it possible to cross this river everywhere?*

In response to the inquiries, the two Aghas explained that their questions stemmed from a wager they had made with the interpreter Yusuf concerning the distances in question. Yusuf had argued that the distance between Zadar and Vienna did not exceed 30 miles. The merchants, however, refuted this claim, explaining that the route from Zadar to Vienna was considerably longer and, based on their personal experience, required approximately three weeks of travel using their own horses. They further noted that they lacked precise knowledge regarding the conditions and

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<sup>568</sup> "Wegen diser verweillung ersuchet mich der herr Resident, daß ich die obangeregte Relations: schreiben durch aigene Staffetam an eine hohe Instanz, wie auch hiemit so forth beschihet, beförden wie auch disen seinen Tschohadarn, nachdem er 1 oder 2 Posttäg erwarthet, wider zurukhschiken möchte, weilen aber der herr Resident noch nicht gewust, das der eine von seinen heraufgeschikhten Janitscharn dahier gestorben, der andere aber respedirt wordten, so kan ich dises leztere ansuchen nicht volziehen, sondern uns mehrerwehnten Tschohadarn bis auf einer hohen Instanz austruckhlichen befehl nothwendig alhier aufhalten, welcher mir meldet, daß er den lezt respedirten fleischmanischen Janitscharn unter weegs vntherha Adrianopel angetroffen, ingeleichen, das ihn der Seraskier zu Belgrad selbst vorkommen lassen, sehr höflich empfangen, und gebetten, daß er mich schön grüssen möchte, und wurde er mir schon geschriben, und zugleich einen expressen heraufgeschikhet haben, wan er sich nicht unpäsßlich befunden, welches aber, da er nunmehr wider besser, ohnverweillt geschehen solle.", 6 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 179v-180r.

<sup>569</sup> For more information about Kanizsa (Nagykanizsa), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Nagykanizsa". Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 Jun. 2019, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagykanizsa>". Accessed 3 January 2025.

navigability of alternative routes. Following the discussion, the Aghas released the merchants in a courteous and respectful manner.<sup>570</sup>

Löffelholz stated that he intended to report the matter to Colonel Petrasch via dispatch and would request that the Colonel initiate an investigation through his own network of scouts. Simultaneously, he noted that he had already undertaken measures to inform the appropriate higher authorities without delay.<sup>571</sup>

#### **4.7. Strict Measures in Sublime Porte and the End of Stepanus Cantecuzenus**

In his letter dated 12 January 1716, Fleischmann reported that he had received the imperial directive dispatched from Vienna via the Janissary Sakallı İbrahim, who had returned from Petrovaradin on 25 December. He affirmed that he was making every effort to execute the contents of the order with the utmost diligence. However, he also conveyed that the prevailing circumstances had become increasingly precarious, necessitating heightened caution to ensure that he would not be placed in a position where fulfilling his responsibilities might become untenable. Fleischmann further noted that this particular report was transmitted covertly through a Dutch interpreter, utilizing a special postal arrangement. He expressed concern that future communication might become increasingly difficult, raising doubts about the feasibility of submitting subsequent reports.<sup>572</sup>

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<sup>570</sup> "Übrigens hat mir dieser tagen ein Kauffman von Carlowiz, welcher sonst nacher Wienn, und Venedig zuhandten pfleget, erzehlet, daß er nebst seinen Cameraden zu Belgrad von 2 Aghen in ein Caffé: Haus geruffen, mit Caffé tractiret, und darbey über folgende puncten befraget worden, wie vil nemblichen Tagraisen von Sadar oder Zara in Dalmatien bis an die Wanna, wie vil von dar bis an die Draw Wo die beste, und geradeste weege, und ob man aller orthen mit Bagage Stukhen, und allen passiren könne? Welche die beste, und nächste weege durch Croathen in Steyermarkht, wie vill meillen von grätz bis Wienn? Wie vil meillen auf dem flachen land über Canischa von der Draw bis Wienn? Vnd ob man aller orthen disen flus füeglich passiren könne? Worzue gedachte zwey Aghen die ursach angegeben, daß Sie mit dem Dolmetsch Jussuff wegen diser Distanzien gewettet, und derselbe sie bereden wollen, das es von Sadar bis Wienn nicht weither als 30 Meillen wäre, welches aber die Kauffleuthe nur für einen prætext halten, und vermainen, daß ein anderes absehen darunter versiren müsse, da sie indessen auf obangemerchte fragen nichts anderes geantworthet, als daß es von Sadar biß Wienn ein zimlich weither weeg wäre, und man solchen mit seinen aigenen pferden in 3 wochen kaum hinter sich legen könne, wegen der andern weegen aber, und sonderlich deren beschaffenheit wären sie wenig informiret, könnten auch dahero nichts gewisses davon reden worauf sie von disen Aghen mit aller höflichkeit wider dimittiret worden.", 6 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 180r-180v.

<sup>571</sup> "Ich berichte dem herrn obrist v Petrasch eben dises mit morgiger ordinari, vnndt ersuche ihn, daß er sich durch seine kundtschaffter diserhalb, so viel möglich, erkundigen lassen wolle, da ich indessen dises einer hohen Instanz unterzüglic gehorsambst beýbringen soll an.", 6 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 2, fol. 180v-181r.

<sup>572</sup> "... untern 4.ten verwichenen monaths, vnd Jahrs zuerlaßsen gnädigst beliebte rescript, habe durch mein den 25.ten Decembris von Peterwardein revertirten Jänitscharn Sakali Ibrahim Baschi in vnterthänigkheit erhalten, dessen inhalt ich all-gehorsambst, vnd genauist folge zulaisten unterthänigst beeýfert bin, allein seýnd die vorschwebende leüffe also

Fleischmann stated<sup>573</sup> that on December 24, the British ambassador paid a visit to the Grand Vizier. With this visit, the ambassador celebrated the Sultan's return and offered his compliments regarding the victory achieved. Additionally, the ambassador indicated that he wished to receive a response to the mediation proposal presented by the King of England a few months prior, aimed at resolving the disputes that had arisen between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice and ending the ongoing war. The Grand Vizier, after a long silence, responded with a few brief sentences, stating that the correspondence had reached the Sublime Porte, but that peace was no longer possible and that continuing the war against the enemy, the Republic of Venice, with all its might was the only thing in the Ottoman's interest.<sup>574</sup>

Fleischmann reported that it was widely believed the King of England would continue to uphold a cordial relationship with the Ottoman Empire and maintain support for its interests, consistent with the policies of his predecessors. Meanwhile, the Dutch envoy held an audience with the Grand Vizier on December 31, during which he formally congratulated him on the Sultan's triumphant return. During this meeting, emphasis was placed on the enduring diplomatic friendship between the Dutch Republic and the Sublime Porte, as well as the historical support extended by the Netherlands to the Ottoman state. The envoy also reiterated the Dutch Republic's willingness to serve as a mediator in ongoing conflicts and expressed readiness to contribute in any manner that would advance the interests of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>575</sup>

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*beschaffen, das vmb nicht völig ausser stand zudienen gesezt zuwerde ich all-menschen mögliche circumspection zugebrauchen habe, worbey das zubeförchten, daß ich ausser gegenwertigen unterthänigsten berichts schreiben [zu dessen beförderung ich unter der hand durch einen Holländischen Dollmäschen ein freyes Post commandement zuwegen gebracht] kaumb noch ein anders werde gehorsambst einsändten können.”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 2r.*

<sup>573</sup> *“Inzwischen werden meine vorige rechts eingeloffen seyn, vnd eüer dhrl: Excellenz, vnd Gnaden daraus das, so sich Zeit der beschehenen Zurukkhunfft des Sultans bey der Porthen geeüssert, mit mehrern zuersehen gnädigst geruhet haben; Weithers hatte den 24.ten Decembl: der Engelländische Podtschaffter bey dem Groß Vezier audienz, in welcher Er Podtschaffter nebst dem auf die glückliche retour, vnd wehrenden feldzug erhaltenen sieg abgezihlten compliment von sich selbst wegen der auf das neulich vnterthänigst gemelte die vom König in Groß Britanien zu beylegung deren zwischen der Porthen, vnd Venedig entstandenen Strittigkeiten, vnd zu verhinderung des vorsehenden Kriegs Offerirte mediation betreffend.”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 2r-2v.*

<sup>574</sup> *“Vor einigen monathen ihme Groß Vezier durch den Constantinopolitanischen Kaimekam zuegeschickhte schreiben gehörige, vnd seinem höchsten Principalen zuübersändten habende antworth meldung gethan, worauf ihme der Groß Vezier nach einen etlich miserere lang gedaurten stillschweigen in wenig, vnd aigentlich in folgenden worthen zuverstehen geben, wie das berührtes schreiben zwar der Porthen zuekommen, allein die Zeit nicht mehr gewesen darauf zu reflectiren, vnd seye villmehr ihrer Porthen convenienz den Krieg wider ihre feinde die Republic Venedig mit allem gwalt fortzusezen, alß sich in einen friden einzulassen.”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 2r-2v.*

<sup>575</sup> *“Vbrigens zweifelte man gar nicht, der iezige König in Engeland werde nach den beyspill seiner Vorfahrer mit der*

The Grand Vizier expressed<sup>576</sup> his appreciation for the longstanding and sincere friendship between the Dutch Republic and the Sublime Porte, acknowledging that, in the future, the Netherlands might serve as a viable intermediary in the pursuit of a mutually beneficial peace. However, he observed that the Dutch had not yet been officially designated by the Republic of Venice as mediators in the conflict. He further emphasized that, under the prevailing circumstances, the continuation of hostilities served the strategic interests of the Ottoman Empire. In response, the Dutch ambassador reaffirmed his government's willingness to extend any form of assistance that aligned with the priorities and interests of the Sublime Porte.

Fleischmann reported that the Dutch Ambassador visited him on January 2 and shared details of his recent discussions with the Grand Vizier. During their conversation, the Ambassador mentioned his intention to dispatch one of his aides to England via Vienna within the coming weeks. Fleischmann noted that, should the Ambassador notify him of this arrangement, he planned to take advantage of the opportunity to forward his own report through that channel. Additionally, he remarked on the Dutch Ambassador's excessive courtesy and laudatory remarks toward the Grand Vizier—behavior that, according to his confidants, had raised eyebrows. These confidants further indicated that the Republic of Venice had not formally authorized any mediation initiative and that it was unlikely either the British or Dutch ambassadors would be able to advance the peace negotiations under the current diplomatic conditions. Nevertheless, Fleischmann expressed

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*Porthen ein beständig auf richtige freundschaftt unterhalten, vnd vor andern deroselben interesse favorisiren wollen, ingleichen wurde den 31.ten dito dem hollandischem Podtschaffter ein zu ablegung seiner über die zuruckkhunfft deß Groß Veziers, vnd von ihme in Morea gemachten progressen gestelter gratulation audienz verstattet, worinnen er Hollandische Podtschaffter die zwishen denen generalstaaten, vnd der Porthen von so langen Jahren hero versirende wahre aufrichtige freundschaftt, und dessen sowohl von seinen Principalen alß Jhme Podtschafften in particulari beÿ verflossenen Zeiten zum Vortheill der Porthen gegebene proben mit vill vnd nachtruckhsamben worthen vorgestellt, weither meldend, daß seine berüchrte Principalen eben diser ursachen halber bewogen worden zu beÿlegung der zwischen Jhr Porthen vnd Republic Venedig entstandenen, vnd in öffentlichen Krieg ausgebrochenen müßhelligkeiten ihre officia anzubiethen mit versicherung sowohl ihr alß seiner des Podtschaffters seithen all-das beÿzutragen, was das ihterehse, vnd avantage der Porthen fördern mag.”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 2v-3r.*

<sup>576</sup> *“Hierauf antworthete der Groß Vezier, daß die Porthen deren General Staaten wahrhaftt aufrichtige, vnd ieder Zeit zu ihrer Porthen vortheill genaigte freundschaftt wohl erkennete, dahero selbe nicht zugegen seÿn wurde, wan sÿe general staaten ihr zu seiner Zeit ein nuzlich, vnd vortheillhaftten friden verschaffen werden, aniezo aber, zumahln er Podtschaffter von der Republic Venedig mit kheiner instruction, vnd vollmacht darzue versehen, erforderete ihr Porthen convenienz den Krieg weither zu continuiren hierauf offerirte er Podtschaffter iederzeit bereith zuseÿn, wie er bereiths vor disem in villen fallen gethan, all das, so Jhr Porthen nuz-vnd vortrüglich verschaffen zuhelffen ...”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 3r-3v.*

confidence that, should a peace agreement materialize in the future, he would be able to obtain timely and reliable information through the Reis Efendi.<sup>577</sup>

Fleischmann reported<sup>578</sup> that the Sublime Porte is determined to capitalize on its victories and to realize its intentions against Venice and Italy regarding the war plans for the upcoming year. On December 3rd, a sharp order was given to the Kapudan Pasha to repair 15 warships within four weeks and to send them to protect the Ottoman islands and maritime trade. Additionally, it was planned to prepare the entire fleet for readiness through continuous day and night work under the constant supervision of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier within three months.

Furthermore, it was noted that although three new warships had recently arrived at the naval shipyard, their construction had been delayed due to the death of Michael, a renowned Greek shipmaster originally from the island of Chios, who passed away fifteen days earlier. Compounding the delay, several cases of illness had also emerged among the sailors. Despite these setbacks, it remained the intention of the Ottoman naval authorities to increase the fleet to a total of 50 warships in the coming year, excluding armed merchant vessels and those operated by the Barbary corsairs. The navy's primary objective was identified as the island of Corfu.<sup>579</sup>

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<sup>577</sup> "... dises erstere hat mir der Holländische Podtschaffter [so nach einigen wochen seinen Cammer diener auf seine im monath Junnio empfangene Creditiv-Schreiben über Wienn in Engeland zuschickhen gedenckhet, welcher gelegenheit auch ich mich, sofern Er sye mir avisiret, gebrauchen werde] in einer den 2.ten dises mir gegebenen visite selbst hinterbracht, daß andern vom Holländischen Podtschaffter aber habe durch meine Confidenten [so sich über desselben Podtschaffters gegen den Groß Vezier gezaigte vngemaine cortesie nicht gnugsamb verwundern können] erfahren, mit dem beÿsatz, daß weder einer noch der andere von bemelten Podtschafftern so nicht im geringsten hiezue von der Republic Venedig bevollmächtiget, in diser fridens-negotiation avanciren, vnd die sache, wan doch gegen alle apparenz was daraus werden solte, auf das, so der Reis Effendi iüngsthin gehorsambst berichter massen hierinfallß versichert, ankommen werde, weithers aber solle mich in diser beÿ gegenwärttigen conjuncturen der Christenheit höchst prejudicirlich fallen wurdende fridens-sach auf mein lezteres untern 21.ten Decembris gehorsambst erlassenes hier pr Duplicatum beÿligendes unterthänigst beziehen.", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 3v-4r.

<sup>578</sup> "Nun auf daß von der Porthen für nechstkünfftige Campagne habendes Dessein, vnd vorkehrende veranstaltungen zugelingen, so bleibt selbige Vest resolviret, sich deren erhaltenen vortheillen zugebrauchen, vnd ihr öffters gehorsambst überschribene wider Venedig, vnd Italien angesehenes vorhaben auszuführen, dahero hat selbige schon den 3.ten iüngst verflossenen monath Decembris dem Capitajn Bahsa scharffe ordre ertheillet in vier wochen funffzehnen Kriegs-Schiff reparirter zu bedeckung deren Insuln; vnd Türckhischen schifffarth aus zuschickhen in dreÿ monathen aber mit der ganzen Flotta [an dessen zuerüstung man fast in stetter gegenwarth deß Sultans, vnd Groß Veziers Tag, und nacht arbeiteth] zum aus lauffen fertig zustehen ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 4r-4v.

<sup>579</sup> "... ohneracht die im hiesigen arsenal kürzlich neü-angelangte dreÿ Kriegs-Schiff, weillen deren Türckhen bester Schiffmeister ein Griech namens Michael gebürtig von Scio vor 15 Tågen gestorben, auch unter den See Leüthen einige Krankhheiten seÿnd, biß dorthin schwärlich im Stand seÿn werde, so dörfte dennoch aufs instehende Jahr die Türckhische Flotta mit denen armirenden Khauffartheÿ Schiffen, vnd ohne denen Barbaresquen [so auch beÿ 20 Kriegs Schiffe zusamben bringen] in 50 Kriegs-Schiffen von der Linie ohne die Branders, Fregaten, Gållern, vnd Transport Schiffen, deren lezteren ein erckleckliche mänge verfertigt wird, bestehen, mit welcher sye vor allem Corfu zuattaquiren gedenckhen ...", 12 January 1716, ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 4v.

The Ottoman leadership was preparing to launch a land-based offensive targeting Dalmatia, with roads and bridges leading to the region and toward Belgrade being readied to facilitate the movement of troops. According to Fleischmann, the Sublime Porte was proceeding with its military preparations under the firm assumption that the Emperor would soon enter the conflict in support of the Republic of Venice, thereby formally initiating hostilities with the Ottoman Empire.<sup>580</sup>

Should the Holy Roman Emperor provide support to the Republic of Venice, the Ottoman navy was expected to launch a maritime assault on Dalmatia, while a land force estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 troops would conduct a concurrent offensive by land. Orders had already been issued to all provincial authorities within the Ottoman Empire, mandating that military units assemble in Edirne by the end of March. In the event that the Emperor adopted an openly hostile stance toward the Sublime Porte, these forces would be redirected toward Imperial territories under the direct command of the Ottoman Sultan. Furthermore, the Tatar Khan was to remain in a state of readiness to initiate coordinated attacks on Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>581</sup>

The Sublime Porte was reportedly planning to deploy Tatar forces to carry out incursions across the borders of Hungary and Transylvania. However, Fleischmann expressed confidence that the Imperial Army would implement the necessary defensive measures to counter such actions and anticipated that these planned attacks would ultimately be unsuccessful.<sup>582</sup>

In his report, Fleischmann mentioned that Sublime Porte planned to send 50 warships with ammunition to Dalmatia along the Danube River via the Black Sea. Preparations were also being

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<sup>580</sup> "... zu Land aber wollen sye in Dalmatien, allwohin sowohl alß gegen Belgrad man bereiths die weeg, vnd brückhen verfertigt, ihre Kriegs-operationes vnternehmen, wie die Porthen all meiner Confidenten außsag nach ganz persuadiret Ihre Röml: Kayl: vnd Catholl: Majt: denen Venetianern assistiren ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 4v-5r.

<sup>581</sup> "... vnd sye Porthen bekriegen wird, so solle der Capitajn Bahsa zu Wasser mit der völligen See Macht, vnd ein Seraskier mit einer Armée von 30 biß 40.000 Mann zu Land gegen Dalmatia wider Venedig agiren, alß ein die Ottomannische haubtmacht, zu dessen längst mit ende nechstkünftigen monaths Martj bey Adrianopl beschehen sollender versamlung bereiths vor etlich Tügen sehr scharffe ordre in alle Türckhische Provinzen ergangen, wurde sich bey ersteren Kayl: seiths vorkehrenden feindschafft passu unter anführung des Groß Sultans gegen die Kayl: Lande wenden, allwohin dann auch die schon verflossenen Sommer hindurch den Tartar Han anbefohlene bereithschafft Haltung angesehen ist, nemlich vmb bey einem mit Jhro allerhöchst: besagten Kayl: Majt: längst beförchtenden Krieg alsogleich mit seinem Tartarschwarn gegen Hungarn, vnd Sibenbürgen einfallen zukönnen...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 5r.

<sup>582</sup> "... allein werden Eüer Dhrleich, Excell: vnd Gnaden auf denen besagten Gränitzen durch dero höchst vernünftige veranstaltungen disen Tartarischen raubereyen so vorbeiegen, daß ihnen zu penetriren, vnd ferner denen Kayl:en Erblanden zu schaden vnmöglich seyn wird...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 5r-5v.

made to send supplies to that area. Sublime Porte had beheaded some wealthy pashas and confiscated their assets to finance war expenses.<sup>583</sup>

Most recently, on December 23, Rikab Kaymakam Mehmed Pasha, who used to be the kahya of the Valide, was beheaded and his assets were confiscated. Mehmed Pasha was first arrested in the Dardanelles, and after a while he was beheaded in Bender and brought to Istanbul. Sirke Osman Pasha was appointed as kaymakam in his office.<sup>584</sup>

Fleischmann noted<sup>585</sup> that Mîrâhur Osman Pasha had also faced a similar fate, indicating that the Grand Vizier's strategy for ensuring his personal security was aimed at eliminating all influential pashas who could pose a threat to him. Indeed, this had significantly reduced the number of such wealthy and powerful pashas. Furthermore, the Grand Vizier had adopted the method of selling the positions and timars (Ottoman land tenure)<sup>586</sup> in the Ottoman Empire to the highest bidder for a three-year term, contrary to the old traditions.

According to Fleischmann, Stephanus (Ştefan) Cantacuzino, the former Prince of Wallachia, had become the subject of significant hostility within the Ottoman court. Among his principal adversaries were Janaki Mavrocordatos, the official translator of the Sublime Porte, and several other influential Greeks. These figures accused Stephanus of having accumulated considerable wealth, derived both from his own familial inheritance and from the confiscated estates of the executed Prince of Bessarabia. Moreover, rumors circulated suggesting that Stephanus had entered into clandestine agreements with the Holy Roman Empire and intended to lead a rebellion against

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<sup>583</sup> "... nebst disem hat man anbefohlen 50 Tschalkhen mit Kriegs munition vor hier durch daß schwarze Meer die donau hinauf zuführen, vnter dem prætext sich selbiges in Dalmatien zugebrauchen mit eben dergleichen vorwendung lassen sÿe auf dem weeg gegen berührten Belgrad lebens mittl zusamben bringen, zu dessen bezahl und bestreitung anderer besonders in ausrüstung der Flotta machenden Speesen man vmb den Sultanischen schatz nicht zu vill anzugreifen über die schon auf vnd zusamben getribene noch verschidene wohl stehende Bahsa aufsuchet, ihre Köpf abschlagen lasset, vnd ihre haabschafften confisciret ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 5v.

<sup>584</sup> "... gestalten den 23.ten December der für sehr reich passirte hiesige Kaimakam, der gewesene Valide Kyhajasi Mehemed Bahsa ab, vnd beÿ denen Dardanellen in scharffen arrest gesezt worden, waraus er schwährlich, wo nicht mit verlust seines Kopfs doch wenigstens daß gelds, vnd gutts komben wird, indessen hat man daß Kaimakamlik dem Sirke Osman Bahsa übergeben, den beÿ dem Sultan gestandenen Rikiab Kaimakam Mehemed Bahsa aber, wie ich etlichmahln unterthänigst vorgemeldet, zu Bender stranguliret, vnd sein Kopff nebst den haabschafften hieher gebracht ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 5v-6r.

<sup>585</sup> "... ein gleiches ist dem Emirahor Osman Bahsa widerfahren, worbeÿ es scheint, daß das iezigen Groß Veziers maxim zu seiner personal sicherheit dahin gehe, alle dreÿ schweisige Bahsa aus dem weeg zuraumben, wie er dann selbige anzahl schon zimlich verringert hat, über dises hat der Groß Vezier noch den modum aquirendi erdacht, daß er wider die vormahlige gewohnheit die Ambter, vnd lehen in Türckheÿ dem meist biethenden auf dreÿ Jahr verkhauffet.", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 6r.

<sup>586</sup> Timar, in the Ottoman Empire, grant of lands or revenues by the Sultan to an individual in compensation for his services. For more information, HALİL İNALCIK, "TİMAR", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/timar>". Accessed on 07.01.2025.

the Sublime Porte at a favorable moment. Owing to his aristocratic lineage and political ambitions, concerns emerged that his aspirations might extend beyond the confines of the Wallachian principality itself.<sup>587</sup>

Stephanus was held responsible for the involvement of his cousin Count Tomaso (also known as *Toma*) in the enemy ranks during the recent war with the Russians and for the destruction of Ibrail, which caused significant damage to the Ottomans. All these accusations led the Sublime Porte to detain Stephanus, his father and his whole family, particularly in light of the anticipated war with the Roman Empire. Fleischmann noted that a few weeks prior to his report, an order was given for a Kapıcıbaşı to be dispatched to arrest Stephanus and his family and bring them to Istanbul.<sup>588</sup>

Fleischmann stated<sup>589</sup> that the position of the Principality of Wallachia, vacated by Stephanus, was granted to Prince Nicholas Mavrocordatos of Moldavia. According to him, this individual had served the Ottomans like his father and brother and had not refrained from harming the Christian world. In addition, he noted that with this new position, Nicholas would now have greater opportunities to harm Christians. The Moldavian principality, which he vacated, had previously been granted to Mihal Bey, who had also served as the Prince of Moldavia. Fleischmann indicated that these two princes were the most trusted individuals by the Sublime Porte under the current circumstances.

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<sup>587</sup> *“Nachdeme sonst der kurz gewesene Wallachische fürst Stephanus Cantecuzenus beÿ der Porthen von seinem feinden [worunter der Türckhische Ober Dollmätsch Janaki Mauro Cordato nebst verschidenen Griechen villerleÿ müßthrauen halber unter andern, daß er sowohl von seiner Familia, alß des enthautben fürsten Bahsaraba zugezogenen Güttern grosse reichthumb besizet, daß er mit denen Teütschen eine schädliche verständnus pflēgete, vnd zuförchten seÿe, er fürst Stephan, zumahln selbiger wegen seinen Cantecuzenischen herkommen nach grossen dingen trachten möchte, beÿ erster gelegenheit sich wider die Porthen auflähnen ...”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 6r-6v.*

<sup>588</sup> *“... allermassen Er vor andern die schuld gehabt, daß beÿ iüngst-vorgewesenen Moscovitischen Krieg sein Vetter Conte Tomaso sich zu denen feinden geschlagen, vnd durch ruinirung Ibrail dem Ottomannischen Reich nicht geringen schaden verursacht, angeklaget worden, wurde endlich sÿe Porthen insonderheit dem iezo von seithen Jhrer Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: apprehendirenden Krieg, vnd in ansehung deß auch von ihme ziehenden gelds durch die wider Jhn stetts continuirten Griechischen machinationen dahin bewēget, daß sÿe vor etlich wochen in aller still ordre gegeben den gemelten fürsten Stephan durch ein dahin geschickhten Capici Bahsa in verwahrung zunehmen, vnd Jhn nebst seinem Vatter, vnd ganzen Familia hieher zuführen ...”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 6v.*

<sup>589</sup> *“... allwohin er sich bereiths unter weegs befinden solle, daß Wallachiische fürstenthumb aber wurde dem Moldauischen fürsten Nicolaky Mauro Cordato [welcher wie sein Vatter, vnd bruder der Porthen ieder Zeith zu schaden der Christenheit gediennet, es so fern Er kan, da er nunmehr in dasige nachbahrschafft stehet, auch ins khünftigt nicht unterlassen wird] und daß fürstenthumb Moldau dem vor Siben Jahren gewesenen fürsten Mihal Begh übergeben der Hoffnung sich auf dise zweÿ Subjecta, deren ersterer würcklich von der Wallacheÿ pohsession genohmen haben, vnd der andere noch hier, vnd nechstens in Moldau abgehen wird, beÿ vorseÿenden conjuncturen (8) vor andern vertrauen zukönnen ...”, 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 6v-7r.*



The Sublime Porte maintained the view that the economic viability of the Republic of Venice was sustained largely through trade conducted via French, British, and Dutch vessels operating under neutral flags in Ottoman ports. Consequently, a stringent prohibition was enacted against the importation of Venetian goods, effectively barring their entry into Ottoman territories. Additionally, restrictions were imposed on the trade of select furs originating from Moscow—particularly sable and fox pelts—allowing their importation only under limited and exceptional circumstances. Fleischmann noted that this measure was likely to inflict significant economic harm on Russia.<sup>590</sup>

Fleischmann stated that he was trying to gather more information about a Ragusan officer named Natale, who was sent to resolve the issues between Moscow and the Tatars. However, it was learned that Natale's mission was either canceled or redirected from Bender to the Tatar Khan due to the decree sent by the Ottomans to stop the Tatar attacks. Fleischmann reported that this situation concerned the Dutch Ambassador Count Colyer, as Natale was believed to have brought a gift worth thousands of ducats from the Czar on behalf of the King of England.<sup>591</sup>

Fleischmann reported that on the evening of January 8, at approximately seven o'clock, a large crowd assembled outside his residence under the pretense that smoke was emanating from the chimney. The gathering, composed of individuals from various national backgrounds, soon turned violent, launching a coordinated assault on the premises. Despite Fleischmann's efforts to calm the situation—making repeated declarations from the windows that no fire was present—the crowd, armed with axes and crowbars, forcefully breached the walls of the house, creating a scene of considerable chaos and instilling fear for the lives of those inside. Although the intervention of Ottoman soldiers from Istanbul eventually succeeded in dispersing much of the mob, a number of

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<sup>590</sup> "... alldieweillen übrigens die Porthen auf denen gedankhen stehet, daß die Republic Venedig durch das auch wehrenden Krieg unter andern alß französisch, Englisch vnd Holländischen Flaquen in Türckheÿ treibende commercium ihre mehreste Subsistenz ziehen, vnd ihr ohne demselben den Krieg fortzusezen ohnmöglich fallen werde, alß ist zu dessen scharffen verboth, vnd khünfftigen einstellung aller Venetianischen wahren gehorsambst beÿligendes Commandement ergangen. Ingleichen seÿnd verschidene aus Moscau kombende Pelz; alß Zobel, maater, langharige fuchß nur etlich wenig Persohnen ausgenohmen, beÿ scharffer straff zutragen untersaget worden, welches, so es bestand hat, die Moscoviter nicht wenig empfinden dörfften.", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 7r.

<sup>591</sup> "Was den gnädigst angeregten, vnd von mir schon zu vor genannten Moscoviter: Obristwachmeister namens Natale gebürtig von Ragusa betrefft, so habe von selbigem über daß gehorsambst berichte nichts weithers in erfahrung bringen können, welches glauben machet, das Er nach denen von der Porthen zu einstellung der von denen Tartarn wider die Moscovitische Calmuken verüebten excursionsen ergangen, vnd längstens überschickhten scharffen ordres entweder contramardiret, oder, wie es neulich verlauthen wollen, von Bender nicht hieher gelassen, sondern zum Tartar Han verwisen worden seÿe, worumben der hier stehende Holländische Botschaffter Herr Graf Colier vmb so besorgter ist, als Er Natale für Jhne Herrn Bodtschaffter vmb selbigen in seiner negotiation zuassistiren ein ansehentliche in etlich tausent Species ducaten-bestehende geschänkhnuß vom Czaar beÿ sich haben solle ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 7r-7v.

armed individuals managed to gain entry into the residence. The following day, Fleischmann submitted a detailed report of the incident to the Reis Efendi, formally requesting an investigation and the prosecution of those responsible. In response, the Reis Efendi expressed deep concern, affirming that both he and the Grand Vizier were greatly troubled by the event. He added that, had this not been the act of an unruly public, the perpetrators would have faced severe punishment.<sup>592</sup>

Fleischmann stated<sup>593</sup> that the incident that occurred strengthened the belief of the Ottoman people that the war with the Germans had become certain. Therefore, he had a belief that he could face greater dangers in the future. Moreover, he mentioned that he was awaiting the return of the messenger he had sent earlier and the final instructions from the Empire, and he also noted in his report that he did not address the damages he incurred and the expenses he made during this process because the Empire prioritized its responsibilities above all else.

According to the information in the report<sup>594</sup> sent by Fieldmarshal Löffelholz dated 1 February 1716, the Grand Vizier had ordered the Serasker in Belgrade to fill the potholes along the road with ice and snow. In this way, the Ottoman Army arriving there would not experience any

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<sup>592</sup> *"Da ich schliesßlichen eben in gegenwärttger untethänigsten expedition begriffen, eraignet sich folgender sehr gefährliche casus: den 8.ten dises abends gegen sibem Vhr versamblete sich beÿ meiner wohnung unter dem falschen prætext einer in meiner Kuchel rauchfang seÿn sollenden feüers brunst ein sehr grosse wänge deß Volckhs von allerhand nation, dise ist endlich auf etlich tausent Persohnen angewachsen, vnd so vmbendig worden, daß selbiges ohneracht aller von meinen fenstern gethannenen remonstrationen, daß khein feüers burnst in meinem Hauß, welches auch einige von ihnen herein gekombenen bekräfttigten, mit gröster Furie mit Hauß Landes - seithen in vier orthten mit hackhen-beülen, vnd hebeÿsen angefallen und gestürmet, auch auf zweÿ orthten durch und in gröster mänge, vnd vnaussprechlicher ungestim hinein gedrunge seÿnd, es hatte daß ansehen, alß wan es unter und über gehen, vnd Wir alle biß auf den letzten massacrirt werden solten, durch sonderbahre göttliche assistenz aber habe die aus Constantinopl gehabte, vnd zweÿ Statt Thor zerbrochene wacht- vnd Türckhen an mich gebracht, vnd mittelß selbiger daß sich schon biß an mein leztes retirade immer heüffig eingezwungen mehrentheillß mit waaffen versehene furiose Volckher abgetriben, daß gröste glückh ware, daß die Meers seithen die gerath übergestandene Türckhische Bottknecht, und Schiff Soldaten abgehalten, auch nicht hinein gekomben, den folgenden Tag liesse ich dem Reis Effendi meine alten guten freünd daß factum vmbständlich hinterbringen, die untersuch und bestraffung aber ihme an heim stellen, auch darbey versichern, daß wie alle bezeügen werden, khein feüers brunst in meiner wohnung gewesen, vnd nur zum prætext genehmen worden seÿe, worauf er Reis Effendi mir sein, vnd des Groß Veziers selbst hierüber habenden müßgefallen in sehr höf und freündlichen terminis hinterbringen, und darbey melden lassen, daß sofern es nicht der vngezaumige Povel wäre, auch eine exemplarische straff erfolgen wurde ...", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 8r-9r.*

<sup>593</sup> *"... mit all disem werde ich ins künfftig, dazumahn allhier unter dem Volckh der Krieg mit denen Teütschen völig Clar seÿn wird, noch grösseren schaden erfahren, vnd der endlichen unterlag exponiret seÿn, dahero ich den gnädigst angeregten bereiths in der abfertigung gestandenen Currier, vnd mit ihme meine lezte instruction gewärttigen. Indessen solle von dem erlittenen verlust, vnd habenden vngemainen ausgaaben nichts melden, sondern mich meiner obhabenden unterthänigsten pflicht, vnd schuldigkeit gemäß zu all dem, was daß allerhöchste Kayl: interesse vnd convenienz erfordert.", 12 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 9r.*

<sup>594</sup> *"... welcher gestalten ihme der quartiermaister deß Seraskiers eröffnet, das von dem Groß Vezier befelch gekomben verschidene gruben mit Eyß, vnd schnee anzufüllen, damit die heraufkombende Armeé sodann an refrachirung khein mangl leyden möge ...", 1 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 11r.*

difficulties in cooling off and resting. Furthermore, a scout returning from Belgrade reported that an official directive had been issued to the Serasker, prohibiting the entry of horses, cattle, and other livestock, as well as goods such as rice, coffee, and similar commodities, into Ottoman territory from the Kapıcıbaşı. Simultaneously, significant efforts were underway to repair and expand the roadways leading toward Zadar, and the fortifications of the Belgrade Fortress were being systematically reinforced. Despite these military preparations, Ottoman authorities were reportedly instructed to preserve amicable relations with Christian commanders along the frontier. According to the scout's information, the Sultan was expected to travel to Belgrade in the upcoming spring. With the seasonal thaw and the reopening of navigation along the Danube, it was anticipated that numerous supply vessels would be dispatched upriver to reinforce Ottoman logistical capabilities in Belgrade.<sup>595</sup>

According to the report<sup>596</sup> presented to the Aulic War Council by Commander Colonel Petrasch in Brod<sup>597</sup> on February 4, 1716, the Bosnian Pasha had received orders to designate a location in the Kupres<sup>598</sup> region between Sarajevo and Livno. This location was considered as a point where the Ottoman Sultan could be stationed next spring, should it be deemed more necessary than Belgrade. It was anticipated that an Ottoman military unit would be stationed in the region of Liusko, located approximately six hours between Gradiška and Banja Luka. In addition, the Sublime Porte was reportedly preparing to deploy another contingent, commanded by four pashas, along the Croatian frontier. This deployment was officially justified as a defensive measure aimed at safeguarding allied territories in Croatia and the Steiermark region from potential incursions by large opposing forces. Furthermore, passage through the Saustrohm region had been strictly prohibited, a restriction likely intended to preserve the secrecy of Ottoman strategic movements. As a result,

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<sup>595</sup> *"So ist auch gestern ein gewisser Rüz, den ich nacher Belgrad hinunter geschickhet, zuruckhkommen, welcher aber nichts weither mitgebracht, alß daß der Seraskier [wie er von dem Capigi vernohmen] vom Groß Vezier befelch erhalten weder pferd, noch einig anderes Viech, auch kheinen reiß, Caffé, vnd dergleichen mehr in daß Türckhische territorium passiren zulassen, indessen aber die weege gegen Zadra außbesseren, und erweitheren, wie auch an der fortification zu Belgrad arbeithen lassen, doch darbey mit denen Christlichen Gränitz – Commendanten alle gute Nachbahrschafft pflegen, und unterhalten solle der Sultan würde khünfftiges fruh-Jahr ohnweith Belgrad ingleichen mit erst offener donau ville Provianth-Schiffe von unten herauf erwarthet, welches dann einer hohen Instanz hiemit annoch gehorsambst berichten sollen."*, 1 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 11r-11v.

<sup>596</sup> *"Auß dem an den Kayl:en HofKriegs Rath von dem Commandanren zu brod herrn Obristen von Petrasch untern 4.ten February 1716 abgestatten bericht schreiben. Vber mein leztes solle unterthänigst gehorsambst berichten, daß der Bahsa aus Bosnien ordre erhalten beÿ Cupres zwischen Seralia, vnd Liono ein orth auszusehen, allwo khünfftiges fruh-Jahr der Türckhische Kayser [falls es nöthiger wäre alß zu Belgrad] stehen könne"*, 4 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 13r.

<sup>597</sup> For more information about Brod, "[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brod,\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brod,_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina)". Accessed on 17.01.2025.

<sup>598</sup> For more information about Kupres, "<https://opcinakupres.ba/okupresu/povijest>". Accessed on 17.01.2025.

acquiring reliable intelligence had become considerably more difficult. The colonel noted that he had persuaded several individuals to undertake covert reconnaissance missions to Zadar once the snow had melted, although he remained uncertain as to whether these individuals would ultimately fulfill their commitments.<sup>599</sup>

According to the report<sup>600</sup> submitted to the Imperial War Council by General Count Herberstein from Segedin on 5 February 1716, Count had obtained certain information from reliable sources in Timișoara. In the spring, two pashas were to be stationed around the Timișoara Fortress with a force of ten thousand men. Additionally, a certain amount of money had been sent to the region. With this money, approximately 20,000 measures of grain and a similar amount of fodder would be purchased and delivered to the warehouses here without delay.

In the report<sup>601</sup> which was received on 5 February 1716, from Brașov by General Baron de Tige, it was stated that the Ottomans had taken the Prince of Moldavia to Wallachia and handed over the principality to him. Stephanus Cantecuzenus, who had been the prince for approximately a year, was to be taken to Istanbul along with his family and many prominent boyars, along with their women and children. Mihal Spadar, the prince's uncle, had attempted to escape but was captured by the Ottomans near the borders of the Empire. He was brought back along with a large amount of gold he was carrying. In place of Mavrocordatos, the Ottoman authorities reappointed Mihal

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<sup>599</sup> "Vber daß ienige Corpo, so mein vorigen unterthänigst gehorsambsten bericht zu folge. In dem sogenannten Liusko solle zwischen gradisca, vnd Bania Luca sechs stund von hier zustehen kombet, wollen die Türckhen ganz gewiß ein anders Corpo an der Croatischen Gränitzschaidungs-linie unter Commando vier Bassen stellen, vnd zwar unter dem saubern prætext Croathen, steüermarckht alß freünde vor einen einfall von ihrer grossen Armee zubedecken, oder frey zustellen; es wird nun untern Saustrohm niemand herüber gelassen umb vermuthlich ihre Dessein, sovill möglich geheimb zuhalten, dahero ietzt etwas zuerfahren vill mehr mühe alß vorhero kostet; Ich habe einige Leüth gefunden, welche nach verschmolzenen schnee sich obligiren biß Zader verdeckht zugehen, vnd Kundschafft zuholen, wie weith sÿe ihre worth halten, stehet zugewarthen.", 4 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 13r-13v.

<sup>600</sup> "Auß dem an den Kayl: Hof Kriegs Rath von dem General Feldwachmeister Grafen von Herberstein aus Segedin untern 5.ten Februarÿ 1716 abgestatten berichtsreiben. Vbrigens geben verläßliche Kundschafften von Temeswar, wie dises fruh-Jahr beÿ hervorgehenden groß unter selbige Vestung zweÿ Bahsa mit zehentausent ann zustehen komben sollen, es seÿnd auch einige Beüth geld dahin geschickhet worden vmb in dem Land ohn verzüglich 20.000 Kübel geträÿdt, vnd sovill hart fuether zuerkhauffen vnd in das aldortige Magazin ohne anstand zulifern.", 5 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 15r.

<sup>601</sup> "Aus Cronstatt sub dato 5. Februarÿ 1716 an nach General Feldwachmeister Baron de Tige eingeloffene nachrichten. Die Türckhen haben den Moldauischen fürsten nacher Wallacheÿ geführet, vnd in selbiges fürstenthumb eingezet, der vor einem Jahr gewordene fürst Stephanus Cantecucenus solle sambt all denen seinigen mit villen vornehmen Boiaren nebst Weib und Kindern nacher Constantinopl geführet werden, es hat sich dises fürsten Vatters bruder Her Spadar Mihal heraus Salviren wollen, allein ist solcher von denen Türckhen ohnweith Vnseren Gränitzen eingehollet, vnd mit villen gold, welches er beÿ sich gehabt, zuruckgeführet worden ...", 5 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 21r.

Voivoda (Grakovitz), who had previously served as Prince of Moldavia six years earlier, to assume leadership of the principality. This decision reportedly triggered considerable unrest in Wallachia. According to a Greek merchant originating from the region, Constantin Cantecuzenus—the father of the deposed prince—privately expressed strong distrust toward the Ottomans, cautioning that they were not to be relied upon to uphold peace. He further asserted that the Ottoman Empire was engaged in extensive preparations for an unusually early military campaign.<sup>602</sup>

The Ottomans collected 1800 loads, totaling 160,000 kile of corn, oats, and barley from Wallachia on several occasions. Additionally, they obtained 3000 pieces of oak timber, each approximately 11 meters long, with a width and thickness equivalent to a human height. These materials were being partially dispatched to Zarnesti<sup>603</sup> and partially to Belgrade.<sup>604</sup>

On 8 February 1716, in a report<sup>605</sup> submitted to the Aulic War Council by Fieldmarshal Freiherr von Löffelholz from Petrovaradin, it was reported that a courier dispatched by Löffelholz to the Serasker in Belgrade had returned with the following intelligence: A senior Ottoman official had recently arrived in Belgrade, accompanied by a mufti from the imperial court. This official, described as highly knowledgeable and experienced in military engineering, conducted a personal inspection of the city's fortifications. He was received with marked deference, and an immediate directive was issued to commence fortification works without delay. In addition, it was noted that an artillery

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<sup>602</sup> "... anstatt des Mauro Cordato stelle haben die Türckhen gleich den vor 6 Jahren gewesten Mihal Voids oder mit dem zuenahmen Grakovitz wider in die Moldau installiret, vnd zum fürsten gemacht, vnd ist also in der Wallacheÿ eine grosse consternation, ich habe selbst mit einem gestert aus der Wallacheÿ gekomenen Griechischen Khauffmann heünte geredet, welcher sagt, daß Ihme deß abgesetzten fürsten hlr Vatter Constantin Contecuzena mündlich anbefohlen mir zumelden, man solte ia denen Türckhen kheinen glauben beÿmessen, daß sÿe friden halten wurden, indeme sÿe die gröste anstalten macheten einen sonst vngemainen fruhzeitigen feldzug zueröffnen.", 5 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 21r-21v.

<sup>603</sup> For more information about Zarnesti (Zernest), "<https://www.visitzarnesti.ro/en>". Accessed on 20.01.2025.

<sup>604</sup> "... die Türckhen haben von der Wallacheÿ mehrmahln 1800 pferd, 160.000 kallien khorn, haaber, vnd gersten, dann 3000 stuckh aichen-holz, eÿlff klatter lang, ellen dickh, vnd brait, welches theillß auf Zernest, theillß gegen Belgrad geführet werden solle.", 5 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 21v.

<sup>605</sup> "Auß dem an den Kayl:en HofKriegsRath von dem herrn feldmarschall Leüthenandten freÿherrn von Löffelholz auß Peterwardein untern 8.ten Februarÿ 1716 abgestatten bericht schreiben. Sonsten hat mein an dem Seraskier zu Belgrad abgeschickhter Expresser zurukhgebracht, daß diser Tügen ein vornehmer Minister, welcher die Fortification verstehen solle, vnd wohl bedienet wäre, von der Porthen nebst einen Muffti zu Belgrad angekomen, welcher sofort die fortification alda [wie er selbst gesehen] in genauen augenschein genohmen, vnd wurde demselben über all ungemaine Ihre erweisen, auch wurde, solbald es nur immer thuenlich, an der fortification daselbst zuarbeithen angefangen werden der von Wienn ehemahls heruntergekombene büchsenmeister aber Thete Carcassen, vnd feüerkuglen verfertigen, vnd bekäme des monaths 40 ft. Besoldung, seÿe aber khein Türckh worden, der Sultan habe dem Tartar Chan daß sogenannte Peitschen-geld a 12.000 ducaten geben lassen vnd solte derselbe 50.000 Mann seiner Tartarn ins felde stellen, vnd darmit in Bosnien marchiren, so seÿe auch dise wochen ein Currier von Constantinopl nacher Belgrad heraufkoben, welcher sogleich zum Seraskier geführet worden, vnd schreiben, vnd ordres mitgebracht haben solle." 8 February 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 23r-24r.

specialist, originally recruited from Vienna for Ottoman service, was stationed in Belgrade and engaged in the manufacture of incendiary bombs and grenades. Although he was receiving a monthly stipend of 40 florins, he had not yet formally assumed Ottoman subjecthood. Furthermore, it was revealed that the Sultan had authorized a payment of 12,000 ducats—referred to as Peitschen-Geld—to the Tatar Khan and instructed him to mobilize a force of 50,000 Tatar troops.

#### 4.8. Tatar Khan and the Kapudan Pasha's Plans

In his report dated April 9, 1716, Fleischmann noted that the Sublime Porte had repeatedly pressed him for clarification regarding the ongoing military preparations in Hungary. Although he attempted to delay his response by offering various pretexts, he observed that the Sublime Porte had come to interpret these preparations as a definitive indication of the Emperor's intention to initiate hostilities against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>606</sup>

According to Fleischmann, it was evident that the Ottoman Empire—despite its generally weakened condition—had initiated preparations to implement essential defensive measures. On March 26, formal orders were issued, calling for the rapid mobilization of troops. In conjunction with these efforts, infrastructure repairs were undertaken, including the restoration of roads and bridges. Additionally, supply depots were being established to store provisions and animal fodder. Fleischmann noted that, at the time, only twelve such warehouses had been set up in Edirne. Troops were being gathered to strengthen the garrisons in Belgrade and Timișoara, and approximately 60 chaikas<sup>607</sup> (small Ottoman warships) were ordered to be equipped and transported via the Black Sea to the Danube River. New orders for these ships would be given there.<sup>608</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> "Gnädigster auch Gnädig vnd Hochgebiettende Herren Herren etc von Zeit meiner iüngsthin in unterthänigkeit gemachten abfertigung hat die Porten wochentlich ia fast Täglic wegen der über die Kayl: seiths in Hungarn vorkehrende Kriegs verfassungen mir den 6.ten abgewichenen monaths Februarÿ gethane proposition erwarthende antworth nachtruckhlich anfragen lassen, worgegen ich zwar ihr Porthen die grosse Distanz deren beeden höfen, vorseÿende rigorese Jahrs: Zeit angeloffene wässer, verschlimerte weeg etc. vorzustellen, und dardurch dise verzögerung zuentschuldigen unermanglet, welches auch anfangs zimlich ausgegeben, vnd selbige einigermassen beruhiget hat, allein aniezo consideriret Sie Porten dise lange außbleibung alß eine bestättigung dessen, was sÿe schon von einigen monathen hero eines von Jhro Röml:en Kayl:en Maÿt: dises Jahr wider Sÿe vornehmenden Kriegs halber apprehendiret ...", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 35r.

<sup>607</sup> A type of ship used by the Ottomans. For more information about Chaika (Çayka), Caferoğlu 1971; 1-11.

<sup>608</sup> "Welchemnach man, sovill gegenwärtig vnerfahrn vnd verhasstes Türckhisches Gouverno, vnd daß durchgehents ausgesaugt-und in ellenden zuestand sich befindende Ottomannische Reich zuthuen capable auf die nöthige gegenverfassungen zugedencken anfanget, wie dann den 26.ten Martÿ bereiths die leztere pressante Ordres zu möglichster beschleinigung deß anmarche deren befelchten Trouppen ausgeschickhet, weeg, und bruggen verbessert, ville mit allersand vor Leüth, vnd Viech nöthigen Lebens mitlen angefüllte Magazins [deren allein zu Adrianopl zwölff seÿnd] aufgerichtet, hin vnd wider Mannschafften, insonderheit zu vermehrung deren guarnisonen in Belgrad vnd Temeswar angeworben, biß Sechzig Tschaiken beordert worden, provosion, vnd munition aufzuladen, vnd über daß schwarze Meer die donau hinauf biß an die eÿserene Porthen [allwo ihnen neüe ordres gegeben werden sollen]

Tatar Defterdar Mustafa Agha returned on March 21 following the conclusion of negotiations concerning the tribute demanded by the Tatar Khan from the Russian Czar. Subsequently, the Khan was instructed to dispatch a contingent of 20,000 troops to Bosnia while maintaining the remainder of his forces in a state of readiness. He was also expected to proceed to Edirne to join the Ottoman Sultan. Prior to doing so, however, he was required to submit a comprehensive report detailing the current political and military developments in both Poland and Moscow.<sup>609</sup>

On March 27, various specialized artisan units of the Ottoman army departed from Istanbul. This was followed on March 30 by the mobilization of approximately 6,000 Janissaries. The Cebeci corps commenced their march on March 31, and the artillery corps, numbering around 5,000, followed on April 1. On April 4, the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, and approximately 2,000 Sipahis relocated to a military encampment situated along the route to Edirne, between Davudpaşa and the Black Sea. Subsequently, on April 6, the Janissary Agha departed for Edirne, accompanied by the Cebecibaşı and Topçubaşı, who likewise began their advance. It was scheduled that the Grand Vizier would arrive in Büyükçekmece on April 11, with the Sultan expected to join him the following day for the continuation of the march toward Edirne.<sup>610</sup>

In the Fleischmann report, it was stated that on March 26, a messenger arrived from Cairo to the Ottoman Palace and that 10 warships from Tunisia, 6 from Tripoli, and 4 from Algeria were ready to join the Ottoman Navy. Therefore, an order was given for the Ottoman Navy to mobilize, and on March 29, the Kapudan Pasha set out towards the Black Sea Strait with a large part of his

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zuführen.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 35v.

<sup>609</sup> "Ingleichen ist der wegen dem von dem Czaar in Moscau für den Tartar Chan noch stetts begehrende tribut hier gewesene Tartarische Defterdar Mustafa Agha schon den 21.ten Martÿ wider zu seinem Principal zuruckhgegangen, mit dem befelch, daß der Tartar Chan, sobald es thuenlich einen schwarm vom 20.000 Tartarn gegen Bosnien schickhen, die übrige bereith halten, vnd sich selbst zu Adrianopl beÿ der Porthen einfinden, anietzo aber derselbe in aller eyll fertigkheit eine genaue information über gegenwärtigen Pohlen vnd Moscovitischen zuestand einsändten solle.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 35v-36r.

<sup>610</sup> "Inzwischen seÿnd würckhlich allhier die zum Türckhischen Laager gehörige Handwerckher den 27ten die Jänitschären, so ungefähr in 6000 Köpfen bestanden, den 30ten die Gebeci, so an der Zahl 4000 gewesen, den 21ten dito, die Topci, so biß 5000 ausgemacht, den 1ten, vnd der Sultan nebst dem Groß Vezier, vnd etwa 2000 Spahi den 4ten dises in daß eine stund von Constantinopl an dem Adrianopolitaner weeg zwischen, Davd Bahsa, vnd weissen Meer aufgeschlagene Laager mit denen vorm Jahr, vnd zu alln Kriegs-Zeiten üblichen ceremonien ausgezogen, den 6ten aber ist bereiths der Jänitscharn Aga weither gegen Adrianopl aufgebrochen, welchem auch der Gebeci vnd Topci Bahsa gefolget, worauf übermorgen, alß den 11ten dises der groß Vezier biß Bujus Cekmece, vnd den Montag darauf der Sultan selbst von hier abgehen, sich wider mit Ihme Groß Vezier conjungiren, vnd sodann mit einander biß nach Adrianopl marchiren sollen.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 36r-36v.

fleet. However, the fleet was poorly equipped. The Pasha planned to go to the Dardanelles to complete the missing manpower.<sup>611</sup>

The Ottoman Navy consisted of 34 warships belonging to the Sultan, 20 merchant ships, 5 fire ships, and 16 galleys this year. In addition, a total of more than 200 sailing ships had been prepared, including 33 Dulcigno frigates and other vessels. Furthermore, 3 small warships would operate secretly, equipped with Christian flags and attire. The primary objective of the Ottomans was to capture the island of Corfu. The Kapudan Pasha's fleet would directly target this objective, while transport ships carrying 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers would also land troops at Corfu. Ahmed Pasha would lead these forces in an assault on Corfu Castle from the land side. However, in the event of an encounter with the Venetian Navy, Kapudan Pasha's primary mission would be to defeat this fleet.<sup>612</sup>

The Ottoman Navy was to lay siege to Corfu from the sea and, should it encounter the Venetian Navy, it would defeat it. Following the capture of Corfu, the Ottoman Palace planned to realize its objectives towards Venice and, more broadly, all of Italy. In a meeting with the Dutch Ambassador on March 29, the Kapudan Pasha expressed that he intended to go much further than expected with the Ottoman Navy that year and to achieve significant accomplishments. He also added that the Germans had sent two generals and many troops to Venice, and that the Pope and the Republic of Genoa had decided to send ships against the Ottomans.<sup>613</sup>

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<sup>611</sup> "Sonsten ist den 26ten Martÿ ein exprehser von Alcair beÿ der Porthen angelanget, mit der nachricht, daß selbige Barbaresquen mit zehen, die von Tunis mit sechs, vnd die von Tripoli mit vier ausgerüsten Kriegs-Schiffen bereith stunden sich mit dem Capitain Bahsa zu conjungiren, dahero man gleich durch die aufgesteckhte haubt flaquen zum auslauffen der Türckhischen Floutta zaichen gegeben, worauf den 29.ten dito der Capitajn Bahsa mit dem mehristen theill der Floutta sich in den Canal deß schwarzen Meers begeben, woraus Er heünt noch mit der ganzen floutta [so durchgehents sehr übel bemannet] nach denen Dardanellen deß weissen Meers abseglen, vnd sich allda umb die nöthige Leüth aufzutreiben eine Zeit lang aufhalten solle ...", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 36v-37r.

<sup>612</sup> "... die berührte Türckhische Flotta aber bestehet disß Jahr ohne denen benenten Barbaresquen in 34. Sultanischen Kriegs-Schiffen 20 außgerüsten Khauffartheÿ Schiffen, 5. Brülotten, vnd 16. Gälleren, dann von denen neulich gehorsambsten berichten 20. Gälleren bleiben 4. Auß mangl der Leüth, wie auch eben diser ursachen halber die mehriste vorm Jahr gehabte Galiotten unbewaffneter in hiesigen haafen zuruckhi nebst disem hat die Porten eine nahmhauffte armada Sottile, worzue die Dulcignotische Fregaten an der Zahl 33 Stossen, vnd selbe mit allen transport Schiffen vnd fahrzeÿgen über 200 Seegel verstärckhet werde; Anbeÿ werden dreÿ kleinern Kriegs Schiff armiret, vnd mit Christlichen fahnen, vnd Kleÿdern versehen, vmb den curs zuthuen, vnd etwa hin-und wider anzuländen. Vor allen ist der Türkhen absehen, zu wasser auf die Insel Corfu [deren durch die franzosen hieher gekombenen Plan gehorsambst beÿlege] gerichtet, dahero hat der erwehnte Capitain Bahsa ordre, mit der Türckhischen Flotta Directé dahin zugehen, die transport Schiff, vnd kleinere fahrzeüß aber nach Saillade zusändten, alda ein corpo von 15 biß 20.000 Mann aufzunehmen, und auf der berührten Insul Corfu aufs Land zusezen, mit welchem sodann der sich schon hier befindende vormahls Tschauss Bahsa gewesene, vnd vor vier Jahren die ordre zu Bender wider den König in Schweden exequirte Türckh Ahmed Bahsa alß Seraskier die Vestung Corfu von seithen deß vesten Landes attaquiren.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 37r-38r.

<sup>613</sup> "Allein er Capitain Bahsa die belagerung zu wasser bedecken, vor allem die Venetianische Flotta, sofern Sÿe ins



The Sublime Porte was planning to take action against Venice in Dalmatia in the same year. However, due to the fear of the Emperor starting a war, the timing had not been definitively established. The Sultan and the Grand Vizier were concealing the possibility of a war with the Germans in order not to frighten or disturb the public.<sup>614</sup> They planned to wait for the situation to become clearer while moving towards Edirne. If the Emperor declared war on the Ottomans, he would divide the Ottoman forces in two and send one part against Venice and the other part against the Empire. The Grand Vizier planned to make preparations to head towards the Albanian coast via Thessaloniki and land troops in Corfu before the Empire declared war, and then advance to Dalmatia. Fleischmann stated that the Ottomans would aim to divert attention elsewhere, even risking not being ready for the first German attack.<sup>615</sup>

Fleischmann believed that the troops expected to be gathered from the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, particularly those coming from Asia, might be delayed due to harsh winter conditions and difficult roads. A significant portion of these troops could fall ill, and the remaining ones might experience a loss of morale. The soldiers learning that they would have to face the Germans while waiting to fight against the Venetians could further exacerbate this situation.<sup>616</sup>

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*gesicht kombet, schlagen, vnd nach eroberung Corfu ferner ihr der Porten gegen Venedig, vnd ganz Italien hegendes öffteres in unterthänigkeit angeregtes Dehsein ausführen solle, sinthemahln der ofternente Capitajn Bahsa dem Holländischen Bodtschaffter, alß er Jhme dem 29ten Martÿ zu seiner vorhabenden abseeglung nebst übergebung deren gewöhnlichen præsenten daß gewöhnl: compliment machte, vnter andern discours-weiß entdeckhet, daß er diß Jahr mit der Ottomannischen Flotta weither, als man sich einbilde, gehen, vnd was wichtiges unternehmen werde, mit dem beÿfügen, daß die Teütsche denen Venetianern nebst villen Trouppen zweÿ General gegeben, auch daß der Pabst, vnd die Republic Genua etliche Schiff wider die Porthen zuschickhen resolviret.”, 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 38r.*

<sup>614</sup> *“Obwohln übrighens die Porten intentioniret diß Jahr in Dalmatien wider Venedig zuagiren, so hat sÿe dannoch diß ihr Dessein auß forcht deß vom Kayl:er seithen wider sÿe entstehende Kriegs, vnd in ermanglung der auf Ihre oben gehorsambst berührte mir den 6.ten Februari gethaue proposition noch nicht angelangten antworth nicht allerdings fest gestellet, allermassen der Sultan, vnd Groß Vezier, welche beede dem Volckh vmb es nicht zuschröckhen, oder zuirritiren die gefahr wegen einen Krieg mit denen Teütschen dato gar nicht merckhen lassen ...”, 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 38r-38v.*

<sup>615</sup> *“... noch mit mir einen eüsserlichen pahsum der Zeit vorkehren wollen, mit der intention von hier aufbrechen vmb wehrende marche Clärer zusehen, was Ihre Kayl: Maÿt: diß Jahr aigentlich respectu der Türckheÿ vorzunehmen gedenkhen, und ihre mesures darnach nehmen, im fall eines mit denen Teütschen habenden Kriegs Ihre Trouppen zertheillen, ein Corpo wider Venedig, vnd die übrige haubtMacht wider Ihre allerhöchst-besagte Kayl:e Maÿt: schickhen zukönnen, worbeÿ einige meiner Confidenten außsagen, wie daß der Groß Vezier auf alle weiß trachte, noch, bevor Ihre Kayl: Maÿt: der Porten den Krieg declariren, sich über Salonik an die Albanische See Küsten zuwenden, allda wegen imbarquirung deren Trouppen, vnd attaquirung Corfu daß nöthige zuveranstellen, und sodann sich weither in Dalmatien zubegeben, mithin dardurch anlaß zuhaben, beÿ dem ersten angrif deren Teütschen nicht gegenwärttig zuseÿn.”, 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 38v-39r.*

<sup>616</sup> *“Was nun die aus denen Ottomannischen Provinzen sich zuversambeln beordnete Trouppen belanget, so dörfen selbige, insonderheit die aus Asien erwarthete deß gewesenen, noch vorseÿenden, vnd beÿ Manns gedenkhen in disen Landen nicht erfarnen kalt-vnd rauchen wetters auch dardurch impracticablen weegen halber sich nicht sobald einfinden können, auch deren ville wehrenden marche erkrankhen, vnd denen übrigen zimblich der mueth entfallen,*

According to Fleischman, the Ottoman Empire had hidden weaknesses. If these weaknesses were targeted through strategically coordinated attacks, the Ottoman Empire would collapse rapidly. The populace was already dissatisfied with the existing oppressive regime. The administration had become unbearable over the past two years, and the Ottoman people were in a state of great weariness. The report mentioned that if the Ottomans were to lose Belgrade, this could strengthen the belief in their own prophecies. The Ottomans held a belief that their administration would one day retreat to Damascus after losing Istanbul. Fleischmann pointed out that if this prophecy were to come true, the Ottoman Empire could abandon all of Europe without any resistance.<sup>617</sup>

Fleischmann stated that the Sublime Porte had completed its preparations for the march. Therefore, he requested permission from the Grand Vizier through the Reis-ül Küttap to follow the Sultan and to be present on matters concerning the two great empires. The Grand Vizier indicated that he would set out directly from Edirne without delay and that the Sultan did not intend to settle in Edirne, but planned to stay briefly near Plovdiv.<sup>618</sup> Upon this, the Grand Vizier suggested to Fleischmann not to go to Edirne, but still left the choice to him. Following this, Fleischmann conveyed his desire to follow the Sultan again through the Reis-ül Küttap. When Fleischmann stated that he needed to be in the Ottoman Palace as he was awaiting instructions from the Imperial Palace, his request was accepted.<sup>619</sup>

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*zumahln sye anstattderen Venetianern mit denen Teütschen zuthuen bekhombeten ...*", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 39r-39v.

<sup>617</sup> *"... gewiß ist es, daß dem Ottomannischen Reich, dessen verborgene schwachheit man nicht glauben allein zu seiner Zeit wohl erkennen wird, nur durch wenig allein geschwind auf einander gebende rechtshaffene stöß ganz leichtlich der garaus gemacht werden könne, gestalten alle sowohl Türckhisch alß Christliche Innwohner mit gegenwärtigen Tyrännischen Gouverno welches von selbstem beÿ ersterem unglückh in die eüsserste verwirrung gerathen wird, sehr übel zufriden, vnd deß fernerer iederzeit hartgewesenen allein von zweÿ Jahren hero vnertäglich wordenen Ottomannischen hochs überdrissig seÿnd. Wan also die Porten Belgrad nebst einer schlacht verlihren solte, wurde selbige sich villmehr an ihre Prophezeÿung, daß nemlich die Ottomannische Regierung mit der Zeit Constantinopl verlihren, vnd sich nach Damasco retiriren müsse, alß an die Waaffen halten, mithin ganz Europa, wan zumahln man Ihnen kheine Zeit lasset, ohne weithere resistenz abandoniren."*, 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 39v-40r.

<sup>618</sup> *"Nachdeme entlich die Porthen alles zu ihrem aufbruch veranstaltet, habe auch Ich durch den Reis Effendi dem Groß Vezier hinterbringen lassen, wie das Ich bereith stunde dem alten gebrauch nach dem Sultan zu folgen, umb iederzeit beÿ der hand zuseÿn denen etwa vorkombenden beede grosse Reiche concernirenden geschäftten vorzustehen, dahero ersuchte ich jhne Groß-Vezier mir vor seinem abmarche den gehörigen Ferman ausfertigen zulassen, warauf man mir von seithen deß Groß Veziers bedeütet, daß er Groß Vezier gerathen weeg ohne zu Adrianopl zuverweilen, ins feld gehe, auch seÿe der Sultan, beÿ welchem der den 3.ten disß aus Asia angelangte dreÿ schwaiff führende Gelebi Jusuf Bahsa Rikiab Kaimacam worden, nicht willens sich alda aufzuhalten, sondern hin-und wider herumb zuziehen, vnd nur etwa in der gegend Philipopli sich etwas niderzulassen."*, 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 40r-40v.

<sup>619</sup> *"... es wurde dahero die convenienz nicht seÿn, daß ich wider dem Sultan, noch ihme Groß Vezier folge, weniger zu Adrianopel, allwo disß Jahr, da die Valide gestorben niemand von dem Sultanischen Hof residiren wird, zurukhbleibe,*

Fleischmann reported that a new ambassador, Montagu, had been appointed to replace the British ambassador Chevalier Sutton in Istanbul, following Sutton's recall. Meanwhile, the movements of Russian Major Natale, who had arrived from Moscow, were significantly restricted by the Ottoman authorities; even his request to observe the Sultan's ceremonial passage was denied. Fleischmann suggested that, had the Ottomans not been preoccupied with concerns over imperial war preparations, Natale's situation might have deteriorated further.<sup>620</sup>

Finally, Fleischmann stated that he sent his report to observe the preparations of the Ottoman Palace and to check whether the expected messenger had fallen ill on the way, noting that his report contained information about the fortifications in Niš<sup>621</sup> or other locations and the advancing Ottoman troops. In addition, it included a request for verbal information to be provided to Baron von Löffelholz, the Imperial Commander in Petrovaradin, regarding the military preparations of the Ottomans.<sup>622</sup>

In a note<sup>623</sup> at the end of his report, Fleischmann mentioned that the Kapudan Pasha was not yet able to sail and that it was very difficult to get from Istanbul to Edirne due to bad weather

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*disem doch vneracht verwöhrete er Groß Vezier mir nicht nach Adrianopel zugehen, vnd stellte alles meiner willkuhr anheimb, auf welches ich ihme durch den mit mir von villen Jahren hero in guter freündtschafft lebenden Reis-Effendi, welchen sowohl selbstn alß andere beÿ ihme intrane Türckhen von Zeit zu regaliren, vnd cultiviren bedacht bin, widerumb in antworth beÿbringen lassen, daß ich destwegen der Porthen zu folgen verlange, weillen es von alten Zeiten hero der brauch, vnd bereiths zu meiner Zeit, alß vor 13ten Jahren practicirlich gewesen.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 40v.*

<sup>620</sup> *"Letztlichen hat der hier anwesende Engelländische Podtschaffter Cavallier Soutton nachricht erhalten, daß sein höchster Principal einen andern namens Montecu an seinen Platz beÿ der Ottomannischen Porten denominiret, vnd ihn zuruckherueffen habe, allein der hier befindliche Moscovitische Major Natali wird von denen Türckhen zimlich starkh eingeschrenckht gehalten, vnd ist ihme auf sein ansuchen nicht einmahl erlaubet worden den Sultanischen auszug zusehen; Sofern aber die Porten ihn nicht in gegenwärtigen lauffen ...", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 41v-42r.*

<sup>621</sup> For more information about Niš, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Niš". Encyclopedia Britannica, 3 Dec. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nis>". Accessed 22 January 2025.

<sup>622</sup> *"Schliesßlichen schickhe gegenwärtig-vnterthänigstes berichts schreiben mit einem von der Porthen vntern prætext zusehen, ob der von oben erwarthende Currier nicht etwa vnter weeg erkrankhet, oder sonst verunglückhet seÿe? Erhaltenen Post Comandement durch meinen heÿdukhen Thomas von hier biß Peterwardein ab, mit der ihme gegebenen ordre auf dem weeg deren Türckhen vorkehrende veranstaltungen aufrichtende agazinen zu Nissa oder anderwertig anlegende fortificatirenen, vnd marchirende, vnd anwerbende Trouppen wohl zuobserviren, vnd hiervon dem Kayl:en Commendanten zugedachtem Peterwardein Herrn Baron von Löffelholz den mündlichen bericht abzustatten.", 9 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 42v.*

<sup>623</sup> *"Der Capitajn Bahsa ist noch nicht im Stand gewesen heünt außzuseglen, dahero dörrfte auch der GroßVezier, vnd Sultan, dazumahl die weege von hier gegen Adrianopl wegen noch täglich vorseÿenden Kalt-regen-und Schnee wetter fast ganz impracticabl, auch destwegen die Jänitschären, Topci, vnd Gebeci etliche Täg still zuligen bemüßiget worden, ihren marche noch was später antretten, und darbeÿ, sofern daß wetter continuiret, grosse ungemach auszustehen haben.", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 43v.*

conditions. Therefore, he mentioned that the Janissaries, Artillery and Cebeci would have to start their march a few days later.

#### 4.9. Diplomatic Tensions and Peace Efforts: The Role of Ambassadors

In his report dated April 16, 1716, Fleischmann noted<sup>624</sup> that on the 9th, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, Chevalier Sutton, had a meeting with the Grand Vizier. During this meeting, the ambassador first expressed the usual courtesies due to his planned travels and also shared the following information: Her Majesty of Great Britain had appointed a member of the Montagu family as the new ambassador to the Sublime Porte and recalled the current ambassador.

The newly appointed ambassador was expected to arrive in Istanbul aboard a British warship. However, given that the Ottoman navy was scheduled to be at sea during this period, this arrangement posed the risk of diplomatic tension. To mitigate potential unrest, an agreement was reached between the parties: either the British warship would operate under the guise of a merchant vessel, as was customary with French delegations, or the ambassador would travel to Istanbul overland.<sup>625</sup>

During the surrender of the Castle of Nafplion, a British consul stationed at the site, along with a physician named Pini—originally from Livorno and formerly employed by the Venetian Bailo as his personal doctor—were taken captive. The British Ambassador submitted a formal request to the Grand Vizier for the release of both individuals. He emphasized that one was a British subject, while the other was an indispensable medical practitioner, and urged that their release be permitted upon the payment of a reasonable ransom.<sup>626</sup>

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<sup>624</sup> "... den 9.ten dises hatte der hier stehende Engelländische Bodtschaffter Cavallier Soutton beÿm Groß Vezier audienz, worinnen Er Bodtschaffter vor allem zu seinen vorhabenden marche daß gewöhnliche compliment abgelegt, vnd anbeÿ notificiret, wie daß Ihre Größ Britänische Mayt sein höchster principal einen andern aus dem Hauß Montecu zum Bodtschaffter beÿ der Ottomannischen Porthen ernennet, mithin ihn revociret habe ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 44r.

<sup>625</sup> "... allem ansehen nach aber dörfte diiser neü-erkisene Ambassadeur auf einen Engelländischen Kriegs-Schiff hieher zuseeglen intentioniret seÿn, welches sodann, gestalten die Engelländer kheinen, er mag seÿn, wer er wolle zubegriessen pflegen, vnd da die Ottomannische Flotta zu selbiger Zeit sich im Meer befinden wird, zu einer verdriesßlichkeit anlaß geben könnte, dahero haben Sÿe beede dise sache dahin verabredet, das entweder daß Engelländische Kriegs-Schiff [wie es beÿ denen franzosen öffters geschehen] für ein Khauffartheÿ-Schiff passiren, oder daß der denominirte Bodtschaffter über Land hieher komben solle.", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 44r.

<sup>626</sup> "Nebst disem hat der Engelländische Ambassadeur ihme Groß Vezier vorgetragen; wie das beÿ übergab der Vestung Napoli di Romania der alda gestandene Engelländische Consul, vnd ein zu Livorno gebürthiger medicus namens Pini] so vor disem alhier beÿ dem Venetianl: Baylo sich aufgehalten] vnd auch ihme alß Leibmedicus gediennet, zu Slaven gemacht worden, welchemnach Er Bodtschaffter sich beÿ ihme Groß Vezier für eine sonderliche gnad in beweglichen terminis ausgebetten die erlaubnus zuhaben dise zweÿ Persohnen, vnd zwar den ersteren alß seinen Nationalen, vnd den andern zu recuperirung seiner gesundheit höchst-nöthigen Medicum vmb einen billichen preÿß auszulösen.", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 44r-44v.

The Grand Vizier had informed that the Sultan, through a Hatt-ı Şerif (an edict written in his own handwriting), had prohibited the sale of individuals captured in the Morea, and therefore, a positive response could not be given to the request of the British Ambassador. However, such permission had been granted to the French and others. By the order of the Grand Vizier, the aforementioned doctor was sent to the Bagnio<sup>627</sup> (the place where the Ottomans held prisoners) in heavy chains, and it had become nearly impossible for him to be released there. Fleischmann believed that this situation appeared to have been created to discredit the British Ambassador, who did not have a very good reputation among the other ambassadors at the Ottoman Palace.<sup>628</sup>

In a subsequent audience with the Grand Vizier, the British Ambassador sought to justify the Russian advance into Poland as a strategic maneuver intended to benefit from the Czar's initiatives in Moscow. The Grand Vizier, however, promptly interrupted, asserting that the Ottoman authorities were fully informed of the situation and that the ambassador need not concern himself with the decisions of the Ottoman court.<sup>629</sup>

Fleischmann noted that, under normal circumstances, the Ottoman court would be expected to issue a strong protest against the Russian advance into Poland, which constituted a clear violation of the Treaty of Prut. However, he observed that this response might be restrained by prevailing conditions, particularly the potential involvement of the Emperor. In the meantime, disaffected Polish factions had once again turned to the Tatar Khan for support. Russian Major Natale, who had been dispatched to the Ottoman court in relation to this issue, was reportedly unable to perform his duties effectively and received poor treatment during his stay.<sup>630</sup>

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<sup>627</sup> For more information about Bagnio, "<https://www.artandpopularculture.com/Bagnio>". Accessed on 22.01.2025.

<sup>628</sup> *"Hierauf meldete der Groß Vezier, daß der Sultan durch ein Chatisserif oder aigenhändige ordre verbiethen lassen kheinen von denen in Morea gemachten Slaven zuverkhauffen, in ansehung dessen man ihm in seinem verlangen nicht willfahren könnte, allein weillen solches denen Franzosen, vnd andern gestattet wurde, vnd da der berührte Medicus gleich darauf aus befelch deß Groß Veziers mit grossen eysen in die Bagnio [aus welchem kheine erlösung ehr zuhoffen] gesezet worden, alß scheint, daß es dem Engelländischen Podtschaffter, so mit allen andern hier anwesenden Ambassadeurs beÿ der Porthen in nicht gar guten credit stehet, zum despect geschehen seÿe ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 44v.*

<sup>629</sup> *"... weithers hat der mehrbesagte Engelländische Podtschaffter in diser audienz zweifels ohne vmb sich beÿ dem Czaar in Moscau ein Meritum zumachen den Discurs auf den von denen Moscovitern in Pohln genohmenen marche wenden, vnd selbigen entschuldigen wollen, allein der Groß Vezier ist ihm gleich in die red gefallen, sagend das verstehe er auch wohl, Ihr habt eüch destwegen nichts zubekümmern, die Porthen wird wissen, was sÿe zuthuen habe ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 44v-45r.*

<sup>630</sup> *"Waraus clar erhellet, daß selbige, wie ich bereiths etlichmahlen in unterthänigkheit berichtet, disen von denen Moscovitern in Pohln gemachten, vnd der Bruttischen Capitulation zuwider lauffenden einzug, wofern nicht gegenwärttge conjuncturen, vnd insonderheit die von dem Kayl:en Hof habende apprehension es verhindern, wenigstens durch den mit ihnen Moscovitern sehr übelzufridenen Tartar Chan [beÿ welchem die Pohlnische*

In an effort to avert a potential conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, the British Ambassador offered an unofficial proposal for compromise to the Sublime Porte. As with previous initiatives, however, his overture was met without a favorable response. Nevertheless, the ambassador dispatched one of his servants directly to Vienna, both in relation to the aforementioned matters and for personal reasons. The envoy was to remain in Vienna for forty days, awaiting directives from England before returning.<sup>631</sup>

Meanwhile, the French Ambassador had received a royal communiqué dated October 21, addressed to the Sultan on behalf of the new French monarch. The letter officially announced the death of King Louis XIV and the succession of Louis XV. It further instructed the ambassador to obtain definitive information regarding whether the Sublime Porte was contemplating war with the Holy Roman Empire. The matter was deemed of the highest importance to the French court, as its subsequent policy decisions would be contingent upon the intelligence received.<sup>632</sup>

Due to his advanced age and ill health, the French Ambassador was unable to attend in person and therefore had the aforementioned royal letter delivered to the Grand Vizier by his secretary on the 11th. Through this correspondence, he obtained clarification regarding the Sublime Porte's true stance toward the Holy Roman Empire. The letter was formally received in the customary manner, and assurances were given that the Sultan harbored no intention of initiating hostilities with the German Empire. On the contrary, he expressed a commitment to preserving peace, provided that the Germans upheld their part in maintaining it. On the following day, the 12th, the Dutch Ambassador was granted a farewell audience with the Grand Vizier. The meeting, however,

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*Malcontenten aufs neue umb Succurs inständig anhalten] nachtrücklich resentiren lassen. Indessen kan dato der unter andern auch destwegen hiehero geschickte Ruhsische Major Natale von der Porten weder sein abfertigung, noch ein besseres tractament erhalten.*", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 45r.

<sup>631</sup> *"Vber all-dises solle der offtbemelte Engelländische Bodtschaffter ohnwissend auf was vollmacht sich zu beylegung deß Venetianischen, vnd verhinderung des apprehendirenden Teütschen Kriegs offeriret, allein auch hierinnen gleichwie in denen vorigen puncten nicht allerdings ein favorables gehör gehabt haben, nichts destoweniger schikhet Er bodtschaffter sowohl diser alß anderen oben gehorsambst angeregten ursachen auch seiner particular angelegenheti halber einen seiner bedienten von hier biß Wienn eigends ab, mit der gegebenen ordre alda vierzig tag auf die auß Engelland revertirende ordre zuwarthen, vnd sodann wider herein zugehen.*", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 45r-45v.

<sup>632</sup> *"Sonsten hat auch der Französische Podtschaffter von seinem neuen König daß gewöhnliche an den Sultan gestellte, und schon unterm 21tem längst verflossenen monaths Octobris datirtes notifications schreiben [warinnen deß Königs Ludovici XIII. absterben, vnd Ludovici XV. Throns besteigung khund gemacht wird nebst dem befelch, sich bey der Porten gründlich zuinformiren, ob selbige prætendire ihrer seithen mit Jhro Kayl:en Mayt: einen Krieg anzufangen, vnd solle es alß ein sach, waran dem König vill gelegen, alsogleich dem französischen Hof vmb seine mesures darnach zunehmen, zuberichten empfangen.*", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 45v.

was uneventful aside from a request for the full restitution of a Dutch vessel that had been seized by Dulcigno pirates near Durrës<sup>633</sup>, as well as the presentation of a decree concerning the incident.<sup>634</sup>

Fleischmann reported that although preparations for the Ottoman naval expedition were ongoing, the fleet was not yet ready to depart. While it was believed that the fleet could leave Istanbul within a few days, it was estimated that it would not be able to set sail from the Dardanelles for at least another month. Consequently, the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were compelled to delay their departure due to these logistical setbacks, compounded by persistent adverse weather conditions and impassable roads. The Grand Vizier, meanwhile, commemorated his military success in capturing all the fortresses in the Morea and postponed his departure until the following Saturday.<sup>635</sup>

During this period, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha was relieved of his duties as Serasker of Belgrade and replaced by Sarı Mustafa Pasha, who had been serving in Bosnia. Concurrently, a series of orders were issued to secure the necessary provisions along the route for the Ottoman forces en route to Belgrade. It was anticipated that, as in the previous year, the main Ottoman army would march through Bosnia and, unless impeded by the Holy Roman Empire, would direct its primary offensive against the Venetian fortress of Zadar in Dalmatia.<sup>636</sup>

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<sup>633</sup> For more information about Durazzo (Durrës), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Durrës". Encyclopedia Britannica, 8 Nov. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Durres>". Accessed 23 January 2025.

<sup>634</sup> *"Weillen aber selbiger Podtschaffter alters, vnd vnpäsßlichkeit halber nicht imstand auszugehen, alß hat er gedachte schreiben den 11ten dises durch seinen Canzler dem Groß Vezier behändigen, vnd sich über die von der Porthen gegen Ihre Röml:e Kayl:e Maýt: hegende aigentliche intention erhollen lassen; der brief wurde wie gewöhnlich acceptiret, vnd annebends versichert, daß der Sultan auf kheine weiß mit denen Teütschen in Krieg zuverfallen, sondern den frieden, sofern sye nur dergleichen thuen, zu continuiren gedenkhe; den folgenden Tag alß den 12ten dises hatte auch der Holländische Podtschaffter die ehre den Groß Vezier zu seinem abmarche zu-complimentiren, allein ist in selbiger audienz ausser dem angesucht und erhaltenen ferman umb ein zu Durazzo von denen Dulcignotischen See-Raubern hinweckhgenommenes Holländisches Schiff ex integro zurestituiren nichts sonderliches vorgegangen."*, 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 45v-46r.

<sup>635</sup> *"Obwohln man übrighen an ausrüstung der Türckhischen Flotta ohne vnterlaß arbeiteth, so hat doch selbige [so zwar in wenig tägen von hier allein schwährlich vor einem monath von denen Dardanellen auslauffen wird] dato noch nicht im stand seyn können abzuseglen, dahero der Sultan, vnd Groß Vezier sowohl diser ursach, alß deren beÿ noch anhaltenden üblen wetter sehr verschlimbt vnd im practicablen weegen halber ihren aufbruch, vnd zwar der Groß Vezier biß auf nechstkünfftigen Sambstag, alß an welchem Er alle Vestungen in Morea erobert, vnd destwegen selben vor allen glücklich schäzet, verschoben."*, 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 46r-46v.

<sup>636</sup> *"Meanwhile, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha had been removed from the position of Belgrade Serasker and replaced by Sarı Mustafa Pasha, who was serving in Bosnia. Additionally, several orders had been sent to procure the necessary supplies on the way for the Ottoman troops to reach Belgrade. This year, it was expected that the main Ottoman army would march following the route taken in Bosnia the previous year and, if not obstructed by the Holy Roman Empire, would primarily attack the Venetian fortress of Zara located in Dalmatia."*, 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 46v.

In his report, Fleischmann stated <sup>637</sup> that the new voivode of Wallachia, Nicholas Mavrocordatos, sent message to the Sublime Porte that General Steinvile, who was serving in Transylvania, had congratulated him verbally and in written and assured him that good neighborly relations would continue. The Sublime Porte welcomed this news.

Fleischmann reported that the Grand Vizier had summoned him the day prior to the submission of his dispatch to discuss two pressing matters. First, the Grand Vizier inquired whether a response had been received to the diplomatic proposal submitted on February 6. Second, he conveyed that, according to a report from the Pasha of Temesvár, the Imperial Commander in Szeged had recently prohibited both Ottoman and Christian merchants from attending the fairs and markets held in Hungary. Fleischmann questioned the motivation behind this prohibition, highlighting its contradiction with long-standing customs and the treaty of friendship between the two empires. In reply, Fleischmann stated that no response had yet been received and attributed the delay either to seasonal difficulties or to causes unknown to him. Regarding the reported prohibition, he claimed no knowledge of such a measure and suggested that, if it had indeed occurred, it likely stemmed from a broader misunderstanding rather than from an official directive. He emphasized that such a restriction would not align with the Imperial Palace's intentions, as the Empire was committed to preserving cordial relations with the Sublime Porte and its people.<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>637</sup> "Leztlichen hat der neue Wallachische Fürst Nicolaki Maurocordato der Porthen berichtet, wie selbiger von dem in Sibenbürgen commandirenden Generalen Herrn Grafen von Steinvile über daß erhaltene Fürstenthumb sowohl schriftlich, alß durch einen zu ihm nach Bukurest geschickten Officier mündlich complimentiret, vnd aller guter, und fridsamen nachbahrschafft versichert worden seye, welches sye Porthen mit sonderlichen wohlgefallen vernahmen.", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 46v-47r.

<sup>638</sup> "Da all dises schon zu Pappier gebracht ware, hat mich gestern nachmittag der Groß Vezier zu sich berueffen, vnd zuverstehen gegeben, daß er zweyer ursachen halber mit mir zureden verlange, vnd zwar erstlich vmb zufragen, ob die längst-erwarthe auf die mit dem 6.ten Februarj gethane proposition gehörige antworth nicht angelanget seye? Vnd andertens daß nachdeme von dem Bahsa von Temeswar der Porthen notificiret worden, wie das der Kayl:e Commandant zu Segedin denen sowohl Türckhischen alß Christlichen in Hungarn negocirenden Khauffleüthen verboten habe auf denen Kürzlich in selbiger gegend celebrirten Kürchmarckhten zuerscheinen, Er Groß Vezier von mir zuwissen begehre, warumb solches sowohl der von so langen Jahren hero geüebten gewohnheit, alß der zwischen beeden Reichen vorsejenden freundschaftt zuwider geschehe? Ich meldete hierauf, daß noch zu dato die berührte antworth nicht angelanget, waran entweder die vorsejende rauche Jahrs Zeit oder villeicht ein anderes mir vnbewuste accidenz ursach seyn kan, Was den anderen puncten betrifft, seye mir von kheinem dergleichen verbott was bewust, vnd da es nur auf einer seithen der so weithschichtigen Gränitz beschehen, so dörfte wohl seyn, das solches etwa von einer üblen verständnus der Gränitzer mithin nicht vom Kayl:en Hof herrüher, sinthemahln sovill mir bewust, selbiger mit der Porthen, vnd derselben Vnterthanen ein gute verständnus unterhalten haben will, hierauf replicirte er Groß Vezier, daß wan Er auf einer seithen die solang ausbleibende antworth, vnd andern seiths die verhinderung des zu fridens Zeit allen Völckhern zugelassene handl vnd wandel auch die von allen orthen erschallende nachricht deren von Jhro Kayl: Mayt in Hungarn machenden ungemainen, vnd auf niemand andern alß auf die Porthen Zihlen könnenden Kriegs præparatorien considerire, so könnte er nichts anders schliessen ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 47r-48r.



The Grand Vizier stated that<sup>639</sup>, considering the prolonged delay in the response, the prevention of trade, and the circulating news regarding the military preparations of the Holy Roman Empire in Hungary, the Sublime Porte concluded that the Emperor intended to disrupt the peace and declare war on the Ottomans. However, he emphasized that the Sublime Porte acted in this manner not out of fear, but to prevent misunderstandings and to demonstrate its intention to maintain peace with the Empire. He indicated that they wished to clearly show their people, God, and the world that there was no reason for concern and that they had not done anything to disrupt the peace with the Emperor.

In their meeting, the Grand Vizier expressed the view that opponents of both Venice and the Ottoman Empire were actively encouraging the Holy Roman Empire to engage in war in an effort to weaken the Ottomans. He further asserted that the Empire sought to depict the Ottomans as the aggressors. However, he underscored that the Ottomans had no intention of initiating hostilities and would continue to exert every effort to uphold peace.<sup>640</sup>

The Grand Vizier informed Fleischmann that, in the interest of preserving peace between the two empires, he had issued explicit orders to Ottoman subjects to ensure that no harm was inflicted during past or current military campaigns, and that no incidents should arise that might jeopardize peaceful relations. This directive aimed to dispel the unfounded accusations propagated by adversaries of the Ottoman Empire at the Imperial court and to counteract the misconceptions they sought to foster. The Grand Vizier further remarked on the circulation of baseless reports in newspapers across the Christian world, falsely alleging that the Ottomans intended to declare war on the Holy Roman Empire. These publications even claimed that Fleischmann himself, the Imperial envoy, had been imprisoned in the Yedikule dungeons and subjected to mistreatment. He specifically

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<sup>639</sup> "... Worbey man aber nicht glauben wolte daß sye Porthen aus forcht sich gegen mich sowohl anietzo, alß vormahln hierinnen sowieth explicire, sondern daß es geschehe, vmb alle etwa dem Kayl:en Hof durch ihre feind gemachte ombrage zubenehmen, und Jhr aufrichtige intention den friden zu conserviren zubezeügen, vor allem aber vmb ihrem Volckh, Gott, vnd der welt Clar zuerweisen, das selbe hieran nicht ursach seÿe, vnd auf kheiner ley weiß Jhro Kayl: Maÿt: einige veranlasßung zur geringsten müßverständnus, will geschwiegen zu Krieg geben wollen ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 48r.

<sup>640</sup> "... vnd solte auch der Kayl:e Hof [bey welchem zweifels ohne die Venetianer vnd andere feind der Porthen vmb sich aus dem spill zuziehen, vnd den Kayser mit der Porthen zuverwickhlen allerhand machinationes verkehren werden] durch ein- oder andere arth ursach zum Krieg suchen zubringen, vmb vorgeben zukönnen, daß die Porthen den Krieg mit Jhro Kayl:en Maÿt gebrochen, so solle solches gewißlich nimmer geschehen, gestalten er Groß Vezier sich ernstlich vorgenommen all-möglichstes anzuwenden vmb den friden zwischen denen beeden Reichen zuerhalten ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 48r-48v.

cited correspondence from the recently deposed Voivode of Wallachia to the Imperial General in Transylvania as a source of such misinformation.<sup>641</sup>

The Grand Vizier proceeded to recount the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the former Prince of Wallachia, Constantin Brâncoveanu (Bassaraba). The Sultan had removed Brâncoveanu from power due to various allegations and summoned him to Istanbul by imperial edict, ultimately leading to his execution. It was revealed that, prior to his removal, Brâncoveanu had disseminated false claims suggesting that the Sultan had regarded him as the most suitable ruler for Wallachia and that this belief had resulted in his reappointment. The Grand Vizier reported that widespread dissatisfaction had emerged among the Wallachian populace due to Brâncoveanu's oppressive and unjust rule, and this discontent had become a matter of open complaint. As Brâncoveanu's political position weakened, he began conveying false information to the Imperial General, including claims that the Ottoman Empire was preparing to breach its peace with the Holy Roman Empire and was mobilizing for war.<sup>642</sup>

The Grand Vizier emphasized that such fabrications had the potential to undermine regional stability and erode the mutual trust essential for diplomatic relations. In response, Fleischmann affirmed that the Sublime Porte had consistently reiterated its commitment to peace with the Emperor and that the Imperial Palace had disregarded these unfounded rumors in light of the Porte's reassurances. The Grand Vizier reiterated the Ottomans' determination to maintain peaceful and amicable relations with the Empire. He also noted that Çerkes Mehmed Pasha had been dismissed from his post due to the emergence of rumors in Belgrade suggesting that the Ottomans were

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<sup>641</sup> "... und aller wegen solche ordres zugeben, daß denen Kayl:en Vnterthanen in vorsejender gleichwie in verflüssener Campagna nicht daß geringste vngemach, weniger was schädliches verursacht, mithin alle die von denen feinden der Porthen bey dem Kayl:en Hof angegebene insubstante vorbildungen, vnd dardurch gemachte ombrages völlig zernichtet werden mögen, allermassen Er Groß Vezier in denen in der Christenheit getruckht vnd interpretirten Zeitungen gelesen, als wan die Porten intentioniret seye Ihre Kayl: Majt: zubekriegen, auch würcklich mich alß dero Residenten in die Siben Thurn geworffen, vnd übel tractiret hette; Vnter andern hette man vill dergleichen vnwarheiten in deß lezt abgesetzten Wallachischen fürstens mit dem Kayl:en in Sibenbürgen commendirenden Generaln gepflogenen correspondenz abgenommen ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, fol. 48v-49r.

<sup>642</sup> "... dann nachdeme der Sultan seinen Vorfahrer den fürsten Constantin Bassaraba verschidener müßethatten halber durch seinen dahin gesandten Bujuk Emirachor absetzen, hiehero bringen, vnd entlich enthautben lassen, habe diser fürst sich an den berührten Emirachor addressiret, selbigen corruppiret, vnd dahin gebracht, daß er den Sultan fälschlich berichtet, daß das Land ihn fürsten alß den zur ergirung am tauglichsten Bojaaren verlange; Worauf man ihn auch zum fürsten ernennet, allein im gegentheill erfahren, daß die Wallachen (mit ihme seiner geüebten grausambkheit und vngerechtigkeit halber gar über zufriden, vnd sich destwegen wider ihn öffentlich beschwähret ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 49r.

preparing for conflict with the German Empire—rumors which, even if groundless, were deemed intolerable by the Ottoman leadership.<sup>643</sup>

In the same meeting, the Grand Vizier clearly stated that the Sublime Porte had no intention of initiating hostilities with the Holy Roman Empire. However, should the Emperor violate the peace, the Ottomans were prepared to defend themselves. These preparations included the transportation of military supplies along the Danube via the Black Sea, as well as other precautionary measures. Additionally, the Grand Vizier disclosed that the Sublime Porte was undertaking military preparations against the Republic of Venice in Dalmatia, with particular focus on an operation targeting the Fortress of Zadar. The necessary materials for this campaign were to be transported to the region through Belgrade.<sup>644</sup>

The Grand Vizier informed Fleischmann that the Venetians had disseminated claims among the Christian states alleging that the Ottoman Empire intended to annihilate Venice and conquer the entirety of Italy. In response, Fleischmann warned the Grand Vizier that such assertions might prompt the Holy Roman Empire to intervene in support of Venice. The Grand Vizier, however, reiterated to both the Imperial and British Ambassadors that the Sultan harbored no intention of disrupting the peace with the Holy Roman Empire and that the Sublime Porte remained committed to maintaining peaceful relations.<sup>645</sup> The Grand Vizier further requested that Fleischmann convey

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<sup>643</sup> "... vnd die aufrichtige verständnus alteriren können in antworthung versicherte ich ihne Groß Vezier, hiervon nichts, wohl aber zuwissen, daß man am Kayl:en Hof auf dergleichen Zeitung wenig observation mache, sich aber villmehr hierinnen an meine von hier einsändtende iederzeit die von der Porthen gegen den Kayl: Hof tragende aufrichtigkeit, vnd ihre zu fortführung deß fridens habende begürde austruckhende bericht halte, hierauf versicherte er Gros Vezier mich, daß die Porthen auf ihrem worth ein vor allemahl fest zuverharren, vnd mit ihren freünd-vnd Nachbahren insonderheit mit denen Teütschen in besten friden zuleben verlange, vnd alles was demselben zuwider, aus dem weeg zuraumen bereith seÿe, sinthemahln da man iüngsthin dahier vernohmen, daß man in der Vestung Belgrad gesprochen, alß wan der Sultan mit denen Teütschen einen Krieg anzufangen willens seÿe, alsogleich den Cerkes Mehemed Bahsa Seraskier alda abgesezet, weillen er Bahsa solche vnfundirte reden nicht verhindert, oder nicht gewust ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 50r.

<sup>644</sup> "... Er Groß Vezier aber wolte noch einmahl mit aller aufrichtigkeit widerhollen, auf das Ich dem Kayl:en Hof berichten möge, wie daß der Porthen intention ein für allemahl seÿe mit selbigem in einem vollständigen friden zuleben, welches sÿe zwar allzeit gehoffet, allein da aniezo die oben berührte antworth in so wichtiger sache sehr lang über die Zeit ausbleibe, vnd ander seiths die Kriegs preparatorien continuiret, auch bereiths daß freÿe commercium auf der Gränitz interrumpiret werde, habe man billiche ursach an fortetflanzung deß fridens [der doch nicht ihrer sondern disseiths gebrochen wird] zuverzweiflen, welches ihn Groß Vezier entlich bewogen, vmb nicht gar überfallen zuwerden, auf die gegenverfassung zgedenken, vnd seÿe resolviret morgen noch einige anzahl fahrzeÿg mit Krieg-provision über daß schwarze Meer die donau hinaufzuschickhen, auch andere Kriegs verfaßungen fürzukehren ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 50v.

<sup>645</sup> "Worgegen ich mich bedankhet daß übrige aber mit unverfänglichen doch mehr hoffung alß apprehension machenden terminis beantwortet; Wordurch ihn Groß Vezier auch so eingenommen, daß er mir in verthrauen eröffnet, wie diser tügen der Engelländische Botschaffter beÿ ihme gewesen, vnd vorgestellet habe, daß die Venetianer sich beÿ allen Christlichen Potentaten beklageten, alß wan die Porthen von kheinem friden was hören, sondern selbe Republic

the Ottoman Empire's dedication to peace to the Imperial Court. He assured him that if the Empire agreed to uphold the current state of peace, all Ottoman military preparations would be suspended and diplomatic steps toward de-escalation would be taken. Concluding the discussion, the Grand Vizier instructed Fleischmann to inform the Imperial General that the Empire's military mobilization was purely defensive and that the Ottomans would not initiate hostilities so long as the Emperor maintained his commitment to peace.<sup>646</sup>

#### 4.10. Ottoman-Austrian Tensions: Prince Eugene's Letter

In his report dated 1 May 1716, Fleischmann recorded that on the 21st of that same month, the Imperial courier Luca arrived at the Ottoman encampment, which was then advancing from Istanbul toward Edirne. Upon arrival in the early hours of the morning, Luca was detained and interrogated throughout the day by the Grand Vizier's steward and held overnight. He was ordered to surrender his dispatches, which he refused. However, with the intervention of the Reis Efendi—who maintained cordial relations with Fleischmann—the courier was released the following day under Ottoman escort and brought to Fleischmann. The documents delivered instructed Fleischmann to present them immediately to the Grand Vizier.<sup>647</sup>

Fleischmann promptly acted and met with the Grand Vizier at approximately two o'clock in the afternoon. Reis Efendi was also present at the meeting. Fleischmann relayed that the military

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*völlig Supprimiren, vnd ganz Itälien über wältigen wolte, dahero Ihre Kayl: Mayt: dessen aufs neüe ihme angewachsene nahmhaffte Macht, auf denen bainen habende Zahlhaffte Kriegs heer, vnd bereiths vorgekehrte verfassungen Er weithleüffig remonstriret, gar leichtlich Selbiger Republic zu succurriren sich entschliessen dörrfte ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 51r-51v.*

<sup>646</sup> "... Er Groß Vezier aber hoffete bald was von Wienn durch mich zuvernehmen, vnd die sache, sofern man wolte durch khein andern alß den Kayl:en Canal zu negotiren mich nochmahln ersuchend beÿ eüer dhrleicht, Excellenz, vnd Gnaden wegen baldiger antworth nachtruckhsambe instanz [worzue Er mir auch gleich ein Post Commandement, dessen ich mich beÿ nechster vorfallenheit bediennen werde, ertheillet] zumachen welches ich ihme auch zuthuen, vnd meiner seiths all-übriges zu beeder Reichen besten vorträgliches zucontribuiren versprache; Warauf ich mich nach einem biß zweÿ Stund gedaurten aufenthalt, vnd empfangenen höflichkeiten von ihme beurlaubet. Eüer Dhrl: Excell vnd Gnaden aber werden aus dem gepflogenen gespräch von selbsten gnädigst abnehmen, wie gern die Türckhen den von Ihro Kayl: Mayt: beförchtenden Krieg vermeÿden, wie hart ihnen selbiger ankombe, vnd in was für ein eüsserste confusion selbige beÿ dessen erfolg werden gestürzt werden ...", 16 April 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 52r-52v.

<sup>647</sup> "Es ist zwar der Kayl: Currier Luca den 21ten diss fruh in dem 2 Stund vom Constantinopl auf dem weeg nach Adrianopl aufgeschlagenen Türckhischen Laager angelanget, allein alda von deß Groß Veziers Chÿhaja biß gegen abend aufgehalten, die ganze nacht hindurch angehalten, examiniret, vnd zu hergebung deren mitgebrachten correspondenzen arrestiret worden, alß Er Currier aber sich hierin gewaigert, vnd inzwischen der mit mir in gar guter freündtschafft lebende Reis-Effendi darzue komben, hat man ihn den folgenden Tag von seithen der Porthen in beglaltung etlicher Türckhen zu mir gesändtet, mit der bedeütung, daß ich ohne verweillung zum Groß Vezier mich begeben, vnd ihme daß vom Kayl:en Hof durch gedachten Currier mitgebrachte hinterbringen möge.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 54r.

preparations of the Ottoman Empire, previously disclosed by the Grand Vizier in February, had now elicited a formal response from the Imperial Court. The reply, conveyed via the Imperial courier, declared that the Emperor had no intention of waging war against the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, he sought the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty of Karlowitz and reiterated his desire to mediate the ongoing dispute between the Ottomans and the Republic of Venice.<sup>648</sup>

Fleischmann reminded the Grand Vizier of the stipulations agreed upon by the signatories of the Treaty of Karlowitz in November 1714 and March 1715, which prohibited either side from initiating hostilities against the other. He also referenced a warning issued by Prince Eugene to the Sublime Porte via Ibrahim Pasha in Vienna. Despite such efforts at conciliation, Fleischmann observed that the Ottoman Empire had continued its hostilities against Venice, escalating both its naval and land forces and advancing in a manner perceived as threatening to Imperial territories. Faced with the diminishing prospect of peace, the Imperial Majesty had deemed it necessary to begin preparations for war as a defensive measure against violations of the treaty.<sup>649</sup>

The Aulic War Council, however, still sought a definitive response from the Grand Vizier, particularly as to whether the Ottomans would immediately cease hostilities against Venice and fully

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<sup>648</sup> *“Warauf ich in aller eill, angesehen man öffters vnd Past augenblühlich die jnstanz gemacht, eüme dhl: Excell: vnd Gnaden gnädigstes rescript dezisferiret, mich gegen 2 Uhr noch selbigen nachmittag zum Groß Vezier verfüget, vnd ihme in gegenwarth deß Reis Effendi in bescheident vnd deutlichen terminis vorgestellet, wie daß ich seine deß Groß Veziers mir über die Kayl:e Kriegs rüstung den 6ten verflossenen monaths Februarÿ gethanne proposition verlangter massen an den Kayl:en Hof überschriben, vnd nunmehr durch einen aigenen Currier die antworth erhalten hette, daß Ihre Kayl:e Maÿt: zwar mit der Porthen kheinen Krieg sondern villmehr die aufrechthaltung, herstell vnd fortsetzung deß Carlovizischen fridens verlangen thetten, allermassen selbe auch bißhero alles, was darzue immer diensamb seÿn können, angewendet, vnd zu disem ende zu gütlicher beÿlegung der zwischen Ihr Porthen vnd der Republic Venedig obschwebenden müßverständnus ihre vermittlung widerholter anerbiethen ...”, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 54r-54v.*

<sup>649</sup> *“... vnd zugleich die zu festhaltung deß gemeinsabnen Carlovizischen fridens mit der Cron Pohn, vnd der mehrernenten Republic habende, vnd beÿ denen damahligen tractaten ordentlich bekhandt gemachte ewige bindnus, vnd daß ein theill ohne dem andern nicht feindlich angegriffen werden möge, durch mich den 10ten November 1714 vnd 1ten Martÿ 1715 erinnern, auch Jhme Groß Vezier durch Ihre hochfürstl: Dhrleicht den Herrn Prinzen Eugenium [tite] Kriegs-Præsidenten vermittels des dem zu Wienn in ablegatione gewesten Ibrahim Agha ertheilten antworthschreibens ferrers deutlich zuerkennen geben, vnd daß der unterbrachene frid mit allen compaciscenten födersamb hinwiderumb fergestellet werden möchte, so freünd alß nachtruckhlich ermahnen lassen, zumaln aber die verhoffte würckhung nicht im geringsten erfolget, sondern die Porthen vill mehr in bekriegung der offternenten in dem Carlovizischen friden mitbegriffenen Republic Venedig forzufahren ihre Macht zu wasser, vnd Land darüber annoch vermehret, vnd sich damit an verschidenen orthen Jhro Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: König Reich vnd Landen sehr bedenklich näherte, so hetten sye anderst nicht thuen können, alß zu denen von der hand deß allerhöchsten Jhnen verlyhenen Waaffen zuschreiten, vnd sich in stand zusezen, vmb auf dem fall, wan alle gute freünd vnd nachbahrliche ermahnungen nicht fruchten werden, gegen Jhren willen durch solche vermittels Göttlichen beÿstandes sowohl Ihre bundgenossene von allen weitheren gewalt, und untertruckungen zuschützen, alß Ihre aigene Land vnd Leüthe von allem feindlichen anfall kräfttiglich zuretteN ...”, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 54r-54v.; OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 125r-126r.*

comply with the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz. Fleischmann declared that, should a decision be reached, he was prepared to return to Vienna immediately and deliver the Sublime Porte's response to His Majesty. Upon hearing these words, the Grand Vizier, visibly pale and deeply moved, sighed and reminded Fleischmann that the Ottomans had never rejected Vienna's offers to mediate the dispute with Venice. Nonetheless, he maintained that war had become inevitable due to the damages inflicted by the Venetians. From the Grand Vizier's perspective, the Ottoman Empire's engagement in this conflict was a matter of justice, and he asserted that divine favor rested upon the Ottoman arms. He added that the war against Venice would persist unless favorable conditions for peace emerged. At the same time, he drew attention to Venice's apparent attempts to provoke a conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire. Despite this, he emphasized that the Ottomans remained committed to peaceful relations with the Empire and would make every effort to preserve the peace.<sup>650</sup>

The Grand Vizier reiterated to Fleischmann that the Ottoman Empire remained open to mediation proposals aimed at resolving the conflict with the Republic of Venice, yet he asserted that the current war had become an unavoidable necessity in light of the injustices committed by the Venetians. He emphasized that the Sublime Porte's objective was either to continue hostilities or to

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<sup>650</sup> "... vnd bleibe also Jhme Groß Vezier kheines weeges verhalten, daß solche verfassungen zu dem erstbenenten ende angesehen seÿen, vmb willen aber beÿ allem disem der hauptzweckh lediglich auf die verschaffung deß allseithigen ruhestandes, vnd sicherheit abzihlete, so wären Ihre Kayl: Maÿt noch von fortsetzung beständiger guter nachbahr vnd freundschaft nicht abgewendet, thetten indoch ein vngesaumbte vnd cathégorische erklährung erwwarthen, ob sÿe Porten von aller feindseeligkeit gegen die Republic Venedig sogleich abstehe, vnd selber über die bißhero zuegefügte schäden eine zuelängliche indemnisation, vnd gut thung laisten, mithin den Carlovizischen friden in allen stuckhen, vnd mit allen denen darin vermängten, vnd verbundenen Mächten redintegriren wolle; weithers hette Jch ordres, mit der von der Porthen hierüber erhaltenden verlässlich vnd Cathégorischen antworth vngesaumbt selbst von hier nach Wienn zurukzugehen, vnd alda Jhro Kayl: Maÿt: dero mir gebende erklährung zu überbringen, Worbeÿ Jch Jhme Groß Vezier daß von Jhro hochfürstl: dhrl: dem herrn Prinzen Eugenio von Savoÿen [till] erlassenes abrueffungs-schreiben, angesehen es die noth erheischet, vnd Jch selbiges nach der beÿm Groß Vezier gehalten audienz Jhme nicht geraumblich mehr hette zuerbringen können, behändiget Jhn Groß Vezier versicherend daß gleichwie mir von Zeit an da Jch die ehre habe, beÿ der Porthen alß Kayl:er Minister anwesend zuseÿn, in allen vorfallenheiten beeder Reichen best freündliches wohl seÿn höhstmöglichst angelegen seÿn lassen, vnd beraiths mein hier in verschidenen Occasionen an tag gelegter eÿßer Jhme Groß Vezier bekchant seÿe, als werde Jch auch aniezo all-meine eüsserste kräfte anwenden, die von der Porthen auf gegenwärtigen vortrag mir zuertheillen beliebende gezimmende antworth nebst dero aigentlichen hegenden intention dem Kayl:en Hof dergestalten vorzutragen, auf daß die zwischen selbigen vnd der Porthen vorseÿende frid-nachbahrliche einverständnus ferners forth erhalten werden möge, worinnen Jch vmb so ehender zu reusciren hoffete alß Jhrer Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: intention hauptsächlich auf die fridens unterhaltung abzihle, vnd selbte anderst nicht, alß wan zu redintegrirung deß Carlovizischen tractats kheine sichere hofnung ehr übrig, zu denen waaffen zu schreiten gedenken etc. etc. hierauf hat Er Groß Vezier [welcher, ohneracht er sich zimlich verstellen wolte, ganz erblaset] seiffzend gemeldet, daß, was die von Kayl:er seithen zu vermittelung deren zwischen der Porthen, vnd der Republic Venedig entstandenen strittigkeiten offerirte officia belange, hette die Porthen selbige nimmer abgeschlagen, sondern declariret, daß sÿe iederzeit die ienige mediation zu acceptiren beraith seÿe, welche Jhr Porthen was nütliches-vnd vortrügliches versprechen wird, allein der Krieg mit denen Venetianern seÿe wegen so villfältig der Porthen zuegefügt unbillen fast vnvermeydlich gewesen, vnd weillen die darzue bewogene gerecht ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 55r-56v.

make peace, contingent upon the emergence of favorable conditions. With regard to discussions on the alliance outlined in the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Grand Vizier maintained that the Ottoman administration did not consider Venetian demands relevant, as Venice was not regarded by the Porte as a principal party to that treaty. In response, Fleischmann reminded him that the Treaty of Karlowitz indeed included Venice and that His Imperial Majesty reserved the right to intervene in the event of a violation of its terms. Nevertheless, the Grand Vizier asserted that the Ottoman conflict with Venice would not give rise to hostility toward the Holy Roman Empire, and he reaffirmed the Ottomans' respect for the Emperor's peaceful intentions. He acknowledged that the Venetians were actively attempting to sway the Empire to their side, but he affirmed that the Sublime Porte would not be influenced by such efforts and remained committed to preserving peace. He added that while the Ottoman Empire did not desire war with the Holy Roman Empire, it was compelled to make defensive preparations to safeguard its territories in the event of conflict. The Grand Vizier requested that Fleischmann convey to His Majesty the Sublime Porte's firm intention to uphold peace and refrain from any actions that might disrupt it.<sup>651</sup>

Regarding a letter sent by Prince Eugene of Savoy, through Ibrahim Agha, the Grand Vizier stated that he did not consider it necessary to issue a formal reply. However, he expressed no objection to Fleischmann's recall, affirming that he could return to Vienna if so instructed by the Emperor. The Sublime Porte would review the contents of the letter and respond in due course, addressing both the written communication and Fleischmann's verbal representations.<sup>652</sup>

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<sup>651</sup> "... als hette gott auch bekhanter massen die Ottomannische waaffen gesegnet, übrighen seÿe Jhr Porthen intention den Krieg mit denen Venetianern alß ihren feinden zu continuiren, oder mit selbigen einen favorablen friden zumachen, auch sÿe hierzue vor allen die Kayl:e vermitlung, ob schon bereiths etlichmahlen die Engelländ vnd Holländische Bodtschaffter allhier die ihrige offeriret, acceptiren, mit Jhro Kayl:en Maÿt: aber wolte sÿe Jhrer seiths eine aufrichtige verständnus fortunterhalten, seÿe auch erbiethig mit selbiger den Carlovizischen friden zurenoviren, wan aber dieselbte was zuezuzezen verlangeten, so hette sÿe die Porten ihres orths auch wohl ein vnd anderes beÿzubringen; auf die von mir gethane einwendung, daß der gedachte vortrag auf die mit Jhrer allerhöchst-besagten Kayl:en Maÿt: in allianz stehende Republic Venedig abzihle, vnd der Carlovizische friden respectu selbiger redintegriret werden müste, replicirte Er Groß Vezier von kheiner bindnus was zuwissen, vnd daß die Porthen, weillen selbige dem Carlovizischen friden nicht einverleibet ist, sich daran nicht zukehren hette, sÿe werde hingegen Jhre Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: gewißlich zu kheinen Krieg vrsach geben, vnd hielte er wohl, daß die Venetianer ihre feinde sehete er wohl; daß die Venetianer ihre feinde zu Jhro Röml: Kayl: Maÿt: recurrirten, vmb Selbe mit der Porthen in einem Krieg zuverwickhlen, vnd sich, da sÿe nicht resistiren können herauszuziehen, Jhre Kayl: Maÿt: hetten auch feinde, welche öffters die Porthen wider selbige zuhezen trachteten, allein hette man Jhnen biß dahin khein gehör geben wollen etc.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 56v-57v.

<sup>652</sup> "Auf den von des Herrn Prinzens Eugene von Savoyen, Jhrer Römische Kaiserliche Majestat Kriegs Præsidentens Hochfürstliche Durchlauchtigen durch den von Wien zurückgekommenen Ibrahim eingesändteten brief glaubte er Groß Vezier, daß kein antwort nöthig angesehen selbtes auf sein Groß Veziers hinaufgeschicktes schreiben ein antwort gewesen seie, meiner avocation aber könnte Er nicht zuwider sein, und ich, da es Jhre Kaiserliche Majestat verlangeten, zurückgehen; den behändigten brief wolte die Porthen überlesen, und sodann sowohl auf meinen mündlichen Vortrag, alß selbigen inhalt eine antworth erteilen.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 57v-58r.

Fleischmann, in turn, reaffirmed the Emperor's primary objective: to restore and preserve the peace established by the Treaty of Karlowitz. He expressed his personal commitment to fostering and sustaining cordial relations between the two empires, noting that he had consistently worked toward this end. Accordingly, he urged the Grand Vizier to provide a response that would facilitate this goal and contribute to the broader maintenance of peace.<sup>653</sup>

Following this exchange, Fleischmann reported that he proceeded to handle other matters as directed by orders from Vienna before departing from the Grand Vizier's presence. He observed that the Grand Vizier had received him with utmost courtesy and that the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, and the wider Ottoman administration had all expressed their appreciation for the manner in which he had conducted himself during his mission.<sup>654</sup>

The following day, Fleischmann visited the British and Dutch ambassadors in Istanbul. In a spirit of collegiality and discretion, he shared with them only a general account of the declaration presented to the Sublime Porte. He further requested their support in ensuring the safety of his return journey to Vienna, in accordance with established diplomatic norms and principles of collective representation. In the absence of a formal Imperial representative, he also encouraged the ambassadors to discreetly inform the Imperial Court of developments in Istanbul and, when the moment was right, to contribute toward securing a just and honorable peace. By doing so, Fleischmann sought to maintain an open channel for diplomatic engagement.<sup>655</sup>

Both ambassadors expressed their willingness to assist in this endeavor. The British Ambassador, in particular, stated that he had consistently received instructions from his sovereign—

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<sup>653</sup> *"Hierauf widerholte ich die vorige versicherung, daß, zumahln Ihre Kaiserliche Majestat vor allem intentioniret seien, den Carlovizischen friden zu redintegriren, und mit der Porthen ferrers zu conserviren, mein eüsserstes anwenden werde, die gute einverständnis zwischen beeden grossen Reichen zuerhalten, wie dann dahin jederzeit meine möglichste application gegangen, ihne Groß Vezier dahero ersuchend, mir eine antworth zugeben, welche mein zum besten beeder Reichen abzihlendes vorhaben umb mehr facilitiren möge ...", 1 May 1716. oeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58r.*

<sup>654</sup> *"... von dem übrigen aber habe bei sotanner der sachen beschaffenheit dero gnädigsten ordres gemäß abscondiret, und mich von ihme Groß Vezier [so mich über die massen höflich tractiret, auch etlichmahl attestiret, daß der Sultan sein Herr, er, vnd die Porthen mit meiner bißhero vorgekehrten conduite sehr wohl zufriden seien] separiret ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58r.*

<sup>655</sup> *"... den folgenden tag nach diser gehabten audienz habe mich zu denen hier stehenden Engelländisch-vnd Holländischen Hhlren Bottschafftern begeben, vnd selbigen die der Porthen gethane Declaration in freündt vertreülich-iedoch nur terminis generalibus beýgebracht mit dem ersuchentlichen zuesatz, daß selbige ex communi repræsentationis et gentium ratione die sicherheit meiner ruckhkehr unterstützen, in abwesenheit eines Kayl: Repræsentantens von denen allhiesigen vorfallenheiten dem Kayl: Hof durch geheimbe weede nachricht ertheillen, vnd beý ersehender gelegenheit eines sicher vnd reputirlichen Fridens Ihre Officia beýtragen möchten, vmb durch selbe allezeit die weeg zur negotiation offen zuhalten ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58r-58v.*



whom he referred to as his supreme master—to support close cooperation with the Holy Roman Emperor. He pledged to promote these shared interests to the best of his ability and to ensure that efforts toward peace would continue seamlessly through his successor, despite his impending departure.<sup>656</sup> The Dutch Ambassador, for his part, suggested that Fleischmann should encourage the Emperor to request the States-General of the Netherlands to issue the necessary directives to support these diplomatic efforts.<sup>657</sup>

In the meantime, Fleischmann advised both ambassadors to implement encryption protocols for their correspondence, though it remained to be seen how they would respond to this recommendation.<sup>658</sup>

On the 21st of the same month, Major Natale, sent on a special mission to the Sublime Porte by the Czar, was turned down by the Sultan and Grand Vizier in a letter to the Czar<sup>659</sup>. The letter in question outlined the full extent of the demands that the Czar had submitted to the Sublime Porte. It opened with a firm and somewhat admonitory tone, asserting that the Sultan regarded the movement of Russian troops into Poland as a clear violation of the peace. Accordingly, the Czar was instructed that, should he wish to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire, he must immediately withdraw his forces from Polish territory and refrain from deploying troops there under any pretext in the future.<sup>660</sup>

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<sup>656</sup> "... hierzue haben sye beede sich sehr willig erzaiget, vnd zwar der Engelländische vmb so mehr, weillen dessen aussag nach seines höchstem Principalens ordres iederzeit dahin gegangen, Ihrer Röml:en Kayl:en Maýt:, alß mit welcher selbiger in so genauer allianz stunde, aller-höchstes interehse, sovill ihme möglich, zuappoggyren auch wolte selbiger ferrers solches nach all-seinen kräften observiren, vnd obwohl er avociret, doch die sache dahin instradiren, auf das sein Successor es leichtlich werde continuiren können ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58v-59r.

<sup>657</sup> "Der Holländische Bodtschaffter aber hat angereget Eüer Dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden zuersuchen auf das selbige beÿ seinen Principaln denen Herren General-Staaten die ordres hierzue zubewürckhen geruhen möchten.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 59r.

<sup>658</sup> "Indessen habe sowohl einen alß den andern wegen eines zifferschlissels ermahnet, vnd stehet zuerwarthen, was sye hierinnen thuen werden.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58r-58v.

<sup>659</sup> "Eben den 21ten dits ist der in der gnädigst bewusten Commission vom Czaar in Moscau hieher geschickhte Major Natale von der Porthen mit einem vom Sultan, vnd einem vom Groß Vezier an den Czaar gestelten schreiben respediret worden.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 58v-59r.

<sup>660</sup> "In bemeltem schreiben ware daß völlige von dem Czaar der Porthen gethanne anbringen begriffen, vnd vor allem Ihme Czaar in sehr verächtlichen terminis bedeütet, daß der Sultan den in Pohln genohmenen marche seiner Trouppen alß eine Clare ruptur des fridens ansehe mithin selbiger so fern Er mit der Porthen im friden leben wolle, die gedachte Trouppen alsogleich aus Pohln zurukhcommandiren, vnd ins khünfftig sich nicht mehr unterstehen solle einiger Mann, unter was prætext es auch immer seÿn mag, durch oder in Pohln zuschikhen, vnd daß die wegen seinen allÿrtem hierzue verlangte erlaubnus der Brutischen capitulation zuwider lauffe, ingleichen könte andertens aus eben diser ursach nicht zuegegeben werden, daß der Czaar einen Minister beÿ der Porthen halte.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA

The letter further declared that the permissions requested for Russian allies were deemed incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty of Prut. Consequently, the request for a permanent Russian representative at the Sublime Porte was categorically rejected. The document emphasized that, aside from the Holy Roman Emperor—who was permitted to maintain a resident ambassador or, intermittently, a secretary of embassy—no other power was entitled to such a diplomatic presence at the Ottoman court.<sup>661</sup> Thirdly, concerning the alleged customs violations perpetrated by the Tsar's Cossacks against Moscow merchants conducting trade through Poland, responsibility for investigating these claims was assigned to the Khan of the Crimean Tatars.<sup>662</sup>

Fourthly, it was stated that the damages inflicted on the Kalmyks loyal to Moscow were carried out not by the Nogai Tatars, but by the Jamboluks loyal to Ajuke Khan. This khan was an independent Uzbek prince not subject to the Ottomans. At the time when Moscow's subjects were harmed and some of them were killed, some Nogai Tatars were also present with these Jamboluks, but not as their allies, but as their enemies.<sup>663</sup> According to Fleischmann's report<sup>664</sup>, the Uzbek prince had indeed sent an envoy to the Crimean Tatar Khan and initiated peace negotiations. For this reason, the Sublime Porte did not pay much attention to the Czar's complaints on this matter, and the commissioners requested in this regard were rejected, and no compensation was given for the damage done.

Returning to the matter of Fleischmann's audience with the Grand Vizier and his anticipated return to Vienna, it was noted that, acting upon the instructions of Prince Eugene, the Grand Vizier

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StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 59r-59v.

<sup>661</sup> *"Nebst deme seye niemand alß dem Röml:en Kayßer erlaubet, einen Residenten, oder zuweillen einen Legations-Secretarium bey selbiger zuhaben."*, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 59v.

<sup>662</sup> *"Was drittens die von denen Czassarovischen Cosaken denen hin-vnd herreysenden Moscovitischen Khaufleüthen in der mauth angethan haben sollende Vngerechtigkeit betreffe, habe man solches dem Tartar-Chan zuuntersuchen heimbgestellt."*, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 59v.

<sup>663</sup> *"Viertens seye der denen Moscovitischen Caluken zuegefügte schaden nicht von denen Nogayischen Tartarn, sondern von denen untern Ajuke Han [so ein Souvrener mithin der Porthen nicht vnterthäniger VssBekischer fürst ist] stehenden Jamboluken geschehen, vnd hetten sich zur Zeit, da die Moscovitische Vnterthanen beschädiget, vnd etliche nidergehauet worden, zwar etlich Nogayische Tartarn bey denen gedachten Jamboluken, aber nicht als confaderirte, sondern alß derenselben feinde eingefunden ..."*, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 59v-60v.

<sup>664</sup> *"...wie dann würckhlich der besagte Uhsbekische fürst zum Crimeischen Tartar Chan geschickhet, vnd einen friden negocyren lasset, mithin seynd auch dise vom Czaar eingewendete beschwährnussen von der Porthen schlecht regardiret, vnd die destwegen angesuchte Commissary abgeschlagen, weniger auf den verüebten schaden eine satisfaction gegeben worden."*, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 60r.

spent two days in deliberation with his advisers, seeking to interpret and reframe the proposals conveyed by Fleischmann in a manner consistent with Ottoman interests. A central concern was determining how best to present this sensitive diplomatic exchange to the Sultan.<sup>665</sup>

On the 26th, the Mufti, the Kadiasker, and all senior Ottoman officials in attendance were summoned to the residence of the Grand Vizier. There, they were informed of the proposals and the contents of Prince Eugene's letter, and were invited to express their opinions at a formal council scheduled for the following day.<sup>666</sup>

On the 27th, the assembly reconvened at the military camp established in Davudpaşa. In the presence of the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, and other high-ranking dignitaries, the proposals delivered by Fleischmann and the letter addressed to the Grand Vizier by Prince Eugene were publicly read aloud. The Sublime Porte's intended response was also presented in the form of a formal manifesto.<sup>667</sup>

Following the reading, the Grand Vizier delivered an extended speech in which he asserted, among other points, that the alliance between the Holy Roman Empire and the Republic of Venice was not incorporated into the Peace of Karlowitz and, as such, imposed no binding obligations upon the Ottoman Empire. He maintained that the Sublime Porte had given the Empire no legitimate grounds for war and insisted that the Ottomans were now compelled to defend themselves solely on the basis of a just cause, having been abruptly attacked by Imperial forces.<sup>668</sup>

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<sup>665</sup> *"Nun wider auf meinen dem Groß Vezier gethannen Vortrag, vnd ruckhkehr zukomben, so hat er Groß Vezier zwey Tag nach einander sich mit denen seinigen über die aus befelch eüer Dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gden unterthänigst beschribener massen gethanne propositiones, vnd daß von eüer hochfürstl: dhrleicht übersändete schreiben, welches er auf seine arth interpretiren lassen, berathschlaget, vnd vor allem auf mittel, vnd weeg getrachtet solches dem Sultan auf eine glimpfliche weiß wissend zumachen ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 60v-61r.*

<sup>666</sup> *"... den 26.ten dits aber wurde der Muffti, Kasiaskier, vnd alle hier befindliche Officier der Porthen in deß besagten Groß Veziers behausung gerueffen, vnd Ihnen die berührte proposition, vnd schreiben communiciret, mit dem bedeüten hierauf reüfflich zureflectiren vmb in der den folgenden Tag angestellten versamlung ihre mainung darüber eröffnen zukönnen ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 61r.*

<sup>667</sup> *"... an gedachten tag alß den 27.ten dises hat sich sodann der Muffti, Kasiaskier, vnd officier in dem beÿ Daud Bahsa aufgeschlagenen Laager eingefunden, warauf man in deß Sultans, Groß-Veziers, vnd derselben gegenwarth die von mir vorgetragene propositionen, vnd dem von Ihro Hochfürstl:en Dhrleicht an ihne Groß Vezier zuegeschickhten brief nebst der von der Porthen hieraufgegebenen antworth in forma manifesti abgelesen.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 61r.*

<sup>668</sup> *"Hierüber machte der Groß Vezier einen langen Discurs, in welchem er vor andern vorgestellet, daß die zwischen Ihro Röml:en Kayl:en Maÿt: vnd der Republic Venedig seÿn sollende allyanz im Carlovizischen friden nicht begriffen ist, mithin die Porthen sich nicht daran zuhalten habe, The Sublime Porte had not completely rejected the proposed Imperial mediation, but had indicated to Fleischmann that it was willing to accept it.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 61r-61v.*

Concluding his address, the Grand Vizier posed a rhetorical question to the assembled council, implying that Prince Eugene's letter was laden with condescension and constituted a direct affront to Ottoman dignity. In doing so, he initiated a deliberation on the appropriate course of action in response to this perceived diplomatic provocation.<sup>669</sup>

The Sultan responded by asserting that, from the perspective of Islamic law, the letter constituted a serious insult and humiliation. In support of this position, the Shaykh al-Islam declared that the Sublime Porte was fully entitled to engage in warfare against the Holy Roman Empire, particularly on the grounds that the Empire had offered support to the Republic of Venice. He emphasized that Muslims could never be compelled to return territories that had been seized through considerable sacrifice and bloodshed.<sup>670</sup>

The Shaykh al-Islam substantiated his stance by presenting a fatwa grounded in Sharia law, which he had prepared in advance. However, an alternative perspective was offered by a senior official who had previously served as the Kadiasker of Anatolia. He argued that Prince Eugene's communication should not be interpreted as a formal declaration of war, but rather as an overture toward negotiation.<sup>671</sup>

In response, the Grand Vizier maintained that, although it was not his intention to declare war on the Empire, the Ottoman state could not stand idle in the face of a perceived threat to its frontiers. Accordingly, he announced that the Ottoman army would be mobilized toward Belgrade. Nevertheless, strict orders were given to the frontier commanders to avoid initiating hostilities and to await the first offensive move by the Holy Roman Empire. Should such an attack occur, they were

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<sup>669</sup> "... vnd die mir damahls gegebene antworth zulaugnen suchet] selbige anzunehmen bereithwillig erbotten, daß man Ihro Kayl:en Mayt: zu kheinen Krieg ursach gegeben, daß die Porthen zwar urplötzlich von denen Teütschen überfallen werde, allein hette sich auf Jhre gerechte sach zuverthrauen etc.etc. fragend, ob man deß hochbesagten Prinzen herrn Eugenÿ hochfürstl:en Dhrleicht brief nicht voller verächtlichkeit vnd geringachtung gegen die Porthen befinde, vnd was beÿ solcher beschaffenheit zuthuen seÿe?", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 61v.

<sup>670</sup> "Da der Sultan selbst en beÿgeruckhet, wie das dardurch daß Mahomedanische gesätz höchstens gekränckhet, vnd verschimpfet werde, disemnach hat sodann der Muffti ausgesprochen, daß die Porthen Jhre Röml: Kayl: Mayt: weillen selbige sich der Republic Venedig anzunehmen erkläret, mit allen Rechten bekriegen, allein auf kheine weiß zugeben könne, daß man das einige, welches denen feinden des wahren ahoedanischen glaubnus mit villen bluth vnd vnkhosten deren Musulmannern abgenommene restituere ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 61v-62r.

<sup>671</sup> "... welches er durch ein bereith gehaltenes Fetva oder gesätzmäßige declaration bekräftiget, ein anderer Effendi aber, so vormahls Kasiaskier in Anatolia gewesen, remonstrirte, daß sowohl die gethane proposition alß der von Ihrer mehr höchst-gedachten hoch fürstlichen dhrleicht etc. übersändte brief kheine aigentliche Kriegs Declaration, sondern vill mehr noch hoffnung seÿenzu einer negotiation schreiten zukönnen ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 62r.

to respond with force in defense of Ottoman sovereignty. This measured approach was accepted by all those present at the council.<sup>672</sup>

It was acknowledged that, in the event of an attack, Ottoman forces would be expected to demonstrate their resolve and defend their cause with courage. In preparation for a potential military confrontation, Bostancıbaşı Halil Pasha—despite his recent dismissal and reputation as an aging and coarse individual with little military experience—was appointed Serasker of Belgrade. Additionally, Sarı Ahmed Pasha, the Beylerbey of Rumelia, was appointed as Nişancı<sup>673</sup>, and Kara Mustafa was designated as the Pasha of Corfu. To reinforce the weakened garrison in Belgrade, where many soldiers had previously perished or deserted, the Janissary Agha in Edirne was instructed to dispatch approximately 2,000 troops under his command.<sup>674</sup>

The sipahis who had been dismissed the previous year were recalled to service, and substantial naval mobilization was initiated. A total of 30 frigates, 6 galleons, and 10 warships were launched from the Imperial arsenal in Istanbul and began outfitting for deployment on the Danube. Nonetheless, it was anticipated that neither these vessels nor the military supplies destined for the Mediterranean would reach Demirkapı for at least two months. In sum, the Sublime Porte was engulfed in a state of considerable disarray. Most concerning, however, was the evident lack of adequate preparation to confront the threat posed by the Holy Roman Empire. Of particular strategic importance was the heavy artillery used in the previous year's Morea Expedition, which remained

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<sup>672</sup> "... herentgegen replicirte der Groß Vezier, daß man nicht warthen könne, biß Ihre Kayl:e Maÿt: sich der Ottomannischen Gränitzen bemächtigen, vnd ob zwar seine mainung nicht seÿn derselben den Krieg zudeclariren, so erfordern doch die höchste noth die Ottomannische Armée gegen Belgrad zuziehen, doch aber denen Gränitz Commendanten zuverbiethen die gerinste feindseeligkeit zuverüeben, vnd standhafftig zuwarthen, biß Kayl:er seiths die erste hostiliet verüebet werde, als dann müste man sich bemühen gwalt mit gwalt abzutreiben, welcher lezten mainung dann die ganze versamlung beÿgefallen ist.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 62r-62v.

<sup>673</sup> Sealer or Court Calligrapher. For more information about Nişancı, ERHAN AFYONCU, "NİŞANCI", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/nisanci> (29.01.2025).

<sup>674</sup> "... beÿ dessen erfolg aber ihre Tapferkheit zu beschürnung der gerechten sache zuerweisen, seither hat man dem kurz abgesetzten Bostangi Bahsa Halil Bahsa, welcher zwar ein alter, vnd broutaler allein des Kriegs weesens ohnerfahrner Mann ist, zum Seraskier zu Belgrad, den Sari Ahmed Bahsa Rumili Begler Beg zum Nischangi, vnd den Kara Mustafa zum Bahsa nacher Corfu ernennet, der noch beÿ Adrianopl stehende Jänitscharen Aga aber ist beordert von seinen vnterhabenden Jänitscharen, deren bereiths ein grosse anzahl gestorben, vnd desertirt, in aller eill Sechzehen Oden, so ohngefähr 2000 Mann ausmachen mögen, nach gedachten Belgrad in die Guarnison zuschickhen auch in daß ganze Ottomannische Reich insonderheit in Asia aufs neüe befelch ausgesckhet, daß die Trouppen deren dato wenig oder gar kheine wegen den Stetts anhaltenden rauchen wetter angelanget, beÿ verlust deß lebens ihren marche auf daß möglichste beschleinigen ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 63r-63v.

stationed in Thessaloniki. The transport of this artillery posed significant logistical challenges and financial burdens, despite the Sublime Porte's heavy reliance upon it.<sup>675</sup>

Amid the ongoing diplomatic engagements, Fleischmann chose not to press for an immediate response from the Sublime Porte regarding his request to return to Vienna. Cautious of provoking misunderstanding or exacerbating tensions, he opted instead to observe developments as they unfolded. On 29 April, Fleischmann had informed the Reis Efendi of his report to the Sublime Porte and requested the issuance of the requisite edict for his return. In reply, the Reis Efendi, on behalf of the Grand Vizier, explained that the proposals submitted by the Holy Roman Empire first required consultation with the Janissary Aghas in Edirne, after which a formal response would be formulated. Thus, an immediate reply was not possible, and Fleischmann's departure was deferred. He was instructed to accompany the Grand Vizier to Edirne, where the matter would be further deliberated, and from where a final response would be dispatched to Vienna.<sup>676</sup>

Fleischmann responded by stressing that such delays jeopardized the possibility of successful mediation. He reported that Prince Eugene had issued explicit instructions to deliver this message to the Sublime Porte: if a definitive and credible response to the proposals was not received in Petrovaradin between 10 and 15 May—either through Fleischmann himself or a designated courier—the Empire would consider the silence a breach of peace, and military action would follow, with Imperial forces already mobilized.<sup>677</sup>

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<sup>675</sup> "... vnd auch die vorm Jahr abgedanckhte Spahi wider erscheinen sollen, ferner hat man aus dem hiesigen zeüghauß 30 frequaten, 6 Galleoten, vnd 10 Flaquen ins wasser gezogen, vnd für die donau zuarmiren angefangen, allein werden dieselbe sowohl alß die Tschaiken, auf welche von denen in daß weisse Meer segelfertigen gelegenen Schiffen die dorthin bestimpte Kriegs provision imbarquiert wird] schwährlich vor zwey monath bey der eysernen Porthen anlangen können, in Summa die Ottomannische Porthen ist bey gegenwärtigen vmb ständen vnaussprechlich verwühret, am mehristen aber bekümmert, daß selbige gegen Ihrer Kayl: Maýt: Landen auf kheine weiß mit dem nöthigen versehen, zu dem muß auch Ihre schwäre vorm Jahr in Morea geführte, vnd noch bey Salonik stehende Artilleria, auf welche Selbe sich vor allem verlasset, erst mit grosser mühe, vnd vnklosten herbeygebracht werden ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 63v.

<sup>676</sup> "... wehrenden oben gehorsambst beschribener versamlung, vnd berathschlagung habe in unterthänigkeit für nicht thuenlich befunden bey der Porthen der gebührenden antworth vnd meiner rükhkehr halber eiige instanz zumachen, sondern vill mehr vmb kheine ombrage zuerwecken, vnd die sach nicht auf einmahl zur extremitet zubringen, was die zeit gestatten, vnd daß resultum abwarthen wollen, allein gestern als den 29.ten dits habe bey dem Reis Effendi die antworth auf meinen der Porthen gethannen vortrag vnd endlich respedition Sollicitiren, auch vmb die zu meiner ruckhkehr nöthige Ferman gewöhnlicher massen anhalten lassen, hierauf hat der Reis Effendi in namen deß Groß Veziers mir bedeuëtet, daß an zuvor mit dem bey Adrianopl stehenden Ogiak oder Jänitscharn Oberhängtern über die Kayl:er seiths der Porthen gethanne proposition deliberiren, vnd die darauf verfassende antworth communiciren müste, mithin könte dise verlangte antworth nicht sogleich gegeben, vnd Ich abgefertiget werden, sondern Ich solle mit dem in wenig tügen aufbrechenden Groß Vezier nach gedachten Adrianopl gehen, allda werde man das übrige vernehmen, vnd mich einem antworths schreiben hinausschickhen.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 63v-64v.

<sup>677</sup> "Hierauf ohne Zeit verlust eingewendet, wie daß dise verzögerung der noch vorgeschinnenen gütlichen vermittelung höchst-præjudicirlich, vnd eüer Dhrleicht, Excell: vnd Gnaden mir gnädigst anbefohlen hetten der Porthen

The Reis Efendi, visibly perturbed, responded indignantly. He expressed dismay at what was perceived as an ultimatum and questioned whether the Ottoman Empire, a sovereign power, was being afforded the diplomatic respect it deserved. He pointed out the inconsistency in expecting an immediate Ottoman reply when the Sublime Porte had exercised patience in awaiting responses to its own diplomatic overtures. In a tone of frustration and despair, he claimed that the Sublime Porte had been misled and placed under undue pressure. He reaffirmed that the Ottoman Empire had not initiated any aggression and had issued explicit instructions to its pashas and frontier commanders to refrain from hostile actions. However, he reiterated that a definitive response could not be given until the planned consultations in Edirne were completed. Should the Holy Roman Empire interpret this delay as a pretext for war, the Reis Efendi declared that divine justice would prevail. The Ottoman Empire, he asserted, would not only reclaim any lost territories but might also pursue further conquests, including the recovery of lands previously lost in Hungary.<sup>678</sup>

According to Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier intended to march directly to Belgrade with the assembled Ottoman army. Nevertheless, it was expected that he would remain in Edirne for at least eight additional days, as the cavalry required a 15-day rest period. Consequently, the army was unlikely to depart before the end of May and would not reach Belgrade before the beginning of July. In the meantime, the Ottoman navy remained largely inactive, with portions of the fleet stationed in the Dardanelles and at Yedikule. Fleischmann noted the challenges in adequately staffing the navy with experienced personnel, estimating that it would be at least a month before the fleet was operational. In Istanbul, the economic situation had become dire. The prices of basic necessities—particularly food—had risen dramatically, with many goods costing three to four times their normal

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*vnzuverhalten, das selbste, im fall die über die Ihr Porthen gethanne propositiones verlässlich-vnd sichere antworth nicht geschwind, vnd ohne Zeit verlust, vnd zwar zwischen den 10.ten vnd 15.ten May zu Peterwardein anlenget, vnd geben, auch ich, oder wenigstens der Currier mit desselbigen respediret werde, es für ein ruptur ansehe, vnd darnach daß weithere durch die schon in bewegung begriffene Kayl:e Truppen vorkehren werden.”, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 64v.*

<sup>678</sup> *“Hierauf hat der Reis Effendi ganz alterirter geantworthet, daß man wohl sehr, wohin dises alles hinausgehe, wie daß nemlich Ihre Röml: Kayl: Mayt: bereith die Porthen mit Krieg zuüberfallen, fragend ob mana uf solche arth mit dem Ottomannischen Reich vmbgehe, vnd selbigem in einer so wichtigen sache ein so kurzen termin sezen können, da die Porthen doch auf ihre anfrag so lange Zeit gewarhet, voller zohrn, vnd ganz Desperat ausschreyend die Porthen seye hinters licht geführt, vnd überfallen worden, Sÿe hette khein Zeit verlohren, sondern an alle Bahsa, vnd befelchs haber deren Gränitzen scharffe Ordres ertheillet ruhig zusizen, vnd gegen die Kayl:e nicht das geringste feind seeliges zubegehen, Sÿe könte mehrers nicht thuen, vnd khein aigentliche antworth von sich geben biß Sÿe zuvor schon mir bedeüter massen mit denen beÿ Adrianopl stehenden Jänitschären Hauptern sich berathschlaget, vnd deren aentlichen erklärang halber einig worden, wolten Ihre Kayl:e Mayt: dises für eine ruptur annehmen vnd die Porthen bekriegen, auch einiges Land hinweckh nehmen, so wurde Gott ein Herr aller Kriegs-Herren solches rechnen, vnd Sÿe es mit dessen beÿstand nicht allein widerumb recuperiren, sondern noch mehrers erobern können, was sÿe in Hungarn verlohren, auf dise antworth habe biß 2 Täg gewarhet, vnd dahero lauff seÿn ...”, 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 64v-65v.*

value. Fleischmann observed that daily expenses had quadrupled, and securing feed for horses had become nearly impossible.<sup>679</sup>

Fleischmann added that although the Turks were following him very closely, he continued to make every effort to obtain information about the preparations of the Sublime Porte. One of the last pieces of information he had was that a man called Paul was travelling towards Belgrade with various European troops. It was also established that the Fortress of Niš had not yet been fortified and that this man was in the service of the Dutch ambassador in Vienna. Fleischmann learned that this man, Paul, had been sent by his chancellor, Baron Shafirov, on 31 March from Gdansk<sup>680</sup> to the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul to monitor Russian interests in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Czar in Moscow. The envoy was instructed to explain to the Ottomans on behalf of the Czar that the Venetian Republic had asked for help, but had been repeatedly refused. The Czar had indicated that he wished to keep the peace as long as the Sublime Porte did not take any other step. At the same time, the Netherlands informed the Ottomans that the request of the Venetian Republic to purchase some ships had been refused. Moreover, the Dutch State forbade all its subjects to supply Venice with military vessels, ammunition and supplies in the war against the Ottomans, on pain of their lives.<sup>681</sup>

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<sup>679</sup> "... allermassen gar wenig mit denen Teütschen zuechten lust haben, der Groß Vezier wird mit der versambleten Ottomannischen Armee directé nach Belgrad marchiren vnd schwährlich, da derselbe sich wohl noch acht Täg allhier aufhalten dörrfte, vor ende May von Adrianopl [allwo 15 Täg denen pferden das groß gegeben werden solle] weither abgehen ... mithin kaumb vor anfang Julÿ zu gedachtem Belgrad einlangen, inzwischen ligt die Türckhische Flotta theillß beÿ denen Dardanellen, vnd theillß beÿ denen Siben Thürnen still, vnd scheint, daß dieselbe mit nöthig vnd erfahrlen Leüthen sehr hart werde können versehen, vnd villeicht schwärlich vor einem monath im stand auszulauffen gesezet werden, allhier aber ist schon ein vnbeschreiblich theürung viller notwendigkeiten, insonderheit in denen esß-wahren welche mehren theillß dreÿ biß vier mahl höher alß sonst am preÿß gestigen, wie ich dann von einer Zeit hero selbst in meiner wüthschafft in einem Tag mehr alß vor disem in vier Tügen auszugeben habe, vnd die Fourage vor pferd gar nicht haben kan.", 1 May 1716. ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 65v-67r.

<sup>680</sup> For more information about Gdansk (Danzig), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Gdańsk". Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Jan. 2025, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Gdansk>". Accessed 30 January 2025.

<sup>681</sup> "Obwohln übrighen die von denen Türckhen [so mir biß dato noch kheine wacht zuegeleget, sehr genau observiret werde, habe dannoch mir möglichst angelegen seÿn lassen zu penetriren, was aigentlich mit überbrindern dises für eine beschaffenheit seÿe, warauf ich michtheills meiner noch stetts unterhaltenden Confidenten in gründliche erfahrenheit gebracht, daß selbiger namens Paul bini [dessen sowohl alß anderer vom oben kömbenden außsag nach verschidene Europäische Trouppen im marche gegen Belgrad begriffen, allein Nissa nicht fortificiret ist zwar ein Domesticus deß zu Wienn anwesenden Holländischen Herren Gesandts Hammel Brninz auf ersuechen deß Czaars in Moscau mit briefen von seinem vice Canzler Baron Schaffirof zu Danzig den 31.ten Martÿ hieher an den Hollandischen Podtschaffter [so unter der hand daß Russische interesse beÿ der Porthen beobachtet] abgesändtet worden seÿe, mit ordre auf das er Podtschaffter der Porthen vorstellen möge, wie daß er Czaar in Moscau zwar etlichmahlen von der Republic Venedig ersuchet worden seÿe selbiger zu Succurriren, so hette er dannoch alles abgrschlagen, vnd verlange mit der Porthen solang dieselbe nicht ein anderes thue, den friden vngekränckhter zuhalten, mit gleicher occasion haben die General Staaten der Porthen melden lassen, daß selbe nicht allein die von der Republic Venedig zu erkhauffung einiger Schifen angesuchte erlaubnus abgeschlagen, sondern all Ihren vnterthannen beÿ verlust deß lebens verboten selbiger mit Kriegs-Schiffen muniton lebensmitlen etc. wider die Porthen zudienen ...", 1 May 1716.



This information was partially conveyed by the envoy—through his interpreter—to the Reis Efendi, reaffirming that his government wished to maintain amicable relations with the Sublime Porte. It was noted that these communications were prompted by reports indicating that the Russian minister in the Netherlands had presented the aforementioned intelligence, reflecting the Czar's intentions toward the Ottoman Empire, to the General Assembly of the Netherlands.<sup>682</sup>

#### 4.11. Mavrocordatos' Dubious Alliance Proposal

In his report dated 7 May 1716, Fleischmann recorded that a confidential informant in Istanbul, reportedly acting on behalf of the newly appointed Voivode of Wallachia, Nicholas Mavrocordatos, disclosed that the voivode was prepared to align himself with the Holy Roman Emperor. According to the informant, Mavrocordatos would openly support the imperial cause upon the arrival of the Holy Roman Empire's forces in the region. To verify the credibility of this claim and to determine whether it was a sincere political maneuver or merely part of a broader scheme of Greek intrigue, Fleischmann engaged in direct conversation with the informant. He was assured that the voivode welcomed the opportunity, was prepared to act upon it, and intended to communicate his disposition to the appropriate authorities within the Empire. The informant also proposed to draft a formal letter declaring Mavrocordatos's intentions and to deliver it to Fleischmann for forwarding.<sup>683</sup>

Nevertheless, the informant later declined to proceed, citing the risks posed by his circumstances—specifically, that he could not carry any written correspondence nor transmit it through Wallachian channels. Fleischmann concluded from this episode that dealing with the current leadership in Wallachia and Moldavia—whom he disparagingly characterized as representative of the *Greek faction*—required decisive pressure, as diplomatic overtures alone

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OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 67v-68v.

<sup>682</sup> "... dises alles hat er Podtschaffter heünt durch seinen Dollmätschen Theillsvermittels deß Reis Effendi der Porthen notificiren, vnd Selbe von seithen seiner hohen Principaln aller ferrern aufrichtigen freündtschafft versichern lassen, vnd zwar daß erstern unter dem Vorwandt, alß wan der in Holland stehende Ruhsische Minister die oben gemelte von seinen hohen Principalen respectu der Porthen habende intention denen Herren General Staaten kund gemacht hette.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 68v.

<sup>683</sup> "Es hat mir der von seithen deß neüen Wallachischen fürstens Nicola Mauro Cordato hier stehende Agent in nahmen seines Principalens hinterbracht, wie daß sein fürst bereith stunde für Ihre Kayl:e Mayt: alles zuthuen, vnd bey anruckhenden Kayl:en Trouppen sich für selbe zuerklären; alß ich aber vmb auf den eigentlichen grund zukomben, vnd zusehen, ob ihme also vmbs herz, oder es nur eine Griechische finesse seye? Ihme Agenten bedeütet, wie daß seine mir gemachte proposition lieb zuvernehmen, dahero Ich erbiethig hierzue all-daß meinige zucontribuiren, vnd dise gute intention deß Fürstens eüer dhrleciht, Excell: und gnaden zuberichten, auch den brief ihme Agenten selbst zu weitherer beförderung zubehängen ...", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 70r.

would yield little cooperation. Consequently, he entrusted part of his report to a servant of the Dutch ambassador in Vienna, Bruninx, who had recently departed Istanbul by sea. Fleischmann noted that, given the current state of affairs, it was unlikely he would find another reliable opportunity to transmit such sensitive information.<sup>684</sup> This document reveals Fleischmann's scepticism about the allegiance of the Voivode Nicholas Mavrocordatos to the Holy Roman Empire, and his view that it was merely a Greek trick. At the same time, the distrust of the rulers loyal to the Sublime Porte is clearly visible.

#### **4.12. The Malta Pirates Incident: The Sublime Porte's Ultimatum to the Ambassadors**

In his document dated 9 May 1716, Fleischmann reported that the document in question contained a proclamation issued by the Sublime Porte in Istanbul, the contents of which had been relayed to him by his trusted informants. These confidants had received a significant portion of the funds delivered by the courier Luca and subsequently conveyed the contents of the proclamation to Fleischmann. According to his account, the Ottoman communiqué was replete with misleading and inaccurate information, particularly concerning his own actions and role. Fleischmann asserted that the declaration was strategically crafted to deflect responsibility for the looming conflict from the Ottoman administration, instead attributing blame to the Holy Roman Empire and to himself personally, likely as part of a broader effort to influence public perception. On the preceding day, an Ottoman naval fleet had set sail for the Black Sea. The fleet comprised five large and twenty-five smaller frigates, in addition to ten armed feluccas. However, Fleischmann noted that the crew was poorly equipped and inadequately trained. Concurrently, the Sultan and the Grand Vizier had departed for Edirne. Fleischmann remarked that he could only accompany them if he managed to secure horses and carts, which were being sold at exorbitantly high prices. Once in Edirne, he stated his intention to await, with divine assistance, the first sign of hostilities and the ensuing developments.<sup>685</sup>

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<sup>684</sup> "... hat er Agent sich excusiret, vorgebend beÿ gegenwärttigen Zeiten nicht in stand zuseÿn daß geringste schreiben anzunehmen, vnd über Wallacheÿ zubefördern, waraus dann gnugsamb erhellet, daß mit disen Griechischen Gesindl, vnd Canalien, deren haupter wahrlich die iezige fürsten in der Wallacheÿ vnd Moldau genennet werden können, ohne ihnen daß messer an haß zusezen, nichts zuthuen ist, disemnach übersändte gegenwärttiges unterthänigstes quadruplicat mit dem neulich hier angelangten, vnd über Meer zuruckgehenden Cammerdiener deß zu Wienn stehenden Holländischen Podtschaffters Bruninx, welches zwar langsam einlauffen wird, allein ist mir beÿ gegenwärttigen Zeiten andere gelegenheit zumachen ohnmöglich gewesen.", 1 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 70r-70v.

<sup>685</sup> "Nachdeme ÿberbringer dises wegen contrari-wind biß anjezo aufgehalten worden, alß habe hiemit das von der Porten außgegebene: und mir disen augenblickh von meinen Confidenten welche den grössten theill des durch den Currier Luca empfangene geld bekhomben, communicierte und fast durchgehends, insonderheit in denen mich concernirenden puncten gethanne proposition gegebene antworthen mit allerhand unwahrheiten angefülte von

In the days leading up to his report, Fleischmann also recorded that the Grand Vizier had issued a stern warning to the French, British, and Dutch ambassadors through the senior translators of the Sublime Porte. The warning stipulated that during the absence of the Sultan or other high-ranking Ottoman officials—such as the Grand Vizier—from the capital, no foreign interpreter, merchant, or subject residing in Ottoman territory was permitted to meet with any Ottoman official. The only exceptions were the kaymakam (provincial governor acting in an administrative capacity) and the mautner (customs officer), who were officially tasked with overseeing matters of trade. Any individual found in violation of this directive would be subject to capital punishment. This warning was issued alongside strong condemnation by the Sublime Porte regarding a recent act of piracy, which had further heightened tensions in the region. According to Fleischmann, a Maltese pirate ship had recently landed near Iskenderun<sup>686</sup>, looted some valuables and kidnapped several Ottoman citizens. Following the incident, the Governor of Aleppo ordered the French and British merchant ships then in Iskenderun harbour to use them to arm the Ottoman navy. However, the French and British consuls in Aleppo and the vice-consuls in Iskenderun didn't obey this order. In fact, the captain of a Dutch merchant ship arriving in Iskenderun under the British flag had resisted by drawing his gun against the Ottoman boats and fired a warning shot. The Ottoman troops then withdrew, but the Governor of Aleppo immediately reported the situation to the centre.<sup>687</sup>

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*heüntigen Gubernio bloß allein umb sich beÿ dem Volckh zuentschuldigen, und die Schuld auf den Kayl: Hof, und mich zuwerffen auf Türkheil: arth heraußgegebene manifest [so der Zeit halber nicht interpretiret werden können] gehorst einschließen, und noch unterthänigst beÿmelden sollen, daß gestern die: auf die Donau bestimpte: in 5. Grossen, 25. Kleinen fregaten, und 10 armirten feluquen bestandene Flotiglia [welche sehr schlecht bemannet] auß hiesigem haafen ins schwarze Meer außgeruckhet, heunt aber ist der Sultan, und Groß Vezier gegen Adrianopel aufgebrochen, welchen ich, sobald die zu meiner Reinsnöttige pferdt, und wägen auch umb den excessivesten preÿß haben khan, folgen, und sodann das fernere mit vorgehender erster hostilität sich eüsserende mit Göttl:er hilff abwarthen werde ...", 9 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 72r-72v.*

<sup>686</sup> For more information about Iskenderun (Alexandretta, Scanderoon), Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Iskenderun". Encyclopedia Britannica, 9 Oct. 2023, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Iskenderun-Turkey>". Accessed 31 January 2025.

<sup>687</sup> "... in dessen hat der Groß Vezier vor gestern denen hier stehenden französisch- Engelländisch: und Holländil: Botschafftern durch der Porten ober Dollmätschen bedeüthen lassen, in abwesenheit der Porten kheinen ihrer Dollmätschen, kauffleüth oder anderen Nationalen außßer zu dem Kaimacam, vnd Mautner [beÿ welchen Sie aigentlich ihrer Kauffartheÿ-Sachen halber zuthuen hätten, unter der Straff erdapet, und gehenckhet zuwerden, zu einem anderen Türkchen zugehen, und wenigkeiten außzuforschen; ingleichen hat sich jüngsthin eraignet, daß ohnweith Scandron ein Maltesicher Corsar aus Land gestigen, und nebst einigen Habschaffen verschidene Türkchen hinweckh genohmen, hierauf hat der Bahsa zu Allepo denen alda stehenden französ: und Engelländischen Consulen anbefohlen, ihre damahls im Haafen zu Scandron gestandene national schiff herzugeben die Türkchen zuarmiren, umb gedachten Malthesischen Cosaren zuübergwältigen, worgegen sich aber sowohl die gedachte Consules von Aleppo, und die Vice-Consules zu Scandron als insonderheit die Capitain eines: unter Engelländil: Flaquen dahin gekhombenen Holländischen Kaufmanns schiff sich wider die auf khleinen fahrzeug gegen Ihme gekhommene Türkchen ins gewehr gesezt, und bereiths ein blinden Stuckh schluß gethann, hierauf haben sich die Türkchen zuruckh gezogen, und der gedachte Bahsa von Aleppo alles hiehero berichtet.", 9 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, 72v-73r.

In response, the Grand Vizier summoned the three translators (dragomans) of the French, British and Dutch ambassadors to his office and informed them in a harsh and arrogant manner of the Sublime Porte's requests. According to Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier made the following explicit demands to the ambassadors:

1. the immediate dismissal of the French and Dutch consuls in Aleppo,
2. the punishment of the vice-consuls in Iskenderun,
3. the immediate release of the Ottoman citizens kidnapped by Maltese pirates.

If these demands were not fulfilled, the Grand Vizier said that he would expel all consuls, even ambassadors, from Ottoman territory. Not content with this, the Grand Vizier told the ambassadors that the Ottomans regarded the Germans and Venetians as open enemies, but the French, British and Dutch were acting as secret enemies and spies. He also claimed that these countries were secretly doing their best to harm the Ottoman Empire. According to Fleischmann, the Grand Vizier had made a similar harsh speech to the secretary of the French embassy, who delivered the official proclamation sent by the French King to the Sublime Porte.<sup>688</sup>

#### **4.13. The Report of Merchant Theodor from Petrovaradin**

Theodor, a merchant from Ladjarek (Lačarak – Sremska Mitrovica), arrived from Intschiko (6 hours south of Belgrade) on 4 July and provided some crucial informations. According to the report, he had seen the Pasha in Semendire with a force of about 6,000 to 7,000 men at Nova Sella<sup>689</sup>, 2 hours from Belgrade. Meanwhile, Tatar troops had re-entered Niš<sup>690</sup> and work had begun on building

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<sup>688</sup> "Disemnach gestern der Groß Vezier. Deren obbemelten französöl: Engelländisch: und Holländischen Bottschaffter 3. Dollmätsche zu sich rueffen, vnd ihnen dises factum in gar hochmüethig: und krächlichen terminis verweißen lassen, absolut begehrend, daß der französöl:e und Holländische Consul zu Allepo abgesetzt, und die Vice Consules zu Scandron gestraffet, auch die durch gemelte Malthesl: Cosaren hinweckhgenohmene Türckhen restituiret wurden, widrigen fahls wolte Er Groß Vezier alle Consules, ja die Bottschaffter selbst aus dem Ottomannil: Reich verjagen, anfüiegend, daß die Teütsche, und Venetianer der Porthen öffentliche, sie aber heimliche feind, und Spionen seÿen, welche, wan sie khönnen, unter der hand derselben schaden zuefüegen; Ein eben dergleichen harten Discurs hat der Groß Vezier gestern, als dem französöl: Canzler des Sultans antworth schreiben auf die: von dem König in franckh reich gethanne notification behändiget wurde, gehalten.", 9 May 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 73r.

<sup>689</sup> For more information about Nova Sela, "[https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/Nova\\_Sela,\\_Kula\\_Norinska](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/Nova_Sela,_Kula_Norinska)". Accessed on 31.01.2025

<sup>690</sup> For more information about Niš, Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Niš". Encyclopedia Britannica, 3 Dec. 2024, "<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nis>". Accessed 1 February 2025.

a bridge over the Danube at Vischnitza. 100 Ottoman soldiers guarded the workers building the bridge.<sup>691</sup>

A contingent of 400 men dispatched from Belgrade to the Drina River was initially ordered to assist in the construction of a bridge. However, this directive was subsequently rescinded, and the unit was recalled and placed on standby in anticipation of the Grand Vizier's arrival. In the meantime, supply vessels continued to arrive daily in Belgrade, where they were promptly unloaded. Despite this ongoing logistical activity, there were no reports indicating the arrival of Ottoman galleys or frigates.<sup>692</sup>

The imperial envoy Mr. Fleischmann arrived in Smederevo<sup>693</sup>, but was instructed to be well guarded and await the arrival of the Grand Vizier.<sup>694</sup>

On the opposite bank of the Danube, opposite Belgrade, the island fortifications were completed and 8 large cannons were placed inside. A firing test was carried out with these guns as far as Zemun<sup>695</sup> and was successful. However, it was observed that there were only 60 soldiers in the fortification. The Ottomans had intended to send 7 ships loaded with flour up the Danube 6 days earlier, but this order was cancelled by the Grand Vizier. The Serasker in Belgrade had sent 70 Hungarian cavalry to the villages in the Ottoman area and these troops were on daily patrol. Theodor stated that he had personally observed these patrols yesterday. About 3 weeks earlier, the Serasker had sent a spy to the Imperial border to follow his operations. The spy was an Ottoman named Hussein, born in a village on the Danube near Belgrade, aged 28-30, with a black beard and speaking

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<sup>691</sup> "Ein Kaufmann von Ladjarek namens Thodor kombet an heünt alß den 4 ten Julÿ von Intschiko, so 6 Stund unterhalb Belgrad liget, vnd berichtet. Daß er den Bahsa, so zu Semendria gewesen, zu Nova sella 2 Stund von Belgrad mit seiner Mannschafft ohngefähr 6 biß 7000 Mann starckh angetroffen, vnd gesehen: zu Nissa waren indessen wider einige Tartarn eingeruckhet, vnd zu Vesnicza seÿen schon alle anstalten zu schlagung einer Schiffbruckhen über die Donau gemacht worden, vnd hatte er solches selbstn gesehen, an welcher sÿe würckhlich arbeitethen, vnd 100 Türckhen darbey die wacht hielten.", 4 July 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 129r.

<sup>692</sup> "Die 400 Mann, so von Belgrad aus nach der Drina seÿnd geschickhet worden vmb die alda stehende bruckhschiffe die Sau herab zu convoyiren, hatten andere ordres erhalten, vnd waren sogleich nacher Belgrad zu ruckh berueffen worden vmb erstlich deß Groß-Veziers ankunfft alda abzuwarthen. Es komben täglich einige Provianth-Schif alda an, welche alle soforth ausgeladen würden, auch wäre alda noch nicht daß geringste zuhören, daß einige Türckhische Gälleren oder Fregatten ankomben solten.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 129r.

<sup>693</sup> For more information about Smederevo, "<https://www.smederevowelcome.com/life-and-fun/history-of-smederevo>". Accessed on 01.02.2025.

<sup>694</sup> "Der Kayl: herr Resident seÿe bereiths zu Semendria angelanget, vnd müste er alda wohlbewacht den Groß Vezier abwarthen ...", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 129r-129v.

<sup>695</sup> For more information about Zemun (Zsemblin), "<https://eyesonbelgrade.com/en/belgrade-tips/story-of-zemun>". Accessed on 02.02.2025.

Hungarian. He had already crossed into Habsburg territory two or three times before and had reported to the Serasker.<sup>696</sup> Theodor's report also referenced two Greek merchants, Jacko and Banajod, who had not traveled as far as Sofia or Plovdiv but had remained in the vicinity of Niš. According to their account, neither the Grand Vizier nor the Janissary Agha had yet reached Niš. It was reported that the two officials had been en route for seventeen days. While some rumors suggested that the Grand Vizier and the Janissary Agha were currently in Sofia, the precise timing of their departure remained uncertain. Meanwhile, a dispatch received in Belgrade the previous Thursday claimed that both figures had, in fact, reached the Niš area. Nevertheless, the exact size of the Ottoman military force remained undetermined. According to what these two merchants had heard in Greece, in Larissa and Yenice-i Karasu<sup>697</sup>, the Ottoman army that year would not be as strong as the previous year. There was no information about the Ottoman troops from Asia and Egypt.<sup>698</sup>

Numan Pasha, who had previously served as a commander in Belgrade, initially expressed reluctance to accept his appointment as Governor of Anatolia and commander of the Asian provincial forces. According to Fleischmann, Numan Pasha's hesitation stemmed from his belief that the ongoing war had been initiated at a legally and politically inappropriate time. Nonetheless, he was ultimately compelled to accept the assignment and was ordered—reportedly for the third time—to proceed to Niš alongside the Grand Vizier, accompanied by all available troops capable of

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<sup>696</sup> "... die gegen Belgrad über gelegene Insul Schanz seye schon würcklich fertig, vnd mit ohngefähr acht stuckhen [mit welchen sye probiret, ob sye biß Zsemlin darmit schiessen könnten, so auch seinen gewünschten zwerkh erraichet] versehen, vnd wie er in derselben gewesen seyn, hette er nicht mehr dann Sechzig Mann wahr genohmen. Die Türckhen seyen zwar willens gewesen vor 6 Tagen Siben bletten mit meehl beladen die Sau hinaufzubringen, sye wären aber von dem Groß Vezier contramandiret worden. Der Seraskier zu Belgrad hatte 70 Husaren ausgeschickhet, welche zu 10 vnd 12 in denen Türckhischen Syrmien ligenden dörrfern patrouilliren müsten, es geschähe auch solches täglich, vnd hette er es gestern annoch gesehen; Vor 3 wochen ohngefähr seye von Seraskier ein Khundschaftter herüber geschickhet worden vmb Vnsers thuen, vnd lassen zuobserviren, welcher ihme sehr wohlbekant vnd wäre derselbe von etwas langer statur, schön von gesicht ohngefähr 28 biß 30 Jahr alt, hat einen schwarzenbarth, traget ein Hungarisches Kleid von duckhen weissen tuch, ist ein gebohrner Türckh, redet Hungarisch, heisst Hussein, vnd ist aus ein ohnweith Belgrad an der Sau gelegenen dorf, diser seye schon zwey biß dreymahl auf vnserer seithen gewesen, vnd allzeit habe er den Seraskier khundschaftt zuruckgebracht.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 129r-130r.

<sup>697</sup> For more information about Yenice-i Karasu (Genisea), MACHIEL KIEL, "YENİCE-I KARASU", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, "<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/yenice-i-karasu>", (31.01.2025).

<sup>698</sup> "Zwey an heünt alß den 4ten Julij aus Griechenland gekombene Khauffleüth namens Jacko vnd Banajod sagen aus, daß sye zwar auf Philippopoli, vnd Sophia nicht komben, sondern nur auf Nissa vmb obgemelte örther herumgangen, da dann weder der Groß Vezier, weder der Jänitscharn Aga noch nicht zu Nissa gewesen, vnd solches biß an heünt der 17te Tag ware, doch aber hatten sye alda gehöret, daß sye beyde annoch mit ihren Trouppen sich zu Sophia befandeten, sye hatten aber nicht erfahren können, wan gedachter Groß Vezier, vnd Janitscharn Aga in selbiger gegend eintreffen würden, zu Belgrad seye vergangenen Donnerstag die Post eingeloffen, daß sich der Groß Vezier, vnd Janitscharn Aga in selbiger gegend Nissa sich würcklich befandeten, wie starckh aber deren Armeé seye, wäre ihnen vnbechant, doch hetten Sye zu Jenischer oder Larissa in Griechenland gehöret, daß die Türckhen dises Jahr nicht so starckh alß vor einem Jahr seyn wurden; Von ankunfft deren Asiatischen oder Aegyptischen Trouppen hatten Sye gleichfallß nichts gehöret.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 130r-130v.

bearing arms. Upon arrival, the advancing Ottoman forces encountered Pasha of Sofia stationed near Niš with an estimated force of 20,000 men. Approximately 2,000 tents had been pitched in the area, with reports indicating that each housed between five to eight Janissaries, suggesting a substantial military presence.<sup>699</sup>

In Vračar, near Belgrade, Mehmed Pasha—who had served as the Governor of Anatolia the previous year—was present with a contingent reportedly numbering 4,000, though other accounts suggested the figure may have reached 6,000. He had formerly been posted in Smederevo and had brought his horses to graze in the region. The merchants accompanying the Imperial envoy stated they had traveled from Niš over the course of three days. However, the envoy was ordered by the Sublime Porte to return to Smederevo, where he and his entourage were placed under Ottoman protection. While granted freedom of movement within Smederevo, he was strictly prohibited from leaving the city.<sup>700</sup>

The Ottoman garrison in Belgrade was estimated at approximately 20,000 soldiers. While supply and ammunition ships arrived daily, there were no confirmed sightings of Ottoman war galleys or chaikas arriving in the area. The anticipated arrival of additional warships from the lower Danube remained uncertain. In Vischnitza, all materials required for constructing a bridge over the Danube had been assembled, though work had yet to commence. A similar situation prevailed in Zemun, where construction materials for a bridge over the Sava River were on site, but the project had not yet begun.<sup>701</sup>

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<sup>699</sup> *“Der vorlezt gewesene Seraskier zu Belgrad Numan Bahsa hatte zwar anfangs die charge eines Anatoli Bahsa oder gouverneurs in Asien, vnd general über die Asiatischen Trouppen nicht annehmen wollen, sinthemahln der ieizige Krieg vnrechtmässig auch kheines weegs zu rechter Zeit angefangen worden wäre, hette aber doch dieselbe entlich acceptiren müssen, vnd bereiths den dritten befelch bekommen mit allen dem, was nur Waaffen tragen könnte sich beÿ dem Groß Vezier einzufinden zu Nihsa hetten sÿe den Sophier Bahsa mit etlich 20000 Mann angetroffen, vnd hatten sÿe ihre augenmaaß nach die aldortige Zelter auf 2000 in deren jede 5, 6 biß 8 Janitscharn wohnen müsten.”*, 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 130v-131r.

<sup>700</sup> *“Zu Vratschar unweith Belgrad ware der vorm Jahr gewesene Anatolier Pascha Mehemed, welcher vorhin zu Semendria gestanden, und die Pferd alda weiden lassen, mit 4000 Mann [so einige auf 6000 vergrößerten angekomen]. Obbemelte Kaufleuthe sagen, daß sie mit dem Kaiserlichen Residenten von Nissa aus 3 Tag reiß gegangen, worauf die ordre von der Porthen gekommene, daß er auf Semendria zurückgehen solle, allwo er auch dermahln nebst seiner Hofstaat mit einer Türckhischen wacht befindlich, und wäre ihme zwar erlaubet in gedachtem Semendria herumb abernicht heraus zu gehen.”*, 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 131r.

<sup>701</sup> *“Die Guarnison zu Belgrad belieffe sich ihrer mainung nach auf 20000 Mann, allwo dato kheine Tschaikhen, vnd Galleren vorhanden oder angekomen hingegen arrivirten täglich einige Prouianth vnd Munitions-Schiff, wie vill aber Tschaikhen vnd Gälleren von unten herauf annoch komben solten, wüsten sÿe nicht zu Vischnitza seÿen schon alle Dumbascen beÿ handen vmb eine schifbruckhen zuschlagen, an welcher sÿe aber noch nicht angefangen; Ingleichen seÿen zu Zsemblin auch bereiths alle Dumbascen zu einer bruckhen über die Sau beÿsamben gebracht, wäre aber eben so wenig, also an der zu Veschnitza angefangen.”*, 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180,

#### 4.14. Fleischmann's Arrest Near Belgrade & New Bridges Over Danube

After all the negotiations were completed, the Sublime Porte immediately issued a series of orders to prepare for war against Austria. Meanwhile, Fleischmann waited silently and watched the negotiations come to an end. However, since no official response was received from the Ottoman Palace, he sent a message to the Reis-ül Küttap asking for the Ottoman response to the Austrian demands and the return arrangements prepared for him. The Reis-ül Küttab sent a response to Fleischmann on behalf of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, and reported that the Austrian demands and the delivered letter had also been forwarded to the Janissary corps in Edirne, and that a response should be prepared together with this unit. Fleischmann was also told that the Grand Vizier would be heading to Edirne in a few days, and that he could follow him and receive the official response from the Sublime Porte in Edirne.<sup>702</sup>

Fleischmann stated that Prince Eugene of Savoy had written to him that if the Ottomans did not respond directly to the Austrian demands at Petrovaradin between May 12-15, Austria would consider this as a declaration of war and that the Austrian army, which had already mobilized, would act accordingly. Upon this objection, the Reis-ül Küttab became extremely angry and said that he could not respond before the time specified by the Ottomans. In the meantime, the Grand Vizier and Ottoman government officials departed for Edirne. Fleischmann followed them.<sup>703</sup>

On May 24th Fleischmann was summoned to the Ottoman camp and was met with a very hostile reception. The Grand Vizier drew the sword at his side and said that the sword was now the only intermediary between the two empires. Thereupon Fleischmann immediately left Edirne and

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Konv 3, fol. 131r-131v.

<sup>702</sup> "Nachdeme man nun durch aus über dießes d'accord ware, so hat man allda gleich in instanti einige Ordres ausgegeben, womit man sich in standhaffte Kriegs-Verfassung wider die Kayßerliche setzen solte. ... dieser Ministre liesse ihm im Nahmen des Groß Vezirs sagen, daß seine gethanene Ausserungen sowohl, als der übergebene brief dem zu Adrianople stehenden Janitscharen Corpo communiciret, und auch mit selber die Antwort, so zugeben seye, überleget werden müßte. Er Fleischmann solte sich gleich nach dem Groß Vezir, welcher in weniger Tagen dahin aufbrechen wurde, auch dahin begeben, um sofort alda die Antwort zuempfangen", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 127r-127v.

<sup>703</sup> "Fleischmann wendete dagegen- ein daß Prinz Eugenius ihme geschrieben, daß wann auf die gethanene Erklärung die Antwort der Pforten nicht alsogleich, und zwar zwischen den 12 und 15 Maji zu Peterwardein oder durch ihne selbst, oder wenigstens durch den Courier zurückeintreffen solte, man es vor eine Ruptur ansehen, und darnach daß weitere durch die schon in bewegung begriffene Kayl: Waffen vorkehren wurde. Auf dieße Einwendung ware der Reis Effendi, ließe sagen, man könnte nicht ehender, als schon gesaget worden, eine Antwort geben, ...Indessen brache der Groß Vezir mit dem ganzen Ministerio von Constple nacher Adrianople-auf und bezoge also das ausgesteckte laager; Fleischmann folgte ihme dahin-nach.", ÖStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, 127v-128r.



set off for Vienna. However, when he reached the village of Kollar near Belgrade, he was ambushed by about 500 Ottoman Sipahis and imprisoned in Smederevo Castle on June 24th.<sup>704</sup>

A diplomatic communication dated 4 July 1716, sent from Stari Slankamen, reported that Fleischmann had been detained by a group of Sipahis while traveling within a day's distance of Belgrade. He was subsequently escorted back to Smederevo and confined in a tower, while the members of his retinue were released. The Ottoman authorities reportedly stated that should compensation be paid for damages incurred along the Sava River, Fleischmann would be permitted to resume his journey without further obstruction.<sup>705</sup>

A day's march from Belgrade, a pasha named Omar, one of the Sultan's personal servants, was stationed with 6,000 sipahis. Furthermore, according to information from a spy, the Grand Vizier would certainly arrive in Belgrade in 7 to 8 days with a large army. This army would include 12,000 Tatar soldiers. The Turks also said that when the Grand Vizier arrived he would take Fleischmann with him. A total of 18 Ottoman soldiers were on guard in Stara Pazova<sup>706</sup> (Surduk).<sup>707</sup>

On July 5, a spy report<sup>708</sup> came from Petrovaradin, showing an Ottoman camp in a valley about two hours away from the Danube, with a hill to its left. This was the camp previously located

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<sup>704</sup> "Wo dann den 24 Er Fleischmann vor den Groß Vezir in das laager beruffen, und auf die feindseeligste Art abgefertiget wurde. Fleischmann wendete freylich seine Wohlredenheit an, vorstellend: Er hoffe, daß durch seine vermittlung die Sache in freundschaftt beygelegt könnte werden; allein der Groß Vezir zoge den neben seiner gelegenen Säbel aus, und sagte, es seye keine andere vermittlung zwischen beyden Reichen mehr als der Säbel ...Fleischmann reißete sofort von Adrianople wegg, in Meynung nacher Wienn sich zubegeben, als Er aber 10 Stund herwärts Belgrade ohnweit dem Dorf Kollar eingetroffen, wurde Er von ohngefehr 500 Spahis, welche ihne allda erwarteten, umrungen und den 24 Juny nacher Semendria in die gefängens gebracht ...", OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 128v-129r.

<sup>705</sup> "Es dienet zur nachricht, daß der herr von Fleischmann nur noch eine Tag reiß vom Belgrad gewesen, alß 50 Spahi ihn verarrestiret, vnd zurukh nach Semendria in einen Thurn geführet, seine Leüthe aber seyen alle frey, vnd wendeten die Türckhen vor, daß wo man ihnen ihren schaden an der Sau bezahlen wurde, solte selber vngehindert seine reyse prosequiren können.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 131v.

<sup>706</sup> For more information about Stara Pazova (Surduk), "<https://starapazova.rs>". Accessed on 01.02.2025.

<sup>707</sup> "Ein tagreiß von Belgrad stunde ein Bahsa namens Ammar ein Cammer Herr vom Groß Sultan mit 6000 Spahi, auch sagte mir mein Khundschaftter, daß die red seye, wie der Vezier ohnfehlbahr innerhalb 7 oder 8 Tügen mit einem grossen Corpo, worunter 12000 Tartarn nacher Belgrad zustehen komben solle; die Türckhen sagten auch, daß selber alß dann den Herrn Residenten mit dahin nehmen werde: zu Surduk Stunden noch in allem 18 Türckhen auf der wacht.", 4 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 131v-132r.

<sup>708</sup> "Peterwardein den 5ten Julij 1716 Mein Khundtschaftter, so den 4ten Julij zurukhgekommen, ist den 3ten huius in dem Laager unter Wellika Sella gewesen, vnd meldet, daß gedachtes Laager 2/4 Stund von der Donau seye in einem grund, vnd habe zur linkhen seithen eine anhöche: dises Laager wäre selbiges, so zu Semendria gestanden, vnd würde von einem Bahsa commandiret; gedachter Bahsa truge seinen namen von dem Land, wo Er gouverniret, vnd heisse Turillia Bahsa, welcher ehemahln in Türckhischen Landen ein Rauber gewesen, würde sonsten auch Czervenka Bahsa genant: Seine Trouppen bestünden in 4000 Mann sambtlich zu pferd, er hette sonst weder Infanteria, noch Artilleria

in Smederevo, and commanded by a pasha. The pasha in question bore the name of the region he ruled. It is stated that he was formerly a bandit in Ottoman territory, but later received the title of pasha. He was known as Czervenka Pasha. He was a middle-aged man, had maintained good order, and was loved and praised among the soldiers. His wife was the sister of the Grand Vizier. His unit consisted entirely of 4,000 mounted men. He had no infantry or artillery, and no camels. All the loads were loaded on mules. These units were transported by sea. Food supplies had previously been transported to this unit by ship, but it was reported that supplies had to be made from Belgrade at that time.

The informant also reported on the ongoing construction of the bridge over the Danube at Vischnitza. The bridge was being erected on wooden piles, with lengths measuring 11 fathoms on one side and 20 fathoms on the other. According to the report dated 4 July, construction had officially commenced the previous day. Ships were to be dispatched from Belgrade to support the effort; these vessels were intended to serve as floating platforms connected to the bridge's wooden pile structure across the two banks. Eleven such ships had already been assembled and were scheduled to depart for Vischnitza on 5 July. The informant noted that the site was unguarded, staffed only by bridge workers, and while he could not confirm a specific completion date, he estimated that the bridge would be finished within approximately eight days.<sup>709</sup> Simultaneously, all available Romani laborers, blacksmiths, and carpenters were engaged in manufacturing nails and related materials for the new bridge over the Sava River. Once completed, this bridge was reportedly to be dismantled, transported to Vischnitza, and installed there. The old bridge was in the process of being taken apart, with one half reconnected to the Belgrade bank and the other half to the opposite shore at Zemun.<sup>710</sup>

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*beÿ sich, auch kheine Camelle, sondern seine Bagage bestunde oder wäre auf lauther mauleslen geladen: dise Troupen seÿen alle über daß Meer herüberkomben, vnd wäre der Bahsa von mitlmässigen Jahren, halte gute ordre, wurde geliebt, vnd gelobet, sein weib wäre deß Veziers leibliche Schwester: Auf denen Schiffen hette man disem Corpo daß Provianth nachgeführt, jezo aber solleten sÿe es von Belgrad ab.*", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 132r-132v.

<sup>709</sup> "Der Khundschaftter meldete auch, daß zu Vischnitza von diser seithen die Brückhe über die donau schon biß 11 Klaffter lang auf lauther pflöckhen oder pfosten errichtet, vnd von der andern seithen ebenfallß biß 20 Claffter gebauet worden, vnd habe man gestern bereiths den anfang daran gemacht, wornach sodann von Belgrad aus die nöthige Schiff hinunter geschickhet sollen werden, vmb sich andurch an die bruckhen, so von beeden Uefern mit pfosten gemacht, anzufügen zu dem ende habe man würckhlich gestern 11 schiff zusamben gestossen, welche man morgen nach gemelten Visniza hinunter würde einnen lassen, beÿ der bruckhen zu gedachtem Visnicza wäre khein wacht, sondern nur die Schif arbeits Leüthe darbeÿ, wie bald aber solche fertig werden, wuste Er nicht, Er vermeinte aber innerhalb acht Tügen", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 132v-133r.

<sup>710</sup> "Alle zigeiner, Schmid vnd Schloßser verfertigen nägl zu der neuen Sau bruckhen, die alte solte verbleiben, vnd wan

The spy reported that he had heard some people in Belgrade say that the Grand Vizier had set out from Niš. However, it was rumored that the Vizier would not be able to reach Belgrade before the harvest, or that he would not arrive, because he was waiting to prevent damage to the agricultural crops. Last Tuesday, the Ostružnica<sup>711</sup> Pasha had passed through Belgrade with about 2,000 soldiers and moved towards the Sava River. This was the point where the Habsburg troops had built a bridge during the siege of Belgrade and was about an hour's drive from Belgrade.<sup>712</sup>

Fortification works on the island known as *Insul Schantz* had been completed, with several cannons already positioned there. It was reported that the Serasker would also be stationed on the island as of 5 July. The defensive position was surrounded by wooden palisades and reinforced with an earthen breastwork (*Brustwehr*). Notably, Christian prisoners were prohibited from participating in the construction; only Ottoman subjects were permitted to work on the site.<sup>713</sup>

The Ottoman pasha stationed near the Sava River reportedly lacked artillery and had been instructed not to engage in any hostile action until the arrival of the Grand Vizier. In the interim, two Ottoman chaikas (armed riverboats) remained positioned near the bridge, equipped with cannons. While the exact size of the force accompanying the Grand Vizier and the Janissary Agha was unknown, rumors suggested that a substantial military contingent was expected.<sup>714</sup>

Fleischmann remained in custody in Smederevo, although he had since been moved from confinement in a tower to a house. No definitive information was available regarding the reasons

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*die neue würde verfertigt seyn, würde man solche nach Wischniza rinnen lassen, alwo sye gebraucht werden solte, die alte wäre zertheillet, worvon die helfften an Belgrad vnd die andere an der Sembliner seithen angehenkhet.*", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 133r.

<sup>711</sup> For more information about Ostružnica (Ostrusnita), "<https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:531829-Ostruznica-srce-srpskih-ustanaka>". Accessed on 02.02.2025.

<sup>712</sup> *"Zu Belgrad hette Er gehöret, daß ein theill von denen Leüthen gesagt hetten, daß der Groß Vezier von Nissa aufgebrochen, vnd daß Er vor dem schnitt nicht anruckhen könte, oder wurde, damit daß geträyd, vnd andurch daß Land nicht runiret wurde ... Verwichenen Diensttag wäre der Bahsa von Ostrusnita Belgrad mit ohngefähr 2000 Mann passiret, vnd hette seinem marche an die Sau [allwo die Kayl:e ihre bruckhen gehabt, alß sye Belgrad belagert] genohmen, dises möchte etwan 1 Stund von Belgrad seyn ..."*, 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 133r-133v.

<sup>713</sup> *"... heunt wurde die Insul Schantz fertig, auf welche etwelche stuckh dahin gepflanzet worden, allwo sich der Seraskier heünt selbst noch logieren werde, selbste ist verpallisadiret, vnd mit einer aufgeworffenen brustwehr versehen, es dörrfte khein rätz in die schanz zur arbeith, sondern nur lauther Türckher ..."*, 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 133v.

<sup>714</sup> *"... der Bahsa an der Sau hette khein stuckh beÿ sich, vnd solten vor ankunfft deß Veziers kheine hostiliteten angefangen werden, zweÿ Tschaikhen stünden mit stucken versehener beÿ der Sau-Schifbruckhen: Wie starckh der Groß Vezier, vnd Jänitscharn Aga aber weiß er nicht, er hette aber gehöret daß vill volckh komben würde."*, 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 133v.

for his continued detention or the timeline for his release. Speculation varied: some attributed the delay to Habsburg Colonel Petrasch's interference with the Ottoman bridgeworks, while others believed it was due to the pending decision of the Grand Vizier. Fleischmann had managed to send two letters via a Janissary courier bound for Petrovaradin. However, the courier was intercepted, executed by strangulation, and his body disposed of in the river. Following this incident, the informant reported that two additional individuals were also executed, though the reasons for their deaths were not disclosed.<sup>715</sup>

On the same day, the Habsburg artillery units with their leader moved in the direction of Raška<sup>716</sup> from Irrick. Upon this movement, the Ottomans immediately dispatched 600 soldiers to the region and took the necessary security measures. Serbian and Bulgarian peasants were carrying large amounts of wood for the bridge the Ottomans planned to build in Vischniza. On the other hand, cattle traders in Serbia were taking their animals to Bulgaria and Zemun to protect them.<sup>717</sup>

#### **4.15. Reports of The Spies and Fleischmann's Effort to Communicate with Vienna**

A significant report concerning the movements of the Ottoman army was provided by a spy named Jacsa Angelith, a coachman from Pechka, who had been embedded with the Ottoman forces since Christmas. His account, dated 5 July 1716 and written in Petrovaradin, offers detailed insight into the army's logistical movements and preparations. Angelith initially served as a coachman transporting an Ottoman qadi from Belgrade to Sofia. During this time, approximately 150 wagons were forcibly detained by Ottoman authorities in Sofia, and he was subsequently taken to Istanbul along with the rest of the convoy, where he remained for approximately six weeks.<sup>718</sup>

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<sup>715</sup> "der herr Fleischmann wäre annoch zu Semendria, vnd hette aniezo ein Hauß bezogen man hette Ihme aber nicht sagen können, wan er koben oder warumb er aufgehalten wurde, theillß vermainten wegen deß herrn obristen Petrasch hintergestelter rinnung ihrer brückhen theillß aber glaubten biß zur auskhunfft deß Groß Veziers: Wie ich heünt schon berichtet, daß der Herr v: Fleischman einem Jänitschärn zwey briefe behändiget solche anhero zu überbringen, vnd solchem Jänitschärn nachgestellt, attrassiret, stranguliret, vnd ins wasser geworffen worden, so meldet der Kundschaffter, daß deren zwey hingerichtet worden." 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 133v-134r.

<sup>716</sup> For more information about Raška (Racta), "<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Raska>". Accessed on 02.02.2025.

<sup>717</sup> "Eben selbigen Tag, alß herr Obristleüthenandt Von Irrickh aufgebrochen, vnd mit denen Stuckhen nacher Racta seinen marche genohmen, seynd 600 Mann von denen Türckhen vmb gute obhuet zutragen, alsobald dahin commandiiret worden; Es führeten auch die Sirmier, vnd Bulgarer bauren daß benöthigte bruckhen-holz nacher Wischniza starckh zue, die Ochsen handler in Sirmien aber Salvirten ihr Viech in Bulgarien, vnd Semblin.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 134r.

<sup>718</sup> "Aussag eines Khundschaffters namens Jacsa Angelith; welcher ein führmann von Petschka, vnd beÿ der Türckhischen Armee seith weÿnachten gewesen mit seinem wagen, Peterwardein den 5.ten Julÿ 1716. Diser Khundschaffter hat den Türckhischen Cadi von Belgrad biß auf Sophia gebracht, vnd weillen man eben damahln biß

Following his detention, Angelith secured a position within the Ottoman army's supply caravan and departed from Istanbul with the advancing forces roughly sixty days prior to his report. His travel itinerary was recorded with notable precision: the first night was spent in Küçükçekmece, followed by successive nights in Büyükçekmece (four hours' distance), Silivri (four hours), Çorlu (six hours), Kılıçlı (Kalischda, six hours), Babaeski (four hours), Havsa (six hours), and Edirne (four hours). The army encamped in Edirne for twelve days, where the Sultan remained during this period.<sup>719</sup>

The Ottoman army (Grand Vizier, Janissary Agha, Cebecibaşı etc.) was stationed in Edirne for 12 days, while the Sultan remained there. Departing from Edirne, the Ottoman army travelled for 5 hours to Musa Pasha Bridge (Çuprija), where there was a large stone bridge over the Maritsa (Evros) River. The army then marched to Harmanli (5 hours), then to Sonchia (4 hours), then to Semisch (3 hours), then to Papazli (5 hours) and finally to Plovdiv (6 hours). They stayed in Plovdiv for 10 days.<sup>720</sup>

The Ottoman army reached Tatar Pazarcık (Pazardžik - 4 hours), then Saranova (2 hours), then Samokov (6 hours) and Ichziman (6 hours). In Samokov a bridge over the Recka River was crossed, then through the forested Nowakowa Planina region to Yenihan (3 hours) and then to Sofia (3 hours). The stay in Sofia lasted for 7 days. If the Grand Vizier marched at a pace of 3-4 hours a day, he could reach Belgrade from Niš in 9 days. Neither in Vischnitza nor in Zemun had any bridges been built yet, but all the necessary materials were ready.<sup>721</sup>

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150 Wägen mit gwalt zu Sophia weckhgenohmen, wäre Er auch unter disen gewesen, vnd mit denen andern nacher Constantinopl geführet worden, allwo Er 1-1/2 monath verbleiben müssen ...", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 134r-134v.

<sup>719</sup> "... vnd sodann alß ein Kayl:er fuhrmann zur Bagage aufgenommen worden, worfür man ihme Täglichs einen Solota gezahlet, mit der Armeé wäre Er alß dann vor etlich vnd 60 Täg von Constantinopl abgangen, da daß erste nachtlager Malil Czekmecz 3 Stund von dar gewesen, daß andere zu Veliko Czekmecz ohngefähr vier stund von dem ersten, daß dritte zu Silibria 4 Stund von dem anderen, daß vierte zu Tschorlio 6 Stund von dem dritten, daß fünffte zu Kalischda 6 Stund von dar, daß Sibende zu Baba 4 Stund von dar, daß achte zu Habsa 6 Stund von dar, daß 9te zu Adrianopl 4 Stund von dar gewesen ...", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 134v.

<sup>720</sup> "... allwo auch der Sultan verbliben, die Armeé aber wäre nebst dem Groß Vezier, Jänitschärn Aga Czebeczy Aga, Topgi Aga, vnd Czerkaczy Bahsa 12 Täg daselbst gestanden, von dar selbe auf Muhsa Bahsa Czupria 5 Stund von dar, allwo eine grosse steinerne bruckhen über die Mariza befindlich, vnd von dannen auf Harmanlia 5 Stund von dar, sodann auf Sonczia 4 Stund von dar, dann auf Semischce 3 Stund von dar dann auf Papasla 5 Stund von dar, dann auf Philipopoli 6 Stund von dar marchiret, allwo sye 10 Täg lang verbliben ...", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 134v-135r.

<sup>721</sup> "... von dar aber auf Tatar Bazarczik 4 Stund von dar, dann auf Saranova 2 Stund von dar, dann auf Samukowa allwo ein bruckhen über die Recka, so ein nicht gar groß aber schnelles wasser befindlich 6 Stund von dar, dann auf Ichziman 6 Stund von dar durch den walt Nowakowa Planina dann auf Jenichan 3 Stund von dar, dann auf Sophia 3 Stund von dar marchiret, alwo sye sich biß Siben tåg aufgehalten ... Wan der Groß Vezier kheine marche von 3 biß 4 Stunden machte, könte Er von Nissa den 9.ten Tag zu Belgrad eintreffen. Weder zu Vischniza noch zu Szemblin ware noch kheine brukhe geschlagen gewesen, aber alles wäre darzue in bereithschafft verhanden.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 135r-136r.

About an hour before the report was written, a Greek merchant from Belgrade had reached Irrickh to inform him that the Pasha, who had been in Smederevo four days ago, had arrived at Vischnitza (where a bridge was to be built across the Danube) with 1800 cavalry. Pasha had sent his infantry to Raška, but the merchant could not give any precise information about the number of infantry.<sup>722</sup>

The merchant, relying on information from another source, stated that the Janissary Agha was expected to arrive in Belgrade within six days, commanding a force of 40,000 men. Four days thereafter, another 40,000 Tatar cavalry were anticipated. Finally, by mid-July, the Grand Vizier was expected to reach Belgrade with an additional 40,000 troops, potentially bringing the total Ottoman force to approximately 120,000. Construction of the bridge over the Sava River was underway, with twenty ships already linked to form part of the crossing. However, work on the Danube bridge at Vischnitza had yet to commence. In Belgrade, only three armed chaikas (small Ottoman warships) had arrived; no frigates or larger galleys were present at the time.<sup>723</sup>

Upon the Grand Vizier's arrival in Belgrade, a strategic council was convened to determine the operational plans for the campaign.<sup>724</sup>

Two nights prior to this report, a Janissary assigned to guard the Habsburg envoy Fleischmann in Smederevo was executed in Belgrade and his body was discarded in the Danube. This Janissary had attempted to act as a spy, having traveled some distance toward Habsburg territory. He was eventually captured by Ottoman soldiers, and two letters were discovered concealed in the sleeve

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<sup>722</sup> "Peterwardein den 5.ten Julij 1716. Ein vor einer Stund aus Belgrad angelangter Griechischer Kaufman zu Irrickh meldet, daß vor 4 Tagen der zu Semendria gestandene Pascha mit 1800 pferden zu Wischniza [wo die bruckhen über die Donau soll geschlagen werden] angekommen, seine Infanteria habe Er gegen Racta hinüber geschickhet vmb auf obhuert zu seyn, wan Vnser Laager etwas tentiren solte; Wie starckh aber gemelte Infanteria seye? Hat er mir nicht wissen zusagen.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 136r.

<sup>723</sup> "Sonsten habe Er gehöret, daß in 6 Tagen der Jänitscharn Aga mit 40.000 Mann ankomben solle beÿ Belgrad, wohin ihme in vier Tagen darauf 40.000 Tartarn folgen würden vnd leztens gegen den halten Julij der Groß Vezier selber mit noch 40.000 Mann, so in allen 120.000 Mann betrageten. An der Sau bruckhen arbeithe man starckh, vnd solten schon zwänzig Schiff an einander gehanget seyn, an der donau bruckhen aber beÿ Wisniza wurde nicht gearbeithet. Von Fregatten, vnd Gallern seye dermahln noch nichts zu Belgrad, sondern nur dreÿ armirte Tschaickhen.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 136r.

<sup>724</sup> "Beÿ ankunfft deß Groß Veziers wurde ein Divan gehalten, vnd in selbigen die operationes zu khünfftiger Campagna beschlossen werden.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 136v.

of his uniform. Upon learning that the letters had been authored by Fleischmann, the Janissary was summarily executed.<sup>725</sup>

According to the report<sup>726</sup> of two Greek spies named Jovan and Kosta dated 6 July 1716, a war council was to be convened in Belgrade with the arrival of the Grand Vizier, where a decision would be made on whether to pursue peace or war with Austria. The total strength of the Ottoman army was expected to reach approximately 200,000 men. The army was planned to consist of 40,000 from the Grand Vizier, 40,000 from the Janissary Agha, while the remaining forces would be made up of the Topçubaşı's troops and the Cebeci corps. Although the bridge over the Sava River had not yet been completed, the pontoons to be used in the construction of the bridge had been prepared.

There were only 12 bridge ships for the Danube bridge at Vischnitza. Therefore, new bridge ships were being built in Belgrade and at least one was completed every day. The larger bridge ships on the Drina could not be used because they could not be brought down the river.<sup>727</sup>

The Pasha in Smederevo was now camped at Nova Sella, near Belgrade, and his army numbered no more than 1800 men.<sup>728</sup>

The Austrian representative to the Ottoman Empire, Resident Mr. Fleischmann, remained in custody in Smederevo and was expected to accompany the Grand Vizier to Belgrade. On the preceding Thursday, a Janissary who had served—and continued to serve—as Fleischmann's

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<sup>725</sup> "Vorgestern nachts ware ein Jänitschar [so zu Semendria die wacht beÿ Herrn Fleischmann hat pflegen zuhaben] zu Bellgrad stranguliret worden, vnd in die donau geworffen, Selbiger hette sich durch practiciren wollen, vnd wäre würckhlich schon ein gut stuckh wegs von Belgrad gegen Vnserer seithen gewesen, man hette ihme aber nachgeschickhet, vnd attrassiret, vnd weillen in dem ermel deß belzes beÿ ihme 2 Brief gefunden worden, mit welchen der Hr: Resident Fleischmann ihne geschickhet hette, wäre Er derentwegen, wie vorgemeldet, hingerichtet worden.", 5 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 136v.

<sup>726</sup> "Zweÿ Griechen von Belgrad namens Jovan vnd Kosta sagen aus den 6.ten Julÿ 1716. Daß man zu Belgrad aniezo redete, daß, sobald der Groß Vezier alda ankomben, man einen Divan oder Kriegs Rath halten, vnd darnach sich zaigen wurde, ob mit denen Teütschen Krieg oder friden zuhoffen seÿe, Gedachter Groß Vezier seÿe vor 7 Täggen zu Nissa angelanget, vnd solte alda sich 10 biß 12 Täg aufhalten, sodann aber seinen marche nacher Belgrad antretten woselbst Er, wan Er deß Tags 6 Stund marchiret, in 10 Täggen eintreffen könte, vnd bestunde die Armée in allen etwa in 200.000 Mann, indeme der Groß Vezier 40.000; der Jänitscharn Aga 40.000 vnd die Gebeci Topci, vnd Cercazi Agen ihre Trouppen auch besonders führeten, über die Sau beÿ Semblin wäre zwar noch kheine bruckhen fertig, iedoch die Dumbascen darzue schon zusamben gebunden.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 137r.

<sup>727</sup> "... worzue die aus der Drina gekombene kleinere employiret würden, zu der bruckh über die Donau beÿ Vischnitza aber wären nicht mehr alß 12 bruckhschiffe verhanden, daher zu Belgrad an neüen gearbeitet, vnd täglich wenigstens eines fertig würde, weillen sÿe ihre in der Drina stehende grössere bruckhschiffe nicht herunter bringen könten.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 137r-137v.

<sup>728</sup> "Der Bahsa, so beÿ Semendria gestanden, vnd aniezo zu Novosella ohnweith Belgrad campiret wäre nicht mehr alß 1800 Mann starckh.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 137v.

bodyguard was apprehended while attempting to deliver correspondence to Petrovaradin. The Janissary was described as distinguished in appearance, possessing a black moustache and a prominent beard on his upper lip. Upon learning of the incident, the Serasker summoned the Janissary, ordered him to surrender the letters in his possession, and instructed him to remain until further notice before proceeding to Petrovaradin. The Janissary complied, handed over the letters, and departed for Zemun. However, before reaching his destination, he was intercepted by two other Janissaries acting under orders. They returned him to the Serasker, who ordered a thorough search. During this search, two additional concealed letters were discovered. The Janissary was immediately executed by strangulation, and his body was cast from the fortress wall, reportedly with a gunshot.<sup>729</sup>

#### 4.16. Colonel Petrach's Letter: Plans & Strategies

In a letter dated 6 July 1716, Colonel von Petrasch reported from Brod to the Imperial War Council that he had received confidential intelligence from Gradiška and Brod. According to this information, the Pasha of Bosnia was advancing with several thousand troops toward Brod. In response, Colonel Petrasch hastened his own military operations and, by 4 July, had reached the upper frontier region approximately three miles from Gradiška.<sup>730</sup>

The frontier guards had been mobilized and were stationed at preassigned positions. However, intelligence<sup>731</sup> gathered by a spy dispatched by Petrasch revealed that both Ottoman commanders had intended to advance toward the Sava River but were unable to mobilize their full

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<sup>729</sup> "Der Kaiserliche Resident befandete sich noch zu Semendria, vnd wurde mit dem Groß Vezier nacher Belgrad heraufkomen, derselbe hette vergangenen Donnerstag einen Jänitscharn, welcher beÿ dem vorigen Residenten, vnd auch beÿ disem Jahsakci oder wacht ware, vnd einen schwarzen mustaz oder ober barth hatte, auch sonst ein hibscher feiner Kerl ware mit briefen heraufgeschickhet, vmb solche nacher Peterwardein zuüberbringen welchen dann der Seraskier sogleich vor sich komen lassen, vnd ihme gesaget, daß Er ihme die brief überlifern, vnd zurucklassen solte, sodann Er schon auf Peterwardein gehen könnte, welches auch der Jänitschar zufriden ge-wesen, dem Seraskier die brief eingehändiget, vnd sich sogleich nach Szemblin überführen lassen, wohin ihme aber alsobald zweÿ Jänitscharen gefolget, ihne angehalten, vnd zum Seraskier zuruckhgeführt, woselbest Er genau visitiret, vnd darbeÿ noch zweÿ oben in den emblen steckhend beÿ ihme gefunden worden, darauf derselbe soforth abgeführt, vnd stranguliret worden, auch hierbeÿ, wie gewöhnlich, ein stuckhschuß von der Vestung beschehen.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 137v-138r.

<sup>730</sup> "Aus dem an den Kayl:en Hofkriegs-Rath von dem Obristen von Petrasch aus brodt von 6 Julÿ 1716 erlassenen schreibens. Sonsten ist in meiner heraufrais von Ratscha die Kundschaft von Gradiska und brodt eingelauffen, daß der Bascha aus Bosnien mit einigen Tausent Mann gegen brodt, aus welcher ursach ich dan meine rais dergestalten beschleuniget, daß den 4.ten schon in der oberen gräniz bis dreÿ Meÿl weeg von Gradiska angelanget.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 141r.

<sup>731</sup> "Die granizer waren bereiths in denen angewisenen posten versamlet; da aber mein ausgeschikhter Kundschaffter mir die verlässliche nachricht gebracht, daß die zweÿ Baschen zwar den obbemelten march an die Sau projectiret, aber mit Leuthen nicht aufkommen können, dahero Sie auch nur die posten am Saustrohn mit einiger Mannschafft verstärcktet, so hab die leuth zu ihrer arbeits mit dem befehl gehen lassen, daß sie jederzeith bereith seÿn sollen, auf erste ordre wider zu erscheinen.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 141r-141v.



forces. As a result, they had only marginally reinforced their positions at Saustrohm. Consequently, Petrasch allowed his troops to resume regular duties while ordering them to remain on high alert for immediate redeployment if necessary.

The Imperial defensive arrangements were strategically constructed to discourage or withstand any attempted Ottoman assault. In particular, the position at Raška had been fortified to a satisfactory degree. Furthermore, with the water level in the Saustrohm River gradually receding, construction of the defensive water ditches—planned by Petrasch—was progressing steadily. These fortifications aimed to ensure that the river could be crossed only by watercraft, thereby restricting Ottoman mobility. Colonel Langlet and other senior officers reportedly expressed strong approval of the engineering efforts undertaken under Petrasch's direction.<sup>732</sup>

Colonel Petrasch stated that he saw with certainty that a large military contingent could not be assembled in Bosnia before the new harvest because of the shortage of bread. According to him, the Sublime Porte only wanted peace until the harvest was completed, which was likely to be at most 14 days. Moreover, an Ottoman village of 10 households in the upper part of Babina Greda<sup>733</sup> had already sided with the Emperor, and other villagers close to Saustrohm had similar intentions. For the time being, however, the villages were heavily defended, with two inhabitants from each village taking turns in the trenches as a guarantee for those who remained.<sup>734</sup>

Additionally, Colonel Petrasch reported that the inhabitants of the upper frontier region had expressed a willingness to pay tribute to the Emperor if such a measure would prevent their lands from being plundered. This offer, however, was limited to the older Bosnian settlements and did not include recent settlers from Dalmatia. While Petrasch affirmed his capacity to provide protection to

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<sup>732</sup> "Sie Posten aber seynt also bestellet, daß die Türkhen so leicht nichts tentiren werdtten können, sonderlich da der Posto zu Ratscha sicher genug gestellet, vnd der Saustrohm, ie länger ie mehr fallet, auch die von mir proiectirte wasser-körb nach und nach geworffen werdtten, wordurch diser flus nur vaser seiths zupassiren seyn wirdt: Es hat herr Obrist Langlet, und alle anweesende hhl:n: officiers dise körb, deren in meiner anwesenheit einige geworffen, vor sehr guth approbiret.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 141v.

<sup>733</sup> For more information about Babina Greda, "<https://babinagreda.hr/>". Accessed on 04.02.2024.

<sup>734</sup> "Ich finde noch beständig das in bostnien aus mangl des brodts vor der neüen Erndte kein sonderliches Corpo zusamben gezogen werdtten kan, und daß die hochhlöbliche:n Nachbarn nur so lang den friden wünschen, biß sie die Endte eingebracht haben werdtten, welches in 14 Tagen wohl geschehen kan; Oberhalb Babina Greda ist ein Türkisches dorff von 10 Häuser auf unsere seithen übergangen, und seynt die übrige unweith des Saustrohm gelegene eben des willen, werdtten aber dato nicht allein sehr starck bewacht, sondern von jedem dorff wechselweis zwey der besten haußgesessenen in den Schanzen als bürgen der übrigen aufbehalten.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 141v-142r.

these populations, he informed them that the matter of tribute would be addressed at a more appropriate time.<sup>735</sup>

#### 4.17. Fleischmann's Detention Conditions

On 10 July 1716, an informant named Craia reported that he had departed from Petrovaradin the previous Sunday and arrived in Smederevo the following day. During his two-day stay in Smederevo, he lodged at a tavern where the Imperial envoy, Mr. Fleischmann, was regularly provided with wine by the Ottoman authorities. While there, Craia inquired whether one of Fleischmann's servants might be permitted to deliver a letter addressed to the envoy by Baron von Löffelholz.<sup>736</sup>

At that time, Fleischmann was confined within a small fortress in Smederevo, while his attendants were held separately in an underground dungeon. Initially, the envoy and his entourage had enjoyed relative freedom of movement within the town. However, following the apprehension and execution—by strangulation—of a Janissary who had attempted to deliver Fleischmann's letters to Belgrade, restrictions were drastically increased. On Sunday, Fleischmann and 33 members of his retinue were imprisoned within the castle tower.<sup>737</sup>

During their confinement, the prisoners were issued 63 ounces of wine for a two-day period and received a daily ration of one and a half ounces of bread per person. The informant subsequently

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<sup>735</sup> "Die gegen der oberen gräniz offeriren sich auf iedesmahliges begehren Ihro Kayl: Majl: den tribut zugeben, umb von der plinderung befreÿet zuseÿn, welches nur von denen alt possessionirten Bosniaken nicht aber von denen neÿen aus Dalmatien angesetzten zuverstehen ist, ich vertröste sie noch allezeit mit der protection. was aber die contribution anbelanget, da habe ihnen bedenthen lassen, daß hiervon zureden noch dato keine zeith ist, und werdten Sie künfftig hierauf die verlangte antworth erhalten.", 6 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 142r.

<sup>736</sup> "Aussag eines Kundschaftters von Irreck namens Craia den 10ten Julÿ 1716. Selbiger ist vergangenen Sonntag von Peterwardein abgeraiset und Montags darauf zu Semendria angekommen, alwo er sich zwei Tag bei dem wüthi wo Er Kayl:e Resident seinen wein [welches allezeit durch die Türkhen geschihet] hollen lasset, aufgehalten, umb zuversuchen, ob etwa einigen von seinen bedienten den von mir Baron von Löfflholz an besagten herrn Residenten mitgegebenen brief einzuhändigen die gelegenheit haben könnte ...", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 143r.

<sup>737</sup> "... welche Er dem gedachter herr Resident in dem kleinen schlössl zu Semendria, seine bediente aber in der Temniz unter der Erden sich eingesperter befindeten, und wäre zwar nur erwehnter herr Resident anfangs zu Semendria nebst seiner Suite freÿ herumb gegangen, da aber der Jenige Türk, welche derselbe mit briefen herauf geschikhet, zu Belgrad entdekhet, stranguliret und in die Donau geworfen wordten, seÿe der Herr Resident sontags darauf in gedachtes Schlössl oder Thurn sambt seinen bedienten, welche in 33 Personen bestunden, in die unterirdische Temniz eingesperret worden ...", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 143r-143v.

traveled to Vischnitz, where he observed that, on both sides of the Danube—particularly in shallow areas—bridge pilings had been driven into the riverbed and planks were already being laid.<sup>738</sup>

The pasha who had escorted Fleischmann from Niš to Smederevo was reportedly stationed approximately ninety minutes south of Belgrade with a force estimated at no more than 4,000 men. Upon completion of the Danube bridge at Vischnitz, it was anticipated that 12,000 Tatar cavalry would be deployed across the river by Ottoman forces and directed toward the Imperial frontier.<sup>739</sup>

Meanwhile, no additional troops had arrived in Belgrade. According to the informant's sources, the Grand Vizier remained in Niš. Moreover, construction of the bridge over the Sava River had not yet commenced, and work on fortifying the strategically located island was still underway.<sup>740</sup>

Contrary to reports suggesting the arrival of the Janissary Agha with a substantial force near Belgrade, the informant categorically denied the claim, going so far as to offer his own life as a guarantee of its inaccuracy.<sup>741</sup>

On August 10, when the Austrians defeated the Ottoman army at Petrovaradin, Fleischmann was released and taken to Belgrade. Eventually, Fleischmann was released for good and allowed to return to Austria. He arrived safely in Vienna in mid-December 1716. Fleischmann's return to Vienna was a great event. The Emperor received him with a formal reception, and during the night ceremony, the people welcomed him with burning torches.<sup>742</sup>

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<sup>738</sup> "...welchen auf zwey Tag 63 Oka wein vor ihre bezahlung gegeben wird, und nächst disem bis 1 ½ Ocka brodt einem jeden des Tags geraicht würdte, von dar wäre er gestern auf Vischniza kommen, alwo er gesehen, des von beyden seithen der Donau, wo solche seicht ist, die pfaller zu der Schiffbrukhen eingeschlagen, und die latten bereiths darauf gelegt wordten ...", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 143v.

<sup>739</sup> "... der Bascha, so den Kayl:en Residenten von Nissa nach Semendria convoyet, und anietzo 1 ½ Stund unterhalb Belgrad stundte, solle nicht stärker als 4000 Mann seyn, so bald aber die brukhen zu Veschniza geschlagen, solten 12.000 Tartarn der Türkhen vorgeben nach dieselbe passiren, und dise seithen herübergehen ...", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 144r.

<sup>740</sup> "... übrigens wäre indessen kein Volck zu Belgrad ankommen, auch hätte er gehöret, daß der Groß Vezier noch zu Nissa befindlich seye, man hätte auch noch nicht angefangen, über die Sau eine brukh zuschlagen, an der schanz aber auf der Insul werde noch immer gearbeithet.", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 144r.

<sup>741</sup> "P.S: Da ich dises überlesen, habe denselben noch ferner examiniren lassen, weillen die heutige und gestrige Kundshafft gegeben, daß der Janitscharen Agha ohnweith Belgrad mit einiger Manschafft angekommen seyn solle, welcher aber solches beständig Verneiret, und seinen Kopf darüber zu pfand gesezet.", 10 July 1716. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 3, fol. 144r.

<sup>742</sup> "... woraus ihne den 10 Augl: nach der bey Peterwardein erfolgten glücklichen Action die damahls nach dem Todt des Groß Veziers Ali Bahsa, welchers in dieser Action geblieben, insgesamt Ad interim regirte Bahsen, durch den in Person dahin geschickten Ciausch Bahschi, Ciauschlar Kiatibi, und Ciauschlar Emini samt 20 Ciauschen nebst einer

## 5. Conclusion

This study conducts a comprehensive analysis of Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic relations through the examination of the correspondence of Anselm Franz von Fleischmann, the Habsburg internuntius to the Ottoman Empire, with the Vienna War Council, the Habsburg border commanders, and the other European state officials between 1711 and 1716. Fleischmann's reports serve as a pivotal primary source, offering critical insights into not only the official interactions between the two empires but also the Sublime Porte's foreign policy perspective, its diplomatic protocols concerning European ambassadors, and the broader mechanisms governing Ottoman foreign diplomacy.

Fleischmann's correspondence reveals a consistent and structured transmission of intelligence from the Sublime Porte to the Vienna War Council (Aulic War Council). As previously noted, these reports encompass critical information regarding Habsburg-Ottoman relations, particularly during periods of heightened tension caused by the Ottoman Prut Campaign, the Venetian-Ottoman War, and the occupation of the Morea. Furthermore, Fleischmann offers detailed observations on the personalities of leading statesmen at the Sublime Porte, their political rivalries, the internal balance of power within the palace, and the strategies employed by the Ottoman administration in its engagement with the West.

The second chapter of Fleischmann's reports centers on the Ottoman-Russian War (Prut Campaign) of 1711. Compared to subsequent sections, this portion is noticeably more limited in volume. This scarcity is likely attributable to the fact that, as Kurat has mentioned<sup>743</sup>, the intelligence sources available to Talman, the then-resident Habsburg diplomat in Istanbul, and Fleischmann, who was dispatched to monitor the war directly in Isaccae, largely overlapped.<sup>744</sup> Additionally, at that time, Fleischmann held the position of embassy secretary and had not yet assumed the role of

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*starcken Convoys auf eine sehr honorable Arts abholen, und nacher Belgrade bringen lassen; allwo Er zwar auf gehalten und eng verwachet, jedoch sehr höflich tractiret worden; dennoch wurde ihm Fleischmann erlaubt, einen Courier nacher Wienn zuschicken. So den 2, 8bris von Belgrade dahin abgefertiget worden ist. Endlich hat Fleischmann soviel zuwegen-gebracht, daß Er des arrestes entlassen, und ihm erlaubt worden; nach den Kayl: Hof sich zubegeben; demzufolge ist Er auch den 29 samt allen denen seinigen von Belgrade aufgebrochen, und den, 9bris zu Peterwardein glücklich eingetroffen, wovon Er noch den nemlichen Tag dem Hof Parte gegeben, und mit dessen Erlaubnuß nacher Wienn aufgebrochen, endlich in Mitte des Monats Decembris 716 in Wienn glücklich eingetroffen ist, wo Ihme zugestanden worden, zu Ihrer Kayl: Majt: publicé zur Audienz zureiten, und zwar, weil ihm die Stundt Spats gegeben worden, haben ihn brennende fackeln begleitet.”, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1716-1717, Kt. 181, Konv 1, fol. 129r-129v.*

<sup>743</sup> Kurat 1951; 25.

<sup>744</sup> 14 September 1711, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1710-1713, Kt. 179, Konv. 1, fol. 161r-162v. Hurmuzaki 1878; 114-122.

minister plenipotentiary (Internuntius), which may have further constrained his access and reporting capabilities.

It is particularly noteworthy that some of Fleischmann's dispatches to Vienna contain encrypted passages. A close examination of these coded sections reveals that they pertain to sensitive military and political intelligence, including the movement of Ottoman military forces and the amount of the money paid by the Russians to Ottoman Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha and his close circle prior to the commencement of peace negotiations following the Ottoman-Russian War. This underscores that Fleischmann's reports extended beyond the scope of conventional diplomatic correspondence, encompassing critical insights into military operations and the internal socio-political dynamics of the Ottoman Empire.

Fleischmann's reports constitute a principal primary source for this period, offering detailed accounts of the Ottoman-Russian War, the subsequent diplomatic negotiations, and the policies adopted by King Charles XII of Sweden and his entourage during their asylum in the Ottoman Empire.

The third chapter of Fleischmann's reports focuses on the Ottoman-Venetian War, which began in 1714 and extended until 1718, when Austria entered the conflict. As previously noted, this segment contains the highest volume of reports authored by Fleischmann, and it is particularly notable for its level of detail and analytical depth. This increase in reporting quality and quantity can be attributed to Fleischmann's promotion to the position of Internuntius and the concurrent development of his independent intelligence network during his tenure at the embassy in Istanbul.

In this phase, Fleischmann's correspondence covers a wide range of topics, including Vienna's diplomatic efforts to prevent the outbreak of war, the renewed alliance between Venice and the Habsburg Monarchy, the Sublime Porte's formal declaration of war, Sultan Ahmed III's concerns regarding internal rebellion, and the Ottoman military campaigns in the Morea. Notably, the information conveyed in Fleischmann's dispatches aligns closely with contemporary accounts by authors such as Diedo, Ferrari, and Mauvillon, suggesting a high degree of consistency between Habsburg diplomatic intelligence and contemporary European narratives of the conflict.

The fourth chapter of this study addresses the process leading to Austria's entry into the war and highlights a significant transformation in the diplomatic dynamics of Ottoman-Habsburg relations. Fleischmann's reports from this period are of particular value, as they document the shifting diplomatic framework between the two empires following the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699)—

a treaty that redefined the European balance of power and elevated Habsburg influence in the region.

In the aftermath of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Empire adopted differing diplomatic postures toward Poland, Venice, and Russia, as opposed to its approach to the Habsburg Monarchy. The Ottomans viewed the territorial concessions and privileges granted to these states not as permanent losses, but as reversible setbacks, to be rectified when political and military conditions became favorable. However, as Fleischmann's correspondence reveals, the Sublime Porte appeared to deliberately avoid provoking conflict with the Habsburgs, pursuing instead a cautious and diplomatically restrained policy aimed at maintaining peace.

This restraint is particularly striking given that the Habsburg Monarchy was deeply engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession, a protracted conflict that might have rendered it vulnerable to an Ottoman offensive. Despite this strategic opportunity, the Ottoman leadership prioritized military action against Russia and Venice, likely influenced less by geopolitical preference and more by internal considerations. As suggested in Fleischmann's reports, Sultan Ahmed III may have feared that a potential defeat against the Habsburgs could trigger internal unrest or even a dynastic crisis, including the possibility of deposition. Therefore, the choice of adversaries appears to have been driven by a pragmatic calculation of political stability rather than any sentimental attachment to the territories lost to Russia and Venice.

It is particularly significant that Fleischmann's reports detail the diplomatic behavior of the Sublime Porte, especially during his interactions with the Reis-ül Küttap and, more notably, the Grand Vizier, in the context of the Ottoman-Venetian War and the Habsburg Empire's offer of mediation. According to Fleischmann, the Ottoman leadership frequently employed delaying tactics in these discussions, seemingly to gain time and avoid committing to a definitive stance.

Fleischmann recounts that during an early meeting with Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha, concerning the Empire's offer to mediate between the Ottomans and Venice, the Grand Vizier responded with a harsh and confrontational tone, even bordering on threatening language. However, in subsequent meetings—particularly those addressing the Venice-Habsburg alliance—the Grand Vizier adopted a markedly different tone, engaging in more conciliatory and diplomatic dialogue, emphasizing the importance of maintaining cordial relations between the two empires.

Following the Sublime Porte's declaration of war on Venice, Ibrahim Agha was dispatched to Vienna with the objective of persuading both Emperor Charles VI and Prince Eugene of Savoy of the

justification for the Ottoman war effort. Fleischmann, drawing on his intelligence network, had previously informed Vienna that Ibrahim Agha's journey would likely be prolonged, indicating a calculated attempt by the Ottomans to buy time and present the conflict as a *fait accompli* before substantive diplomatic engagement could occur.

Notably, a reciprocal strategy was employed by Vienna during Ibrahim Agha's return journey. Based on Fleischmann's repeated warnings that the Habsburg Empire would be the next target after Venice, the Vienna War Council deliberately sought to delay Ibrahim Agha's return, aiming to ensure Fleischmann's safe departure from the Ottoman Empire in the interim.

In this context, Fleischmann's correspondence stands out as a critical primary source, offering valuable insights into the evolving balance of power, the strategic use of diplomatic rhetoric, and the function of intelligence-gathering within both the Ottoman and Habsburg imperial administrations. These reports underscore the sophisticated interplay of diplomacy, subterfuge, and timing that characterized early 18th-century interstate relations.

Fleischmann's reports constitute a valuable source for understanding not only Ottoman imperial diplomacy in the early 18th century, but also the internal dynamics of the Sublime Porte, particularly the character profiles of high-ranking statesmen and the moral and institutional decline within the Ottoman administrative and military apparatus. When examined through the lens of social history, these reports reveal widespread discontent across both the military elite and the general populace, suggesting a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction with the empire's trajectory.

This climate of unrest and institutional deterioration appears to have facilitated Fleischmann's ability to establish a network of informants within both the palace and the army. His correspondence frequently refers to the lavish gifts and financial inducements he was required to offer in exchange for sensitive information—requests that prompted him to seek increased funding from Vienna. Through these interactions, Fleischmann provides detailed insights into the dispositions and motivations of Ottoman officials. Notably, he cultivated a close and mutually beneficial relationship with the Reis-ül Küttap, a key bureaucratic figure, from whom he acquired substantive intelligence about inner workings of the Ottoman state.

Beyond such alliances, Fleischmann portrays many officials in the Sublime Porte as self-serving, materialistic, and driven by personal gain. His characterization of Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha is particularly telling—depicting him as a despotic and ruthless figure, intolerant of opposition and willing to eliminate anyone who posed a threat to his authority. Of particular interest is

Fleischmann's observation regarding the financial frailty of the Ottoman treasury, especially in the context of the Venetian campaign. He notes that the campaign was financed not through traditional state revenues but by confiscating the wealth of disgraced pashas, a practice indicative of the state's desperate economic conditions.

The fourth chapter of this study also highlights Fleischmann's frequent reports on the increasing financial demands he faced in the preceding years, offering indirect but telling commentary on the broader economic hardship affecting Ottoman society. Moreover, his repeated warnings to Vienna—urging the Habsburg court to take strategic advantage of the Ottoman Empire's economic and military vulnerabilities—reflect a keen awareness of the empire's structural weaknesses. Fleischmann viewed these conditions as indicative of an imminent imperial decline, and he advised Vienna to act decisively during this moment of fragility.

Ultimately, his critiques of corruption, particularly within the Ottoman administrative and military ranks, proved to be prescient. In retrospect, the observations recorded in his reports anticipated the progressive weakening of Ottoman power, and likely played a role in informing Habsburg military and diplomatic strategy. Thus, Fleischmann's assessments can be seen not only as diagnostic of Ottoman internal decay, but also as instrumental in shaping Habsburg responses at a pivotal moment in regional geopolitics.

When analyzed through the lens of Discourse Analysis<sup>745</sup>, Fleischmann's reports reveal not only their informational content, but also the linguistic tone, rhetorical strategies, and diplomatic positioning that shaped their construction. This methodological approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of how language functions as a tool of power, persuasion, and representation within the context of early 18th-century diplomacy.

The tone employed by Fleischmann offers important insight into his perceptions and intentions regarding the Ottoman Empire. His reports display a cautious yet subtly critical style, characterized by rhetorical markers that both convey intelligence and hedge its epistemological reliability. Phrases such as "it seems" and "according to my informants" illustrate a careful balancing act: asserting the value of the information while maintaining diplomatic prudence and acknowledging the limitations of his sources.

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<sup>745</sup> For simplified illustrations of the analysis of Fleischmann's reports & correspondence, see Appendix 11 and Appendix 12.



Furthermore, the rhetorical tone shifts markedly when Fleischmann discusses the Ottoman administration. In these instances, his language becomes more emotive and evaluative, frequently employing terms such as “*Feindt*” (enemy), “*Barbarens*” (barbarians) or “*Türkische Grausambkeit*” (Turkish Tyranny). These word choices serve dual purposes:

1. They work to legitimize his critique of Ottoman inefficiency and moral decline, particularly in relation to military and administrative structures.
2. They reveal the tension between Fleischmann’s subjective perceptions and the constraints of his formal diplomatic role.

This interplay between subjectivity and diplomacy aligns with Foucault’s Discourse Theory, which holds that power is exercised and transmitted through language.<sup>746</sup> Fleischmann’s rhetorical positioning, therefore, is not merely descriptive but performative—shaping how the Vienna War Council would interpret Ottoman intentions and internal dynamics.

An especially telling feature of Fleischmann’s discourse is the dual attitude he adopts toward Ottoman elites. While he is often severely critical of high-ranking officials—especially those perceived as corrupt or ineffective—he is equally willing to praise individuals who cooperate with him or provide useful intelligence. This rhetorical flexibility suggests a form of strategic adaptability in his diplomatic communications, wherein praise and criticism are deployed selectively to reinforce Habsburg strategic interests.

Fleischmann thus emerges in his reports as both a participant and observer, whose narratives are shaped by personal judgments as well as institutional expectations. His tendency to express subjective and emotionally charged evaluations, and to praise or condemn the Ottoman administration in accordance with how its members advanced his mission, and his writings that include the victimized narrative of Christians – Christian protectionism – places his writings within a historiographical tradition that emphasizes Habsburg superiority, rational justification, and imperial legitimacy.

In conclusion, Fleischmann’s reports can be characterized as employing a confirmatory and explanatory discourse, yet one that is deeply subjective, ideologically informed and orientalist perspective. His use of language serves not only to convey diplomatic intelligence but also to construct a narrative that reinforces the political and moral framework of Habsburg imperial identity.

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<sup>746</sup> Foucault 2002; 6-7.

Fleischmann's reports reveal that his diplomatic observations extended beyond the internal dynamics of the Sublime Porte and its leading statesmen to include detailed accounts of the activities and interactions of foreign ambassadors stationed in Istanbul. Notably, his correspondence provides intelligence on the French, British, Dutch, Russian, and Venetian representatives, shedding light on the broader diplomatic landscape of the early 18th century.

In these reports, French ambassadors are frequently portrayed as actively attempting to undermine relations between the Sublime Porte and the Habsburg Monarchy, often engaging in covert or subversive diplomacy. By contrast, the British and Dutch envoys are typically depicted as pursuing their own national interests through mediation offers, reflecting their efforts to assert influence in Ottoman-European affairs without committing to direct confrontation.

The Russian and Venetian ambassadors, however, emerge in Fleischmann's writings as victims of discriminatory treatment by the Ottoman administration. References to their imprisonment and diplomatic mistreatment highlight not only the precarious nature of foreign representation in the Ottoman capital but also the uneven application of diplomatic norms at the time.

Fleischmann's commentary on these various diplomatic actors adds a unique dimension to the historiography of early modern international relations. His perspective—shaped by his own positionality as a Habsburg envoy—offers original insights into the competitive and often contentious atmosphere of imperial diplomacy. In this regard, his narrative serves as a valuable contribution to understanding the dynamics of inter-imperial negotiation, ambassadorial rivalry, and the politics of diplomatic status in the Ottoman court. Within the temporal framework of this study, Fleischmann's detailed and nuanced accounts provide a rich source for reinterpreting diplomatic history through the lens of trans-imperial interactions.

Fleischmann's reports suggest that the Sublime Porte employed a deliberate strategy of diplomatic ambiguity in its dealings with the Habsburg Monarchy, aimed at gaining time and maintaining strategic advantage by keeping its adversaries in a state of uncertainty. This policy, characterized by misdirection and calculated delay, was notably implemented in the period leading up to military operations.

According to Fleischmann, prior to initiating a campaign, the Sublime Porte would often deny any intention of undertaking military action, even as preparations were underway. During this phase, Ottoman officials would circulate false or misleading information regarding the intended target of

the operation. Once the actual location of the offensive had been determined, the Porte would delay the reception of foreign ambassadors, offering various pretexts to postpone diplomatic engagement and limit the capacity of other powers to intervene. Similarly, mediation proposals were frequently deferred under the guise of further consideration, serving to prolong negotiations while the Ottoman military position was consolidated.

This strategy was employed most conspicuously in the lead-up to the Venetian Campaign, during which the Sublime Porte sought to isolate Venice diplomatically before launching hostilities. However, despite these efforts, the strategy ultimately failed to prevent the Habsburg Monarchy's intervention in the latter stages of the conflict.

Fleischmann's analysis of these tactics reveals a calculated use of diplomatic deception and procedural delay as tools of Ottoman foreign policy. His observations contribute to a deeper understanding of the methods by which the Sublime Porte managed imperial diplomacy, illustrating how manipulation of diplomatic timing and communication served as a mechanism for managing international relations in a period of shifting alliances and escalating conflict.

Fleischmann's reports constitute a critical primary source for understanding the diplomatic decision-making processes of the Ottoman administration in the early 18th century, as well as the broader contours of Ottoman-European relations. These documents offer valuable insights not only into the political and military dimensions of Ottoman-Habsburg interactions, but also into the diplomatic language, negotiation strategies, and foreign policy approaches employed during both war and peace.

The reports analyzed in this study have been utilized by numerous historians investigating Ottoman-Habsburg relations during the specified period. However, this research distinguishes itself by organizing the documents thematically based on content, analyzing them through the framework of diplomatic discourse and strategic communication, and comparing them with other contemporary primary sources. Furthermore, the inclusion of original quotations from the reports in footnotes enhances the transparency and scholarly rigor of the analysis, setting this study apart from previous works. By adopting this methodological approach, the study aims to make a substantive contribution to the historiography of Ottoman-Habsburg diplomacy. The breadth and depth of the documents examined are intended to provide new perspectives and empirical data for scholars interested in the diplomatic history of the period.

The analysis is primarily centered on the diplomatic narratives and intelligence that Fleischmann communicated to the Vienna War Council, with attention given to events, negotiations, and strategic considerations rather than detailed military operations. While the study touches on aspects of military planning and execution, its emphasis remains on the diplomatic dimensions of inter-imperial relations. These reports, however, hold further potential for future research specifically focused on military protocol, operational planning, or the logistical infrastructure of early modern warfare. Therefore, future studies could utilize documents from the *Kriegsarchiv* and other countries' archives for more detailed research. There is also very limited information available regarding Fleischmann's biography. Future research on Fleischmann could explore this subject more comprehensively.

In addition, Fleischmann's repeated references to the intrigues of French ambassadors at the Sublime Porte invite opportunities for comparative analysis. A focused study juxtaposing Fleischmann's correspondence with the memoirs or diplomatic records of French envoys from the same period could yield important insights into the dynamics of inter-ambassadorial rivalry, the manipulation of Ottoman diplomacy, and the broader interplay of European powers within the Ottoman court. Such a comparative approach would further enrich the field of early modern diplomatic history and enhance our understanding of the multilateral dimensions of imperial negotiation and strategy.

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## 7. Appendices

**Figure 1:** Translation of the Letter sent by Emperor Karl VI to Sultan Ahmed III; After the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, Anselm Franz von Fleischmann was appointed as Kethüda to Istanbul. BOA, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivleri, Document Code: TS.MA.e / 420 - 43 –.



TSMA.E.0420

**Figure 2a:** Article published in the Wiener Zeitung on 15 July 1711 about the Czar and his army being unable to advance further on the banks of the Prut River due to lack of supplies and troops and being surrounded by the Ottoman army. Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Juli – Dezember 1711 / 1711.08.29.




**Figure 2b:** Article published in the Wiener Zeitung on 16 August 1711 on the repulse of the Ottoman army's attacks by the Czar and his army besieged on the banks of the Prut River and the Grand Vizier's questioning of the Russian camp as to whether they wanted a truce. Wiener Zeitung – Wienerisches Diarium, Juli – Dezember 1711 / 1711.08.29.






**Figure 3:** Encampment of King Charles XII and his Troops. Village of Warnitza - Bender (Tighina – Moldova). Motraye 1732; 137.




**Figure 4a:** Copy of the letter sent by Grand Vizier Ali Pasha to Prince Eugene, informing him that the Republic of Venice had not complied with the peace terms, had taken advantage of the opportunity to invade Morea while at peace with the Ottoman Empire, and that it had become necessary to remove Venice from regions close to Ottoman territory, and that an expedition would be organized in the same year to clear Morea, which belonged to the Ottoman Sultan, of the enemy and to repair the damage Venice had caused to Ottoman merchants at sea and on land, and that the current peace between the Ottoman Empire and the Emperor should be maintained. BOA, A.DVNS.NMH.d, 6, 340-343.

و بالجمله خير خواهان دولت عليه صانبة الابرار ايله اداره كونس مساوره  
اولن دقم و نديك جمهوري اونه دن بوشرايط صلح و صلوحه مراعات  
ايمد يار و سوزلرند طور مد يار مقتدا دخي ايتاي صلح اسغال دولت عليه  
وقت فرصت عدا ايدوب موره غرنه سن غضب و استيلا و اليوم وجوه سفاكه  
نقض عهد اجزا ايمكله قرب جوار دولت عليه دن طرد و ابعاد ايمك فرض عين  
اولشدر ديو باجمهم زاي و اتفاق ايدوب و مقتضاي شريعت غرا اوزره متقد  
فتوالو و يولمكله حالو اسبوسنه مباركه ده و نديك كوني قرب جوار فرده واقع  
ملك موروث بادشاه اسلام اولون موره غرنه سندن استناد فوز و نصرت  
لبن العباد ايله



**Figure 4b:** Copy of the letter sent by Grand Vizier Ali Pasha to Prince Eugene. BOA, A.DVNS.NMH.d, 6, 340-343.

**Figure 5a:** The Copy of the report dated 15 January 1715 sent by Szeged (Segedin) Commander Ernst Graf von Herberstein to the Vienna War Council. In the report, it is stated that the Pasha of Timișoara wanted to send a message to Prince Eugene through an Agha, but the letter would be sent to Vienna by Herberstein. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 7r-7v.

1715-15. Jan.

Copia.

Hochlobl. Kay. Maj. d. d. Hofkriegsraths,

Es hat den 14. huius der Bassa aus Temeswar einen  
 Agha nach Wien nimm Schauson expresse auf den  
 geschickt, nach Befandigung eines Briefs, von  
 welchem die Copia gesondt beizufügen wollen, und  
 da bemalten Agha befohlen worden mit einem  
 Schreiben an d. d. Hofkriegsrath zu schreiben, dass  
 Eugenium gar keine Antwort zu geben, mündlich  
 aber nichts zu bringen sollte, als dass der Krieg  
 des Briefs lauffet, und widerwärtig eine auf,  
 „wollt d. d. Hofkriegsrath zu bringen, daumufso  
 sein nicht noch völlig anstatt, bey d. d. Hofkriegsrath  
 umsonst gar keine Antwort zu geben, son-  
 „dern solch mit allen manieren persuadiren, und  
 mit d. d. Schreiben zu befandigen, so auf geschick,  
 und in mitgeben ist nun an den Bassa einen  
 soflustig gegenwärtig mitzugeben, und wider  
 zumal solch abgeordnet, also per Staffettam  
 die Befandigung des Briefs anordnet, und so,



**Figure 5b:** The Copy of the report dated 15 January 1715 sent by Szeged (Segedin) Commander Ernst Graf von Herberstein to the Vienna War Council. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 7r-7v.

mit pflichtigster mayen nimpflichkeit, ziffeln in  
 "dreyen gaderstern" dassa ninnen pflichtig ant"  
 "wordt nimmend. In anweisung dass far"  
 "dann quardigstern besetzt wird zu seyen bestan"  
 "digen quardern nimmend.

Sind ziffeln: Kayl<sup>2</sup> in ziffeln:

Segedin den 15<sup>ten</sup> Jener.  
 1715.

Unterzeichnet: auf geforderten  
 Leuten, und Anst.  
 Ernst Graf von Herberstein



**Figure 6a:** Latin translation by Andreas Schmid, dated 20 January 1715, of the letter written by the Pasha of Timișoara Hacı Mustafa, at the request of the Grand Vizier, to Prince Eugene, dated 11 January 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 8r-12v.






**Figure 6b:** Latin translation by Andreas Schmid, dated 20 January 1715, of the letter written by the Pasha of Timișoara Hacı Mustafa, at the request of the Grand Vizier, to Prince Eugene, dated 11 January 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 8r-12v.

amicorum generalium, nec non miserorum subdi:  
torum ac Vasallorum emergentibus negotijs inten:  
tos esse, et cum prefati generales amici nostri, valde  
boni, et amore digni sint homines, quare eorum  
vicinitate summo opere contenti sumus, speratur  
fore, ut quoque illi nobis contenti sint, mi sincere,  
honorande, magnifice, ac dilecte amice, puro pre:  
dite animo generalis, illa, qua ad vos haec litera  
exarata sunt, die, homo noster Constantinopoli ad:  
veniens, inter alia, quamvis nullius momenti  
haec attulit nuntia, quod Reipublica scilicet Vene:  
tae populus malevolis et facinorosis adherens  
hominibus, suos in mari hinc inde vagantes homi:  
nes nullo modo cohibendo, aut frenando, naves  
Mercatorum infestando, bona, mercesque eorum  
depredando, quae insolentia jam antea quidem  
inhibita erant, ast y' minime auscultando,  
deprehensis tandem quam plurimis ac diversis eo:  
rum fraudibus et dolis, violatis itaque cum in ami:  
citiq' constante perseverantibus, ut sunt excel:  
si Imperij, amicis, nec non cum sincera et candida  
Porta pactis et conventis, perpetratisque contra



**Figure 6c:** Latin translation by Andreas Schmid, dated 20 January 1715, of the letter written by the Pasha of Timișoara Hacı Mustafa, at the request of the Grand Vizier, to Prince Eugene, dated 11 January 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 8r-12v.

pacem actionibus, iuste et legaliter contra eos  
 bellum iudicatum, sacraque De eo Sententia pro:  
 nunciata est: quam Sententiam Turcæ Fetva vocant  
 eamque Musti dare solet: ope ergo Excelsi hoc  
 expeditio belli faustissimò primò Vere mari  
 terrarum ex parte Excelsi Imperij contra Venetos  
 firma et fixa manet, et quamvis certum sit, nego:  
 tia hæc ex parte felicis et gratiosi Domini mei  
 Supremi Vezirij, quoque fide transcriptum et signi:  
 ficatum iri, nihilominus tamen considerando, ne  
 mihi presentis Status ignorantia imputetur, atque  
 ex eo, quod utriusque partis benevolus et sincerus  
 Sim amicus, hæc per fidelem nostrum Ibrahim  
 Agam vobis transcripsimus et significamus, pro:  
 positum verò nostrum solummodo Declaratio ami:  
 citie, et sinceritatis est, bellum enim hoc, quod con:  
 tra eos, qui spiritu carentium, multaque loquen:  
 tium secuti sunt Insurrexerunt, pacta, promissaque vio:  
 lando fraudulenter paci contravenerunt, ex parte  
 excelsi Imperij Declaratum et susceptum est,  
 mutue amicitie ac benevolentie nostre minimè  
 obest, ac præjudicat, imò amicitiam ex utraque  
 parte magis firmari, indiesque augeri certò videbi



**Figure 6d:** Latin translation by Andreas Schmid, dated 20 January 1715, of the letter written by the Pasha of Timișoara Hacı Mustafa, at the request of the Grand Vizier, to Prince Eugene, dated 11 January 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 8r-12v.

tur, Deo Excelso sint laudes! eo quod nos cum  
 tam bonis, benevolis, et charis / uti Vos estis / con:  
 juncti et consociati simus amicis, venientes, et  
 reserentes Mercatores, Subditi, et Vasalli ratio:  
 ne bonorum suorum et mercium ex utraq; parte  
 bona fruuntur securitate et pace, ob quod bene:  
 ficium gratiarum actio reddenda, quae autem  
 iuxta amicitiam et benevolentiam in observan:  
 dis, uti decet / pacis legibus consistit, vos ergo  
 sincere et chare amice noster debitam amicitiam  
 et benevolentiam non intermittatis, huiusq; amici  
 vestri non obliviscentes, quoties se occasio obtu:  
 lerit nobis scribatis. Plurimodo autem in gaudio  
 et letitia ac in incolumitate vivatis. De cætero  
 pax super eum, qui sequitur viam salutis -  
 Dabuntur quinta Mensis Muharrem A<sup>h</sup> 1127. id  
 est 11<sup>ma</sup> Januarij. 1715.

Ex Sinceris amicis  
 Hadsej Mustafa  
 Gubernator Temisva:  
 rensis.

Andreas Schmid  
 transcrit 20<sup>ma</sup> die Januarij.  
 1715.



**Figure 7:** Summary of the letter regarding the Ottoman envoy Ibrahim Agha, sent by Freiherrn von Löffelholz from Petrovaradin to the Imperial War Council on February 26, 1715. OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 29r-29v.






**Figure 8:** Fleischmann's note stating that the Sultan in Edirne (Adrianople) had decided to pay part of the *postal akçesi* they had previously requested in order to prevent any rebellion by the restless janissaries in the army. 7 April 1715, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 55v-56r.

D. S.  
 Ihnen augenblicklich anzuzeigen, daß der  
 Sultan in dem Janissaren zu Adrianopol und  
 die Zubehörenden, und die Befehlshaber anzuweisen  
 zuverleihen, die selben zu 3 postalakçesi anzu-  
 zuweisen anzuweisen, und zugleich den Janissaren  
 alle beordnen mit demselben dem Sultan nicht  
 gedenken Adrianopol gegen die selben anzuweisen,  
 von dem Besonderen Janissaren abzuweisen, das  
 gewisse expropre anzuweisen, so auch Success  
 von selbst anzuweisen, das Sultan soll  
 sich allzu Tag zu Silibrea und die alie derbey  
 dieglücken Flotta anzuweisen in anzuweisen  
 zuweisen, und auch die so befehlende regan  
 zu zuweisen, anzuweisen gedenken, wofür  
 anzuweisen uniu von sich anzuweisen abzuweisen  
 was nachgehen derbey, das Capitain Dusen zu  
 wie uniu zu gedenken gutan anzuweisen  
 intentioniert, im Fall so die Venetianische Flotta  
 gegen Morea nicht anzuweisen, und selbst sich reti-  
 riren werden, das anzuweisen was schon zu dem  
 an, alie mehrden mit ihm zu schlagen, oder  
 mit befehl dem Albanesen zu anzuweisen  
 so zu, und die bey dem Venetianen zu  
 nachgehen sich mit ihm anzuweisen Success  
 conjunction zu dem, also daß die anzuweisen  
 alie anzuweisen, daß man dem Barban gleich  
 anzuweisen so zuweisen in dem die anzuweisen  
 so zuweisen die anzuweisen retirada, wie  
 so bey Pruth gedenken, dem uniu was zu  
 anzuweisen.



**Figure 9:** A note written in French, regarding the capture of Souda Castle by Ottoman forces and the request of the Provveditore to allow him and his entire garrison to return to the Republic of Venice in order to surrender the fortress. 25 October 1715 (?), OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 140r.

Voici le detail de l'ude. le 19.<sup>me</sup> le Cap.<sup>te</sup> Bassa arriva  
 avec l'armée navale. Le Provvediteur de la place ne  
 voulut pas la remettre ainsi qu'il avoit promis à Ali  
 Bassa; et à son Rekmé Bassa. le 22.<sup>me</sup> le Capitaine  
 Bassa fit transporter sur une grande navire, qu'il avoit  
 fait faire, quelques piéces de canons, et 400. Soldats  
 sur une petite Isle voisine de la lude pour la battre.  
 de là. Le Provvediteur y envoya 150. Hommes pour les  
 deloger sans l'avoir le nombre des Soldats ottomans.  
 Les Venitiens furent tous tués en piéce, et le Capitaine  
 Bassa voyant, que le Provvediteur continuoit à se  
 defendre, fit mettre quantité des fusiliers sur les  
 mâts de son vaisseau, et poussant après de la  
 lude, lui firent decharger de toute son artillerie.  
 tous les autres vaisseaux à son exemple firent  
 la même chose: mais cela n'ayant rien produit.  
 le 24.<sup>me</sup> le Capitaine Bassa fit encore transporter de  
 la petite Isle quelques piéces des canons, et mille  
 Hommes, que là dessus le Provvediteur avoit capitulé,  
 le 25.<sup>me</sup> a remis la place à condition, que lui, et  
 toute la garnison seroit transporté sur les terres  
 de l'obéissance de la Republique, ce que leur étoit  
 accordé, il y avoit dans la place 250. Soldats Venitiens,  
 et quelques Grecs, on a trouvé environ 95. piéces  
 des canons.



140



**Figure 10a:** A letter of intelligence sent by Field Marshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz und Kolberg, commander of the Petrovaradin Fortress, to the Vienna War Council regarding the movement plans of the Ottoman army, which he obtained from a merchant. 16 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 179r-181r.

Vorsteh. Ray" zu Löffelholz Rath.  
 Durchlauchtigster Herr, quädigst.  
 quädig: und hochachtungsvoll.  
 Ich bin durch E. Ex. D. Minus quädigst. quädig:  
 und hochachtungsvoll Herrn Christen Johann  
 yafonfamb, der seine Wohnung in Tcho-  
 hadar von dem Ort in der Person anwies,  
 sondern Ray" zu Herrn Reswertan v. flücht,  
 man aus Constantingrel dasin arrivirt,  
 welcher uns auch an dem augenblicken Brief  
 "fassen, auf dem Ortman's Relation: Dessen  
 "an an einem Vorsteh. Ray" zu Löffelholz Rath  
 mitgebracht, und ist uns formelhaft  
 Tschohadar zwar bewußt, in 3. ten De-  
 cember von Constantingrel abgegangen,  
 als er aber von der Adrianopel war,  
 "eins geworfen, und sich alle in der Hof: schon  
 gewöhnlich was an demselben wollen, so  
 man Ihro sehr gewarnt, weilan d. grob.  
 Veriet nach Kuzlus einen Brief nach  
 Laff, die Hof: nicht auf die alte, sondern  
 wandte, und seinen Ort zügeln, also.





**Figure 10b:** A letter of intelligence sent by Field Marshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz und Kolberg, 16 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 179r-181r.

Es der Tschokadar von dem  
wider unser Constantinopel zu dem  
wofür der Herr Resident ein wenig  
H. Comendament ausgehandelt hat mit wol.  
esam der Tschokadar nach der 19ten  
Decembris von Constantinopel wider ab  
gegangen: Dergleichen der Comendament  
auf dem Herr Resident, das ist  
der obangewiesene Relations. schreiben dem  
eigene Pascha an eine hohe Instanz,  
wie auf dem sofort beifolgt, besondern  
wie auch der Herr Tschokadar, nach  
dem er 1. und 2. H. Tag erwartet,  
wider zu dem schreiben werden aber  
der Herr Resident noch nicht gewiss,  
das 3. H. von einem französischen  
Janitscharen Asien geschoben, sondern  
aber respektiert von dem, so der Herr  
Pascha auf dem sofort beifolgt, besondern  
mit unsern Tschokadern es auf  
einer hohen Instanz ausstellen lassen  
noch nicht als ein aufgeben, wofür wir  
nehmen, das er der Herr Resident  
manigsten Janitscharen unter wenig



**Figure 10c:** A letter of intelligence sent by Field Marshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz und Kolberg, 16 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 179r-181r.

Brianopol angaboban, inqlausen, das Jhn d  
 Seraskier zu Belgrad folgt Vorhommern  
 lassen, sehr schnell umgesehen, und gebath,  
 das zu dinsten geschon wider, und wir,  
 da es nur schon geschriben, und zuehnt  
 nimm expressen geschickelst haben,  
 wann es sich nicht ungepöhl beschunden, wohl,  
 „sch abet, da es unumstosslich wider besser,  
 ofternwillt geschickelst soll.

„Sonst hat mir Jhn sagen ein Lauffman  
 von Earlowitz, welcher sehr uarfer Mann,  
 und Venedig zusammen vffgelegt, erzehlet,  
 das es nicht finnen Cameraden zu Belgrad  
 von 2 Tagen in ein Caffé: sayd es ge,  
 „rufen, mit Caffé tractirt, und darob  
 über folgenden puncten befragt worden,  
 wie vil umbelusen dazwischen von Sada,  
 oder Sara in Dalmatien bis an die Werra  
 wie vil von der bis an die Trau? wo die  
 beste, und gardeste wange, und ob man  
 aller derson mit Bagage, Posten, und allen  
 papieren kom? welche die beste, und uelste  
 wange dem Proassen in Varnmarkt, wie  
 vil Meiden von ganz bis Thurn? wie





**Figure 10d:** A letter of intelligence sent by Field Marshal Georg Wilhelm Löffelholz und Kolberg, 16 January 1716, OeStA/HHStA StAbt, Türkei-I, Turcica, 1714-1716, Kt. 180, Konv 1, 179r-181r.


Mit Ansehen auf dem flachen Land über  
 Caniska von der Draue bis Wien! Und  
 ob man aber schon diesen flüß fünglich  
 passieren könnte. Vorzu gedachte Queng  
 gehen in in fars augenabon, das die mit  
 dem edmuthig Fußfuß wegen des Distanz  
 "fien gewendet, und in falso die baraden  
 werden, das es von jeder bis Wien nicht  
 weiter als 30 Meilen wäre, welches  
 aber in der flucht nicht für einen  
 pretext halten, und in manchen, B ein  
 andrer abfassen darunter verfahren müßte,  
 da die in diesen auf obengenannte fragen  
 nicht anders beantwortet, als das es  
 von jeder bis Wien ein zimlich weiter  
 weg wäre, und man schon mit einem  
 eigentum gefanden in 3. wochen den  
 futen auf legen könnte, wegen der and  
 wegen aber, und sonderlich in dem  
 "falschheit wären die wenig informiert,  
 davon auf das nicht gewiß ist schon  
 rathen, worauf die von diesen gehen mit  
 aber geflucht wird Dimitris worden,  
 das erwiste dem farn obist v. farn  
 haben diese mit morgigen ordinari. Und





**Figure 11:** Simplified visual of Fleischmann’s reports on Discourse Analysis (By AI Data Analyst).

**Theme Emphasis and Interpretive Commentary**



**Discourse Themes and Word Frequencies**





**Figure 12:** Locations of correspondence in archive documents. The size of the red marks represents the density of correspondence. Ergün 2023; 1-14.

