

A Cross-Cultural Investigation of the Conception of Lie

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ABSTRACT

Lying has been explored by scholars in a number of fields, from philosophy to linguistics. From the perspective of philosophy, several scholars have provided a definition of the word *lie*. However, there is no unanimous definition. The lack of consensus creates division even among the scholars who research the topic of lie, dividing them into deceptionists and non-deceptionists. The deceptionist scholars suggest that a lie needs intention to deceive, while the non-deceptionist scholars dispute this argument. One thing in common between these camps is that they all have an agreement that *believed-false* is the most prominent element to determine a lie. Believed-false determines a lie based on the belief of the speaker that the proposition is false. In another research field, Coleman and Kay's (1981) conducted a prototypical semantic research of the English word *lie* with English native speakers as respondents. The results of Coleman and Kay's (1981) study support the philosophers' argument. Since the definition of *lie* is mainly given by Western philosophers and also many experimental studies have been conducted in the Western lingua-cultures, it would be interesting to find out whether the perception and judgement of lying is shared universally. In order to do that, the present research follows the methodology of Coleman and Kay (1981). The data for this dissertation was collected using a questionnaire containing at least eight stories. Respondents from four countries: Indonesians, Chinese, Hungarians and Russians, filled out the questionnaire. The main question of the research is whether these lingua-cultural groups support the suggested elements of Coleman and Kay (1981) and their order of the elements. The research also addresses the factors involved in the interpretation of lying, and the perception of several types of lies, such as half-truth, untruthful implicatures, and white lies. The primary finding was belief-false were disregarded by Indonesian and Chinese people. These two groups considered falsehood or objective falsity as the most important element, whereas Hungarians and Russians perceived believed-false or subjective falsity as the most prominent element to define lying. Several factors were involved in the interpretation of lying, such as (1) the religion, (2) the social distance of the interlocutors, and (3) the age of the speaker. Regarding the types of lie, Indonesians and Chinese people consider untruthful implicature as a more lie-like statement, whereas Hungarians and Russians perceive it to be less lie-like. Moreover, all lingua-cultural groups have uncertain perception regarding half-truth and perceive a white lie as an acceptable and justified lie. The consideration that *lie* should be universally defined as the speaker's false belief is the result of the tendency of ethnocentric discussion of lying by the Western scholars.

DISSERTATION DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of PhD at University of Szeged, and has not been previously included in a dissertation submitted to this university or any other institution for a degree, diploma or any other qualifications.

All the sources and materials previously published or written by other people are fully acknowledged and all quotations properly identified. Apart from these due references, the dissertation is entirely my own work. Some parts of this dissertation have appeared in my previously published papers, which were done concurrently with my dissertation (i.e., Adha 2020a, Németh T. and Adha 2021, Adha and Li 2023)

I agree that the final version of this dissertation can become available via the university's research repository, the university, and search engines.

Ahmad Adha

Date: February 23, 2023

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As in my other final works, I am dedicating this work to my first teacher and late mother Rafidah, who always supported my educational journey, and to my late grandmother who always asked when I would have finished my PhD study and come back home, and to my sister Siti Nurheraty who sometimes does not know what I am doing and my whereabouts, but still believes in me.

This work is a cross-cultural work, so I want to show my gratitude to my colleagues: Li Xiaoyun, who assisted me in the study with Mandarin Chinese speakers, and Denis Shuvalov who helped me in two studies with Russian speakers. Also, I would like to thank Anneliese Harper for her thoroughly language and content check of the dissertation. Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my supervisor Enikő Németh T., who have accepted me in the department of Theoretical Linguistics, have given me some guidance on my educational path, assisted me in the study with Hungarian speakers, and was always supportive in my PhD journey.

This dissertation is not even near perfection, and for sure, there will be still some mistakes even after several reviews. At the time of the writing, I did not know yet that the mistakes were not factual. However, I did not believe that I had the intention to make these mistakes.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Background and Aims of Dissertation

Everyone might have told a lie at some point in their life. In fact, on average, people tell a lie at least once or twice a day (DePaulo, et al. 1996). For many people, lying is considered a negative act and should be avoided since it is generally unacceptable to give untruthful information to others. The most common folk understanding about lying is based on the falsehood of a statement. For example, it would be quite common to conclude that a person lies if s/he says, 'I did not eat the cookie', when it is obvious that s/he has cookie crumbs all over her mouth. In this case, the situation in which there are cookie crumbs leading to a conclusion that the person had eaten the cookie, does not align with the statement. Thus, the statement is false, and false statement is generally perceived as a lie. Of course, a false statement is not enough to be considered as a lie, the false statement should be accompanied with a deceptive intention. According to Online Oxford Learner's Dictionary, a *lie*¹ is defined as *a statement made by somebody knowing that it is not true*, and to *lie*² is *to say or write something that you know is not true*. Based on these definitions, the speaker's knowledge is taken into consideration. In order to apply these definitions to the previous example, the person produces a lie because s/he knows that the statement is not true (or the statement is false). Both the falsehood of the statement and the knowledge that the statement is not true (or false) are the elements of the definition of lying. However, these definitions are not appropriate because the definitions may include other false statements known to be false by the speaker such as irony, hyperbole, etc.

Several linguists and philosophers have tried to provide a definition of lie. In addition to the elements mentioned above, there are other elements that scholars integrate in their definition. Mahon (2015, 1) compiles four necessary conditions based on the definitions of lie provided by scholars: (1) The statement condition where a statement is being made by a person. (2) The untruthful condition, meaning that the person believes the statement to be false or the statement be untruthful³. (3) The addressee condition to signify that the untruthful statement is made to another person. And (4) Intention to deceive the addressee condition in which the person who stated a lie intends that the other person believes the untruthful statement is true. A statement must meet all four of these conditions to be considered a lie. For example, if lie is

¹ See https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/lie2_2 for reference.

² See https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/lie2_1 for reference.

³ In the Oxford definition, the term *know* is used instead of *believe*.

defined without considering the presence of an addressee, which is the third condition, would it still be a lie? Can a person be considered as a liar if she says a statement, she believes to be untruthful in an empty room?

These four conditions by Mahon (2015) are summarized into three elements and were used by Coleman and Kay (1981) in an experiment to find out how the native speakers of English perceive the English word *lie*. In short, the elements are (1) falsehood or objective falsity, (2) believed-false or subjective falsity, and (3) intention to deceive. The result of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment demonstrates that the English people define a lie based on the speaker's belief. This result lines up with the definitions of many scholars (Bok 1999, Carson 2010, Fallis 2012, Heffer 2020, Lackey 2013, Marsili 2014, Saul 2012, Stokke 2013, Wright 2019) and the Oxford dictionary given in the previous page. Coleman and Kay's (1981) study has been replicated with groups of different languages and cultures, such as Arabic (Cole 1996) and Spanish (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012). The results are similar to the English experiment in which the second element, the speaker's belief that the statement is false, is the most prominent element in defining a lie. A different result was obtained by Yoshimura (1995) and Vajtai (2013) in the replication studies with native speakers of Japanese and Hungarian, respectively. The native speakers of Japanese consider the element of falsehood as the most prominent element, whereas for Hungarians, the speaker's intention to deceive is the most important element, although Vajtai (2013) does not rule out the possibility that Hungarians also perceive false belief as the most important element.

Based on the philosophers' definition and the majority of the results of the empirical studies conducted previously with native speakers of English, Arabic, and Spanish, the definition of lie might seem to be universal. However, the definition based on the false belief of the speaker should be challenged since the way lie is defined and perceived might vary across different cultures, especially when the result from the study with Japanese speakers (Yoshimura 1995) is taken into consideration. These variations are the results of different ways of thinking and different rules of verbal and non-verbal communication. As Kecskés (2007, 71) argues, using a particular language and belonging to a particular speech community means having preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts. Thus, it is feasible to say that there could be cases where one cultural group perceives a statement as a lie, but this perception is not shared by another cultural group. Furthermore, Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, and Lee (2007) also consider cultures to play a role in shaping the choice and moral judgements about truth and deception. This leads to the possibility that there is no universal definition of lying. Moreover, if we consider the definitions of lie in the dictionaries of other languages, e.g., of Chinese or of Indonesian, then lie is described differently in comparison to the English

definition before. In the Modern Chinese Dictionary⁴, huǎnghuà 谎话 ‘lie’ is defined as *untruthful and deceiving words*. Meanwhile, the adjective word in Indonesian *bohong*⁵ ‘lying’ is defined as *not in accordance with the actual thing (such as circumstances or others); not the real thing; fake*. Therefore, based on the definitions in these two languages, lie is defined according to the objective falsity of the statement, unlike in English in which lie is perceived as a subjective falsity. The definitions from Chinese and Indonesian dictionaries are also aligned with Yoshimura’s (1995) finding in the replicated study of Coleman and Kay’s (1981) experiment with Japanese speakers.

In order to find out whether speakers from different lingua-cultures have similar or different perception of lie, the present dissertation intends to replicate Coleman and Kay’s (1981) experiment. By having these experiments cross-culturally, it can be assumed that the possible differences in the perception of *lie* can be revealed. Thus, the present dissertation will contribute to the debate about the definitions of *lie*, including the feature of universality of the definitions, and also give some elaboration regarding how lying is interpreted and perceived in different cultural settings and contexts. For this purpose, I aim to explore how lie is defined and perceived cross-culturally through conducting research projects with people from different lingua-cultures, namely Indonesian, Chinese, Hungarian and Russian.

In the dissertation, I have several aims. First, I want to know how native speakers of Indonesian, Mandarin Chinese, Hungarian and Russian interpret their respective word *lie*, whether or not their respective word *lie* contains the three prototypical elements of lie suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981). Second, if the interpretations include all the prototypical elements of lie, I also intend to reveal the order of these elements in terms of their importance. Previously mentioned replicated studies of Coleman and Kay’s (1981) experiment exhibit some similarities and differences. Accordingly, as the third purpose of this dissertation, I aim to examine the evaluation of different lingua-cultural groups for a situation where a lie occurs, and also if there are certain factors involved in their interpretation of lie. Not only do scholars on the topic of lie provide definitions of lie, but they also construct some taxonomies of lie. Thus, I would like to find out how different types of lies are categorized and evaluated by different lingua-cultural groups. To achieve these aims, four experiments were conducted using a linguistically- and culturally modified versions of the questionnaire from Coleman and Kay’s (1981) experiment. The questionnaires contained at least eight stories and were distributed to the respective native

⁴ The entry huǎnghuà 谎话 ‘lie’ can be found in the dictionary on page 577. The dictionary is edited by Institute of Linguistics of Chinese Academic of Social Sciences and it was originally published in Beijing in 2016 by The Commercial Press entitled 现代汉语词典: 第七版 xiàndài hànyǔ cídiǎn: Dì qī bǎn (*Modern Chinese Dictionary: the 7th edition*).

⁵ See <https://kbbi.web.id/bohong> for reference.

speakers. A scoring method suggested by Coleman and Kay's (1981) was also applied in the experiments in order to have results regarding the mean scores of the stories. The mean scores exhibit whether the story contains a stronger or weaker lie.

1. 2 Terminology

As mentioned before, Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment has been repeated for this dissertation. The work has three main terms referred to as elements of a prototypical lie (Coleman and Kay 1981), they are falsehood, belief, and intent. *Falsehood*, usually referred to as objective falsity, is the state of truth of the proposition meaning that the proposition is incompatible and not aligned with the factuality of a feeling and of a situation. *Belief*, also called as subjective falsity, refers to the mental state or the attitude of the speaker towards the proposition of the element. When the term is used, it signifies that the speaker has a belief that a certain proposition is not compatible with his or her belief or knowledge, regardless the factuality of the proposition itself. Lastly, *intent* refers to the mental state of the speaker, particularly in regard to the intention to deceive the hearers into believing that the speaker believes the proposition of the statement.

1. 3 Organization

This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. In this chapter, I have presented the background and the purposes of the research. In Chapter 2, I provide a critical review of the literatures regarding the approaches to the definition of lie. I will concentrate on the studies which are connected to the present studies. Firstly, I discuss the philosophical approaches to the definition of lie. Next, I will explain some elements contributed to the definition of lie and from that elements, I will describe two camps of scholars that differ in their definitions of lie. Thirdly, I will provide a review of some empirical research about perception of lying. After that, I will discuss the cross-cultural research on lie that tend to diverge from the philosophers' argumentation. After that, I describe several factors involved in the interpretation of lying based on the previous research. And finally, I will present different types of lie.

Chapter 3 discusses how data was collected for the four experiments with native speakers of four different cultural group. The experiments were mainly based on Coleman and Kay's (1981) methodology. In this particular chapter, I will outline the research questions in the empirical study of this dissertation. I will present the questionnaire of the experiment conducted by Coleman and Kay (1981). I will also give some brief information regarding the respondents, and I explain the method of analysis.

Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide the replicated studies with different groups of respondents: Indonesians, Chinese People, Hungarians and Russians respectively. Each of these chapters has similar organization covering six sections. First, I will present a brief introduction of the research on lying, especially regarding the studied cultural groups. Second, a linguistically and culturally adapted questionnaire is elaborated in the section about method of the research project. After that, I will present the demography of respondents from the particular lingua-cultural group experimented. Next, the chapters include tables and figures depicting the results from the replicated study, together with discussions of the particular study. And finally, I will make conclusions at the end of each chapter.

Chapter 8 discusses the cross-cultural results based on the experiment of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment, the previous replicated studies and the research projects from the present study. Then, a discussion based on the results of the comments of the present research projects will be presented. In the end, I will provide a general discussion based on the results and the comments from the present replicated studies.

Chapter 9 will summarize the results of the research by addressing and answering each research question. And I will also review limitations of the present dissertation and provide some future directions of the research.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I attempt to present a comprehensive overview of analysis on lying. In Section 2. 1, I review the two main approaches in philosophy that are used by the scholars to define a lie; namely speech-act and speaker-meaning approaches. Next, in Section 2. 2, I describe the most common elements that the scholars integrate in their definitions of lie. After describing philosophical approaches to lying, in Section 2. 3, I explain research with empirical approach regarding definitions of lying since the former philosophical approach might not cover cross-cultural differences. In Section 2. 4, I outline the cross-cultural research on perception of lying, mainly from the replicated studies of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment. From this, a section regarding several factors in the interpretation of lying is elaborated in Section 2.5. And finally, in Section 2. 6, I provide a brief description of three types of lies.

2. 1 Philosophical Approaches to Definition of Lie

In the previous introductory chapter, it is mentioned that Mahon (2015) summarizes four conditions that are commonly emphasized by scholars who aim to characterize deception and lie. Even so, most Western scholars are still not in complete agreement regarding what constitutes a lie. In the field of philosophy, there are two main approaches (Meibauer 2019); (1) the approach of the speech act in which lying is a kind of speech act or communicative act, and (2) the speaker-meaning approach which is an approach based on Grice's theory of meaning and conversational implicature.

Scholars who endorse the speech act approach analyze lying as an act of assertion. Therefore, definitions are derived from Searle's (1969) Sincerity Conditions for assertions or from Bach and Harnish's (1979, 42) definition of assertion as follows.

S asserts that *p* iff *S* expresses
i. the belief that *p*, and
ii. the intention that *H* believe that *p*.

One of the proponents of the speech act approach is Marsili (2014) who defines the verb *lie* as indicated below.

S lies to *A* about *p* iff:
i. *S* genuinely asserts *p*
ii. *S* believes *p* more likely to be false than true.

If the definition of assertion by Bach and Harnish (1979) is taken into consideration to describe the definition of lie by Marsili (2014), then a speaker lies to a hearer regarding one proposition if and only if the speaker fulfills several prerequisites; (1) the speaker believes that the proposition to be most likely false, but at the same time (2) the speaker tries to appear that the speaker fully believes the truthfulness of that proposition since Marsili (2014) uses the phrase ‘genuinely believe’, and (3) the speaker has the intention so that the hearer believes the proposition. However, the problem regarding Marsili’s (2014) definition is that the definition presents some incompleteness such as the absence of mentioning the hearer. Also, this definition only fulfils two of Mahon’s (2015) necessary conditions of lying, namely statement and untruthful conditions.

The other philosophical approach is to define lying using the theory of speaker-meaning. As for this approach, the definition of lie cannot be separated from Paul Grice’s early work (1975/1989)⁶ regarding Cooperative Principle and the maxim of quality which govern the cooperative communication. Both should be thought of as principles that rational creatures would or should follow in a talk exchange. According to the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1989, 26), our contribution in a talk exchange should be made as is required by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange. Furthermore, Grice (1989, 27) divides the maxims into four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.

The category of Quality includes a supermaxim and two specific maxims (Grice 1989, 27).

Supermaxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

First maxim of Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false.

Second maxim of Quality: Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Some approaches to define and describe deception and lie are based on the violation of either supermaxim or maxims, or all of them. This violation is a form of non-cooperative form of communication. Fallis (2012) is one of the scholars who uses this approach in his definition of lie. Fallis (2012, 569) defines a *lie* as follows.

You lie if and only if you say that *p*, you believe that *p* is false (or at least that *p* will be false if you succeed in communicating that *p*), and you intend to violate the norm of conversation against communicating something false by communicating that *p*.

⁶ The original publication is in 1975, whereas the second publication is in 1989.

The definition provided by Fallis (2012) has two common elements with Coleman and Kay's (1981), which are the speaker's belief and intention. According to Fallis' (2012) definition, the speaker lies if and only if the speaker believes that the proposition is false, and the speaker also has the intention to communicate something false through communicating that proposition. The definition by Fallis (2012) also lacks two conditions of lying assumed by Mahon's (2015): the statement and addressee conditions. Thus, this definition should also be considered inappropriate.

The two approaches differ in the way that the speech act approach considers a lie as something *asserted*, whereas the speaker-meaning approach argues that a lie is something *said*. Regardless of the approaches, the scholars mentioned above mostly define lying based on the subjective falsity or the belief of the asserter or of the speaker. Their definitions are consistent with the results from an empirical study by Coleman and Kay (1981) and its more recent replications (Cole 1996, Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012). In order to more fully understand lying, it would be useful and appropriate to explore the definitions and perception of lying in other cultures, as well as the results of studies which attempt to replicate findings from Western cultures. According to Chinese and Indonesian dictionaries and the result from Yoshimura's (1995) replicated study, speaker's belief is either not mentioned or not in the focus as the main element of the definition of lie. Since assertion accounts for the expression of belief, it is more compatible to lean more on the argument that a lie is a said proposition.

2. 2 Elements of Lying

In the previous part, it has been established that to lie means to *say* something false or something believed to be false by the speaker. Something false refers to objective falsity, whereas something believed to be false indicates subjective falsity. The latter is the untruthful condition as mentioned by Mahon (2015, 1) in his summary of definitions. Another condition which is neglected by several scholars on the topic of deception and lying is the fourth condition (Mahon 2015), intention to deceive the addressee. In the traditional concept of lying, an intention to deceive the hearer is needed. Some scholars support this argument. However, this idea has been attacked by scholars who argue that an intention to deceive is not necessary for a lie to happen. Therefore, Mahon (2019, 33) classifies scholars into two camps, namely deceptionist and non-deceptionist scholars.

The deceptionists argue that the speaker lies when she makes a statement that she believes to be false with the intention that the statement be believed to be true. Scholars who are considered to be in this group are Bok (1999), Dynel (2018), Lackey (2013), Mahon (2008)

and Meibauer (2014). Bok (1999) argues that lies are statements that speaker believes to be false, although the statement itself may be true, and that are intended to mislead the hearer. She considers the intention to mislead is important to exclude communicative acts such as irony, jokes or teasing⁷ that are not intended as lying or deception. This definition also argues that a lie is not necessarily a falsehood, meaning that objective falsity should not be the element of a lie. A true statement that is believed by the speaker to be false in order to mislead a hearer is also a lie according to her. Lackey (2013) also defines the verb *lie* without referring objective falsity.

Lackey (2013, 236) defines the verb *lie* as follow.

- The speaker lies to the hearer if and only if
- i. the speaker states that *p* to the hearer
 - ii. the speaker believes that *p* is false, and
 - iii. the speaker intends to be deceptive to B with respect to whether *p* in stating that *p*.

According to the definition above, a lie is a stated proposition which is believed to be false with the intention to deceive others. Both definitions (Bok 1999, Lackey 2013) argue that a lie should be a statement, signifying that a non-verbal deceptive act could not be regarded as a lie even though it is done to deceive others. The necessity that *lying* should be a statement to deceive others fulfills Mahon's (2015) first and third conditions for lying, namely statement and addressee condition, respectively. Now, let us take a look at Mahon's (2008) definition and see what kind of elements or conditions he includes in his definition. For Mahon (2008, 227), a person lies when she makes a statement that she believes to be false with the intention that the hearer believes it to be true, or the intention that the hearer believes that the speaker believes it to be true, or with both intentions. Apparently, all four conditions are included in his definition. Furthermore, in Mahon's (2008) definition, there are two possible intentions in the mental state of the liar.

Unlike the deceptionist scholars, the non-deceptionists are scholars who argue that intention to deceive is not necessary for defining a lie. This means that Mahon's (2015) fourth condition, the intention to deceive the addressee, is not needed as the element to define lying. As indicated in the previous section, neither Marsili (2014) nor Fallis (2012) mention intention in their definition, so, they are among non-deceptionists. Other non-deceptionist scholars who

⁷ Jokes, teasing and irony may contain untruthful proposition which is believed to be false by the speaker. However, the untruthfulness is meant to be conceived by the hearer, making the intention to deceive absent when saying jokes, teasing or irony. Dynel (2015) refers irony as overt untruthfulness, whereas deceptive acts such as lying is covert untruthfulness.

do not integrate the element of intention in their definitions of lying are Carson (2010), Heffer (2020), Saul (2012), Sorensen (2007), Stokke (2013), and Wright (2019).

Wright (2019) simply uses the breach of the element of belief in his definition. He considers a speaker lies when the speaker believes that not- x and/or the speaker believes that x is false. The following is a situation to challenge Wright's (2019) definition.

In the news, a woman claims that she gives birth to a child conceived without coitus. Amanda has never heard of test tube babies, so she does not believe the claim and believes that the woman giving birth without having had sex is false.

According to Wright (2019), Amanda lies because she believes the opposite of the news. Intuitively, the situation presented above should not be considered as lying since the mental state of the speaker alone is certainly not sufficient. A lie should be realized in form of a linguistic expression or a sentence (statement condition) and the sentence should be stated to someone (addressee condition). Other non-deceptionist scholars approach the definition differently. Using the speech act approach, Sorensen (2007) and Heffer (2020) integrate assertion in their definition of *to lie*. According to Sorensen (2007, 256), the speaker lies to the hearer if and only if the speaker asserts that p to the hearer, and the speaker does not believe that p . Although definition by Sorensen (2007) has more conditions or elements, namely statement, addressee, and untruthful condition or false belief, the definition allows irony and hyperbole to be considered as lies since both are assertions that are believed to be true by the speaker.

Lies as warranted untruthful statements are described by two philosophers, Carson (2010) and Saul (2012). According to Carson (2010), the speaker tells a lie if and only if the speaker makes a false statement x to the hearer, the speaker believes that x is false or probably false (or, alternatively, the speaker does not believe that x is true), the speaker states x in a context in which the speaker thereby warrants the truth of x to the hearer, and the speaker does not take him- or herself to be not warranting the truth of what s/he says to the hearer. Meanwhile, Saul (2012, 3) argues that if the speaker is not the victim of linguistic error or malapropism or using figurative language such as metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, which referred also as conventional suspension (Heffer 2020, 120-124), then s/he lies if and only if the speaker says that p , the speaker believes p to be false, and the speaker take him- or herself to be in warranting context. The two definitions argue that the speaker warrants the truth of the statement or warrants the context, and the speaker lies if she does not take him- or herself in that condition. Although the definitions do not include intention to lie, warranting the truth or

the context may be perceived as having an intention. Below is an example to elaborate these definitions.

Someone asks Benny about the closing time of a shop which Benny knows for certain that the closing time is 8PM. For some reason, Benny decides to make a statement ‘the shop closes at 10 PM’ believing that the statement is false.

For Benny’s statement to be considered a lie, his false belief is not enough. According to the definitions, Benny lies if he warrants the truth of the statement or the context, which is by guaranteeing the truth of the statement. One way to guarantee the truth of the statement is by trying to appear certain and be reasonable. By doing so, Benny wants the person whom he lies to (or the hearer) to take the statement to be truthful which he initially believes to be false. In order for his statement to be believed as true, or for others believe that he believes his statement to be true, Benny should appear to believe his claim to be true. This purposeful façade belies mental states of want and desire. This *want* or *desire* mirrors the intention mentioned by Mahon’s (2008) in the previous page.

Stokke (2013) is another scholar who did not suggest the element of intention by integrating the theory of common ground in his definition. The definition is based on Stalnaker’s (1999) model of assertion. According to Stalnaker (1999), an assertion is an attempt to modify the common ground shared by the participants in the conversation. Accordingly, Stokke (2013, 49) states that the speaker lies to the hearer if and only if the speaker says that p , believes that p is false and proposes that p become a part of common ground. Common ground is usually considered as common knowledge or common beliefs shared by the speaker and hearer, or in other words, common ground can be thought of as the information that the speaker and hearer take for granted (Maier 2019). Maier (2019, 308) also suggests that updating common ground cannot be accomplished by the speaker alone. His suggestion is based on Stalnaker’s argument that the speaker can only propose an update. If lying is about proposing the believed-false to be updated to become a common ground, then the mental state of proposing is also similar to the mental state of *wanting* or *desiring*. This entails that, by proposing to update a common ground, the speaker simultaneously intends a statement to be believed false by the hearer.

Although the non-deceptionist scholars have provided definitions without the element of intention, this camp still has one thing in common with the scholars in the group of deceptionists. Both camps agree that the element of belief or subjective falsity is necessary in the determination of lie. In fact, none of the previously mentioned scholars hold that objective falsity is important for a lie to happen. Scholars referred to in this section work mainly in the

field of philosophy, whereas most scholars arguing for the objective falsity as the most important element of lying take the empirical approach to lying. In investigating the topic of lying, the current study uses an empirical approach since it can affirm or deny the validity of theories from a more philosophical approach in order to correctly understand and situate the current study in the field of lying, it is first necessary to focus on other empirical examinations of lying.

2.3 Empirical Approach to Lying

Empirical research is more commonly conducted within the field of lie detection. Researchers in this field mainly focus on discovering linguistic differences produced by liars and truth-tellers. Vrij (2008) claims that verbal cues, such as negative statements, generalizing items and self-references are relatively more consistent than non-verbal indicators of lying. Vrij (2008) also adds, truth-tellers provide more details and are able to tell something in a reversed chronological order. Furthermore, Undeutsch (1967) argues that memory of an actual experience differs in content and quality from statements based on invention or fantasy. It can be assumed that the tellers of an actual experience are truth-tellers, whereas the tellers of invention or fantasy are liars. The conclusion of such research always leads to the conception that the presence of the cues of lying does not necessarily indicate that a person is lying, rather, the cues make it more likely that a person is lying. The research of lie detection is generally based on the understanding that a lie is binary; either one is lying, or one is telling the truth. Meanwhile, empirical research on the topic of conception of lying, especially in the subfield of linguistics, such as semantics and pragmatics, and also in philosophy, lying and truth-telling is not described as a dichotomy (Chen, Hu and He, 2013, p. 395; Coleman and Kay, 1981, p. 27; Marsili, 2014), but rather as a spectrum. It means that a statement should not be interpreted as ‘either a lie or not a lie’, but as ‘more lie-like or less lie-like’.

As previously mentioned, many scholars in philosophy argue that false belief is required to define lying. Turri and Turri (2015), however, object based on their research with three experiments. Each experiment included a story for respondents to judge. All stories featured Jacob whose friend Mary was being searched by the authorities. The federal agents visited Jacob and asked Mary’s whereabouts. Mary was at the grocery store, but Jacob thought that she was at her brother’s house. The standard view of lying is Jacob lied if he said Mary was at the grocery store. The result of the first experiment supports this standard view. However, this result is due to respondents’ perspective-taking and expression of (dis)approval of Jacob’s conduct (Turri and Turri 2015, 163). Thus, second experiment was conducted in

which the result suggested that it was only a lie when Jacob's dishonest assertion was false, not when his dishonest assertion was true. The result of the second experiment was considered by Turri and Turri (2015, 165) as an artifact of the mode of questioning. Therefore, the third experiment was done by putting forward the following story to their respondents (Turri and Turri 2015, 167).

Jacob's friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will alert the public to serious corruption in the government. Soon some federal agents visit Jacob and ask where Mary is, in order to detain her. Jacob thinks that Mary is at her brother's house, so he tells the agents, "She is at the grocery store." In fact, Mary is at the grocery store.

According to the philosophers' definition which is mainly based on the belief of the speaker, Jacob's statement is a lie because he believes that Mary is somewhere else even though it turns out that his statement is objectively truthful. In regard to the story above, participants were asked if Jacob's statement is objectively true or false. Moreover, participants were asked if Jacob tried to lie and actually did lie, or Jacob tried to lie but only thinks he lied.⁸ The result shows that only ten percent of the respondents classified John's dishonest but true assertion as a lie, also the respondents perceived Jacob as trying to lie but only thinking that he lied (Turri and Turri 2015, 165-166). As a result, when a speaker asserts a dishonest statement that turns out to be true, the statement cannot be considered a lie. In this case, the speaker only thinks she is lying. Based on the findings of the whole experiments, Turri and Turri (2015) propose that the common meaning of *lie* requires objective falsity. These results have been challenged by Wiegmann, Samland and Waldmann (2016) who argue that the wording and the splitting response in the experiments lead the respondents to the findings. Having more numbers of respondents, Wiegmann, Samland and Waldmann (2016) reconducted the experiment by presenting two options to the respondents: (1) He tried to lie and actually did lie [although what he said turned out to be true] and (2) He tried to lie but only thinks he lied [because what he said turned out to be true]. The results exhibit that 81% of the respondents who were not alerted to pay attention to the objectivity of the statement considered Jacob's remark a lie, and 58% still considered the statement as a lie if they were alerted about the objective truth (Wiegmann, Samland and Waldmann 2016, 40). Wiegmann, Samland and Waldmann (2016) conclude that the standard subjective view regarding lying has no reason to be abandoned.⁹

⁸ These options were used by Turri and Turri (2015, 165) to find out if lie supports the subjective view as in the case of *Jacob actually did lie*; or lie supports the objective view in the case of *Jacob only thinks he lied*. The result suggests that most participants chose the latter option.

⁹ See also Wiegmann and Meibauer (2019) and Wiegmann, Rustchmann and Willemsen (2017) for the similar result in the field of empirical philosophy.

Possibly the most important piece of empirical research in relation to the current study is the original experiment by Coleman and Kay (1981). These scholars proposed a semantic analysis of the English word *lie* by isolating three elements that constitute prototypical lie. The elements are the following (Coleman and Kay 1981, 28).

- i. the proposition (P) is false,
- ii. the speaker (S) believes P to be false,
- iii. in uttering P, S intends to deceive an addressee (A).

As previously mentioned, these three elements fulfill Mahon’s (2015) four common conditions of lying. In the element (i), the proposition should be expressed into a statement in order for a lie to happen. This statement is aligned with Mahon’s (2015) statement condition. Furthermore, the element (ii) is the untruthful condition, and the element (iii) contains addressee and intention condition. The first element is usually referred to objective falsity or shortened *falsehood*, the second element refers to subjective belief or shortened *belief*, whereas the third element is the element of *intention*. According to Coleman and Kay (1981), the prototypical lie is characterized by falsehood, which is deliberate and intended to deceive, which means that a statement containing all three elements would be considered as a full-fledged lie or more lie-like statement, whereas a statement lacking one or more of the elements could still be classified as a lie, but to lesser degree or as a less lie-like statement. To test their hypothesis about a prototypical lie, Coleman and Kay (1981) constructed a questionnaire consisting of eight stories based on the permutations of the presence or absence of the elements. The following table exhibits the story-numbers with the element being present (+) or absent (-). For example, Story 1 in the questionnaire contains all three elements.¹⁰

Table 2-1 Stories and their elements

Story numbers	Falsehood	Belief	Intention
1	+	+	+
2	-	-	-
3	+	-	+
4	-	+	+
5	+	+	-
6	-	-	+
7	+	-	-
8	-	+	-

¹⁰ See Chapter 3 for the complete stories of the questionnaires.

The questionnaire was distributed to 71 native speakers of American English. However, four respondents were discarded from the analysis, thus 67 native speakers of American English were considered as valid respondents. These respondents were recruited at a university in the State of California, USA. Coleman and Kay (1981, 31) did not make other attempts in their sample other than the respondents' native language. Considering the wide range of use and the variety of English, this research might not provide a comprehensive interpretation of the English word *lie*. As for the result, Coleman and Kay (1981) suggested that the element (ii) where the speaker S believes P to be false, was the most important element for the native speakers of American English. The next most important element was intention, and the least important element was falsehood. The result of this research supports the philosophers' argument that belief of the speaker is the most important element in the definition of what constitute a lie.

2. 4 Cross-Cultural Research on Lying

Coleman and Kay's (1981) work was a prototype semantic approach, and the experiment was initially conducted to find out the prototypical elements of the English word *lie*. Compared to the philosophers mentioned in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 who only rely on their intuition and their own cultures to define lying, studies conducted by researchers who take the empirical approach may be adapted into several different languages and cultures. For example, Coleman and Kay's (1981) methodology has been used and is applicable in the field of pragmatics. The experiment has been adopted in several lingua-cultural groups. Therefore, the present work partially replicates Coleman and Kay's (1981) prototypical analysis of English by applying the same method for four different lingua-cultural groups. The main purpose is to investigate whether or not the concept of lying is different for these groups, and if so, to what degree. In addition, cultural considerations regarding the concept of lying will also be examined in order to understand these differences.

Yoshimura (1995)¹¹ was the first researcher who replicated the study. The purpose of the replicated study was to elaborate the prototypical elements contributing to the meaning of the Japanese word 嘘 *uso* 'lie'. Yoshimura (1995) translated the questionnaire created by Coleman and Kay (1981) into Japanese and distributed the questionnaire to Japanese respondents. The result was significantly different from the original study. For Japanese, the element of falsehood contributed the most to the interpretation of lying, followed by the element of belief as the next most important element. The element of intention became the least

¹¹ Yoshimura's (1995) work is only available in Japanese and could not be found online. However, Sakaba (2020) provides a thoroughly discussion about this replicated study.

important. Considering the number of participants was low, it is necessary to have another study with speakers of other Asian lingua-cultures.

Cole (1996)¹² reproduced Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment to investigate the distribution and the proportion of the semantic elements of the Arabic word كذبة *kathaba* 'lie' and if the native speakers of Arabic would have the same interpretation of lying as the native speakers of English. The original questionnaire containing eight stories was modified linguistically and culturally so it was appropriate to the Meccan Arabic speaking respondents, with an addition of two stories aimed to find out a cross-cultural difference (Cole 1996, 476). This study was built on the hypothesis that the interpretation of lying might be different from the American English respondents in Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment since the society of Meccan Arabic people was heavily influenced by the religion of Islam. The results were remarkably similar to the results of the study with native speakers of English. So, for Meccan Arabic speakers, subjective falsity is also the most important element, followed by intention and then falsehood. Based on the comments of the two additional stories, Cole (1996, 481-482) concluded that there are situations where lying is permitted, such as lying to reconcile between couples in order to make peace between them, and to protect oneself from great danger.

Hardin (2010) adopted Coleman and Kay's (1981) research in the Eastern Region of Ecuador to investigate the Spanish word *mentira* 'lie' and to explore the concept of lie for native speakers of Spanish in Ecuador. The stories of the questionnaire were also modified so the intended respondents perceived the stories as culturally and linguistically relevant. Hardin (2010, 3203) also added five more stories in the questionnaire. The additional stories involved some untruthful statements that are commonly made by the native speakers of Spanish in Ecuador, yet the statements are acceptable for them. The results show that just as in the original Coleman and Kay's (1981) and Cole's (1996) studies, belief is that the most important element for these particular Spanish speakers as well. The second most important element, however, was falsehood, rather than intention. Intention is considered to be less significant in the interpretation of lie for Spanish-speaking Ecuadorians. Therefore, in Ecuador, people would still give directions even though they are not familiar with the area, or a shopkeeper still tell the customer about the arrival of a product although she does not know it exactly. Ecuadorians do not want to appear unfriendly and unhelpful. These acts are considered *mentira piadosa* 'white lie' (Hardin 2010, 3207). Even so, both of the above-mentioned acts are still perceived as lies, but the desire to maintain the relationship prevailed over the need for truth and accuracy (Hardin 2010, 3209).

¹² Similar to the replicated study with Japanese speakers, the full text of Cole's (1996) article is not available online. Therefore, the description of this study is based on the review given by Hardin (2010).

Eichelberger (2012) developed a study to contrast the results of Hardin's (2010) study which was done in a small town in eastern Ecuador as it is mentioned above. Eichelberger (2012) worked with Spanish speakers in metropolitan Madrid. Eichelberger (2012) also examined how the second language learners of Spanish whose first language is English interpreted the Spanish word *mentira* 'lie'. The questionnaire was taken from Hardin's (2010) Spanish questionnaire in which there were eight stories, and from the original Coleman and Kay's (1981) study and five additional stories conducted by Hardin (2010). At the end of the questionnaire, there were three optional questions to give the respondents an opportunity to elaborate their personal experience. Regarding the second research question, the second language learners exhibited that they primarily rely on the first language pragmatic system, and gradually developed awareness in the second language system (Eichelberger 2012, 76).

The final replicated study to be addressed is the study conducted by Vajtai (2013) with Hungarian native speakers. The main purpose of the study is to discuss the assessment of Hungarian speakers regarding the argument in the original study by Coleman and Kay (1981). The study used a questionnaire with the linguistically and culturally modified version of the original stories and no additional stories. Although Vajtai (2013, 27) did not rule out the possible order of the important elements, where belief or subjective falsity was the strongest element as in the studies with English, Arabic, and Spanish respondents, Vajtai (2013) concluded intention to be the main element to be Hungarians' judgement of lie. Also, according to Hofstede's (1980) index score on individualism and collectivism, Hungarian society can be considered as an individualistic one¹³ and is almost as individualistic as British and American¹⁴. Given this particular characteristic, it stands to reason that the Hungarian results would be similar to those of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment whose participants were American English people.

These results from previous replications of Coleman and Kay's (1981) study, especially from Yoshimura (1995), clearly indicate that cultural forces are at play in the understanding and evaluation of lying. Thus, it makes sense to examine cross cultural studies of lying in order to refine this comprehension.

Much comparative research on the perception of lying demonstrate distinct results between Euro-American and Asian or Pacific lingua-cultures. On the topic of production of untruthful or lying discourse, the difference is even more clear. For example, Leal, Vrij, Vernham, Dalton, Jupe, Harvey, and Nahari (2018) conducted an experiment by interviewing

¹³ Holicza (2016) elaborates this explanation on index score of individualism versus collectivism regarding Hungarian society.

¹⁴ See <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/hungary,the-uk,the-usa/> for reference.

Chinese, Arabic, and English speakers. The participants in this study were asked to describe their visit to a nearby restaurant. Some participants were asked to be truthful, while the other was encouraged to provide untruthful information. The results show that there are cultural cues differentiating the participants. Chinese and Arabic participants reported fewer details and the verbal cues of deception emerged less frequently in these groups, compared to the results from the experiment with English participants. Leal et al. (2018) claim that the results are due to the fact that Chinese and Arabic speakers belong to cultures with high-context communication while the English speakers to low-context communication. This perspective on cultural differences in communication styles is suggested by Hall (1976). According to Hall (1976), in low-context cultures, a more explicit communication style is used than in the high-context cultures. Furthermore, the difference regarding the communication style seems to affect the acceptance of lying where people from high-context cultures tend to consider what other people are thinking. The impact of these two cultural communication orientations is well illustrated in the research. For example, Thai people tend to hide displeasure by saying something nice (Intachakra 2011) and Koreans judge truthfulness based on how they think others would judge (Hee and Ahn 2007). In addition, Samoans are inclined to lie if the lie is beneficial to their family or group (Aune and Walters 1994, 165), and Euro-Americans accept lies that self-flatter (Mealy, Walter and Urrutia 2007). Clearly culture influences how people understand and respond to lies

There are only a few studies conducted particularly on the topic of how lying is defined and judged. As mentioned before, Yoshimura (1995) replicated Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment among Japanese speakers and yielded different results. For Japanese speakers, a lie was found to be defined according to the falsehood of the statement, rather than the belief of the speaker regarding the statement. Sakaba (2020) uses the perspective of speech act to elaborate the findings of this replicated study of Yoshimura (1995). According to Sakaba (2020), the Japanese word 嘘 *uso* 'lie' is not necessarily equivalent to the English word *lie*, since the Japanese word can be used as a noun and interjection whereas the English word *lie* is a noun or verb (Sakaba 2020, 44). Moreover, the Japanese word *uso* has more to do with the untruthful statement rather than untruthful attitude. In other words, the word *uso* is used to refer to 'what someone says is not true' (Sakaba 2020, 49) and the Japanese word *uso* is used without a negative evaluation to convey that 'someone did something bad'. Sakaba (2020, 50) also adds that *uso* does not have any evaluation nor the intention to hide the truth which fits the result from Yoshimura (1995) that intention is the least important element of prototypical lie for Japanese people. Sakaba (2020, 54) concludes there is a difference between the meaning of words *lie* and *uso* pointing out that the difference of the perception that telling *uso* is not always

considered as something bad, unlike telling a lie. Sakaba (2020) argues that ethnocentrism plays a role in the conceptualization of lying, including the reprehensiveness of lying (considered to be universal).

In 2002, Brown studied lying in Mexico and those findings parallel the work of Yoshimura (1995) in that falsehood is the strongest element of lying. Brown (2002) studied how caregivers of Tzeltal people of Mexico use conventional social lies,¹⁵ which she described as the kind of speech that no one expects to be true. In the reference to Coleman and Kay's (1981) result about English prototypical *lie*, Brown (2002, 269) comments that falsehood of the statement is the strongest criterion for a *lot* 'lie' to happen. Furthermore, unlike for the English-speaking people from Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment, subjective falsity was the weakest criterion for Tzeltal people. The Tzeltal folk model of truth or lying included a presumption that everyone lies for self-interest, especially in the case of influencing others or deflecting unwanted consequences of one's actions. Thus, like in the case of Japanese people, lying is also not perceived as morally bad or anti-social. This moral neutrality toward lying indicates that no particular value is placed on truth and sincerity even though it is clear that there is a distinction between what is true and what is not true for Tzeltal people (Brown 2002, 263).

Danziger (2010) worked with people in Belize and also found cultural differences with finding that is similar to the two previously mentioned studies. Danziger (2010) conducted a comparative study with English speakers of American and Mopan Mayan speakers of Belize. The study was adapted from Coleman and Kay's (1981) study with four associated judgement questions. The first question is about the moral judgement of lying: whether it is considered good, bad or neutral to lie. The second, third and fourth question comprise situations where correspondents were required to give a judgement. The second situational question is similar to Coleman and Kay's (1981) story 1 in which elements of falsehood, belief and intention are present in the situation. Moreover, the third and fourth situational questions are similar to story 7 (the story with the element of falsehood only) and story 8 (the story with the element of belief only) from the experiment of Coleman and Kay's (1981) research, respectively. The results demonstrate that the blameworthiness of Mopan Mayan *tus* 'lie' is much greater than that of English *lie*. Moreover, regarding the prototypical lie in the second situational question, all consultants showed a remarkable agreement. American judgements, however, appeared to depend more on the speaker's belief, whereas for the Mopan, whether the utterance was literally false mattered more (Danziger 2010, 210). To put it another way, Mopan Mayan perceive the

¹⁵ Similarly to jokes, irony and teasing, untruthfulness in conventional social lies are meant to be conceived by the hearer.

literal falsehood as more reprehensible, regardless of the belief or desire states of the utterer. Danziger (2010, 204) also adds that it does not mean that Mopan Mayan people do not have belief and desire states. These mental states exist and are commonly used in their talks. It is only that the Mopan Mayan people do not consider these mental states to be relevant to the assignment of blame for wrongdoing.

Finally, Chen, Hu and He (2013) examined the cross-cultural validity of the definition of lie. The study includes a questionnaire containing nine stories to be judged for groups of American English and Chinese speakers. Each story has two questions concerning whether the story has a lie and whether the lie is (un)acceptable. Both of the groups responded to the questionnaire in their respective languages. The results demonstrate that Chinese speakers seem to display more tolerance for untruthful sentences compared with Americans. Chen, Hu and He (2013, 391) also concluded that there are two requirements for a lie; (1) an untrue assertion is necessary for a lie to happen, and (2) the speaker's intention to lie and motivation to lie (benefit, gain, harm) plays a role. Chen, Hu and He (2013) support Coleman and Kay's (1981) assertion that lying is not binary in nature, but rather a scalar notion. Although the study is more recent, there are three objections regarding the questionnaire used in Chen, Hu and He's (2013) study. First, Chen, Hu and He (2013, 398-399) included scenarios with metaphor and joking. Mahon (2008, 227) points out that there is a difference between making an untruthful statement while believing that one is in a context where the norm of truthfulness is in effect (as in the case of joking and using figurative language such as irony, metaphor or hyperbole), and making an untruthful statement while intending that the statement be believed to be true (as in the case of lying). Even though the result from Chen, Hu and He's (2013) study shows that both scenarios are less of a lie, there is no need to integrate metaphor and joking in the questionnaire as these two are not commonly considered to be lies. Secondly, Chen, Hu and He (2013) do not consider the element of false belief to be a required element to define a lie even though English speakers in Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment perceived false belief or subjective falsity as the most important element of lying. This perception is also shared by speakers of Spanish, Arabic, and Hungarian, but not by Japanese, Mexican Tzeltal, and Belize's Mopan Mayan speakers. Third, there has been no further cross-cultural investigation of lying which builds on the cross-cultural work of Chen, Hu and He (2013) which might hinder the cross-cultural investigation on conception of lying since the dissertation is cross-cultural comparative in nature.

As indicated, several Western scholars mention belief as the most common element in the perception and judgement of lying. These definitions, however, contradict the findings from different cultural groups. Thus, it is possible to say that the consideration of false belief in the definition of lying is ethnocentric and not universal, given that the definition of lying and the

interpretation of false belief differ from one linguistic group to the next. Given the usefulness and replicability of Coleman and Kay's (1981) study, it makes sense to use it as Yoshimura (1995), Cole (1996), Hardin (2010), Eichelberger (2012) and Vajtai (2013) did in their studies of lying in different cultures. The methodology is particularly useful in bringing the folk conceptualization of lying and the theoretical conceptualization of lying into congruence as Dynel and Meibauer (2016) suggest. Therefore, the adaptation of Coleman and Kay's (1981) methodology is a feasible way in order to theoretically conceptualize the perception and judgement of lying.

Since cross cultural studies tend to reveal different results, it is important to provide an overview on the literature regarding potential social or cultural factors in the interpretation of lying. This topic is elaborated in the next section.

2. 5 Factors Involved in the Interpretation of Lying

In empirical research involving respondents to give judgements on people's acts, it is arguably logical that the respondents' social and cultural background and understanding might play a role in their judgements. A host of cultural and social factors have been involved in the respondents' interpretation of lying according to the previous research. These factors might also influence the interpretation of the respondents in the present study.

In the original study, Coleman and Kay (1981, 40) mentioned that many respondents provided comments pointing out the relationship of the characters in story 3, that is a mother and a son, may have an effect on the respondents' judgement. Meanwhile, in story 6 where a female character is in a relationship with a male character, one American respondent perceived that because they are not engaged, she is not compelled to share some information, or in other words, she may withhold information from her boyfriend. However, others commented that 'the seriousness of the relationship-type makes it a lie' (Coleman and Kay 1981, 40). The relationship between the speaker and the hearer is also found to be one of the determining factors of interpretation of lying among Arabic speakers of Mecca Cole (1996) and Hungarian speakers (Vajtai 2013, 27).

Cole (1996) suggests age as a variable which may impact lying in that a false statement might not be considered as lying if it is stated by a child since they do not know the meaning of lying (Cole 1996, 479). Therefore, the Arabic interpretation of lie depends on the age of the person who makes the statement, and this has yet to be examined as a factor in other studies.

As it is mentioned before, the religion of Islam may influence the interpretation of lying by Meccan Arabic people in Cole's (1996) study. This is inferred based on the comments to a

story where the character claims to be sick to avoid taking a test and coincidentally becomes sick. Her statement becomes true because God gives her the illness. Furthermore, a respondent even quoted one saying from Islamic prophet that one should not pretend to be sick because one will become sick and will die (Cole 1996, 480). In a less religious group such as the Spanish, the illness is viewed as a bad karma (Eichelberger 2012, 73). Danziger (2010) also addresses religion-related explanation based on comments from Mopan Mayan consultants of her study. According to the comments, God plays a role so that believed-false statement turns out to be true in order for *tus* 'lie' not to happen. False statement and stories are prohibited among this society based on the religious concept of *tzik* 'respect' (Danziger 2010, 214).

The possibility of cultural factors involving in the interpretation of lie was initially mentioned by Hardin (2010) in her replicated study of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment. It was previously mentioned that Ecuadorians do not want to be unhelpful or to give a bad impression through the act of *mentira piadosa* 'white lie' (Hardin 2010, 3207). This, act is based on fundamental cultural ideas of *confianza* 'trust and closeness in a relationship' and *calor humano* 'warmth, friendliness, doing good to others', and it is also shared among Spanish speakers of Madrid (Eichelberger 2012, 64).

2. 6 Typology of Lying

One of the aims of this dissertation is to explore the perception of types of lie by different groups of lingua-cultures. For this purpose, this final section in the Chapter 2 will review various taxonomies of lie. Recall that the scholars dealing with the topic of deception and lying are divided into two camps (Mahon 2019, 33), (1) deceptionists who argue that intention to deceive is necessary to define a lie, and (2) non-deceptionists who are against this argument. Lackey (2013) who is a deceptionist suggests three types of lies as a counterargument to the non-deceptionists, they are as follows. (i) bald-faced lie, (ii) knowledge lie, and (iii) coercion lie. The brief characterization and explanation of these types of lies will be presented below.

Bald-faced lie is a type of lie where both the speaker and the hearer realize that the lie is indeed a lie, or in other words, both interlocutors know that the speaker states untruthful statement and the hearer knows that the speaker does not believe the statement. Philosophers such as Carson (2010), Fallis (2012), and Sorensen (2007) considered bald-faced lie as a lie. However, deceptionists such as Dynel (2015) argue that bald-faced lie is not a lie, but rather an overt truthfulness, meaning that the untruthfulness is available to the hearer. Bald-faced lie has similar status with other figurative language such as metaphor and hyperbole, where bald-faced lie is used in special conversational contexts to communicate various contextually motivated

implicated meanings (Dyner 2018, 355). A bald-faced lie is not an assertion since bald-faced liars have no commitment to the truth of their statement (Meibauer 2014). For Meibauer (2014), both the speaker and the hearer mutually know that what the speaker says is false, and the speaker's utterances are untruthful, and this untruthfulness leads to conversational implicature.

The second type of lie is knowledge lie, which is defined as a lie intended to prevent the hearer from knowing that the proposition is untrue, but the lie itself is not intended to deceive the hearer into believing that proposition. According to the non-deceptionists such as Sorensen (2010), the intention of deceive is not present for this type of lie. Meanwhile, the deceptionists argue that stating a knowledge lie requires a speaker to conceal some information. By concealing information, the speaker can be considered as being deceptive. The last type of lie to counter argue the non-deceptionists is the coercion-lie. Coercion-lies occur when a speaker believes that p is false, the speaker states that p without an intention to deceive, but the speaker is coerced or frightened into doing so (Lackey 2013).

The present dissertation mainly discusses and uses methodology from Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment. However, none of the types of lies mentioned above are present in any of the stories of Coleman and Kay (1981). Therefore, I want to explore three other types of lies which are reflected in the stories of the questionnaire constructed by Coleman and Kay (1981). The types of lies to be addressed are half-truth, untruthful implicature and white lie. In the next part of the section, the arguments of the scholars regarding these types of lies will be elaborated. After that, I will review previous research conducted in regard to any of these types of lie. And finally, I will present the story from the experiment of Coleman and Kay (1981) which might represent the particular type of lie.

2. 6. 1 Half-truth

There are several other terms used to refer half-truth, such as omission or withholding information. When a speaker makes a half-truth statement, the speaker leaves the hearer in the state of ignorance regarding the information. Even though the statement is not necessarily untruthful, some scholars dealing with the topic of deception and lying (Chisholm and Feehan, 1977, Ekman, 2009, Mahon, 2007) argue that it is still possible to cause the hearer to have a false belief by limiting the amount of information provided by a speaker. Scholars disagree on whether to consider half-truth as a lie or not. For some scholars, half-truth is not a lie since it does not involve using a language to make a statement (Dyner, 2011, 153-154, Mahon, 2019). Meanwhile, for other group of scholars, a half-truth is a lie due to withholding relevant information can be deceiving (Ekman, 2009, 28, Vincent and Castelfranchi, 1981, 762, Vrij, 2008, 16). The middle-ground argument in this discussion is suggested by Egré and Icard

(2019) who argue that a half-truth is neither clearly false nor clearly true, but that a half-truth can be a lie if the statement fails to be unambiguously true. Regarding Grice's (1989) Cooperative Principle and its maxims, a half-truth may deceive somebody since it violates Grice's (1989) first maxim of Quantity (Dyner, 2011, 153-156, Meibauer, 2014, 104, Vincent and Castelfranchi, 1981, 762).

Previous research focusing on the categorization of half-truth or omission was done by Wiegmann, Rutschmann, and Willemsen (2017) by asking their participants to choose between two options, to (rather) agree or disagree to the statement "Tom lied to Jane" in regards to the following scenario (Wiegmann, Rutschmann and Willemsen 2017, 605-606).

Jane recently found out that her son Tom got a couple of bad marks at school and might have to repeat a year if his marks do not improve. When Jane talks to Tom's teacher, she learns that Tom often does not do his homework. The next day, Tom gets a lot of homework. He knows that if he does all of it, he will not be able to meet his friend in the afternoon. When he comes home, Jane asks: "What's your homework?" In order to avoid telling his mother that he got a lot of homework to do, Tom only tells his mother about the English homework but does not mention the homework in maths and biology: "I have to read a chapter of this novel for my English lessons."

The results of this experimental study exhibit that the majority of participants (78%) perceive that it is possible to lie by omitting some truth.

As previously mentioned, a half-truthful statement is not necessarily false. In regard to Coleman and Kay's (1981) second and third element of prototypical lie, when a speaker is making a half-truth statement, the speaker believes the statement to be truthful but intends to deceive others. So, the element of belief is absent, whereas the element of intention is present. Below is an example of half-truth based on the absence of falsehood and false belief and on the presence of intention.

Charlie has been a manager of production of a company since 2020. In one meeting with workers, he told the workers "This year's financial loss is the smallest that the company has made ever since I took the position!" It was indeed truthful that the financial loss at that year was the smallest, but it was also true that the financial loss has steadily decreased since 2015 and Charlie knows about this.

Based on the situation above, the statement that Charlie made is truthful according to the speaker's point of view and the factual situation. Also, Charlie believes what she is saying is truthful, but he has an intention to cause a false belief to other workers by withholding relevant information from them. As for Coleman and Kay's (1981) first element, the statement should be subjectively and objectively true, so the element of falsehood should be absent. Accordingly, half-truth is represented in Coleman and Kay's (1981) story 6 [- - +].

John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Mary's ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary, 'Have you seen Valentino this week?' Mary answers, 'Valentino's been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.' Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with Valentino the night before.

2. 6. 2 Untruthful Implicature

Other terms used to refer an untruthful implicature are indirect lying (Falkenberg 1988) (Vincent and Castelfranchi 1981), falsely implicating (Adler 1997), misleading (Saul 2012), and paltering (Schauer and Zeckhauser 2009). Meibauer (2019) uses the term *lying while saying the truth* to convey untruthful implicature. This lie occurs when a speaker lies if and only if the speaker asserts p while not believing that p , or the speaker conversationally implicates on the basis of the speaker's assertion that q while not believing that q (Meibauer 2019).

Wiegmann and Meibauer (2019) reviewed some studies on lying by falsely implicating where the findings of the studies vary and contradicted to each other. For example, Weissman and Terkourafi (2018, 9) presented one of their cases as below.

Rumors have spread about an incident in the art studio yesterday. Alex was in the studio all day and saw Sarah, frustrated with a project, pick up a hammer, walk over to a statue and kick the statue over with her foot, causing it to smash all over the floor. The following day, Alex talks about the incident. Mark, 'I heard Sarah had a meltdown in the art studio yesterday! What happened?' Alex, 'You should have been there! In a fit of a rage, Sarah picked up a hammer and broke a statue.'

On the case above, the statement made by Alex implies that Sarah was on a rage and broke a statue with a hammer. This statement creates a more negative perception about Sarah's rage in comparison to a statement in which a statue was broken because it was kicked. Among 15 cases in the experimental study (Weissman and Terkourafi 2018), 11 cases were not considered to be lies by the respondents. On the contrary, Antomo, Paluch, Paul, Müller, and Thalman (2018) find an evidence that supports the argument that deceptive or untruthful implicatures can be perceived as a lie. In the study, one of the stories for a deceptive implicature is below (Antomo, et al. 2018, 139).

It's Otto's birthday and he gives out chocolate bars at kindergarten. Paul immediately eats his one. When he gets home, he takes a second chocolate bar from the box of sweets in the kitchen. Paul's mother comes in and asks, 'Paul, why do you have a chocolate bar in your hand? Did you take one from the box of sweets again?' Paul responds, 'It's Otto's birthday today and he brought chocolate bars for everyone.'

There seems to be a blurred line between deceptive or untruthful implicatures and half-truth, where some relevant information is being concealed in order for the hearer to infer different meaning regarding the speaker's statement. Thus, the example provided in the previous sub-section about Charlie may be considered as an untruthful implicature since he wants to imply that his presence in the company bring smaller financial loss. Story 6 [- - +] from Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment might also have an untruthful implicature. When Mary says that Valentino has been sick for the past two weeks, she wants John to infer the implicature that Mary would not have met Valentino due to his condition. But story 3 [+ - +] of Coleman and Kay (1981) can also be taken into consideration of having an untruthful implicature.

Pigfat believes he has to pass the candy store to get to the pool hall, but he is wrong about this because the candy store has moved. Pigfat's mother doesn't approve of pool. As he is going out the door intending to go to the pool hall, Pigfat's mother asks him where he is going. He says, 'I am going by the candy store.'

The above story may also have an untruthful implicature because Pigfat's statement implies that he would just go by the candy store, and not to the pool hall. The paraphrased fragment below is created to elaborate how this particular story can be considered as an untruthful implicature.

Mother : Where are you going?
 Pigfat : I am going by the candy store.

Using the definition suggested by Meibauer (2019), Pigfat's remark above is *p*, meanwhile *q* or Pigfat's intended implicature is 'I am just going by the candy store, and not to anywhere else.' As for the case of this story, Pigfat does not believe that *q*. So, this implicature or *q* is untruthful because Pigfat intends to go somewhere else. The concern here is that Pigfat's statement is subjectively truthful, but objectively false since the candy store has been moved. Therefore, in addressing untruthful implicature, both stories might be used.

2. 6. 3 White Lies

The last type of lie to be discussed here is white lie, which is usually referred to with other terms in social psychology, such as prosocial lie or a lie with benevolent motives or socially useful effects (Dietz 2019). Dietz (2019) also argued that white lies can be used in a narrower and broader sense. In the narrower sense, a white lie indicates a falsehood that is not meant to injure anyone (Bok 1999). In the broader sense, the lie functions as a comprehensive concept

covering all lies that are morally allowed or even needed for some reasons, such as social benefit or cases of defense. The broader sense follows the Platonic tradition about the perception and acceptance of lie. According to Plato, there are circumstances where a lie can be justified, but the lies are encouraged more to support the rulers of ideal state (Mahon 2019).

Dietz (2019) also compiles three main oppositions to white and prosocial lies:

- (1) The condition of truthfulness where lying cannot be justified in any circumstances. If there are lies allowed in certain situations, then the lies would undermine the general law and the integrity of the social community (Kant 1949). This approach is based on Aristotelian approach who believes that all lies should be condemned. Aristotle argues that truthful person is the one who is truthful in what he says and in how he lives (Mahon 2019).
- (2) Tolerating white lies will contribute to the loss of social trust since any lie damages the reliance (Mill 1987).
- (3) The violation of freedom and the autonomy of the addressee since lies force a person to serve somebody else's will (Schopenhauer 1969).

In the pragmatic context, these arguments are rather weak since white lies are generally acceptable for the purpose of politeness. What is considered a white lie depends of the definition. According to Terkourafi (2019), white lies do not qualify as lies under approaches requiring the speaker to have the intention that the hearer will believe the false statement, and also under a different set of approaches that require lies to be morally wrong. Previous replicated studies (Cole 1996, Eichelberger 2012, Hardin 2010) of Coleman and Kay's (1981) work indicate that white lies in story 5 [+ + -] are still lies even though they are harmless, and white lies are necessary to maintain a good and harmonious social relationship. Here is another example of a white lie similar to Coleman and Kay's (1981) story 5.

It is a week before Christmas and Emily decides to buy the newest edition of a game console for her brother, Damien. Although she has tried her best to find it, she could not find one since it sold out. So, she just bought the previous edition of the console. On Christmas day, Damien opens the gift. Although he does not like the gift, he says to Emily, "Thank you. This is what I have always wanted!" Damien does not believe his own words and he does not try to make Emily believe as well.

A white lie is generally understood as a statement believed to be false by the speaker, but the speaker has no intention to make the hearer believes what s/he says. Therefore, a white lie constitutes the element of falsehood and belief being present and the element of intent being absent.

This chapter has presented a comprehensive and critical overview of the previous literature on the notion of lying, starting from the philosophical and linguistic approaches to the definition of lying, and then isolated the elements in the operational definition(s) used by scholars in their examinations of lying. I have also outlined the empirical research, both cross-culturally and comparatively, on lying in order to test the philosophers' definition of lying. This chapter has ended with some outlines of the taxonomies of lies. In the following chapter, I will deliver the methodology of the present dissertation, which is mainly from Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment.

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I present the research questions and methodology used for the research reported in this dissertation. The experiments were mainly based on Coleman and Kay's (1981) study. First, in Section 3. 1, I outline the research questions of the dissertation. After that, in Section 3. 2, I give a description about how the questionnaires were developed, which is based on the original questionnaire containing at least eight stories adapted from Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment. Next, in Section 3. 3, I provide information concerning respondents in the four research projects. Finally, in Section 3. 4, I briefly explain the method of the data analysis.

3. 1 Research Questions

Before reviewing the methodology used for the experiments, it is necessary to discuss some questions that I wanted to address while conducting the experiments.

As elaborated before, all elements appear in the original study with English native speakers (Coleman and Kay 1981), as well as in the replicated studies with Arabic native speakers (Cole 1996), Spanish speakers (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012), Japanese native speakers (Yoshimura 1995), and Hungarian native speakers (Vajtai 2013). The first question I consider for this dissertation is:

(1) According to native speakers of different lingua-cultures, does the perception of the word 'lie' in their respective languages involve the three prototypical elements; namely falsehood, belief, and intention as suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981)?

There were four studies conducted with four different lingua-cultural groups. Therefore, the first research question has four sub-questions. The sub-questions are: (i) Does the perception of the Indonesian word *bohong* 'lie' involve the three prototypical elements of lie? (ii) Does the perception of the Mandarin word 谎话 *huǎnghuà* 'lie' involve the three prototypical elements of lie? (iii) Does the perception of the Hungarian word *hazugság* 'lie' involve the three prototypical elements of lie? (iv) Does the perception of Russian word ложь *lozh'* 'lie' involve the three prototypical elements of lie? Following the results from the previous replicated studies, it was expected that people from each lingua-cultural group investigated in this dissertation would have a perception of the lie involving all three prototypical elements.

The order of the elements in terms of importance in the original study (Coleman and Kay 1981) is belief>intent>falsehood. This result is similarly exhibited in the study with Arabic native speakers (Cole 1996). However, the order of the elements is slightly different from the results of the studies of Spanish speakers (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012). The order of the

elements in both studies with Spanish speakers is belief>>falsehood>intent. Meanwhile, for Japanese (Yoshimura 1995), as cited by Sakaba (2020), the order of the elements is falsehood>belief>intent, whereas for Hungarian (Vajtai 2013), the order is intent>belief>>falsehood. Based on these differences of the order of the element, the second research question for the dissertation is:

(2) Assuming the three prototypical elements involved in the experimented lingua-cultural groups, what is the order of the elements from the strongest to the weakest?

This second research question also delivers four sub-questions: (i) What is the order of the elements of the prototypical lie for Indonesians? (ii) What is the order of the elements of the prototypical lie for Mandarin Chinese speakers? (iii) What is the order of the elements of the prototypical lie for Hungarians in the experiment? (iv) What is the order of the elements of the prototypical lie for Russians? In this dissertation, it was expected that the order of the prototypical elements for Indonesians and Mandarin Chinese speakers might mirror the results of the Japanese study, whereas the order for Hungarians and Russians might be identical to the findings from the Coleman and Kay's (1981) original study or the replicated study with Spanish speakers of Madrid (Eichelberger 2012).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are some cultural or social factors involved in the interpretation of lying by Spanish (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012) and Arabic native speakers (Cole 1996). This argument brings us to the third research question:

(3) Are there any cultural or social factors involved in the interpretation of lying by the different lingua-cultural groups?

Again, this research question has four sub-questions depending on the studied group (i) Are there any cultural or social factors determining the interpretation of lying by Indonesians? (ii) Are there any cultural or social factors determining the interpretation of lying by Chinese people? (iii) Are there any cultural or social factors determining the interpretation of lying by Hungarians? (iv) Are there any cultural or social factors determining the interpretation of lying by Russians? Considering the experimented groups differ linguistically and culturally from each other, it was predicted that each group would have some cultural or social factors affecting their evaluation of situations where a lie is involved.

Lastly, I also want to find out the perception of different types of lies as presented in the previous chapters, namely half-truth, untruthful implicature, and white lies. Thus, the last research question I consider is:

(4) How do Indonesian, Chinese, Hungarian, and Russian lingua-cultural groups perceive different types of lies?

In details, the last research question is elaborated into three sub-questions: (i) How do the different lingua-cultural groups categorize and evaluate half-truth? (ii) How do the different lingua-cultural groups categorize and evaluate untruthful implicature? And (iii) How do the different lingua-cultural groups categorize and evaluate white lies? Based on the previous study and the expectation for Research Question 2 in which Asian lingua-cultural groups would have the element of factuality as the most important element, then it was expected that Indonesian and Chinese people might have different perception of half-truth and untruthful implicature whether they can be considered as lies or not. As for white lies, the elements of factuality and belief are included. Therefore, all lingua-cultural groups would still have regarded these lies as lies.

3. 2 Developing the Research Instrument

Data was collected through questionnaires adapted from Coleman and Kay's (1981) study. Each questionnaire contained at least eight stories from the original questionnaire which were modified to be linguistically and culturally appropriate for each lingua-cultural group of participants. The adapted stories will be given in the subsequent chapters (Chapters 4-7). The stories were adapted by means of two-ways of translation process with a help of native-speakers. First, the questionnaires were translated from English into the languages at stakes. After that, the questionnaires were translated back to English in order to have a consistent and relevant translation which fits the original version.

The basic eight stories are formed relying on the permutation of the three elements of the prototypical lie as proposed by Coleman and Kay (1981, 28). The elements are usually configured as [false], [belief], and [intent]. Coleman and Kay (1981, 28) also claim that a prototypical lie consists of all three elements. The positive [+] and negative [-] symbols after each story below signify the presence and the absence of the elements, respectively. For example, Story 1, which is considered to contain prototypical lie, has symbols of [+ + +] meaning that the story contains falsehood, false belief and an intention to deceive. Meanwhile, Story 5 is described to have symbols of [+ + -], which means that this particular story has falsehood and false belief, but it is without an intention of the speaker to deceive the speaker. The original stories from Coleman and Kay's (1981, 31-32) study are as follows.

1. Moe has eaten the cake Juliet was intending to serve to company. Juliet asks Moe, 'Did you eat the cake?' Moe says, 'No.' Did Moe lie? [+ + +]
2. Dick, John, and H.R. are playing golf. H.R. steps on Dick's ball. When Dick arrives and

- sees his ball mashed into the turf, he says, ‘John, did you step on my ball?’ John replies, ‘No, H.R. did it.’ Did John lie? [– – –]
3. Pigfat believes he has to pass the candy store to get to the pool hall, but he is wrong about this because the candy store has moved. Pigfat’s mother doesn’t approve of pool. As he is going out the door intending to go to the pool hall, Pigfat’s mother asks him where he is going. He says, ‘I am going by the candy store.’ Did Pigfat lie? [+ – +]
 4. One morning Katerina has an arithmetic test she hasn’t studied for, and so she doesn’t want to go to school. She says to her mother, ‘I’m sick.’ Her mother takes her temperature, and it turns out to Katerina’s surprise that she really is sick, later that day developing the measles. Did Katerina lie? [– + +]
 5. Schmallowitz is invited to dinner at his boss’s house. After a dismal evening enjoyed by no one, Schmallowitz says to his hostess, ‘Thanks, it was a terrific party’ Schmallowitz doesn’t believe it was a terrific party, and he really isn’t trying to convince anyone he had a good time, but is just concerned to say something nice to his boss's wife, regardless of the fact that he doesn’t expect her to believe it. Did Schmallowitz lie? [+ + –]
 6. John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Mary’s ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary, ‘Have you seen Valentino this week?’ Mary answers, ‘Valentino’s been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.’ Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with Valentino the night before. Did Mary lie? [– – +]
 7. Two patients are waiting to be wheeled into the operating room. The doctor points to one and says, ‘Is Jones here the appendectomy or the tonsillectomy?’ Nurse Braine has just read the charts. Although she is anxious to keep her job, she has nevertheless confused the charts in her mind and replies, ‘The appendectomy,’ when in fact poor Jones is the one scheduled for tonsillectomy. Did Nurse Braine lie? [+ – –]
 8. Superfan has got tickets for the championship game and is very proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, ‘Listen, Superfan, any day you don’t come to work, you better have a better excuse than that.’ Superfan says, ‘I will.’ On the day of the game, Superfan calls in and says, ‘I can’t come to work today, Boss, because I’m sick.’ Ironically, Superfan doesn’t get to go to the game because the slight stomachache he felt on arising turns out to be ptomaine poisoning. So Superfan was really sick when he said he was. Did Superfan lie? [– + –]

Two remarks are in order concerning these eight stories. First, there are two controlling stories where respondents are expected to answer them correctly. Story 1 containing all

elements was created as a sample of an ordinary lie, whereas Story 2 without any element was constructed as an ordinary true statement. Second, respondents who answered wrong for either of these stories would be considered as invalid and their responses would not be included in the analysis. This exclusion is based on the assumption that the particular respondents might be unwilling or ingenuine to take the questionnaires. By this methodological decision, the present study follows Coleman and Kay's (1981) consideration.

A scoring method used by Coleman and Kay (1981, 30) was also utilized in the present study. The scoring is based on the combination of responses from two questions. These questions are to evoke the scale of the degree of lying and degree of certainty. The questions were placed after each story and an optional comment section was also provided so the respondents could describe reasons underlying their responses. However, there was a small change made in the experiment with Russian speakers.¹⁶ The change is about the comment section. Instead of being a non-obligatory separate section, the comment section was integrated into an option under the certainty part.

The original study (Coleman and Kay 1981, 30) complies the following questions.


It was {a lie / not a lie / I can't say}

I am {very sure / fairly sure / not too sure} most others would agree with the choice I just circled.

A 7-scoring scale was constructed by Coleman and Kay (1981) from the combination of the two responses above. 7 is the most prototypical lie, while 1 is the least prototypical lie. The score 7 was assigned when the respondent was very sure that the character's utterance in a story was a lie. Score 6 was assigned when the respondent was fairly sure that the story contained a lie and score 5 was assigned when the respondent was not too sure that the character lied. Score 4 was given when the respondent chose "I can't say" in the first question. When the respondent made this choice, the response of the second questions was disregarded following Coleman and Kay's analysis (1981, 30). The lower scores were given when the respondent thought the story did not contain a lie. 3 was provided when the respondent was not too sure about the story not having a lie. 2 was assigned when the respondent was fairly sure that the story having no lie. Finally, score 1 was given when the respondent was very sure that the story did not contain a lie. Figure 3-1 below exhibits the 7-scoring scale obtained from the combination of the options given to the respondents. The 7-scoring scale was applied across all experiments with different speakers of languages.

¹⁶ See Section 7. 2. Method of this dissertation for the comprehensive reasons.

Figure 3-1 The 7-scoring scale



3.3 Respondents

There were four lingua-cultural groups of respondents participating in four different research projects, namely Indonesian, Chinese, Hungarian and Russian. All respondents were recruited to fill the questionnaire through an online platform *Google Form* in the experiments with native speakers of Indonesian, Hungarian and Russian. Meanwhile, the experiment with Mandarin Chinese native speakers were asked to fill the questionnaire using 问卷星 *wènjuàn xīng*. It is important to note that the sample respondents were not distributed evenly. For example, in Chinese experiment, more respondents were female and below the age of 20 years. As for the Hungarian experiment, there were more male respondents. However, each experiment successfully managed to reach at least 120 respondents, although the number of respondents that were taken into consideration for the analysis differed in the four research projects. Following the methodological rules provided above, respondents were considered valid if they answered stories 1 and 2 correctly. Invalid respondents were discarded from the analysis. Each chapter, from Chapter 4 to 7, provides the detailed demographical information of the participants of the investigated groups.

3.4 Data Analysis

The mean scores of each story were obtained by accumulating the responses from each respondent and then dividing the numbers by the number of valid respondents. Although, each experiment has at least 120 respondents, the number of valid respondents varies. It depends on the rule regarding stories 1 and 2 which had to be answered correctly in some studies but not others in order to be included in the analysis. A table is constructed to show the total and the mean scores for each story for every experiment. When the mean score is between 3.01 and 4.99, it is considered that the respondents in the experiment have uncertain perception regarding

the lie in the story. The lie is neither weak nor strong. A figure is also made to exhibit the stories in the lie-value continuum wherein a story appearing on the right side has a more lie-like situation, whereas a story on the left side has a less lie-like situation.

A descriptive analysis was utilized to find out the order of the elements in terms of importance. To do this, central tendency and data frequency scores of the stories were compared. Therefore, another table with median, mode and data distribution will be displayed in addition to the mean scores from the previous table. After the table, comparisons were done based on the scores for each story.

There were two levels of comparison: first, the comparisons of stories with one element which leads to a logical consequence that a certain element is stronger or weaker than the other; second, further comparisons of stories with two elements are expected to reinforce the previous logical consequence. In the first level comparison, each story has only one element which means that the present element in the stories represents the elements being compared. Therefore, stories 6 [− − +], 7 [+ − −] and 8 [− + −] represent intent, falsehood, and belief, respectively. As for the second level comparison, each story has two elements with one common element and with a different one. The different element is the represented element of the story. For example, stories 4 [− + +] and 5 [+ + −] have the element of belief as the common element. Thus, story 4 represents the element of intent whereas story 5 represents the element of falsehood. If the scores of a certain story are bigger than the other story, the symbol '>' will be used. The symbol also signifies that one element is stronger than the other. On the contrary, symbol '<' will be used when the scores of a certain story are smaller. This also means that the element is less important than the other element being compared. A conclusion that one element is stronger is obtained in case of the element is consistently shown to be stronger in both comparisons. However, if there is any inconsistency in the comparisons, it will be resolved by referring to any other scores or the comments obtained regarding the element.

In this chapter, I have outlined four main research questions I seek to investigate in the research projects with four different lingua-cultural groups. I have showed the questionnaire originally created by Coleman and Kay (1981) and provided the methodological decision regarding the experiment and the analysis. I also explained how the respondents were reached. After that, I explained the method for data analysis using a scale suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981). The subsequent four chapters describe the application of the methodology to the four different lingua-cultural groups as well as the experiments and their results. In the next chapter, the experiment with Indonesian speakers is discussed.

CHAPTER 4 PERCEPTION OF LYING BY INDONESIANS

This chapter¹⁷ discusses the experiment with Indonesian respondents and its results. In Section 4. 1, I present a brief introduction of research related to hoaxes in Indonesia because research on the topic of lying is quite rare in Indonesia. In Section 4. 2, I outline the stories of the questionnaire used for the Indonesian respondents. Then, in Section 4. 3, I present the demographical features of respondents. In Section 4. 4, I provide the results of the Indonesian experiment. Afterwards, discussions on the basis of results and comments from Indonesian respondents are given in Section 4. 5. And finally, I make some conclusion on the basis of this experiment in Section 4. 6.

4. 1 Introduction to the Research Project

Research on the topic of lie is quite scarce in Indonesia. The closest topic related to untruthful and deceptive message is *hoaks* ‘hoax’. In the last five years, Indonesian researchers focus on this topic, mostly in relation to politics (Triyono 2020) and social media (Setiawan 2018). According to the Indonesian dictionary, *hoaks* is defined as information or news with lies.¹⁸ Following the definition of *lie* in Indonesian given in Chapter 1, *hoaks* may imply that the information or the news is not true, i.e. that it is fake. On the topic of deception detection, Adha (2020b) has conducted research by interviewing participants and asking them to provide one personal story and one deceptive story. The transcriptions of the interviews were used as data, and certain linguistic cues of both stories were counted. Some cues were used either more or less in two different stories. For example, in telling truthful story, Indonesian respondents tended to use more words, verbs, sentences and group reference such as *kita* or *kami* ‘we, us’ and use less third person pronoun *dia* ‘he, she, him, her’ or *mereka* ‘they, them’ and self-reference *aku, saya* ‘I, me’. To compare, in an experimental study conducted with American English speakers,¹⁹ Burgoon (2018) argues that the truth tellers also used more words, verbs and sentences, however, pronouns are not reliable indicators of deception. In a comparative research with British, Arab and Chinese participants, Leal, et al. (2018) concludes that there are cultural cues as the result of differences of communication styles in the production of deceptive messages. For example, the British, belonging to low-context cultures, used a more explicit communication style or reported more details in comparison to the Chinese and Arab whose

¹⁷ This chapter is mainly based on Adha’s (2020a) published paper on the replicated experiment of Coleman and Kay (1981).

¹⁸ See <https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/hoaks> for reference.

¹⁹ This information is not specified in the article but is drawn based on the demographical information of the participants, the place of the research being conducted, as well as the affiliation of the author then.

cultures are high-context. Indonesia is also among countries with high-context cultures, it is possible to expect that there would be differences not only in the production of deceptive information, but also in the perception of deception or lie. Thus, the present study is essential to explore the perception of lie by Indonesians.

4. 2 Methods

As mentioned before in Chapter 3, the questionnaire for Indonesian respondents was linguistically and culturally adapted. The names used in each story have been changed to common Indonesian names. Golf in the story 2 and pool in the story 3 in the original questionnaire have been changed to chess and video game kiosk, respectively, considering the chess and video game are more common in Indonesia than the ones used in the original questionnaire. The stories vary in terms of the social distance of the characters. A closer familiar distance between friends or partners can be seen in stories 2 and 6, whereas stories 3 and 4 exhibits familiar distance between parents and children. As for the other stories, the social distance of the characters is professional, either between colleagues as in stories 1 and 7, or between superiors and subordinates which can is shown in stories 5 and 8. The questions for the questionnaire can be seen below. Recall that the positive [+] and negative [-] signs in the translated version of the story indicate the presence or absence of the element of falsehood, belief and intention, respectively.

1. **Cake story**

Mail memakan kue yang Yuli akan hidangkan ke kerabat kerjanya. Yuli bertanya kepada Mail, 'Apa kamu memakan kuenya?' Mail menjawab 'Tidak.' Apakah mail berbohong?
Mail has eaten the cake that Yuli was intending to serve to company. Yuli asks Mail, 'Did you eat the cake?' Mail says, 'No.' Did Mail lie? [+ + +]

2. **Chess story**

Herman sedang menyaksikan Dicky dan Joni bermain catur. Herman memindahkan pion kuda Dicky ketika dia hendak ke dapur mengambil air minum. Ketika Dicky kembali dan melihat pionnya berpindah, dia bertanya 'Joni, kamu memindahkan pionku ya?' Joni menjawab, 'Bukan saya. Herman yang memindahkannya.' Apakah Joni berbohong?
Herman is watching Dicky and Joni playing chess. Herman moves Dicky's pawn when the latter is gone to the kitchen to get a drink. When Dicky returns and sees his pawn moved, he asks, 'Joni, did you move my pawn?', Joni replies, 'Not me, Herman moved it.' Did Joni lie? [- - -]

3. **Video game story**

Prasetyo yakin kalau dia harus melewati toko kue untuk sampai ke tempat rental game, tapi ternyata dia salah karena toko kuenya sudah pindah. Ibunya tidak suka kalau Prasetyo bermain game. Ketika Prasetyo hendak keluar rumah ingin ke tempat rental game, ibunya bertanya dia mau kemana. Prasetyo menjawab, 'Saya akan pergi melewati toko kue.' Apakah Prasetyo berbohong?

Prasetyo believes he has to pass the cookie store to get to the video game kiosk, but he is wrong about this because the cookie store has moved. His mother doesn't approve of Prasetyo playing video games. As he is going out intending to go to the kiosk, his mother asks him where he is going. He says, 'I am going by the candy store.' Did Prasetyo lie?

[+ – +]

4. **Math test story**

Suatu hari Rina akan menghadapi ujian matematika namun dia tidak belajar semalam sebelumnya, jadi dia tidak ingin ke sekolah. Dia berkata kepada ibunya, 'Bu, saya sakit.' Ketika ibunya mengecek suhunya, ternyata Rina memang sakit. Malamnya, dia menderita demam. Apakah Rina berbohong?

One day Rina has a math test she hasn't studied for the night before, and so she doesn't want to go to school. She says to her mother, 'Mom, I'm sick.' When her mother checks her temperature, it turns out that Rina is really sick. Later in the evening, she develops a high fever. Did Rina lie? [– + +]

5. **Dinner story**

Sandi diundang untuk makan malam di rumah atasannya. Setelah acaranya selesai, Sandi berkata kepada atasan dan istrinya, 'Terima kasih, acara makan malamnya sangat menyenangkan.' Menurut Sandi, acaranya tidak begitu menyenangkan, dan dia tidak berusaha meyakinkan kalau dia menikmati acara itu. Dia hanya ingin mengatakan hal yang baik kepada istri atasannya meskipun dia tidak percaya apa yang dikatakannya. Apakah Sandi berbohong?

Sandi is invited to a dinner at his boss' house. After the dinner program is finished, Sandi says to his boss and hostess, 'Thanks, the dinner was terrific.' According to Sandi, the dinner was not that terrific, and he really isn't trying to convince (anyone) that he had enjoyed the program. He just wants to say something nice to his boss' wife, regardless of the fact that he doesn't believe what he says. Did Sandi lie? [+ + –]

6. **Sick ex-boyfriend story**

Jojo dan Maria baru saja mulai berpacaran. Vino adalah mantan Maria. Suatu malam, Jojo bertanya kepada Maria, 'Kamu ketemu Vino minggu ini?' Maria menjawab, 'Vino

sudah dua minggu ini sakit tenggorokan.’ Memang benar Vino sudah sakit selama dua minggu, meski begitu Maria sempat ketemuan dengan Vino semalam sebelumnya. Apakah Maria berbohong?

Jojo and Maria have recently started going out together. Vino is Maria’s ex-boyfriend. One evening Jojo asks Maria, ‘Have you met Vino this week?’ Maria answers, ‘Vino has been sick with a sore throat for the past two weeks.’ Vino has in fact been sick with a sore throat for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Maria had the chance to meet Vino the night before. Did Maria lie? [– – +]

7. **Surgery story**

Dua pasien sedang menunggu untuk dimasukkan ke ruang operasi. Dokter menunjuk salah satunya dan berkata, ‘Andi ini akan operasi usus buntu atau amandel?’ Suster Citra baru saja membaca data pasien meski dia cemas untuk tetap memiliki pekerjaannya dan keliru memberi tahu dokter dan berkata, ‘Operasi usus buntu,’ padahal sebenarnya Andi dijadwalkan untuk operasi amandel. Apakah Suster Citra berbohong?

Two patients are waiting to be admitted into the operating room. The doctor points to one and says, ‘Is Andi here for the appendectomy or the tonsillectomy surgery?’ Nurse Citra has just read the charts and although she is anxious to keep her job, she is mistaken and tells the doctor ‘The appendectomy,’ when in fact Andi is scheduled for the tonsillectomy surgery. Did Nurse Citra lie? [+ – –]

8. **Football match story**

Rey baru saja membeli tiket nonton bola dan dia sangat senang akan hal itu. Dia pun menunjukkan ke bosnya, bosnya berkata, ‘Dengar Rey, kalau kamu tidak datang kerja, kamu harus punya alasan yang kuat.’ Rey berkata, ‘Siap, bos.’ Pada hari pertandingan bola, Rey menelpon bosnya dan berkata, ‘Saya tidak bisa masuk kerja, bos, karena saya sakit.’ Ironisnya, Rey tidak dapat menonton pertandingan bola tersebut karena menderita sakit perut yang ternyata adalah gejala keracunan. Jadi, Rey benar-benar sakit ketika dia menelpon bosnya. Apakah Rey berbohong?

Rey has just bought tickets for the football match and is very happy about it. He shows them to his boss and his boss says, ‘Listen, Rey, if you don’t come to work, you better have a better reason.’ Rey says, ‘Alright boss.’ On the day of the football match, Rey calls his boss and says, ‘I can’t come to work, boss, because I’m sick.’ Ironically, Rey doesn't get to watch the football game because the slight stomachache turns out to be poisoning. So, Rey was really sick when he called his boss. Did Rey lie? [– + –]

4.3 Respondents

120 native speakers of Indonesian filled out the questionnaire on *Google Form*. However, only 102 participants' responses were taken into consideration for the analysis because 18 respondents responded wrong for either Story 1 or 2, or both. The table below provides the detailed information of the participants. Generally speaking, over 84.3% of the Indonesian participants were between ages 20 and 40, 86.3% held bachelor's degree or higher and males and females were fairly equally represented.

Table 4-1 Data of Indonesian participants

Characteristics	Total	Percentage
Gender		
Male	51	50
Female	50	49
Not provided	1	1
Age		
Below 20 years old	5	4.9
21–30 years old	41	40.2
31–40 years old	45	44.1
Above 40 years old	11	10.8
Education		
High school diploma	14	13.7
Bachelor diploma	52	51
Postgraduate diploma	36	35.3
Language spoken		
Indonesian, local and foreign languages	44	43.2
Indonesian and local languages	24	23.5
Indonesian and foreign languages	24	23.5
Indonesian language only	10	9.8
Origin		
Sumatra	6	5.8
Java	49	48
Kalimantan	1	1
Sulawesi (Celebes)	43	42.2
Lesser Sunda (Bali, NTB, NTT)	2	2
Eastern Indonesia (Moluccas, Papua)	1	1
Current domicile		
Same as origin	51	50
Move to another part in Indonesia	27	26.5
Move abroad	24	23.5

4.4 Results


The scores from 102 valid respondents were added up and then divided by 102 to obtain the average score for each story. Table 4-2 below shows the degree of which Indonesian participants perceived the characters of each story with 7 being the perfect prototypical lie score.

Table 4-2 The scores and mean scores of 102 Indonesian participants assigned to each story

Story	Total score	Mean score
1. Cake [+++]	703	6.89
2. Chess [---]	126	1.24
3. Video game [+ - +]	515	5.05
4. Math test [- + +]	333	3.27
5. Dinner [++ -]	535	5.25
6. Ex-boyfriend [---]	328	3.22
7. Surgery [+ - -]	468	4.59
8. Football match [- + -]	166	1.63

The scores in bold (with mean scores ranging from 3.01 to 4.99) in the table mean that the respondents could not determine with certainty whether the stories contain either stronger or weaker lie. The mean scores from Table 4-2 can be modified into a figure to discern the order of the lie-value. The figure below shows the least prototypical lie on the left and the most prototypical lie on the right.

Figure 4-1 Stories placed on the lie-value continuum on the basis of Indonesian respondents' evaluation



Coleman and Kay (1981, 32) claim that a story with fewer elements will be the least prototypical lie. However, story 7 having only the element of falsehood appears to be closer to the most prototypical lie compared to story 4 with two elements but no element of falsehood. Moreover, all the stories with the element of falsehood (stories 1, 5, 3 and 7) are closer to the most prototypical lie with higher mean scale scores compared to stories without the element of

falsehood. Furthermore, story 8, the story with only the element of belief, is in the lower continuum in comparison to stories with the element of falsehood or intention.

Table 4-3 Central tendency and frequency of Indonesian data

Story	Mean	Median	Mode	Responses		
				Lie	Can't say	Not lie
1. Cake [+++]	6.89	7	7	102	0	0
2. Chess [---]	1.24	1	1	0	0	102
3. Video game [+ - +]	5.05	6	7	66	5	31
4. Math test [- + +]	3.27	2	1	36	3	63
5. Dinner [++ -]	5.25	6	7	74	5	23
6. Ex-boyfriend [- - +]	3.22	2	2	29	8	65
7. Surgery [+ - -]	4.59	6	7	54	10	38
8. Football match [- + -]	1.63	1	1	7	0	95

Based on the table above, the comparisons of mean, median and scores between the element of falsehood and the element of intent are as follow.

$$6 [- - +] (3.22, 2, 2) < 7 [+ - -] (4.59, 6, 7); \text{ intent} < \text{falsehood}$$

$$4 [- + +] (3.27, 2, 1) < 5 [++ -] (5.25, 6, 7); \text{ intent} < \text{falsehood}$$

Meanwhile, the comparisons between the element of falsehood and the element of belief can be seen below.

$$7 [+ - -] (4.59, 6, 7) > 8 [- + -] (1.63, 1, 1); \text{ falsehood} > \text{belief}$$

$$3 [+ - +] (5.05, 6, 7) > 4 [- + +] (3.27, 2, 1); \text{ falsehood} > \text{belief}$$

Therefore, it can be concluded that the element of falsehood is perceived to be the most important element by Indonesian respondents.

$$6 [- - +] (3.22, 2, 2) > 8 [- + -] (1.63, 1, 1); \text{ intent} > \text{belief}$$

$$3 [+ - +] (5.05, 6, 7) \text{ and } 5 [++ -] (5.25, 6, 7)$$

As can be seen above, the comparison of the element of belief and intent results in an inconsistency. In the first level of comparison, all scores indicate that the element of intent is stronger than the element of belief. In the second level of comparison, both median and mean scores are similar, whereas the mean score of story 3 is smaller than story 5. Also, in terms of the frequency of the data, 66 respondents considered story 3 to have a lie and 74 respondents who perceived story 5 to contain a lie. However, regarding the certainty of the respondents in their judgement of the character, 50 respondents assigned score of 7 to story 3, whereas for story 5, there were only 36 respondents who gave the same score.

If the mean score difference being compared, the mean score difference of the first level of comparison is rather bigger, that is 1.59, whereas the mean score difference of the second

level comparison is 0.2. Moreover, story 8 [- + -] is even almost close to Story 2, the story with no elements. Thus, based on the big difference of comparison of story 6 and 8, it is feasible to say that the element of intention is stronger than the element of belief. Furthermore, the element of belief is barely mentioned in the comments as it will be revealed in the discussion. Therefore, the most likely order of Coleman and Kay's (1981) elements in Indonesian is falsehood>intent>belief.

4.5 Discussion

To have a thorough discussion, comments given by the respondents will be considered. The comments provide an insight both into the reasons of respondents' choices and the way the respondents perceive situations where a lie occurs.

Although story 1 [+ + +] is constructed to contain a prototypical lie, the mean score (6.89) from Indonesian respondents is not exactly 7. Respondents who were certain that the character lied emphasized that Mail, the character of story 1, lied because he denied the fact that he had eaten the cake. In other words, the respondents perceived factual falsity to be present and necessary to consider a statement a lie. Story 2's [- - -] mean score is 1.24, which is also not exactly the lowest possible score. This suggests that there were respondents who perceived the character was lying even though the story was not constructed to contain a lie. In story 2, it is described that Herman, the audience, is watching Dicky and Joni playing chess. When Dicky goes for a bathroom break, Herman is moving his pawn. So, after Dicky goes back, he asks the other player, Joni, if he has moved his pawn. Joni answers truthfully that Herman, the audience, has moved the pawn. Respondents who agreed that the character was telling the truth supported the spontaneous and truthful statement of the other player.

Many comments from respondents on both controlling stories are advice for the characters. For example, in the case of story 1, respondents argued that Mail was supposed to tell the truth since eating the cake would be considered *haram* 'forbidden, sinful'. As for story 2, respondents noted that Joni should not stay silent when the audience is interfering the game because he might let the cheating continues if he has not been asked. Respondents also suggested that the audience should be a game mediator so that the game would be fair and lie or cheating should be avoided in a competition. This tendency to give some advice shows the collectivistic nature of Indonesian people, which is mainly based on religious principles *mengingatkan dalam kebaikan* 'to remind (others to do) kindness.' Indonesians have been taught not only to be kind, but also to remind other people to be kind.

In story 3 [+ – +], the character makes a false statement about his going to his mother and intends to deceive her by using the false statement. However, it turns out that he does not realize that he is actually mistaken about his belief or knowledge. The absence of the element of belief in this story seems to be disregarded by many Indonesian respondents. This story receives a quite high mean score, that is 5.05. There are three main reasons why Indonesian respondents think the character is lying. First, the character is hiding his main goal or his true intention of going out. Some respondents addressed the character's intention by using the term *niat*, which is an Islamic concept that the intention is deeply rooted in one's heart (Maqsood 1994, 51). If one's intention is not aligned with his or her words, it may be considered as a negative act. Other possible terms used by respondents to describe intention which are not based on religious principles are *maksud* and *tujuan* 'intention, purpose'. Second, the character is also hiding his fondness of video games from his mother. Below are two comments from Indonesian respondents.

- (4. 1) *Karena tujuan akhir Prasetyo adalah rental game, bukan toko kue.*
(Prasetyo is lying) because his final intention is the game kiosk, and not the cookie store.
- (4. 2) *Karena Prasetyo tidak ingin diketahui ibunya jika ia melakukan hal yang yidak disukai ibunya, karenanya dia tidak mengatakan niat yang sebenarnya.*
(Prasetyo is lying) because he does not want his mother to find out that he does things which his mother does not like, and because of that he does not say his true intention.

The third and most probable reason of story 3 [+ – +] receiving high mean score from Indonesian respondents is due to the benefit that the lie brings as Chen, Hu and He (2013) propose. In story 3, it is clear that by making a false statement, the character may pursuit his goal, which is playing a video game. So, the lie in story 3 brings benefit for the liar. It is also possible for a lie to reap a benefit to the hearer as in the case of story 5. Story 5 [+ + –] contains a false statement which the character does not believe. According to the comments from Indonesian respondents, the kind of lie in story 5 can be used as a tool for politeness and for reducing the disappointment of others. Comment (4.3) below shows that the lie made by the character is justifiable and acceptable lie, whereas comment (4.4) exhibit advice, similarly to stories 1 and 2 as previously explained.

- (4. 3) *Pernyataan Sandi merupakan kebohongan pada dirinya sendiri, namun attitude Sandi bisa dikatakan bentuk kesopanan atas undangan yang diterimanya kepada tuan rumah.*

Sandi's statement is a lie to himself, but his attitude can be considered as politeness to his hosts.

- (4. 4) *Berbohong untuk tidak membuat orang lain merasa kecewa. Ada baiknya jikalau Sandi berkata, "Terimakasih atas jamuan makan malamnya" tanpa harus berbohong.*

This is a lie to avoid disappointment to others. It is better for Sandi to just say, "Thank you for the dinner invitation" without having to lie.

The element of belief does not seem to be taken into consideration by Indonesian respondents since the presence or absence of this element does not affect the score of the stories. This argument can be seen in the result of the stories 3 [+ - +] and 5 [+ + -] which received high scores, 5.05 and 5.25, respectively. As the result shows that Indonesian respondents perceived the element of falsehood as the most important element, both of these stories have high score due to the presence of this element. Accordingly, Indonesians perceive that anything that is not based on a factual situation or feeling will be considered a strong lie.

Story 7 [+ - -] which solely contains the element of falsehood supports this argument. In this story, the nurse mistakenly informs the doctor about the patient's chart. According to the comments, many Indonesians also believed that the nurse made a mistake. Regardless, the Indonesian respondents still thought that the nurse lied in the situation as hinted by the higher mean score of 4.59. Although this lie value of story 7 is considered to be in the medium range, the score is relatively high that it is arguably possible to put it in the stronger lie continuum. Respondents commented that her statement was not based on factual facts and that she pretended as she knew the facts. This act of pretension is viewed as a lying act by Indonesians.

- (4. 5) *Itu adalah kebohongan, karena dia berpura-pura tahu jawabannya padahal dia tidak tahu. Dan akibat dari kebohongannya sangat fatal.*

It is a lie, because she pretended that she knew the answer even though she did not. This lie has a fatal effect to others.

Another reason that may affect the respondents' judgement is the serious effect caused by the nurse's statement as shown by comment (4. 5) above. So, the fact that the nurse makes a statement she pretends to know in order to keep her job (benefiting herself) and that it may cause serious consequences (harming others) might be the reasons for the higher score of story 7 although the story has only one element, which is the element of falsehood. In conclusion, falsehood is most likely the most important element of the prototypical lie for Indonesians.

Stories in which the characters do not state a false statement result in medium or lower continuum. This trend is demonstrated by results of stories 4 [- + +], 6 [- - +], and 8 [- + -]. Stories 4 and 6 are almost in the middle of lie-values, meaning that Indonesians are not certain

whether the character is lying or not. In addition to having no element of falsehood, both of these two stories have the element of intention. In story 4, the daughter claims to be sick even though she believes that she is not. She intends to deceive her mother, so she does not have to go to school. This story was constructed to contain the element of belief and intention, but many Indonesian respondents disregarded the belief the character has. Similarly to story 3, more comments emphasize the character's *niat* 'intention.' Also, there are few comments such as *perkataan adalah doa* 'prayers are words' to describe the character's situation. These comments are made by respondents to refer Mohammad's hadith, the second source of law in Islam. This interpretation where respondents quoted Islamic understanding mirrors the findings of Cole (1996) especially when it comes to the interpretation of this particular story. Therefore, it can also be deduced that Indonesians' interpretation of lying is influenced by the religion of Islam. Another aspect that can be drawn from Indonesian data is that Indonesian respondents seem to make a judgement of the whole story, not only at the time of utterance. So, a statement believed to be false that turns out to be true is not a lie for many Indonesian respondents. Below is one of the comments from the respondents.

- (4. 6) *Dilihat dari hasil akhir, Rina jujur antara perkataan dengan kenyataan. Tapi dilihat dari proses, dia berbohong. Tinggal dari sisi mana ingin menilai, jika secara keseluruhan maka Rina setengah berbohong.*
 If we see the end of the story, Rina's utterance aligns to the factuality (or reality). But if we consider the process, she can be considered to be lying. So, it depends on which point of view we adopt. Overall, she was half lying.

Since the element of belief is barely addressed by the respondents, it is feasible to argue that this element might not exist in Indonesians' perception of lying, or this element plays no crucial role in the definition of lying. This result is strengthened by the result of story 8 [- + -], a story with the only element of belief. The mean score from Indonesian respondents is the second lowest, 1.63, resulting in agreement that the character is not lying to his boss. The comments also suggest that many respondents understood that the character calls his boss not because he wants to watch the football game. So, the story was generally seen by the respondents that the character has no intention of deceiving his boss when he made the statement that he believed to be false. One respondent commented as follow.

- (4. 7.) *Kasihannya Rey. Tapi memang dia ga masuk kantor karena sakit, jadi harusnya dia ga bohong dong. Semoga atasannya percaya dia beneran sakit.*
 Poor Rey, he did not work because he was indeed sick, so he did not lie. I wish his boss believed that he was really sick.

Stories 4 [- + +] and 8 [- + -] have almost similar plotlines where the characters make a statement, they believe to be false, but later the believed-false statement turns out to be true. Many Indonesian respondents emphasized the end result of the statement. This is possibly based on the religious understandings of the respondents in which negatively intended acts would not be considered sinful if the acts do not occur.²⁰ In other words, if one intends to do a bad act and he does not do it, his intention should not be regarded. As for the case of the characters in stories 4 and 8, respondents did not consider the lies that have been prepared before and only make judgement based on the alignment of the characters' statements and factual situations.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, *hoaks* 'hoax' can be considered as fake or untruthful information. However, there was not any comment from respondents suggesting that the falsehood in the statement made by the speakers of the story is a hoax. Therefore, it is possible that hoax is more commonly used to refer to a reported falsehood made by others and/or falsehood circulated in social media. Regarding the social distance or relationship of the characters in the story, this seems to be not an influential aspect of the respondents' interpretation.

Previous discussion suggests that Indonesians view the element of falsehood as the strongest element of prototypical lie and the element of belief might not be present as Coleman and Kay (1981) suggest. To summarize, the order of the elements of prototypical lie for Indonesians based on their importance is falsehood > intent (>belief). The reason why the element of belief is put in brackets is because this element might not be considered and/or realized by Indonesians as indicated in their comments. Since this result is somehow different from the original study by Coleman and Kay (1981), it may suggest that there is a feasible relation between different cultures and communication styles and there are differences in the perception of lying.

4. 6 Conclusions

The Indonesian word *bohong* 'lie' seems to not involve all three prototypical elements suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981) with the element of falsehood as the most important element, followed by the element of intention. Some comments suggest that a lie (only) involves falsehood and intention, such as *ini adalah kebohongan karena tidak berdasarkan fakta* 'this is a lie since it is not based on facts' and *bohong itu tergantung niatnya* 'a lie depends on its intention'. These results suggest that Indonesians make their judgements of lying based on the

²⁰ See <https://sunnah.com/bukhari:6491> for reference.

alignment of the statement with their factual opinion and intention. The judgement is also built on religious understanding, mainly on Islamic perspectives.

This chapter has presented the results and discussion of lying among Indonesians as a replication of the work of Coleman and Kay (1981). The results indicate that the most important element for Indonesians is the element of falsehood. This result is significantly different to other replicated studies with the exception of the result of the study with Japanese respondents (1995). Indonesians are also making judgement based on the end result of a statement. Thus, a false statement turning out to be true would not be considered as false anymore since the statement is aligned with the factuality. In the following chapter, I will discuss the replicated study with Chinese people.

CHAPTER 5 PERCEPTION OF LYING BY CHINESE PEOPLE

This chapter²¹ elaborates the experiment with Mandarin Chinese speakers and its results. The chapter consists of six sections. In Section 5. 1, I deliver a brief introduction to the comparative research of lying between Chinese and Anglo-European lingua-cultures. In Section 5. 2, I outline the questionnaire used for the Chinese respondents. Then, in Section 5. 3, I provide the demographical information of the respondents. After that, in Section 5. 4, I present the results of the Chinese experiment and then give some discussions regarding this particular experiment in Section 5. 5. Finally, in Section 5. 6, I give some conclusions based on the experiment.

5. 1 Introduction to the Research Project

There is abundant comparative research conducted between Chinese and Western lingua-cultures. Yeung, Levine and Nishiyama (1999) replicated a study by McCornack, Levine, Solowczuk, Torres, and Campbell (1992) to test violations of Grice's four maxims (McCornack, et al. 1992). The studies were conducted in several states in the United States (Jacobs, Dawson and Brashers 1996, McCornack, et al. 1992, Lapinski 1995) and the results indicated that violation of any maxim is considered deceptive for Americans. The results were different however, when the same study was conducted with members of different linguistic-cultural groups. Data from the Hong Kong students indicated only violations of maxims of quality and relevance were rated to be more deceptive, whereas violations of maxim of quantity (omissions) and manner (equivocation) were not considered deceptive (Yeung, Levine and Nishiyama 1999).

As previously mentioned in Section 2.4, a cross-cultural study of the definition of lie was conducted by Chen, Hu and He (2013) with two groups of respondents: American and Chinese groups. Respondents needed to fill a questionnaire in their respective language. The results suggested that the Chinese speakers seem to be harsher in making a judgement about lie-likeness of a situation, yet they display more tolerance for the lie in comparison to Americans. In additions, Chen, Hu and He (2013, 391) present requirements for a lie to happen, where one of the requirements is that an untrue assertion is necessary for a lie to happen. In other words, the element of falsehood plays a role in determining a lie. This result mirrors the result of Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment replicated with Indonesian respondents in the previous chapter. Based on the two studies above, it is feasible to suggest that Chinese people

²¹ This chapter is based on Adha and Li's (2023) paper on the replicated experiment of Coleman and Kay (1981) with native speakers of Mandarin Chinese.

may have different perceptions on what situations should be considered as deceptive or having a lie. Furthermore, Chinese people might also exhibit different levels of reprehensibility towards lying, in comparison to people from the Western lingua-cultures. By applying Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment, it is expected that the definition of lie for Chinese people might be based on the factuality of the statement, rather than the belief on the statement.

5. 2 Methods

Similar to the questionnaire for Indonesian respondents, the questionnaire for Mandarin Chinese native speakers was linguistically and culturally adapted. For example, names of the characters were changed into Chinese names. The stories display different environments and varied social distances among the characters. There are stories that take place in a professional environment between employees (stories 1 and 7), between managers (story 2), and between managers or bosses and their subordinates (stories 5 and 8). Moreover, there are three stories with familiar relationships, they are stories 3 and 4 in which the characters are parents and children, and finally story 6 where a couple is having an interaction. The stories in the questionnaire are presented below.

1. **Cake story**

小明吃了小红要送给公司的蛋糕。小红后来问小明：“是你把我蛋糕吃了吗？小明回道：“不是”。

Xiǎomíng chīle xiǎo hóng yào sòng gěi gōngsī de dàngāo. Xiǎo hóng hòulái wèn xiǎomíng: “Shì nǐ bǎ wǒ dàngāo chīle ma? Xiǎomíng huí dào: “Bùshì”.

Xiaoming ate the cake that Xiaohong wanted to give to the colleagues. Xiaohong later asked Xiaoming: “Did you eat my cake?” Xiaoming replied: “No.”

2. **Chess story**

李总，张总和王总正在打高尔夫球。李总不注意踩到了张总的球。张总从卫生间回来时看到他的球被踩进了草地，便问到。张总：“王总，是你踩到我的球了？”王总：“不是我，是李总踩的”。

Lǐ zǒng, zhāng zǒnghé wáng zǒng zhèngzài dǎ gāo'ěrfū qiú. Lǐ zǒng bù zhùyì cǎi dào le zhāng zǒng de qiú. Zhāng zǒng cóng wèishēngjiān huílái shí kàn dào tā de qiú bèi cǎi jìnle cǎodì lǐ, biàn wèn dào. Zhāng zǒng: “Wáng zǒng, shì nǐ cǎi dào wǒ de qiúle?”. Wáng zǒng: “Bùshì wǒ, shì lǐ zǒng cǎi de”.

Manager Li, Manager Zhang and Manager Wang are playing golf. Manager Li accidentally stepped on Manager Zhang's ball. When Manager Zhang comes back from

the bathroom, he sees that his ball has been stepped into the grass, so he asked. Manager Zhang: “Mr. Wang, did you step on my ball?”. Manager Wang: “It was not me; it was Mr. Li who stepped on it.”

3. **Swimming pool story**

张华知道从他家去游泳池的路上会经过水果市场。但其实不然，因为水果市场已经搬迁了。他妈妈平时不允许他周内去游泳。周内的某一天，他准备出门去游泳时，他妈妈问他出门去哪儿。他回答说：“我会路过水果市场”。

Zhāng huá zhīdào cóng tā jiā qù yóuyǒngchí de lùshàng huì jīngguò shuǐguǒ shìchǎng. Dàn qíshí bùrán, yīn wéi shuǐguǒ shìchǎng yǐjīng bānqiānlè. Tā māmā píngshí bù yǔnxǔ tā zhōu nèi qù yóuyǒng. Zhōu nèi de mǒu yītiān, tā zhǔnbèi chūmén qù yóuyǒng shí, tā māmā wèn tā chūmén qù nǎ'er. Tā huídá shuō: “Wǒ huì lùguò shuǐguǒ shìchǎng”.

Zhang Hua knew that he would pass the fruit market on the way from his house to the swimming pool. However, this was not true because the fruit market had been relocated. His mother usually did not allow him to go swimming during the week. One day during the week, as he was about to go out for swimming, his mother asked him where he was going. He replied: “I would pass by the fruit market.”

4. **Math test story**

何柳某天早上有个数学考试，但因为没准备，她不想去，于是对她妈妈说：“我生病了”。但让何柳吃惊的是，她妈妈给她量了一下体温发现她真的生病了，后来去医院才发现她得了麻疹。

Hé liǔ mǒu tiān zǎoshang yǒu gè shùxué kǎoshì, dàn yīnwèi méiyǒu zhǔnbèi, tā bùxiǎng qù, yúshì duì tā māmā shuō: “Wǒ shēngbìnglè”. Dàn ràng hé liǔ chījīng de shì, tā māmā gěi tā liàngle yīxià tǐwēn fāxiàn tā zhēn de shēngbìnglè, hòulái qù yīyuàn cái fāxiàn tā déliǎo mázhěn.

He Liu had a math exam one morning, but because she was not prepared, she did not want to go, so, she told to her mother, “I’m sick.” But what surprised He Liu was that her mother took her temperature and found that she was really sick. Later, she went to the hospital to find out that she had measles.

5. **Dinner story**

张杰被邀请去他老板家参加晚宴。沉闷的晚宴结束，张杰对女主人说，“谢谢你，今天的晚宴很棒”。他这样说，不是因为他真的认为晚宴很棒，也不是想让别人觉得他很享受，而是因为他想对女主人即他老板的妻子说一些好听的话，尽管他并没有想着她会相信他所说的。

Zhāngjié bèi yāoqǐng qù tā lǎobǎn jiā cānjiā wǎnyàn. Chénmèn de wǎnyàn jiéshù, zhāngjié duì nǚ zhǔrén shuō, “xièxiè nǐ, jīntiān de wǎnyàn hěn bàng”. Tā zhèyàng shuō,

bùshì yīnwèi tā zhēn de rènwéi wǎnyàn hěn bàng, yě bùshì xiǎng ràng biérén juédé tā hěn xiǎngshòu, ér shì yīnwèi tā xiǎng duì nǚ zhǔrén jí tā lǎobǎn de qīzi shuō yīxiē hǎotīng dehuà, jǐnguǎn tā bìng méiyǒu xiǎngzhe tā huì xiāngxìn tāsuǒ shuō de.

Zhang Jie was invited to his boss' house for a dinner party. At the end of the dull dinner, Zhang Jie said to the hostess, "Thank you, today's dinner was great." He did not say it because he really thought the dinner was great, or he wanted others to think he was enjoying it, but because he wanted to say something nice to the hostess, the wife of his boss, even though he didn't think she would believe what he said.

6. **Ex-boyfriend story**

李红和张宇刚谈恋爱不久。一天晚上，张宇问李红“你这周有没有见过孙凯？”（孙凯是李红的前男友）。李红回答道“他这两周腿骨折了”。孙凯确实骨折有两周了，但李红也的确在昨天晚上见了孙凯。

Lǐ hóng hé zhāngyǔgāng tán liàn'ài bùjiǔ. Yītiān wǎnshàng, zhāngyǔwèn lǐ hóng "nǐ zhè zhōu yǒu méiyǒu jiànguò sūn kǎi?" (Sūn kǎi shì lǐ hóng de qián nányǒu). Lǐ hóng huídá dào "tā zhè liǎng zhōu tuǐ gǔzhéle". Sūn kǎi quèshí gǔzhé yǒu liǎng zhōule, dàn lǐ hóng yě díquè zài zuótiān wǎnshàng jiànle sūn kǎi.

Li Hong and Zhang Yugang fell in love not long ago. One night, Zhang Yugang asked Li Hong "Have you seen Sun Kai this week?" (Sun Kai is Li Hong's ex-boyfriend). Li Hong replied, "He had a broken leg for the past two weeks." It is true that Sun Kai did have a fracture for two weeks, but Li Hong did meet Sun Kai the night before.

7. **Surgery story**

有两个病人正等着进手术室做手术。主刀医生指其中一位病人，问道“李刚做的是阑尾手术还是扁桃体手术？”。护士小王混淆了病人的病历，尽管她刚刚看过两个病人的病历并且不想丢掉自己的工作，但还是回答道“是阑尾手术”。而可怜的李刚实际上要做的是扁桃体手术。

Yǒu liǎng gè bìngrén zhèng děngzhe jìn shǒushùshì zuò shǒushù. Zhǔdāo yīshēng zhǐ qízhōng yī wèi bìngrén, wèn dào "lǐgāng zuò de shì lánwěi shǒushù háishì biǎntáotǐ shǒushù?". Hù shì xiǎo wáng hùnxiáole bìngrén de bìnglì, jǐnguǎn tā gānggāng kànguò liǎng gè bìngrén de bìnglì bìngqiě bùxiǎng diūdiào zìjǐ de gōngzuò, dàn háishì huídá dào "shì lánwěi shǒushù". Ér kělián de lǐgāng shíjì shàng yào zuò de shì biǎntáotǐ shǒushù.

There are two patients waiting to be admitted to the operating room for a surgery. The chief surgeon pointed to one of the patients and asked nurse Xiao Wang, "Is Li Gang here for appendectomy or tonsillectomy surgery?" Nurse Xiao Wang mixed up the patients' medical records and replied, "It is for appendectomy surgery." although she

had just read the medical records of the two patients and did not want to lose her job. Poor Li Gang was actually there for a tonsillectomy surgery.

8. **Basketball story**

小何有两张篮球冠军赛的门票，他非常庆幸，并拿给了他老板看。而他老板对他说道“小何，要是你哪天没来上班，你得需要一个比这更好的借口”。小何说道“我知道了”。在比赛日那天，小何给老板打电话请假“老板，我今天生病上不了班”。不巧的是，他那天的比赛并没有看成，因为他原本的一点点胃疼后来被发现是食物中毒的症状。总之，小何在电话里说他生病时他的确生病了。

Xiǎo hé yǒu liǎng zhāng lánqiú guànjūnsài de ménpiào, tā fēicháng qìngxìng, bìng ná gěile tā lǎobǎn kàn. Ér tā lǎobǎn duì tā shuōdao “xiǎo hé, yàoshi nǐ nǎ tiān méi lái shàngbān, nǐ dé xūyào yīgè bǐ zhè gèng hǎo de jièkǒu”. Xiǎo hé shuōdao “wǒ zhīdào le”. Zài bǐsài rì nèitiān, xiǎo hé gěi lǎobǎn dǎ diànhuà qǐngjià “lǎobǎn, wǒ jīntiān shēngbìng shàng bùliǎo bān”. Bù qiǎo de shì, tā nèitiān de bǐsài bìng méiyǒu kàn chéng, yīnwèi tā yuánběn de yī diǎndiǎn wèi téng hòulái pī fà xiàn shì shíwù zhòngdú dí zhèngzhuàng. Zǒngzhī, xiǎo hézài diànhuà li shuō tā shēngbìng shí tā díquè shēngbìngle.

Xiao He had two tickets for the basketball championship game. He was very happy and showed them to his boss. And his boss said to him, “Xiao He, if you don’t come to work one day, you need a better excuse than that.” Xiao He said, “I know.” On the day of the game, Xiao He called the boss to ask for a sick leave “Boss, I am sick, and I can’t get to work today.” Unfortunately, he did not manage to watch the game because his little stomach-ache was later found to be a symptom of food poisoning. In short, Xiao He was indeed sick when he said it on the phone.

5.3 Respondents

The Chinese questionnaire was distributed using a platform website called 问卷星 *wènjuàn xīng* which provides services of online questionnaire design, data collection and result analysis. With the assistance of a colleague, the questionnaire was distributed to students attending classes in a private higher-education institution in the Northwestern part of China. The Chinese questionnaire reached 120 students who are native speakers of Mandarin-Chinese. As a control indicated earlier, if participants responded incorrectly to stories 1 or 2, their responses were not considered for the analysis. Thus, 39 respondents were eliminated from the data leaving 81 participants in the Chinese experiment. Information about the Chinese participants is given in

the table below. In general, a majority of the Chinese participants were female (67.9%), enrolled in college (81.5%) and younger than age 20 (84%).

Table 5-1 Data of Mandarin-Chinese speaking participants

Characteristics	Total	Percentage
Gender		
Male	24	29.6
Female	55	67.9
Not provided	2	2.5
Age		
Below 20 years old	68	84
21–30 years old	12	14.8
31–40 years old	1	1.2
Education		
High school or secondary school	13	16
Undergraduate or college	66	81.5
Postgraduate	2	2.5
Origin		
North (Shanxi, Tianjin)	5	6.2
East (Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shanghai, Zhejiang)	7	8.6
South-Central (Henan, Hunan)	10	12.3
Western (Ningxia, Shaanxi)	59	72.9

5.4 Results

The data from the Chinese experiment in terms of scores and means are indicated in Table 5-2.


Table 5-2 The scores and mean scores from 81 Mandarin Chinese native speakers participating in the experiment

Story	Total score	Mean score
1. Cake [+++]	520	6.42
2. Golf [---]	154	1.90
3. Pool [+ - +]	450	5.56
4. Exam [- + +]	441	5.45
5. Dinner [++ -]	358	4.42
6. Ex-boyfriend [- - +]	264	3.26
7. Surgery [+ - -]	440	5.44
8. Basketball [- + -]	208	2.57

There are only two bold mean scores from this present experiment. The scores in bold (with mean scores ranging from 3.01 to 4.99) in the table exhibits uncertainty of the respondents

to consider whether the statements in the stories contain weak or strong lies. A figure 5-1 below is constructed based on the results from the table 5-2 above to give a convenient display of stronger and weaker stories.

Figure 5-1 Stories place on the lie-value continuum from Mandarin Chinese speaking respondents



Story 7 having only the element of falsehood also appears in the right part of the figure, closer to the most prototypical lie. In comparison, story 5 with two elements but no element of intention is in the left part of the figure. This figure disagrees with Coleman and Kay’s (1981, 33) claim that a story with fewer elements will be the least prototypical lie.

Table 5-3 Central tendency and frequency of Chinese data

Story	Mean	Median	Mode	Responses		
				Lie	Can’t say	Not lie
1. Cake [+ + +]	6.42	7	7	81	0	0
2. Golf [- - -]	1.90	2	2	0	0	81
3. Pool [+ - +]	5.56	6	6	65	1	15
4. Exam [- + +]	5.45	6	7	67	2	12
5. Dinner [+ + -]	4.42	5	6	44	5	32
6. Ex-boyfriend [- - +]	3.26	2	2	25	4	52
7. Surgery [+ - -]	5.44	6	7	59	4	18
8. Basketball [- + -]	2.57	2	2	13	2	66

Here are the comparisons of mean, median and mode scores between the element of intent and the element of belief.

6 [- - +] (3.26, 2, 2) and 8 [- + -] (2.75, 2, 2)

3 [+ - +] (5.56, 6, 6) and 5 [+ + -] (4.42, 5, 6)

The modes in both comparisons and the median in the first level of comparison result in the same score. If only the mean score is taken into consideration, then it can be concluded that intent > belief. This argument can be strengthened by referring to the number of responses considering the stories to have lie. Both stories 6 and 3 have higher frequency for respondents who perceived the character to be lying compared to stories 8 and 5, respectively. As for the

comparisons of the element of falsehood and the element of belief, only the first level comparison shows consistency.

7 [+ - -] (5.44, 6, 7) > 8 [- + -] (2.57, 2, 2); falsehood > belief

3 [+ - +] (5.56, 6, 6) and 4 [- + +] (5.45, 6, 7)

The mode for story 3 representing the element of falsehood is the only lower score when it is compared with story 4. However, falsehood can be stronger than belief if only referring to the mean score. This is the comparison between the element of intent and the element of falsehood below.

6 [- - +] (3.26, 2, 2) < 7 [+ - -] (5.44, 6, 7); intent < falsehood

4 [- + +] (5.45, 6, 7) > 5 [+ + -] (4.42, 5, 6); intent > falsehood

The polar results are shown in different levels of comparison. In the first level of comparison, the score differences are higher compared to that in the second level comparison. Based on this fact alone, the element of intent can be considered as less strong compared to the element of falsehood. An elaboration to clarify this matter will be given in the discussion. All in all, it can be concluded that the order of the elements in terms of importance for the Chinese respondents is falsehood>intent>belief.

5. 5 Discussion

The mean score for story 1 [+ + +] in the experiment with Chinese people is 6.74, was lower than the result from Indonesian experiment, 6.89. This low mean score may indicate that Chinese respondents were less certain if other respondents would have similar responses. There were no comments provided to give reasons about their choices. Meanwhile, story 2 [- - -] obtains a relatively high score, 1.9, for a story which was constructed to not contain a lie. This score also exhibits uncertainty on the part of the respondents. One respondent stated that the story did not indicate that one character, Manager Wang, saw the action. Because of this, the respondent assumed that this missing piece of information might intervene in the respondents' views. The comment concerning Wang is as follows.

- (5. 1) 不同的人有不同的看法，王总可能看到了这一幕，也可能没看到，在这种情况下，许多人都会不相信别人，人们对王总的话一定是怀有戒备的，这些都是影响人们判断的事，但张总或许会认为王总说的是真话，这些与张王两人的关系有许多的影响。

Bùtóng de rén yǒu bùtóng de kànfǎ, wáng zǒng kěnéng kàn dào le zhè yī mù, yě kěnéng méi kàn dào, zài zhè zhǒng qíngkuàng xià, xǔduō rén dōu bù huì xiāngxìn biérén, rénmen duì wáng zǒng de huà yīdìng shì huái yǒu jièbèi de, zhèxiē dōu shì yǐngxiǎng rénmen pànduàn de shì, dàn zhāng zǒng huòxǔ huì rènwéi wáng

zōng shuō de shì zhēn huà, zhèxiē yǔ zhāng wáng liǎng rén de guānxi yǒu xǔduō de yǐngxiǎng.

Different people (respondents) might have different views on judging whether Manager Wang is lying because it is uncertain to them whether Manager Wang saw the scene or not. Under such circumstance, (I think) many people (respondents) would be skeptical of Manager Wang's words as there are many factors affecting people's judgements. It might be possible that Manager Zhang may think Manager Wang is telling the truth, but this judgement is subjected to the influence of the relationship between them.

There is also one interesting note about the comment above, that is, the respondent made a reference regarding the interpersonal relationship between the speaker and the hearer. The relationship between the speaker and the hearer might play a role in Chinese judgement of lying. The argument of interpersonal relationship as a mitigating factor in lying is elaborated more in subsequent sections.

In supporting Coleman and Kay's (1981) approach that belief is the strongest element to define a lie, Sweetser (1987) suggests that there are two basic principles of social interaction, namely (1) try help, not harm, and (2) knowledge is beneficial. Relating to story 2, Mr. Wang's statement constitutes to the truth since he tries to help, and his knowledge is beneficial to Mr. Zhang. Yeung, Levine and Nishiyama (1999, 3-5) suggest Chinese people tend to avoid conflict, thus the truthfulness of the statement might be deemed harmful and detrimental by 39 Chinese respondents who were discarded from the analysis. Even though the statement was true, it was judged negatively because it was seen as an accusation that was quite direct for Chinese people, therefore, unacceptable act. Therefore, Chinese people perceive that there would be some moments in which people should avoid telling the truth, similar to Colombian people (Travis 2006).

Story 3 [+ - +] contains all elements but the element of belief, which can be considered as a non-lie following definitions given by the philosophers in Chapter 2. The absence of the element was noticed by one respondent; however, this particular respondent considered the character in the story to be lying. Thus, it is safe to presume that the Chinese people also do not perceive the element of belief as an element of a prototypical lie. Regarding story 3, the speaker of the untruthful statement is the son, and the hearer is his mother. As mentioned before, a closer interpersonal relationship, such as family relationship may affect Chinese respondents' judgement of lying. This assumption is similar to Coleman and Kay's (1981, 40) discussion concerning this particular story. Furthermore, this story receives the second-high mean score, 5.56, after the most prototypical lie. The third-high mean score is obtained from story 4 [- + +], a story without the element of falsehood. Interestingly, this story also includes a brief conversation between a parent and a daughter. Mao and Chi (2011) argue that respect and

obedience to parents are major avenues to increase harmony in family, which connected to filial piety. As a result, being intentionally deceptive to parents is perceived not only being disinclined to avoid conflict, but also being unethical since deception to parents does not align with the traditional filial piety within Chinese culture. When comparison between stories 3 and 4 was made, there were some distinctive scores making it difficult to decide which element was stronger. However, the absence or the presence of the element of belief was barely mentioned by the respondents. Also, story 4 might have higher score due to the relationship of the characters rather than the absence of the falsehood in the story. If story 4 was presented with characters who did not have close relationship, this story might result in smaller scores. Therefore, it can be concluded that the element of falsehood is stronger than the element of belief.

Some of the Chinese respondents indicated that story 8 [- + -] is similar to story 4 [- + +] in which a character claimed s/he was sick to avoid exam or work. The difference between these stories is that story 8 does not contain the element of intention. The absence of the element of intention might lower the mean score from this experiment. Also, the relationship between the speaker and the hearer for story 8 is a professional relationship, neither a personal nor family relationship. Based on the results of story 3 [+ - +], 4 [- + +], and 8 [- + -], it is probable that different social relationships between the characters affect the Chinese people's judgement of lying. In respect of the element of belief, the sole element in story 8, Chinese respondents also do not seem to refer to in their comments. This can imply that the element of belief might not be perceived as an important element, or it might play less crucial role in Chinese people's judgement.

Story 5 [+ + -] is generally considered by the respondents to contain a white lie. The lie value of story 5 is 4.42 which is in the medium range. However, this mean score may be considered as a stronger lie. One respondent commented as below.

- (5. 2) 善意的谎言，出于礼貌不管好不好都会相互称赞。
Shànyì de huǎngyán, chū yú lǐmào bùguǎn hǎobù hǎo dūhuì xiānghù chēngzàn.
It is a white lie out of courtesy. People often do this no matter whether the dinner is good or not.

Although a white lie is still perceived as a lie for Chinese people, this type of lie is regarded to be a tool for politeness and a way not to disappoint other people. Chinese people might accept the falsehood in story 5 because it is harmless to others, whereas the falsehood in story 7 [+ - -] is unfavorable, leading to a higher mean score for this story, 5.44. The fact that the story has the element of falsehood and the statement by the character bringing harm to a

particular person, may lead to argument that these two aspects affect Chinese people's judgement of lying.

The final story to be addressed is story 6 [- - +] where the character does not present the whole story or equivocates so as not to answer the question directly. Yeung, Levine and Nishiyama (1999) term this a violation of maxim of manner. This suggest that equivocation is less deceptive, which parallels the results from the Chinese respondents. With the mean score of 3.26, the character in story 6 is not considered to produce a more prototypical lie. In addition, this center-continuum score also indicates that Chinese people are uncertain whether the character is lying or not. In other words, there is a mixed result.

5. 6 Conclusions

The discussion reveals that the Chinese word 谎言 *huǎngyán* 'lie' might also not involve three prototypical elements that Coleman and Kay (1981) suggest in their experiment with American English native speakers. Similar to the results from the Indonesian native speakers, the Chinese also disregard the presence of belief in the stories. In conclusion, the order of the elements of a prototypical lie based on their importance is also falsehood>intent (>belief). Moreover, some factors influencing Chinese people's judgement, such as the relationship between the speaker and the hearer, and the harms brought by the false statement. As indicated, stories with familiar characters and with false statements causing harms to other are perceived more negatively by Chinese people.

This chapter has discussed the results from the replicated study of Coleman and Kay (1981) with Mandarin Chinese speaking respondents. The result regarding the most important element of a prototypical lie is similar to the results from the experiments with other Asian linguistic groups. After this chapter, I want to shift the focus to the experiment with respondents from a Central European country, Hungary.

CHAPTER 6 PERCEPTION OF LYING BY HUNGARIANS

In this chapter, the perception of lying by Hungarians will be explored.²² In Section 6. 1, I present an introduction regarding the previous replicated experiment of Coleman and Kay (1981) with Hungarian respondents by Vajtai (2013) and address some shortcomings of his study. In Section 6. 2, I discuss the stories in the questionnaire and additional stories for this particular experiment in order to challenge Vajtai's (2013) findings. Afterwards, in Section 6. 3, I describe the demographic information of respondents for the experiment, then I elaborate the results of the present Hungarian experiment in Section 6. 4. In Section 6. 5, I discuss how Hungarian respondents perceive stories where lies occur. Finally, in Section 6. 6, I make the summary of the findings of the study with Hungarian respondents.

6. 1 Introduction to the Research Project

As mentioned, Vajtai (2013) replicated Coleman and Kay's (1981) study with Hungarian native speakers. In his conclusion, Vajtai (2013) does not rule out the possibility that the most important element of a prototypical lie is belief which is similar to the results of the original study in English (Coleman and Kay 1981) and of the replicated studies with Spanish speakers (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012). Vajtai (2013) also suggests that it is also possible that the intention is the strongest element for Hungarians in their judgements of lying. It seems Vajtai's (2013) conclusion is fairly inadequate considering the number of respondents in the study, and also the cultural resemblances between Hungarians and Western Europeans. Moreover, there are some mistranslations made in his version of the questionnaire. Thus, the present experiment was redesigned by involving more respondents and adding more stories to be judged. The experiment was expected to have similar results to those of experimental studies conducted with English (Coleman and Kay 1981) and Spanish speakers (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012).

6. 2 Methods

As was necessary with the first two studies, stories for the Hungarian questionnaire were also translated from Coleman and Kay's (1981) English version and were modified to be linguistically and culturally appropriate. Hungarian names for of characters were retained from Vajtai's (2013, 12) questionnaire. Nevertheless, notable changes on the question structure were

²² This chapter is mainly based on the already published article in Hungarian by Németh T. and Adha (2021).

made. For example, Vajtai (2013, 12) uses the question *te etted meg a tortát?* lit. you ate the cake? ‘were you who ate the cake?’ This form where the second person pronoun *te* ‘you’ is put in the first position actually puts an emphasis on the subject. Meanwhile, the present questionnaire uses the form in which the verb *megetted* ‘ate’ is put in the first position. Therefore, the structure of the question in this present questionnaire is *megetted a tortát?* ‘did you eat the cake?’, to follow the question in the original study by Coleman and Kay (1981). Another change was also made for the structure of a sentence in story 7 [+ – –] in which Vajtai (2013, 12) writes *Bár nagyon igyekszik példás munkát végezni, a nővér véletlenül összekeveri a betegeket és azt feleli.* ‘Although she strives to do an exemplary work, the nurse accidentally confuses the patients, and responds.’ This translation deviates from the sentence used in the original study: Although she is anxious to keep her job, she has nevertheless confused the charts in her mind and replies (Coleman and Kay 1981, 31). As for the present questionnaire, the sentence structure was used as follows. *Bár aggódik az állása miatt, a nővér ennek ellenére összekeveri a fejében a kórlapokat és azt feleli.* ‘Although worried about her job, the nurse nevertheless confuses the medical records in her head and responds.’ Such translation errors might have influenced the previous Hungarian respondents in their judgement. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the questionnaire. The translated stories used for the present Hungarian questionnaire are as follows.

1. **Cake story**

Máté megette a tortát, amelyet Júlia a vendégeknek szeretett volna felszolgálni. Júlia megkérdezi Mátét: - Megetted a tortát? Máté azt feleli: -Nem. Hazudott Máté? [+ + +]
Máté ate the cake that Júlia wanted to serve to the guests. Júlia asks Máté, “Did you eat the cake?” Máté says, “No.” Did Máté lie?

2. **Golf story**

Dávid, János és Ádám épp golfoznak. Ádám rálép Dávid labdájára. Mikor Dávid odaér és észreveszi, hogy a labdája bele van nyomódva a tőzegbe, azt kérdezi: - János, ráléptél a labdámra? János azt feleli: - Nem, Ádám volt. Hazudott János? [– – –]
Dávid, János and Ádám are playing golf. Ádám steps on Dávid’s ball. When Dávid gets there and notices that his ball is pressed into the peat, he asks, “János, did you step on my ball?” János replies, “No, it was Ádám.” Did János lie?

3. **Candy store story**

Patrik abban a hitben van, hogy el kell mennie a cukorkabolt előtt ahhoz, hogy eljusson a biliárd szalonhoz, de téved, mert a cukorkabolt elköltözött. Patrik anyja nem helyesli a biliárdot. Ahogy Patrik elhagyja a házat azzal a szándékkal, hogy biliárdozni menjen,

Patrik anyja megkérdezi, hogy hova megy. Patrik azt mondja: - A cukorkabolt felé megyek. Hazudott Patrik? [+ - +]

Patrik believes that he has to go in front of the candy store to get to the billiards salon, but he is wrong because the candy store has moved. Patrik's mother doesn't approve of billiards. As Patrik leaves the house with the intention of going billiards, Patrik's mother asks where he's going. Patrik says, "I'm going to the candy store." Did Patrik lie?

4. **Exam story**

Egyik reggel Katalinnak aritmetika vizsgája van, amire nem tanult és így nem akar iskolába menni. Azt mondja az anyjának: - Beteg vagyok. Az anyja megméri a lázát és Katalin meglepetésére kiderül, hogy valóban beteg; aznap később kijön rajta a kanyaró. Hazudott Katalin? [- + +]

One morning Katalin has an arithmetic exam that she didn't study for and so she doesn't want to go to school. She tells her mother, "I'm sick." Her mother measures her fever and to Katalin's surprise it turns out she's really sick; the measles will come out on it later that day. Did Katalin lie?

5. **Dinner story**

Sándor a főnökéhez hivatalos vacsorára. A szörnyű vacsora után - amelyet senki sem élvezett - Sándor azt mondja a háziasszonynak: - Köszönöm, remek parti volt. Sándor persze egyáltalán nem gondolja komolyan, hogy remek volt a parti és nem is próbál senkit meggyőzni arról, hogy jól érezte magát, de úgy véli, valami kedveset kell mondania a főnöke feleségének, bár egyáltalán nem várja el tőle, hogy elhiggye. Hazudott Sándor? [+ + -]

Sándor is invited to his boss for an official dinner. After a terrible dinner, which no one enjoyed, Sándor says to the housewife, "Thank you, it was a great party." Sándor, of course, doesn't think seriously at all that the party was great and doesn't even try to convince anyone that he was having a good time, but he thinks he should say something kind to his boss' wife, even though he doesn't expect her to believe it at all. Did Sándor lie?

6. **Ex-boyfriend story**

József és Mária nemrég kezdtek el járni. Vilmos Mária ex-barátja. Egyik este József megkérdezi Máriától: - Láttad Vilmost a héten? Mária azt válaszolja: - Vilmos mononukleózissal gyengélkedik két hete. Vilmos tényleg ebben a betegségben szenved két hete, de valóban az a helyzet, hogy Máriának előző este randevúja volt Vilmostal. Hazudott Mária? [- - +]

József and Mária have recently begun to date. Vilmos is an ex-boyfriend of Mária. One night, József asks Mária, “Did you see Vilmos this week?” Mária replies, “Vilmos has been sick with mononucleosis for two weeks.” Vilmos did suffer from this disease for two weeks, but it is indeed the case that Mária had a date with Vilmos the night before. Did Mária lie?

7. **Surgery story**

Két páciens arra vár, hogy betolják őket a műtőbe. A doktor rámutat az egyikre és azt kérdezi: - Géza vakbélműtőre vagy mandulaműtőre vár? Betti nővér épp akkor olvasta a kórlapokat. Bár aggódik az állása miatt, a nővér ennek ellenére összekeveri a fejében a kórlapokat és azt feleli: - Vakbélműtőre, miközben szegény Gézát valójában mandulaműtőre jegyezték elő. Hazudott Betti nővér? [+ – –]

Two patients are waiting to be wheeled into the operating room. The doctor points to one and asks, “Is Géza waiting for cecal surgery or tonsillectomy?” Nurse Betti was just reading the medical records. Although worried about her job, the nurse nevertheless confuses the medical records in her head and replies, “For cecal surgery, while poor Géza was actually prescribed for tonsillectomy. Did Nurse Betti lie?”

8. **Match story**

Miklós, a szuperdrukker jegyeket kapott a bajnokságra és nagyon büszke rájuk. Megmutatja őket a főnökének, aki azt mondja: - Nézd, Miklós, ha előfordul, hogy valamelyik nap nem jössz dolgozni, jobb lesz, ha jobb kifogást találsz, mint ez a bajnokság. Miklós azt mondja: - Jobbat fogok. A meccs napján Miklós betelefonál a munkahelyére és azt mondja: - Ma nem tudok bemenni dolgozni, főnök, mert beteg vagyok. A sors iróniája, hogy Miklós a meccsre sem tud elmenni, mert a reggel érzett enyhe hasfájásáról kiderül, hogy ételmérgezés. Hazudott Miklós? [- + –]

Miklós, the superfan, got tickets to the tournament and is very proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, “Look, Miklós, if you don't come to work one day, you'd better find an excuse other than this tournament. Miklós says, “I'll do better.” On the day of the match, Miklós calls his place of work and says, “I can't go in to work today, boss, because I'm sick. The irony of fate is that Miklós can't go to the match either, because the mild stomachache he felt in the morning turns out to be food poisoning. Did Miklós lie?”

According to Vajtai (2013, 29), there are some issues regarding the social distance in the scenarios, particularly in story 5 [+ + –], which was originally constructed without the element of intention by Coleman and Kay (1981). The respondents in his study might perceive

the employee to have an intention to deceive although story 5 was originally constructed by Coleman and Kay (1981) without the element of intention. Thus, stories 9 [+ + -] and 11 [+ + -] below were added in the present questionnaire in which conversations occur between two people without any close social relationship. The addition of these two stories will give a better understanding regarding the role of intention in the perception of lying by Hungarians. A second problem that Vajtai (2013) also found that some respondents considered the statement made by the character in story 6 [- - +] to be irrelevant. According to comments made by respondents in Vajtai's (2013) study, the character's response is irrelevant. As a result, Vajtai (2013, 29) proposed an alternate story containing solely the element of intention, which becomes story 10 [- - +] for this present study. The additional stories are also to explore possibility whether or not the element of intention is the strongest element, as Vajtai (2013) suggests. The following are the three additional stories for the present questionnaire.

9. **Dress story**

Helga egyedül megy egy ruhaüzletbe ruhát vásárolni. Felpróbál egy ruhát, amely tetszik neki, de abban nem biztos, hogy a színe jól áll neki. Ezért szeretné valaki más véleményét is hallani. Helga megkérdezi Petrát, aki egy másik, történetesen éppen ott lévő vásárló. Petrának nem igazán tetszik a ruha és a színe. Azért, hogy kielégítse Helga komfortérzetét, de nem azzal a céllal, hogy Helga elhiggye neki, azt mondja, hogy: – Jól áll rajtad a ruha. Hazudik Petra? [+ + -]

Helga goes to a clothing store by herself to buy a dress. She tries on a dress that she likes but she is not sure if the color suits her. So, she wants to hear opinion from another. Helga then asks Petra, another store visitor who happens to be there. Petra does not really like the dress and the color. In order to comfort Helga's feeling and with no purpose for Helga to believe her, Helga says, "The dress looks good on you!". Is Helga lying?

10. **Photo story**

Krisztinának van barátja, de erről a családjá még nem tud. A barátja meglehetősen jómódú és elvitte Krisztinát Velencébe vakációzni. A kirándulás során a pár fényképeket készített. Miután visszatérnek Magyarországra, Krisztina bátyja megtalálja az egyik fotójukat. Krisztina még mindig nem akarja, hogy a család tudomást szerezzen a barátjáról. Ezért, amikor a bátyja megkérdezi, hogy hol készült a fénykép, ezt válaszolja: – Velencében készült. Hazudik Krisztina? [- - +]

Christine has a boyfriend, and her family does not know about this yet. The boyfriend is quite wealthy and has taken Christine to Venice for a vacation. The couple took photos

in their trip. Once they are back in Hungary, one of their photos was found by Christine's brother. Christine still does not want her family to know about her boyfriend. So, when her brother asks her where the photo was taken, she answers, "It was taken in Venice." Is Christine lying?

11. **Restaurant story**

Olivia egyik délután a Széchenyi téri parkban sétált, amikor egy japán turista ment oda hozzá és megkérdezte tőle, merre van a legközelebbi sushi étterem. Szerencsére, Olivia előző nap felfedezte, hogy nyílt egy új sushi étterem, de a pontos helyszínre nem igazán emlékezett. Anélkül, hogy a turistát félre akarta volna vezetni, azt mondta: – Ott van a Közép fasoron, körülbelül tíz perc sétányira innen. Az étterem valójában a Fő fasoron van. Hazudott Olivia? [+ + –]

One afternoon, Olivia was walking in the Széchenyi park when a Japanese tourist came and asked her about the nearest sushi restaurant. Luckily, the day before Olivia found out that a new sushi restaurant was opened but she forgot the exact location. With no intention to get the tourist lost, she told, "It's on Közép Lane, about ten minutes walking from here!" However, in reality, the restaurant is on Fő Lane. Did Olivia lie?

6. 3 Respondents

Similar to the other experiments, 120 Hungarian respondents filled the questionnaire in Hungarian. But only data from 110 respondents were taken into analysis. The following table exhibits the detailed information about the Hungarian participants. In this study, more than 75% of the respondents were male, under the age of 30 and in college or university. Also, majority of the respondents lived in Hungary and spoke Hungarian and other language(s).

Table 6-1 Data of Hungarian Participants

Characteristics	Total	Percentage
Gender		
Male	85	77.3
Female	24	21.9
Not provided	1	0.8
Age		
Below 20 years old	48	43.6
21–30 years old	35	31.8
31–40 years old	9	8.2
Above 40 years old	18	16.4
Education		
Vocational school or <i>szakiskola</i>	1	0.9
High school or <i>középiskola, gimnázium</i>	22	20
College or <i>főiskola</i>	30	27.3
University or <i>egyetem</i>	57	51.8
Language spoken		
Hungarian and other language(s)	95	95.5
Hungarian language only	5	4.5
Current residence		
Capital city of Budapest	20	18.2
City	40	36.4
County seat or <i>megyeszékhely</i>	28	25.4
Move abroad	22	20

6. 4 Results

The results shown in Table 6-2 below has three columns. The first column has the stories' names followed by symbols signifying the presence [+] or the absence [-] of the respective elements, they are falsehood, belief, and intent. The second column is the total score from 110 valid Hungarian respondents. Recall that score close to 7 means the character in the story produces a statement with a prototypical lie, while score close to 1 is a less prototypical lie.

Table 6-2 The scores for each story from 110 Hungarian respondents

Story	Total score	Mean score
1. Cake [+ + +]	767	6.97
2. Golf [– – –]	125	1.14
3. Candy store [+ – +]	259	2.35
4. Exam [– + +]	625	5.68
5. Dinner [+ + –]	591	5.37
6. Ex-boyfriend [– – +]	420	3.82
7. Surgery [+ – –]	272	2.47
8. Match [– + –]	380	3.45

The following table contains the results from three additional stories in the previous section.

Table 6-3 The scores for additional stories

Story	Total score	Mean score
9. Dress [+ + -]	570	5.18
10. Photo [- - +]	128	1.16
11. Restaurant [+ + -]	244	2.22

Figure 6-1 Stories placed on the lie-value continuum from Hungarian respondents




Figure 6-1 above was constructed to see the place of the stories in the lie-value continuum ranging from 1 to 7. The figure partially supports Coleman and Kay's claim (1981) regarding stories with more elements will be a more prototypical lie. Stories 3 [+ - +] and 11 [+ + -] with two elements appear to be on the left side of the continuum, quite further from story 8 [- + -] and 6 [- - +] with one element. In fact, Story 10 [- - +] is very close to story 2 [- - -] with no element, only by two hundredths.

Comparisons of the central tendency scores and also frequency of lie and not lie responses of each story were presented to discover the order of the elements. The subsequent table exhibits those data from the present Hungarian experiment.

Table 6-4 Central tendency and frequency of Hungarian data

Story	Mean	Median	Mode	Responses		
				Lie	Can't say	Not lie
1. Cake [+ + +]	6.97	7	7	110	0	0
2. Golf [- - -]	1.14	1	1	0	0	110
3. Candy store [+ - +]	2.35	1	1	18	7	85
4. Exam [- + +]	5.68	7	7	85	7	18
5. Dinner [+ + -]	5.37	7	7	79	7	24
6. Ex-boyfriend [- - +]	3.82	3	1	48	6	56
7. Surgery [+ - -]	2.47	2	1	20	6	84
8. Match [- + -]	3.45	2	1	44	3	63
9. Dress [+ + -]	5.18	6	7	72	15	23
10. Photo [- - +]	1.16	1	1	0	2	108
11. Restaurant [+ + -]	2.22	1	1	16	8	86

Below is the comparison between the element of falsehood and the element of belief.

7 [+ - -] (2.47, 2, 1) and 8 [- + -] (3.45, 2, 1)

3 [+ - +] (2.35, 1, 1) and 4 [- + +] (5.68, 7, 7)

In the first level of comparison above, both median and mode scores of stories 7 and 8 are similar. However, the mean score of story 8 as well as the number of respondents answering that the story containing a lie are higher than those of story 7. This leads to a strong argument that the element of falsehood is always weaker than the element of belief. As for the comparisons of other elements, there are some inconsistencies, making it rather complicated to make a conclusion. Now, the comparisons between the element of intent and the element of falsehood will be given. Here is the first level of comparison of the two elements.

6 [- - +] (3.82, 3, 1) and 7 [+ - -] (2.47, 2, 1)

10 [- - +] (1.16, 1, 1) and 7 [+ - -] (2.47, 2, 1)

In this comparison, it is difficult to make a judgement which the stronger element is since the scores from any story do not outnumber the other. When we refer to the number of responses suggesting the story has a lie, story 6 has 48 responses whereas story 7 has 20 responses. No respondent, however, considered story 10 to contain a lie, making this story seem to be constructed the same way as story 2. Meanwhile, the second level of comparison have a more promising conclusion although some scores were also similar.

4 [- + +] (5.68, 7, 7) and 5 [+ + -] (5.37, 7, 7)

4 [- + +] (5.68, 7, 7) and 9 [+ + -] (5.18, 6, 7)

4 [- + +] (5.68, 7, 7) > 11 [+ + -] (2.22, 1, 1); intent > falsehood

As presented above, only the last comparison is conclusive. But, by taking into consideration the number of responses, 85 respondents claiming story 4 having a lie whereas for story 5, 9 and 11, there were only 79, 72 and 16, respectively. Thus, it is safe to assume that intent is stronger, and falsehood is the weakest element of all.

Finally, here are the comparisons to decide whether the element of intent or the element of belief is the strongest element.

6 [- - +] (3.82, 3, 1) and 8 [- + -] (3.45, 2, 1)

10 [- - +] (1.16, 1, 1) and 8 [- + -] (3.45, 2, 1)

Above comparisons are the first level, whereas the comparisons below are the second level.

3 [+ - +] (2.35, 1, 1) < 5 [+ + -] (5.37, 7, 7); intent < belief

3 [+ - +] (2.35, 1, 1) < 9 [+ + -] (5.18, 6, 7); intent < belief

3 [+ - +] (2.35, 1, 1) > 11 [+ + -] (2.22, 1, 1)

Similar to the earlier comparison, story 10's elements might be misassigned, so, the comparison of this story with another can be discarded. As for the other comparisons, the lie responses

obtained for stories 6 and 8, as well as stories 3 and 11 are so close to each other and are inconclusive. However, two comparisons in the second level are more definitive to draw a conclusion that the element of belief is the strongest element of a prototypical lie for Hungarians. The order of Coleman and Kay's (1981) elements for Hungarians in terms of importance will be belief>intent>>falsehood.

6. 5 Discussion


The previous part demonstrates that the conclusion regarding the order of the elements for the present study differs to the one in Vajtai's (2013) work. However, if comparison is made between the results of the mean scores of the present experiment and of Vajtai's (2013) study, the mean value differences between the two experimental studies are small. It can be presumed that Vajtai (2013) made an error in drawing the conclusion regarding the strongest element of prototypical lie for Hungarians. Table 6-5 below shows the mean scores of stories from the two studies with Hungarian respondents.

Table 6-5 The comparison of lie-values of two different studies with Hungarian participants

Story	Vajtai (2013)	Németh T. and Adha (2021)	Mean Value Difference
1. Cake (+ + +)	6.71	6.97	0.26
2. Golf (---)	1.28	1.14	0.14
3. Candy store (+ - +)	2.96	2.35	0.61
4. Exam (- + +)	5.35	5.68	0.33
5. Dinner (+ + -)	5.10	5.37	0.27
9. Dress (+ + -)		5.18	
11. Restaurant (+ + -)		2.22	
6. Ex-boyfriend (- - +)	3.66	3.82	0.16
10. Photo (- - +)		1.16	
7. Surgery (+ - -)	2.59	2.47	0.12
8. Match (- + -)	2.85	3.45	0.60

Values between 3.01 to 4.99 above are bold typed meaning that the Hungarian respondents are not confident enough to decide whether the character in the story is lying or not. Both groups of Hungarian respondents possess almost identical judgement of lie, especially for story 6 [- - +] in which both groups found it difficult to decide whether Mária is lying or not. Differences are slightly bigger for story 3 [+ - +] and story 8 [- + -]. Hungarian respondents for the present study are more certain to determine that Patrik in story 3 is not lying, meanwhile judgement about Miklós in story 8 is put in the middle continuum, meaning the present study's respondents are less certain to consider whether Miklós is lying or not. Figure 6-2 on the next page exhibits clearly the results from both experimental studies.

Figure 6-2 The comparison of lie-values of two different studies with Hungarian participants



Hungarian respondents for the present study are more confident in their judgement for story 1 [+ + +] and story 2 [– – –]. In fact, for story 1, 107 out of 110 respondents (97.3%) are absolutely sure that the character is lying, and only three respondents (2.7%) feel pretty sure about their judgement. As for story 2, 94 respondents (85.5%) are absolutely sure that János is not lying, and 14.5% (16 respondents) are just pretty sure about their answers.

For story 3 [+ – +], 102 respondents (92,7%) are absolutely sure and pretty sure about their choices (either they perceive the character is lying or not). This number suggests a higher certainty level of the respondents of the present experiment in comparison to respondents of Vajtai’s (2013). For story 3, the certainty level is only 65% (Vajtai 2013, 24). More than a third of the present study’s participants consider Patrik not lying. This also means that the absence of the element of belief for this story is successfully recognized. In addition, hiding the true purpose about whereabouts or intention is also recognized based on the respondents’ comments. Meanwhile, respondents who judged Patrik is lying commented that he only provides answer about direction to his mother who asks a question regarding location. This irrelevant and evasive answer are seen to be deceptive for Hungarian respondents who respond that Patrik is lying.

Story 4 [– + +] receives 77.3% responses, or 85 respondents considered Katalin is lying because her misbelief about her situation. This recognition of the absence of misbelief is expected for Hungarian respondents even though the same recognition was not made by respondents from Indonesia and China. One Hungarian respondent commented as follow.

- (6. 1) *Itt nem azt mondja a beszélő, amit ő igaznak hisz.*
Here the speaker is not saying what she believes to be true.

Similar comments are commonly made by respondents in the present study. Meanwhile, Vajtai (2013, 25) claims that most comments made by respondents in his study emphasized on

Katalin's intention. In contrast, respondents in the present study thought that Katalin was not lying. For example, one respondent commented as follow.

- (6.2) *Eredetileg hazugságnak szánta, ám később kiderült, hogy - a saját megdöbbenésére is- igazat mondott.*
Originally, she intended it as a lie, but later it turned out that, to her own shock, she was telling the truth.

Both stories 3 and 4 use characters with a familiar relationship. However, unlike the comments from the Mandarin Chinese speakers, none of the Hungarian respondents commented addressing this matter.

Vajtai (2013, 25) indicated that the respondents for his study were divided in their beliefs of the character of Story 5 [+ + -]lying. For the present study, 79 respondents (71,8%) thought that Sándor is lying of which 56 respondents (72,7%) were absolutely sure about their choices. Respondents who considered the character lied commented that this type of lie is acceptable and unarmful. If the character did not lie, discomfort might arise. Additionally, several terms were given by respondents to refer to this lie, such as *tapintat* 'tact', *kegyes hazugság* 'merciful, gracious or white lie', *udvariasság* 'courtesy, politeness', *füllentés* 'fib', and *jóindulatúnak* 'benign, benevolent'.

Story 6 [- - +], the only story from the original study to have been constructed with intention as its single element, appears in the center of the lie-value continuum with the mean score of 3.82. This mean score is almost similar to Vajtai's (2013) result, 3.66. These mean scores in two experimental studies suggest that respondents were divided in their judgement of Mária's statement. In fact, in the present study 56 respondents (51%) think she is lying while 48 respondents (43.6%) do not think so. Some respondents were able to recognize the presence of the element of intention. One comment from a respondent indicated that the type of relationship between the two characters was similar to that from Coleman and Kay (1981, 40). According to this respondent, Mária is lying and cheating on József if they are not in an open relationship. Objectively, Mária's answer in the story contains some truths but the answer is not relevant to the question. This reason is given by respondents judging Mária not lying. However, evasiveness and irrelevance are also the foundation of the other responses claiming Mária is lying. As was the case with story 3 [+ - +], withholding information still received mixed perception. Below are the comments from both sides regarding being quiet about the truth.

- (6.3) *Mária nem válaszolt a kérdésre, vagyis elhallgatta az igazságot. Az igazság elhallgatása ugyanúgy hazugság, mint valótlan állítani. Vagyis: a valós irreleváns ugyanannyira hazugság, mint a valótlan releváns.*

Mária did not answer the question, that is, she kept quiet about the truth. To silence the truth is as much a lie as to claim it is untrue. That is, the truthful irrelevance is as much a lie as the untruthful relevance.

- (6. 4) *Nem hazudott, hanem csúsztatott, elhallgatja az igazságot, valójában nem válaszolt a kérdésre.*
She didn't lie, she slipped, she kept quiet about the truth, she didn't really answer the question.

Story 7 [+ – –] receives the second highest non-lie judgement (76.4%) for the original story. Many Hungarian respondents wrote *tévedett* 'she was wrong, she made a mistake'. This story was constructed to have only the element of falsehood. Several comments from the present study acknowledge the absence of the element of intention. This argument leads Vajtai (2013, 26) to consider the importance of intention for Hungarians' perception of lie.

The only story with the element of belief was story 8 [- + –]. Some respondents, however, commented that Miklós has intention to lie in the situation, meaning that the story might be perceived as [- + +] instead of [- + –]. Vajtai (2013, 26) claims that omitting the word *ironically* in the story might have a role for the respondents in his study to successfully convey the story 8 as having only one element. In the present study, the word was not omitted to mirror the original study. One comment addressing the intention of Miklós is presented below.

- (6. 5) *Azzal a szándékkal mondta, hogy félrevezesse a főnökét. Aztán később alakultak úgy az események, hogy a mondata mégis „igazzá vált”. A hazugságot én nem pusztán úgy értem, hogy „nem igaz az állítás”, hanem benne van a beszélő szándéka is arra, hogy félrevezesse a hallgatót arról, ahogyan ő látja/tudja a dolgokat.*
He said with the intention of misleading his boss. Then later events unfolded so that the sentence still became “true”. By lie, I do not only mean “the statement is not true,” but it also includes the speaker's intention to mislead the listener into how he or she sees/knows things.

Such kind of comment is typical and is mainly made by respondents who consider Miklós is lying, which amounts to 44 of respondents (40%). Still, 63 respondents (57.3%) think that Miklós is not lying.

Stories 9 [+ + –], 10 [- – +] and 11 [+ + –] were constructed to find out the strongest element of a prototypical lie for Hungarians as Vajtai (2013, 27) suggested that it is the intention. Stories 9 and 10 were provided by Vajtai (2013, 29) when he described his methodological problem. Story 9 [+ + –] was proposed because Vajtai (2013) argued that story 5 [+ + –] in his study had a higher mean score because his participants may have perceived story 5 as [+ + +] instead of [+ + –]. This argument is based on the social relationship of the boss and employee in Story 5 even though there was only one respondent addressed about this.

Vajtai (2013, 29) then suggested to have characters with a distanced relationship where a man compliments a woman trying on a piece of clothing. However, the genders of the characters in this suggestion were modified into two women. This modification was to avoid possible comments about the man teasing the woman, which might be perceived that the man has an intention to deceive in order to pursue the woman. Vajtai (2013, 29) claimed that this story might have a lower lie-value. However, the result from the present experiment for story 9 [+ + -] is 5.18. This mean score is just slightly below than story 5's white lie mean score, that is 5.37. When this story was translated into Hungarian, the translator admitted that respondents might assume the two characters are not complete strangers. None of the comments, however, suggest so. In fact, many comments are similar to those made concerning story 5. Thus, it can be argued that the high score for white lie is because Hungarians still perceive a white lie as a lie even though it is still acceptable for the sake of politeness. Also, the social relationship of the speaker and the hearer does not appear to affect the judgement of the respondents regarding the false statement.

Story 10 [- - +] was proposed by Vajtai (2013, 29) based on his friend's experience. I made some changes to shorten the story where I cut the following part,

... She knows her brother well enough to be sure that her brother will not believe her if she told him that she had been to Venice. Thus, in order to get her brother off of her she says to him: 'It was taken in Venice'. Christine's brother replies ironically: 'Of course, of course.' and – not believing Christine – leaves bothering the topic.

and change it into

... So, when her brother asks her where the photo was taken, she answers, 'It was taken in Venice.' Is Christine lying?

Omitting the part might cause the respondents not to recognize that the element of intention is present in the story. The story was reconstructed in a way that Christine's unwillingness to reveal her boyfriend is her intention to lie. However, none of the respondents commented regarding the presence or absence of intention in the story. Most respondents addressed that Christine relevantly answered the questions. One respondent commented below.

- (6. 6) *A feltett kérdésre válaszolt. A bátyja a jelek szerint nem volt kíváncsi arra, hogy kivel látható a képen, mivel nem arra kérdezett rá.*
She answered the question. Her brother didn't seem to be wondering who she was in the picture with, as he didn't ask her that.

In addition to the respondent taking a particularly low context approach to understanding the story, the comment above suggests a certain relevance. This may be the reason there is a relevance to the given question in the answer. This relevance is possibly the reason that this story is perceived not to contain a lie and the story might be perceived to have no elements of prototypical lie, which may be the reason why the story receives the second lowest mean score of 1.16 after story 2 with the mean score of 1.14. Therefore, instead of [– – +] story 10's elements should be [– – –].

The last additional story is Story 11 [+ + –] which was constructed to have falsehood and misbelief but no intention to deceive. This combination of elements is successfully perceived by respondents based on their comments given below in which they address these elements.

(6. 7) *Nem vezette rossz szándék a hamis információ átadásakor, csak rosszul emlékezett.*

She was not led by bad intentions in passing on false information, she only remembered badly.

(6. 8) *Nem direkt mondott rosszat, ő szerinte ez igaz ez az állítás.*

She did not mislead on purpose, she just thought this statement is true.

Compared to story 9 [+ + –], this story has two complete strangers asking and answering. As Vajtai (2013, 29) argues, having strangers might lead to lower lie-value, which is true for this story. Strangely, none of the respondents commented that story 11 is a case of white lie as in stories 5 [+ + –] and 9. Most of the comments are about mistakes that character makes due to bad memory. These comments are also common for story 7 [+ – –] which might be the reason of almost equal score for these stories 7 and 11. Accordingly, story 11 seems to have a flaw in the assignment of elements, instead of [+ + –], story 11's elements are supposed to be [+ – –].

Overall, Hungarian respondents from this present experiment seem to be more certain of their judgement compared to other groups in the Western world such as English people (Coleman and Kay 1981), Arabic people (Cole 1996), and Ecuadorian Spanish people (Hardin 2010). Nonetheless, Hungarians' understanding of lying is as equivalent as these three cultural groups in which the element of belief plays the most important role in the determination of lie. This result partially denies Vajtai's (2013, 27) initial argument that intention is the strongest element in the prototypical lie in Hungarian.

6. 6 Conclusions

Coleman and Kay's (1981) study has been replicated with several cultures, including Hungarians by Vajtai (2013) who concluded that the order of elements of prototypical lie for Hungarians is intention>belief>>falsehood. But Vajtai (2013, 31) also does not disregard the possibility that belief might be the most important element for Hungarians, instead of intention. This present experiment tries to confirm or reject Vajtai's (2013) previous argument on Hungarian perception of lying. After following the study of Coleman and Kay (1981) with additional stories to test the element of intention, it can be concluded that the Hungarians' order of elements is similar to those of English people (Coleman and Kay 1981) and of Arabic people (Cole 1996). So, the order of elements is belief>intention>>falsehood. Majority of the comments from Hungarian respondents addresses either the belief or the intention of the characters. The relationship of the characters is rarely mentioned. Unlike the results from previous experiments with Asian respondents, there seems to be no social and cultural factors in the interpretation of lying by Hungarians.

Hungarians seem to be more certain in making a judgement when a lie occurs, especially in the case of white lies. Hungarians still perceives white lies as lies but they are acceptable for maintaining a social relationship. Furthermore, based on the discussion, Hungarians have mixed perception regarding withholding information (or half-truth) and evasive responses. Evasiveness is sometimes done through providing an irrelevant statement. In many cases, relevance of information plays a role in the Hungarians' judgement.

Finally, this chapter has provided results and discussion of another replicated study of Coleman and Kay (1981) with Hungarian respondents, in order to challenge the findings from the previous study by Vajtai (2013). The results are in line with other studies conducted in Arabic and Euro-American lingua cultures. The subsequent chapter presents the last replicated study with native speakers of Russian.

CHAPTER 7 PERCEPTION OF LYING BY RUSSIANS

This chapter is about the replicated study of Coleman and Kay (1981) with native speakers of Russian. The chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 7. 1, I present an introduction to the research of lying, focusing on a replication from another experimental study with native speakers of Russian as respondents. In Section 7. 2, I review the stories of the questionnaire utilized for the Russian experiment, and some brief discussion about (unintentional) changes of format of the questionnaire. After that, in section 7. 3, the demographical information of the respondents is presented. Then, in Section 7. 4, I overview the results of the Russian experiment. In Section 7. 5, I discuss the results. Finally, to close the chapter, I give some conclusions in Section 7. 6.

7. 1 Introduction to the Research Project

Recent research exploring the evaluation of lying with Russian native speakers as respondents was conducted by Reins, Wiegmann, Marchenko, and Schumski (2021). The researchers investigated four different types of indirect deceptions, presuppositions, GCIs, PCIs, and non-verbal actions with three different groups of respondents: English speaking respondents in the United Kingdom, Russians in Moscow, and Russian living in a Western country. Respondents were required to respond to scenarios with any of the deceptions. After the scenarios, respondents were asked whether each agent in the scenarios had lied and/or misled, and they also needed to evaluate morality of the action. Reins, et al. (2021) were interested in the cultural differences between Eastern and Western Europeans. Russian people are described to be more collectivistic, more interdependent, and more holistic, than the Western Europeans (Tower, Kelly and Richards 2011, Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett, and Kitayama. 2008). Reins, et al. (2021) find that Russian participants generally judge deceptions to be less morally reprehensible compared to participants from the United Kingdom. Also, the judgements of Russian participants living in a Western country differed slightly from the judgements of Russians living in Moscow. The judgements of Russian respondents living in the United Kingdom resembled judgements of English-speaking respondents from the United Kingdom. Reins, et al. (2021) also suggested that these differences were small and the three groups showed similar judgement. This conclusion leads to an assumption that the present experiment would yield in the same results as the original experiment by Coleman and Kay (1981).

7.2 Methods

As was the case for the linguistic groups involved in the previous projects as part of this study, these stories were also adopted for the Russian questionnaire. The stories for the Russian questionnaire have also been adapted linguistically and culturally. Names, activities and terms were adapted to make the stories culturally relevant for the Russian respondents as well. The stories also display both equal and nonequal relationships, either the characters are in familiar or in professional settings. Equal relationships can be seen in stories 1, 2, 6, and 7. In these stories, the characters are either colleagues or a couple. Meanwhile, nonequal relationship is found in stories 3, 4, 5, and 8 in which the conversation is either between a parent and a child or between a boss and a subordinate. Here are the stories in the questionnaire.

1. **Cake story**

Миша съел торт, который Юля хотела подать гостям. Юля спросила Мишу: «Ты ли съел торт». Миша ответил: «Нет».

Misha s "yel tort, kotoryu Yulya khotela podat' gostyam. Yulya sprosila Mishu: «Ty li s "yel tort ». Misha otvetil: «Net».

Misha ate the cake that Julia wanted to serve to the guests. Julia asked Misha: “Have you eaten the cake?” Misha replied: “No.”

2. **Golf story**

Руслан, Женя и Адам играют в гольф. Адам наступил на мяч Руслана. Когда Руслан подошёл и увидел, что его мяч втоптан в траву, он спросил: «Женя, ты ли наступил на мяч?». Женя ответил: «Нет, это сделал Адам».

Ruslan, Zhenya i Adam igrayut v golf. Adam nastupil na myach Ruslana. Kogda Ruslan podoshol i uvidel, chto yego myach vtoptan v travu, on sprosil: «Zhenya, ty li nastupil na myach?». Zhenya otvetil: «Net, eto sdelal Adam».

Ruslan, Zhenya and Adam play golf. Adam stepped on Ruslan’s ball. When Ruslan came up and saw that his ball was trampled into the grass, he asked: “Zhenya, did you step on the ball?” Zhenya answered: “No, Adam did.”

3. **Candy store story**

Петя уверен, что для того чтобы попасть в бильярдную, он должен пройти мимо магазина сладостей. Но он заблуждается, потому что магазин сладостей переехал. Известно, что мама Пети не одобряет его походы в бильярдную. В то время как Петя выходил из дома с намерением посетить бильярдную, мама спросила его о том, куда он идёт. Петя ответил, что идёт в сторону магазина сладостей.

Petya uveren, chto dlya togo chtoby popast' v bil'yardnyuyu, on dolzhen proyti mimo magazina sladostey. No on zabluzhdayetsya, potomu chto magazin sladostey pereyekhal. Izvestno, chto mama Peti ne odobryayet yego pokhody v bil'yardnyuyu. V to vremya kak Petya vykhodil iz doma s namereniyem posetit' bil'yardnyuyu, mama sprosila yego o tom, kuda on idot. Petya otvetil, chto idot v storonu magazina sladostey.

Petya is sure that in order to get into the billiard room, he must walk past a candy store. But he is wrong because the candy store has moved. It is known that Petya's mother does not approve of his visits to the billiard room. While Petya was leaving the house with the intention of visiting the billiard room, his mother asked him where he was going. Petya replied that he was walking towards the candy store.

4. **Math test story**

Однажды утром у Кати должна была быть контрольная работа по математике, к которой она не подготовилась. По этой причине она не хотела идти в школу и сказала маме, что плохо себя чувствует. Мама измерила ее температуру, и, к удивлению самой Кати, оказалось, что она действительно болеет. Как стало известно к вечеру, Катя заболела корью.

Odnazhdy utrom u Kati dolzhna byla byt' kontrol'naya rabota po matematike, k kotoroy ona ne podgotovilas'. Po etoy prichine ona ne khotela idti v shkolu i skazala mame, chto plokho sebya chuvstvuyet. Mama izmerila yeye temperaturu, i, k udivleniyu samoy Kati, okazalos', chto ona deystvitel'no boleyet. Kak stalo izvestno k vecheru, Katya zaboolela kor'yu.

One morning Katya was supposed to have a math test for which she had not prepared for. For this reason, she did not want to go to school and told her mother that she was not feeling well. Her mother took her temperature, and, to the surprise of Katya herself, it turned out that she was really sick. As it turned out in the evening, Katya fell ill with measles.

5. **Dinner story**

Александра пригласили на ужин домой к его начальнику. После унылого вечера, который никому не понравился, Александр обратился к хозяйке дома: «Спасибо, вечеринка была потрясающей». Александр понимал, что вечеринка не была потрясающей и не пытался убедить кого-то, что хорошо провёл время. Он просто хотел сказать что-то приятное жене его начальника, не ожидая, что она поверит ему.

Aleksandra priglasili na uzhin domoy k yego nachal'niku. Posle unylogo vechera, kotoryy nikomu ne ponravilsya, Aleksandr obratilsya k khozyayke doma: «Spasibo,

vecherinka byla potryasayushchey». Aleksandr ponimal, chto vecherinka ne byla potryasayushchey i ne pytalsya ubedit' kogo-to, chto khorosho provol vremya. On prosto khotel skazat' chto-to priyatnoye zhene yego nachal'nika, ne ozhidaya, chto ona poverit yemu.

Alexander was invited to dinner at his boss' house. After a dull evening that no one liked, Alexander turned to the hostess: "Thank you, the party was amazing." Alexander understood that the party was not amazing and did not try to convince someone that he had a good time. He just wanted to say something nice to his boss wife, not expecting her to believe him.

6. **Ex-boyfriend story**

Женя и Маша недавно начали встречаться. Валентин - бывший парень Маши. Однажды вечером Женя спросил Машу: «Видела ли ты Валентина на этой неделе?». Маша ответила: «Валентин болен мононуклеозом вот уже пару недель». Факт в том, что Валентин действительно болен мононуклеозом и что Маша виделась с ним прошлой ночью.

Zhenya i Masha nedavno nachali vstrechat'sya. Valentin - byvshiy paren' Mashi. Odnazhdy vecherom Zhenya sprosil MASHU: «Videla li ty Valentina na etoy nedele?». Masha otvetila: «Valentin bolen mononukleozom vot uzhe paru nedel'». Fakt v tom, chto Valentin deystvitel'no bolen mononukleozom i chto Masha videlas' s nim proshloy noch'yu.

Zhenya and Masha have recently started dating. Valentine is Masha's ex-boyfriend. One evening Zhenya asked Masha: "Have you seen Valentine this week?" Masha replied: "Valentine has been sick with mononucleosis for a couple of weeks now." The fact is that Valentin is really sick with mononucleosis and that Masha saw him last night.

7. **Operation story**

Двое пациентов ждут, когда их перевезут в операционную. Врач указывает на одного из них и спрашивает: «Евгений здесь на удаление аппендикса или на удаление миндалин?». Медсестра по имени Анастасия только что ознакомилась с медицинскими карточками пациентов. Несмотря на то, что Анастасия хотела сохранить работу, она все же перепутала карточки пациентов и ответила: «Он на удаление аппендикса». А ведь Евгений на самом деле нуждался в удалении миндалин.

Dvoye patsiyentov zhдут, когда их perevezut v operatsionnyuyu. Vrach ukazyvayet na odnogo iz nikh i sprashivayet: «Yevgeniy zdes' na udaleniye appendiksa ili na udaleniye mindalin?». Medsestra po imeni Anastasiya tol'ko chto oznakomilas' s meditsinskimi

kartochkami patsiyentov. Nesmotrya na to, chto Anastasiya khotela sokhranit' rabotu, ona vse zhe pereputala kartochki patsiyentov i otvetila: «On na udaleniye appendiksa». A ved' Yevgeniy na samom dele nuzhdalsya v udalenii mindalin.

Two patients are waiting to be transported to the operating room. The doctor points to one of them and asks: “Is Eugene here to remove the appendix or to remove the tonsils?” A nurse named Anastasia has just reviewed the patient’s medical records. Despite the fact that Anastasia wanted to keep her job, she nevertheless mixed up the patient cards and replied: “He is for the removal of the appendix.” But Eugene actually needed to have his tonsils removed.

8. **Ticket story**

Преданный фанат Николай заполучил билеты на чемпионат и был неистово этому рад. Он показал эти билеты своему начальнику, который сказал ему: «Слушай, Николай, если ты когда-нибудь решишь не прийти на работу, то тебе лучше найти более веское оправдание, чем этот чемпионат». Николай ответил: «Найду». В день чемпионата Николай позвонил начальнику и сообщил: «Я не смогу пойти сегодня на работу, так как заболел». По иронии судьбы Николай не смог пойти и на чемпионат из-за легкой боли в животе, которая, как оказалось, была спровоцирована отравлением птомаином. Иными словами, Николай был действительно болен, когда он сообщил о недомогании.

Predannyy fanat Nikolay zapoluchil bilety na chempionat i byl neistovo etomu rad. On pokazal eti bilety svoeyemu nachal'niku, kotoryy skazal yemu: «Slushay, Nikolay, yesli ty kogda-nibud' reshish' ne priyti na rabotu, to tebe luchshe nayti boleye veskoye opravdaniye, chem etot chempionat». Nikolay otvetil: «Naydu». V den' chempionata Nikolay pozvonil nachal'niku i soobshchil: «YA ne smogu poyti segodnya na rabotu, tak kak zabolet». Po ironii sud'by Nikolay ne smog poyti i na chempionat iz-za legkoy boli v zhivote, kotoraya, kak okazalos', byla sprovotsirovana otravleniyem ptomainom. Inymi slovami, Nikolay byl deystvitel'no bolen, kogda on soobshchil o nedomoganii.

A devoted fan Nikolai got tickets for the championship and was extremely happy about it. He showed these tickets to his boss, who told him: “Listen, Nikolai, if you ever decide not to come to work, then you better find a more compelling excuse than this championship.” Nikolai replied: “I’ll find it.” On the day of the championship, Nikolai called his boss and said: “I can’t go to work today, because I got sick.” Ironically, Nikolai was unable to go to the championship either because of mild abdominal pain, which, as it turned out, was triggered by ptomaine poisoning. In other words, Nikolai was really sick when he reported the illness.

Recall in Chapter 3, in Section 3.2, a small change has been undertaken in the questionnaire for this Russian experiment. The change is about the comment section. Instead of being a non-obligatory separate section, the comment section was integrated into an option under the certainty part. This change was rather a misunderstanding between me and my Russian colleague. The change, however, does not affect the whole study and the result. The responses from the respondents who chose to provide comments cannot be included in the analysis since their scores cannot be determined using the 7-scoring scale. However, their comments will be taken into consideration in the discussion section of this chapter.

7.3 Respondents

The Russian questionnaire was circulated online through the platform of *Google Form* and reached 134 native speakers of Russian. Nine respondents were discarded following Coleman and Kay's (1981, 31) requirement about the responses for story 1 [+ + +] and 2 [- - -]. Furthermore, six respondents providing comments instead of choosing any certainty level were also excluded in the result section. In the end, for the Russian experiment, 119 responses were taken into consideration in the analysis. The information about the respondents is described in Table 7-1. Generally speaking, men and women were relatively equally represented (42% men) as were several levels of educational attainment. Over a third of the participants (36.9%) were aged 22 or younger and 61.4% fell between the ages of 21 and 40.

Table 7-1 Data of Russian Participants

Characteristics	Total	Percentage
Gender		
Male	50	42
Female	69	58
Age		
Below 20 years old	44	36.9
21–30 years old	66	55.5
31–40 years old	7	5.9
Above 40 years old	2	1.7
Education		
General Secondary	30	25.2
Vocational Secondary	17	14.3
Bachelor	37	31.1
Master or specialist	34	28.6
Other level	1	0.8
Language spoken		
Russian, regional, and foreign languages	8	6.7
Russian and foreign languages	70	58.8
Russian and regional languages	7	5.9
Russian language only	34	28.6

7.4 Results

The following table contains scores and mean scores from the experiment with the Russian native speakers. For the present results, the stories' names are listed followed by the presence [+] or the absence [-] of the elements of falsehood, belief and intention, respectively.


Table 7-2 The scores and mean scores from 119 Russian native speakers participating in the experiment

Story	Total score	Mean score
1. Cake [+++]	818	6.87
2. Golf [---]	172	1.44
3. Candy store [+ - +]	422	3.55
4. Math test [- + +]	628	5.28
5. Dinner [++ -]	590	4.96
6. Ex-boyfriend [--- +]	436	3.66
7. Operation [+ - -]	414	3.48
8. Ticket [- + -]	391	3.28

There are more bold mean scores from this experiment in comparison to the previous experiments. The scores in bold whose mean scores ranging from 3.01 to 4.99 in the table

represent uncertainty of the Russian respondents to consider whether the statement in the stories contains a weak or a strong lie. Other than the controlling stories, the story 4 is the only story where Russians seem to be sure to categorize the element as a stronger lie. A figure 7-1 below is constructed based on the results from the previous table.

Figure 7-1 Stories place on the lie-value continuum from Russian respondents



Story 1, the cake story, has all the elements of a prototypical lie and appears to the right end of the continuum followed by stories 4 and 5, each comprises of two elements. Story 3, also with two elements, is in the position that is weaker than the position of story 6. This disproves Coleman and Kay’s (1981, 32) claim that stories containing more elements would be judged as a more prototypical lie. Although the mean score difference between stories 3 and 6 is not big, story 3 is a lot further away compared to the other two stories with two elements.

The order of the elements is obtained through comparing scores of central tendencies as well as frequency of responses of the stories. The data can be seen in the following table.

Table 7-3 Central tendency and frequency of Russian data

Story	Mean	Median	Mode	Responses		
				Lie	Can’t say	Not lie
1. Cake [+ + +]	6.87	7	7	119	0	0
2. Golf [- - -]	1.44	1	1	0	0	119
3. Candy store [+ - +]	3.55	2	2	43	8	68
4. Math test [- + +]	5.28	6	6	92	5	22
5. Dinner [+ + -]	4.96	6	6	99	7	33
6. Ex-boyfriend [- - +]	3.66	3	2	38	21	60
7. Operation [+ - -]	3.48	2	2	37	9	63
8. Ticket [- + -]	3.28	2	1	44	1	74

First, the comparisons of the element of intent and the element of belief are addressed below in which a contradictive result can be seen.

6 [- - +] (3.66, 3, 2) > 8 [- + -] (3.28, 2, 1); intent > belief

3 [+ - +] (3.55, 2, 2) < 5 [+ + -] (4.96, 6, 6); intent < belief

Although scores of story 6 are higher than those of story 8, the frequency of data yields in a different manner. Not only does story 6 have less lie responses (38 compared to 44 for story 8), it also has 21 respondents who could not decide whether the story contained a lie. This leads to an assumption that the element of belief might be stronger than the element of intent. The same consideration also goes for the comparisons of the element of falsehood and the element of belief.

7 [+ - -] (3.48, 2, 2) and 8 [- + -] (3.28, 2, 1)

3 [+ - +] (3.55, 2, 2) < 4 [- + +] (5.27, 6, 6); falsehood < belief

Story 8 has 44 lie responses and 1 undecided response, whereas story 7 has 37 lie responses and 9 indecisive responses. Therefore, it can be concluded that the element of belief is stronger than the element of falsehood and is also the strongest among all. Finally, between the element of falsehood and the element of intent, only the mean scores are definitive to make a conclusion.

6 [- - +] (3.66, 3, 2) and 7 [+ - -] (3.48, 2, 2)

4 [- + +] (5.27, 6, 6) and 5 [+ + -] (4.96, 6, 6)

In the first level comparison, the difference of lie response frequency between stories 6 and 7 is only 1. This makes it difficult to consider that story 6 is stronger than story 7. As mentioned earlier, story 6 receives quite high indecisive responses, making the story more believable to argue that it has weaker judgement compared to story 7. Therefore, the element of intention might be not as prominent as in the interpretation of lying by Hungarians in the previous chapter. In the second level comparison, story 4 has a higher mean score than story 5. However, story 4 has 92 lie response, whereas story 5 has 99 respondents considering that the story contains a lie. So, it may be concluded that for the Russians in this study, the element of falsehood is actually stronger than the element of intent, just as the results from the experiments with Spanish speakers (Eichelberger 2012, Hardin 2010). All in all, the order of the elements from the Russian experiment in terms of importance is belief > falsehood > intent.

7.5 Discussion

In the experiment with Russians, only few respondents provided comments. Moreover, the comments were made by respondents who considered it as an option in the second question of the questionnaire regarding uncertainty. As mentioned before, even though the respondents providing comments were excluded in the data analysis, their comments are still considered for the elaboration of the discussion regarding the Russians' perception and judgement of lying.

The mean score for story 1 [+ + +] is 6.87 whereas for story 2 [- - -] is 1.44. Unfortunately, there were no comments that provide hints about the backgrounds and reasons

of the Russian respondents' choices regarding story 1. As for story 2, the mean score is relatively high among other European groups where the English group obtained 1.06 (Coleman and Kay 1981) and both the Continental Spanish speakers and Hungarians resulted in the mean score of 1.14 (Eichelberger 2012, Németh T. and Adha 2021). And even though story 2 was constructed to have no lie, one respondent gave a brief comment regarding story 2: Нет, это очевидная ложь *Net, eto ochevidnaya lozh'* 'No, that is an obvious lie.' Again, there is no elaborated comment for this story, and it is quite hard to understand why the respondent commented in such a manner.

Recall that story 3 [+ – +] is about a son who falsely believes that a certain store is still in its location but has actually moved, whereas story 4 [– + +] is about a daughter claiming sick in order to avoid an exam. The results for stories 3 and 4, with the mean scores of 3.55 and 5.28, respectively, are almost similar to the results from the experiment with English native speakers of the United States (Coleman and Kay 1981), where the mean scores are 3.66 for story 3 and 5.16 for story 4. Kühnen, Roeder, Shah, Upmeyer, and Zakaria (2001) suggest that Americans are prototypically considered as people belonging to individualistic cultures whereas Russians are of collectivistic cultures. The present results for stories 3 and 4 suggest that both groups share almost similar perception of lying. This results also support Reins, et al.'s (2021) findings that both Russian and English speakers in their study have identical judgement for deceptive acts.

Despite not obtaining comments regarding both stories, the mean scores are quite indicative that Russians put emphasis on the element of belief in their judgements of lying. This argument is based on the fact that the story without the element of belief resulted in a lower mean score as evidenced by story 3 about the candy store. Story 4 with the element of belief being present obtained a higher mean score. Story 5 [+ + –] was consistently regarded by other respondents in other experiments to contain a white lie. However, comments for this story from the present experiment are divisive. Respondent of comment (7.1) perceives a white lie as a lie, meanwhile respondent of comment (7.2) considers etiquette as part of politeness and that etiquette is not a case of a lie.

- (7. 1) Солгал во благо.
Solgal vo blago.
He lied for a good reason.

- (7. 2) Он соблюдал правила этикета.
On soblyudal pravila etiketa.
He followed the rules of etiquette.

If comparison was conducted on stories with only one element being present, then the element of intent will become the most salient element among the three. This is due to story 6 [– – +] having only the element of intent obtains a mean score that is slightly higher, that is 3.66, followed by story 7 [+ – –] with the element of falsehood with a mean score of 3.48, then story 8 [– + –] with the element of belief having a mean score of 3.28. However, the combination of elements, especially the element of belief with any other element, will always end up in a higher mean score. Regarding story 6, two respondents commented that the character did not lie, but did not provide the relevant answer for the question. Here are two comments about story 6.

(7. 3) Она не солгола, а ушла от ответа.
Ona ne solgola, a ushla ot otveta.
She did not lie but evaded the answer.

(7. 4) Ну они ж просто не договаривают, если остальные достаточно умны , то полностью уверен.
Nu oni zh prosto ne dogovarivayut, yesli ostal'nyye dostatochno umny , to polnost'yu uveren.
Well, they are just trying not to say something, if the other is smart enough, then I am completely sure.

The implication of the comments above is that lying requires *saying* something, rather than implicating something. This is against the previous result by Reins, et al. (2021) suggesting that it is still possible to deceive by implicature, even in the perspective of Russian native speakers.

Story 7 [+ – –], as predicted to be similar in other replicated experiments in Europe, receives a lower mean score, 3.48, even though it is still in the medium range. One respondent commented that what the nurse did is a mistake. The comment can be found below.

(7. 5) В случае если Анастасия перепутала карточки намеренно, то это однозначно лож, и моё мнение разделит большинство. В противном случае однозначно не лож.
V sluchaye yesli Anastasiya pereputala kartochki namerenno, to eto odnoznachno lozh, i moyo mneniye razdelit bol'shinstvo. V protivnom sluchaye odnoznachno ne lozh.
If Anastasia mixed up the cards on purpose, then it is definitely a lie, and the majority will share my opinion. Otherwise, it is definitely not a lie.

The respondent above used the term ‘on purpose’, which might indicate that the action of Anastasia was intended to deceive. However, this is just a hypothetical consideration of the respondent. It is possible to conclude that the respondent giving the comment above did not consider the element of intention being present.

Russians are considered to be a group of people that tend to be more collectivistic and holistic (Tower, Kelly and Richards 2011, Varnum, et al. 2008). By collectivistic and holistic, it is meant that Russian people are more interdependent to each other. One of Russian traditional value is *sobornost* emphasizing communal spirit and sense of togetherness. This value is in contrast to most Western culture that promote individualism and competition (Vlachoutsicos 1998). Interestingly, a similar value is also manifested within Spanish-speaking cultures such as in Colombia (Travis 2006), Ecuador (Hardin 2010) and Spain (Eichelberger 2012) through the understanding of *confianza* which is about having trust and being close to each other. Therefore, it is not surprising that the present results with Russian speakers mirror those with Spanish speakers in which the order of the elements is belief, falsehood and intent. Unfortunately, due to the flaw of the experiment and lack of comments from the respondents, the social and cultural backgrounds of the interpretation of lying are not completely elaborated.

7. 6 Conclusions

According to the results and the discussion above, the Russians' perception and judgement of lying involve all three elements suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981). Similar to the results from the studies with Spanish speakers (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012), the element of belief is the strongest element among the three elements, followed by falsehood then intent. Thus, the order of the elements of a prototypical lie based on their importance for Russian native speakers is belief>falsehood>intent. This combination of elements, especially when belief is combined with other elements, will result in a stronger lie. When a story consist of falsehood and intent, the mean score will not be high In order to reach a more conclusive result for Russians' perception of lying, it is necessary to conduct a future research with more stories involved as previously has been done in the Hungarian experiment.

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the results from the Russian study. In terms of the strongest element of lying, Russians have also similar conception of lying as their continental European counterparts. After presenting results and discussion from four different lingua-cultural groups, the next chapter will present a cross-cultural discussion based on the original experiment, previous replicated studies as well as four research projects of the dissertation. The next chapter also provides discussion regarding the experiments on this dissertation.

CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSIONS

This chapter consists of two sections. First, in Section 8. 1, I will present the cross-cultural results which will be based on the results of the original experiment by Coleman and Kay (1981), the results from previous replicated studies, as well as the results from the replicated experiments of the dissertation. After that, I will present a cross-cultural discussion of the experiments from the dissertation. The discussion will be based on the results and the summary of the comments from four research projects in this dissertation. In Section 8. 2, I will provide a general discussion based on the results and comments from the replicated experiments.

8. 1 Cross-Cultural Results and Discussion

Recall that in the previous chapters, it is mentioned that Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment has been replicated in various lingua-cultures. In this section, Table 8-1 below exhibits the results of the original study and the replicated studies to have a cross cultural view regarding the conception of lying between different lingua-cultures.

Table 8-1 below shows the lie-value or mean scores for stories from the experiments with English native speakers (Coleman and Kay 1981), Spanish native speakers in Ecuador (Hardin 2010) and in Madrid (Eichelberger 2012), Hungarian native speakers (Németh T. and Adha 2021), Russian native speakers, Arabic native speakers of Mecca (Cole 1996), Indonesian native speakers (Adha 2020a), and native speakers of Mandarin Chinese (Adha and Li 2023).

Table 8-1 The comparison of lie-values of experiments with participants from various lingua-cultures

Story	English	Ecuadorian Spanish	Madrid Spanish	Hungarian	Russian	Arabic	Indonesian	Mandarin Chinese
1. [+++]	6.96	6.86	6.47	6.97	6.87	6.74	6.89	6.42
2. [---]	1.06	1.32	1.14	1.14	1.44	1.24	1.24	1.90
3. [+ - +]	3.66	4.10	3.24	2.35	3.55	3.63	5.05	5.56
4. [- + +]	5.16	5.90	5.95	5.68	5.28	4.67	3.27	5.45
5. [+ + -]	4.70	5.93	5.44	5.37	4.96	4.31	5.25	4.42
6. [- - +]	3.48	4.84	4.12	3.82	3.66	3.19	3.22	3.26
7. [+ - -]	2.97	4.75	3.98	2.47	3.48	1.94	4.59	5.44
8. [- + -]	4.61	5.16	5.37	3.45	3.28	4.27	1.63	2.57

Again, the scores in bold indicate that the mean scores for the stories are in the range of 3.01 to 4.99, which means that the respondents in the particular lingua-cultural group are not certain enough to judge whether the characters are lying or not.

According to the table, both experiments with Hungarian and Chinese speakers have less bolded main scores. This means that, compared to other groups, respondents of these two groups seem to be more confident in the categorizing of the stories regardless of whether the stories contain a lie. Furthermore, with the mean score of 6.97, Hungarians are the group of people who are quite sure that they share each other perception regarding the character lying in story 1 [+ + +], whereas native speakers of Mandarin Chinese are the group who are less certain about their common perception regarding the character in story 2 [- - -]. Meanwhile, the Russians show more uncertainty in their responses as indicated by five stories placed in the medium range. In addition, the Indonesian is the only group who are uncertain regarding the character in Story 4 [- + +] as indicated by having the only bold mean score for this story in comparison to other groups.

Even though results for story 5 [+ + -] from English, Chinese, and Russian respondents obtain mean scores in the medium range, it is still possible to make an argument that all cultural groups have a tantamount result when it comes to story 5 where all perceive that the character creates a stronger lie. In addition, all groups also show the same tendency for story 6 [- - +], except for Spanish speaking Ecuadorians. In this case, respondents of any culture are all unsure to consider a lie if a proposition has objective and subjective truths but no intention to deceive.

Finally, division between perception can be drawn especially for stories 3 [+ - +], 7 [+ - -], and 8 [- + -]. For these stories, there are similarities of results from experiments with Indonesian and Mandarin Chinese speakers as opposed to results from the experiments with English, Madrid Spanish, Hungarian, and Russian speakers. As can be seen in the table, the experiments with Indonesian and Mandarin Chinese speakers result in higher mean scores for stories 3 and 7, where both stories have the element of falsehood. In addition, the Indonesian and Chinese group assign lower mean score to story 8, the story with only element of belief being present. On the contrary, the groups of European lingua-cultures obtain lower mean scores for stories 3 and 7, and higher mean score for story 8.

In order to perceive the gaps between the results of all experiments, a figure has been constructed on the subsequent page. The results of the mean scores are even more clearly visible when put in a figure. Figure 8-1 exhibits dots representing mean scores across all experiment, the numbers in x-axis are the number of the stories in the questionnaire, and the numbers in y-axis are the lie-value continuum from the experiments. Based on the figure, big differences between all experiments are shown for stories 3, 7, and 8. Moreover, for story 4 [- + +], most

of the mean scores are almost close to each other, except the mean score from the experiment with Indonesians which has a standalone mean score.

Figure 8-1 Comparison of lie-value from the experiments




Table 8-2 below compares the rankings of all studies according to each story’s mean score. Stories are ranked starting with the story with the lowest mean-scale score on the left to the highest mean-scale score on the right. The order from the study with Arabic speakers (Cole 1996) is given in brackets because the result mirrors the original experiment (Coleman and Kay 1981). As for the result from the study with Ecuadorian Spanish people (Hardin 2010), the mean scores of story 5 is higher than that of story 4. The table below also strengthens the results regarding the story with the most prototypical lie, Story 1, and the story with the least prototypical lie, that is story 2.

Table 8-2 Order of the stories’ mean scale scores (non-lie to lie)

English (and Arabic)	2	7	6	3	8	5	4	1
Madrid Spanish	2	3	7	6	8	5	4	1
Hungarian	2	3	7	8	6	5	4	1
Russian	2	8	7	3	6	5	4	1
Indonesian	2	8	6	4	7	3	5	1
Mandarin Chinese	2	8	6	5	7	4	3	1

As can be seen in Table 8-2, results from continental Europe (Madrid Spanish, Hungarian, and Russian) are similar for the first, second and third strongest prototypical lie. After that, a division occurs in which Hungarian and Russian respondents consider story 6 [– – +] to have a stronger lie, while English, Arabic and Madrid Spanish respondents perceive story 8 [– + –] to contain a rather stronger lie. It can be considered that both Hungarians and Russians put more emphasis on the story with the element of intention, rather than the story with a subjective belief. Meanwhile, results from respondents of Asian lingua-cultures show a similar tendency

for the weaker lies, where they both consider stories not having the element of falsehood to be on the left side of the order.

Previous chapters have exhibited the order of the elements of prototypical lie. Together with the existing replicated results, the results can be divided into four different groups based on shared orders of elements. Table 8-3 below summarizes the results of the experiments. The first group is the results from the experiments with respondents speaking English (Coleman and Kay 1981), Arabic (Cole 1996), and Hungarian (Németh T. and Adha 2021). The second group is both from the experiments with the speakers of Spanish (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012), and Russian. The third is from the study with Japanese speakers (Yoshimura 1995). And finally, the last group is the results from the experiments with respondents from Indonesia (Adha 2020a) and China (Adha and Li 2023).

Table 8-3 Comparison of the order of the elements from all experiments

Order of the elements	English <i>lie</i> , Arabic <i>kathaba</i> , Hungarian <i>hazugság</i>	Spanish <i>mentira</i> , Russian <i>lozh'</i>	Japanese <i>uso</i>	Indonesian <i>bohong</i> , Mandarin Chinese <i>huǎngyán</i>
1	belief	belief	falsehood	falsehood
2	intent	falsehood	belief	intent
3	falsehood	intent	intent	(belief)

Among the recent replicated experiments, the experiments with Hungarian native speakers and with Russian native speakers conclude that the word *lie* in their lingua-cultures involves three prototypical elements. Meanwhile, the experiments with native speakers of Indonesian and of Mandarin Chinese result in agreement that both groups might not even consider the element of belief when interpreting lie.

The main objection of the dissertation concerned the philosophers' argument that lying should be based on the false belief of the speaker. However, there has been some research, mainly through cross-cultural studies, that exhibited that some cultural groups perceive lying merely as an objective falsehood. Coleman and Kay's (1981) story containing only the element of falsehood is story 7 [+ – –], to which distinct results between respondents from Asia and from the Anglo-European lingua-cultures are obtained. The experiment with Mandarin Chinese speakers results in the highest mean score, 5.44, for this story among all experiments. Unfortunately, there are only two comments from this group. The first one, the respondent who assign a score of 7, comments 护士辞退吧 hùshì cítuì ba 'the nurse should quit'. The second respondent gives a score of 5, meaning the respondent was not too sure that the character is lying. This second respondent comments 他不记得的事 是乱猜 tā bù jìdé de shì luàn cāi

‘what he does not remember is a guesswork’. These comments only provide judgements about the nurse’s act, but not an elaborated reason for why the respondent might have considered the nurse to be lying.

There are more comments from Indonesian respondents than from the Chinese respondents. According to table 8-1, the experiment with Indonesian speakers result in the mean score of 4.59. Although the number is categorized as in the middle range of lie-value continuum, the score is still quite high in comparison to other Anglo-European results (ranging from 2.47 to 3.98). Based on the comments from Indonesian respondents who regard the nurse not lying, the description for the nurse’s action is either *keliru* ‘wrong, mistaken’, *teledor* ‘careless’, or *tidak disengaja* ‘indeliberate’. This means that some of respondents were able to recognize that the element of intention is not present for this story. As the mean score suggests, there are more respondents from Indonesia that consider the nurse is lying. And since falsehood is the most important element for Indonesians, some respondents argue that the nurse’s statement is not based on factuality like these comments below.

- (8. 1) *Karena Suster Citra tidak mengatakan fakta yang sebenarnya.*
Because Nurse Citra does not provide the real facts.
- (8. 2) *Pernyataan Suster Citra merupakan pernyataan kebohongan karena pernyataan ini muncul karena ketidakyakinan dia terhadap kesalahan yang dibuatnya.*
The statement of Nurse Citra is a lying statement because it is based on her uncertainty regarding the mistake that she makes.

Other respondents comment on the fatality of the Nurse’s untruthful statement. One interesting comment encountered from a respondent who choose ‘do not know’ whether the character is lying or not. The comment is as follow.

- (8. 3) *Ini sebenarnya kelalaian sih, dan dia memberikan pernyataan sesuai apa yang dia tahu (dimana di sini Suster Citra tidak tahu apa-apa dan seharusnya baca dulu data pasiennya), jadi kalau ditanya bohong atau tidak, jujur aku bingung jawabnya. Apakah memberi jawaban yang tidak benar berdasarkan pengetahuan yang salah itu dianggap bohong?*
This can be considered as a mistake, and the nurse makes a statement based on what she knows (in which she knows nothing, and she is supposed to read the patients’ chart before making the statement), so if I am asked whether she is lying or not, honestly, I could not decide. Is giving an untruthful statement based on wrong knowledge considered a lie?

The element of belief has been concluded to be disregarded in the interpretation of lying by Asian respondents, including Indonesians. But for the case of respondents giving a comment

such as above, the element of belief might be present, but in the form of knowledge. This belief/knowledge of the proposition will be elaborated in the upcoming section.

Regarding the result from Hungarian experiment, the obtained mean score is the lowest among all experiments, which is 2.47. The result exhibits a more certain attitude from the Hungarian respondents that the character is not lying. There is only one comment from a respondent who certainly thinks that the nurse is lying. The comment is based on the fact that the nurse is worried about her job.

- (8. 4) *"Bár aggódik az állása miatt, a nővér ennek ellenére" ez azt jelenti, hogy direkt mondott mást.*
“Although she is worried about her job, the nurse nonetheless ...” that means she said something else on purpose.

Otherwise, the majority of the respondents are in agreement that the nurse is making a mistake. Moreover, there is one respondent who emphasizes that not telling the truth does not necessarily mean a lie.

- (8. 5) *Bár nem mond igazat nem feltétlen hazugság hisz egy szimpla tévedésről van szó.*
Although she does not tell the truth is not necessarily a lie since it is a simple mistake.

As mentioned in the previous chapter in the discussion of the experiment with Russian respondents, this story receives a lower mean score due to the absence of the element of belief and intention. One Russian respondent, however, considers the character is lying and commented.

- (8. 6) *Анастасия солгала прежде всего сама себе.*
Anastasiya solgala prezhde vsego sama sebe.
Anastasia lied primarily to herself.

Another story that sets apart Asian and collectivistic culture respondents from those of more individualistic and Euro-American cultures is story 8 [- + -], a story that was constructed to have solely the element of belief. If lying is about misbelief of a statement, then this story will have a quite high mean score across all experiments with people from different cultural backgrounds. This argument will be true if it is based on the study with Spanish people (Eichelberger 2012) with the mean score of 5.37. In the original experiment (Coleman and Kay 1981), the mean score for story 8 is 4.61, which is in the medium range. The score is even lower in the study with Hungarian speakers and Russian speakers, indicating that the Hungarians and

Russians, among all other people of Euro-American lingua-cultural groups, are the most uncertain groups in deciding whether the character is lying or not. Surprisingly, when the story was tested with the Indonesian speakers (Adha 2020a), story 8 obtains the second lowest mean score, 1.63, after story 2 with the mean score of 1.24. This is surprising considering story 2 [– –] was constructed not to contain any element of a prototypical lie. Story 8 in the experiment with Mandarin Chinese speakers resulted in the same tendency as the Indonesian counterpart. Story 8 receives the mean score of 2.57, making it the second lowest mean score after story 2. One Chinese respondent wrote 小王很诚实 *Xiǎo Wáng hěn chéngshí* ‘Xiao Wang (the character of story 8) is being honest’. Unfortunately, there were no comments elaborating the reasons for the choice encountered in the experiment. Other respondents only provided some hypothetical situations regarding the story, but not comments regarding the lie or misbelief of the character.

According to the results from the experiment with Indonesian respondents, the majority of the comments were about the honesty and truthfulness of the character’s statement which also aligns with the factual situation. There were 31 comments garnered from the Indonesian experiment; three comments come from respondents who assigned the score of 2 for the story, while the rest of the respondents were very certain that the character was not lying, or they gave the score of 1 for the story. As mentioned before, the Indonesian respondents do not make the judgement based only at the time of the statement being made, but the whole situation. So, for Indonesians, a believed-false statement which later turns out to be true cannot be considered a lie since the factual situation is still in accordance with the statement (event if the statement is believed or known to be false before). Two Indonesian respondents noted the subsequent comments.

- (8. 7) *Terlepas dari kronologisnya yang dimulai dari mengarang kebohongan, pada akhirnya Rey memang sakit sehingga pas dengan karangan yang dibuatnya.*
Regardless the chronology of the story starting from preparing the lie, in the end Rey (the character) was really having stomachache which aligns with the lie he prepared.
- (8. 8) *Rey sudah menyiapkan alasan untuk tidak masuk kantor, ternyata apa yang dia pikirkan sungguh terjadi padanya.*
Rey has prepared a reason (in this case, a lie) not to go to work, but what he has prepared had really happened to him.

Comments such as (8. 7) and (8. 8) are also encountered in the experiment with Hungarian speakers, but such comments were only few in the Hungarian experiment. There were more

comments coming from respondents giving the score of 5 to 7, signifying that those respondents considered the character to be lying. An example of the comments can be found below.

- (8. 9) *Az adott pillanatban történő állítása hazugság volt, hiszen nem volt beteg, nem érezte annak magát, el akart lógni, az a szándék vezette, hogy hazudjon.*
His claim at that moment was a lie, since he was not sick, he did not feel it, he wanted to hang out, the intention led him to lie.

Although the story contains the element of false belief, it is barely mentioned by the Hungarian respondents. One comment, however, recognizes the element of belief in the form of knowledge. The comment is as follows.

- (8. 10) *Amikor mondta, még nem tudta, hogy beteg. Az volt a szándéka, hogy elmegy a meccsre és ezért nem megy dolgozni.*
When he said it, he did not know that he was sick yet. His intention was to go to the match and therefore not to go to work.

The knowledge regarding the sickness that the respondent addressed here might be considered as ‘a belief’ if knowledge and belief are the same entities. Therefore, it is important to address this topic in the next section of this chapter.

Story 4 [- + +] is almost similar to story 8 [- + -] in a way that the believed-false statement turns out to be true. The difference is that story 4 has the element of intent in addition to the element of belief. In the table 8-1, it is exhibited that the results from the experiments with Indonesians and Arabic people are the only ones in the medium range, whereas the results from other experiments are above 5. This suggests that the other groups are more certain of their categorization of the character in the story 3 [+ - +] is lying.

From the Chinese perspective, the mean score for this story is surprisingly high considering that it lacks the element of falsehood, which is the strongest element for this group. The Chinese perceive intention to play quite a big role in determining if someone is lying or not, and especially if the lie is directed towards people with closer social relations, such as parents. In addition, pretending to be sick as in case of story 4 is perceived negatively by two respondents who commented as below.

- (8. 11) 不想考试，所以假装。
Bùxiǎng kǎoshì, suǒyǐ jiǎzhuāng.
(She) does not want to take the test, so (she) pretends (to be sick).
- (8. 12) 本来不想去学校装病，结果真病了。
Běnlái bù xiǎng qù xuéxiào zhuāng bìng, jiéguǒ zhēn bìngle.

(She) does not want to go to school and pretends to be sick, but (she) got really sick.

Results from experiments with Indonesian and Chinese respondents support the argument of Turri and Turri (2015) that a believed-false statement turning out to be true cannot be regarded as lying since the character fails to lie. One Hungarian who had this perception commented as such.

- (8. 13) *Hazudni akart, de nem sikerült.*
(She) wanted to lie, but (she) did not succeed.

For this specific story, the experiment with Hungarians obtains the second highest mean score, 5.68, after the study with Madrid Spanish speakers with the mean score of 5.95. As expected, respondents from Hungary are also able to recognize the presence of the element of (false) belief in the story, or in the form of false knowledge, as suggested in two comments below.

- (8. 14) *Itt nem azt mondja a beszélő, amit ő igazanak hisz.*
Here, the speaker does not say what she believes to be true.

- (8. 15) *Ő úgy tudta, hogy nem beteg, és ennek mondott ellent, ezért hazudott.*
She knew she was not sick, and she said the opposite, therefore she lied.

On the contrary, false belief or false knowledge is not even discussed in the comments of Indonesian respondents. Indonesians emphasized the intention of the character and the final situation after the intended-to-lie utterance. Since the story receives middle range mean score and mixed perception, it is important to examine these two common comments by Indonesian respondents. Comment (8.16) is from a respondent who assigned score 7 for the story, whereas comment (8.17) results for score of 1.

- (8. 16) *Iya, dia berbohong sebab saat mengatakan dia sakit, dia bermaksud berbohong, walaupun setelahnya memang dia benar sakit.*
Yes, she is lying because when she says she is sick, she intends to lie, although after that she turns out to be sick.

- (8. 17) *Pada kenyataannya Rina memang sakit.*
Factually, Rina is indeed sick.

The two comments above display that the factual situation which is aligned with the statement even though the respondents of comment (8. 16) ends up assigning highest score for the story. In fact, comment like (8. 16) is quite common among Indonesian respondents. Thus, for

Indonesians, a statement intended to be untruthful, if it turns out to be true, is still a truthful statement.

Now, it is possible to focus to stories containing a half-truth, an untruthful implicature and a white lie. As mentioned in section 2. 6. 1 in the chapter of Literature Review, Coleman and Kay's (1981) story 6 [- - +] presents half-truth. The consideration of story 6 becoming half-truth comes from the idea that Mary did not present the whole story when she answered John's question. With no information regarding the cultural backgrounds of the participants, 78% of respondents from Wiegmann, Rutschmann and Willemsen's (2017) experimental study considered half-truth as an act of lying. This number was higher than the results from the experiments for the present dissertation. Mean scores from all experiments are in the middle range, indicating that respondents in any experiment do not have a unanimous opinion. In fact, the Indonesians' (Adha 2020a) and the Chinese's (Adha and Li 2023) evaluations resulted in the lowest mean scores, 3.22 and 3.36, respectively.

Based on the comments made by the respondents from Indonesia, the fact that Mary does not say 'No, I did not meet him' makes the statement not qualified as a lie. For Indonesian respondents, her statement is considered factual. However, the perception of Indonesians regarding giving an evasive answer is quite negative. Many Indonesian respondents, both those who think Mary is lying or those who think Mary is being truthful, mentioned the factual statement and the evasive answer in their comments. The following comment (8. 18) is from a respondent who assigned a score of 6, whereas the comment (8. 19) comes from a respondent who gave score of 1 in the questionnaire for story 6.

- (8. 18) *Maria memberikan jawaban berdasarkan kenyataan kondisi Vino, namun tidak menjawab dengan tepat atau jujur pertanyaan Jojo.*
Maria provides an answer that is based on the factuality about the condition of Vino, but she does not precisely or honestly provide an answer to Jojo's question.
- (8. 19) *Maria tidak berbohong, tapi Maria berusaha menggiring jawaban ke arah yang berbeda untuk menghindari konflik dengan Jojo.*
Maria is not lying, but she tries to lead the answer into a different perspective in order to avoid conflict with Jojo.

Avoiding a conflict is usually mentioned for the case of white lie, however, from the comment above this case it is also true for story 6. One respondent from the Chinese experiment commented that Mary's statement is a white lie. Another comment also stresses the need to pursue harmony between the three characters in the story.

- (8. 20) 李红和孙凯、张宇之间的关系并不太复杂，互相理解就好。
Lǐ hóng hé sūn kāi, zhāngyǔzhī jiān de guānxì bìng bù tài fùzá, hùxiāng lǐjiě jiù hǎo.
The relationship between Li Hong, Sun Kai, and Zhang Yu is not too complicated. It is good to understand each other.

The Hungarian study offered a different perspective on Mary's case by introducing the possibility that Mary is being unfaithful. The comments of the Hungarian respondents indicate that concealing a partial or whole information could constitute a more lie-like situation. Here are comments from Hungarian respondents suggesting the argument.

- (8. 21) *Itt az információ szintén vissza lett fogva, mint az előző példában. Itt viszont az nem csak a teljes valóság egy része lett kirekesztve hanem maga az egész valóság.*
Here, the information was also retained as in the previous example. Here, however, not only a part of the whole reality was excluded, but the whole reality itself.
- (8. 22) *Az elhangzott válasz önmagában nem hazugság, de a teljes történetet ismerve egyértelműen hazudott.*
The answer given was not a lie in itself, but she clearly lied knowing the whole story.

One thing to note about comment (8. 21) is that the particular respondent saw an untruthful implicature in the statement 'the whole reality was excluded' as opposed to the intended half-truth. The mean score from Hungarian experiment for this story is 3.82. Thus, it is also not surprising to have a mixed perception regarding the statement of the character. Hungarian respondents addressed the evasiveness of Mary's answer regardless the score they assigned for the story. One Russian respondent also addressed the topic of hiding (or concealing) the truth in the comment below.

- (8. 23) *в данном случае Маша ответила на другой вопрос, утаив истину.
V dannon sluchaye Masha otvetila na drugoy vopros, utaiv istinu.*
In this case, Masha answered another question, hiding the truth. ...

The next discussion is about untruthful implicature, which is conveyed by Meibauer (2019) under a phrasal term *lying while saying the truth*. As presented in section 2. 6. 2 in Chapter 2, untruthful implicature might be represented in Coleman and Kay's (1981) story 3 [+ – +] even though the borderline between untruthful implicature and half-truth is quite blurred. Means for story 3 from previous replications are in the middle range, indicating no groups of respondents had consensus concerning this story. There was greater consensus in the responses

of the Indonesians and Chinese whose mean scores were relatively high, 5.05 and 5.56 respectively. Unfortunately, no comment addressed untruthful implicature in any of the Asian experiments. In fact, there were only few comments from the Chinese experiment and these comments were too brief to analyze. Meanwhile, based on Indonesian comments, respondents who think that the character is not lying argue that the statement is truthful since the character uses the phrase *melewati toko kue* ‘to pass by the cookie store’, and not the phrase *menuju toko kue* ‘to go to the cookie store’. Other comments address the character’s lack of knowledge indicated by comments below.

(8. 24) *Ketidaktahuan bukanlah sebuah kebohongan.*
Not knowing is not a lie.

(8. 25) *Dia tidak tahu kalau toko sudah berpindah.*
He does not know whether the store has moved.

Recall that for this story, the majority of the Indonesian respondents considered the character to be lying because he is hiding his final destination. Furthermore, it is a common comment from the respondents regarding the factual objective truth that there is no more cookie store. Regardless his knowledge about this truth, he is still lying. One of those comments is as follow.

(8. 26) *Karena toko kue sudah tidak berada sebelum tempat rental game yang berada, Prasetyo tidak akan menuju maupun melewati toko kue, dan tujuan semula Prasetyo adalah ke rental game, bukan ke toko kue. Berati Prasetyo sudah berbohong.*
Because the cookie store is not located before the game kiosk as it used to be, Prasetyo would neither goes to nor passes by the cookie store. Moreover, his initial purpose is to go to the game kiosk, and not to the cookie store. It means Prasetyo did lie.

Instead of untruthful implicature, one comment encountered may indicate that half-truth is being discussed. The respondent commented:

(8. 27) *Prasetyo tidak menjelaskan kondisi sebenarnya.*
Prasetyo does not explain the actual condition.

Although the comment before seems to be about the initial purpose of the character, it can also be observed that the particular respondent commented that the character did not present the whole story. As was the case with the comments from the Chinese participants, this comment also hints at some perception either untruthful implicature or half-truth.

Concealing the true purpose or the final destination is also mentioned at least by two Hungarian respondents. Consider the comments below.

(8. 28) *Hazudott, mert elhallgatta az igazságot (hogy biliárdozni megy). Teljesen mindegy, hogy mit gondolt a cukorkabolt hollétéről, amikor nem oda akart menni.*

He lied because he kept quiet about the truth (that he went to play billiard). It didn't matter what he thought of the candy store's whereabouts when he didn't want to go there.

(8. 29) *Habár igaz, hogy Patrik azt hiszi, a cukorkabolt felé megy, mégis letagadja ezzel valódi célját. Tehát függetlenül attól, hogy a cukorkabolt elköltözött vagy sem, hazudott.*

Although it is true that Patrik thinks he is heading for the candy store, he still denies his true purpose. So, independently of whether the candy store moved or not, he still lied.

What is interesting is that the two comments focus on the evasiveness of the answer. A respondent commented that the character's statement is not an answer to his mother's question. Another respondent added that the evasive answer is a strategy to avoid the mother's negative reaction if she knew the real answer. Thus, according to these respondents, the character has practically lied. As presented in Table 8-1, story 3 [+ – +] in Hungarian experiment receives the lowest mean score, 2.35, among all other experiments (ranging from 3.24 to 5.56). In contrast to the Indonesian respondents, more Hungarian respondents thought the character in story 3 was not lying. Interestingly, these Hungarian respondents addressed withholding/silencing information, and/or half-truth. This is represented by the comments below.

(8. 30) *Patrik nem hazudott, csak az információ egy részét visszatartotta az anyja előtt.*

...

Patrik did not lie, he only withheld some pieces of the information from his mother. ...

(8. 31.) *Nem hazudott, csak elhallgatta az igazságot.*

He didn't lie, he just kept quiet about the truth.

(8. 32.) *Mivel ő úgy tudta, hogy arrafelé van a cukorkabolt, igazság jött ki a száján, bár nyilvánvalóan csak részigazság, ha a szándékait vizsgáljuk.*

Since he knew that the sugar shop was over there, truth came out of his mouth, though it was obviously only a partial truth if we looked at his intentions.

Although the results of the present experiments are less convincing compared to the results from Wiegmann, Rutschmann and Willemsen's (2017) experimental study, the comments made

by Hungarian respondents are quite surprising considering this group is also among the Western lingua-cultures. In addition, comments (8.30), (8.31), and (8.32) support Mahon's (2019) and Dynel's (2011, 153-154) argument that omissions or half-truths cannot be considered lies since they do not support using language to make a statement. Moreover, the comments from Hungarian respondents regarding story 3 do not support the argument of Vincent and Castelfranchi (1981, 762), Ekman (2009, 28) and Vrij (2008, 16) who perceive omission as a lie.

The last story, story 5 [+ + -] concerns a white lie. The pragmatic definition of speech act of lie by Chen, Hu and He (2013, 390) suggests that if the proposition p has more benefits to others, p would be perceived to be less lie-like. In story 5, the character makes a remark that it was a terrific party. In making this remark, the character does not intend to deceive others. The statement was made in order to please the boss and his wife. In other words, the statement was made to benefit others. Referring to Chen, Hu and He's (2013, 390) pragmatic definition of lying, then the mean score for story 5 should have been lower and the statement should be considered less lie-like. This argument is true for the Chinese experiment which had a mean score of 4.42, the lowest among the results from any experiment. However, based on the result from the Indonesian experiment, the story receives the mean score of 5.25, making it the second highest mean score in the experiment. Indonesian respondents assigned score of 6 or 7 for the story, indicating that they believed strongly that the character was lying. Many respondents emphasized the fact that the character's sentence was not factual, or that it was the opposite of the character's actual feeling and opinion. Regardless, in terms of reprehensibility of this lie, a white lie is acceptable and permissible to please others, since this type of lie is not harmful. The acceptance of this non-factual statement can be seen in the comments such as below.

(8.33) *Meskipun untuk menyenangkan hati istri atasannya, tetap saja menjawab dengan hal yang tidak sesuai kenyataan adalah bohong.*

Even though (the lie is) to please his boss' wife, it is still a lie since the statement is not based on factuality.

(8.34) *Pada intinya, dia berkata lain yang tidak sesuai fakta. Dirinya hanya melakukan basa-basi busuk yang tidak jujur.*

Basically, he says things that are not aligned with facts. He is only doing a dishonest 'rotten' small talk.

This is also addressed by one Hungarian respondent and one Russian respondent whose comments follow.

- (8. 35) *Hazudott, viszont próbált udvarias és kedves lenni. Ilyen esetben nem mondanám ezt egy erős hazugságnak.*
He lied but he tried to be polite and kind. In that case, I would not say this to be a strong lie.
- (8. 36) Лож во благо - тоже лож. Отрицать что Александр солгал трудно.
Lozh vo blago - tozhe lozh. Otritsat' chto Aleksandr solgal trudno.
A lie for good is also a lie. It is hard to deny that Alexander lied.

A white lie is not only acceptable, but also expected across cultures. Not only is the speaker expected to utter the white lie, but the hearer is also expected to know it is a white lie. This expectation of white lies can be seen in the following comments.

- (8. 37) *Dia berbohong untuk dirinya sendiri, namun dia melakukan itu karena dia tahu etika bertamu yang baik.*
He is only lying to himself, but he is doing it because he knows the etiquette to be a good guest.
- (8. 38) 小明这种可能是他喜欢。
Xiǎomíng zhè zhǒng kěnéng shì tā xǐhuān.
Xiao Ming (the boss) might like this.
- (8. 39) *Hazudott, és tudta, hogy tudhatják, hogy hazudik.*
He lied, and he knew that they (the boss and his wife) could know that he had lied.

One thing to note is that while the concept of the white lie might be understood among Indonesian respondents, there is no specific term in Indonesian for this type of lie. The closest is the phrase *basa-basi* ‘small talk’, which was mentioned by three Indonesian respondents to describe the character’s remark for the situation. By definition, *basa-basi* is a sentence used as a politeness tool and not to convey information.²³ In contrast, Chinese, Hungarian, and Russian respondents mentioned terms that are equal to the English white lie. In Mandarin Chinese, the term used is 善意的谎言 *shànyì de huǎngyán* ‘white lie’; the term in Hungarian is *kegyes hazugság* ‘merciful, gracious or white lie’, while in Russian, it is referred to with a phrase ложь во благо *lozh' vo blago* ‘lie for good’.

Another point from the pragmatic definition of speech act of lying suggested by Chen, Hu and He (2013, 390) is that lie-likeness depends on the extent to which speaker intends to conceal the untruth of *p* from the hearer. This argument lines up with the case of white lie where

²³ See <https://kbbi.web.id/basa-basi> for reference.

the speaker tries to conceal a truthful opinion or feeling. One Indonesian respondent commented regarding the concealment of untruth.

(8. 40) *Sandi menutupi pendapat yang sebenarnya dari atasannya demi bersikap sopan terhadap atasan dan istri atasannya.*

Sandi conceals his factual opinion from his boss in order to be polite to his boss and his wife.

8. 2 General Discussion

As established in Chapter 2, many Western philosophers and researchers argue that subjective falsity or the belief of the speaker that the statement is false is the most important element in the definition of lie. The results of the replicated studies, however, indicate that the element of belief plays no crucial role in defining a lie for Indonesian and Chinese respondents. The element of belief was hardly mentioned by the respondents in their comments. Nevertheless, there were two notions to be discussed before making a conclusion regarding the element of belief in the conception of lying. The first notion is *pretending* as some respondents from Indonesia and China mentioned regarding the characters in story 4 [- + +] and 7 [+ - -]. The second notion to be discussed is *knowledge* in terms of characters of story 3 [+ - +] and 7.

Pretending is encountered in the comments about the character of story 4 where she pretended to be sick in order to avoid having a math exam, and the character of story 7 in which the nurse pretended that she knew information for certain. Dynel (2019) argues that pretending (in her argument, she uses the term ‘pretence’) is a vague notion and does not have a consistent definition, yet the notion has a number of proposals concerning the interpretation of deception. Dynel (2019, 327) uses the words *pretence* and *untruthfulness* synonymously since pretence may also be comprehended in relation to the speaker’s untruthfulness, such as the expression of what the speaker believes to be false (Dynel 2018). Moreover, Vincent and Castelfranchi (1981, 763) suggest that pretending or behaving-as-if involves an act where certain conditions do not exist: the pretender knows about this non-existence but wants the other to assume that they do exist. Recall that story 4 was constructed to have the element of belief and intention, however the proposition ‘I am sick’ becomes truthful since the character was indeed sick. When the character pretends to be sick and expresses the proposition, she believes that her sickness is false and at the same time she also believes that the said proposition is false. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that both false belief regarding the proposition and false belief regarding the pretending to be sick are the same mental states. However, it is also arguably possible to say that the belief regarding the act of pretending precedes the belief of the proposition. In other words, the pretending drives the character into saying, ‘I am sick’. The fragment below is

There is some question concerning knowledge and whether or not knowledge in a proposition is equal to belief of a proposition. This discussion comes up because some respondents from Indonesia mentioned about the absence of knowledge. Recall that both characters in story 3 [+ – +] and 7 [+ – –] do not have a belief regarding the false statement that they make. Instead of mentioning the absence of belief of the speakers, some comments from Indonesians suggest that the character in story 3 does not know that the store has moved, and the character of story 7 does not know some specific information for certain. Sweetser (1987, 47) argues that truth entails belief which is normally taken as having adequate justification, and hence equivalent to knowledge. In other words, adequate justification, evidence or information would shape the belief of a person. Additionally, if someone believes in something, it means that person also has a knowledge of it. Thus, according to this argument, belief is equal to knowledge. Sweetser (1987, 49) also adds the second issue to define lying after defining the truth. Sweetser (1987, 49-50) suggests two simplified discourse settings required for a lie to happen; (1) knowledge is beneficial, and (2) informing is help. This cognitive model would be able to facilitate a definition of lying that could apply across different cultural contexts, particularly for story 3 and 7 for Asian lingua-cultural contexts. For these two stories, respondents from Indonesia and China did not consider the characters to have adequate information and justification, meaning that there is an absence of belief or knowledge. However, in both situations, knowledge is prominent and necessary. Recall that for story 3 the mother asks the son's purpose. This means that the knowledge and information regarding the son's whereabouts are beneficial for the mother. As for the story 7, the knowledge is not only beneficial but also critical to the patient's wellbeing, particularly truthful information.

Other groups of scholars do not equate knowledge and belief but consider that knowledge entails belief. For example, Benton (2019, 123) suggests that believing is entailed by knowing, which is a factive verb.²⁴ Furthermore, belief can be false, while knowledge is distinguished from mere belief in that one can only know facts, that is true propositions (Benton 2019, 122). The factive verb such as *know* can embed only true proposition and express our own grasp of the reality (Nagel 2017). According to the comments of the Asian respondents, mainly respondents from Indonesia, reality and factuality in conceptualizing *lie* is more concerned, rather than the subjective belief of the speaker. Therefore, a definition integrating the factive words *knowing* and *knowledge* are more applicable cross-culturally since both knowing and knowledge are equal or at least entail believing and belief. Benton (2019, 133) defines lie as an assertion intended to represent the opposite of what is known to be true, or at

²⁴ See also Nagel (2017) for a comparative description between knowing as a factive mental state and belief as nonfactive mental state.

least be believed to be true. This definition uses *assertion* which has been established in Chapter 2 that lie is something said rather than asserted. Thus, this definition should not be accepted. Wierzbicka's (1996, 152) definition of lie is something known to be untrue by the speaker but said, so the hearer would think it is true, and it is morally bad if someone does this. This definition should also be rejected since the reprehensibility of lying should not be part of the definition. As the results suggest, a white lie is still a lie. As Wierzbicka's (1996, 153) argues, however, cultural models are reflected in the meaning of the words. The cultural models encoded in the meaning of Indonesian word *bohong* and Mandarin Chinese word *huangyin* are somewhat different from that encoded meaning of Hungarian word *hazugság*, Russian word *lozh*, and English word *lie*. Sakaba (2020, 53) suggests that in order to discuss the concept of lying, native speakers' point of view should be incorporated for valid cross-linguistic and cross-cultural analysis and conceptual imposition should be avoided.²⁵

This chapter has presented cross-cultural and comparative discussions of results both from the present experiments and previous replicated studies. According to the data, it seems that there are some differences in how *lying* is conceptualized in different lingua-cultural groups of speakers. The data suggest that the second element of prototypical lie, the element of belief, is disregarded for people from Asian cultures. Thus, for Asian people, *lie* is more concerned with the factuality or objective falsehood, whereas for Western people, *lying* is conceptualized as subjective falsehood, depending on the speaker's belief of the statement. The consideration that a *lie* should be universally defined as the speaker's false belief is the result of ethnocentrism on the part of the Western scholars who first created the definition.

²⁵ Conceptual imposition refers to the process where a scholar takes for granted that a linguistic concept of the scholar's own language also exists in other language (Levisen 2012, 40). Conceptual imposition is one of the two groups of ethnocentrism which Levisen (2012) claims to be a major obstacle for linguistic and cultural analysis. The other group is cultural stereotyping.

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS

After presenting the results, analyzing and discussing the data, it is important to provide closure of the dissertation. In Section 9. 1., I will present again the research questions and provide the summary of the answer to the research questions. After that, in Section 9. 2., I will review some limitations of the studies in this dissertation and give some directions for the future research in the cross-cultural perceptions of lying.

9. 1 Conclusions

The dissertation has four research questions with three to four sub-questions each. I will present each question and provide the summary of the answer together with the results after analyzing the data. Let us start with the first research question.

(1) According to native speakers of different lingua-cultures, does the perception of the word 'lie' in their respective languages involve the three prototypical elements suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981)?

To answer the question, it is necessary to look at the mean scores of each story of each experiment, to consider the ranking of the stories in each experiment, and also to reflect on the comments given by the respondents in the research projects. It appears that for Indonesian and Chinese people, the perception of lying might not involve all the three prototypical elements of lie. The element of belief might be not considered in their conception of lying. This element, however, might manifest as knowledge. Further research is necessary to understand the backgrounds and to confirm or deny this argument. Meanwhile, for Hungarians and Russians, it seems all three prototypical elements of lie are present in their interpretations of lying.

The second research question is as follows.

(2) Assuming the three prototypical elements involved in the experimented lingua-cultural groups, what will be the order of the elements from the strongest to the weakest?

Since *belief* is absent in the interpretation of lying by Indonesian and Mandarin Chinese native speakers, the results from the experiments with these groups of speakers contradict the philosophers' definitions, and the results of the original experiment (Coleman and Kay 1981) and of other replicated studies (Cole 1996, Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012). For both Indonesian and Mandarin Chinese speakers, the order of the elements is falsehood>intent(>belief). Falsehood being the most important element for these groups makes this result aligned to a replicated study with Japanese speakers (Yoshimura 1995). Meanwhile, the results

from Hungarian experiment show similarities with the original study (Coleman and Kay 1981) in which the order of the elements is belief>intent>>falsehood. The results from the present Hungarian experiment reject the findings from the previous Hungarian study by Vajtai (2013). As for the results in experiment with Russian respondents, the findings resemble the Spanish studies (Eichelberger 2012, Hardin 2010).

The third research question is given below.

(3) Are there any cultural or social factors involved in the interpretation of lying by the different lingua-cultural groups?

The other replicated studies find that there are some social, cultural or religious factors influencing respondents' judgement of a lying situation (Hardin 2010, Eichelberger 2012, Cole 1996). In order to answer this research question, it is necessary to refer to the comments that the respondents made. Similar to Arabic speaking people in Cole's (1996) study, Indonesians' interpretation of lying is also influenced by the religion of Islam as many Islamic terms and concepts emerged in the comments. As for the Chinese people, they take into consideration the relationship of the speaker and the hearer. The respondents from China have a more negative perception when the false statement is uttered by a child who intends to deceive parents. Therefore, age might also play a role in Chinese people's interpretation of lying. Meanwhile, the European groups rarely address such social and cultural reasons in their comments. In the current study, one of the respondents' comments indicated consideration of the personal relationship between the speaker and the hearer, supporting Vajtai's (2013) conclusion that such a relationship would affect the interpretation of a lie. The lack of social and cultural data from the European studies makes it hard to factor these issues into their interpretations.

Finally, the fourth research question is as follows.

(4) How do different lingua-cultural groups, in this case Indonesian, Chinese, Hungarian, and Russian, categorize and evaluate the types of lies: half-truth, untruthful implicature, and white lies?

This question can be answered by referring to stories 3 [+ - +], 5 [+ + -], and 6 [- - +] of the questionnaire and review the mean scores of each experiment. Story 3 is considered to contain untruthful implicature since the character does not believe the truthfulness of the implicature of the proposition. According to the mean scores' results, the respondents from Asia perceive it more lie-like. However, the judgement is mainly due to the presence of the element of falsehood for Asian respondents and the absence of the elements of belief for Europeans. Thus, the European respondents consider it to be less lie-like. The categorization of the story 3 to contain untruthful implicature might be not accurate. Story 6 has been described to contain half-truth and the results exhibit that all respondents in any experiment are uncertain to make the

categorization. Finally, story 5 is commonly regarded to have a white lie. According to the results for this story, all respondents are unanimous to categorize a white lie as a lie. In addition, all respondents agree that this type of lie is acceptable and permissible, and it is even suggested as a part of etiquette and polite attitude, and to bring harmony between the speaker and the hearer.

9. 2 Limitations and Future Directions

In this section, I will discuss some limitations regarding the present study and how these limitations may possibly have affected the results.

The demography of the respondents is not balanced and representative enough, considering countries such as Indonesia, China and Russia have big population. And, although the current experiment with Hungarian speakers has number of respondents that is twice than the previous study (Vajtai 2013), it still does not represent the perception of the whole country. The imbalance of respondents in terms of gender and age makes the current results only representative for those taking part in the experiments. There might be different results obtained if the number of older generations had taken a part in the questionnaire. For better representativeness, future researchers are suggested to recruit respondents with a balanced and varied demographical background information.

The method of obtaining data through an online platform, is not adequate considering the site has no systems to check the data filled by similar respondents or to review if respondents really take the time to read the questionnaire. Thus, during the data collection of these experiments, it was possible for a respondent to have the questionnaire several time, or the respondent might just randomly choose any option in the questionnaire without reading it. Therefore, in the future, it is better to utilize a platform which gives a unique link so one respondent may only fill the questionnaire once, and also a platform that provides information regarding the time the respondent takes to finish the questionnaire. By having a more reliable platform to obtain the data, it might decrease and avoid some inadequacies of the present study. Moreover, future research is also suggested to have retrospective interviews in order to obtain deeper understanding regarding the reasons of respondents making their choices.

Regarding the stories in the questionnaires, some respondents perceive a story to contain an element more or less than expected. For example, in the study with Hungarian respondents, story 8, which was constructed to have only the element of belief was also perceived as having the element of intent. To evade this, future questionnaire should involve more stories. By doing this, some inconsistencies when comparing the mean scores can be

avoided. Also, the method using statistical analysis should be done to have a clearer result in the data analysis.

One of the research questions of this dissertation was to find out the perception of half-truth and untruthful implicature. As mentioned before, there is no clear borderline between these lies. So, it was rather difficult to conclude that the results regarding both types of lies are appropriate. Moreover, the stories were not specifically constructed to find out the conception of those types of lies. Thus, there is weak support for Asian respondents being more likely than the other lingua-cultural group of respondents to consider untruthful implicature more lie-like. This is because it has been consistently described in the discussion part that both of these lingua-cultural groups do not consider a statement as a lie if the proposition is not said. Therefore, in order to have a more appropriate conclusion regarding half-truth and untruthful implicature, future research should have stories that are specifically constructed to contain these types of lies.

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APPENDIX

Kuesioner: Persepsi Kebohongan

Responden yang terhormat,

Saya Ahmad Adha mahasiswa PhD di jurusan Linguistik Teoretis Universitas Szeged, Hongaria, di bawah supervisor Prof. Enikő Németh T. Untuk kesempatan ini, saya sedang melakukan penelitian mengenai pandangan orang Indonesia terhadap kebohongan. Pada kesempatan ini, saya memohon kerjasama untuk berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini sebagai responden dari kuesioner ini.

Kuesioner ini terdiri dari dua bagian utama:

1. Bagian pertama responden diminta untuk melengkapi data diri.
2. Bagian kedua, responden diminta untuk: (a) merespon apakah karakter berbohong dalam situasi tersebut, (b) memberikan penilaian terhadap pandangan responden itu sendiri, dan (c) memberikan komentar yang bersifat opsional.

Di bagian terakhir, responden diwajibkan untuk memberikan komentar terhadap salah satu atau keseluruhan situasi.

Jenis kelamin

- Laki-laki
- Perempuan
- Memilih tidak menjawab

Umur

- <20
- 21-30
- 31-40
- >40

Pendidikan terakhir

- SMA
- S1
- S2

Bahasa yang dikuasai

- Bahasa Indonesia saja
- Bahasa Indonesia dan bahasa daerah
- Bahasa Indonesia, bahasa Inggris dan/atau bahasa asing lainnya
- Bahasa Indonesia, bahasa daerah serta bahasa Inggris dan/atau bahasa asing lainnya

Daerah asal

- Indonesia Timur (Maluku, Maluku Utara, Papua, Papua Barat)
- Jawa
- Kalimantan
- Kepulauan Sunda Kecil (Bali, NTB, NTT)
- Sulawesi
- Sumatra

Daerah domisili sekarang

- Daerah yang sama dengan daerah asal
- Daerah yang berbeda dengan daerah asal tapi dalam wilayah Indonesia
- Luar negeri

Herman sedang menyaksikan Dicky dan Joni bermain catur. Herman memindahkan pion kuda Dicky ketika dia hendak ke dapur mengambil air minum. Ketika Dicky kembali dan melihat pionnya berpindah, dia bertanya 'Joni, kamu memindahkan pionku ya?' Joni menjawab, 'Bukan saya. Herman yang memindahkannya.' Apakah Joni berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Prasetyo yakin kalau dia harus melewati toko kue untuk sampai ke tempat rental game, tapi ternyata dia salah karena toko kuenya sudah pindah. Ibunya tidak suka kalau Prasetyo bermain game. Ketika Prasetyo hendak keluar rumah ingin ke tempat rental game, ibunya bertanya dia mau kemana. Prasetyo menjawab, 'Saya akan pergi melewati toko kue.'

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Jojo dan Maria baru saja mulai berpacaran. Vino adalah mantan Maria. Suatu malam, Jojo bertanya kepada Maria, 'Kamu ketemu Vino minggu ini?' Maria menjawab, 'Vino sudah dua minggu ini sakit tenggorokan.' Memang benar Vino sudah sakit selama dua minggu, meski begitu Maria sempat ketemuan dengan Vino semalam sebelumnya. Apakah Maria berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Sandi diundang untuk makan malam di rumah atasannya. Setelah acaranya selesai, Sandi berkata kepada atasan dan istrinya, 'Terima kasih, acara makan malamnya sangat menyenangkan.' Menurut Sandi, acaranya tidak begitu menyenangkan, dan dia tidak berusaha meyakinkan kalau dia menikmati acara itu. Dia hanya ingin mengatakan hal yang baik kepada istri atasannya meskipun dia tidak percaya apa yang dikatakannya. Apakah Sandi berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Rey baru saja membeli tiket nonton bola dan dia sangat senang akan hal itu. Dia pun menunjukkan ke bosnya, bosnya berkata, 'Dengar Rey, kalau kamu tidak datang kerja, kamu harus punya alasan yang kuat.' Rey berkata, 'Siap, bos.' Pada hari pertandingan bola, Rey menelpon bosnya dan berkata, 'Saya tidak bisa masuk kerja, bos, karena saya sakit.' Ironisnya, Rey tidak dapat menonton pertandingan bola tersebut karena menderita sakit perut yang ternyata adalah gejala keracunan. Jadi, Rey benar-benar sakit ketika dia menelpon bosnya.

Apakah Rey berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Mail memakan kue yang Yuli akan hidangkan ke kerabat kerjanya. Yuli bertanya kepada Mail, 'Apa kamu memakan kuenya?' Mail menjawab 'Tidak.' Apakah mail berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Dua pasien sedang menunggu untuk dimasukkan ke ruang operasi. Dokter menunjuk salah satunya dan berkata, 'Andi ini akan operasi usus buntu atau amandel?' Suster Citra baru saja membaca data pasien *meski dia cemas untuk tetap memiliki pekerjaannya* dan keliru memberi tahu dokter dan berkata, 'Operasi usus buntu,' padahal sebenarnya Andi dijadwalkan untuk operasi amandel. Apakah Suster Citra berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Suatu hari Rina akan menghadapi ujian matematika namun dia tidak belajar semalam sebelumnya, jadi dia tidak ingin ke sekolah. Dia berkata kepada ibunya, 'Bu, saya sakit.' Ketika ibunya mengecek suhunya, ternyata Rina memang sakit. Malamnya, dia menderita demam. Apakah Rina berbohong?

- Ya
- Tidak
- Tidak tahu

Saya ... sebagian besara kan setuju dengan pilihan saya di atas.

- sangat yakin
- cukup yakin
- tidak begitu yakin

Komentar

Komentar

Silahkan mengomentari salah satu atau keseluruhan dari situasi yang sudah diberikan di bagian sebelumnya.

Tuliskan komentar anda di kolom berikut.

Terima kasih.

Terima kasih atas partisipasinya!

性别 : 男 女 不便透露
年龄 : < 20 21-30 31-40 > 40
目前所得的最高学历 : 高中/中专 大学本/专科 硕/博士研究生
出生省份 :

李总, 张总和王总正在打高尔夫球。李总不注意踩到了张总的球。张总从卫生间回来时看到他的球被踩进了草地, 便问到

张总: “王总, 是你踩到我的球了?”。

王总: “不是我, 是李总”。

你认为王总的回答是?

谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见:

小明的妈妈平时不允许他去游泳池, 但是小明知道从他家去游泳池必经糖果店, 但他不知道其实糖果店已经搬迁了。现在他想去游泳, 所以当他妈妈问他出门去哪时, 他回答说: “我要去糖果店”。

你认为小明的回答是:

谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见:

李红和张宇刚谈恋爱不久。一天晚上, 张宇问李红“你这周有没有见过孙凯?” (孙凯是李红的前男友)。李红回答道“他这两周腿骨折了”。孙凯确实骨折有两周了, 但李红也的确在昨天晚上见了孙凯。

你认为李红的话是:

谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见:

小王被邀请去他老板家参加晚宴,大家都觉得晚宴很沉闷,但是结束时小王对女主人说,“谢谢您,今天的晚宴很棒”。他这样说,不是因为他真的认为晚宴很棒,也不是想让别人觉得他很享受,而是因为他想对女主人即他老板的妻子说一些好听的话,尽管他并没有想着她会相信他所说的。

你认为小王的话是：

- 谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

- 非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见：

小王很骄傲有两张篮球决赛的门票,还拿给了他老板看。他老板对他说“小王,要是你哪天没来上班,你需要找一个比这个更好的借口”。小王说道“我知道了”。在决赛那天,小王给老板打电话请假“老板,我今天生病上不了班”。但是让他没想到的是他那天真的病了(他在电话里说他生病时他不知道他确实生病了),因为他原本的一点点胃疼后来被发现是食物中毒的症状,所以他那天的比赛并没有看成。

你认为小王的话是：

- 谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

- 非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见：

小王吃了小李原计划要送给公司的蛋糕,小李后来问小王:“是你把我的蛋糕吃了吗?小王回道:“不是”。

你认为小王的回答是：

- 谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

- 非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见：

有两个病人正等着进手术室做手术，主刀医生指着其中一位病人问护士“他要做的是阑尾手术还是扁桃体手术？”。这位护士记不清了，尽管她才刚刚看过两个病人的情况。但是她不想丢掉自己的工作，所以还是回答道“是阑尾手术”。而可怜的这个病人实际上要做的是扁桃体手术。

你认为护士的话是：

谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见：

小花某天早上有个数学考试，但因为没准备，她不想去，于是对她妈妈说：“我生病了”。她妈妈给她量了一下体温发现她真的生病了，后来去医院才发现她得了麻疹。

你认为小花的话是：

谎话 不是谎话 我不确定

我_____大部分人的答案与我的回答一致。

非常确定 确定 不确定

其它意见：

Kérdőív: a hazugság percepciójáról a magyarországi magyar anyanyelvi beszélők körében

Kedves Válaszadók,

Ahmad Adha vagyok, a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Nyelvtudományi Doktori Iskola Elméleti Nyelvészet Programjának PhD-hallgatója. Témavezetőm prof. Németh T. Enikő. Kutatásom a hazugság percepcióját vizsgálja a magyarországi magyar anyanyelvű lakosság körében. Megkérem Önt, hogy válaszaival segítse a kutatási projektemet.

A kérdőív anoním, az Ön személye nem azonosítható. A kérdőív két részből áll:

1. Az első rész a válaszadók demográfiai adataira kérdez rá.
2. A második részben pedig tizenegy történetben a résztvevőknek el kell dönteniük, hogy egy adott személy egy adott helyzetben hazudik-e vagy sem, mérlegelniük kell hogy mennyire biztosak ebben, és megjegyzéseket is tehetnek.

A kérdőív kitöltése körülbelül 10-15 percet vesz igénybe.
Köszönöm a segítségét!

Nem

- Férfi
- Nő
- Nem válaszol

Kor

- <20 év
- 21-30 év
- 31-40 év
- 41-50 év
- 51-60 év
- >60 év

Iskolai végzettség

- Általános iskola
- Szakiskola
- Középiskola, gimnázium
- Egyetemi hallgató
- Főiskola/Egyetem

Nyelvismeret

- Csak Magyar mint anyanyelv
- Magyar mint anyanyelv és még más nyelv(ek)

Jelenlegi lakhely

- Falu/kisváros
- Város
- Megyeszékhely
- Főváros

Dávid, János és Ádám épp golfoznak. Ádám rálép Dávid labdájára. Mikor Dávid odaér és észreveszi, hogy a labdája bele van nyomódva a tözegbe, azt kérdezi: - János, ráléptél a labdámra? János azt feleli: - Nem, Ádám volt. Hazudott János?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Patrik abban a hitben van, hogy el kell mennie a cukorkabolt előtt ahhoz, hogy eljusson a biliárd szalonhoz, de téved, mert a cukorkabolt elköltözött. Patrik anyja nem helyesli a biliárdot. Ahogy Patrik elhagyja a házat azzal a szándékkal, hogy biliárdozni menjen, Patrik anyja megkérdezi, hogy hova megy. Patrik azt mondja: - A cukorkabolt felé megyek. Hazudott Patrik?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

József és Mária nemrég kezdtek el járni. Vilmos Mária ex-barátja. Egyik este József megkérdezi Máriától: - Láttad Vilmost a héten? Mária azt válaszolja: - Vilmos mononukleózissal gyengélkedik két hete. Vilmos tényleg ebben a betegségben szenved két hete, de valóban az a helyzet, hogy Máriának előző este randevúja volt Vilmossal. Hazudott Mária?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Sándor a főnökéhez hivatalos vacsorára. A szörnyű vacsora után - amelyet senki sem élvezett- Sándor azt mondja a háziasszonynak: - Köszönöm, remek parti volt. Sándor persze egyáltalán nem gondolja komolyan, hogy remek volt a parti és nem is próbál senkit meggyőzni arról, hogy jól érezte magát, de úgy véli, valami kedveset kell mondania a főnöke feleségének, bár egyáltalán nem várja el tőle, hogy elhiggye. Hazudott Sándor?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Miklós, a szuperdrukker jegyeket kapott a bajnokságra és nagyon büszke rájuk. Megmutatja őket a főnökének, aki azt mondja: - Nézd, Miklós, ha előfordul, hogy valamelyik nap nem jössz dolgozni, jobb lesz, ha jobb kifogást találsz, mint ez a bajnokság. Miklós azt mondja: -Jobbat fogok. A meccs napján Miklós betelefonál a munkahelyére és azt mondja: - Ma nem tudok bemenni dolgozni, főnök, mert beteg vagyok. A sors iróniája, hogy Miklós a meccsre sem tud elmenni, mert a reggel érzett enyhe hasfájásáról kiderül, hogy ételmérgezés. Hazudott Miklós?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Máté megette a tortát, amelyet Júlia a vendégeknek szeretett volna felszolgálni. Júlia megkérdezi Mátét: - Megetted a tortát? Máté azt feleli: -Nem. Hazudott Máté?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Két páciens arra vár, hogy betolják őket a műtőbe. A doktor rámutat az egyikre és azt kérdezi: - Géza vakbélműtőre vagy mandulaműtőre vár? Betti nővér épp akkor olvasta a kórlapokat. Bár aggódik az állása miatt, a nővér ennek ellenére összekeveri a fejében a kórlapokat és azt feleli: - Vakbélműtőre, miközben szegény Gézát valójában mandulaműtőre jegyezték elő. Hazudott Betti nővér?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Egyik reggel Katalinnak aritmetika vizsgája van, amire nem tanult és így nem akar iskolába menni. Azt mondja az anyjának: - Beteg vagyok. Az anyja megméri a lázát és Katalin meglepetésére kiderül, hogy valóban beteg; aznap később kijön rajta a kanyaró. Hazudott Katalin?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Helga egyedül megy egy ruhaüzletbe ruhát vásárolni. Felpróbál egy ruhát, amely tetszik neki, de abban nem biztos, hogy a színe jól áll neki. Ezért szeretné valaki más véleményét is hallani. Helga megkérdezi Petrát, aki egy másik, történetesen éppen ott lévő vásárló. Petrának nem igazán tetszik a ruha és a színe. Azért, hogy kielégítse Helga komfortérzetét, de nem azzal a céllal, hogy Helga elhiggye neki, azt mondja, hogy: – Jól áll rajtad a ruha. Hazudik Petra?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Krisztinának van barátja, de erről a családja még nem tud. A barátja meglehetősen jómódú és elvitte Krisztinát Velencébe vakációzni. A kirándulás során a pár fényképeket készített. Miután visszatérnek Magyarországra, Krisztina bátyja megtalálja az egyik fotójukat. Krisztina még mindig nem akarja, hogy a család tudomást szerezzen a barátjáról. Ezért, amikor a bátyja megkérdezi, hogy hol készült a fénykép, ezt válaszolja: – Velencében készült. Hazudik Krisztina?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Olívia egyik délután a Széchenyi téri parkban sétált, amikor egy japán turista ment oda hozzá és megkérdezte tőle, merre van a legközelebbi sushi étterem. Szerencsére, Olívia előző nap felfedezte, hogy nyílt egy új sushi étterem, de a pontos helyszínre nem igazán emlékezett. Anélkül, hogy a turistát félre akarta volna vezetni, azt mondta: – Ott van a Közép fasoron, körülbelül tíz perc sétányira innen. Az étterem valójában a Fő fasoron van. Hazudott Olívia?

- hazudott
- nem hazudott
- nem tudom eldönteni

Az adott válaszomban

- teljesen biztos vagyok
- meglehetősen biztos vagyok
- nem igazán vagyok biztos

Megjegyzés

Köszönöm a részvételt.

Co-research: Prototype Semantic

Дорогие друзья! В рамках совместного исследования авторы просят вас уделить 5-7 минут вашего драгоценного времени на данный опрос. Глобальной целью настоящего исследования является изучение восприятия лжи у разных народов. Данная форма рассчитана на граждан РФ.

С уважением, Адха Ахмад и Шувалов Денис.

Пол

- Мужской
- Женский
- Предпочитаю не отвечать

Возраст

- <20 (включительно)
- 21-30
- 31-40
- >41 (включительно)

Образование (уже имеется)

- Среднее общее
- Среднее профессиональное
- Бакалавриат
- Магистратура, специалитет
- Иное

Владение языками

- Только русский
- Русский и региональный(-е) язык(-и)
- Русский и английский или другие иностранные языки
- Русский, региональный(-е) язык(-и) и английский или другие иностранные языки

Место рождения (федеральный округ)

- Центральный (Москва)
- Северо-Западный (Санкт-Петербург)
- Южный (Ростов-на-Дону)
- Северо-Кавказский (Пятигорск)
- Приволжский (Нижний Новгород)
- Уральский (Екатеринбург)
- Сибирский (Новосибирск)
- Дальневосточный (Владивосток)
- Не в РФ

Место проживания

- Совпадает с местом рождения
- В Российской Федерации, но не совпадает с местом рождения
- За границей

1/8

Далее вашему вниманию представлены 8 коротких историй. Просьба ответить на вопросы к каждой из них. Если желаете, то можете обосновать свой выбор в поле "Комментарий". Правильных ответов здесь нет. Отвечайте, основываясь на Вашем мировосприятии.

Руслан, Женя и Адам играют в гольф. Адам наступил на мяч Руслана. Когда Руслан подошёл и увидел, что его мяч втопан в траву, он спросил Женю: «Женя, ты ли наступил на мяч?». Женя ответил: «Нет, это сделал Адам». Солгал ли Женя?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

2/8

Петя уверен, что для того чтобы попасть в бильярдную, он должен пройти мимо магазина сладостей. Но он ошибается, так как магазин сладостей уже переехал. Кроме того, известно, что мама Пети не одобряет его походы в бильярдную. Однажды, когда Петя выходил из дома с намерением посетить бильярдную, мама спросила его о том, куда он идёт. Петя ответил, что идёт в сторону магазина сладостей. Солгал ли Петя?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

3/8

Женя и Маша недавно начали встречаться. Валентин - бывший парень Маши. Однажды вечером Женя спросил Машу: «Видела ли ты Валентина на этой неделе?». Маша ответила: «Валентин болен гриппом вот уже пару недель». Факт в том, что Валентин действительно болен гриппом и что Маша виделась с ним прошлой ночью. Солгала ли Маша?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

4/8

Александра пригласили на ужин домой к его начальнику. После унылого вечера, который никому не понравился, Александр обратился к хозяйке дома: «Спасибо, вечеринка была потрясающей». Александр понимал, что вечеринка не была потрясающей и не пытался убедить кого-то, что хорошо провёл время. Он просто хотел сказать что-то приятное жене его начальника, не ожидая, что она поверит ему. Солгал ли Александр?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

5/8

Преданный фанат Николай заполучил билеты на чемпионат и был неистово этому рад. Он показал эти билеты своему начальнику. Начальник сказал ему: «Слушай, Николай, если однажды ты не придешь на работу, то тебе лучше иметь оправдание получше, чем этот чемпионат». Николай ответил: «У меня будет оправдание получше». В день чемпионата Николай позвонил начальнику и сообщил: «Я не смогу пойти сегодня на работу, так как заболел». По иронии судьбы Николай не смог пойти и на чемпионат из-за легкой боли в животе, которая, как оказалось, была спровоцирована пищевым отравлением. Иными словами, Николай был действительно болен, когда он сообщил о недомогании своему начальнику. Солгал ли Николай?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

6/8

Миша съел торт, который Юля хотела подать гостям. Тогда Юля спросила Мишу: «Ты ли съел торт?». Миша ответил: «Нет». Солгал ли Миша?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

7/8

Двое пациентов ждут, когда их перевезут в операционную. Врач указывает на одного из них и спрашивает медсестру: «Евгений здесь на удаление аппендикса или на удаление миндалин?». Медсестра по имени Анастасия недавно ознакомилась с медицинскими карточками пациентов. Несмотря на то, что Анастасия дорожила своей работой, она все же запуталась в карточках пациентов и ответила: «Он на удаление аппендикса». А ведь Евгений на самом деле нуждался в удалении миндалин. Солгала ли медсестра Анастасия?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий

8/8

Однажды утром у Кати должна была быть контрольная работа по математике, к которой она не подготовилась. По этой причине она не хотела идти в школу и сказала маме, что заболела. Мама измерила ей температуру, и, к удивлению самой Кати, оказалось, что она действительно болеет. Как стало известно к вечеру, Катя заболела корью. Солгала ли Катя?

- Да
- Нет
- Сомневаюсь

Я (вариант ответа), что большинство людей согласятся с выбором, который я только что сделал(-а)

- Полностью уверен(-а)
- Скорее уверен(-а)
- Не уверен(-а)

Комментарий
