

DOCTORAL (PhD) DISSERTATION

Onward Migration Aspirations of Syrian Refugees, Integration Processes
and Legal Alternatives to Secondary Migration: A Comparative Study

by

Tuğçe Kılıç

Szeged, 2023.

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DEDICATION

To my most beautiful mother Seher and dearest father Ramazan

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As Tolstoy once said, “All great literature is one of two stories; a man goes on a journey, or a stranger comes to town.” In other words, all great literature comes out of migration. This piece of work also involves two migration stories: the story of a girl who arrived in Szeged to tell the stories of strangers who took a long journey to look for their new safe homes in this world. During this journey, I have been graced to have the presence of supportive and encouraging companions along the way.

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List of Abbreviations

ADHD	Attention-Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder
AMMR	The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation
APR	Asylum Procedures Regulation
CAPI	Computer-assisted personal interviewing
CATI	Computer-assisted telephone interviews
CEAS	The Common European Asylum System
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
DGMM	The Directorate General of Migration Management
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
ECHO	The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECRE	The European Council on Refugees and Exiles
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EFTA	The European Free Trade Association
EMN	The European Migration Network
ESSN	The Emergency Social Safety Net
EU-LISA	European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security, and justice
EU	The European Union
EURODAC	European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROSUR	The European Border Surveillance System
FRIT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
FRONTEX	The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGU	Integrationsgrunduddannelsen
IOM	The International Organisation for Migration
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LFIP	The Law of Foreigners and International Protection
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
MENA	Middle East & North Africa
MIPEX	The Migrant Integration Policy Index
MPF	Migration Partnership Framework

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE / ODIHR	The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe / The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PECI	Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración
PIKTES	Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids Into the Turkish Education System
TFEU	The Treaty on Functioning of the European Union
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	The United Nation Children's Fund
USA	The United States of America
WFP	World Food Programme

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

In recent years, the phenomenon of migration has gained a lot of attention and been elevated to the top of the agendas of many States and international organizations. Despite its recent popularity, migration has a long history, dating back to the earliest human beings walking on the earth. For a long period of time, both for humans and for other living species, migration has played a crucial role in change and development. Although migration can be realized willingly and voluntarily, people might be forced to move when they are exposed to threats to life and livelihood.

Until today, most of the research on migration have concentrated on one-time migration movement, usually from developing countries to developed ones. Nowadays, increasing number of migrants migrate multiple times, whether on purpose or not. In order to underline that it is a type of migration which takes place more than once, up till now, a great number of terms have been used to describe this form of migration such as: “transit migration”, “fragmented migration”, “secondary migration”, “stepwise migration”, “post-migration movement”, “multinational migration”, “twice migration”, “triangular migration”, “sequential migration”, “third-country migration”, “serial migration”, and “onward migration”.¹ The term “onward migration” has a high theoretical value because it goes beyond the bipolar mapping of migrant trajectories which is usually realized between one location at the origin and another at the destination; therefore “onward migration” breaks this limitation and it keeps the option open for migrants to migrate to another place -or more than one place- after settling down, although they had not intended to do it when they started their journey.²

As De Hoon et. al. referred in their research, if the onward migration is wanted to be comprehended thoroughly, it is very crucial to take a variety of distinctive characteristics of refugees into account. While the continuous instability usually makes the refugees not to go back to their countries, it might have a contrast impact on onward migration. Restrictions such as Dublin Regulation, do not allow refugees to select the country of settlement, so refugees set an intention to move onward to another country when they have a more

¹ J. Ahrens, R. King, “Onward Migration and Transnationalism: What Are the Interconnections?”, in J. Ahrens, R. Kings (eds.), *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism Complex Trajectories, Practices and Ties*, IMISCOE Research Series, Springer, 2023, pp.5-6.

² J. Ahres, M. Kelly, I. Van Liempt, Free movements? The onward migration of EU citizens born in Somalia, Iran and Nigeria. *Population, Space and Place*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2016, p. 2.

stabilized legal status. In many European countries, refugees typically hold economically and socially disadvantageous positions while facing with feelings of isolation and exclusion in everyday public and political discourses, which might push them to move onward.³

Integration processes in the host countries have a shifting role in migration aspirations. The primary priority of the refugees who flee the war is to ensure their physical safety first. Once they arrive the first country of asylum, this concern is resolved to some extent. Obtaining some legal status, accession to certain rights and securing their life conditions are directly related to the integration policies and practices in the receiving countries. Hence, the refugees' satisfaction with the life in the host countries are correlated with the effectiveness of the integration processes. In lack of obtaining these priorities and States' failure to meet the needs of refugees, refugees consider moving onward to another countries.

Especially in the absence of legal channels of onward migration such as resettlement/relocation/assisted return programme, irregular entries continue to be the reality of the migration system. More and more states try to prohibit the irregular entries with serious preventions and never refrain from punishing the irregularity severely. The legal, administrative, and financial façades of the programmes should be strengthened via the networking of international relations and solidarity between states. Only after that a genuine alternative to individual/spontaneous and mainly risky secondary migration can only be maintained.

1.1. Motivation and Objective for the Research

The early years of the 21st century has witnessed a great variety of national as well as international crisis: terrorist crisis, financial crisis, political crisis (e.g., Brexit), humanitarian crisis, global health crisis (e.g., Covid-19 pandemic), energy crisis, climate crisis, conflict crisis, and last but not least so-called migration crisis. Among all, the migration crisis is quite specific since it is the combined consequence of several phenomena (natural, social, economic) as a means of conflict resolution, but also as an indicator of the reordering of international relations at least in certain regions. International migration, its magnitude, direction, and characteristics are part of the system of international relations and are also a product and even an inspiration of it (e.g., more and more irregular phenomena accompany

³ M. De Hoon, M. Vink, H. Schmeets, A ticket to mobility? Naturalisation and subsequent migration of refugees after obtaining asylum in the Netherlands, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol.46, No.7, 2020, p. 1188.

human migration, which is leading to an increasing intensity of state/civilian cooperation). Because of this interrelationship, international migration and international relations cannot be examined in isolation, in such a way that only one or the other can be validly concluded. Therefore, the movement of people across borders must no longer be dealt with only within the framework of the sovereignty of states, but also outside it. The one-sided or indiscriminate control of migration and migration policies by States have such serious side effects that the “patient may die from the treatment”.

In this world of crisis, Syria has undoubtedly been one of those countries that has suffered the most. Inspired by the events in Tunisia, the initial anti-government demonstrations protesting the regime and requesting for reforms, turned into a big-scale internal war in Syria when the law enforcements used severe violence to suppress the unrest more quickly. Until today, the world has seen numerous major influxes, many of which were caused by persecution, armed conflicts, violence, human rights violations, and the events profoundly unsettling public order, but the latest and the greatest one started to take place in 2011 when the Syrian people affected by the Arab uprisings forced to flee. The displaced people began to take a shelter primarily in the neighbouring countries. This is how Turkey has become the first country hosting the largest refugee population in the world. However, some Syrians preferred to seek asylum in the countries located in Europe and Member States of the EU. Throughout the time that the Syrian refugees’ wave of immigration, the Syrian refugees widely encountered with the securitization discourse and practices in the transit and destination countries. Besides, the EU used its infamous foreign policy tool, namely externalization to deter the refugees from reaching its border and keep them out of the “Fortress Europe”. Since Turkey has been the usual starting point of the journeys of the most Syrian refugees, the EU (European Union) developed a cooperation with Turkey naming it as “The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan”. The outcomes of the externalization Plan were immediately effective and noticeable on the statistics in a short amount of time that border crossings and requests for asylum have considerably decreased since the statement's implementation. However, it did not bring an end to the people’s will of migration via regular (Resettlement Programmes etc.) or irregular entries (via cooperating with smugglers).

Many Syrian refugees after having taken shelter in the first countries of asylum led to onward migration because of unmet needs, poor living conditions in the host countries and with hoping to find better living standards in European countries. In order to understand the reasons behind the onward migration and if there is any correlation between the integration policies and practices of the host countries, in this research, three countries are

selected as case countries: Turkey, Denmark, and Spain. There are several reasons behind these choices. First of all, from the very first days of the crisis, Syrians' one of the most preferred neighbouring destination countries has been Turkey. Syria is Turkey's longest border neighbour with 911 km longitude and Turkey is one of the closest countries to Syria from the geographical point of view. Due to Turkey's formerly open-door policy to everyone escaping from the warzone, Turkey became one of the most immigrated countries for Syrians in the region and has owned the first place for the largest refugee population hosting country in the entire world.

Majority of Syrians who intended to reach to the European countries followed several different routes. However, the sea routes attracted great attention because of the fact that the lack of legal channels. Many refugees were left with no choice but cooperating with criminal networks and smugglers. The Greek Islands and Mediterranean Sea served as an important passage for refugees. The Aegean and Mediterranean seas have been a scene for tragic, dramatic, and painful humanitarian events during refugees' migration influx. Until the EU-Turkey Deal aiming to tackle irregular migration came into force, unprecedented number of refugees tried to reach the European countries especially the Northern and Western European countries where they could have a more stabilized life conditions via the Eastern Mediterranean route referring the road starting mostly from the shores of Turkey and continue as Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria up to the Balkan route. Scandinavian countries are well known for their strong welfare regimes, therefore, majority of the refugees aimed to arrive in one of those countries. Among all, Denmark holds a quite distinctive stand in terms of migration policies. Announcement of not accepting automatic UN (United Nations) refugee resettlement quota in 2017 followed with the paradigm shift in 2019 setting a goal of zero asylum seekers. Syrian refugees faced with fear of deportation when their resident permits were revoked, and they were encouraged to return back to Syria in 2021.

Although the primary objection of the EU-Turkey deal was to control the passages and stop the irregular immigration waves to the Europe, and it worked well to some extent in the Eastern Mediterranean route, it did not manage to put an end to refugees' onward migrations to the European countries. The Western Mediterranean route began to be the most popular entry point to Europe in 2018.⁴ Syrian refugees used this route passing through the sub-Saharan countries such as Algeria and Morocco to eventually reach Spain by arriving

⁴ Frontex, *Migratory Routes*, Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/>, Accessed on: 08.03.2023.

the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa. Many Syrian refugees considered the Western Mediterranean route as the one and only as well as less costly way to step in Europe. Therefore, arrivals to Spain along the Western Mediterranean route increased remarkably, and once again showed that border closures on one route just shifts the migration to another route.

As previously mentioned, until now most of the research in migration studies focused on one-way, linear migration which starts usually at the country of origin and ends up in the destination country. The research on onward migration has started to gain importance in the last 15 years, although it is still being comparatively understudied.⁵ In fact, the onward migration has several effects on the international relations, policy, and law-making process. These impacts can be listed in terms of their short-term, mid-term and long-term effects. In the short-term effects, in the absence of legal channels, there will be a rise on the irregular migration and parallelly the activities of the criminal network and business of smugglers will increase. This fact will grow the States' security concerns and it will lead to more stricter border management activities. In the mid-term effects, the most preferred routes for irregular migration will be closed with several measures and the closure of the passages will shift the migratory routes to another route. Arrival of a large number of refugees might create a humanitarian crisis, therefore burden and responsibility sharing should be allocated among the States. In the long-term effects, multilateral cooperation will be needed to address the issues stemming from the immigration and the needs of refugees. Therefore, the States should work together to enhance the frameworks of the international programmes such as The Resettlement Programme and Migration Partnership Programme. In the long term, international standards including policy and legal changes should be improved based on the refugees' needs, challenges and successes experienced.

In the literature, migration and integration has also been studied separately. Believing that integration is a natural continuation of migration, this research aims to understand the aspirations for onward migration of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Denmark and Spain who flee from the war and sought protection in one or more than one country. By analysing their migration trajectories, it is intended to understand the association between the integration of refugees into the host countries and their aspiration to migrate. The main motivation is to shed light on the refugee's aspirations to move onward and try to highlight the common

⁵ D. Turcatti, Remapping Onward Migration through the Trajectories of Colombian parents in London, *Migration Studies*, Vol. 10, No.4, 2022, p. 706.

patterns which triggers refugees to decide on secondary migration, and what could be the safer, less risky, and legal alternative to secondary migration.

1.2. Research Questions and Research Hypotheses

In this section, it is aimed to clarify the research questions and formulate the research hypotheses. There is no doubt that well-defined research questions usually help to determine the scope, focus, and purpose of a scientific research. Likewise, the hypotheses provide a direction to follow and in a way a goal to achieve. The research questions and the research hypotheses are interconnected elements of a research: research questions usually lead to the creation of research hypotheses. Under the light of these facts, the research questions are clarified, and the research hypothesis are formulated as follows:

- Research Question 1.: What are the determinants that influence the decision-making process of refugees driving them to move onward?
- Hypothesis 1.: The refugees' extent of dissatisfaction with the life in the host country is directly connected with their aspirations and decisions regarding onward migration.
- Research Question 2.: Is there an association between the aspiration of migration and integration processes?
- Hypothesis 2.: Unmet needs, unfulfilled life expectations and lack of sense of belonging in the host country increase the refugees' aspiration for migration.

1.3. Research Methodology

In order to answer the formulated research questions and the hypothesis, this empirical research is designed to use qualitative methods to collect the data, interpret them and draw conclusions from it. In migration studies, qualitative research has a crucial place due to the fact that it helps to provide “rich, in-depth, and nuanced analysis”; it lets to produce “conceptual refinements with higher validity”; it allows to “redefine the existing categories”, “generate new hypotheses and even theoretical paradigms”; it investigates “complex, conjunctural, multi-faceted dimensions of the migration dynamics”; and it is prone to comprehend “the voices of social actors and immigrant groups, especially the ones who lack

means of participation and representation in mainstream society and politics.”⁶ In social sciences, the qualitative research has a holistic approach including rich varieties of disciplines, research branches, and different techniques.⁷ The qualitative research is used when we want to explore a problem or an issue related to a group or population, when we want to get an explicit and comprehensive understanding of the problem, when we want to encourage people to tell their stories and make their voices heard and understand the contexts from their end.⁸ Researchers prefer to conduct their research adopting qualitative measures since quantitative methods and statistical analyses do not respond to their needs.⁹ In contrast to the more rigid frameworks of quantitative methodologies, qualitative research give researchers more flexibility, and dynamism.¹⁰ In this research, quantitative methods such as surveys were not selected as a methodology, believing that it would not sufficiently provide insights about the research questions. In migration studies, quantitative surveys are used to create “systematic and structured data”.¹¹ But, there are some groups of people whom are not very easy to locate which makes collecting survey samples quite difficult; therefore, refugees are among those “hard-to-reach populations”.¹² Collecting data of such a small and vulnerable group which immigrated relatively not long time ago creates obstacles for getting sources for quantitative analysis. Whereas the qualitative methods such as interviews bring a broader perspective of the personal experiences. Since this research aims to shed light on the onward migration aspirations of the Syrian refugees, qualitative methods are adopted to conduct the research considering the limitations and disadvantages of the quantitative research methods for the selected research group.

Comparative research design is adopted to make the analysis. This method is highly important because a carefully chosen comparison study might disprove accepted wisdom or

⁶ R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz, “Introduction: Preparing the Way for Qualitative Research in Migration Studies”, in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 2-3.

⁷ J. Beuving, G. De Vries, *Doing Qualitative Research The Craft of Naturalistic Inquiry*, Amsterdam University Press, 2015, p. 19.

⁸ J. W., Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007, p.40.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ J. Corbin, A. Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, 4th edn., Sage Publication, 2015, p.47

¹¹ J. Salamonska, *Quantitative Methods in Migration Research*, in P. Scholten (eds), *Introduction to Migration Studies*, IMISCOE Research Series, Springer, 2022, p. 426.

¹² R. Tourangeau, Defining hard-to-survey populations, in R. Tourangeau, B. Edwards, T. P. Johnson, K. M. Wolter, N. Bates (eds), *Hard-to-Survey Populations*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p.10.

demonstrate how current academic hypotheses might be incorrect.¹³ Most of the comparisons in migration studies have been done based on the cross-location comparisons such as comparing the countries, regions, cities, and neighbourhoods but among all, cross-country comparison comes first.¹⁴ Although qualitative comparative research takes more time and drains more energy, it is far more fulfilling because of the knowledge they produce.¹⁵

This research incorporates a multi-sited fieldwork approach. In comparative studies, multi-sited fieldwork carries a great importance. International migration, movement, and multi-sitedness have linked to each other by an evident and traditional connection.¹⁶ Comparative study of multiple sites provides significant benefits by demonstrating the interactions between variables in the sites of origin and destination; and assists to clarify the divergence and convergence over a large variety of results.¹⁷ Although researching about migrants in different places can be much harder for a single researcher to do it all alone by himself or herself, in fact this kind of approach contributes enormously to produce an ambitious research work.¹⁸

As Borkert stated that migration studies have naturally an interdisciplinary perspective. The study of international migration is regarded as a perfect interdisciplinary research field due to its efforts on creating innovative and effective policy proposals. There are several factors such as: push factors to realize migration as well as economic, demographic, geographic, social, political, and historical results of migration which makes impossible to evaluate migration studies with an only one disciplinary perspective. As a discipline, the study of migration is a heterogeneous research field; therefore, researchers adopt the new concepts from other fields and incorporate them into the unique field of

¹³ I. Bloemraad, *The Promise and Pitfalls of Comparative Research Design in the Study of Migration*, *Migration Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, p. 29.

¹⁴ R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz, "Mapping the Qualitative Migration Research in Europe: An Exploratory Analysis", in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ E. Morawska, "Qualitative Migration Research: Viable Goals, Open-Ended Questions, and Multidimensional Answers", in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, p. 116.

¹⁶ E. Gallo, "In the Right Place at the Right Time: Reflections on Multi-sited Ethnography in the Age of Migration", in M. Falzon (ed.), *Multi-Sited Ethnography Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research*, Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p. 87.

¹⁷ D. FitzGerald, A comparativist manifesto for international migration studies, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.35, No.10, 2012, p. 1726.

¹⁸ R. King, "Context-Based Qualitative Research and Multi-sited Migration Studies in Europe", in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, p. 42.

migration studies. Most scholars emphasize that it is necessary to use the interdisciplinary approach to comprehend better the movements, patterns, accommodation, and integration realms of migration.¹⁹

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, this research utilizes a wide range of sources from different scientific disciplines. This interdisciplinary framework incorporates several various fields, including but not limited to law, international relations, political science, and sociology. Using variety of sources from different disciplines helps to explore the research questions more comprehensively. While the legal sources enable to understand the regulatory framework, international relations sources provide a global context, highlighting how different actors affect or shape the phenomenon. In order to get more insights about the decision-making processes and governance structures, inclusion of the political sciences sources is necessary. Since migration and integration is directly related to the society, people's experiences, cultural and societal norms and behaviours, sociology offers a wide spectrum of sources, therefore its sources incorporated to obtain a much bigger perspective.

In migration studies, theories are selected according to the specific contexts that are being investigated. For this research, three theories are found relevant to the context of the Syrian migration to the host countries. According to the "Laws of Migration" by Ravenstein people migrate to short distance and the one who migrate long distance generally go to the industrial and commercial centres. The Syrian refugees initially sought a shelter in the geographical proximity and the ones who wanted to apply asylum in further locations usually went or intended to go to the Northern countries of Europe where the industry is quite developed. According to "A Theory of Migration" also known as "Push and Pull Factors" is widely used in migration studies to understand the reasons behind many migration movements. The most recent example can be given as Syrian immigration. The negativities at the origin country such as conflict, war, instability push people to emigrate while positive notions such as security, stability, welfare, access to education, health services and investment possibilities have acted as a pull factor to the countries just as in the example of the case countries of this research. Last but not least, the Network theory argues that existing networks have an influence on the route and destination choices for the people who intend to immigrate. Once they reach to the destination country, those networks support them to

¹⁹ M. Borkert, "Moving Out of the Comfort Zone: Promises and Pitfalls of Interdisciplinary Migration Research in Europe", in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, p. 60.

accommodate and adapt to their new life. Many Syrians reported to choose their destination country after consulting their networks in the destined places, and they tend to live within their network after migration.

For qualitative research, one of the most important research tools is conducting interviews. The interview has a strong position in the qualitative research toolkit. It is sine qua none especially for the research focusing on the vulnerable groups of people on the move and gathering information on numerous irregularity-related topics.²⁰ In-depth biographical interviews help to understand the life histories of the individuals and contributes to picture a biographical constellation which usually covers “the non-linear, and multi-directional, life events with extensive collective influences”.²¹ Interviews help researchers to collect in-depth information and insights directly from participants to explore different angles of the topics and uncover the rich narratives and experiences. In this research, in order to investigate the research questions and hypotheses, the data from the multi-sited field works acquired via semi-structured interviews through mainly in-depth biographical interviews and questionnaire.

1.3.1. Case Study Selection

In this qualitative research, there are three countries as case studies. These cases are selected within the framework of “Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)”. This strategy enables researchers to determine “a point of similarity” between different cases and by this way, it reveals the independent variable which is responsible for the observed result.²² Applying the MDSD approach, Turkey, Denmark, and Spain are chosen as case countries due to their different political, economic, and social characteristics to investigate the research questions and test the hypotheses. It is aimed to demonstrate by analysing how different systems and structures impact the refugees’ decision making for onward migration and see if there is any shared convergence or divergence in the selected case countries effecting the outcome. By selecting Turkey, Denmark, and Spain, it is aimed to show that although the case countries are very different from one another politically, economically, geographically, and culturally, the driving factors for refugees’ onward migration aspiration and decision-making are

²⁰ O. Fedyuk, V. Zentai, “The Interview in Migration Studies: A Step towards a Dialogue and Knowledge Co-production?” in R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Yalaz (eds.), *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 171-172.

²¹ S. A. Tobin et al., “Ambivalent Entanglements: Syrian Refugees’ Network Relations and (Im) mobilities in Protracted Displacement”, in J. Ahrens, R. Kings (eds.), *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism Complex Trajectories, Practices and Ties*, IMISCOE Research Series, Springer, 2023, p. 106.

²² J. Steinmetz, *Politics, Power, and Purpose: An Orientation to Political Science*, Fort Hays State University, Hays Kansas, 2021, p.178.

common. It is also intended to indicate that there is an association between integration and onward migration aspiration of refugees. By analysing these three different countries, it is aimed to point out that the resettlement programme, migration partnership programme and EU's Action Plan on integration and inclusion diminish the individual/spontaneous and mainly risky secondary migration conditional on the fact that the legal administrative and financial façades of the programmes are strengthened.

As per the case countries: Turkey has the longest border with its neighbour Syria. When the Syrian refugees decided to seek a shelter in the neighbouring countries, Turkey became one of their first countries in the neighbourhood to search for safety. Due to Turkey's open-door policy, the number of Syrian refugees dramatically increased in a short amount of time making Turkey the first country all over the globe to house the largest refugee population for consecutive years. Although there is a cultural affinity between Turkey and Syria according to the Syrian refugees' narratives, temporary protection legal status, integration challenges such as employment, stable livelihood and language barriers influence their decision on onward migration.

Denmark is traditionally known as the first mover of the international humanitarian legislations. It has one of the strongest welfare regimes in the European continent. Many Syrian refugees tried to reach to Northern countries of the EU when they intended to seek a shelter in Europe, and Denmark was one of them. However, things did not turn out as good as the Syrian refugees were expecting. In 2019, Denmark had a sharp shift on its immigration policies. Many of them faced with family reunification obstacles and deportation risks. Government policies, media portrayal, psychosocial factors challenged their lives in Denmark and influence their decision for onward migration.

Although Spain has not initially been the primary destination for Syrian refugees, some factors developed throughout the years have made it a target point for them. Syrian refugees who arrived in Europe irregularly, usually left the Turkish shores and reached Greece and then follow up the Balkan route to apply for asylum in the most developed countries in Europe. However, the so-called EU-Turkey Deal acted as a game changer and decreased the number of arrivals and closed the Balkan Route. As border closures just shifts the migration to another route, the Western Mediterranean Route has become the most popular entry point for the irregular migration. Passing thorough the North African and Sub-Saharan countries, Spain was the only choice for many Syrians who aimed to arrive to Europe irregularly. However, some Syrian refugees were resettled to Spain via the Resettlement Programme. Spain's approach to refugee integration and economic, social, and

political systems provided for the refugees will bring an important angle for the investigation of the research questions.

1.3.2. Data Collection

Initially, the data was designed to be collected in-person on the spot. However, in early 2020, the borders were closed, flights stopped operating and human movement was restricted because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The researchers were forced to adapt new methods of data collection. The remotely administered audio-visual techniques became quite popular. In social sciences, the usage of the computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) and the computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) increased remarkably during that period. As a researcher, I also altered my data collection methodology adapting the new normal of the pandemic atmosphere.

There were several different channels to help me to reach the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Denmark, and Spain. International organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) specialized in refugee related issues and situations; civil society led initiatives helping the refugees; Syrian cultural associations; human rights groups; and social media platforms gathering Syrians together served as a great bridge connecting the Syrian refugees and me as a researcher. As per the countries, for Turkey: Building Bridges for Refugee Children civil initiative helped me to get in touch with Syrian refugees participating in their projects; for Denmark: I express my enormous gratitude to the Danish Refugee Council which assisted me to connect with Finjan – a local Syrian civil society organization operating in Denmark. Unlike Turkey and Denmark, I could not receive any reply to my messages from any organization in Spain. Yet, I found a Facebook group named “Sirios en España” and published a note in Spanish explaining the research and my kind request for looking for volunteers. Using the snowball sampling, I managed to recruit 26 participants at total: 9 participants (9 questionnaire responses, 7 biographical interviews) in Turkey; 9 participants (9 questionnaire responses, 8 biographical interviews) in Denmark; 8 participants (6 questionnaire responses, 8 biographical interviews) in Spain.

The participation in the research was absolutely voluntary. The questionnaire forms were provided in English with their translations into Arabic. The in-depth biographical interviews were conducted in several different languages. The participants could directly speak to the researcher either in Turkish, English, or Spanish. However, for the participants who would like to speak in Arabic, the interviews were facilitated by an Arabic interpreter. In order to inform well the refugees about the project, I prepared a detailed research

information sheet²³ (along with its Arabic translation) presenting the research purposes, possible outcomes, what would happen if they participated in the research, and I also included the contact information of the Doctoral School, researcher, and supervisor in case they would like to clarify any questions, doubts and/or hesitation prior to taking part in the research. The consent form for the participation²⁴ and the research questionnaire form²⁵ (along with their Arabic translations) were digitalized via Google forms. The initial plan was to distribute the forms and followingly conduct the biographical interviews. However, some participants disclaimed that they had trust issues, therefore they did not want to leave something filled by them behind and opted out completing the questionnaire forms. On the other hand, some participants who could not speak in the languages of the researcher (neither Turkish, nor English or Spanish), decided not to take part in the in-depth biographical interviews which would be assisted by the Arabic interpreter due to their concerns about privacy.

The in-depth biographical interviews were conducted in various platforms by adjusting the participants' preferences mostly taking place in Zoom / WhatsApp / Messenger. In order to acquire accurate, sincere responses, and provide the most credible results as possible, researchers constantly strive to build trustworthy connections with their respondents.²⁶ In order to gain the participants' trust, I tried to be as transparent as possible. Before starting the interviews, I presented myself and the research in a detailed way and gave them a room to clarify anything on their mind regarding myself and the research itself. Both before conducting the research and during the interviews, the participants were informed about that the data obtained through forms and interviews would be strictly kept confidential; each and every participant who took part in would remain anonymised and the pseudonyms would be used in order to identify them throughout the research.

During the in-depth biographical interviews, the past, present, and future of the participants tried to be understood. Therefore, three semi-structured in-depth questions²⁷ were asked to the interviewees in order to gain these perspectives. All the interviews were recorded digitally and ensured to be secured in a password protected computer and mobile phone.

²³ Please find it in the Appendix No.1.

²⁴ Please find it in the Appendix No.2.

²⁵ Please find it in the Appendix No.3.

²⁶ I. Van Liempt, V. Bilger, "Ethical Challenges in Research with Vulnerable Migrants", in C. Vargas-Silva (ed.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012, p.461.

²⁷ Please see Appendix No.3.

1.3.3. Data Analysis

In this research, the qualitative data analysis has been conducted in 5 steps:

- In the first step, all the recorded interviews were carefully listened to, and the transcriptions of each digital audio-visual items were undertaken by the researcher. Each and every transcript were printed and classified according to the corresponding country. In order to ensure the privacy and keep the data confidential, the real names of the participants were replaced with pseudonyms, by this way the privacy was enhanced. The replies of the questionnaire forms and the interview transcriptions were matched as per the respondents to bring all the data together.
- In the second step, the files combining the interview transcriptions and questionnaire answers were reviewed and analysed based on the aim of the research. The data sets were arranged by applying the qualitative data coding. In order to find the common themes and patterns, the data was categorized and labelled with key words.
- In the third step, the acquired data was analysed by grouping the data into classifications and topics. The data was controlled according to the codes, categories, and themes of the research and interpreted within the framework of research purposes.
- In the fourth step, the theoretical research findings were identified after processing the data. The relevant parts of the interviews were quoted to exemplify and support the research findings.
- In the final step, the research conclusion was drawn, and recommendations were provided to solve some practical and theoretical problems regarding the research topic.

CHAPTER II: MIGRATION (THEORITICAL PART I)

*Like many birds, but unlike most other animals, humans are a migratory species.*²⁸

Massey et al.

2. MIGRATION

2.1.1. The Concept of Migration

Whenever the core subject is the human beings, the concept should cover almost all the aspects of life. Human mobility has demonstrated this fact clearly during the history. Migration has affected the individuals as well as communities in terms of social, economic, political, psychological, cultural dimensions to a certain extent. Migration is a dynamic process; push and pull factors, reasons, and consequences, causes and effects which trigger the individual to move can change from person to person. Since everybody is sui generis, each and every migration movement throughout the history has had its own uniqueness. Even though the triggers to leave the point of origins are similar for the same group of migrants, their migration experience can differ from one another depending on where, when, and how they immigrated to the point of destination eventually. Therefore, it is not easy to draw a clear-cut definition for migration. Until today, the concept of migration has been defined by crosscutting as well as different disciplines (such as anthropology, sociology, demography, economy, geography, political sciences, psychology, and history, etc.); applying a wide range of methodology, by a great number of scholars all over the world but predominantly by the North America and Europe.²⁹ This fact is significant evidence which reflects the interdisciplinary nature of migration. Considering the fact that the main elements namely persons, states, geographies, cultures, and policies shape the migration experience, it is hard to create a globally accepted description of migration. Consequently, there is not unanimously agreed definition of migration term.³⁰ Taking into account the current patterns and trends in migration, it is not possible to comprehend the complex and multifaceted nature of migration thoroughly if the tool kit of solemnly one discipline is used neglecting a variety

²⁸ Massey et al., *Worlds in Motion Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.1.

²⁹ A. Pisarevskaya et al., 'Mapping Migration Studies: An Empirical Analysis of the Coming of Age of a Research Field', *Migration Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2020, p. 457.

³⁰ J. I. Clarke, *Population Geography*, 2nd edn., Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1972, p.130.

of perspective, levels and assumptions.³¹ Therefore, the concept of migration has been defined by many disciplines, and there is a considerable number of studies explaining it on the literature.

The phenomenon of migration became a theme for scholars for the first time in the late 19th century when the commercialization of agriculture, industrialization and urbanization caused immense number of population movements from rural to urban regions.³² Although the first studies of migration field was launched right after the Industrial Revolution, changing political conjunctures, socio-economic tendencies, occurring events (natural disasters, conflicts, wars etc.) have led researchers to produce a wide range of migration related research topics until now. Each discipline put an effort to define the complexity of migration. Therefore, the literature is quite rich with the definition of migration, and there are several common points which emphasised the same notions. Moving from one place to another, crossing frontiers, residential changes and geographical shifts are highly used terms on the literature while defining the concept of migration.

The verb “to migrate” originally derived from the Latin word “migrare” and signifies “to change one’s residence, hence, to depart, even for another country.”³³ According to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, migration contains the (more or less) perpetual action of moving of persons or groups into new places or communities crossing the symbolic or political frontiers.³⁴

According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology, migration is done by changing a geographical location via passing a political border and this permanent residence change usually takes a year or more period of time. If the migration is realized within the same political border, for instance within the same neighbourhood, city, or county, then it refers to spatial mobility instead of internal migration. Therefore, all sort of migration is a clear example of spatial mobility, while all the examples of spatial mobility are not regarded as migration.³⁵

³¹ Massey et. Al, ‘Theories of International Migration: A review and Appraisal’, *Population and Development Review*, Vol.19, No.3, 1993, p. 432.

³² R. Cohen, ‘Introduction’, in Robin Cohen (ed.), *Theories of Migration*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p. xi.

³³E. Partridge, *Origins A Short Ethymological Dictionary of Modern English*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 1982.

³⁴ G. Marshall, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, Oxford/Newyork, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 329.

³⁵ B. S. Turner, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 384-385.

According to the Sage Dictionary of Sociology, migration stands for moving from one state to another, with the aim of residing. If people move for leaving the country, it refers to emigration; and if it is done for entering the country, then it is called as immigration. Taking this separation into account, the current usage of “migration” term developed during the modernization period, when the national frontiers were built, and the nation-states emerged. Otherwise, there would not be any definition difference as immigration or emigration, people could move around regardless of the national borders.³⁶

In the European Union (EU) context, migration is defined in two distant ways and both of which emphasizes the spatial change and minimum duration of time. In the first definition: a person who has been a usual resident in another EU member state or a third country, resides in a location within EU Member State territory, and stays there or is expected to stay there at minimum -12 months- period of time; in the second definition: a person who has been a usual resident in an EU Member State stops being a usual resident in that particular EU Member State for at least or expected to be minimum of 12 months period of time.³⁷ Considering the two definitions, it is visible that the change of location either within the EU or outside and duration of the residency forms the two main norms of migration term within the EU context.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) states that “migration is moving away from the place of individual’s regular residence, within the same country or by crossing an international border.”³⁸ The IOM refers that the action of moving from a location is migrating no matter how far the distance is: it can be “from a rural area to an urban place, from one district or province to another within the same country, or from one state to a different state”.³⁹

It is clear in all definitions that migration stands for a person’s mobility from one place to another during a particular duration of time; yet, there is not any consensus on definition regarding how far the distance and how long the duration should be to be counted as migration.⁴⁰ Especially with the recent developments on transportation and

³⁶ S. Bruce and S. Yearley, *The Sage Dictionary of Sociology*, London, Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 197-198.

³⁷ European Commission, *Asylum and Migration Glossary 6.0 A Tool for Better Comparability Produced by the European Migration Network May 2018*. Brussels, European Commission, European Migration Network, 2018, p. 255.

³⁸ International Organization for Migration, *International Migration Law Glossary on Migration Number 34*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2019a, p. 137.

³⁹ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2019b, p. 29.

⁴⁰ P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, and V. Robinson, *Exploring Contemporary Migration*, 1st edn., London, Routledge, 1998, p. 34.

communication facilities, the once-off human mobility which ends up with a permanent residence has changed its characteristic that now people are more prone to stop in more than one destination and replace their residence over another one.⁴¹ Nevertheless, migration is not a merely a change of residential place over an act of movement within a certain duration of time and between particular distance. The mobility of human population from one place to another is quite dynamic and it has its own complexity. According to Boyle et. al., this process of shifting people from one place to another can have a considerable impact on several dimensions:

- Migration has a cultural character. Not only migrants themselves, but also the destinations they immigrate get affected by this notion and the cultural impact can be visible on art, media and through the common-sense practices of daily life.
- Migration has a psychological perspective. Moving from one place to another can raise migrant's expectation too high and/or cause an extremely stressful experience for the migrant and this massive change in life can bring existential motivation and/or traumas.
- Migration has economic impacts. The remittances sent by the immigrants are still a great reliance for most of the national economies; contrarily, while some others accuse immigrants to be the reason of high unemployment levels on market in certain countries.
- Migration has a political importance. Migration is at the heart of the current topics not only on the internal politics but also at the international political arena.
- Migration has a spatial aspect. Migration happens across space, therefore drawing, measuring, and scaling the migration patterns is highly significant.⁴²

In a world where the new technologies in the means of communication and media emerge and expand quickly, “‘time’ has ceased, ‘space’ has vanished and we now live in a global village”.⁴³ This fact has increased the people's level of awareness and curiosity about the world and along with the communication and transportation facilities, the movement of people has been highly eased. “In this global village, people are constantly moving across

⁴¹ M. Borkert and R. Penninx, 'Policymaking in the field of migration and integration in Europe: An introduction', in G. Zincone, R. Penninx, M. Borkert (eds.), *Migration Policymaking in Europe The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, p. 8.

⁴² P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, and V. Robinson, *op.cit.*, p.5.

⁴³ M. McLuhan, Q. Fiore, *The Medium is the Massage An Inventory of Effects*, California, Gingko Press, 2005, p.63.

borders and engaging in international exchange.”⁴⁴ Over the past few decades, while globalization and transnationalism widens, deepens, and speeds up, more and more people have started to live outside of their birthplaces. There have been several factors which triggered the emigration and immigration to gain momentum. One of these factors can be noted as the speedy increase on the world population, yet it does not grow equally in each and every state on earth. The population size of the developed countries has been shrinking since they have a low fertility/birth rate, hence the population is ageing, and this results in the decrease of number of the labour force.⁴⁵ According to the UN, the remedy for the population decline and population ageing is the replacement migration, by which it indicates that receiving the international migration would reduce the effect of ageing population and diminish the fall of the working age population.⁴⁶

Although on the previous studies the concept of migration has been usually associated with the terms of development, labour market or brutal conflicts, there can be also a variety of ecological, socio-economic or political reasons to force or voluntarily make people decide to move.⁴⁷ These trigger factors are quite various and mostly related to the contemporary social issues: ethnicity, religion, language related socio-cultural situations, looking for better living standards, the gap between the global South and global North, fleeing instable social, political, economic and ecological incidents, seeking for a dignified life condition which respects to the human rights can be counted as such.⁴⁸ During the 19th century, state formation and nation-building were predominant concepts in the world political order (in fact, some states exchanged their nationals beyond borders to create a nation state after World War I); however, conversely in today’s world, state dissolution, state failure and internal war pave the way for migration.⁴⁹ Whatever the reason is, people have always been adopted

⁴⁴ S. Lui, Z. Volcic, C. Gallois, *Introducing Intercultural Communication Global Cultures and Contexts*, London, Sage, 2011, p. 4.

⁴⁵ G. Marois, A. Belanger, and W. Lutz, ‘Population aging, migration, and productivity in Europe’, *PNAS*, Vol.117, No.14, 2020, p. 1.

⁴⁶ United Nations, *Replacement Migration: Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations Publications, 2001, p. 7.

⁴⁷ A. Monsutti, ‘The Contribution of Migration Studies and Transnationalism to The Anthropological Debate: A Critical Perspective’, in C. Audebert, M. K. Dorai (eds.), *Migration in a Globalised World New Research Issues and Prospects*, Amsterdam University Press, 2010, p. 107.

⁴⁸ T. Faist, *The Transnationalized Social Question Migration and the Politics of Social Inequalities in the Twenty-First Century*, 1st edn., New York, Oxford University Press, 2019, p.1.

⁴⁹ T. Faist, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3.

migration as “one of the most important survival strategies” whenever they encounter with a natural or human-made danger.⁵⁰

According to Castles, Haas and Miller, the traditional migration models still exist in new forms all over the world; yet the new flows are emerging as a result of the economic, political, and cultural developments as well as brutal clashes and wars. In spite of the heterogeneity, it is still possible to divide the general tendencies into 6 categories which are classified as follows:

1. “*The globalization of migration*”: International migration become an important phenomenon for all globe and the number of the countries which are affected by it are increasing day by day. Furthermore, the immigration countries are prone to accept more and more immigrants coming from different source countries with a wide range of economic, social, and cultural backgrounds.
2. “*The changing direction of dominant migration flows*”: Until the World War II, Europe served as the major emigration centre, people were moving to other territories to conquer, colonize and reside in. This fact changed in the opposite way in 1950s and nowadays Europe is at the heart of the immigration destinations of all over the world. There is an increase on South-North migration and the Gulf Region is becoming a magnetic point for the global migrant workers.
3. “*The differentiation of migration*”: There is not any country which embraces only one type of migration. One country can have different migration types at once. No matter how hard the governments try to prevent or cease the migration, one type of migration generally gives a place for other type of migration (e.g., Labour migration usually continues with family reunification).
4. “*The proliferation of migration transition*”: Countries which are traditionally known as the emigration countries can transform into immigration countries. Transit countries tend to turn into immigration places such as Turkey and Spain, while immigration countries can become emigration countries such as Latin America.
5. “*The feminization of labour migration*”: For a long period of time, labour migration was realized by male, while females usually migrated via family reunification. Since the 1960s, women have become a pioneer on labour migration and their visibility on migration has improved immensely.

⁵⁰ G. Hugo, ‘Environmental Concerns and International Migration’, *The International Migration Review*, Vol.30, No.1, Special Issue: Ethics, Migration, Global Stewardship, 1996, p. 105.

6. “*The growing politicization of migration*”: International migration causes states to change their internal politics, make bilateral and regional cooperation as well as strengthen their national security policies. This is what makes the time we live as the age of migration.⁵¹

It is perfectly possible to observe all the above-mentioned tendencies in today’s migration flows. Nevertheless, the world keeps changing in each and every minute and new developments occur on the world’s economy, political arena, and social structure in line with the changes. It is sine qua non that these contemporary changes will lead to emerge new migration tendencies as the world keeps turning.

In this thesis, the concept of migration will be investigated in the triangle of States, international organizations, and individuals’ relationship. As previously mentioned, there is not any universally and unanimously agreed definition of migration. Each State has its own history of migration and acquires different migration experiences while every individual creates his/her unique migration story. Therefore, it can be easily said that there is not any canonized definition or unified concept in this either. This “independency” on the concept and definition of migration in States and individuals can be seen in the international level, as well. Consequently, in the absence of any universal consensus on how to define the concept of migration or unanimously agreed definition of it in the triangle of international relations, it has been a necessity to make a conceptual overview of the social sciences to determine which of them is applicable to this research.

2.1.2. The Theories of Migration

The history of migration dates back to the creation of the first human-being. Although it is one of the oldest phenomena that humanity possesses, systematic analysis of the theme only started in the 19th century. There is not any common, unifying migration theory which is accepted by everyone, yet all the existing theories are fragmented set of theories and evolved separately from one another.⁵² Nevertheless, none of the theories claims to explain the migration with its all aspects, and the existing theories are subsidiary for each other instead of being an alternative for one another.⁵³

⁵¹ S. Castles, H. de Haas, and M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 5th edn., London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 16-17.

⁵² Massey et. al. (1993), op.cit., p. 432.

⁵³ A. İduygu, S. Erder, Ö. F. Genkaya (eds.), *Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Gö Politikaları, 1923-2023: Ulus-devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere*, Ko Üniversitesi Gö Araştırmaları Merkezi, İstanbul, 2014, p.45.

Until today, given to its extremely complex and multi-dimensional nature, different disciplines ranging from demography, geography, economics, statistics, sociology, political science, or even advanced methods of theoretical physics suggested several hypothesis, analysis, models, and conceptualization to explain the theory of migration.⁵⁴ Brettell and Hollifield states that in the social sciences, it is important to start with a question. Even though the researchers use the similar data sets, the interpretation of the data may vary depending on the formulation of the questions. Although they are analysing the same concept, the answers tried to be found can be quite far from each other since the questions are rather divergent. Therefore, it is possible to construct a dialogue between migration researchers across disciplines via this matrix:⁵⁵

Discipline	Research Question(s)	Levels/Units of Analysis	Dominant Theories	Sample Hypothesis
Anthropology	How does migration effect cultural change and affect ethnic identity?	More micro/ individuals, households, groups	Relational or structuralist and transnational	Social networks help maintain cultural difference.
Demography	How does migration affect population change?	More macro/ populations	Rationalist (borrows heavily from economics)	Immigration increases the birth rate.
Economies	What explains the propensity to migrate and its effects?	More micro/individuals	Rationalist: cost-benefit and push-pull	Incorporation depends on the human capital of immigrants.
History	How do we understand the immigrant experience?	More micro/ individuals and groups	Eschews theory and hypothesis testing	Not applicable
Law	How does the law influence migration?	Macro and micro/ the political and legal system	Institutionalist and rationalist (borrows from all the social sciences)	Rights create incentive structures for migrants.
Political Science	Why do states have difficulty controlling migration?	More macro/ political and international systems	Institutionalist and rationalist	States are often captured by pro-immigrant interests.
Sociology	What explains immigrant incorporation?	More macro/ ethnic groups and social class	Structuralist and/or functionalist	Immigrant incorporation is dependent on social capital.

⁵⁴ J. Bijak, *Forecasting International Migration: Selected Theories, Models and Methods*, Working Paper 4, Central European Forum for Migration Research, Warsaw, 2006, p.3.

⁵⁵ C. B. Brettell, J. F. Hollifield (eds.), *Migration Theory Talking across Disciplines*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 3.

Source: C. B. Brettell, J. F. Hollifield (eds.), *Migration Theory Talking across Disciplines*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 3.

It is also clear from the Table 1 that no independent research methodology or explanatory principle has emerged in sphere of international relations, because the methods and aspects of other disciplines are applied in the various fields of international cooperation.

The theories of migration can be analysed in micro, meso, and macro levels. According to Parnwell, in the micro-level analysis, it is intended to understand the factors which trigger persons to depart from their place of origin, moreover for what reason and under which conditions the migration decision taken is investigated; while in the meso-level analysis, social and economic conditions of the origin country and the destination country are compared, and in the macro-level analysis, the effect of migration to several various areas is evaluated.⁵⁶ According to Faist, the micro-level analysis concentrates on the “individual decision making” on migration, however, these individual decisions are not always taken freely and autonomously in the cases of some refugees, contract workers, their children and spouses.⁵⁷ It is important to note that the macro level analysis contains very much diverse dimensions to investigate including emigrant and immigrant nation-states, international system, administrative capacity, political stability and so on, while the meso-level analysis locates in between micro and macro level analysis and puts the relations and resources of the individual with larger groups, organization, social movements and institutions into center.⁵⁸

Since the 19th century, various theories have analysed migration with different perspectives. It is significant to underline here that migration has a dynamic and variable character; therefore, the theories of migration are prone to change according to political, economic, and social processes within time and global tendencies.

According to Erbaş, migration is a progressive process and there is a rich variety of migration models, for this reason, it is difficult to create one migration theory and stick with it for all the analysis on the different migration types. However, it is still possible to develop some theories based on the analytical studies on the field. And when we look deep into these theories, we can clearly see how the migration comprehension changes according to the modern and postmodern understandings:

⁵⁶ M. Parnwell, *Population Movements and The Third World*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 75.

⁵⁷ T. Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 75-78

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

<i>Table 2: Modern and Postmodern Scientific Perspective and Migration</i> ⁵⁹	
<i>Modernism/Positivism</i>	<i>Postmodernism</i>
Migration is an accomplished fact; therefore, it is an empirical reality which can be understood easily with its all aspects.	Migration is not an accomplished fact and an empirical reality which can be understood easily with its all aspects, instead it is a continuous process.
Migration always occurs in similar ways and happens with similar reasons.	Migration occurs in different ways and happens for different reasons.
The reasons of migration are various, and these reasons can be determinable.	The reasons of migration are extremely various; therefore, it is too complex to determine them.
The groups of migration are homogeneous, and their way of migration is similar.	The groups of migration are heterogeneous, and their way of migration is very much diverse.
The differences which can be observed in a specific historical moment are temporary.	What needs to be done is to determine the differences about migration.
Instead of differences, the similarities should be underlined and emphasized.	The differences should be underlined and emphasized.
Migration can be explained/theorized with just one theory.	Theorization is not possible in the field of migration. It is only possible to make explanations within the framework of the analysed case.
De facto macro-level suggestions can be provided in the conclusion.	Only specific evaluations can be made within the framework of the studied case in the conclusion.

Source: H. Erbaş, *Gidişlerden Kaçışlara Göç ve Göçmenler: Kuram Yöntem ve Alan Yazıları*, Phoenix Yayınları, Ankara, 2019, p. 141.

Until today, migration has been theorized by various disciplines, under different categories, at ranging levels (micro-meso-macro), based on distinct classifications. Each theory developed in isolation from one another, and there is a significant divergence “in their level of analysis as well as paradigmatic and thematic orientation.”⁶⁰ However, the common perspective of these theories is generally focused on the factors which shape the decisions of the individuals about their possible movement.⁶¹ According to Hagen-Zanker, when a migrant takes a migration decision, this decision generally not only affects migrant’s himself or herself but also their families, what is more, each decision comes with costs and benefits and their act of migration brings some influences on decision-making processes of future migrants and economic development of the origin and destination countries.⁶² She compiled a general framework of migration decision making in several levels which can be seen below:


⁵⁹ Translated by the author. For the original source please check: H. Erbaş, *Gidişlerden Kaçışlara Göç ve Göçmenler: Kuram Yöntem ve Alan Yazıları*, Phoenix Yayınları, Ankara, 2019, p. 141.

⁶⁰ H. de Haas, *Migration and Development: A theoretical Perspective*, COMCAD Working Papers No.29, Bielefeld, p. 9.

⁶¹ I. Gordon, ‘Modelling Approaches to Migration and Labour Market’, in T. Champion, T. Fielding (eds.), *Migration Processes and Patterns: Research Progress and Prospects*, Belhaven Press, London, 1992, p.119.

⁶² J. Hagen-Zanker, *Why do people migrate? A review of theoretical literature*, MGSOG Working Papers 2, Maastricht, 2008, pp.18-20.

Table 3: A general framework of migration decision-making



Source: J. Hagen-Zanker, *Why do people migrate? A review of the theoretical literature*, MGSOG Working Papers 2, Maastricht, 2008, p. 19.

It is true that each migration decision is encouraged or triggered by a reason. As these reasons are quite diverse, the variety of migration type also gets very rich. This fact has a direct effect on creating a definition of migrant as well as producing a migration theory. As previously emphasized, many scholars have contributed a lot to theorize the phenomenon of migration under many different disciplines and even some has recently tried to merge all the theories with an attempt to umbrella them under “a comprehensive, contextualised and

integrated theorisation of human mobility”.⁶³ There are a number of migration theories in the literature to be used as a tool in the analysis. In the following section, some of the migration theories will be explained in a more detailed way. These theories are specifically selected in order to explain and understand the migration process of Syrian refugees and their current situation.

2.1.2.1. “The Laws of Migration” by Ravenstein

The very first theory of migration in the history of migration studies belongs to a geographer, Ernst Georg Ravenstein by his famous work *the Laws of Migration* published for the first time in the Journal of the Statistical Society. There were many factors which inspired Ravenstein to develop his theory. First of all, the period when he prepared his theory was under the overwhelming influence of the demographic changes of the 19th century England. After the industrial revolution, the life was changed significantly both in the individual and social level. The factories emerged, railways facilitated the transportation, the economies of scale diversified, hence many people left their homes in order to find new job opportunities, a better life condition or to get away from the unbearable situations back at their place of origin.⁶⁴ The internal population movement was so intensive that only during the second half of the 19th century, 4 million people emigrated from the rural areas of England and Wales, more interestingly 3 millions of whom immigrated to urban cities.⁶⁵ In a time like this, Ravenstein took his motivation from Dr. William Farr to draft the laws of migration stating that “*It was a remark of the late Dr. William Farr, to effect that migration appeared to go on without any definitive law, which first directed my attention to a subject...*”⁶⁶ Ravenstein aimed to form the “laws” of migration and by doing this, he also referred to determine the “principles” and “rules” of migration.⁶⁷

Ravenstein published two articles about the laws of migration: one in 1885 and the other one in 1889. In the first article, he presented his theory in seven points:

⁶³ H. de Haas, ‘A theory of migration: the aspirations-capabilities framework’, *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol.9, No.8, 2021, p. 31.

⁶⁴ J. Corbett, *Ernest George Ravenstein The Laws of Migration 1885*, CSISS Classics, 2003, p.1.

⁶⁵ J. Long, ‘Rural-Urban Migration and Socioeconomic Mobility in Victorian Britain’, *Journal of Economic History*, Vol.65, No.1, 2005, p.2.

⁶⁶ E. G. Ravenstein, *The Laws of Migration*, *Journal of the Statistical Society*, Vol. 48, No: 2, 1885, p.167.

⁶⁷ D. B. Grigg, E. G. Ravenstein and the “laws of migration”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 3, No.1, 1977, p. 42.

1. The vast majority of people migrate within a short distance. This movement has an impact on the population because of the fact that it causes further migration. By being displaced and/or forced to shift their places, people tend to go in the direction of the places which are in the heart of the commerce and industry where the migrant absorption is highly achievable.
2. As a result of this population shift, the rural areas are left with work force gaps. These gaps are filled with the migrants coming from more remote districts. Step by step it demonstrates a domino effect and this migratory movement end up with creating “currents of migration” throughout the country.
3. The process of dispersion goes in the reverse direction of absorption and shows the same characteristics. The absorption of migration happens in the developed, urban, and industrial places; however, the dispersion goes in the opposite way.
4. Every main current of migration generates a compensating counter-flow. This means that every country which receives immigration has a potential to give the same scale of emigration.
5. The people who immigrate to long distances usually prefer to move to one of the most alluring commercial or industrial areas.
6. The local people of towns rarely immigrate compared to those in the country’s rural areas.
7. More women migrates than men.⁶⁸

Ravenstein released his second article in 1889 again with the same title as “the Laws of Migration”. In this new article, Ravenstein extended his research, diversified the country cases, and added some new comments to his previous study. In the opening, he emphasized that the laws of migration is engaged with the human agency therefore, it should not be expected the same rigidity of physical laws.⁶⁹ According to him, additional to which were mentioned in the first article, “bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation)” also contribute a lot to the currents of migration; however, the migration flows triggered by these reasons cannot be compared in volume with the ones who hit the road in order to satisfy

⁶⁸ E. G. Ravenstein, *op.cit.*, pp. 198-199.

⁶⁹ E. G. Ravenstein, The Law of Migration, *Journal of The Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1889, p. 241.

their will to find better conditions in economic sense.⁷⁰ Ravenstein believes that “migration means life and progress; a sedentary population stagnation.”⁷¹

It has been more than a century that Ravenstein published his pioneering theory of “Laws of Migration”. Since then, the “currents of migration” have transformed and diversified in a significant way, and today “the Laws of Migration” is open to discussion. Nevertheless, there are still some “rules” of Ravenstein which can be observed in the recent Syrian migration flow. Ravenstein mentioned that people can be forced to migrate out of negative reasons such as compulsion, oppressive laws, and bad treatment. And he also emphasized that people tend to migrate in short distance. When the Syrian Civil War caused an unprecedented number of displacements, people sought a shelter initially according to geographical proximity namely Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Ravenstein highlighted that people who migrate long distance, generally go to the centres of the commerce and industry. And in the Syrian migration flow, the ones who preferred to seek a shelter in further locations which turned out to be European countries, majorly went to or intended to go to the Northern European countries where the industrialization is high, economic wellbeing is sustained and welfare regime is set. Even in the distribution of the number of Syrians to the cities within a country, it can be easily seen that people prefer to live in the big cities (if not they want to change their location to the big ones) where they can find wider job opportunities and maintain a better life standard.

2.1.2.2. “A Theory of Migration”- Push and Pull Factors

Everett S. Lee is the founder of the theory of “push and pull factors” which has widely been cited, developed, contributed, and extended over the years by the other scholars in the field of migration studies. In 1966, Lee published his well-known work “*A theory of Migration*” where he mentioned the push and pull factors throughout the article in the journal called *Demography*. In the introduction, Lee emphasized that although there was a dozen of studies concentrating on various topics such as age and migration, sex and migration, race and migration, education and migration etc. during the last hundred years, not a brand-new migration theory was proposed by the scholars; instead, all the produced works referred to “the Laws of Migration” by Ravenstein and very few of them criticized it.⁷² For this reason,

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.286.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.288.


⁷² E. S. Lee, *A Theory of Migration, Demography*, Vol. 3, No.1, 1966, p. 48.

on the one hand Lee provided a new theory of migration in his “A Theory of Migration”; on the other hand, he also evaluated the “The Laws of Migration” by Ravenstein.⁷³

Lee states that the aim of his article is to determine a general framework by which the various spatial movements are explained with small, clear, and self-evident propositions in order to analyse and concluded about the volume of migration, development of the migration flows and counterflows and the characteristics of migrants. According to him, the definition of migration is not limited with certain restrictions, in other words, permanent or semipermanent residence change, voluntary or involuntary movement, internal or external migration, short distance or long-distance act of moving can be referred as migration. The only exclusion shall be the perpetual migration of nomads and migratory workers, as a matter of course, there is not any long-term residency for them.⁷⁴

According to Lee, there are four main headlines which have an influence on the decision-making process of the migrants and their initiatives to take the first steps of migration: “1. Factors associated with the area of origin, 2. Factors associated with the area of destination, 3. Intervening obstacles, 4. Personal Factors.”⁷⁵ These are the primary elements of the push and pull factors which determines the framework and the components of Lee’s theory of migration.

Table 4: Origin and Destination Factors and Intervening Obstacles in Migration



Source: E. S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, *Demography*, Vol. 3, No.1, 1966, p.50.

⁷³ A. Narayanamoorthy, A. Jyotishi, R.S. Despande, Agricultural Growth and Migration: Search for New Evidence, *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Vol.54, No:3, 1999, p. 403.

⁷⁴ E. S. Lee, *op.cit.*, p.49.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.50.

On the chart, Lee illustrated the first tree components of his theory showing the push and pull factors over the individual's decision-making for migration. These factors are divided into 3 and shown as positive (+), negative (-) and indifferent (o) in the diagram. Positive (+) sign represents the pull factors while negative (-) sign indicates the push factors, and indifferent (o) sign stands for the factors which does not have any effect on migration. Just as two polars of a magnet, positive factors of the migration destination which encourage people to immigrate named after as pull factors (+), negative factors in the place where people live and motive them to emigrate is categorized as push factors (-). These factors can be different in personal level and might change from person to person: for instance, a prospective migrant-family with a child finds migration attractive if there is a good school system, while a prospective migrant-family with no children might find it repulsive due to the high real estate taxes. And it does not mean anything for the unmarried male without taxable property which corresponds to indifference.⁷⁶ It is important to note that both the origin and destination areas have their own push and pull factors and the push and pull factors exist together in each case. Another point Lee emphasized is that between the origin and destination areas, there are intervening obstacles which should be included into the migration analysis. These obstacles can be distance, physical barriers, or immigration law. Last but not least, personal factors also have an influence on the decision-making process of an individual. Personal sensitivities, intelligence, awareness of the conditions at origin and at destination, personal contacts, sources of information, personalities can be counted as personal factors to affect the decision of migration.⁷⁷

The Theory of Migration by Lee is still valid in today's world and can be used to understand the logic behind many migration movements. The most recent migration example namely Syrian mass migration can also be analysed within the framework of push and pull factors. The negativities at the origin area such as conflict, war, instability have served as push factors and caused people to emigrate. Security, stability, welfare, access to education, health services, investment possibilities at the destination areas have acted as pull factors for Syrians to immigrate to the countries in the geographical proximity such as Turkey and beyond like European countries.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

2.1.2.3. Network Theory

The network theory explains the relationship ties between migrants, former migrants and non-migrants, and claims that these ties bind them within a web where they get a feedback mechanism in the origin and the destination places. When a prospective migrant takes a migration decision, there is generally an information flow, knowledge and experience sharing with the ones who immigrated beforehand. This creates an interpersonal network between people which later facilitates the migration process as well as integration stages such as employment.

Boyd argues that interpersonal relations have a significant effect on lives of individuals, families, and households. Hence, examining networks, especially those associated with families and households, enables comprehension of migration as a social outcome; this is not only attributed to individual choices, nor is it exclusively influenced by economic or political factors, instead it emerges from the interplay of all these elements.⁷⁸

According to Abadan, migrant relationship network is a web stemming from common roots, kinship, friendship between the migrants, prospective migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination places. This network encourages people to migrate but also it is a social capital when people have a problem to solve or get some help in case of searching for a job.⁷⁹

According to Gurak and Caces, a migrant network does not have to extremely be institutionalized and does not have a normative definition. Individuals belonging a network may not refer their relationship as a network nor utilize the term. Nevertheless, networks are not spontaneous nor temporary. Their relationship advances over time and grow bigger and bigger. Networks help to diminish the migration costs, enable to keep the links with the origin society, play a role to determine who migrates from communities and households, impact the selection of destination and origin areas, and assist the migrants' process of integration. They add that the most significant role of networks is to provide a short-term adaptive assistance to the newcomers such as finding an accommodation and maintain a general survival strategy. One of the limiting characteristics of the networks is that migrants do not have contact with the wider destination society. While the networks have a great

⁷⁸ M. Boyd, Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas, *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1989, p. 642.

⁷⁹ N. Abadan-Unat, *Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurttaşlığa*, 1st edn., İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 18.

influence on short-term adaptation, long-term integration is somehow restricted due to the fact that the migrants stay closed in the network communities.⁸⁰

Jeff Crips argues that there are important number of functions of the migrant networks and he summaries them in four categories: First of all, migrant networks serve as a significant source of information when it comes to “the transport arrangements, entry requirements, asylum procedures, social welfare benefits, as well as the detention and deportation policies of different destination states.” Secondly, migrant networks act as financial resources for the prospective migrants coming from the low or middle-income country. Third, migrant networks set an organizational infrastructure for people to enable them to migrate from one place to another especially in the case of irregular or clandestine migration. And finally, he states that migrant networks prepare subsistence and support for migrants (particularly entry into the labour market) once they arrive to the destination countries.⁸¹

The Network Theory can be used in the analysis of the Syrian refugee flows. Initially, migrant networks provided significant assistance on determining the route, the means of journey as well as transit and destination countries. Once they arrive the destined places, the existing networks supported and facilitated their adaptation. Their experience served as a model for many and other migrants from the network back in the origin places followed the example to reach the host countries. Nowadays, most of the host countries try to develop an integration strategy for them. On the analysis, it can be easily seen that Syrians tend to live within their network, in the same neighbourhood in a way of ghettoization. This fact clearly shows that in order to analyse and understand the mass migration from Syria and Syrians’ integration into the host countries, the Network Theory could be used to explain the migration process and the current situation.

2.1.3. The Types of Migration

Migration is not a new phenomenon since its beginning corresponds to the start of the humanity. For such a long period of time, it is inevitably true that migration has served enormously for the humanity and the civilization to develop throughout the years. Given the fact that it is quite a long history, until today, there have been various number of reasons

⁸⁰ D. T. Gurak, F. Caces, Migration Networks and Shaping of Migration Systems, *International Migration Systems: A Global Approach*, Routledge, London, pp. 151-154.

⁸¹ J. Crisp, *Policy Challenges of the New Diasporas: Migrant Networks and Their Impact on Asylum Flows and Regimes*, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.7, UNHCR Center for Documentation and Research, Geneva, 1999, pp. 5-6.

which cause or motivate people to move further. In order to understand and analyse better, these movements are classified in several different categories in the literature. These categories can be roughly listed as:

- Types of migration by destination: internal migration and international migration.
- Types of migration by legal status: regular migration and irregular migration.
- Types of migration based on will: voluntary migration and forced migration.

2.1.3.1. Types of migration by destination: Internal Migration and International Migration

2.1.3.1.1. Internal Migration

The types of migration by destination are determined by looking at if any border is passed while moving. This border crossing should be between cities, regions, countries, continents. If the movement is done within the domestic territory of the country, which can be moving from one neighbourhood to another and/or from one city to another, this is classified as internal migration. Internal migration is realized for the purpose or with the effect of obtaining a new residence within the country of origin.⁸² Internal migration does not cause serious changes on country demography, yet it changes the general characteristics of the areas where immigrated. Internal migration can be analysed as urban-urban, urban-rural, rural-urban migration. The urban-urban migration is the movement from one urban place to another one with the intention of employment while the urban-rural migration is done either for new residence purposes or as return migration of previous rural-urban migrants.⁸³ However, the most common example of the internal migration is the rural-urban migration which can be done short and longer distance movements of traders, pastoralists and agricultural workers usually as a result of “poverty, low agricultural incomes, low productivity, population growth, shortages, fragmentation and inequitable distribution of land, environmental degradation, and the relative lack of economic opportunities in rural areas.”⁸⁴

⁸² International Organization for Migration, *International Migration Law Glossary on Migration Number 25*, 2nd edn., Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011, p. 51.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.103.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

2.1.3.1.2. International Migration

International migration is a process of cross-border movement of persons who changes his or her country of usual residence.⁸⁵ An individual departs “from the country of origin, or country of habitual residence” and passes an international border in order to reside in another country either permanently or temporarily.⁸⁶ Although international migration has a cross-border nature, and states are interdependent on the migration policies, there is not any official international multilateral framework to regulate the international migration flows.⁸⁷ International migration consist of several different forms of migration movements such as labour migration, environmental migration, high skilled and business migration, forced migration and so on. According to Thomas Faist, international migration is not only about a permanent movement from one State to another one, rather it is multi-dimensional economic, political, cultural and demographic process which contains several links between two or more settings and multiple bonds of immigrants and remainders.⁸⁸ Hein de Haas argues that international migration has some costs and risks, needs knowledge and social network as well as compulsory aspirations.⁸⁹ According to him, the most significant trigger of the international migration is the global inequality of development opportunities.⁹⁰ Douglas S. Massey evaluates the forces that generate international migration in four categories: “1. *The structural forces in developing societies that promote emigration*; 2. *The structural forces in developed societies that attract immigrants*; 3. *the motivations, goals, and aspirations of the actors who respond to these forces by migrating internationally* and 4. *The social and economic structures that arise to connect areas out – and in–migration.*”⁹¹ However, international migration can be also associated with directly or indirectly to conflict; on the one hand it is perceived as a benign action against violence and destructivism, on the other hand, it may increase the perceptions about the security threats.⁹²

⁸⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration Revision 1*, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 58, New York, United Nations Publications, 1998, p. 9.

⁸⁶ International Organization for Migration, *International Migration Law Glossary on Migration*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2004, p.33.

⁸⁷ G. Toksöz, S. Erdoğan, S. Kaşka, *Türkiye’ye Düzensiz Emek Göçü ve Göçmenlerin İşgücü Piyasasındaki Durumları*, IOM International Organization for Migration, Ankara, 2012, p.11.

⁸⁸ T. Faist, *Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture*, WPTC-99-08, Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, University of Bremen, 1999, p. 14.

⁸⁹ H. De Haas, International Migration, Remittances and Development: myths and facts, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No.8, 2005, p. 1271.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ D. S. Massey, International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty- First Century: The Role of the State, *Population and Development Review*, Vol.25, No.2, 1999, pp: 303-304.

⁹² S. Castles, H. de Haas, and M. J. Miller, *op.cit.*, p.6.

2.1.3.2. Types of migration by legal status: Regular Migration and Irregular Migration

2.1.3.2.1. Regular Migration

Regular migration refers to the legal entry, legal stay, and legal departure of the individuals to a country. It is also known as facilitated migration which is supported by state policies and practices. In the regular migration, migration happens via recognized and legal channels. As long as a person crosses an international border in compliance with the law of the origin, transit, and destination countries and within the framework of the international agreements to which that States are parties, it is considered as regular migration. However, there are other elements needs to be taken into consideration on regular migration: apart from the fulfilling the migration laws of the countries, provision of safety, respect to human dignity and well-being of the migrants, mitigation of the risks should be maintained.⁹³

2.1.3.2.2. Irregular Migration

Irregular migration also known as clandestine migration is the type of migration that occurs by breaching the immigration requirements and regulations of the country of origin, transit, or destination. There is not any universally recognised definition of irregular migration. A person who crosses the border without complying with the obligatory legal steps and migrates ignoring the regular migration channels is evaluated within the framework of irregular migration.⁹⁴ However, there are mainly two categories of irregular migration: the first category defines the migrants who enter the country without the necessary authorization or documents (such as passport, visa etc.). The second category clarifies the migrants who violates the rules of stay and/or residence in the territory of a State.⁹⁵ Irregular migration generally leads the migrants to more vulnerable situations and make them to be abused physically, psychologically, economically, moreover it puts them in a dangerous position such as victim of smugglers, human trafficking, labour exploitation, sexual harassment.

⁹³ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p.191.

⁹⁴ International Organization for Migration (2004), *op.cit.*, p.34.

⁹⁵ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p. 117.

2.1.3.3. Types of migration based on will: Voluntary Migration and Forced Migration

2.1.3.3.1. Voluntary Migration

Voluntary migration is the type of migration that migrants themselves decide to move from their regular residence place to another place based on their own free will. The reason behind the movement can be anything such as: employment, family reunification, education, seeking better life conditions, etc. Voluntary migration usually occurs after some time of preparation and based on a migration plan. For instance, having the invitation letter, necessary legal documents such as passport and visa, accommodation upon arrival, place to work and so on. Migration with a preparation beforehand and based on a plan generally results in regular and economically beneficial migration. When the migration happens in a regular way, States can also get ready for migration process and migration becomes a benefit for all the parties. For example, with the labour migration, States provide workforce in the necessary industries while the migrants voluntarily build a new life path through economic gain for themselves as well as their origin countries via remittances. However, the voluntary migration can have negative effects on the origin countries. Well-educated and talented individuals especially in the developing countries migrate to much more developed countries in order to be deployed and this causes a great brain-drain in the origin countries.

2.1.3.3.2. Forced Migration

Forced migration is the movement of people who are exposed to threats to life and livelihood which can be caused by force, compulsion, coercion, natural or human-made dangers including disasters caused by the environment, starvation, chemical or nuclear energy or development initiatives.⁹⁶

According to Betts, people are faced with existential menaces and come across with obstacles in the society. There is a difficulty in enjoying the fundamental rights and liberties in the origin country and the State is unable to protect the individual and/or groups. Due to these facts, people tend to leave their countries. Forced migration is usually evaluated as political since people are forced to escape from being tried or confronting with conflict. In fact, in practice the reason behind the forced migration is affected by both political and economic facts.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ International Organization for Migration (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 25

International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p. 77.

⁹⁷ A. Betts, *Zorunlu Göç ve Küresel Politika*, Hece Yayınları, Ankara, 2017, pp. 14-18.

However, according to Bartram et. al the forced migration is quite complex and there are several categories to be defined so. The most typical example of the forced migration is displaced persons, asylum seekers or refugees who are exposed to violent threats such as conflicts and persecution. People who are left with no other choice but leave just because of being precluded from expressing their freedom of thought and faith as well as living free and equal according to their sexual orientation and gender identity are also listed among the forced migration categories. However, not in all cases people need to encounter with the danger of death to be evaluated among the forced migration. Sometimes people are forced to leave their places because of comparatively less violent reasons which affects their living standards significantly. They highlight that socio-economic processes which cause impoverishment maybe does not lead to death, but it extremely violates the living conditions of people. Environmental degradation, natural disasters, industrial accidents, pollution climate change, drought and global warming are also discussed to be examined as forced migration. Last but not least, sometimes the lives of people may be affected from some external structures and powers. For example, the development projects may occupy the places where the houses of migrants are located for a short period of time because of a reason such as dam construction. They stress that in such cases, people need to migrate to some other places. This can be also regarded as forced migration.⁹⁸

Castles argues that human trafficking across international boundaries, North-South inequality, and societal crises, last but not least economic factors which lead States to fail (since the failed economies give a room for “weak states, predatory ruling cliques and human rights abuse”) can be also categorized as forced migration reasons.⁹⁹

2.1.3.3.2.1. Refugee

The Geneva Convention was the first to establish the definition of a refugee in 1951. According to the Article 1 A (2) a refugee is a person who:

“owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the

⁹⁸ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *Göç Meselesinde Temel Kavramlar*, 2nd edn., Hece Yayınları, Ankara, 2019, pp. 152-156.

⁹⁹ S. Castles, Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation, *Sociology*, Vol. 37, No.1, pp: 15-17.

country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”¹⁰⁰

“1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” brought two limitations to definition of refugees. According to this convention, a person could be defined as refugee in case the event which forced him to migrate occurred before 1 January 1951 and the event took place in “Europe”. However, these two limitations regarding to the time and geography were omitted from the text in “the 1967 Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees”, and therefore the scope of the convention got universal. The current protocol should be applied by the States without giving any reservations in terms of time and geographical limitation. Nevertheless, the States who were parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention were entitled to keep the geographical limitations. Currently, geographic limitation for determining the status of refugee is applied by Congo, Madagascar, Monaco, and Turkey.

In order to maintain the enforcement of the convention by the party States, the United Nations established a refugee agency namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This is the primary and most global organization to remain responsible for ensuring the protection of refugees. However, the protection of refugees is provided and supported with several other legal documents. Some regional agreements were signed in order to secure the protection of refugees. The Organization of African Union adopted the “Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa” in 1969, the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama adopted “the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees” in 1984. At European level, the Council of Europe also adopted various instruments regarding the refugees: “the European Agreement on Abolition of Visas for Refugees 1959”, “Resolution 14 1967 on Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution”, “the European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees 1980”, “the Recommendation on the Protection of Persons Satisfying the Criteria in the Geneva Convention who are not Formally Refugees 1984”, “Dublin Convention 1990”, last but not least the Council of the European Union adopted the directive about “the qualification and status of refugees and persons who need international protection” in 2004. Apart from the international and regional legal documents, the protection of refugees is also supported by the international human rights law.

¹⁰⁰ 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1, A (2).

Although the term of refugee defines the people who needed to flee their own home and passed some international borders because of various reasons such as climate, aggression, and political conflict, with the emergence of the modern nation states it have become “a radically new form of homelessness”.¹⁰¹ Mostly, the movement of refugees is generated as a result of political conflicts in the failed nation-states, collapsed states and weak states. Even though, the conflicts are created with intervention of both internal and external forces, today the root causes of the overwhelming number of refugees come from the conflict zones where there is an external intervention.¹⁰² Refugees forced to migrate from depressed areas and search for a place to reach safety, security, access to opportunities and rewards; therefore, migration in the case of refugees can be regarded as “voting with their feet.”¹⁰³

2.1.3.3.2.2. Asylum Seeker

A person who is searching for international protection is defined as an asylum seeker. When an individual leaves their country of origin because of persecution, violence and/or breach of human rights, s/he arrives to another country to request for an international protection. This is the first necessary step towards having a refugee status. Their application of international protection is investigated by the authorities. During this examination period, the individual awaiting for the decision on their claim for refugee status in accordance with the relevant international and national instruments is named as asylum seeker.¹⁰⁴ The result of the application may end up with positive or negative decision. It is important to emphasize that each and every recognized refugee is an asylum seeker in the beginning, but not all the asylum seeker is given a guarantee to become a recognized refugee.¹⁰⁵ If the result is positive, the refugee status is granted to the applicant by the responsible authorities. In case the result is negative, the applicant must leave the country and may be expelled, if they are not given a permission to stay on humanitarian or other related bases.¹⁰⁶ Rejected asylum application generally gives a rise to “unregistered” or “illegal” migration.¹⁰⁷ Some scholars

¹⁰¹ M. R. Marrus, *The Unwanted European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985, p.4.

¹⁰² A. R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, S. Aguayo, *Escape From Violence Conflict and The Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, p. 230.

¹⁰³ M. Parnwell, *op.cit.*, p.77.

¹⁰⁴ International Organization for Migration (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁵ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p.14.

¹⁰⁶ International Organization for Migration (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, p.233.

argue that the definition of refugee on the 1951 Convention is not defined clear enough and does not correspond anymore the contemporary refugee movements comparing the ones following the Second World War, the UN definition requires to be a “political refugee”, but nowadays people flee because of civil conflicts, massive violations of human rights, foreign aggression, occupation, poverty, famine, disease and ecological disasters, therefore this leads many asylum seekers cannot be granted the refugee status.¹⁰⁸

2.1.3.3.2.3. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)

Internally displaced persons (IDP) are one of the mostly encountered type of forced migration. When persons or group of persons are forced to leave their habitual residence or obliged to flee their homes because of “armed conflicts, violence, violation of human rights, natural or human-made disasters”¹⁰⁹, they move around within the political border of their countries of origin instead of crossing an international border. Although today the IDPs are recognized by the United Nations, and several formal and informal international organizations, they do not have an internationally recognized status.¹¹⁰

Internal displacement is not a new phenomenon, it happens before the cross-border displacement takes place and it is usually associated with the refugee issue even though it has way different features and protection methods.¹¹¹ Although it has a quite a long history, for a long period of time the situations of the internally displaced persons remained unknown, and the international responses were not given until the end of 20th century.¹¹² The first initiative was launch in 1992 by the United Nations to create a legal and normative framework to protect the internally displaced persons. The legal and institutional frameworks for the IDPs were developed and in 1998 “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” were adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Commission with the goal of determining the “rights and guaranteeing their protection, assistance during displacement, during return or resettlement and reintegration”.¹¹³

The number of people internally displaced throughout the world is enormously rising each and every year. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the highest

¹⁰⁸ M. O’Neill, *Asylum, Migration and Community*, the Policy Press, Bristol, 2010, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p.109.

¹¹⁰ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, p.119.

¹¹¹ C. Phuong, *The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.2.

¹¹² A. Betts, *op.cit.*, p.22.

¹¹³ United Nations, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, UN DOC E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,6.

number in ten years with approximately 40.5 million new displacements took place in 2020 regardless of the fact that the global Covid-19 pandemic restricted the mobility, blocked data collection, and fear of infection discouraged people to seek shelter.¹¹⁴ Internally displaced persons can be forced to leave their habitual residences for several reasons including internal wars, conflicts, natural or human made disasters. Recently, uprisings such as the Arab Spring caused a lot of people to be displaced in the Middle East and North Africa. Syria is one of the countries with the greatest number of internally displaced people. Displacements not only cause people to lose their properties such as “homes, incomes and land but also cultural heritage, friendship and a sense of belonging to a particular place”¹¹⁵, while it affects the lives of individuals on a large scale ranging from “impoverishment, social isolation, exclusion from health, welfare and education provision, the breakdown of social relationships and support structures, and the undermining of authority structures and social roles.”¹¹⁶

According to Bartram et. al., borders are the symbols of belonging and protection and the IDPs are still within the political border of their countries of origins even though they are displaced from their regular residences. However, if the IDPs are not protected well enough and are not provided necessary aid by their own government, they can become the subject of international concern.¹¹⁷

2.1.4. International Migration Law

Since the ancient societies were isolated from each other because of the geographic and racial differences, there was not any common international interest just like today to bring them together in the past.¹¹⁸ With the rise of the modern States as the States gained sovereignty, the World order changed and the relations between the States as well as some subjects among them needed to be regulated within the legal framework. Despite the fact that it had been evolving for many centuries, the current form of international law is usually regarded to have started with the Peace of Westphalia 1648.¹¹⁹ The reason why the international law exists is to regulate the relations between States under the roof of “common

¹¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *GRID 2021 Internal Displacement in a Changing Climate*, Geneva, IDMC, 2021, p.3.

¹¹⁵ E. Mooney, The Concept of Internal Displacement and The Case for Internally Displaced Persons As A Category of Concern, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.3, 2005, p. 15.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, pp. 122-123.

¹¹⁸ D. J. Bederman, *Globalization and International Law*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 4.

¹¹⁹ A. Aust, *Handbook of International Law*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 3.

principles and rules”.¹²⁰ Previously known as “the Law of Nations”¹²¹ might be thought that it only governs the relations between the sovereign States, but in fact persons, relationships or transactions that spans national boundaries may be subjected to the international law.¹²²

According to Chetail, two important developments in the international legal system took place during the twentieth century: 1. There was an incredible increase on the international rules regarding almost every aspect of human activity; 2. There was a rise of new subjects for the application of international law, including people, international organisations, and multinational companies; nevertheless, States continues to be on the fundamental focus of the international law.¹²³ One of those subjects that the international law dealt with has been migration. In today’s world, the tie between the individual and State can take many different forms. Usually, the nation-State is in charge of shaping these ties. Very basically, in order to be defined as a State, some elements which should definitely be is a group of people who reside in the designated territory. And the designated territory is determined with border divisions putting the geographic and political boundaries for that population living in that territory. In other words, borders are the entities which separates the nation-States from one another. The debate over whether a person is a part of the State begins after they cross the border and enter nation-State’s territory. The concept of international migration has only emerged at this precise moment. It is the very same moment for a person which determines the form of status and core of membership that s/he will have with the State. All of this information is crucial to understand that the migration control has been closely linked to national sovereignty.¹²⁴ This represents a fundamental tenet of classical international law: a State has primary jurisdiction over its territory and people, and as such, due to its sovereignty, may choose whether or not to grant entry to non-citizens.¹²⁵

Although the term “international migration law” was first written in the book title of Richard Plender in 1972, in fact it was even in use earlier by Louis Varlez where he named after his course as “International Migration Law” at the Hague Academy.¹²⁶ International

¹²⁰ A. Aust, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

¹²¹ A. Clapham, *Brierly’s Law of Nations*, 7th Edition, Oxford University Press, Croydon, 2012.

¹²² D. J. Bederman, *The Spirit of International Law*, The University of Georgia Press, Athens& London, 2002, p.1.

¹²³ V. Chetail, Sources of International Migration Law, in B. Opeskin et. al., *Foundations of International Migration Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.56.

¹²⁴ C. Dauvergne, *Challenges to sovereignty: migration laws for the 21st century*, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.92, Geneva, 2003, p. 3.

¹²⁵ V. Chetail, *op.cit.*, p.56.

¹²⁶ V. Chetail, Remarks by Vincent Chetail, *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, Vol.110, 2016, p.201.

Migration Law is essentially a doctrinal construction deduced from the conventional sources and actors of international law, much like many other fields (such as environmental law or trade law).¹²⁷ The current system of international law regulating migration is made up of a patchwork of superimposed norms from a huge variety of subjects that intersect one another (for instance human rights law, trade law, humanitarian law, labour law, refugee law, maritime law, air law, consular law, criminal law, etc.)¹²⁸

According to Chetail, it is possible to describe the international migration law as the body of international rules and principles which regulates how people move between States and have legal standing within the border of destination countries.¹²⁹ The international migration law not only covers the emigration but also governs the immigration side of the migration process; in addition to being very inclusive, it regulates all types of migration regardless of their reasons for coming (such as work, family reunification, asylum, or education), their legal status (regular or irregular), or the length of their stay (transit, temporary stay, long-term residence).¹³⁰

IOM states that a globally recognized legally binding document which covers the international migration law aspects of the migration regulation does not exist; however, a number of international rules have been agreed in the form of multilateral and bilateral treaties, as well as non-binding instruments as a result of State-to-State relations, negotiations, and practice to regulate the State power, duties and tasks as well as rights of migrants.¹³¹ “The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration” is the first main document to be negotiated between governments in 2018 which addresses every facet of international migration; while being a non-binding (soft-law) instrument based on international law with several goals that are also covered by customary international law.¹³²

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ V. Chetail, *International Migration Law*, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law, Oxford University Press, 2019, available at: <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law/9780199668267.001.0001/law-9780199668267-chapter-1#law-9780199668267-chapter-1-note-39>, accessed on: 25.07.2023.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ IOM, *International Migration Law*, Available at: <https://www.iom.int/international-migration-law>, Accessed on: 25.07.2023.

¹³² *Ibid.*

Table 5: Principal International Treaties relating to Migration¹³³

Principal international treaties relating to migration			
Subject Matter	Treaties	Entry into Force	States parties
Human Rights Law	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	1969	174
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	1976	160
	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	1976	167
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	1981	187
	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	1987	149
	Convention on the Rights of the Child	1990	193
	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families	2003	44
	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	2008	103
	International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance	2010	29
Refugee Law	Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees)	1954/1967	147
	Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen	1961	21
	Protocol to the Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen	1975	16

¹³³ V. Chetail, Sources of International Migration Law, in B. Opeskin et. al., *Foundations of International Migration Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 62-64.

Labour Law	ILO Convention No 29 concerning Forced Labour	1932	175
	ILO Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise	1950	150
	Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others	1951	82
	ILO Convention No 97 concerning Migration for Employment	1952	49
	ILO Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour	1959	169
	ILO Convention No 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation	1960	169
	ILO Convention No 143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers	1978	23
	ILO Convention No 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour	2000	174
Trade Law	General Agreement on Trade in Services	1995	153
Maritime and Air Law	Convention on International Civil Aviation	1947	190
	Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic	1967	114
	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea	1980	159
	International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue	1985	98
	Convention on the Law of the Sea	1994	162
	International Convention on Salvage	1996	59

Criminal Law	Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2003	163
	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children	2003	163
	Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air	2004	129
Consular and Diplomatic Law	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations	1964	187
	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	1967	173
Nationality Law	Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness	1937	24
	Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws	1937	21
	Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality	1937	26
	Convention on the Nationality of Married Women	1958	74
	Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons	1960	66
	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	1975	38

Source: V. Chetail, Sources of International Migration Law, in B. Opeskin et. al., *Foundations of International Migration Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 62-64.

As Chetail indicated that due to the dominance of the national sovereignty and the lack of a global migration organisation, the legal system regulating migration is way more fragmented. But, over the last ten years, the recent migration related events showed that there is a high need for an inter-State collaboration. States are more conscious that migration is a topic which effects more than one country so that a unilateral migration management cannot respond the necessities stemming from migration. However, they still need to learn how to work together on a matter that has historically been seen as a crucial aspect of their sovereignty.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ V. Chetail, *op.cit.*, 2012, p. 91.

2.1.5. Onward Movement /Secondary Migration

When a migrant or a refugee takes a migration decision, in the most cases, there is not a linear line connecting the countries of origin and destination. There is rarely once-off movement which ends up directly with the intended destination. In fact, there are several other countries in front of migrants/refugees to pass on the way to reach their targeted countries. During the journey if their needs are unfulfilled, access to services are unreachable, they cannot find the optimum safety or livelihood, migrants or refugees change their intended destination, and they move onwards from their first destination.¹³⁵ Therefore, this type of migration is named after onward migration or secondary migration. These two terms are used interchangeably.

The onward movement of migrants is not a new phenomenon and there have been several occasions where the issue of onward movement brought on the table and was discussed thoroughly. For example, in 1989, the UNHCR executive committee discussed the issue of refugees and asylum seekers who leave the country which they already found protection to another country in an irregular manner.¹³⁶ Although for a long period of time, the UNHCR utilized the term of secondary migration in its official documents to address the movements of migrants whether voluntary or forced, regular or irregular, refugees and asylum seekers may not always stay in their first country of arrival as their eventual destination and they might transit through several countries before obtaining the international protection and even after gaining access to international protection.¹³⁷ However, lately the UNHCR prefers to use “onward movement” to indicate that such kind of migrations “may be driven by numerous different factors, and often involve tertiary or multiple stages.”¹³⁸

In the literature, several definitions are available in order to clarify the term of onward movement/ secondary migration. It can be easily said that there is not any universally agreed definition of onward movement/ secondary migration. There are different definitions

¹³⁵ Mixed Migration Centre, *Moving on: Exploring Onwards Migration of Refugees and Migrants from East Africa*, MMC Research Report, Nairobi, 2021, p. 9.

¹³⁶ UNHCR, *Problem of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection*, No.58 (XL), 1989. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c4380.html> Accessed on: 03.08.2021.

¹³⁷ UNHCR, *Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: The 10-Point Plan in Action: Chapter 8, Addressing Secondary Movements*, Imprimerie Centrale, Luxembourg, 2011, p. 210.

¹³⁸ UNHCR, *Guidance on Responding to Irregular Onward Movement of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers*, 2019, p.1.

and especially divergence on the defined groups. The IOM defines secondary migration as “the movement of a migrant from their first country of destination to another country, other than the country in which he or she originally resided and other than the person’s country of nationality.”¹³⁹ Although this definition embraces all type of migrants through a holistic approach, most of the other definitions focus on the forced migrants more. The UNHCR defines the onward movement as “movement by refugees and asylum-seekers from one country where they enjoyed international protection, or could have sought and received such international protection, to another where they may request it”.¹⁴⁰ The European Migration Network (EMN) deriving the UNHCR’s Executive Committee Conclusions No 85 in 1989, defines the secondary migration as the “the movement of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who for different reasons move from the country in which they first arrived to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere”.¹⁴¹ According to the European Commission Staff Working Document, the secondary movement by asylum-seekers and refugees means that the same person submits multiple application of asylum simultaneously or consecutively in many EU Member States because of the fact that there are “differences between Member States in terms of access to asylum procedures, receiving protection and obtaining a secure legal status, the lack of or inadequate knowledge about the asylum and asylum procedures, the reception conditions, the rights granted, as well as the possibility for social and economic integration.”¹⁴²

According to Long, onward movement and/or secondary migration can be used to refer to three different notions to explain: 1. Refugees, asylum-seekers or other forced migrants continue to move on instead of staying in the country after crossing an international border. This type of migration generally happens in an irregular way which can end up with dangerous outcomes since people do not possess any valid visas or official documents, and they tend to avoid from official authorities. Furthermore, the governments are usually reluctant to proceed temporary transit papers to ease this type of movements. Syrians who attempted to reach Germany or Sweden via Italy and Turkey in 2015-16 can be given as an

¹³⁹ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p.194.

¹⁴⁰ UNHCR (2019), *op.cit.*, p.1.

¹⁴¹ European Migration Network, *Glossary: Secondary Movement of Migrants*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/secondary-movement-migrants_en , Accessed on: 05.08.2021.

¹⁴² European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions – Policy Plan on Asylum- an integrated approach to protection across the EU; Impact Assessment; {COM(2008) 360}, p. 9.

example to this category. 2. People who already in exile move further internally, such as refugees moving from a camp to a city, or from a resettlement hub to a town to look for better life conditions. This type of migration can be realized in a clandestine and irregular way, but it can also be legally authorized or permitted while people lose the benefits and services related to the assigned place. 3. Irregular, disorganized, and uncontrolled movement of people has always been a subject of States' concerns. Recently, onward movement is getting attention in order to create durable solutions for displacement instead of stopping or reversing migration.¹⁴³

The drivers which lead migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees to move onward is quite complex and secondary migration can take place for variety of reasons. According to the expert discussion paper on "Onward movement of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees" prepared by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, onward migratory movements can happen because of limits on availability and standards of protection, such as restricted access to humanitarian assistance or other means of survival; family separation; obstacles to the means of securing documentation; and a lack of comprehensive solutions. On the paper, it is also emphasized that people seeking protection might encounter with difficulties to access to legal and administrative processes including asylum procedures while procedures in some countries might not correspond to the standards of fairness and quality, hence it rises a risk of exposure to refoulement. In some cases, irregular migration might be less risky than staying in a previous country where there is an absence or limited scope of protection. One another factor to encourage migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees to move onward could be the desire to come together with the extended family and communities, and lack of access to regular migration channels.¹⁴⁴

The major difference of the stepwise migration from the linear migration is that secondary migrants usually have the human capital.¹⁴⁵ The human capital is associated with the migration aspirations-increasing effect.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, one of the motivations which make migrants to leave their initial destination in Europe stems from the search of the highest

¹⁴³ K. Long, Onward Migration, in C. Costello, M. Foster, J. McAdam (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 1102.

¹⁴⁴ Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, *Onward Movement of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: Discussion Paper prepared for the Expert Roundtable on Onward Movement*, Geneva, 2015, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ A. Takenaka, *Secondary Migration: Who Re-Migrates and Why These Migrants Matter*, Migration Information Source, 2007. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/secondary-migration-who-re-migrates-and-why-these-migrants-matter> Accessed on: 06.08.2021.

¹⁴⁶ H. De Haas, *The Determinants of International Migration Conceptualising Policy, Origin and Destination Effects*, University of Oxford, International Migration Institute Working Papers 32, DEMIG Project Paper 2, Oxford, 2011, p. 21.

return to the human capital, which is the pursuit of a better life conditions that involves a lifestyle improvement, access to welfare, more and better opportunities for household, expectation to rise their long-term material and immaterial wellbeing.¹⁴⁷

According to Kong, many asylum-seekers involve in onward migration following well-established routes for several reasons: first of all, not all the States evaluate the asylum applications on the same and equal bases and many of them have different refugee recognition rates per year. Secondly, the rights and opportunities given to the asylum-seekers and refugees after getting registered may change from country to country. Moreover, asylum-seekers might have other factors to shape their decision besides protection such as “family and diaspora connections, the size of the labour market, language skills, the availability of social protection programmes and safety nets and the relative openness of the country of destination”.¹⁴⁸

When a migrant, asylum-seeker or a refugee take a migration decision, they rarely have a final destination on their mind, whereas their prospective residence is shaped on the way. Kuschminder and Waidler argues that there are three reasons to explain this decision-making process in transit: 1. Initial trigger for migration might disappear on the transit zone. Especially forced migrants have much more time for consideration in transit once they find an immediate safety and they can continue to journey if they are not content with the conditions in the transit country. 2. Migrants can build new ‘spontaneous social networks’ on the way of transit which can assist them, transfer information, and have an influence on their potential travel routes and destinations. 3. Capabilities have a great effect on the migration aspiration and decision-making in transit. For instance, a migrant might find a work in transit and can get ready financially to move onward. Therefore, capabilities give migrants ability and encourage them to move onward.¹⁴⁹

Especially during the secondary migration, there are several different factors which effect the preferences of the migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. Possibilities and opportunities available in potential destination countries have a great impact on the decision-making process. Therefore, migration policies on destination preferences carry a great importance. These policies include “1. *Migration controls which limit where people can, and*

¹⁴⁷ E. Castagnone, *Building a comprehensive framework of African Mobility Patterns: The Case of Migration Between Senegal and Europe*, Graduate School in School in Social, Economic and Political Sciences, Department of Social and Political Studies, University of Milan, 2011, p. 141.

¹⁴⁸ K. Long, *op.cit.*, pp. 1103-1104.

¹⁴⁹ K. Kuschminder, J. Waidler, At Europe’s Frontline: Factors Determining Migrants Decision Making for Onwards Migration from Greece and Turkey, *Migration and Development*, Vol.9, No.2, 2020, p. 191.

cannot, travel legally; 2. Perceptions regarding opportunities for securing residency “papers” and in turn, access to the labour market and welfare support; and 3. Opportunities for family reunification.”¹⁵⁰ Many asylum-seekers have preferred to seek protections in European countries since the summer 2015. Onward movements of asylum seekers have recently been among the top priorities on the policymaking level in the European Union. Therefore, in the next session, secondary migration in the EU context will be discussed.

2.1.5.1. Onward Movements / Secondary Migration in the EU

The European Union Member States have recently become the targeted destination countries in order to seek a shelter by unprecedented number of asylum-seekers and refugees coming from almost all over the world but mostly from the Middle East and North Africa. Although this phenomenon occupies a top place in the EU policy making nowadays, it is not a new issue in the EU context. The initiatives to regulate these flows but also to limit and prevent to some extents were taken with the establishment of the Dublin system in the beginning of 1990s. The Dublin Regulation (EU) No.604/2013 (“Dublin III”) is the EU regulation which constitutes the standards and procedures for determining the EU Member States in charge of reviewing an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. The European Commission identifies multiple international protection applications as “asylum shopping” and also stresses that “one of the aims of the Dublin system was to address the phenomenon of asylum shopping by asylum-seekers by deterring them to lodge more than one asylum application in the same or in a different Member State.”¹⁵¹

It is obvious that within the European Union, the national asylum systems and reception circumstances of every Member State clearly differ greatly from one another. Therefore, it is not really possible to claim that all Member States are equally safe countries, and they have a particular degree of harmonised protection measures. According to some judgments ruled by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a Member State must forbid the transfer of an application under the Dublin Regulation if the applicant’s fundamental rights will be put at actual risk.

¹⁵⁰ H. Crawley, J. Hagen-Zanker, *Deciding Where to go: Policies, People and Perceptions Shaping Destination Preferences*, *International Migration*, Vol. 57, No.1, 2019, p. 27.

¹⁵¹ European Commission, Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Policy plan on asylum: an integrated approach to protection across the EU- Impact Assessment, COM (2008) 360 Final, Brussels, 17.06.2008.

The Case of *M.S.S v Belgium and Greece* is seen as an important judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding this issue. An Afghan national identified by the initials “M.S.S” fled Afghanistan travelling via Iran and Turkey and entered the EU via Greece. He was taken under detention for a week, when released, he was asked to leave the country. After transiting through France, he arrived in Belgium and applied for an asylum. As a result of the examination, his biometrical data was found on the Eurodac report registered previously in Greece. Hence, according to the Dublin Regulation, he was transferred to Greece and “had immediately placed in detention in a building next to the airport, where he was locked up in a small space with twenty other detainees, had access to the toilets only at the discretion of the guard, was not allowed out into the open air, was given very little to eat and had to sleep on a dirty mattress or on the bare floor.”¹⁵² The applicant also faced with the risk of returning back to Afghanistan where his life was in danger because the Greek authorities did not handle his legal issue properly.¹⁵³ The applicant filed a lawsuit against Greece and Belgium within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” and in violation of Article 13 of the Convention “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in (the) Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” In the light of above, the court decided that both Greece and Belgium violated these two Articles. The court considers that Belgian authorities didn’t investigate enough whether “the applicant would be treated in conformity with the Convention standards”; if they had done this, “they would have seen that risks the applicant faced were real and individual enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.”¹⁵⁴ Therefore, the court concludes that “the applicant’s transfer by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.”¹⁵⁵ All in all, the case of *M.S.S v Belgium and Greece* highlighted the significance of the non-refoulement principle and emphasized that the EU Member States should not transfer the application of an asylum seeker to another member country if it generates a high risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the place where the person is transferred.

¹⁵² *Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece* (2011) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 30696/09, § 34. Available at: <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-103050%22%7D> , Accessed on: 02.08.2023.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, § 35-53.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, § 359.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, § 360.

The joined cases C-411/10 N.S and C-493/10 M.E of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dealt with the Dublin System’s “safe country” idea and respecting the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Case C-411/10 covers that an Afghan national whose initials are N.S. came to the United Kingdom after travelling through different countries. He was detained in Greece. After Greek authorities released him, he claims that he was caught by the police and sent for an expulsion to Turkey, where he was imprisoned for two months in appalling conditions. Claiming that he escaped from the detention in Turkey, he arrived in the United Kingdom and lodged an asylum application.¹⁵⁶ The Secretary of State notified him that he will be removed to Greece and N.S. claimed that this will violate his fundamental rights. The Secretary of State notified him that “his removal to Greece would violate his rights under the ECHR was clearly unfounded, since Greece in on the ‘list of safe countries.’”¹⁵⁷ The case C-493/10 M.E, five appellants all unconnected with each other coming from Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria travelled via Greece and arrested because of the illegal entry, later they went to Ireland and made an asylum application there; however, Eurodac system confirmed that they were in Greece before arriving to Ireland and transfer of appellants to Greece was asked.¹⁵⁸

The Court ruled that “the Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.”¹⁵⁹

Abovementioned judgments have clarified that the transfer of asylum applicants to another Member State might breach their fundamental rights. Meanwhile, it also proves that it is not possible to claim that every Member State is equally safe within the European Union. Therefore, the Dublin III Regulation Article 3(2) states that “where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systematic flaws in the asylum procedure and

¹⁵⁶ Joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2011), ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, § 34-35.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, §37-38.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, §51-52.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, §94

in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible.”¹⁶⁰

The European Commission accelerated the legislative proposals regarding to deterrence and prevention of the onward movement of asylum-seekers across the EU border, especially during the 2015 summer months, after confronting with a huge number of asylum-seekers in the EU territories. The European Commission set an objective to improve the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and to make sure the functioning of the Dublin mechanism to discourage and sanction irregular moves to other Member States.¹⁶¹ Considering the secondary movements as the most pressing implementation problem, the European Commission stated that the secondary movements remain a common problem in the EU, therefore reducing and preventing the secondary movements within the EU is an objective to achieve.¹⁶² In order to better monitor secondary movements and facilitate the fight against irregular migration, the European Commission set out a priority and presented proposals to reinforce the Eurodac system (by which biometric data of the asylum seekers are collected to see if the applicant applied for international protection in somewhere else.)¹⁶³ The EU agencies such as FRONTEX, EASO, EUROPOL, EUROSUR, eu-LISA are also responsible for gathering data on the secondary movements of applicants of international protection, and they engage and support each other during this process. Especially, FRONTEX conducts research specifically dedicated to the secondary movements within the European border and releases the analysis in its annual Risk Analysis report.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p.4. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02013R0604-20130629> , Accessed on: 02.08.2023.

¹⁶¹ European Commission, Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 Final, Brussels, 06.04.2016

¹⁶² European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 final/2, Brussels, 04.05.2016.


¹⁶³ European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), COM(2016) 465 final, Brussels, 13.07.2016.

¹⁶⁴ FRONTEX, Risk Analysis for 2021, Warsaw, 2021, Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis_2021.pdf , Consulted on: 13.08.2021.

According to the CEPS research paper, the concept of “secondary movements” in the EU context comes from the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” movements of asylum seekers inside the Schengen Area. Both primary and secondary movements are viewed as “irregular” and “quasi-criminal”. Primary movements of asylum seekers stand for movement which happens out of “*involuntariness of individuals*”. People are forced to flee their country of origin to save their lives and search for international protection. They are in real need of safety and protection; therefore, primary movement is considered as legitimate. On the other hand, according to the current EU conceptualisation, secondary movements are realized based on “voluntariness” of asylum seekers. Once they enter the first country of asylum within the EU border, they secure their safety and further movements happen because of their “free choice”. According to the EU Dublin Regulation, all member states are equally safe, and the asylum systems of the Member States rely on the principle of “mutual trust” among Member States. Therefore, when an asylum seeker leaves his/her first country of asylum and move on for another country within the EU to seek protection, it is evaluated as illegitimate, thereby, it needs to be prevented, criminalized, and deterred.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ S. Carrera, M. Stefan, R. Cortinovis, N. C. Luk, *When mobility is not a choice Problematising asylum seekers’ secondary movements and their criminalisation in the EU*, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 11, 2019, p. 4.

Table 6: Onward Migration and the EU



Source: S. Carrera, M. Stefan, R. Cortinovis, N. C. Luk, *When mobility is not a choice Problematising asylum seekers' secondary movements and their criminalisation in the EU*, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 11, 2019, p. 5.

It is important to underline that the diverging national jurisprudence within the EU countries prepares a base for different practices.¹⁶⁶ And it is expected to trigger the secondary movement more if the EU does not fade these differences and harmonize the asylum policies among member states.¹⁶⁷ Particularly, asylum procedures and reception conditions have a great impact on the onward movement. According to a research, although the Dublin system is constructed on the principle of “*mutual trust*” among Member States, in practise asylum seekers do not share the same trust since they are concerned with access to welfare services, labour and housing markets in the first country of entry.¹⁶⁸ The onward movement of asylum seekers and refugees does not generate only from the search of safety, besides they have

¹⁶⁶ M. Takle, M. L. Seeberg, “All European countries are not the same!” *The Dublin Regulation and Onward Migration in Europe*, Norwegian Social Research, NOVA Report No. 12, 2015, p.17.

¹⁶⁷ S. H. Legomsky, *Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection*, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, No.2, 2003, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.18.

different forms of insecurities; therefore, they are expecting to rebuild their lives somewhere else.¹⁶⁹

In September 2020, the European Commission proposed the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A number of migration and asylum related comprehensive topics were covered ranging from the new arrival procedures, a common framework for solidarity and responsibility sharing, migration governance, and asylum system.¹⁷⁰ Stating that the so-called refugee crisis which was taken place in 2015-2016 unfolded the most important deficiencies and the events demonstrated that each Member State was impacted differently; therefore, it raised the concerns and brought disparities which must be recognized and overcome by the European Union.¹⁷¹ However, the main aim of the Pact is to diminish and regulate the irregular entries to the Union; in doing so, the Commission targets to decrease the business of the smugglers, human trafficking, as well as secondary migration within the EU.¹⁷² On the New Pact, the European Commission addressed the secondary migration through several measures including prevention and reducing of the unauthorised movements; better tracking, detecting and controlling the unauthorised movements with the help of Eurodac; reinforcing the fight against migrant smuggling to combat those who organize unauthorised entry, etc.

In June 2023, the Council of the European Union came to an agreement on the EU Pact of Migration and Asylum: The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) and the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR).¹⁷³ The AMMR includes provisions to avoid secondary migrations; for example, the regulation obliges asylum applicants to make the asylum claim in the Member States where they initially arrive or have permission to stay; it discourages onward movements by limiting the choices for transferring or shifting

¹⁶⁹ S. E. Zimmermann, Irregular Secondary Movements to Europe: Seeking Asylum beyond Refuge, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2009, p. 93.

¹⁷⁰ European Commission, *Communication From the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, COM(2020) 609 Final, Brussels, 23.09.2020. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0609> , Accessed on 06.08.2023.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² C. Katsiaficas, M. Wagner, *The New Pact: Supporting or constraining mobility out of protracted displacement?*, ICMPD, Available at: <https://trafig.eu/blog/the-new-pact-supporting-or-constraining-mobility-out-of-protracted-displacement> , Accessed on: 06.08.2023.

¹⁷³ OCHA, *EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: Member States' recent agreement is a severe blow back to protection standards in Europe*, 30 June 2023, Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/eu-pact-migration-and-asylum-member-states-recent-agreement-severe-blow-back-protection-standards-europe> , Accessed on: 06.08.2023.

responsibilities among other countries within the EU; by this way it reduces the changes for asylum seekers to select the Member State where they lodge their application.¹⁷⁴

The EU takes concrete steps to diminish the number of secondary movements within its territory. However, if the secondary migration is genuinely asked to be reduced, it is very important to create more comprehensive, liberal, responsive integration policies and they should be implemented in the national, regional, and international level instead of boosting prevention, deterrence, and criminalization of the movement.

2.1.6. Resettlement

Resettlement basically means that refugees who have already sought protection in a country can be transferred to another State which has accepted to recognize them as refugees but later will grant them a permanent residency and/or a possibility of naturalization.¹⁷⁵ Resettlement of refugees is seen as one of the most crucial elements of international protection regime, a part of the comprehensive protection and persistent solutions strategies.¹⁷⁶ According to the UNHCR's guidelines, resettlement programme has three crucial functions:

1. Resettlement is an international protection mechanism serving as a tool to protect and address the needs of refugees who are having difficulty to enjoy the fundamental rights and whose life, liberty, safety, health are in danger in the country where they are under international protection.
2. There are several durable solutions which can be provided for refugees such as voluntary repatriation and local integration. Among all, resettlement has a unique stand because it is a long-term solution which can be accessible by greater numbers or groups of refugees.
3. Resettlement is a programme which brings the States together to enable them to cooperate and share the responsibility to protect the refugees and lessen the difficulties that the country of asylum is facing with. Therefore, resettlement is

¹⁷⁴ Council of the European Union, *Migration policy: Council reaches agreement on key asylum and migration laws*, 8 June 2023, Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/08/migration-policy-council-reaches-agreement-on-key-asylum-and-migration-laws/>, Accessed on: 06.08.2023.


¹⁷⁵ International Organization for Migration, 2019a, op.cit., p. 184.

¹⁷⁶ UNHCR, *UNHCR Resettlement Handbook*, 2011, p.47. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf>, Accessed on: 14.03.2023.

programme of a concrete demonstration of international solidarity and global cooperation.¹⁷⁷

There are two important preconditions for internationally protected individuals to be considered for the resettlement programme: - to be determined as a refugee by UNHCR and – resettlement is the only durable solution left after evaluation of all the other durable solutions.¹⁷⁸ Vulnerable individuals or groups should be eligible to fit in one of more categories of UNHCR resettlement submission. Those categories are roughly listed as legal and/or physical protection needs, survivors of torture and/or violence, medical needs, women and girls at risks, family reunification, children and adolescents at risk, lack of foreseeable alternative durable solutions.¹⁷⁹

Table 7: The Resettlement Continuum



Source: UNHCR, *Refugee Resettlement - What is resettlement?*, Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Service, Division of International Protection, October 2020, p. 2. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/5fe06e8b4>, accessed on:16.03.2023.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.36.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

Participating in the resettlement programme is totally voluntary and depends on the will of the State, however there is still a huge gap between the number of refugees recognized as in need of resettlement and the States' "quota" reserved for the number of individuals that should be accepted as refugees.¹⁸⁰ From 2003 to July 2020, the UNHCR resettled 1,089,664 refugees to 45 different countries. While the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and Sweden were seen as the top countries for resettlement destination, the case countries of this research namely Denmark took the 12th row with 6425 number of refugees and Spain got the 17th place with 2544 number of refugees within the resettlement programme.¹⁸¹

According to the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, it has been witnessed throughout the history that the resettlement programme can be very quickly arranged and efficiently implemented as long as States' have a will to cooperate. Currently, there are certain challenges that the programme is encountering in the recent years. Since the 1980s, seeking asylum and controlling the irregular migration have been extremely politicized, strict measure have been taken such as border monitoring, harder visa requirements etc. These developments have two big consequences: while the protections space is getting narrower, control measures forces asylum seekers and refugees to deal with the smugglers and traffickers. Another challenge in front of the programme is that there is an imbalance between the number of resettlement places and the number of refugees in need of resettlement. Therefore, many refugees who are in need of resettlement left without solution.¹⁸²

The concept of security and the perception of security have gone through a big change after particularly the terrorist attacks following the 9/11 events. This fact indirectly also alters the interpretation of being a refugee and some States raise security concerns when it comes to the resettlement processes of refugees. Another important challenge is that some States abuse the resettlement programme for the sake of making money because of their strong poverty. Although the UNHCR tries hard to combat the fraud in the processes, it also continues to conduct the programme properly for the ones who need it in those countries.¹⁸³

Once the refugees are resettled, the next thing the States should concentrate on is to

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁸¹ UNHCR, *The Impact of Government-Sponsored Refugee Resettlement: A Meta Study of Finding from Six Countries*, December 2020, p. 3. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/603e5d344>, accessed on: 16.03.2023.

¹⁸² UNHCR, *UNHCR Resettlement Handbook*, 2011, pp.67-70. Available at:

<https://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf>, Accessed on: 16.03.2023.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

integrate them into the host societies. Therefore, minimum two-way approach integration shall be the focus of the States in order to refrain from racial discrimination and intolerance that the refugees might be faced in the local community. Effective management of the resettlement programme is only possible when there is an active collaboration between the resettlement actors such as host countries, resettlement States, NGOs, partner organizations as well as refugees themselves. Some States have discriminatory selection criteria, while some host governments limits UNHCR's access to the process, all these have a negative impact on the resettlement programme and makes it clear that stronger partnerships are needed to have a more efficient implementation of the programme.¹⁸⁴

2.1.7. Relocation

Relocation within the European Union is a programme that the EU Member States demonstrate solidarity and responsibility sharing between each other.¹⁸⁵ DG Home defines the relocation as moving someone who has been given international protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention or 2011/95/EU Directive from one EU Member State to another where they will be granted the exact same protection and it also covers the transfer of those who have requested international protection from the EU Member State in charge of investigating their request to another EU Member State, which will review their claim for international protection.¹⁸⁶

In its Art. 1, Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive) encourages an equal effort between EU Member States in accepting and absorbing the costs of accepting the displaced persons in the case of a mass migration from third countries.¹⁸⁷ There are two main target groups for the intra-EU relocation scheme: asylum applicants and beneficiaries of international protection who are moved into another EU Member State host country usually from their first country of entry to the EU.¹⁸⁸ It is a mechanism that enables thorough

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ IOM, *Relocation*, Available at: <https://eea.iom.int/relocation> , accessed on: 29.07.2023.

¹⁸⁶ European Commission, *Asylum and Migration Glossary 3.0 a tool better comparability produced by the European Migration Network*, October 2014, p. 237.

¹⁸⁷ Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Official Journal L 212, 07/08/2001 P.0012 – 0023.

¹⁸⁸ European Commission, *Relocation: EU solidarity in practice*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/relocation-eu-solidarity-practice_en , Accessed on: 29.07.2023

pre-departure support and the subsequent migration of people seeking international protection.¹⁸⁹

The EU emergency relocation programme was put into effect based on two Council Decisions made in September 2015 and 2016 in accordance with Article 78(3) TFEU, which gives a floor to the Council to take provisional measures in case of emergency within the framework of the emergency response system, which entails a temporary distribution plan for people who are obviously in need of international protection; hence this was done to ensure that all EU Member States participated fairly and equally in this joint effort.¹⁹⁰ The main aim of the first EU emergency programme which terminated in 2017 was to diminish the burden on the frontline countries such as Italy and Greece of receiving too many migrants coming from the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁹¹

The European Commission unveiled an action plan for supporting Greece right away in 2020. In accordance with this proposal, the European Commission suggested establishing a voluntary relocation programme for unaccompanied minors, vulnerable asylum applicants and recipients of international protection from Greece to other countries in Europe. The relocation programme from Greece has participants from 16 countries including 13 EU Member States, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF are among the international organizations that work with the Greek Government to administer the programme. The relocation plan is being implemented under the coordination and facilitation of the European Commission. Additionally, it also covers the costs of the relocation process's preliminary steps in Greece while managing the transfer of money to the participating countries.¹⁹²

The Declaration on Solidarity was ratified by 21 European countries in June 2022. It initiated the creation of the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism (VSM), which intends “to provide a concrete response to the migratory difficulties of the Mediterranean Member States” via the relocation of refugees and asylum applicants or via money donations.¹⁹³ In accordance with the Declaration, with the practical assistance of EU Agencies, the European

¹⁸⁹ IOM, *Relocation*, Available at: <https://eea.iom.int/relocation> , accessed on: 29.07.2023.

¹⁹⁰ European Commission, *Relocation*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/relocation_en , Accessed on: 30.07.2023.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² European Commission, *Relocation: EU solidarity in practice*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/relocation-eu-solidarity-practice_en , Accessed on: 29.07.2023

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

Commission coordinates the relocation procedures under the VSM: In order to ensure a successful implementation, the European Commission delivers EU financing, hosts frequent meetings with Solidarity Platform partner countries and participants and oversees the development of operational procedures and coordinates their coordination while the EUAA acts like a focal point in the relocation process by giving the extra support for operation to the participating European countries.¹⁹⁴

Table 8: 2022 Relocation Statistics¹⁹⁵

2022 Relocation statistics						
Top Destination Countries		Top Departure Countries		Top Nationalities		Sex and Age
Germany	216	Greece	394	Afghanistan	143	18+ years old Male 122
France	184	Italy	254	Syria	71	18+ years old Female 351
Portugal	160	Cyprus	48	Cameroon	66	0-17 years old Male 86
		Malta	14			0-17 years old Male 151

Source: IOM, EEA Relocation in 2022, Available at: <https://eea.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1666/files/IOM%20Relocation%20support%20EEA%20-%202022%20.pdf>, Accessed on: 30.07.2023.

On the way to the permanent relocation system among the EU Member States, the VSM plays a crucial role in the direction of the proposed Pact on Migration and Asylum and Migration Management Regulation; therefore, the lessons learnt from the the VSM programme will be very insightful for the upcoming permanent relocation method.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ IOM, *EEA Relocation in 2022*, Available at: <https://eea.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1666/files/IOM%20Relocation%20support%20EEA%20-%202022%20.pdf>, Accessed on: 30.07.2023

¹⁹⁶ European Commission, *Relocation: EU solidarity in practice*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/relocation-eu-solidarity-practice_en, Accessed on: 29.07.2023

CHAPTER III: INTEGRATION (THEORITICAL PART II)

3. Integration

3.1. The Concept of Integration

The word of integration etymologically comes from the Latin verb “integer” which means “untouched, whole”.¹⁹⁷ In migration studies, integration is assumed as the ideal situation for the post-migration period, which aims to bring the different parties of the society and make them harmonized and create a “whole”. With the most basic approach, integration can be interpreted as a base for living together in the same society which can be achieved by social inclusion and social cohesion. However, the concept of integration is very blurry to define and very hard to measure. Robinson states that “‘integration’ is a chaotic concept: a word used by many but understood differently by most” and he underlines that unifying the definition is hardly achievable since the concept is “individualized, contested and contextual”.¹⁹⁸ Grillo defines integration as a “fuzzy concept” with numerous interpretations.¹⁹⁹ Banton refers integration as a “treacherous concept, resting on a mathematical metaphor, which assumes that the social processes of group interaction can be likened to the mathematical processes of making up a whole number.”²⁰⁰ As Castles et al. argued that “there is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated.”²⁰¹ Although the emergence of discussions about the concept of integration in academic and policy works corresponds to the second half of the 19th century, nowadays contemporary social scientists put once again a lot of effort to the scientific discourse on addressing the concept of integration.²⁰² However, there is no consensus on the proposed definitions of the concept. Not only researchers in the field of “integration” but also the ones who develop and

¹⁹⁷ E. Partridge, *op.cit.*, p. 3357.

¹⁹⁸ V. Robinson, *Defining and Measuring Successful Refugee Integration*, Proceedings of ECRE International Conference on Integration of Refugees in Europe, ECRE, Brussels, 1998, p. 118.

¹⁹⁹ R. Grillo, Danes and Other, in K. F. Olwig, K. Paerregaard (eds.), *The Question of Integration: Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish Welfare State*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2011, p. 266.

²⁰⁰ M. Banton, National Integration in France and Britain, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 151-152.

²⁰¹ S. Castles, M. Korac, E. Vasta, S. Vertovec, *Integration Mapping the Field*, Home Office Online Report 28/03, London, Home Office, 2002, p. 12.

²⁰² R. V. Berkel, I. H. Moller, Introduction, in R. V. Berkel, I.H. Moller (eds.), *Active Social Policies in the EU Inclusion through participation?*, The Policy Press, Bristol, 2002, pp. 4-5.

implement integration policies have different conceptual approach to the theme.²⁰³ More importantly, any formal definition for it is still absent in the international refugee law.²⁰⁴ The definitions of the concept of integration in the literature generally considers the integration multidimensional and at least two or more-way process.

According to the UNHCR, “integration is complex and gradual, comprising three distinct but inter-related legal, economic, and social and cultural dimensions, all of which are important for refugees’ ability to integrate successfully as fully included members of society.”²⁰⁵ At the heart of the UNHCR definition, the concept of integration is seen as a two-way process which composes of the “adaptation” of one party and “welcome” by other, by which it makes integration different from assimilation due to the fact that the refugees do not have to leave their cultural identity behind them.²⁰⁶

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines the concept of integration as “the two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural, and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion.”²⁰⁷

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) defines integration as a dynamic and two-way, long-term, and multi-dimensional process:

- It is a dynamic and two-way process because it requires both receiving societies and the individuals/communities to be involved: refugees should be ready to adapt to the lifestyle of the host society while preserving their own cultural identity, and host societies should be willing to make necessary preparations on the public institutions for changes in demographic profile, regard refugees as a part of the national community and take initiatives to ease access to resources as well as decision-making processes.

²⁰³ M. Korac, Integration and How We Facilitate It: A Comparative Study of the Settlement Experiences of Refugees in Italy and the Netherlands, *Sociology*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003, p. 52.

²⁰⁴ J. Crisp, *The local integration and local settlement of refugees: a conceptual and historical analysis*, *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No.102, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Geneva, 2004, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, *Conclusion on Local Integration No. 104 (LVI)- 2005*, 7 October 2005, No. 104 (LVI), Available at:

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4357a91b2.html>, Accessed on: 30.08.2021.

²⁰⁶ UNHCR, *A New Beginning Refugee Integration in Europe*, 2013, p. 14. Available at:

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/522980604.html>, Accessed on 30.08.2021.

²⁰⁷ International Organization for Migration (2019a), op.cit., p. 106.

- It is a long-term process because integration starts with refugees' arrival to the host society, and it lasts until a refugee becomes an active member of that society enjoying the legal, social, economic, educational, and cultural rights and facilities.
- It is a multi-dimensional process since it is a matter of the host country's durable asylum system and refugees' own perception of acceptance by and membership in the host society.²⁰⁸

The concept of integration is also defined from the European perspective by the European Institutions in several times. In a general view, from the European framework, integration is very complex and sensitive task, and it is regarded as a dynamic, long-term, and continuous process.²⁰⁹

In 2003, the European Commission released a Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment. In this document, integration is defined as “a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant”. It is implied that integration needs a holistic approach covering all the dimensions of integration and it should involve the development of a balance of rights and obligations over time based on reciprocity.²¹⁰

In 2005, the European Commission came up with a more comprehensive Communication drawing a common agenda for integration framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. In this agenda, the definition of integration and integration requirements are provided in 9 points for the EU and Member States which is listed in the below chart:²¹¹

<i>“1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States</i>
<i>2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union</i>
<i>3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible</i>

²⁰⁸ European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), *Position on the Integration of Refugees in Europe*, 2002, p.4. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4e5c154.html> , Accessed on 31.08.2021.

²⁰⁹ L. Ahokas, *Promoting immigrants' democratic participation and integration*, Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy Juvenes Print, Tampere, 2010, p. 8.

²¹⁰ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions *on Immigration, Integration and Employment*, COM (2003) 336 Final, Brussels, 03.06.2003, pp. 17-18.

²¹¹ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *A Common Agenda for Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union*, COM(2005) 389 final, Brussels, 01.09.2005, pp. 5-10.

<i>4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration</i>
<i>5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society</i>
<i>6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration</i>
<i>7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizen is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens</i>
<i>8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law</i>
<i>9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration”</i>

In 2010, the European Commission emphasized that integration needs effective policies, coherent planning, and involvement of all relevant stakeholders.²¹² The Council of the European Union stressed that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual interaction, requiring not only efforts by national, regional and local authorities but also a greater commitment by the host community and immigrants”.²¹³

In 2011, the European Commission released a Communication related to the renewed European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals and noted that “the agenda cannot be implemented through European instruments alone”.²¹⁴ By this way, three-way process of integration which includes the countries of origin to support the process was introduced. In this third pillar, the countries of origin play a crucial role in the process in three ways: “1. to prepare the integration already before the migrants’ departure; 2. to support the migrants while in the EU, e.g., through support via the Embassies, 3. to prepare the migrant’s temporary or definitive return with acquired experience and knowledge”.²¹⁵ Summing up, these definitions given and used by international organisations are not scientific, but they guide governments and national legislation and the building of

²¹² European Council, *The Social and economic integration of the Roma in Europe*, COM (2010) 0133 Final, Brussels, 07.04.2010.

²¹³ Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Integration as a Driver for Development and Social Cohesion*, 9248/10, Brussels, 04.05.2010, p. 3.

²¹⁴ European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, COM(2011) 455 final, Brussels, 20.07.2011, p.3.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

international relations also on the integration of migrants (for example in decisions on resettlement, permanent admission, return or removal of non-integrated migrants).

According to Entzinger and Biezeveld, the concept of integration can be analysed in macro and micro levels. Macro level of integration refers to the characteristics of a society: the more a society is integrated, the more intense and closer the groups or individuals get to one another. In order to define this notion, “social cohesion” has recently been in use as an equivalent for integration. On the other hand, micro level of integration refers to the groups or individuals. Micro level of integration has several dimensions: the dimension of “*frequency*” stands for the number of ties and contacts that an individual or group holds; the dimension of “*intensity*” is related to the feelings of belonging and familiarity with these contacts; the dimension of “*identification*” is about how a migrant identifies himself/herself either with their home country or the country of residence.²¹⁶

Integration is an interdisciplinary process and has a multidimensional nature. Some researchers divide integration into subcategories. These subcategories can roughly be listed as: political integration, economic integration, social integration, residential integration, cultural integration, psychological integration, religious integration, legal integration, educational integration, health integration and so on.²¹⁷ “*Social integration*” can stand for the integration in neighbourhoods or educational institutions; “*economic integration*” refers to have an access to the labour market; “*political integration*” means participation in general elections and local associations; cultural integration understood how tight the immigrant or refugee sticks with the traditions, identity or sense of belonging of his/her country of origin.²¹⁸ Legal integration covers mutual rights and obligations between the migrants and the receiving societies, religious integration is “a powerful dimension” and includes values and customs as well as religious education.²¹⁹

According to the IOM, integration should reply to the necessities and complexities of today’s migration such as considering the shifts and changes in the direction of migratory flows, duration of stay, cultural backgrounds, gender and skill levels and different needs of

²¹⁶ H. Entzinger, R. Biezeveld, *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*, European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), Rotterdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 2003, p. 6.

²¹⁷ C. Kovacs, *A critical approach to the production of academic knowledge on refugee integration in the global North*, Working Paper Series No. 09, Refugee Studies Center, University of Oxford, 2015, p.14.

²¹⁸ M. Rytter, Writing Against Integration: Danish Imaginaries of Culture, Race and Belonging, *Ethnos*, Vol.84, No.4, 2019, p. 681.

²¹⁹ International Organization for Migration, *Migrants and the Host Society: Partnerships For Success*, International Dialogue on Migration No.11, IOM – MPRC, Geneva, 2008, pp. 26-28.

newcomer migrants than second or third generation migrants. Therefore “one-size-fits-all” integration approach is rarely achievable. A balanced interplay between various dimensions of integration and sustainable efforts of migrants, the host society, the country of origin, business, and civil society as well as other stakeholders bring successful integration.²²⁰

In today’s world, each society has its own political, cultural, sociological features and characteristics mostly stemming from the nation-state phenomenon. During the post-migration period, a migrant exists with his/her own cultural, economic, legal, political, sociological background in the newly arrived society. Integration intends to diminish these differences between the newcomer and the older resident of that particular society; however, this does not mean that the process will end up making them similar. What makes integration distant from assimilation is that integration is a process of a migrant’s participation into the host society without relinquishing one’s own identity. Some scholars argue that if the integration process is not accomplished, these distinct features of the newcomers create several problems in the society such as a threat to security and social cohesion.²²¹ When integration is neglected and insufficient or ineffective efforts are done to maintain it, it leads to numerous major risks: the newcomers can get marginalized and this can cause various problems such as lack of educational opportunities, language barriers and inability to access the labour market.²²² Furthermore, a failed integration process rises the possibilities for secondary movement and onward migration.

In the literature, there are some studies which analyse the success of integration and correlatively migration aspiration and return intentions. The degree of integration depends on various factors related to the structural and cultural dimensions such as migrants’ social position (social and cultural aspects), level of education and position in the labour market in the host country²²³ as well as transnational involvement, identification with the country of origin.²²⁴ The sustained ties of migrants, especially those with whom they interact play a significant role on the level of their integration.²²⁵ The research by Carling and Pettersen to see the return migration intentions of the immigrants in Norway in the integration-

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²²¹ S. Castles, H. De Haas, and M. J. Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

²²² International Organization for Migration, *Integration and Social Cohesion: Key Elements for Reaping the Benefits of Migration*, Global Compact Thematic Paper Integratin and Social Cohesion, 2017, p. 1.


²²³ E. Snel, G. Engbersen, A. Leerkes, Transnational Involvement and Social Integration, *Global Networks*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2006, p. 267.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

²²⁵ M. B. Erdal, C. Oeppen, Migrant Balancing Acts: Understanding the Interactions Between Integration and Transnationalism, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 36, No: 6, 2013, p. 897.

transnationalism matrix has salient results. According to the research conducted with ten large immigrant groups from various country of origins (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Somalia, and Chile) living in Norway, the results indicate that immigrants who are both “*weakly integrated and strongly transnational*” have the highest possibility of return intentions. People who are “*both strongly integrated and strongly transnational*” as well as people who “*are neither strongly integrated nor strongly transnational*” have the lowest likelihood of return migration.²²⁶

Table 9: Return Expectations in the Integration- Transnationalism Matrix



Source: J. Carling, S. V. Pettersen, Return Migration Intentions in the Integration-Transnationalism Matrix, *International Migration*, Vol. 52, No.6, 2014, p. 22.

On the other hand, besides measuring the degree and the success of integration, some researchers believe that discussing the concept of integration is in vain and faulty process, while many argues that this concept should be disregarded as a research topic.²²⁷ By nature, the concept of integration is an ambiguous theme, consequently, there are numerous interpretations by researchers, States, and policymakers. Until now, many terms were used to describe the social change within the society for the post-migration period such as assimilation, absorption, acculturation, accommodation, incorporation and recently more in

²²⁶ J. Carling, S. V. Pettersen, Return Migration Intentions in the Integration-Transnationalism Matrix, *International Migration*, Vol. 52, No.6, 2014, p. 27.

²²⁷ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

use terms such as inclusion and participation but according to Favell, none of them can correspond the technical “social engineering” quality of the term integration; nor create an ideal end-goal for society as a whole.²²⁸ However, achieving a successful, well-functioning, multicultural or multi-racial society via integration is very difficult and improbable.²²⁹

Defining the concept of integration is hard by nature but finding consensus on the definitions is even harder. A great number of contentious and contested discussions about the term continue to be debated in the academia. The post-migration period is very complex both for the immigrants and the host societies. Integration should be evaluated according to specific characteristics of the immigrants and the host society, taking the time into account, and analysing the historical, political, social, and legal conditions of the immigrants, host society and the countries involved in the migration process.

3.2. Theories of Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Integration

3.2.1. Assimilation Theories

The root of the word “assimilation” comes from the Latin word “similis” which means “same”, and assimilation corresponds “to make similar”.²³⁰ According to the IOM Glossary, assimilation is “a one-directional policy approach to integration whereby an ethnic or social group – usually a minority – adopts the cultural practices of another – usually that of the majority ethnic or social group.”²³¹ According to Sarah E. Simons, assimilation can be defined as “that process of adjustment or accommodation which occurs between the members of two different races, if their contact is prolonged and if the necessary psychic conditions are present. The result is group-homogeneity to a greater or less degree. Figuratively speaking, it is the process by which the aggregation of peoples is changed from a mechanical mixture into a chemical compound.”²³²

Kaya states that the leading policies which were created for the ethnic minorities and immigrants were shaped by the assimilation theories in the late 19th century and they were implemented until 1960s. The first theory of assimilation was produced by the Chicago School in the United States of America (USA). The source of inspiration for the Chicago School was the city’s itself. As a reflection of the Industrial Revolution which took place in

²²⁸ A. Favell, *Integration Nations: The Nation State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe, Multicultural Challenge, Comparative Social Research*, Vol. 22, 2003, p. 15.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ E. Partridge, *op.cit.*, p. 2869.

²³¹ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p. 12.

²³² S. E. Simons, *Social Assimilation I, American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.6, No: 6, 1901, pp: 791-792.

Europe, the USA was also rapidly industrialized. As a result of the improved transportation facilities, especially due to the rail-way transport, Chicago became a hub for commerce, finance, and culture. Everybody from all around the world but particularly the Blacks from the South who were dreaming better life conditions immigrated to Chicago. Day by day, the waves of immigration flowing to Chicago increased and inevitably this irregular migration created some problems such as low quality of life, contagious diseases, ethnic conflicts, poverty, high level of unemployment, racism, unplanned urbanization, and so on. The representative of the Chicago School started to conduct research to address all these problems emerged with the immigration.²³³

The concept of assimilation was born with the aim of “Americanization”.²³⁴ The old identities of the newcomers was seen as a thread to the new society, therefore the Chicago School expected immigrants to relinquish their original identities and adopt the norms, values, and behaviours of the new societies.²³⁵ Seeing the foreigner or ‘other’ as deviant and potentially dangerous resulted in development of the assimilation theories in the USA as an answer to the mass migration of the early 20th century.²³⁶ One of the leading assimilation theorists Robert Park from the Chicago School stated that assimilation carries two different meanings: “to make like” which represents “to acquire one another’s language, characteristic attitudes, and modes of behaviour” and “to take up and incorporate” which stands for incorporation of both individuals and ethnic groups into “larger groups”; when these two notions come together new national identities could be built in the modern world.²³⁷

Very much famous theory of assimilation was known as the theory of *Melting Pot* which is originally a name of a theatre play.²³⁸ In this play, America metaphorically stands for the God’s crucible, and all the European immigrants in the Ellis Island are invited to melt and reform in this pot. One of the representatives of this theory, Milton M. Gordon argues that assimilation is a process, and it should be divided into steps and stages: **1.** Changing the immigrants’ cultural patters (including religious belief and observance), **2.** Entering into a societal network and institutions or a societal structure, **3.** Inter marriage or interbreed with

²³³ T. Kaya, Chicago Okulu: Chicago’ya Özgü Bir Perspektif, *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, Vol.3, No:2, 2011, pp: 368-369.

²³⁴ W. Hirsch, Assimilation as Concept and as Process, *Social Forces*, Vol.21, No.1, 1942, p. 37.

²³⁵ A. Çağlar, A.Onay, Entegrasyon/Uyum: Kavramsal ve Yapısal Bir Analiz, in B. D. Şeker, I. Sirkeci, M. M. Yüceşahin (eds.), *Göç ve Uyum*, Transnational Press London, London, 2015, p. 52.

²³⁶ S. Castles, Twenty-First-Century Migration as a Challenge to Sociology, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol.33, No.3, 2007, p. 356.

²³⁷ P. Kivisto, What is the Canonical Theory of Assimilation? Robert E. Park and His Predecessors, *Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 40, No:2, 2004, pp:155-156.

²³⁸ G. Szuberla, Zangwill’s The Melting Pot Plays Chicago, *History and Memory*, Vol.20, No.3, 1995, p. 3.

the locals, **4.** Developing a local sense of peoplehood, or ethnicity, **5.** Reaching a point where they do not face with discriminatory behaviour, **6.** Reaching a point where they encounter with no prejudiced attitudes, **7.** Not raising their demand related to the public or civic life issues including value and power conflict with the originals.²³⁹ Alba and Nee also think that assimilation happens through a boundary-related process and they name them as: “*boundary crossing, boundary blurring, and boundary shifting*”. *Boundary crossing* stands for the classic version of individual-level assimilation meaning that a person moves from one group to another without making a significant change to the boundary itself. *Boundary blurring* signifies that the social profile of a boundary cannot be distinguished, and the clarity of social distinction has become foggy. *Boundary shifting* means that there is a relocation of the boundary which is to say that former outsiders change into insiders.²⁴⁰ Robinson also believes that assimilation consists of stages: “**1.** Arrival, **2.** Secondary group contact: Uniplex relations, which usually happens with members of the host society in the workplace and the area of residence, **3.** Shared membership of instrumental associations, **4.** Primary group contacts: Multiplex relations, such as trade unions, **5.** Acculturation, **6.** Shared identity, **7.** Inter-marriage as well as Political absorption, **8.** Total assimilation”.²⁴¹

Brubaker argues that the term of assimilation can be evaluated as in a way of transitive and intransitive. As a result of the contemporary appreciation of “difference” and “diversity” but also given the fact that there are many historical and comparative evidence which shows that it rarely works and strengthen the differences instead of diminishing, the transitive use of the term of assimilation which means forcing immigrants to “make similar” through state policies and programmes against their will has become disreputable and wrong. Intransitive use of assimilation stands for “becoming similar in certain respects” and it might not be regarded as morally objectionable, analytically useless, or empirically wrong.²⁴²

Morawska considers that assimilation is “a multipath process involving the incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into the economic, political and social institutions, and culture of different segments of the host society: mainstream middle- and rising lower class (so-called upward assimilation), struggling lower- and underclass

²³⁹ M. M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*, 6th edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 1966, pp: 69-70.

²⁴⁰ R. Alba, V. Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp: 60-61.

²⁴¹ A. Bloch, *The Migration and Settlement of Refugees in Britain*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p.156.

²⁴² R. Brubaker, The Return of Assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 24, No.4, p. 534.

(downward assimilation), or immigrant/ ethnic enclave (adhesive assimilation)”²⁴³. It is important to underline that ethnic assimilation rarely happens due to the fact that transnational engagements help immigrants to preserve the ethnic identity.²⁴⁴ Therefore, inspiring from the cultural pluralism which argues that no one can have a chance to select their ancestors, as well as all the ethnicities have values which can be added to the host society, in time the assimilation theories left its place to theories of multiculturalism.²⁴⁵

3.2.2. Theories of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is a relatively new concept that it was not defined in the original *Oxford English Dictionary*, yet it came to existence in the 1989 revised edition.²⁴⁶ Most basically multiculturalism means that minorities and immigrants living in the society can maintain their cultural and ethnical differences, without relinquishing their original identity and without being forced to adopt the ones in the new society. Multiculturalism is an ideology which provides a specific way that defines how the immigrants are going to integrate, and how they are expected to be integrated in the destination country, yet it is also an approach of migrant integration which embraces the differences and diversities in the society where the immigrants are not expected to leave their “original” culture and become identical with the locals in the target country.²⁴⁷

Multiculturalism, according to the Collins Dictionary of Sociology, is “the acknowledgement and promotion of cultural pluralism as a feature of many societies... multiculturalism both celebrates and seeks to protect cultural variety, (e.g., minority languages), while at the same time focusing on the often-unequal relationship of minority to mainstream cultures.”²⁴⁸

According to the IOM glossary, “multiculturalism is a model of integration policies that welcomes the preservation, expression, and sometimes even the celebration of cultural diversity. This approach encourages migrants to become full members of society while retaining their cultural identities. It combines the recognition of varied backgrounds,

²⁴³ E. Morawska, *Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy it Suggests*, in C. Joppke, E. Morawska (eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p.134.

²⁴⁴ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-45.

²⁴⁵ M. K. Şan, I. Haşlak, *Between Assimilation and Multiculturalism Rethinking the American Mainstream*, *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, Vol.7, No.1, 2012, p. 46.

²⁴⁶ N. Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1997, p.8.

²⁴⁷ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, p.221.

²⁴⁸ D. Jary, J. Jary, *Collins Dictionary of Sociology*, Harper Collins, Glasgow, 1991, p.142.

traditions, and ways of seeing the world with certain universalist values, such as the rule of law, or gender equality, that override cultural differences and guarantee the same rights for all. The integration relationship is then best captured in the image of a mosaic enabling minority ethnic groupings to live side by side with the majority constituency.”²⁴⁹

According to Nathan Glazer, multiculturalism is a position-taking which “rejects assimilation and the ‘melting pot’ image as an imposition of the dominant culture, and instead prefers such metaphors as the ‘salad bowl’ or the ‘glorious mosaic’, in which each ethnic and racial element in the population maintains its distinctiveness.”²⁵⁰

Assimilation was main dominant policy domain until the late 1970s; however, assimilationist policies have been in conflict with social realities as a result of immigrants' socioeconomic marginalization and the rise of racism and this resulted in a multiculturalist policy shift in countries where they applied the assimilationist model.²⁵¹ Around the 1960s and 1970s, distancing away from “policies of assimilation of ethnic minorities and immigrants in particular” and shifting to “policies of acceptance and integration of diverse cultures”²⁵², multiculturalism was born as a new public policy first in Canada in 1971 and followingly Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands which are known as the traditional countries of immigration.²⁵³ Multiculturalist shift has two key principles: **1.** social equality and participation and **2.** Cultural recognition: The first key principle is about the necessity of the immigrant participation in all societal institutions through government policies and encouragement given to immigrants to acquire cultural capital (language, cultural knowledge, etc.) as well as human capital (education, vocational training); the second key principle covers the right to maintain their own religion and languages and to build communities to achieve successful settlement.²⁵⁴

The first systematic theory of multiculturalism was provided by Will Kymlicka and provision of basic individual rights to national minorities lies at the heart of his perception of multiculturalism. According to him, minority rights are incompatible with the concept of human rights because some of the most significant and contentious issues pertaining to

²⁴⁹ International Organization for Migration (2019a), *op.cit.*, p. 142.

²⁵⁰ N. Glazer, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

²⁵¹ S. Castles, How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1995, pp. 300-301.

²⁵² C. Kukathas, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, in G. F. Gaus, C. Kukathas (eds.), *Handbook of Political Theory*, Sage, London, 2004, pp. 250-251.

²⁵³ W. Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.179.

²⁵⁴ E. Vasta, *Accommodating diversity: why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point*, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 53, University of Oxford, 2007, p. 7.

cultural minorities cannot be adequately addressed by traditional human rights standards.²⁵⁵ These can be listed as the languages should be recognized in the parliaments, bureaucracies and courts, each ethnic or national group have publicly funded education in its mother tongue, internal boundaries should be drawn so that cultural minorities from majorities in local regions, whether traditional homelands of indigenous peoples should be reserved for their benefit, what degree of cultural integration can be required immigrants seeking citizenship.²⁵⁶ Kymlicka emphasizes that the value of national identity is bond to the value of cultural membership, and what makes cultural membership important is that being a part of a cultural community is necessary for individual autonomy.²⁵⁷ Kymlicka argues that in order to participate within the mainstream institutions and feel more at home in these entities, greater acknowledgement of immigrants' ethnic identities and accommodations for their ethnic traditions are necessary.²⁵⁸ He adds that for a more equitable integration, it is better to revise the terms of integration instead of leaving the goal of integration, by this way, immigrants can integrate into the society in a two-way process by committing to new society and making a new home.²⁵⁹ According to Kymlicka, civic integration is very significant for immigrants' integration into mainstream society and there are core principles which can be listed as: “ – the key role of employment in integration, - respect for basic liberal-democratic values, such as liberty, democracy, human rights, equalities (such as gender equality), and the rule of law, - basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions, - the necessity of antidiscrimination laws and policies.”²⁶⁰

According to Parekh, multiculturalism has three central insights, and these three insights compose the creative interplay of a multicultural perspective: **1.** Human beings come to existence, grow up and live in a culturally embedded world and this shape their cultural identity., **2.** All cultures are different, and these differences should be valued, besides respect should be paid to the culture because of what it means to its members, **3.** Cultures develop through conscious and unconscious interaction with each other and each cultures has

²⁵⁵ W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 4.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

²⁵⁷ W. Kymlicka 2001, *op.cit.*, p.250.

²⁵⁸ W. Kymlicka, Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol.26, No.2, 2010, p. 192.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ W. Kymlicka, *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, 2012, p. 16.

something from other cultures, which makes them rarely sui generis, therefore all cultures can be evaluated “partially multicultural in their origins and constitution”.²⁶¹

Multiculturalism receives some criticism from the scholars, together with analysts, politicians, and activists. According to Kymlicka, liberal multiculturalism can be maintained effortlessly only if the State is well-established on liberal democracy, as well as basic foundational principles such as rule of law and human rights are well guarded.²⁶² Some activists and politicians argue that multiculturalism crystallizes the ethnic and cultural differences, hence this leads to separatism and national disintegration.²⁶³ Especially triggered with the critics noting that multiculturalism strengthens cultural differences, such differences end up with separatism, separateness in return leads to conflict or possible extremism even terrorism, there has been a sharp turn against multiculturalism and furthermore “failure of integration” was largely blamed with the notion of multiculturalism.²⁶⁴ During the last decade, multiculturalism has been devaluated with some declarations by some State leaders emphasizing that the state multiculturalism has been a failure for the States, e.g. In 2011, David Cameron declared that state multiculturalism is dead.²⁶⁵ At the same time, latest patterns of global migration, certain practices among migrant themselves, limited tolerance for minorities, racism, persistence of discrimination, success of populist, anti-immigrant political parties cause questioning the effectiveness and worth of multicultural policies.²⁶⁶

3.2.3. Integration Theories

The emergence of the integration theories dates as back as the early 1920s. The concept of integration was analysed by Park and Burgess in 1921 under the title of assimilation. According to their definition, “assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons

²⁶¹ B. Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, pp. 336-338.

²⁶² W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys Navigating the New Interntional Politics of Diversity*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p.8.

²⁶³ D. Bartram, M. V. Poros, P. Monforte, *op.cit.*, p. 224.

²⁶⁴ S. Vertovec, Towards Post-Multiculturlism? Changing Communities, Conditions, and Contexts of Diversity, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 61., No.199, 2010, p. 86.

²⁶⁵ F. Mathieu, The Failure of state multiculturalism in the UK? An analysis of the UK’s multicultural policy for 2000-2015, *Ethnicities*, Vol. 18, No.1, 2017, p.43.

²⁶⁶ S. Vertovec, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-86.

or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.”²⁶⁷

One of the first theories of integration was proposed by Karl Marx and his theory of integration mainly focused on the role and the inclusion of immigrants who have a rural background, into “the working class of industrial and capitalist-oriented host societies”, therefore the core of his integration theory lies on “the emergence of the separation between *foreign* and *autochthonous* workers and how it could be deconstructed”.²⁶⁸

One of the first users of the word of “integration” in their scientific works is the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim. Durkheim developed a specific theory of social integration. According to him, individuals come together and construct the society. Durkheim argued that social facts can be analysed as objects: Just like a biologist investigating the human body, Durkheim claimed that each separate part of body -such as the brain, heart, lungs, and liver- can be studied and if these parts work in harmony with each other, the life of the organism can survive smoothly, in other words, the continuation of a society depends on cooperation.²⁶⁹ Evolution of societies, individual-society relation and consensus in the society can be explained by the division of labour. “Solidarity arising from the division of labour, or organic solidarity”²⁷⁰ is crucial for the societies because the social cohesion can only be maintained by the division of labour and specialization. The division of labour brings social differentiation, and in case of lack of integration, this leads society to anomie and suicide.²⁷¹

Another important scholar working on integration in the 1950s was an American sociologist Talcott Parsons. He focused on creating a system of certain functions by applying which a society can sustain a stable social life. According to him, an actor's interactions with other actors make up a social system and the relationship between the actors constructs the network.²⁷² Parsons argues that there are four societal functions on the social system which is known as A.G.I.L. paradigm (the acronym of the first letters of adaptation of the environment, goal-attainment, integration, latent pattern maintenance). The ‘A’ function adaptation needs to deal with the external environmental problems; the ‘G’ function goal-

²⁶⁷ R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to The Science of Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1921, p. 735.

²⁶⁸ C. Giordano, Paradigms of Migration: From Integration to Transnationalism, *Kultura IR Visuomene Socialiniu tyrimu zurnalas*, Vol. 1, No.2, 2010, p. 14-15.

²⁶⁹ A. Giddens et al., *Introduction to Sociology*, 11th ed., W. W. Norton & Company, New York, p.12.

²⁷⁰ E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p. 68.

²⁷¹ E. Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 262.

²⁷² T. Parsons, *The Social System*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 15.

attainment stands for the goals and the motivation of the societies and mobilization of resources to achieve these goals; the 'I' function integration is necessary to create a cohesive and harmonious system, all the institutions of the society should be regulated in order not to face with major conflictual disruptions; the 'L' function latent pattern-maintenance/tension-management refers to the processes in which the social system preserves normative patterns and regulates the strains and tensions of the actors.²⁷³

Following years, some leading sociologists developed social-/system-integration separation based on their reading of Talcott Parsons. The first sociologist who used the social integration notion was the British sociologist, David Lockwood. In 1964, he made a distinction between the system integration and social integration in his article titled "Social Integration and System Integration". According to him, social integration refers to "the orderly or conflictual relationships between the actors" while the system integration tries to define the incompatible/contradictory relationships between "parts of the social system".²⁷⁴ A German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas followed the Lockwood's social-/system-integration distinction. For Habermas, social integration stands for an internalist, agency-oriented view of the social world, while system integration places a strong emphasis on an externalist perspective that transcends action orientations.²⁷⁵ In 1984, Anthony Giddens defined the integration as the process of "involving reciprocity of practices (of autonomy and dependence) between actors or collectivities" and he added that social integration implies "systemness on the level of face-to-face interaction" while the system integration speaks about "the connections with those who are physically absent in time or space".²⁷⁶

During the recent years, some scholars have been discussing if integration can be maintained and even some refuses to go deep in the topic because it is in vain to debate over a non-existent subject. There are many anti-integration theories which are important to highlight in this section. For instance, Boswell argues that the concept of integration has a broad meaning: economic and social integration is the easiest to define since it means an access to labour market, education, and welfare systems; while cultural integration stands

²⁷³ A. J. Trevino, Parson's Action-System Requisite Model and Weber's Elective Affinity A Convergence of Convenience, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 5, No: 3, 2005, p. 322.

²⁷⁴ N. Mouzelis, Social and System Integration: Lockwood, Habermas, Giddens, *Sociology*, Vol. 31, No.1, 1997, p. 111.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁷⁶ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, University of California Press, Glasgow, 1984, p. 28.

for learning the host country's language, adopting the societies basic norms, and on the other hand, political integration means to have right to vote and participate for elections which is seen as the final step of the successful integration. However, immigrants are expected to maintain the national and ideological aspects of the receiving society which could lead to assimilation and multiculturalism.²⁷⁷

Schinkel criticizes and stands against for the concept of integration for three main reasons: 1. research on immigrant integration is conceptually weak (or absent), especially in terms of the idea of society; 2. monitoring of immigrant integration is a neo-colonial knowledge form that is intricately linked to the current power structures; 3. social sciences should focus on what happens when migrants move across social ecologies instead of resorting to common-sense and/or policy categories.²⁷⁸

As a reply to Schinkel's "Against immigrant integration", Favel also provides twelve propositions in order to re-evaluate the academic use of the concept of "integration" in migration studies. He argues that integration measures are nothing different than assimilation measures. Integration is a theoretical concept, it should not be used in place of "insertion", "inclusion" or "adaptation". It is inappropriate to discuss "national integration" in the modern world system, otherwise it would be much correct to call it "global or planetary integration". Therefore, today's discussion of the immigrant integration into the "national" societies is normative. Integration might result in rigidity, conformity, fixed differentiations, and closure such as in North Korea or East Germany. National integration which is also tested via integration tests means adjusting immigrant with the norms of mainstream society which could be interpreted as structural assimilation. Currently, what is called as an integration by the nation-states is differentiating the national society from the immigrants; in fact, as a sociological concept, it should mean vice-versa. The core aim of integration should support individual to become modern and global. According to him, there are global inequalities which are built on the inequalities of nationality: e.g., being a UK (United Kingdom) citizen is different from being a Somalian citizen, also border controls play a great role on production and continuation of these inequalities; hence, if current sense of integration ignores this fact, inequalities become worse. Anti-migration standing gives

²⁷⁷ C. Boswell, *European Migration Policies in Flux Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2013, pp.75-76.

²⁷⁸ W. Schinkel, Against 'immigrant integration': for an end to neocolonial knowledge production, *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol. 6., No. 31, 2018, p. 1.

political power to the States and the people, it also lies in the quintessence of sovereignty; this is a coproduction and it equally effects integration.²⁷⁹

3.3. Indicators of Integration


3.3.1. Ager and Strang

Alastair Ager and Alison Strang prepared a report about the integration of refugees to the UK for the Home Office in 2002. With this report, they intended to improve understanding of what refugee integration means and tried to define the concept of integration, believing that establishing a solid foundation for discussion on questions of integration policy and practice would be highly beneficial.²⁸⁰ In order to support and assist the local projects and policy makers, Ager and Strang created a framework which is designed around ten key domains covering the themes: employment, housing, education, health, social bridges, social bonds, social links, language and cultural knowledge, safety and stability, rights & citizenship; and grouped under four headings: means and markers, social connections, facilitators, foundation as shown in the chart below:

²⁷⁹ A. Favell, Integration: twelve propositions after Schinkel, *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol.7, No:21, 2019, pp.: 1-8.

²⁸⁰ A. Ager, A. Strang, *Indicator of Integration Final Report*, Home Office Development and Practice Report No.28, London, 2004, p.2.

Table 10: The Indicators of Integration Framework



Source: A. Ager, A. Strang, Indicator of Integration Final Report, Home Office Development and Practice Report No.28, London, 2004, p.3.

According to Ager and Strang, *markers and means* are the most critical factors and key aspects of the integration process. Employment, housing, education, and health fall under this heading. These are widely regarded as the signs of successful integration. Becoming a “full and equal citizens” can be possible around such themes. *Employment* has an impact on various areas such as gaining economic independence, future-planning, interaction with the host society, improving language skills, restoring self-esteem, and encouraging self-reliance. *Housing* helps to produce the feeling of at home which has a significant effect on refugees’ overall physical and emotional well-being. While safety and security sensation booster the integration process, the relation with the neighbourhood can impact the feeling of being settled. *Education* is considered as one of the most supportive factors of effective integration process. It helps to build skills and competences which later brings the employment opportunity, to establish relationships with the local community, to support the host-society language learning. *Health* is necessary for the active engagement in a new society. Reliable access to health services, health care delivery to improve the physical

and mental health needs, health provision within the mainstream are the core elements of the integration.²⁸¹

They also argue that *social connection* is very important and plays a great role in the process of integration at a local level. Many definitions of integration emphasize that integration is a two-way process, therefore deep and good social connection between the refugees and the other members of the host communities foster the integration process and help to shape the sense of belonging, create shared values, and enable the absence of conflict. *Social bonds* describe the proximity to familiar patterns of relationship. Being close to family members play a crucial role to make them feel settled. *Social bridges* bring two sides of the community together via social activities including sports, religious worship, community groups and political activity which empower harmony among them and bring long-term social and economic benefits. *Social links* describe the link between the individual and structures of the state. For instance, lack of language knowledge, and having difficulty to access to services may end up with creating barriers.²⁸²

Ager and Strang indicated that *facilitators* help to remove barriers before economic and social participation in mainstream society. When refugees feel familiar themselves with the language and culture and assured them safe and secured within the community, local integration can take place much more easily. *Language and cultural knowledge* facilitate the social relations between the refugees and the wider community. Language knowledge enables the social integration, economic integration, and full participation, while cultural competence diminishes the risk of isolation and being alienating. *Safety and stability* have wide implications for refugee integration and are important to support the role of social connection. While the sense of safety and stability maintains the peaceful feeling within community, it also enables effective access to public services.²⁸³

According to them, *foundation* includes the fundamental understanding of the rights accorded and responsibilities expected of refugees, and these can be measured via several tools. *Rights* may cover the notions of human dignity, equality, freedom of cultural choice, justice, security, and independence as well as the rights of citizenship, family reunification and equality in legislation and policies. *Citizenship* is regarded as the necessary condition for integration and full civic participation, including political engagement. Rights and

²⁸¹ A. Ager, A. Strang, Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol.21, No.2, 2008, pp.: 169-173.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, pp.: 177-181.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.: 181-184.

citizenship are the basis for full and equal engagement within the host society which may lead to permanent stay.²⁸⁴

3.3.2. Macro Integration Indicators

The studies on the integration and integration indicators were accelerated when the millennium years started. However, the first steps towards the migrant integration indicators in Europe was taken by the projects entitled “The integration of immigrants: towards equal opportunities” (1991 to 1996) and “Tensions and tolerance: building better integrated communities across Europe” (1996-2000) by the Council of Europe.²⁸⁵ Nevertheless, it was emphasized in the report published in 1997 that finding a coherent set of indicators and the measurement of integration were quite hard given the fact that immigrant origins, or ethnic or religious affiliations, education, labour skills vary from one to another.²⁸⁶

From the European Union perspective, the first initiative was taken in 2004. The Council of the European Union, Justice and the Home Affairs Council held a meeting in Brussels and debated several topics including the immigrant integration policy in the European Union. In this meeting, it was stressed that immigration would continue to be a permanent feature for the European Union; therefore, for the sake of managing migration better and given the shared interest of the Member States, the development and implementation of a set of EU common integration policy is essential.²⁸⁷ The European 2010-2014 Stockholm Programme indicated to develop a system of core indicators in a limited number of relevant policy areas (e.g. employment, education and social inclusion) to monitor and compare the results of integration policies, national experiences and strengthen the European learning process.²⁸⁸ In 2010, the ministers responsible for integration came together in Zaragoza meeting and agreed on the EU Common Basic Principles for immigrants integration on the policy areas of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship and core indicators based on existing and comparable data for most

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.: 173-177.

²⁸⁵ Council of Europe, *Political and Social Participation of Immigrants Through Consultative Bodies*, CDMG (99) 21, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1999, p. 5.

²⁸⁶ Council of Europe, *Measurement and indicators of integration*, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1997, p. 107.

²⁸⁷ Council of the European Union, *Press Release*, 2618th Council Meeting, 14615/04 (Presse 321), Brussels, 2004, pp.: 15-16.

²⁸⁸ European Council, *The Stockholm Programme – An Open And Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens*, (2010/C 115/01), Official Journal of the European Union, p.30.

Member States, limited in number, comparable in time, productive and cost-effective, simple to understand and easy to communicate, focused on outcome.²⁸⁹

Table 11: The List of Zaragoza indicators and proposed additional indicators.

List of Zaragoza indicators and proposed additional indicators

	EMPLOYMENT	EDUCATION	SOCIAL INCLUSION	ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP	WELCOMING SOCIETY
ZARAGOZA INDICATORS	Employment rate	Highest educational attainment	At-risk-of-poverty (and social exclusion)	Naturalisation rate	Perceived experience of discrimination (survey)*
	Unemployment rate	Tertiary attainment	Income	Share of long-term residence	Trust in public institutions (survey)*
	Activity rate	Early school leaving	Self-reported health status (controlling for age)	Share of elected representatives (research)*	Sense of belonging (survey)*
	Self-employment	Low-achievers (PISA)	Property ownership	Voter turnout (research)*	
	Over-qualification	Language skills of non-native speakers (LFS module)**			
PROPOSED NEW INDICATORS	Public sector employment	Early childhood education and care (SILC/PISA)**	Child poverty (SILC)	Participation in voluntary organisations (survey)*	Public perception of racial/ethnic discrimination (Eurobarometer)
	Temporary employment	Participation in lifelong learning (LFS, AES)	Self-reported unmet need for medical care (SILC)	Membership in trade unions (survey)*	Public attitudes to political leader with ethnic minority background (Eurobarometer)
	Part-time employment	Not in education, employment or training (LFS)	Life expectancy (SILC)	Membership in political parties (survey)*	
	Long-term unemployment	Resilient students (PISA)**	Healthy life years (SILC)	Political activity (survey)*	
	Share of foreign-diplomas recognised (survey)**	Concentration in low-performing schools (PISA)**	Housing cost overburden (SILC)**		
	Retention of international students (research)*		Overcrowding (SILC)**		
			In-work poverty-risk (SILC)		
			Persistent poverty-risk (SILC)		

Source: T. Huddleston, J. Niessen, J. D. Tjaden, *Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration, Final Report for Directorate-General for Home Affairs*, The European Commission, Brussels, 2013, p. 25.

On the Zaragoza integration indicators, there are four prioritised key areas which are selected according to the common basic principles: Employment is a crucial part of the integration process, and education is a sine qua non for immigrants to achieve their goals in life and become an active member of the society. Social inclusion is highly significant in terms of accessing to the labour market as well as entering into the society in a broad sense. To make the integration process more effective and boost their sense of belonging, the participation of immigrants in the democratic process as active citizens plays a supportive role for their integration into the society. The EU's migrant integration indicators conduct

²⁸⁹ Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Integration as a Driver for Development and Social Cohesion*, 9248/10, Brussels, 4 May 2010, p. 14.

the analysis by using the Eurostat's data. Three main policy purposes are determined as the key purposes which are followingly: better comprehension of integration contexts and immigrant's integration outcomes, assessing the results of the integration policies, and mainstreaming integration into general policies.²⁹⁰

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is one of the most globally used indicators which is a very useful tool to measure integration in 8 policy areas in 56 countries across six continents. The main aim of the index is to evaluate and compare what countries are doing to integrate the immigrants into the host societies. MIPEX intends to determine the highest and newest European and International standards aimed to remove obstacles and maintain equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for all residents. Using a core set of indicators, MIPEX identifies and measures integration policies in countries, and associates the links between integration policies, outcomes and public opinion based on international scientific studies.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ European Commission, *EU 'Zaragoza' Integration Indicators: Italy*, 11 April 2016, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/eu-zaragoza-integration-indicators-italy_en , Accessed on: 01.01.2022.

²⁹¹ G. Solano, T. Huddleston, *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020*, Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) Barcelona, Migration Policy Group (MPG) Brussels, 2020, pp.:5-6.

Table 12: The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)²⁹²



According to Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, there are multiple factors that affect the integration of immigrants into the host societies. In 2020 MIPEX conducted the assessment with a wide range of policy areas: Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, Education, Political Participation, Permanent Residence, Access to Nationality, Anti-discrimination, and Health. Labour market mobility is very important not only that it provides a career but also it helps for the public acceptance. Under well-developed policies, immigrants are more likely to gain greater professional capabilities and improve their language skills, while the residents see them as an economic opportunity than as a competition or threat. Family reunion has a major impact on the well-being of the immigrants. Under inclusive policies, immigrants tend to reunite, settle down in the country, find jobs and have a better accommodation to live and age with dignity. Education helps students with immigrant background achieve their academic goals, yet the positive effects of education are not limited with this. Under the well-structured education policies,

²⁹² The graphic is based on the Mipex Policy Areas: Available at: <https://www.mipex.eu>

immigrants feel themselves safe and secure in the schools, and develop a sense of pride and belonging as their local peers. Political participation gives immigrants an opportunity to make their voices be heard and a chance to improve public life and attitudes. Inclusive policies boost trust and satisfaction in general due to the fact that immigrants are more likely to vote in the elections, join the political groups and parties and take democratic actions such as protests, boycotts etc. Overtime, immigrants develop a sense of a common civic rather than ethnic identity. Permanent residence is a fundamental step on the way to the full citizenship and better integration outcomes. Under inclusive policies, permanent residence helps immigrants to stay long-term, settle down and secure better jobs. Access to nationality increases naturalisation rates and improve integration outcomes. By having the citizenship, immigrants benefit many elements such as having dual nationality, ameliorating socio-economic status, developing sense of belonging and trust and being accepted by the public. Discrimination is likely to happen in all societies, however where there are strong anti-discrimination policies, immigrants can be more aware of their rights, have a greater trust in the police and legal system, likewise this can boost the trust in society and the country's democratic system. Healthcare is one of the fields encountered with administrative barriers. Under restrictive policies, immigrants tend to develop poor health conditions, frailty and even mortality comparing to non-immigrants residents of the society.²⁹³

In brief, the indicators adopted at the Zaragoza meeting and the MIPEX also examine and assess the functioning of state measures and regulations for the integration of migrants at national level. This is a macro-level approach only in that it allows for a comparison of the effectiveness of integration policies of Member States/receiving countries, and thus for some explanation and forecasting of secondary movements in a given region. This overcomes the problem that integration measures are largely the responsibility of Member States, but their impact is transnational, and if individual Member States require external support for national regulations and measures, comparability and knowledge of the regional context can help in determining such support and support instruments. Thus, explain how academic and practical results on assessment of integration shall be implemented in an amalgam.

²⁹³ Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, *Measuring Policies to Integrate Migrants across six continents*, available at: <https://www.mipex.eu> , accessed on: 08.01.2022.

3.4. The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027

According to statistics, the birth places of the 34 million EU residents, approximately 8% of the EU population are not from any Member States of the EU, additionally 10% residents who are between 15 to 34 born in the EU while one of their parents was born in a foreign country; therefore, individuals with a migrant heritage constitutes a great part of EU residents.²⁹⁴ However, they still encounter with several challenges to access to certain rights such as education, job market, health services, and social inclusion.²⁹⁵ Therefore, the EU prepared a strategic framework the so-called “Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027” to address the integration of migrants and to promote inclusion.

A comprehensive integration and inclusion policy highlighted as an important component of the efficient and well-directed migration and asylum policy on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.²⁹⁶ The fundamental principles and core values of the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion are listed as such: “Inclusion for all”, “Targeted support where needed”, “Mainstreaming gender and anti-discrimination priorities”, “Support at all stages of the integration process”, “Maximising EU added value through multi-stakeholder partnerships”.²⁹⁷

The development and implementation of social policies falls under the responsibility of national governments, but the EU also gives an important help to Member States by providing financial support, defining guidelines and encouraging partnerships in this field with immigrants, host societies, social and economic counterparties, civil and private sector.²⁹⁸ The main action areas have been addressed as: “inclusive education and training”,

²⁹⁴ European Commission, *Inclusion for all: Commission presents action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027*, 24 November 2020, Brussels, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2178, Accessed on: 22.08.2023.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ European Commission, *Action Plan on the integration and inclusion*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion_en#:~:text=The%20Action%20plan%20on%20Integration,as%20gender%20or%20religious%20background., Accessed on: 22.08.2023.

²⁹⁷ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027*, 24.11.2020, Brussels, COM(2020) 758 final.

²⁹⁸ European Commission, *Action Plan on the integration and inclusion*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion_en#:~:text=The%20Action%20plan%20on%20Integration,as%20gender%20or%20religious%20background., Accessed on: 22.08.2023.

“improving employment opportunities and skills recognition”, “promote access to health”, “adequate and affordable housing”.²⁹⁹

3.5. Temporary Protection, Integration, and Onward Migration

Temporary protection is regarded as addition to the international refugee protection system to maintain rapid protection, grant access to legal status, and to give rights for the displaced people.³⁰⁰ The European Commission defines the temporary protection as “an exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from non-EU countries who are unable to return to their country of origin.”³⁰¹ A new survey on temporary protection (TPs) by the IOM in 2023 confirms how the intention for secondary migration is strongly connected to proper information, language barriers, provided-assistance, and resources. As of May 2023, more than 4 million Ukrainians were granted the statuses of temporary protection in EU Member States.³⁰² Naturally, the Ukrainians’ reception and free choice are differing from Syrian refugees’ conditions, but human aspirations and needs are the same.

According to the IOM, the Russian-Ukrainian war has caused more than 6.2 million people to leave Ukraine and more than 5.2 million people to move elsewhere within the country. In the survey "Needs, Intentions and Integration Challenges of Ukrainian Refugees in Hungary"³⁰³, IOM interviewed 413 people to better understand current patterns and their changing needs. The surveys were conducted in Budapest and at the Záhony railway station. The average age of the respondents was 41 years (40 for women and 47 for men).³⁰⁴

There is still a great need for Ukrainian refugees to be informed about where they can turn for concrete help, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said in its latest survey, conducted between April and June. Nearly 40 percent of those arriving in Ukraine did not know where and from whom they could ask for help.³⁰⁵

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ UNHCR, *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022*, p. 30, Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/global-trends-report-2022.pdf>, Accessed on: 24.08.2023.

³⁰¹ European Commission, *Temporary Protection*, Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/temporary-protection_en, Accessed on: 24.08.2023.

³⁰² Eurostat, *31 May 2023: over 4 million – temporary protection in the EU*, 7 July 2023, Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230707-1>, Accessed on: 24.08.2023.

³⁰³ IOM, *Hungary Surveys with Refugees from Ukraine: Needs, Intentions & Integration Challenges*, April-June 2023, Country Reports & Data Analysis, 2023.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.7.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.17.

One question in the survey asked whether refugees plan to stay in Hungary in the longer term. Forty-four per cent of respondents said they would not move from their current place of residence, while 30 per cent would only stay temporarily in the country.³⁰⁶ Popular destinations include Germany, Austria, Italy, and Turkey. Around 11 per cent were thinking of returning to Ukraine, and another 11 per cent of respondents were not sure whether to stay or move.³⁰⁷

The vast majority of those who would go back to Ukraine would go to the same region they came from. They would go back mainly because of their families and lack of resources. The data also shows that many (69%) would only stay in their actual location of residence for less than a week. A fifth (23%) would stay for less than a month, with smaller proportions planning to stay for one to three months (2%), three to six months (1%) and six months to a year (1%).³⁰⁸

The research showed that the most urgent needs identified by displaced people on arrival were financial support and transport. The proportion of people needing financial assistance has increased dramatically, from 27% in the previous quarter to 51%. The need for transport assistance has also increased, with 49% of arrivals needing this type of assistance. Other practical needs changed little between the two data collection periods. Almost two thirds of respondents (62%) indicated that they had received some sort of help in Hungary. The most common were assistance with transport (80%) and food (55%). This was followed by accommodation and financial assistance, but refugees also received hygiene items, clothes, vouchers, and language courses. Importantly, 36% of respondents did not know where or who to turn to for help, and 58% of them needed more information about financial support. Information on general information, long-term accommodation, transport, and food assistance was also felt to be lacking.³⁰⁹

More than half of refugees cited lack of language skills as the most important barrier to social integration. This proportion was close to 60 percent in the previous survey, from where it fell to 53 percent. This was followed by financial difficulties, which rose from 25 to 33 percent. In the current survey, fewer respondents cited lack of long-term housing and access to social services as barriers. 24 percent of respondents enrolled their child in a Hungarian school, while 24 percent enrolled their child in online classes provided by the

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.9.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.11.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.9.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-20.

Ukrainian educational institution as well as in the Hungarian school. one-third of refugees' children study exclusively online. Six per cent have not enrolled their child, but plan to do so. Nearly 94 per cent of respondents said they had not experienced any discrimination, 6 per cent had.³¹⁰

Taking everything into account, it may be said that the findings of the survey point out that there is a significant need for a thorough and well-coordinated integration strategy and implementation in the EU to address the challenges of the temporary protected individuals. As the survey points out that the intention of the onward migration is closely associated with lack of knowledge and information, receiving aid, encountering language obstacles, last but not least access to rights and resources in the host countries.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” [asked Alice]

“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat.

Alice in Wonderland

chapter vi

4. International Context of Syrian Migration

4.1. International Context of Syrian Migration and Europe

If we were supposed to summarize the beginning of the 21st century with one word, that word would definitely be “crisis”: terrorist crisis which began with 9/11 attacks and still be an issue in the international agendas of the States; natural disasters which caused deaths of millions of people as well as humanitarian crisis; financial crisis which majorly affected negatively the economies of the small countries such as Greece; so-called refugee crises stemmed from the turmoil in the permanent crisis lands of the Middle East especially in Syria and its surroundings; Brexit crisis within the European Union.³¹¹ And at the time of writing this chapter, we are in the middle of another global crisis also known as the Covid-19 crisis which has led to dramatic loss of human lives worldwide and not only has still been challenging the public health with new variants of the virus but also continues to impact social, political and economic systems in a new-normal world order. However, it is quite mind-bending that no matter how restricted the human mobility has ever been, since the beginning of the pandemic, around 40.5 million new displacements were recorded in 2020, the highest figure in ten years.³¹² The number of people displaced by violence, persecution and civil strife continued to increase during 2020 and over the past year, the Covid-19 pandemic aggravated existing humanitarian and protection challenges.³¹³

The latest crisis of the 21st century is currently taking place in the territory of Ukraine where the Russian invasion caused so many people to fled to seek shelter in different

³¹¹ J. Krecic, *The Final Countdown of Lessons to Be Learned from Comedy and Antihumanism*, in J. Krecic (ed.), *The Final Countdown: Europe, Refugees, and the Left*, Ljubljana: Irwin; Vienna: Wiener Festwochen, 2017, p. 9.

³¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

³¹³ United Nations Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *General Assembly Official Records, Seventy-Sixth Session Supplement No.12, A/76/12*, New York, 2021, p. 1.

countries of Europe. Not long after the crisis started, the EU did not lose any time to implement immediate actions to assist the refugees: temporary protection scheme was activated for the people escaping from the war, EUR 523 million was allocated for humanitarian assistance, civil protection help was provided to Ukraine, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, the Republic of Moldova and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), financial and technical support have been extended to the member states which receive the refugees, and the EU also offered border management assistance for the EU countries as well as Moldova.³¹⁴ Unlike other nationals coming from the conflict areas such as Middle East, many Ukrainian nationals can enter the Schengen area of the European Union without a visa. The war activated the discussions of the temporary protection directive in the EU under the Dublin III regime. As of March 2023, 4 million people from Ukraine were granted temporary protection within the EU covering their rights to have a residence permit, access to housing and the job market, health care and children's access to education.³¹⁵

The people fleeing from Ukraine sought shelter primarily in the neighbouring countries, and they were sincerely welcomed not only by the local society who gathered with the civil initiative along the border to hand them food and basic needs but also by the politicians who supported them with immediate policy changes. Poland, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, France, Belgium, and Denmark offered free rail transport for the ones who hold a Ukrainian passport or ID card fleeing from the war exempting them from the ticket charges.³¹⁶ Some telecommunication companies provided the calls and text messages to Ukraine without any cost.³¹⁷ Some European countries such as Slovakia and Poland declared an open-door policy and permitted Ukrainians to enter their countries even in the absence of proper passports or other travel documents.³¹⁸ Meanwhile,

³¹⁴ European Council, *Refugee inflow from Ukraine*, Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/refugee-inflow-from-ukraine/>, Accessed on: 15.08.2023.

³¹⁵ European Council, *Infographic – Refugees from Ukraine in the EU*, Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/>, Accessed on: 10.08.2023.

³¹⁶ S. G. Carroll, EU rail companies offer fleeing Ukrainians free travel, *Euractiv*, 28 February 2022, Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/railways/news/eu-rail-companies-offer-fleeing-ukrainians-free-travel/>, Accessed on: 10.08.2023.

³¹⁷ “Deutsche Telekom introduces free-of-charge calls to Ukraine”, *Reuters*, 25 February 2022, Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/deutsche-telekom-introduces-free-of-charge-calls-ukraine-2022-02-25/>, Accessed on: 10.08.2023.

³¹⁸ R. Reilly, M. Flynn, *op.cit.*, p.1.

some EU governments such as Ireland, made an emergency measure to all Ukrainians coming to Ireland removing the visa requirements between Ukraine and Ireland.³¹⁹

On 4 March 2022, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection directive which was originally approved in 2001 as a response to the unprecedented displacement which happened aftermath of the armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, mostly affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.³²⁰ This fact brought different questions including the free movement (whether one can enjoy temporary protection in case of secondary movement) or transferring them to the first country of refuge would be available or not.³²¹ However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine in Spring 2022 gave impetus to the application of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. The EU Commissioner Janez Lenarcic referred to the Ukrainian influx to the European Union as “the largest humanitarian crisis on our European continent in many, many years”³²², but in fact, it is crucial to highlight here that the continent encountered with another serious humanitarian challenge which was triggered by the Syrian Civil War in 2015; and the responses given by the EU to these two “crises” have been completely different; besides, the difference between the responses also shed light on the reasons why the people escaping from Ukraine - especially the ones from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East- are not receiving the equal level of treatment as the nationals of Ukraine.³²³

What the EU did not do with the influx of Syrian refugees in 2015, the EU has now done: Ukrainians in need of international protection can choose freely between EU Member States and Ukrainians with biometric passports can stay and travel freely in the EU for 90

³¹⁹ Government of Ireland, Department of Justice; Department of Foreign Affairs, *Minister McEntee announces immediate lifting of visa requirements between Ukraine and Ireland*, 25.02.2022, Available at: <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/00aef-minister-mcentee-announces-immediate-lifting-of-visa-requirements-between-ukraine-and-ireland/>, Accessed on: 10.08.2023.

³²⁰ European Council, *Infographic- EU temporary protection for displaced persons*, Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/temporary-protection-displaced-persons/#:~:text=The%20temporary%20protection%20was%20initially,another%20year%2C%20until%20March%202025.>, Accessed on: 12.08.2023.

³²¹ D. Thym, *Temporary Protection for Ukrainians: the Unexpected Renaissance of ‘Free Choice’*, EU Migration Law Blog, 07.03.2022, available at: <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/temporary-protection-for-ukrainians-the-unexpected-renaissance-of-free-choice/>, accessed on: 11.04.2022.

³²² “Russian invasion risks displacing more than 7 million Ukrainians, says EU crisis commissioner”, *France 24*, 27/02/2022, Available: <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220227-europe-must-prepare-for-millions-of-ukrainian-refugees-eu-commissioner-says>, Accessed on: 10.08.2023.

³²³ R. Reilly, M. Flynn, *The Ukraine Crisis Double Standards: Has Europe’s Response to Refugees Changed?*, Global Detention Project, 2022, p. 1.

days. Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated that: “These are not the refugees we are used to. As the Austrian chancellor said, these are our relatives, family. These are Europeans, intelligent, educated people, some of them are programmers. We, like everyone else, are ready to welcome them. This is not the usual refugee wave of people with an unclear past. None of the European countries is worried about them.”³²⁴ Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban also welcomed Ukrainians stating that “one doesn’t have to be a ‘rocket scientist’ to see the difference between ‘masses arriving from Muslim regions in hope of a better life in Europe’ and helping Ukrainian refugees who have come to Hungary because of the war.”³²⁵ In this statement, Orban was referring to Syrian refugees who arrived to Europe in 2015. Back then, he made very harsh comments about migration referring the refugees as “Muslim invaders” and “migrants as a ‘poison’”.³²⁶ Comparing the leaders’ welcoming discourses for Ukrainian refugees to “the refugee crisis in 2015”, there is a very wide disparity. On the top of that, the people escaping from Ukraine especially the ones from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East did not receive the equal level of treatment as the nationals of Ukraine. These differential treatment to the refugees in the EU brought the questions of discrimination and double standards.

According to Addie Esposito, there are four main reasons behind this differential treatment: 1. Islamophobia biases how refugees are treated; Ukrainian Christians treated better than Muslim refugees who were exposed to xenophobia and some studies supported this fact by showing lower Muslim asylum approval rates, especially boosted by the anti-Muslim rhetoric like Orban’s and the assumption that Middle Eastern refugees are terrorists rising the security concerns of public, 2. Prejudices based on religion and race have a direct impact on the treatment of refugees: due to their shared values and identity, the Ukrainian refugees received favourable treatment, while the refugees whose origins are from Africa, the Middle East and Asia encountered with unequal treatment although they all flee from the same conflict, which highlights superficial European solidarity, 3. Racism rooted media coverage also has an influence on refugee treatment. Semantics plays a great role in shaping

³²⁴ European Commission, *Bulgaria takes first steps to welcome those fleeing Ukraine*, 10 March 2022, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/bulgaria-takes-first-steps-welcome-those-fleeing-ukraine_en, Accessed on: 12.08.2023.

³²⁵ PM Orban: Every refugee arriving in Hungary from Ukraine must be helped, *About Hungary*, 28 February 2022, Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/pm-orban-every-refugee-arriving-in-hungary-from-ukraine-must-be-helped>, Accessed on: 13.08.2023.

³²⁶ A. Pearson, *Viktor Orban’s most controversial migration comments*, Deutsche Well, 01/09/2018, Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/viktor-orbans-most-controversial-migration-comments/g-42086054>, Accessed on: 13.08.2023.

public perception of their legitimacies: While Ukrainians were labelled as “refugees” which refers a force migration, Middle Eastern and African refugees were addressed also as “migrants” which can be interpreted as a voluntary movement. 4. The crisis in Ukraine had an extensive global coverage and this fact brought geopolitical implications, as the way how the EU responses to the refugee crisis also shows its stand against Russia. Without engaging in direct military action, the EU has demonstrated its support for Ukrainian sovereignty and resistance to Russian aggression by welcoming Ukrainian refugees and sanctioning Russia with economic measure.³²⁷

So, beyond the differential treatment of the EU, this is further evidence of how international solidarity is a major determinant of migration routes and admission, and how migratory pressures affect regional relations.

But what boosted the Syrian migration to the EU? How did everything start? In a world of crisis like this, one of the most suffered countries has been Syria because of the fact that every hour of every day since 2011, 50 Syrian families have become internally displaced and forced to migrate.³²⁸ The main reason behind these movements were the first wave of the Arab uprisings which is also known as the Arab Spring. It all was started when Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest humiliation by the police, and later demonstrations erupted and spread around the country against the regime in December 2010.³²⁹ Rapidly, a domino effect occurred across the Middle East and anti-government protests were taken place largely in other countries in the region, including Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Mauritania, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. Every uprising in each country was based on a different reason but mainly originated from the internal problems such as: a lack of democracy, human rights violations, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, rising food prices, and some demographic factors.³³⁰ The Arab uprisings resulted not only in significant transformations such as establishment of new governments in Egypt and Tunisia, but also induced limited

³²⁷ A. Esposito, The Limitations of Humanity: Differential Refugee Treatment in the EU, *Harvard International Review*, 14.09.2022, Available at: <https://hir.harvard.edu/the-limitations-of-humanity-differential-refugee-treatment-in-the-eu/>, Accessed on: 13.08.2022.

³²⁸ Amnesty International, *World leaders in London must deliver transformational new deal for Syrian refugees and host countries*, 3 February 2016, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/world-leaders-in-london-must-deliver-transformational-new-deal-for-syrian-refugees-and-host-countries-1/>, accessed on: 16.01.2022.

³²⁹ K. Dalacoura, The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-)*, Vol. 88, No.1, 2012, pp.: 63-64.

³³⁰ E. N. Rozsa et. al., *The Arab Spring - Its Impact on the Region and on the Middle East Conference*, Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East Policy Brief, Nos. 9/10, 2012, p. 1.

reforms on constitutions in others including Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco.³³¹ The events in Syria was initiated in the southern town of Dar'a on March 18, 2011 by young school children who drew a graffiti on school wall which read, "It's your turn now doctor!"³³² referring the Syria's president Bashar al-Assad who trained as an ophthalmologist, and "people want the overthrow of the regime", a slogan that was used in Egyptian uprising, which caused them to be arrested and later protests were started by the public for the release of the children³³³ as well as for greater political freedom, and to revile the government corruption.³³⁴ The protests grew bigger and bigger in the country wide as the government gave a brutal reaction and tried to suppress the demonstrations using violence.

The crisis lasted more than three years and each day it became more complicated. Although the international conferences were arranged to stabilize the situation, none of them could lead to a happy end. The international public opinion created different groups, and Murat Erdoğan listed them as such: 1. The Group of Friends of the Syrian People, this is the group which openly declares themselves as the friends of Syrian people and put a distance between the Syrian people and the regime; 2. The Group of Friends of the Syrian Regime, this group does not officially exists but it refers to the countries which do not want the overthrow of the regime for the sake of their own benefit; 3. The Group of Countries which Refrain from Taking an Initiative in the Syrian Crisis, this group is mainly responsible from the severity of the crisis and even necrotising the situation. This disunity caused not only a severe civil war which has been continuing until today and costed more than 200,000 people's lives, but also caused the emergence of the uncontrolled organisations such as the ISIS and damaged the regional relations e.g., Turkey-Syria.³³⁵

Until today, the world has witnessed a lot of mass influx triggered by the persecution, conflicts, violence, human rights violations, events extremely disturbing public order; but the latest one started to take place in 2011 when the Syrian people affected by the Arab uprisings forced to flee. The number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide has exceeded 84 million by the mid 2021, the highest number of refugees is originated from Syria who

³³¹ M. Robbins, People Still Want Democracy, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.26, No.4, 2015, p. 85.

³³² O. E. Ogunnowo, F. Chidozie, International Law and Humanitarian Intervention in the Syrian Civil War: The Role of the United States, *SAGE Open*, Vol.10, No.2, 2020, p.5.

³³³ P. Droz-Vincent, "State of Barbary" (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in Syria, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.68, No.1, 2014, p. 34.

³³⁴ P. H. Stewart, B. V. Esveld, *The Children of Syria Young Lives Damaged by War*, Human Rights Watch, 13 March 2020, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/13/children-syria>, accessed on: 14.02.2021.

³³⁵ M. M. Erdoğan, *Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, pp.: 71-72.

sought a shelter in neighbouring countries.³³⁶ Although majority of the refugees would like to settle down into a more secure and economically more stable countries; in the worldwide, only 16% of the refugees is hosted by the developed countries, 84% of them end up living in the developing countries.³³⁷ There was an extraordinary increase in the number of the refugees and migrants fleeing the war in Syria trying to cross in the European Union starting from the beginning of 2014.³³⁸ However, the European Union failed to give a harmonious welcome to them, furthermore, each and every Member States took a different position against migration.

Additionally, the European Union Member States developed two main approaches for the increased influx of refugees and migrants: first of all, “keep-them-out syndrome” metastasized to several European countries: Hungary built a fence along its border in Serbia, Spain did the same in Ceuta and Melilla, Bulgaria also put a barbed wire fence along the length of its frontier with Turkey, huge border barriers were established in Calais, last but not least non-EU European country Macedonia deployed armoured vehicles to block the irregular migration; secondly, the European Union decided to prevent the arrivals of the refugees and migrants reaching to its territories.³³⁹ Many scholars criticize that these approaches stating that they contradict with the values and founding principles of the European Union, this is why Engelbrekt et al. argue that the greatest difficult challenge the EU has ever encountered with is how to uphold the ideals upon which it was founded in an increasingly less liberal world.³⁴⁰

No matter how harsh the EU is criticized, still the EU’s one of the biggest aims in terms of migration is to reduce the irregular migration and illegal border crossings. Since the irregular entries in the external borders of the European Union in 2022 increased with an 77% of ratio comparing to the previous year³⁴¹, the EU decided to strengthen its border

³³⁶ UNHCR, *Mid-Year Trends Report 2021*, pp.1-5, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/618ae4694/mid-year-trends-2021.html>, accessed on: 19.02.2022.

³³⁷C. Edmond, *84% of refugees live in developing countries*, World Economic Forum, 20 June 2017, available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/eighty-four-percent-of-refugees-live-in-developing-countries/>, accessed on: 19.02.2022.

³³⁸ M. Berry, I. Garcia-Blanco, K. Moore, *Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A content Analysis of Five European Countries*, Report prepared for the UNHCR, December 2015, p.3.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ A. B. Engelbrekt et al., *The European Union in a Changing World Order: What is at Stake?*, in A. B. Engelbrekt et al. (eds.), *The European Union in a Changing World Order*, Palgrave MacMillan, Cham, 2020, p.3.

³⁴¹ Frontex, *EU external borders in October: Number of irregular entries on the rise*, 14.11.2022, Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-external-borders-in-october-number-of-irregular-entries-on-the-rise-7CiZBL>, Accessed on: 13.08.2023.

controls by taking several different measures. The president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen determined the key goals in her letter to the Member States highlighting “effective external borders, working with partners to prevent irregular departures and break the business model of smuggling networks, supporting those in need of international protection, offering safe and alternative legal pathways, and returning those with no right to stay.”³⁴² In order to fortify the border protection, the European Union allocates EUR 600 million “to support Member States with border control and technological equipment” and the primary goal will be the crucial border between Bulgaria and Turkey.³⁴³ In line with the same purpose, the Commission has granted “a new EUR 220 million project for state-of-the-art surveillance equipment” to Turkey with the aim of stopping the unauthorised migration at the Eastern border.³⁴⁴ Underlining the goal of diminishing the secondary migration, the Commission also gives out “amounting to EUR 200 million will target help on reception, addressing key concerns such as the reception of unaccompanied minors, increasing capacities close to external borders and meeting needs of specific Member States.”³⁴⁵

On 28 March 2023, the civil liberties committee members in the European Parliament determined their stance on main migration files and started the inter-institutional discussions between the European Parliament and EU ministers.³⁴⁶ There are several pieces of legislation in the package; for example, the “screening regulation” aims to increase the controls of third country nationals at the external borders of the EU, another regulation that attempts to establish a “centralised system for the identification of Member States holding conviction information” of non-EU nationals, while “solidarity, relocation mechanism and a regulatory framework for crisis management” are covered by other files.³⁴⁷ In order to complete the legislative procedure before the upcoming EU elections in May 2024, the Commission and EU lawmakers will negotiate the pact which they plan to have it approved before February 2024.³⁴⁸

³⁴² European Commission, *Ursula von der Leyen’s Letter to the Member States on 20 March 2023*, Available at: <https://www.eunews.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Letter-by-President-von-der-Leyen.pdf>, Accessed on: 13.08.2023.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶ E. Vasques, *EU to start talks on migration reform laws*, *Euractiv*, 28 March 2023, Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/migration/news/eu-to-start-talks-on-migration-reform-laws/>, Accessed on 13.08.2023.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

In September 2019, the EU prepared a proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The president of the European Commission set an objective to produce an integrated policy-making in the fields of “asylum, migration, return, external border protection, fight against migrants’ smuggling and relations with key third countries reflecting a whole of government approach based on the overarching principles of solidarity and a fair sharing of responsibility.”³⁴⁹ This proposal was based on Article 77 (2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which foresees certain measures regarding the regulation of the controls of the people passing their external frontiers and Article 77 (2)(d) of the TFEU which covers the steps required for the progressive implementation of a integrated system for managing external frontiers.³⁵⁰ In September 2022, the European Parliament and the five revolving Council Presidencies have decided on a Joint Roadmap on organising, coordinating and implementation of the timeline for the discussions on the Pact.³⁵¹ Their aim is to finalize the adoption of the legislative proposals before the 2019-2024 legislative session comes to close.³⁵² In June 2023, the European Commission declared that the Member States reached a successful political agreement regarding to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum whose aim is to bring a common solution for a balanced solidarity and responsibility between the Member States.³⁵³ By this statement, the Commission confirmed that a broad approach on the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) and the Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR), which create the two important tenets of the pact was achieved.³⁵⁴ The AMMR includes the provisions to prevent secondary migrations, and it discourages onward movements by putting limitation to the options for transferring or shifting responsibilities of transfer between EU Member States.³⁵⁵

³⁴⁹ European Commission, *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817*, Brussels, 23.9.2020, COM(2020) 612 final, 2020/0278(COD).

³⁵⁰ European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E077>, Accessed on: 15.08.2023.

³⁵¹ European Commission, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en, Accessed on: 15.08.2023.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ European Commission, *Statement on the political agreement on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, 9 June 2023, Brussels, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3183, Accessed on: 15.08.2023.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Council of the European Union, *Migration policy: Council reaches agreement on key asylum and migration laws*, 8 June 2023, Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press->

It has been clearly seen that the response of the EU given to the Ukrainian refugees shows that the EU is more than competent to handle significant number of refugee movements; therefore, it is highly important for the Member States to consider and effort to create a regulation with the aim of obtaining a “stable and long-term functioning European Asylum policy.”³⁵⁶

4.2. Securitization of Migration

During the history, there have been some important turning points which significantly changed the structures, actors and even the understanding of the concepts. One of the best examples of this notion can be the definition of security and threat which completely transformed into something else right in the post-Cold War era. Although there is no clear answer yet for the question of whether the international migration is a menace for sovereignty and integrity of nation-states³⁵⁷; especially following the 9/11 terror attacks, “securitization of migration” gained prominence. Nation-states put a lot more effort to control the migration, even more they try to prevent the migration and block people in advance to reach their borders.

During the mass influx to Europe, the Syrian refugees widely encountered with the securitization discourse and practices in the transit and destination countries. The securitization approach is widely shaped by the Copenhagen School especially by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever who contributed significantly to the security literature. According to the Copenhagen School, instead of being an objective (or subjective) situation, security is a term that does something, which is to securitize.³⁵⁸ Therefore, from the Copenhagen School point of view, securitization is considered as a more extreme version of politicization, meaning that the referent object is portrayed as an existential threat that justifies taking drastic steps and deviating from standard political process.³⁵⁹

[releases/2023/06/08/migration-policy-council-reaches-agreement-on-key-asylum-and-migration-laws/](https://www.releases/2023/06/08/migration-policy-council-reaches-agreement-on-key-asylum-and-migration-laws/),
Accessed on: 15.08.2023.

³⁵⁶ L. Rasche et al., *The EU Migration Pact at Two What Remains of the Fresh Start?*, Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, 14 September 2022, p.8.

³⁵⁷ J. F. Hollifield, T. K. Wong, *The Politics of International Migration How Can We “Bring The State Back In?”* in C. B. Brettell, J. F. Hollifield (eds.), *Migration Theory Talking across Disciplines*, 3rd Edition, Routledge, New York and London, 2015, p.520.

³⁵⁸ B. Buzan, L. Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p.214.

³⁵⁹ B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, New York and London, 1998, pp.23-25.

Demirtaş states that according to the Copenhagen School, there should be some components in order to maintain a successful securitization. First of all, the subject should be constructed as an *existential threat* against the State or the society. Within this framework, refugees are the most instrumentalised persons for the last couple years that the extreme right and nationalist parties claim that refugees damage the identity and the value of the State and society. Secondly, the *referent object* is located at the core of the securitization discourse, and it represents the object which the threat is addressed to. In this context, the State, society, and the economic structure can be regarded as the referent object since the refugees pose a threat to the homogeneous feature of the integrity of the State, identity of the society, and put the border security and social security system in danger. Demirtaş adds that the Copenhagen School also emphasized the importance of the *audience* during the securitization process. The target point of the decision-makers' discourse is the audience, who generally corresponds to the society. They try to convince the audience -in other words the voters- of the threat that it will jeopardise the security of the State, therefore strong and effective precautions are needed to be taken including military actions.³⁶⁰

Securitization of the migration in Europe is a process with multiple-actors and aiming to reach some certain securitization outcomes. Radical right parties are the most important actors of the securitization process in Europe. Rejecting the multiculturalism, putting forward the “first our country” motto, defending the Christian values, and advocating the Islamophobia are the common themes integrated into the securitization discourse of some European countries.³⁶¹ Another possible and perhaps indirect consequence is that it limits multilateral international cooperation to manage migration, as security (police, military, intelligence) measures are usually designed and implemented within the framework of nation states. This in turn leads directly to unilateral actions by nation states, with all its consequences being passed on to other countries.

³⁶⁰ B. Demirtaş, Mülteciler ve Güvenlikleştirme, *Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi*, No.8, September 2019, pp. 2-3.

³⁶¹ N. Mandacı, G. Özerim, Uluslararası Göçlerin Bir Güvenlik Konusuna Dönüşümü: Avrupa’da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol.10, No. 39, 2013, pp. 125- 127.

4.3. Externalization of the EU Borders

Another important method for deterring and diverting migrants and refugees from reaching the European Union border is externalization. Externalization is a relatively new term which emerged in the early 2000s. The UNHCR defines the externalisation as “measures preventing asylum-seekers from entering safe territory and claiming international protection, or transfers of asylum-seekers and refugees to other countries without sufficient safeguards.”³⁶² Crips define the externalization as “measures taken by states in locations beyond their territorial borders to obstruct, deter or otherwise avert the arrival of refugees.”³⁶³ It is an umbrella concept which covers the remote control, non-entrée, deterrence, offshoring, pull and pushbacks, extra territorial asylum process, protection elsewhere, visa controls, carrier sanctions, the posting of immigration officers internationally, funding, equipping and training migration management in third countries, and to some extent resettlement.³⁶⁴

Externalization is a new tool for the EU’s foreign policy. In order to “keep the irregular migrants out”, the EU developed some legal instruments to prevent the irregular migration and also to encourage asylum-seekers and refugees to follow the legally determined pathways to enter to the EU. In June 2016, the European Commission presented the Migration Partnership Framework (MFP) as a European Union Global Strategy which has short-term and long-term measures:

³⁶² UNHCR, *UNHCR Note on the “Externalization” of International Protection*, 28 May 2021, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/60b115604.html> , accessed on: 27.02.2022.

³⁶³ J. Crips, *Externalization and the Erosion of Refugee Protection*, University of Melbourne, 2019, available at: <https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-social-and-political-sciences/our-research/comparative-network-on-refugee-externalisation-policies/blog/externalization-and-the-erosion-of-refugee-protection> , accessed on: 27.02.2022.

³⁶⁴ N. F. Tan, *Conceptualising Externalisation: Still fit for Purpose?*, *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 68, November 2021, p.8.

<i>Short Term Measures</i>	<i>Long Term Measures</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Save lives at sea and in the desert;</i> • <i>Fight traffickers and smugglers' networks that benefit from people's despair;</i> • <i>Increase returns of those who do not have the right to stay; and enable migrants and refugees to stay closer to home rather than embark on dangerous journeys.</i> • <i>Open up legal ways to Europe for those in need, in particular with more resettlements for refugees.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Address the root causes of irregular migration and force displacement by supporting partner countries in their political, social, and economic development.</i> • <i>Improve opportunities in countries of origin fostering sustainable development, so people can build a future in their country.</i>

Source: European Commission, *Migration Partnership Framework A New Approach to Better Manage Migration*, 2016, p. 1.

In order to implement this framework, the main approach has been determined as developing partnerships with third countries. The partnerships are planned to be prepared via compacts and the EU addressed it as a “win-win” situation.³⁶⁵ The EU listed the third countries including Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh while the EU classified Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya as five priority countries. These countries have an origin or transit country nature. In the design of the plan, these partnership parties will tackle together to prevent deaths, save lives, fight against trafficking, break the business model of smuggling networks, regionalize crisis, make the refugees stay closer to their home countries, encouraging migrant returns and assisting countries to address the root causes of migration.³⁶⁶ Although the main aim of this

³⁶⁵ European Commission, *Migration Partnership Framework A New Approach to Better Manage Migration*, 2016, p.1.

³⁶⁶ Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council and the European Investment Bank, *on establishing a New Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, COM (2016) 385 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016.

partnership was intended to manage the migration in a better way cooperating with the key third origin and transit countries via tailor-made compacts, the relations with the priority countries changed its form in a more pragmatic way that the cooperation developed into other areas mixing political, aid and security engagements.³⁶⁷

Zoomers et al. argues that the European Union cooperated with many emigration and transit countries setting different objectives since the 1990s. There has been an increase on various bilateral and multilateral agreements between the EU and global South migrant source countries aiming to control migration within the framework of fighting irregular migration, re-admission, and repatriation. By these agreements, the goal was to lead migrants use legal ways by applying migration quota, circular migration as well as stimulating co-development. According to them, over time, migration restriction and control have taken the priority on the agreements and the externalization of the EU's migration control become more dominant. Particularly after the establishment of Frontex (the European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member States of the European Union), bilateral and multilateral agreements have focused on preventing and fighting with irregular labour migration not only limited to admission procedures and arrangements for repatriation, but also social security, family reunification, integration, and return.³⁶⁸

Practices that disallow access to international protection, evade accountability, or shift obligations are incompatible with universal solidarity and responsibility sharing and they are considered legally flawed and in the long term they are destined to be ineffective and unsustainable.³⁶⁹ Zoomers et al. listed four main criticisms about the EU-driven bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries of emigration and transit:

1) Efforts to control migration are in vain because it ends up with spatial substitution effects like changing the migration routes. Much stricter and more restrictive migration policies only shift the migration route by strengthening the migration networks and business models.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ European Parliament, *8 Towards A New Policy On Migration, New Migration Partnership Framework External Component of Migration Policy*, 2022, p. 2.

³⁶⁸ A. Zoomers, F. V. Noorloos, I. V. Liempt, *Between Sticks and Carrots: The Future of EU Migration Deals*, *Clingendael Spectator*, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2018, p. 3.

³⁶⁹ M. Garlick, *Externalisation of International Protection: UNHCR's perspective*, *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 68, November 2021, p.7.

³⁷⁰ A. Zoomers, F. V. Noorloos, I. V. Liempt, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-6.

2) Agreement parties are not equal in the sense of power relations; one part is stronger and more dominant, hence this cause unbalanced and ineffective partnerships. Negotiations for the EU migration agreements are generally top-down. The initiatives about the externalization of the migration policies as well as the negotiations of the agreements are led by the EC which is a very significant power figure whereas third country remains relatively ineffective. Readmission of the third country nationals is a fragile issue but the EU has been insisting to deal with this through third countries. For this reason, cost-benefit balance for those countries is frequently neglected since third country governments are less effective.³⁷¹

3) Not only negotiations of the EU migration agreements but also the agreements themselves are generally not transparent and found highly informal. For example, the agreements with African countries, preparations took place behind closed doors. Negotiations were ad hoc depending on rapidly changing situations. Plans for repatriation and migration control but also incentives such as development aid and preferential entry quota were prepared in an informal way. These arrangements were lack of transparency and control by parliaments; yet were limited checks and balances. For example, financial clauses and collaborating institutions and some other politically sensitive issues were not defined within the framework of formal agreement. Governments as agreement parties, were enabled to cooperate with other institutions such as local intelligence services and private security companies without any parliamentary control. This is mainly because of the reason that the agreements were not published and archived officially.³⁷²

4) Last but not least, human rights of the refugees were often neglected on the migration agreements. As a result of stricter deterrence policy, irregular migrants especially on the transit zones faced with extremely vulnerable situations. It is reported that many refugees were exposed to human rights violations, torture, disappearances and political liquidations by the European police and immigration services in order to stop the migration influx. Refugees generally end up with repatriation or detention which follows imprisonment. Not only human rights but also their right to have a non-refoulement principle was violated by getting a rejection to their application for asylum and sent back to their origin countries where their lives were in danger.³⁷³

Externalization of the EU's migration policy was one of the direct responses for the influx coming from Syria. The protests started with the Arab uprisings in Syria turned into a

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² *Ibid.*

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

full-scale civil war between the rebel groups and government troops. What made it worse was the international intervention. It triggered the tension which eventually caused many Syrians to become internally and externally displaced, left with destroyed homes, lack of access to basic nutrition, education, and medical care. More than half of the Syrian population approximately 12.5 million people displaced from their homes.³⁷⁴ While some of them sought a shelter in the neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, some of them left the Turkish shores by boats to arrive Greek Islands crossing the Aegean Sea or Mediterranean Sea and passing thorough the Balkan route to arrive the official borders of the European Union. Each and every EU member state took a different position against these arrivals. The EU received many negative feedback and critics from the international community upon the wire-fences built between Hungarian-Serbian border by Hungary, the UK's decision on strengthening the wire-fences on the railway between the UK and France in order to prevent any irregular entry of the migrants, some changes and suspensions of Dublin and Schengen regimes driven by some EU member states (e.g., Germany, Austria, Czechia, Slovakia, and the Netherlands).³⁷⁵

The world witnessed heart-breaking humanitarian tragedies at the European Union borders during the summer 2015. The complexity of the situation has been critically discussed referring it as a “crisis”: Ban Ki-moon evaluated it as “not crisis of numbers; it is a crisis of solidarity”³⁷⁶, Fröhlich defines it as “multi-level political crisis in an already struggling European Union”³⁷⁷, Nieman and Zaun emphasized that it is “the crisis of Common European Asylum System”³⁷⁸, Slominski and Trauner named it as “migration crisis”³⁷⁹. Although the reference of the crisis may change from one scholar to another, events at the frontiers of the European Union demonstrated a lack of institutional strength, inadequate surveillance, low solidarity, and low harmonization in the EU's approach to

³⁷⁴ Pew Research Center, *About Six-in-Ten Syrians Are Now Displaced from Their Homes*, 10 June 2016, available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/13/about-six-in-ten-syrians-are-now-displaced-from-their-homes/ft_16-06-09_syrians/, accessed on: 07.03.2022.

³⁷⁵ F. Yılmaz Elmas, *Avrupa Kapı Duvar Göç Yaklaşımında Söylem-Eylem Tutarsızlığı*, Usak Yayınları, Ankara, 2016, pp. 268-270.

³⁷⁶ B. Ki-Moon, *Refugees and Migrants: A Crisis of Solidarity*, United Nations University, 09.05.2016, available at: <https://unu.edu/publications/articles/refugees-and-migrants-a-crisis-of-solidarity.html>, accessed on: 07.03.2022.

³⁷⁷ C. Fröhlich, A Critical View on Human Mobility in Times of Crisis, *Global Policy*, Vol.8, No.1, 2017, p.5.

³⁷⁸ A. Nieman, N. Zaun, EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.56, No.1, 2018, p.1.

³⁷⁹ P. Slominski, F. Trauner, How do Member States Return Unwanted Migrants? The Strategic (non-)use of ‘Europe’ during the Migration Crisis, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.56, No.1, 2017, p. 101.

immigration.³⁸⁰ International community condemned all the actions including harsh pushbacks, unethical and illegal practices taken place in the EU border zone. The UNHCR stressed that the fundamental values of humanity, solidarity, and respect for human rights served as the cornerstones upon which the EU was built, so all EU Member States are implored to exercise moral and political leadership by implementing an all-encompassing action plan that is centred on these principles.³⁸¹

As a response to all these calls, the European Union aimed to strengthen political dialogue, cooperation, exchange of knowledge and experience with third countries.³⁸² Externalization of migration policy was the direct answer given to the so-called “refugee crisis”. The main tool of the externalization of migration, in other words “remote control”³⁸³ was actively engaged on the plan. Most of the refugees who applied for asylum followed a route starting from Turkey, the country which has been hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees. Therefore, the EU took an initiative to create a new status quo based on externalization so that the EU developed a cooperation with Turkey. In the following section, the EU-Turkey Joint Action plan will be briefly analysed.

4.4. The EU- Turkey Deal

The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan or widely known as “the EU-Turkey Deal” is legally referred as a “clarification” or “memorandum” and regarded as a political instrument instead of an international agreement because of the fact that it was not institutionally signed between the EU and Turkey, neither was endorsed by the EU Parliament; whereas, it was prepared at an EU-Turkey Summit where 28 EU Member States, 3 EU institutions as well as Turkey participated.³⁸⁴ The statement is originally based on a paper titled as “The Merkel Plan” issued by a think-tank called European Stability Initiative.³⁸⁵ The policy proposal

³⁸⁰ M. Scipioni, Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 9, p. 1365.

³⁸¹ V. Turk, *European leaders strongly urged to put human life, rights and dignity first in Mediterranean decision*, UNHCR, 23.04.2015, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2015/4/5538dd589/european-leaders-strongly-urged-human-life-rights-dignity-first-mediterranean.html> , accessed on: 09.03.2022.

³⁸² European Commission, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action*, JOIN(2015) 40 final, Brussels, 09.09.2015.

³⁸³ D. Scott Fitzgerald, Remote control of migration: theorising territoriality, shared coercion, and deterrence, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol.46, No.1, 2020, p. 4.

³⁸⁴ M. Erdoğan et. Al., *A New Era in EU-Turkey Cooperation The Syrian Crisis and EU-Turkey Deal of 18 March 2016 The Perceptions of European And Turkish Decision Makers*, Economic Development Foundation (IKV), April 2023, pp. 36-37.

³⁸⁵ European Stability Initiative, *The Merkel Plan Restoring control, retaining compassion A proposal for the Syrian refugee crisis*, 4 October 2015, available at: <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20->

initially was laid from the same think-tank via an essay by G. Knaus titled as “Why people Don’t Need to Drown in the Aegean” where he provided “two-pronged strategy for addressing the refugee crisis”: 1. Taking asylum applications equally in the EU, 2. Establishing a new Turkey-EU agreement to close the route into Greece and to prepare a solid readmission process from Turkey.³⁸⁶ Dutch politician Diederik Samsom supported the policy proposal and “the Merkel-Samsom Plan” was proposed for the consideration of Turkey and the EU.³⁸⁷ Not only due to the fact that hosting the highest number of refugees within the EU member states but also Germany’s role as a central power in the EU common policy making and negotiations with Turkey within the framework of EU’s enlargement policy made Germany have a more steering role during the crisis time.³⁸⁸ Although several actors including the Member States and the European Council were actively engaged in the decision-making process, the national governments of Germany and Turkey put the policy into the final form.³⁸⁹

On 20 April 2015, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk invited the Council for an extraordinary summit to discuss the migratory pressure on the Mediterranean Sea.³⁹⁰ On the very same day, the EU Foreign and Interior Ministers adopted 10-point-action-plan to tackle with the migration pressure, and point number 8 calls for the creation of a new, Frontex-led repatriation scheme for the swift return of irregular migrants from frontline Member States.³⁹¹ This point can be regarded as the first step of the EU-Turkey cooperation. As a result of a set of meetings between the EU and Turkey during the summer and autumn months of 2015, the EU-Turkey cooperation aiming to support the refugees and to strengthen

[%20The%20Merkel%20Plan%20-%20Compassion%20and%20Control%20-%204%20October%202015.pdf](#) , accessed on: 11.03.2022.

³⁸⁶ European Stability Initiative, *Why people don’t need to drown in the Aegean*, 17 September 2015, pp. 8-9.

³⁸⁷G. Knaus, *The Merkel-Samsom Plan – a short history*, 29 January 2016, available at: <https://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2016/01/29/the-merkel-samsom-plan-a-short-history/>, accessed on: 19.03.2022.

³⁸⁸ E. Turhan, *Europe’s Crises, Germany’s Leadership and Turkey’s EU Accession Process*, CESifo Forum 2/2016, p. 26, available at: <https://global-diplomacy-lab.org/files/forum-2016-2-turhan-turkey-germany-june.pdf> , accessed on: 19.03.2022.

³⁸⁹ S. Paçacı Elitok, *Three Years on: An Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal*, MiReKoc Working Papers, 04/2019, p. 8.

³⁹⁰ European Council, *President Donald Tusk calls an extraordinary European Council on migratory pressures in the Mediterranean*, 20 April 2015, available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20/tusk-extraordinary-european-council-migration-mediterranean/> , accessed on: 20.03.2022.

³⁹¹ European Commission, *Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: The point action plan on migration, Luxembourg*, 20 April 2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/lt/IP_15_4813 , accessed on: 20.03.2022.

the cooperation on migration management released as a draft on 6 October 2015.³⁹² Approximately 10 days later, on 15 October 2015, the plan was released under the name of “EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan” in order to cope with the crisis in three ways: “(a) by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey (Part I) and (c) by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU (Part II).”³⁹³ On 29 November 2015, the EU heads of state or government arranged an international meeting with Turkey and the EU promised Turkey several points to be accomplished including re-energizing Turkey’s accession to the EU, application of the re-admission agreement from June 2016, fulfilling the visa liberation process and lifting of visa requirements for Turkish nationals in the Schengen zone by October 2016.³⁹⁴ European Commission stated that as part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda, the European Council agreed to boost political engagement with Turkey, while providing a significant financial support for Turkey to maintain an immediate and continuous humanitarian assistance for the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey.³⁹⁵

Under the light of these initiatives, on 18 March 2016, the European Council delivered a press release with the name of “EU-Turkey Statement” where they mentioned that in order to undermine the smugglers' business model and provide migrants with an alternative to putting their lives in danger, the EU and Turkey decided to put an end to the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. The EU-Turkey Statement contains nine main components providing a roadmap to cope with the irregular migration situation:

“1. All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey;

2. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU taking into account the UN vulnerability criteria;

3. Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU;

³⁹² European Commission, *Draft Action Plan: Stepping up EU-Turkey cooperation on support of refugees and migration management in view of the situation in Syria and Iraq*, MEMO/15/5777, Brussels, 6 October 2015.

³⁹³ European Commission, *EU-Turkey joint action plan*, MEMO/15/5860, Brussels, 15 October 2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860, consulted on: 02.04.2022.

³⁹⁴ European Council, *Meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey*, Brussels, 25 November 2015, available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/29/>, accessed on: 02.04.2022.

³⁹⁵ European Commission, *EU-Turkey Cooperation: A €3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey*, IP/15/6162, Brussels, 24 November 2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6162, accessed on: 02.04.2022.

4. *Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated;*

5. *Determining a roadmap to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens to travel in the EU;*

6. *The EU will provide €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey in cooperation with Turkey and once this fund is fully used, the EU will disburse additional €3 billion by the end of 2018;*

7. *The EU and Turkey encouraged to work on upgrading of the Customs Union;*

8. *Re-energizing the EU accession process for Turkey opening new chapters;*

9. *The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavor to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.*³⁹⁶


The results of the EU-Turkey Action Plan were quickly effective and very visible on the statistics in a very short period of time. The arrivals from Turkey to Europe decreased dramatically up to 97% and the European Commission referred the cooperation between the EU-Turkey as “a game changer”.³⁹⁷ Since the EU-Turkey Statement put into action and resettlement schemes were enforced in 2016, the daily average of irregular crossings from Turkey to the Aegean islands have dropped from 1794 to 85 until the end of 2018.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁶ European Council, *EU-Turkey Statement*, Press Release, 144/16, Brussels, 18 March 2016, available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf> , accessed on: 02.04.2022.

³⁹⁷ European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement Three Years On*, Brussels, March 2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-03/20190318_eu-turkey-three-years-on_en.pdf , accessed on: 02.04.2022.

³⁹⁸ European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Document Turkey 2019 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, {COM(2019) 260 final}*, SWD(2019) 220 Final, Brussels, 29.05.2019, p. 46. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2019-05/20190529-turkey-report.pdf> , accessed on: 02.04.2022.

Table 13: The EU-Turkey Statement in Action



Source: European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement Three Years On*, Brussels, March 2019.

Although asylum applications and attempts to cross the borders have significantly declined after the enforcement of the statement, there are still many controversies about the implication of the deal. Promised visa-liberalization, financial support and re-energizing Turkey’s accession to the EU membership are still pending on the agenda. One of the most unsettled topics on the EU-Turkey relations has been the visa liberalisation during the history of two parties. Whenever they sit a table together, it has usually become one of the points to be negotiated until now. Within the framework of the EU-Turkey deal, visa-liberation was again used by the EU as a foreign policy tool and has turned into a “carrot” for Turkey.³⁹⁹ In 2019, the European Commission stressed that in order to lift visa requirement, Turkey should fulfil the benchmarks such as the fight against corruption, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, cooperation with Europol, data protection legislation, anti-terrorism legislation, the EU-Turkey readmission agreement and biometric passports.⁴⁰⁰ Although visa-liberation was included in the EU-Turkey statement, EU shows its reluctance with this report to lift the requirement immediately before Turkey’s progress in the mentioned areas.

³⁹⁹ S. Paçacı Elitok, *op.cit.*, p.5.

⁴⁰⁰ European Commission, *op.cit.* {COM(2019) 260 final}, p. 49.

Table 14: Implementation Chart in 10 Areas of the EU-Turkey Statement (2016-2022)⁴⁰¹

<i>EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016</i> <i>Analytical Categories and Evaluation of their Implementation in Practice</i> <i>(The grey areas are for cooperation on refugees and immigrants, and the blue areas are for Turkey-EU relations and visa.)</i>	
<i>Statement (original)</i>	<i>Evaluation</i>
<i>Preamble-1:</i>	
<i>Today the Members of the European Council met with their Turkish counterpart. This was the third meeting since November 2015 dedicated to deepening Turkey-EU relations as well as addressing the migration crisis.</i>	<i>With regard to this action point, Turkey has done its part and the transits from Turkey to the Greek islands have significantly declined.</i>
<i>Turkey and the European Union reconfirmed their commitment to the implementation of their joint action plan activated on 29 November 2015. Much progress has been achieved already, including Turkey's opening of its labour market to Syrians under temporary protection, the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police and enhanced information sharing. Moreover, the European Union has begun disbursing the 3 billion euro of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for concrete projects and (...)</i>	<i>Refugees and migrants arrived in Greece from Turkey by sea before and after March 2016:</i>
<i>On 7 March 2016, Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the EU also agreed to continue stepping up measures against migrant</i>	<i>Before the Statement:</i> 2014:41,038 2015:856,723 2016:173,450 <i>Total (Before the Statement):</i> 1.071.211 <i>After the Statement:</i> 2016:21,998 2017:29,718 2018:32,494 2019:59,726 2020:9,714 2021:4,331 <i>Total (After the Statement): 157.981</i>

⁴⁰¹ M. Erdoğan et. al., *A New Era in EU-Turkey Cooperation The Syrian Crisis and EU-Turkey Deal of 18 March 2016 The Perceptions of European And Turkish Decision Markers*, Economic Development Foundation (IKV), April 2023, pp. 29-31.

<p><i>smugglers and welcomed the establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea. At the same time Turkey and the EU recognize that further, swift and determined efforts are needed.</i></p> <p><i>In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU.</i></p>	
<p><i>Preamble-2: Work has advanced on visa liberalization and in the accession talks, including the opening of Chapter 17 last December.</i></p>	<p><i>Regarding visa liberalization for Turkey, 66 out of 72 criteria were met. However, the expected change, especially in the anti-terrorism law, could not be implemented in Turkey at that time due to domestic political reasons. With the transition to the state of emergency after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, it was not possible to make the necessary arrangements for visa liberalization.</i></p> <p><i>The 17th chapter in the EU-Turkey membership negotiations was opened in December 2015. However, this process could not continue, especially after 15 July 2016.</i></p>
<p><i>Action Points-1: All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order. Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey. Turkey and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and agencies, will take the necessary steps, and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these arrangements. The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU.</i></p>	<p><i>The practice of returning to Turkey for those who crossed to the Greek islands after 20 March 2016, as stated under this action point, has remained limited.</i></p>
<p><i>Action Points-2: For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU</i></p>	<p><i>This arrangement, which is defined as the 1-to-1 rule, hardly was implemented. Until the end of 2021, the number of those who returned to Turkey from the</i></p>

<p>taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same day the returns start. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. On the EU side, resettlement under this mechanism will take place, in the first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by Member States in the conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within the Council on 20 July 2015, of which 18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any further need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons. The Members of the European Council welcome the Commission's intention to propose an amendment to the relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for any resettlement commitment undertaken in the framework of this arrangement to be offset from non-allocated places under the decision. Should these arrangements not meet the objective of ending the irregular migration and the number of returns come close to the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be reviewed. Should the number of returns exceed the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be discontinued.</p>	<p>Greek islands pursuant to the 1-1 rule was around 2,100. The EU, on the other hand, received 32,182 refugees from Turkey. Although the EU seems to have kept their word more on this issue, its contribution on this matter remains minimal, considering the constantly increasing number of Syrians in Turkey, which exceeds 3.7 million by now.</p> <p>However, the promise of the EU to prevent irregular migration and to allow regular migration has not been fulfilled. While it was foreseen in the Statement that the EU member states would receive 18+54 (72) thousand people from Turkey on a voluntary basis, there was no progress because the EU countries did not reach an agreement among themselves on this issue. If the EU side had fulfilled this promise, it should have taken at least 324 to 432 thousand people from Turkey in the last 6 years. Considering that the number of refugees the EU received from Turkey during this period was 32 thousand, one must conclude that the envisioned burden sharing remained but lip service.</p>
<p>Action Points-3: Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.</p>	<p>Before the Statement in 27 Months (2014-2015-20 March 2016), a total of 1 million 71 thousand people passed from Turkey to the Greek islands, while this number remained at 156 thousand in the 68 Months (5.5 years) after the Statement. In other words, it decreased from 40 thousand to 2300 people per month. Turkey has fulfilled its promise on this issue to a very large extent.</p>
<p>Action Points-4: Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme.</p>	<p>This point is also highlighted in Action Point 2. However, the EU side did not implement it.</p>
<p>Action Points-5: The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow</p>	<p>(Same as Preamble) Regarding visa liberalization for Turkey, 67 out of 72 criteria were met. However, the expected change, especially in the anti-terrorism law, was not implemented in Turkey at that time due to domestic political reasons. With the transition to the state of emergency after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the work on the issues that need to be done especially in the anti-terrorism law was stopped. (Note: While the number of unfulfilled criteria was 6 in 2016, this number decreased to 5 according to the 2021 EU Commission Turkey Report.)</p>

<p><i>the Commission to make, following the required assessment of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision.</i></p>	
<p><i>Action Points-6: The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food, and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018.</i></p>	<p><i>Within the scope of FRIT, the EU has done its part in terms of the € 3+3 billion resource planned to be allocated for refugees in Turkey. Although it is the EU's fastest fund transfer project in its history, only 4.2 billion of the 6 billion € from 2016 to 2018 reached Turkey. While the EU side mentioned that the money was given on a project basis, one of the reasons for the delay was the slow progress of the projects in Turkey. The Turkish side, on the other hand, stated that the need had exceeded 6 billion, that Turkey had spent money on its own since 2011, and that financial support should be more comprehensive and faster.</i></p>
<p><i>Action Points-7: The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.</i></p>	<p><i>Especially due to the developments after 15 July 2016, no progress has been made in updating the Customs Union.</i></p>
<p><i>Action Points-8: The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States' positions in accordance with the existing rules</i></p>	<p><i>Although the Statement of 29 November 2015 First Tur-key-EU Summit held in Brussels on Turkey's membership negotiations is invoked here, which led to Chapter 17 being opened on 14 December 2015 and Chapter 33 being opened during the Dutch presidency on 30 June 2016, no real progress could be made with regard to this Action Point. In 2018, the European Council still did not agree with Turkey. It was decided not to open or close the chapter.</i></p>
<p><i>Action Points-9: The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be safer.</i></p>	<p><i>On the Syrian territory close to Turkey's border, the action plan foresaw a collaboration for the people of that region and the refugees to eliminate the reasons for irregular migration in the first place. This could not be realized. Turkey's operations in 2017 and beyond have generally been described by the EU as a population policy effort against the Kurds and even as an «occupation». However, for the EU, Turkey's presence in Syria is of increasing importance today. It is clear that if the Turkish government plans to withdraw from Syria, this will create a very serious concern for the EU.</i></p>

Source: M. Erdoğan et. al., *A New Era in EU-Turkey Cooperation The Syrian Crisis and EU-Turkey Deal of 18 March 2016 The Perceptions of European And Turkish Decision Markers*, Economic Development Foundation (IKV), April 2023, pp. 29-31.

From the beginning of welcoming the refugees and only by January 2017, it is estimated that Turkey has spent over €11.4 billion to provide necessary aid for them with limited international support.⁴⁰² Within the framework of the deal, the European Union allocated €3+3 billion financial aid for Turkey, which is also known as the Emergency Social Safety Net-ESSN- and was funded from 2016 until 2020. Recently, the EU has announced to keep providing further €325 million to extend the humanitarian aid programme for refugees until early 2023 in Turkey.⁴⁰³ Considering the quantity that Turkey hosting now, the amount of the financial aid to cover the Turkey's needs is inadequate to fill the technical, administrative, and social gaps.

Re-energising the EU-Turkey accession negotiations was one of the points that the two parties were supposed to fulfil as the deal envisaged. However, there were unexpected impediments on the way which blocked the energy to flow between the EU and Turkey during the following time-period. There was a military coup d'état attempt on 15 July 2016 against the Turkish government, hence the government declared the state of emergency. This fact affected the chapters of negotiations and only the chapters regarding the security and economic policies remained opened. The main chapters which would carry Turkey to the full membership namely Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom, and Security) could not succeed to be unlocked.

According to Kleist, there were three main goals for both sides to develop cooperation. For the European Union: 1. Taking back the control at the external South-East Schengen frontier; 2. Immensely lowering, if not completely ceasing, the arrival of the unauthorised immigrants from Turkey, 3. Responding to public antipathy against refugees by demonstrating sovereign power at the frontier and heeding the calls for stopping the immigration of asylum seekers. For Turkey: 1. Obtaining funding to host the refugees, 2. Due to the hosting of (Muslim) refugees, creating a sphere of influence in the region and a normative status both internationally and domestically, 3. Gaining power in discussion over Turkish national's access to EU visas, foundation of a customs union, re-energizing the EU

⁴⁰² European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, *Turkey: Refugee Crisis ECHO Factsheet*, Brussels, January 2017, Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/turkey_syrian_crisis_en_1.pdf, Accessed on: 09.04.2022.

⁴⁰³ European Commission, *Turkey: EU provides further €325 million in humanitarian aid for refugees*, Press Release, Brussels, 2 December 2021, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_6470, accessed on: 09.02.2022.

membership dialogs.⁴⁰⁴ Kleist adds that the deal had some narrow and clear policy goals, after 5 years of implementation of which, he reports that Knaus, the inventor of the EU-Turkey deal found the cooperation very successful in principle but still there are some failures on practical execution.⁴⁰⁵ The deal created its own criteria of success which is diminishing irregular migration at any cost while the border controls were not “humane”, 1-to-1 mechanism ended up with failure, control over irregular border crossings has been externalised to Turkish authorities in return which gave a diplomatic leverage to Turkey in other policy areas.⁴⁰⁶

According to Ayhan Kaya, two biggest facts became visible by the EU-Turkey deal: First of all, the deal was a sign of paradigmatic shift of the EU-Turkey relations and secondly, the institutional and structural weaknesses within the Union became evident by the externalization of the migration and asylum policies. The deal brought both parties some mutual wins, and mutual losses: The mutual wins can be listed as such: The decrease on the border crossings especially for the European Union was a big win, while for Turkey gaining external financial resource and structural transformation could be counted as the only positive outcomes from the deal. The integration of the Syrian refugees was encouraged due to the deal, and Turkey has considerably progressed in providing the refugees the access of education, health, and citizenship since 2015.⁴⁰⁷

Kaya also highlights that the mutual losses cover certain policy changes and critiques coming from international arena: as a result of “the refugee bargain”, the EU sacrificed the democratic conditionality principle and stop following the progress of Turkey on the Copenhagen Criteria topics such as democracy, human rights, freedom of expression. With this deal, the EU forced the refugees to stay in Turkey and this action received quite a lot of criticism arguing that EU contradicts with its own establishing values. It is known that the content of the deal was drafted by a think-tank called European Stability Initiative which is not specialised on the refugee themes.⁴⁰⁸

Therefore, Kaya thinks that the humanitarian side of the crises was neglected, and the success was focused on the statistical achievements. The EU-Turkey deal prioritized the

⁴⁰⁴ J. O. Kleist, *Beyond the Crisis Mode of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement: Towards Sustainable Rights-based EU Asylum and Refugee Policies*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Greece, 2022, p.12.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.20.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.16-22

⁴⁰⁷ A. Kaya, *AB-Türkiye Mülteci Mutabakatı: Tampon Ülke?, Tüsiad Küresel Siyaset Forumu Makale Dizisi No-2*, Mart 2022, pp.: 6-10.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

concept of securitization to safeguard “the Fortress Europe”. The voluntary return of refugees was encouraged instead of integrating them in Europe. Externalization of the EU migration and asylum policies also made some transit countries to use the refugee related issues as a foreign policy tool.⁴⁰⁹

On 29 February 2020, Turkey announced that the borders with the European Union was going to be opened so that the refugees under temporary protection could migrate. There were different nationals from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, and too little Syrian refugees who gathered in the cities on the Turkey-Greece border such as Edirne, Çanakkale, İzmir. Few migrants could pass the borders, but majority encountered with harsh pushbacks and violence both in Greece and other arrived countries by the border force. The crisis did not last long due to the fact that the government decided to close the borders after the first Covid-19 case was reported. This event not only deteriorated already poor EU-Turkish relations, but also show that there are some missing elements in the EU-Turkey deal.⁴¹⁰

The accords such as the EU-Turkey Deal also influenced the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum. According to the IKV’s report, the EU puts more emphasize on the externalization and securitization on the New Pact, likewise the EU sees the EU-Turkey Deal which brought the “refugee cooperation” as a big success and therefore, this method has become an “institutional policy.”⁴¹¹

The future of the EU-Turkey deal depends also on several factors. The national governments play a crucial role on the improvement of the bilateral relations; therefore, the results of Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections of 2023 were observed with a great curiosity from various points. During the election campaign and post-election period, one of the hotly debated topic was migration and the residence of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Within years, as the Syrians’ stay in the country extended, the Turkish society’s welcoming approach to Syrians gradually decreased and Syrians were not seen any more as “guests” as the Erdogan’s government promoted previously.

During the pre-election period, election surveys demonstrated that one of the top three problems of Turkey was “refugee issue” taking the second place on the list.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ K. Kirişçi, *Revisiting and going beyond the EU-Turkey migration agreement of 2016: an opportunity for Greece to overcome being just “Europe’s aspis”*, ELIAMEP Policy Paper, No64, 2021, p.8.

⁴¹¹ M. M. Erdoğan et. Al., *op.cit.*, 2023, pp. 61-62.

⁴¹² B. Dönmez Ersöz, *Türkiye’de Halkın Gündemi Ekonomi ve Mülteci Sorunu, Amerika’nın Sesi*, 27 Ocak 2022, Available at: <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/6415369.html>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

Consequently, this anti-refugee stand among the voters reflected to the election discourse of the political parties. Zafer Partisi centralized its election campaign in the migration issue and addressed the immigration influx to Turkey as “challenge to the unity of Turkey” which would cause a demographic shift in Turkey.⁴¹³ The president Erdoğan highlighted the refugee issue on his election discourses and mentioned that they are preparing a “voluntary repatriation plan” for 1 million Syrians to 13 different regions in Syria.⁴¹⁴ The leader of the largest opposition bloc Kılıçdaroğlu promised a lot of changes expected by the EU for example, establishing back the parliamentary system or enforcing decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights, however, migration and Syrian refugees were an exception since he said that “we have to give back our streets and neighbourhoods to their owners”.⁴¹⁵ Within two years of coming to power, Kılıçdaroğlu’s party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi promised to create the conditions for voluntary return of refugees to Syria, including establishing a dialogue with the Assad regime, improving cooperation and coordination with the international community, providing infrastructure investments in Syria.⁴¹⁶ After the election period ended with the victory of Erdoğan, in the post-election period, the experts reported that they would not expect any shift or change in the migration policy of Erdoğan government.⁴¹⁷

It is regarded by some that the EU-Turkey deal gave a room the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric, because of the fact that with the EU-Turkey deal, Europe completely disregarded the democratic norms and came to a very pragmatist accord with the Turkish government: basically the EU told that as long as Turkey maintains the EU borders guarded, the president has all the power to do what he wants inside of Turkey.⁴¹⁸ The oppositions’ prominence in the anti-refugee rhetoric during the 2023 elections has shown that the EU-

⁴¹³ E. Irgil, Z.Balcioğlu, *Zafer Partisi, Refugees, and the Upcoming Elections in Turkey*, Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ), 22 October 2022, Available at: <http://turkishpolicy.com/blog/104/zafer-partisi-refugees-and-the-upcoming-elections-in-turkey>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

⁴¹⁴ BBC News Türkçe, *Erdoğan, 1 milyon Suriyelinin gönüllü geri dönüşü için hazırlık yaptıklarını söyledi*, 3 Mayıs 2022, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-61307585>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

⁴¹⁵ N. Van Heukelingen, F. Püttmann, *With or without Erdoğan, we need to talk about refugees again*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, May 2023, p. 1.

⁴¹⁶ M. Tahiroğlu, *Göç Politikaları: Türkiye’deki Mülteciler ve 2023 Seçimleri*, 20 September 2022, Heindrich Böll Stiftung, Available at: <https://tr.boell.org/tr/2022/09/20/goc-politikalari-turkiyedeki-multeciler-ve-2023-secimleri>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

⁴¹⁷ Reuters’tan ‘Erdoğan’ yorumu: Mülteci sözünü yerine getirmekte zorlanabilir, 1 June 2023, *Duvar*, Available at: <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/reuterstan-erdogan-yorumu-multeci-sozunu-yerine-getirmekte-zorlanabilir-haber-1621461>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

⁴¹⁸ I. Karsit, *Turkey’s Far Right Has Already Won*, 12 July 2022, *Foreign Policy*, Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/12/turkeys-far-right-has-already-won/>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

Turkey deal's negative effect on democracy is no longer limited to the government; therefore, it is utterly important for the EU to bring more enduring and fair approach to protect refugees instead of externalizing it.⁴¹⁹

All in all, the balance of the EU-Turkey Deal is complex because it has temporarily resolved the migration crisis, but by turning it into an integration crisis. If a refugee cannot get even the most basic security and care in a country, then, regularly, or irregularly, secondary migration is triggered, and it is already for integration. And secondary migration of Syrian refugees is not a marginal phenomenon that affects international relations.

⁴¹⁹ G. Türkmen, *How the European Union Contributes to Turkey's Anti-Refugee Rhetoric*, 5 June 2023, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/how-the-european-union-contributes-to-turkeys-anti-refugee-rhetoric/>, Accessed on: 17.08.2023.

CHAPTER V: CASE COUNTRIES IN MIGRATION CONTEXT

5. Country Analysis

5.1. Turkey

5.1.1. Emigration and Immigration in Turkey⁴²⁰

Anatolia, the peninsula also known as Asia minor forms the Asian portion of the modern Republic of Turkey, and it is the very same territory which has been witnessing the countless number of migrations and conquests throughout the history.⁴²¹ Anatolia is famous for prosperity and richness in all senses: Located in the route of different kind of migratory birds which migrates during the seasonal changes; Anatolia hosts a great variety of flora due to its geographical position surrounded by the seas, besides it has always attracted the human mobility due to its geographical as well as climatic richness, fertile agricultural soil, embracive living spaces which have been home to different cultures, languages, religions, myths, stories, traditions, political, social and economic products.⁴²²

Migration is not a new phenomenon for the Anatolian lands, Anatolian people nor for the States established on it. For a long period of time, migration has shaped the society, enriched the culture, and even used as a foreign policy tool by the States on it to achieve their goals. For instance, the Ottoman Empire had a migration-oriented conquest policy. Stating that “conquering the hearts of the people is more important than conquering the territory”⁴²³, the Ottoman Empire deployed Sufi dervishes to take part in numerous campaigns in Europe as a cultural influencer and “migration-facilitator”. (One of the greatest examples of this is Gül Baba also known as the “Father of Roses” in Budapest, Hungary.)

According to Prof. Dr. Kemal Karpat, Turkey was established, changed, and today became a nation State thanks to migration.⁴²⁴ Starting from the 1850s, the population of Anatolia increased gradually up to 30% with the migrants coming from the Balkans, Russia, and the Middle East since the Ottoman Empire started to lose territory in those regions. However, immigrations and emigrations escalated in the 19th century when the Islamisation of Anatolia started to take place, and the process continued after the establishment of Turkey. The Republic of Turkey which was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire has excessive

⁴²⁰ The section 5.1.1. is structured on the lecture notes of the courses Migration Workshop by Prof. Dr. Murat Erdoğan during the 2020-2021 Spring Term at Ankara Düşünce Atölyesi and Online Migration Awareness Course by Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya at the İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Center for Migration Research.

⁴²¹ A. Wolff (Ed.), *Britannica Concise Encyclopedia*, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., Peru, 2006, p. 67.

⁴²² A.Kaya, M. M. Erdoğan, Giriş, in M. M. Erdoğan, A. Kaya (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015, p.3.

⁴²³ K. Karpat, op.cit., 2015, p. xxvii.

⁴²⁴ A.Kaya, M. M. Erdoğan, op.cit. 2015, p. xix.

experience with the phenomenon of migration from the first day of its foundation. The largest scale of mass migration during the Islamization of Anatolia happened in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne when approximately 750.000 Muslim-Turks immigrated to Anatolia from Greece and circa 1.500.000 Orthodox-Greek emigrated from Anatolia to Greece. The process of Islamization of Anatolia which started with the migrations in the post-World-War First environment perpetuated until after the World War Second with the migrants coming particularly from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

While Turkey was witnessing “international migration” on its territory starting from 1915, an excessive amount of internal migration commenced to take place in the 1950s. Within the framework of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, Turkey received financial aid, and this fact brought young Turkey an agricultural transformation through the mechanization of agriculture. Consequently, the machines took over the people’s jobs and people from the rural region destined to migrate in search of means of livelihood to the urban cities such as İstanbul and İzmir (which were the two cities that received many migrants from all over Turkey back then.) And it is important to note here that there is still a dynamic movement from the East to the West, from the South to the North as an internal migration during the seasonal agricultural works in Turkey.

After the World War Second, there was a development shift in Europe, especially the industrialized Western countries were lack of workforce and decided to invite guest-workers from several countries initially from the Mediterranean region and Central Europe. Turkey was also among the migrant-worker sending countries to the West. There were several reasons for Turkey to take this decision: back then in 1960s, creating the source of income was quite difficult for Turkey. Although Turkey was trying so hard to develop and progress, the economic and political situation was not suitable for this to happen. The government planned to gain 2 main wins by sending migrant workers to the West: **1.** Turkey did not have enough skilled workers in the country at the moment of invitation. Since the first agreements of the migrant workers were arranged within a rotation system which means that the workers would come back to their origin countries after 1 year of working (this is why they are called as guest-workers), in a short period of time, Turkey would achieve to have a more qualified human capital with highly trained workers abroad. **2.** Since the Turkish economy was fragile, the government supposed that the remittances of guest workers would be a great benefit for the economic recovery. Therefore, Turkey signed several worker agreements with different countries in Europe. The first agreement was done with the United Kingdom in 1959 and the last one was with Denmark in 1979. Currently, the Turkish diaspora is quite wide in Europe

located in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, and many other countries within the European Union borders. The migration of migrant workers continued in 1980s and many workers migrated to the rich countries where the petroleum was produced such as the Gulf countries, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

In 1990s, Turkey started to witness not only dynamic internal migration flows but also various immigration types coming from several European countries. Although internal migration took place excessively, the movements were not based on free-will and voluntary action. Because of the terrorist attacks starting from the 1980s, people living in the South-eastern cities of Turkey forced to migrate to the Western cities of Turkey for the sake of saving their lives, living in security, and protecting their dignity. For Turkey's timeline, the 1990s has a role as the years when Turkey opened up for globalization and slowly began to deepen the relations with the European Union. This fact also reflected to the migration patterns which Turkey attracted. Due to Turkey's pleasant climate, long sunny days during the year, warm beaches and affordable cost of living made European people to migrate to Turkey. The majority of the people are retired therefore this type of migration is named after "international retirement migration", but also known as "life-style migration". Another important migration type which Turkey came across with during the 1990s was the transit migration. Because of the fall of the Iron Curtain, and due to Turkey's geographic location, Turkey became a centre point for the migrants. Many people from the Eastern Europe, Post-Soviet States, Russia, Ukraine (and so on) came to Turkey to commerce. Migration served for them as a means of livelihood because every time they come to Turkey, the migrants filled their luggage with the products and sold the items purchased in Turkey in their own country and gained money by this way.

In 2000s, two major migration types become salient: brain drain (from Turkey) and international forced migration (to Turkey). The first 20 years of the millennium, Turkey has gone thorough significant political and economic changes and challenges. Weakening rule of law, human rights violation, deteriorating economic situation, lack of stability and predictability, not respecting meritocracy have caused to rise the concerns of the qualified, well-educated, highly skilled, and brilliant brains of Turkish youth. Therefore, Turkey faces a serious brain drain, by which day by day there is a sharp increase on emigration from Turkey. Geographically speaking, Turkey has been a transit country located between the rich, industrialized, high welfare level, developed West and instable, poor, underdeveloped, in violent conflicts East. People fleeing the conflict, turmoil, instable, fragile states generally

set the Europe as a destination. Although Turkey acts as a bridge for many international forced migrants to reach the European countries, Turkey itself is also becoming a target for them. Currently, there is an extensive irregular international movement in Turkey. According to the UNHCR, Turkey is the first country which hosts the world's largest refugee population since 2014 with around 3.6 million Syrians under temporary protection and over 330,000 refugees and asylum seekers under international protection.⁴²⁵ The first group of Syrian asylum seekers were just 252 people, they arrived on 29 April 2011 and back then, nobody could ever guess that the number of asylum seekers would rise to this level, and even their first arrival date would become a very historical turning point and would carry a symbolic meaning in Turkey's future.⁴²⁶ For Turkey, the "issue" of Syrian asylum seekers has become both internal and foreign policy subject beyond being a humanitarian drama taking place in the neighbouring country.⁴²⁷ In the following section, the arrivals of Syrians under temporary protection will be thoroughly analysed.

5.1.2. Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey

From the first day of the Syrian civil war, Turkey tried to establish a bilateral talk with the Syrian government to soften the tension between the parties but it failed, and as a next move, Turkey started to make a pressure to the international community and claimed that there would not be any better solution other than the overthrow of the Syrian government under the Bashar Al-Assad lead, therefore Turkey became the main supporters of the Syrian opposition.⁴²⁸ This fact has made Turkey to be a part of the crisis, but also made it the victim of the crisis because of the fact that Turkey could not foresee that the international community would not be convinced about Syria, various other actors would take part in the crisis region, the crisis would last too many years, the country would face with the multi-lateral security risks, the number of the asylum-seekers would rise this much, and finally Turkey would carry the majority of the financial burden on its own.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁵ UNHCR, Turkey Fact Sheet, 17 September 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-september-2021-entr>, accessed on: 25.05.2022.

⁴²⁶ M. M. Erdoğan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi 2019 Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi- SB 2019*, Orion Kitapevi, Ankara, 2020, p. XVII.

⁴²⁷ M. M. Erdoğan, *Türkiye'de Suriyeliler Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*, 2nd edn., İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, p. 3.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p.4.

As of 10.08.2023, Turkey currently hosts 3.312.209 Syrians under temporary protection approximately 11 years after the first arrival.⁴³⁰ There are couple of reasons which attracted the Syrians to come to Turkey to seek a shelter. Just right after 6 weeks of the beginning of the internal conflict in Syria, on the day of the first group of Syrians arrived to Cilvegözü border gate, Turkey announced an “open-door policy” for the Syrians fleeing the war. The “open-door policy” consisted of three main elements: **1.** Turkey extended “temporary protection” to the Syrians arriving mass influx circumstances., **2.** The open-door policy guaranties the ‘non-refoulement’ principle., **3.** The government financed from its own resources to set the best possible living conditions and humanitarian assistance by building and running the refugee camps.⁴³¹ Turkey’s open-door policy received so many kudos from the international arena, e.g. The European Commission remarked on Turkey’s progress report 2014 that “Turkey must be praised for its invaluable support to Syrian refugees.”⁴³² Actually, the open-door policy was an extent of the Turkey’s foreign policy resolutions: “The government presented the refugees as the elements of ‘religious or cultural solidarity’, (ensar or muhajir), as ‘regional actors’ and the actors of ‘strength’ as well as ‘humanitarian foreign policy’”.⁴³³

Erdogan and Corabatir divides Turkey’s process management into 3 periods: 2011-2013, 2014-2016, 2017-2019.

1. 2011-2013: during these years, the number of Syrians were only limited to 250.000. The government expected that the crisis would not take so long time and would end shortly, the Damascus regime would fall down, and the refugees would return back to Syria. The EU did not consider the situation as a crisis, yet and continuously requested Turkey to apply an open-door policy. The government approached the issue quite emotionally and repeatedly gave as an example of the Prophet Mohammed’s immigration from Makkah to Madinah and used the notion of “Ensar-Muhajir” (people from Madinah who helped immigrated muslims) on its all discourses. Syrians were mostly living in the refugee camps on the border zone, and there were not any support or location plan for Syrians on the agenda.

⁴³⁰ İçişleri Bakanlığı, Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, Geçici Koruma, *Yıllara Göre Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyeliler*, available at: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>, accessed on: 18.08.2023.

⁴³¹ K. Kirişçi, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Limits of an Open Door Policy*, Brookings, 27.06.2013, available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/06/27/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-the-limits-of-an-open-door-policy/>, accessed on: 11.06.2022.

⁴³² European Commission, *Turkey 2014 Progress Report*, COM (2014) 700 Final, Brussels, 08.10.2014, p. 65.

⁴³³ M. M. Erdoğan, “Securitization from Society” and “Social Acceptance”: Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees, *Uluslararası İlişkileri*, Vol.17, No.68, 2020, p. 75.

2. 2014-2016: the most distinct feature of this period is that the refugees started to live outside of border zone and there was a sharp increase on the refugee numbers. The camps were full, Assad was resisting, and the crisis was extending. The ISIS emergence in the region made so many people displaced who headed to Europe and then, the EU started to refer it as the “crisis”. This period is also when Turkey and the EU initiated the cooperation for the so-called EU-Turkey deal.

3. 2017-2019: the sharp increase on the refugee numbers both on Syrians and non-Syrians was remarkable during this period. The EU tried to externalize the situation, security, cost, including the integration and Turkey intended to instrumentalize it as a part of EU accession and a tool to criticize the EU and also consider it as a soft power subject. Syrians’ permanent stay started to be accepted both by Syrians and Turkish society. Although there is not any official declaration, this period is also when the local integration policies are created.⁴³⁴

From the legal point of view, the situation is quite complicated in terms of definition. Syrians cannot be referred as “refugees” based on the current administrative and legislative regulations in Turkey. In order to diminish the potential risks stemming from the unstable region where it locates, Turkey (in 1962) signed the Geneva Convention on 24 August 1951 with two limitations: time and geography. In 1967, the limitation of time was eliminated but, Turkey still maintains the geographical limitation meaning that Turkey only accepts the people coming from the member states of the Council of Europe as refugees. However, looking at the Turkey’s rank among the refugee hosting countries, it can be easily said that the limitation could not succeed to protect Turkey from the refugee influx.⁴³⁵ Currently, there are 4 different status according to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection: refugee, conditional refugee, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection.

Since April 2011, there has been a “status” and “definition” problem for the Syrians in Turkey. Within the society, Syrians are called as “refugee”, “asylum-seeker”, “under temporary protection status”, “guests” far from their technical, legal, and international concepts.⁴³⁶ Based on the current legal framework, Turkey decided to grant Syrians “temporary protection” status which was applied by the European Commission during the Balkan Wars in 1990s. Just like in the Balkan Wars, it is expected that the people who fled,


⁴³⁴ M. M. Erdoğan, M. Çorabatır, *Suriyeli Mülteci Nüfusunun Demografik Gelişimi, Türkiye’deki Eğitim, İstihdam ve Belediye Hizmetlerine Yakın Gelecekte Olası Etkileri*, UDRA Programme Research Panel, pp. 16-17.

⁴³⁵ M. M. Erdoğan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi – SB 2017, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları*, 2018, pp. 7-8.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.

and sought a shelter in order to save their lives will return back to their home countries when the war is over, this is why the status named after as temporary. Although Turkey granted Syrians the temporary protection in accordance with the international law, as the period they stay in Turkey gets longer, the given status receives much more critics since it creates some handicaps in terms of integration, as well. In the short and medium term, it is not foreseen that there will be an essential change in the legislations which permits the Syrians to have a refugee status, however, what is quite unusual is that the policy change might end up with naturalizing over 450.000 newly born Syrian babies through citizenship acquisition and give them an option to obtain residency.⁴³⁷

Table 15: International Protection According to the Turkish Law



Source: M. M. Erdoğan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi 2019 Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi- SB 2017*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, p. 10.

⁴³⁷ M. M. Erdoğan, M. Çorabatır, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

At first glance, it is not very easy to distinguish the differences between the statuses of the International Protection According to the Turkish Law. Therefore, in the following table, it is intended to compare what kind of rights the holders possess on longer staying and the integration chances the status brings to the status holders according to the current legislation:

Table 16: International Protection Status and Rights

International Protection Status	Rights
Refugee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residence permit valid for 3 years via international protection status ID card (LFIP- Article 83). • A travel document issued in accordance with Article 28 of the Geneva Convention • Family Reunification (Geneva Convention IV, Article 82, third paragraph), Family residence permit (LFIP- Article 34/1) • Right to education (Geneva Convention IV, Article 94, second paragraph), (LFIP- Article 89/1) • Right to have social aids, and health services (LFIP- Article 89/2, 89/3) • Right to access to wage-earning employment (Geneva Convention, Article 17)., International protection status ID card acts as work permit (LFIP- Article 89/4-b).
Conditional Refugee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residence permit valid for 1 year via international protection status ID card (LFIP- Article 83). • Alien’s passport issued in accordance with Article 18 of the 5682 Passport Law which allows 1 entrance to Turkey and 1 exit from Turkey and it is valid no less than 3 months. • Family reunification or family residence permit are not regulated within the framework of law. • Right to education (LFIP- Article 89/1), for all degrees and for every field (Regulation for Foreign Students Studying in Turkey- Article 6-8) • Right to have social aids, and health services (LFIP- Article 89/2, 89/3) • Right to access to the labour market. Needs to apply for a work permit after 6 months of the international protection application (LFIP- Article 89/4-a).
Subsidiary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residence permit valid for 1 year via international protection status ID card (LFIP- Article 83). • Alien’s passport issued in accordance with Article 18 of the 5682 Passport Law which allows 1 entrance to Turkey and 1 exit from Turkey and it is valid no less than 3 months. • Family Residence permit (LFIP- Article 34/1) • Right to education (LFIP- Article 89/1), for all degrees and for every field (Regulation for Foreign Students Studying in Turkey- Article 6-8) • Right to have social aids, and health services (LFIP- Article 89/2, 89/3) • Right to access to the labour market. International protection status ID card acts as work permit (LFIP- Article 89/4-b).

Temporary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Right to stay in Turkey via temporary protection ID. The duration of stay shall not be considered equal to residence permit and this ID does not give right to apply for Turkish citizenship (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 25). • Right to apply for a passport in case they do not belong it or cannot acquire one. Evaluated based on the Passport Law and given upon the decision of the General Directorate. (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 43). Travelling to a 3rd country is only possible upon the permission of the Directorate General (Temporary Protection Regulation – Article 44) and entry prohibition is based on the general provisions (Temporary Protection Regulation – Article 45) • Right to apply for family reunification in Turkey with the spouse, minor children, and dependent mayor children. (Temporary Protection Regulation – Article 49) • Right to education inside and outside temporary accommodation centres under the control and responsibility of the Ministry of National Education (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 28/1), procedures and principles related to associate, undergraduate, masters and doctorate degrees shall be determined by the Presidency of Council of Higher Education (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 28/2) • The ones in need can benefit from the social aids (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 30). Foreigners under temporary protection can enjoy the basic and emergency health services (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 27) • The ones holding the temporary protection ID card can apply to Ministries of Family, Labour, and Social Services for a work permit in the sectors, business lines, and geographical areas specified by the President. (Temporary Protection Regulation- Article 29/2)
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Source: Author’s own compilation (2022) based on N. Baran Çelik, Türk Hukukunda Uluslararası Koruma Başvurusunda Bulunan Veya Uluslararası Korumadan Yararlanan Yabancıların Hak ve Yükümlülükleri, *İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi Özel Sayı*, Cilt:1, Yıl 2015.

According to Erdogan and Corabatir, at the beginning of the crisis, migration was a temporary “issue” for both Turkey and the Syrians and within this framework, it was considered as emergency management. However, as the time goes by, 5 main facts have changed the characteristic of the subject:

1. The number of Syrians in Turkey extraordinarily augmented, and the total population exceeded 3.6 million. If the naturalized Syrians are added up, then it makes over 3.6 million people.
2. The Syrian migration to Turkey has started more than 8 years ago and still continues. This period has not only exceeded the expectations but also psychological time limits.
3. Two years after their arrival, the Syrians have started to settle down in the cities outside of the border zone. Still, almost the half of the Syrian population is living in the non-border cities. Getting away from the border zone, meaning that becoming distant from the homeland played an accelerant role for disengagement.

4. In the course of time, the crisis got deeper, more complicated, and multi-actor involved into it. Today, no predictions can be made about when the peace environment can be maintained in Syria. Although the peace is settled between the war parties, the peace is not expected to be maintained in Syria in the medium and long term.
5. The physical and emotional destruction created in Syria over the 8 years will not be easily eliminated. Within this time framework, returning to Syria seems highly risky. Especially enjoying the right to education, health, accommodation, infrastructure will not seem possible for a long period of time.⁴³⁸

It is simple to understand that migration generally has a nature of permanence: Migrants tend to stay longer where they settle down and develop a sense of belonging. Since the current voluntary return conditions to Syria are not fully ready yet, it is predicted that the Syrians will stay longer time than expected in the current host countries. This fact brings the need of solid integration measures onto the table. In the following section, the integration of Syrians in Turkey will be discussed.

5.1.3. The Concept of Integration in Turkey

In Turkey, the concept of integration has been verbalized as “harmonization” for the first time on the Law of Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) (6458/ 4.4.2013). On the Article 96, it is stated that the main purpose of ‘integration’ is to facilitate migrants’ mutual cohesion with the society and to enable them to gain necessary knowledge and skills to act independently without having any third persons’ support either in Turkey, in the resettled country, or in their own country when they return back.⁴³⁹ According to the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), within the framework of the LFIP/Article 96, “the harmonization is a process at the end of which migrants are accepted as a part of the society, both individually and as a group, while referring it as a two-way dynamic relation where the society and migrants are mutually and equally take part in and where the society and migrants are actively participating, other than being passive, to the issues relating to them.”⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Ibid., pp.12-13.

⁴³⁹ Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 6458, 4/4/2013, Dördüncü Kısım, Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Korumaya İlişkin Ortak Hükümler, Uyum, Madde 96- (1).

⁴⁴⁰ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, *Turkey and Migration*, Publishing Number 19, September 2014, p. 48.

It is stressed that harmonization does not correspond neither to assimilation nor integration in the law and in the works of DGMM. The harmonization activities of Turkey are directed by the DGMM, and the contents of the activities are listed below:

- Undertaking integration activities in order to facilitate a foreigners', international protection applicants' or beneficiaries' integration with society,
- Developing knowledge and skills acquisition for facilitating them to be independently active in all areas of social life without the aid of third persons, in our country, in the country they are resettled or when they return back to their own countries,
- Organizing basic courses for foreigners on the political structure, language, legal system, culture, and history of the country as well as their rights and obligations,
- Carrying out promotion and information activities through organizing courses, distant learning, and similar systems with regard to issues such as benefiting from public and private goods and services, access to education and economic activities, social and cultural interaction and receiving basic health services,
- Planning integration activities by benefitting from the suggestions and contributions of public institutions and organizations, local administrations as well as civil society organizations, universities, and international organizations,
- Supporting migrants' harmonization with the host society without being forced to renounce their own cultural identities,
- Developing awareness and tolerance environment with regard to integration process in society.⁴⁴¹

As previously mentioned, integration is a multi-dimensional and multi-level process. In this process, there are several actors taking part in, and one of the most important elements is the road map of the host countries which shapes and leads the main policies and goals towards integration. Recently, Turkey has become a scene for the international migration. Currently, there are millions of migrants with several different legal statuses, various nationalities, from different cultural and religious backgrounds living with Turkish society. This fact rises the importance and the need of effective integration policies as a part of the migration management. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior Directorate of Migration Management in coordination with the related public institutions, municipalities, international organizations, civil sector prepared "The National Strategy on Harmonization

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

and the National Action Plan 2018-2023” and it was adopted by the Government of Turkey in February 2018. Under the roof of harmonization, 6 thematic areas are determined as the strategically important priorities: social cohesion, information, education, health, labour market, and social support (social services and aids).⁴⁴²

The first component of the National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan is the social cohesion. This strategy targets strengthening the social acceptance of the migrants in the society and taking the necessary measures for improving the culture of living together. The main aim is defined as to develop a sense of belonging by integrating the migrants into the society culturally, socially, and economically, to mutually recognize the differences within the framework of social dialogue, to maintain the respect and to ensure living together.⁴⁴³

The second component engages with strengthening the standard information mechanisms with new tools, actively providing the information that the migrants with different statutes in need of and integrating them into the information mechanisms. As a result of the ascensive migration movements to Turkey, it is observed that there is a sharp increase and variety on the need and sources of information of the migrants. One of the first steps is to create the necessary assurance, standards, and facilitators for the migrants to get information about the rights and services that they have and provide them access to reach this information.⁴⁴⁴

The third component covers the strategic goals for the field of education. It aims to strengthen the access to the formal training and increase the participation. Maintaining migrants to continue the formal education and developing systematic methods to ensure persistency on their attendance are among the main strategic goals. It is quite significant for harmonization to support migrants in terms of socio-economic development by educating them, to upbringing qualified individuals in order to enrich the human capital in the country. Additionally, the interaction of the children at the early age enables a positive impact on the integration.⁴⁴⁵

The fourth component deals with the field of health and aims to provide health care services to the migrants in an effective and sustainable way. Some of the most common problems in the health care services all around the world for migrants are that the migrants

⁴⁴² The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, *The National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan 2018-2023*, p.11.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p.12.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 12-23.

cannot accommodate with the health care system of the host country; they have insufficient information about the host country's health care system; being uninformed about how to access to the health care services, lack of awareness and experience of the health care providers about the specific needs of the migrants, as well as language and communication barriers can be also counted among the most frequent obstacles they come across with. Therefore, the main strategic goals are listed as: - at the border points or in the first neighbourhood they have settled down, migrants should be gone through some examinations such as health condition evaluation, being injected the incomplete vaccination, taking precautions against the emergency or contagious illnesses and other health risks while documenting and saving the data about them; - providing effective information for migrants about how to enjoy the health related rights; - strengthening the patient counselling services including the translation facilities in the health care premises.⁴⁴⁶

The fifth component is mainly about the migrant's access to the labour market. According to the National Action Plan, starting from the 2000s, Turkey started to develop a more comprehensive vision towards integration into the labour market to encourage the regular migration, to strengthen the international protection system and to discourage the irregular migrant workforce. On the 10th Development Plan (2014-2018), the vision is prepared according to the needs and regulations of migrant workforce in line with Turkey's labour market priorities. On the plan, it is aimed to increase the number of students as well as high-skilled migrant force in Turkey via Turquoise Card, the ones who become pioneer at one of the strategically important science and technology fields with their education level and professional experience. Therefore, the strategic goals are determined as to provide fast and effective access to the labour market, to identify the migrants' professional qualifications about participating in the labour market, to inform them about their work and social security rights, to enable them to access to rights, and to assess the workplace conditions.⁴⁴⁷

The final component of the National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan is social services and benefits. Social services and benefits are the support given to the migrants when they first arrive to the country and during the further period when they have differentiating needs than their first arrival. The strategic goal is set as to develop the social support programmes so as to include migrants and to strengthen the related institutions and organizations.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 13-25.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 13-26.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 14-27.

When the National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan is thoroughly analysed, it is clear to see that all the main domains of the integration field are taken into consideration. This plan reveals the fact that the policies produced for the main dimensions of the integration are very comprehensive, therefore, it will constitute a big facilitation for integration of the migrants and refugees in Turkey in the long term.

5.1.4. Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Since the first day of the Syrian refugees' arrival to Turkey, the Turkish government has been handling the situation referring that it is temporary. Although Turkey exerted great effort to provide fast and effective humanitarian aid to those who needed it, the policymaking could not go further than the ad-hoc nature. The duration of the refugees' stay in Turkey is still uncertain and will seem to last more than expected. Especially, 90 per cent of the Syrian refugees currently settled down in urban cities of Turkey, and when we take their prolonged presence into consideration, this fact creates new challenges and brings the necessity of addressing the socio-economic integration issues.⁴⁴⁹

According to Özçürümez and İçduygu, it is highly important to set a harmonious living condition for both the local people and the people who came to Turkey through forced migration, in order to decrease the tensions between them which occurs from time to time, to take precautions against the potential conflicts, and to make them live together in peace and happiness.⁴⁵⁰ Therefore, creating and applying effective integration policies plays an important role more than ever. Until now, Turkey addressed some integration domains and developed some integration policies in certain fields including health, education, access to the labour market, social aids. In the following paragraphs, these domains will be briefly summarized:

- **Health:** Access to healthcare services is quite important for not only the individuals under temporary protection but also for the local community for several reasons. Easy and affordable access to health care services in the individual level can bring macro results such as maintaining a good community health and preventing serious health threads such as pandemic. During April 2011- January 2013, only Syrians under temporary protection residing in the camps could enjoy the health care

⁴⁴⁹ F. Memişoğlu, *The Syrian Community in Turkey: Perspectives, Prospects, and Policies*, Podem Publications, İstanbul, 2018, p.8.

⁴⁵⁰ S. Özçürümez, A. İçduygu, *Zorunlu Göç Deneyimi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşme*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2020, p.21.

services.⁴⁵¹ But as the number of Syrians living outside of the camps grew rapidly and it got too hard to access the health services by themselves, the regulations were arranged to provide health care services for the ones living outside of the camps, as well.⁴⁵² This right was regulated under the Temporary Protection Regulation on 22.10.2014 and published on the Official Gazette No.29153. In order to register each and every Syrians living in Turkey, they were asked to enjoy the free health-care services only within the borders of the cities where they are officially registered. In case they go or move to another city without any official permission, they are not able to enjoy the health-care services free of charge.⁴⁵³ According to the Article 9 of the Principles of the Health-care Services for the foreigners granted for Temporary Protected Status, the invoice of the service shall be submitted to the governorship where the temporary protected is registered, besides treatment and medical expenditures is paid by the governorship.⁴⁵⁴ According to MIPEX 2019 results, Turkey's integration policies for health ranked 69 out of 100 which is above the MIPEX average (56) and it is found slightly favourable because of the fact that all persons residing in Turkey regardless of their status can enjoy the emergency and primary health care services without paying anything since law 5510 involves asylum-seekers and persons with International Protection Application within the General Health Insurance coverage.⁴⁵⁵

- **Education:** Turkey pays special attention to provide education services to the temporary protected Syrians and the scope of education is defined in the Article 28 of the Temporary Protection Regulation. According to this article, “education activities shall be conducted inside and outside temporary accommodation centres under the control and responsibility of the Ministry of National Education. In that regard: “a) Pre-school education services may be provided to children who are 36-66 months old, where the children who are 54-66 months old are prioritized. b) Education activities for those at the age of primary and secondary education shall be

⁴⁵¹ M. M. Erdoğan, *Türkiye’de Suriyeliler Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*, 2nd edn., İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018, p. 90.

⁴⁵² Ibid., p. 91.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴⁵⁴ Geçici Koruma Altına Alınanlara Verilecek Sağlık Hizmetlerine Dair Esaslar, Available at: <https://dosyasb.saglik.gov.tr/Eklenti/1376,saglik-bakanligi-gecici-koruma-yonergesi-25032015pdf.pdf?0> Accessed on: 03.01.2023.

⁴⁵⁵ MIPEX Integration Policy Index 2020, Turkey Key Findings, Available at: <https://www.mipex.eu/turkey>, Accessed on: 09.11.2023.

carried out in line with the relevant legislation of the Ministry of National Education.

c) Language education, vocational courses, skills trainings, and hobby courses addressing all age groups may be organized depending on the demand.”⁴⁵⁶ It is also highlighted that “procedures and principles related to associate, undergraduate, masters and doctorate degrees shall be determined by the Presidency of Council of Higher Education”.⁴⁵⁷ In order to facilitate and contribute to the access of education, UNICEF (The United Nation Children’s Fund) and the Ministry of National Education jointly create programmes and projects both for the Syrian children and disadvantages Turkish children under the three pillars of strengthening the system, increasing the quality and access of comprehensive education.⁴⁵⁸ Since 2016, the EU has been supporting the integration of Syrians in Turkey and this assistance is named after as Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT). Under this facility, the project named “Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids Into the Turkish Education System (PIKTES)” has started to be conducted and the main purpose has been determined so as to promote the access of children under temporary protection to education in Turkey and to support their social cohesion.⁴⁵⁹ Regardless of the supports, projects and initiatives, the schooling rate of the Syrians under temporary protection is only 65% as of January 2022. One of the observed reasons is underlined in the report that families who are considering the onward migration are reluctant to register their children in the schools.⁴⁶⁰ According to MIPEx 2019 results, Turkey’s integration policy for education ranked 52 out of 100 which is below the MIPEx average (56), and it is found halfway favourable. Although it is found halfway favourable, it is still a progress for Turkey because of the fact that on the previous assessment, education became the weakest integration policy area. Since 2014, there have been some changes which gives the legally resident foreigner, asylum-seeker, and refugee

⁴⁵⁶ Temporary Protection Regulation, Article 28/2, Available at: <https://en.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/files/temptemp.pdf>

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ UNICEF, *Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Çocuklar*, Nisan 2016, p.2, available at: https://www.unicef.org/turkiye/media/2571/file/TURmedia_Turkiyedeki%20Suriyeli%20Cocuklar_Bilgi%20Notu%20Nisan%202016_1.pdf.pdf, accessed on: 17.10.2022.

⁴⁵⁹ Ministry of National Education, *Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids Into the Turkish Education System (PIKTES)*, 2018. Available at: <https://piktes.gov.tr/Home/ProjeninAmaciENG>, accessed on: 17.10.2022.

⁴⁶⁰ Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü, Göç ve Acil Durumlarda Eğitim Daire Başkanlığı, *Geçici Koruma Altında Bulunan (SURIYE) Yabancı Uyruklu Öğrenciler*, January 2022, available at: https://hboqm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2022_01/26165737_goc2022sunu.pdf, accessed on: 17.10.2022.

children the right to compulsory education, besides they can get educational guidance and language support.⁴⁶¹

- **Access to the Labour Market:** In Turkey, the labour market accession is regulated on the Regulation on Work Permit of the Foreigners Granted the Temporary Protection (6575/ 15.1.2016) based on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (6458/ 4.4.2013). According to the Article 4 of the regulation, the foreigners granted for temporary protection cannot work nor be worked without having the work permit.⁴⁶² The foreigners under temporary protection can apply for work permit as long as they are in compliance with three main requirements: a) possession of temporary protection identity card and foreigner identification number which indicate that the foreigner is under the scope of temporary protection, b) having completed at least 6 months under temporary protection by the time the work permit application is done, c) prior authorization should be taken from the relevant ministries for certain career fields (the ones intends to work in the education field shall take the authorization from the Ministry of National Education, the ones intends to work in the health field shall take the authorization from the Ministry of Health, the ones intends to work as an academics shall take the authorization from the Council of Higher Education).⁴⁶³ Additionally, it is stated that if the foreigner is subject to work in the seasonal agricultural and husbandry jobs, s/he can be exempted from the work permit.⁴⁶⁴ The Article 8 of the regulation emphasises that there is an employment quota which states that the number of Syrian workers in a work place cannot exceed the 10% of Turkish workers' number; if the employee numbers of the work place is below 10 people, then maximum 1 Syrian can work in there; the employment quota can be ignored if any Turkish citizen is not found suitable for in the vacancy within 4 weeks of period prior to the work permit application.⁴⁶⁵ According to MIPEX 2019 results, Turkey's integration policy for

⁴⁶¹ <https://www.mipex.eu/turkey>

⁴⁶² Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzinlerine Dair Yönetmelik, 6575, 15/1/2016, Çalışma İzni Alma Zorunluluğu, Madde 4- (1). Available at: <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/3.5.20168375.pdf>, accessed on: 5.11.2022

⁴⁶³ T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, *Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzni ve Çalışma İzni Muafiyetlerine Dair Uygulama Rehberi*, Kasım 2021, p.2., available at: <https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/media/87546/gkss-uygulama-rehberi.pdf> accessed on: 5.11.2022.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁶⁵ Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzinlerine Dair Yönetmelik, 6575, 15/1/2016, Çalışma İzni Alma Zorunluluğu, Madde 8- (1) (2) (3). Available at: <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/3.5.20168375.pdf>, accessed on: 6.11.2022

labour market mobility ranked 22 out of 100 which is below the MIPEX average (56), and it is found slightly unfavourable having a place among the last 10 countries in the list. It is stated that the migrant workers do not have the equal rights as workers and there is not any specific measure to develop their job-related skills.⁴⁶⁶

- **Social Aids:** According to the Article 30 of the Regulation of Temporary Protection, it is possible to provide social aid, social services and psychosocial support to the ones who are in special need of it, under the control and responsibility of the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services.⁴⁶⁷ The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) is most comprehensive programme which aims to respond the needs of vulnerable refugees living in Turkey. The ESSN was initiated by the European Commission right after the EU-Turkey Deal came into force on 18.03.2016. It is known as the biggest humanitarian aid programme of the European Union. The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) work closely for the ESSN programme. The programme is implemented by the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, Directorate General for the Migration Management, Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, the World Food Programme, and Turkish Red Crescent. Within the framework of the programme, the refugees receive an ESSN debit card (Kızılaykart) which contains a fixed amount of monthly money and by which, they are able to purchase their daily basic needs including but not limited to food, medicine, fuel, rental fees, and expenses etc. In order to apply for Kızılaykart, there are some requirements to match and to be eligible to apply. In the webpage of Kızılaykart, as of November 2022, the criteria of eligibility for assistance listed as “• In case there is a male individual aged between 18 - 59 in the household: The dependency ratio must be 1,5 or above for each adult male aged between 18 - 29 in the household who is responsible for taking care of dependent individuals (the dependent individuals: children between the ages of 0 - 17 and adults 60 years old and above). • In case there is no adult male individual between the ages of 18 - 59 in the household: The number of adult females between the ages of 18 - 59 should not exceed 2, and the total number of household members should not exceed 6.”⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ <https://www.mipex.eu/turkey>

⁴⁶⁷ Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 6203, 22/10/2014, Sosyal Hizmetler ve Yardımlar, Madde 30, Available at: <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/21.5.20146883.pdf> , Accessed on: 21.11.2022.

⁴⁶⁸ Kızılaykart Programme Criteria, available at: <https://kizilaykart.org/suy/EN/faq4.html> , accessed on: 21.11.2022

5.2. Denmark

5.2.1. The Danish context

Migration policy and context has been heavily influenced by centuries of rivalry and struggle for regional dominance between Denmark and Sweden, while economic and cultural ties in the region have grown ever closer.

Denmark has a royal tradition dating back to the 10th century, to the time of the Vikings, making the Scandinavian country one of the oldest monarchies in Europe. At first the king was elected, but in 1660 he became hereditary. In 1849, a new constitution made the country a constitutional monarchy, and the Succession Act of 27 March 1953 introduced the possibility of female succession. The Kingdom of Denmark also includes the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which, although part of Denmark, have their own internal administration. Margaret I, (1353-1412) regent of Denmark (from 1375), of Norway (from 1380), and of Sweden (from 1389), who, by diplomacy and war, pursued dynastic policies that led to the Kalmar Union which united Denmark, Norway, and Sweden until 1523, and Denmark and Norway until 1814. Kalmar Union, Scandinavian union formed at Kalmar (1397) that brought the three kingdoms together under a single monarch until 1523. The Kalmar Union lasted until Sweden rebelled and became independent in 1523, under King Gustav I Vasa. At the same time, Norway sank to the status of a Danish province (1536).

Part of this close regional cooperation is the *Nordic Passport Union*, which was established in three stages. In 1952, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland agreed to abolish passports for travel between them and readmit citizens of other countries who entered illegally from one of the four countries to another. On 1 July 1954, the agreement was extended to allow citizens to settle and work in any of the four countries without a residence or work permit. Iceland implemented the agreement on 1 January 1966. Passport controls for non-member country nationals at the borders between Member States were abolished by a treaty signed between Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland on 12 July 1957, which entered into force on 1 May 1958. The treaty was extended to Iceland on 24 September 1965 and to the Faroe Islands on 1 January 1966. Greenland and Svalbard remain outside the passport union. The Passport Union allows citizens of the Nordic countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) - to travel and stay - to issue any travel document (e.g. passport or identity card) or residence permit. But since 25 March 2001, all five countries have been part of the Schengen area. The Faroe Islands, however, are part of the

Nordic Passport Union but not part of the Schengen area, while Greenland and Svalbard are outside both. Greenland has an open border with all the Nordic countries and allows Nordic citizens to enter, settle and work there without a passport or permit. And in Svalbard, Scandinavian citizens are allowed to settle and work without a permit, as a result of the Svalbard Treaty (1962), which requires only a valid travel document, i.e. a passport or ID card, for entry for EU/EFTA citizens, and even a driving licence for Norwegian citizens until 31 December 2021. This means that Scandinavian citizens have enjoyed freedom of movement for quite some time and do not need an identity document to enter or stay in another Scandinavian country. An important exception is the "temporary" border control introduced in 2015, which has been in place for several years. In addition, under the Helsinki Treaty⁴⁶⁹, civil servants from the foreign service of any Nordic country in other parts of the world must assist nationals of another Nordic country if that country is not represented in the area concerned⁴⁷⁰. The institutionalisation of Nordic cooperation (Nordic Council)⁴⁷¹ has had a strong impact on migration policy and it is understandable that its achievements should be preserved.

On the other hand, Denmark joined NATO in 1949 and the EEC in 1973. However, the country rejected certain elements of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union. Denmark had four derogations or "*opt-outs*" from *EU cooperation*. The Danish opt-outs stem from 1993 and were agreed amongst at the time 12 Member States after the Danish population initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in 1992. The four original opt-outs are outlined in the Edinburgh Agreement and concern the Monetary Union (EMU), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Citizenship of the European Union. Moreover, the Denmark has held three referenda on the opt-outs. In December 2015, the Danes held a referendum on the opt-out concerning Justice and Home Affairs. The vote was to determine if Denmark would maintain the reservations, they held in the original opt-out or replace it with an opt-in model. Denmark voted not to modify the original opt-out. In June 2022, the Danes held a referendum on the opt-out concerning Common Security and Defence Policy. A majority of Danes voted "yes" to abolish the opt-out. The abolition means, that Denmark, since the 1st of July 2022, has entered into EU's

⁴⁶⁹ The Treaty of Helsinki (1962) on cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden established the framework for Nordic cooperation in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers.

⁴⁷⁰ Nordic Co-operation, *Nordic Agreements and legislation*, Available at: <https://www.norden.org/en/information/nordic-agreements-and-legislation>, Accessed on: 10.01.2023.

⁴⁷¹ Nordic Co-operation, *Nordic Council of Ministers*, Available at: <https://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-ministers>, Accessed on:10.03.2023

Common Security and Defence Policy⁴⁷². In other words, the opt-outs have created a specific but dynamically adaptive migration policy and institutional set-up that requires its own contextual analysis in terms of regulation and cooperation.

5.2.2. Emigration and Immigration in Denmark

As one of the welfare states located in the Scandinavian peninsula which geographically set natural borders between Norway, Sweden, Finland by the range of mountains, and links of seas, Denmark has longer history in the Scandinavian culture comparing to its northern neighbours.⁴⁷³ This long existence in the peninsula shaped the ethnic profile and due to the closeness to the continental Western Europe made it to have the “most European”⁴⁷⁴ characteristic among others. Throughout the history, Scandinavia possessed relatively a homogeneous population however, especially Sweden and Denmark have been a scene for a lot number of immigrations.⁴⁷⁵

Trends in emigration and immigration in Denmark changes according to certain periods: Denmark implemented a restrictive immigration policy right after the World War I, by only allowing the people who had a special tie with the country for the entrance.⁴⁷⁶ After the World War II, Danish citizens immigrated mostly to Canada and Australia, and due to the free labour mobility scheme between Nordic countries, only Northern and Western European citizens immigrated to Denmark during the late 1950s.⁴⁷⁷ The events taking place in Europe such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 resulted in immigration to Scandinavia. In the post-World War II period, the Northern Western European countries strengthened economically and become highly industrialized which created extra need for labour force that the local people were not adequate to fill the vacancies in the production phase; this was mainly for two reasons: 1. Native workers had a high-education profile, and increasing chances to be hired as a white-collar employee therefore, the jobs on the production sector

⁴⁷² The Danish Parliament, The Danish opt-outs from EU Cooperation, Available at: <https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/eu-information-centre/the-danish-opt-outs-from-eu-cooperation>, Accessed on: 10.01.2023.

⁴⁷³ G. Broberg, 'Scandinavia: An Introduction', in G. Broberg and N. Roll-Hansen (eds.), *Eugenics and the Welfare State Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland*, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan, 2005, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁷⁶ E. Ersboll, 'On Trial in Denmark', in R. Van Oers, E. Ersboll, D. Kostakopoulou (eds.), *A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Lieden, 2010, p. 108.

⁴⁷⁷ P. Nannestad, 'Immigration as a challenge to the Danish welfare state?', *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.20, No.3, 2004, p. 757.

such as agriculture, cleaning, construction, and mining were not attractive enough for them because of low salaries and unhealthy working environment, 2. the workforce shortage was too high that it could not be filled by the local people.⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, inviting guest-workers from the neighbouring countries was one of the remedies for this problem. Back then, the Iron Curtain divided the East and West sharply which did not allow the free human mobility, therefore, North-Western host countries went beyond the geographical proximity and extended their country portfolio to invite workers from different parts of the world.⁴⁷⁹ Denmark, as well, recruited limited number of guest-workers (less than 500) particularly from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan in 1960s; however, just in a decade Denmark reached to 8138 Turkish, 6770 Yugoslavian and 3733 Pakistani citizens within its border.⁴⁸⁰

The 1973 oil crisis had a huge impact on the international relations, and one of the most effected relationships in the world order became the labour migration scheme of the North-Western Europe. The precise impact of the crisis was so visible that now, it is seen as one of the turning points in the migration history in the region. Because of the crisis, the economic situation of Europe got gradually weaken, and consequently, the economic growth rapidly decreased. Therefore, the industrial production slowed down, which later caused the need of extra labour workforce to diminish. This fact led the North-Western European countries to reevaluate the labour migration schemes and create new policies. This is also seen as the end of an era for the labour immigration to Denmark although immigration of labour has continued to take place within the different agreements framework such as through Common Market/European Economic Community/ European Union schemes, and inter-Nordic labour market.⁴⁸¹ Non-European immigrant policies focused on controlling, restricting, and decreasing migration; instead of ceasing it, it turned out to be transformed into a new form of migration which led the natural growth of migrant population through chain migration since all the guest-workers began to bring their families via family reunification.⁴⁸² For a long period of time, family reunification was an important channel for immigrants to arrive to Denmark.

⁴⁷⁸ C. Van Mol, H. De Valk, 'Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective', in B. Garces-Mascareñas, R. Penninx (eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe Context, Levels, Actors*, Springer Open, 2016, p. 32.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid. P. 33.

⁴⁸⁰ P. Nannestad, op.cit., p. 757.

⁴⁸¹ H. Vad Jonsson, K. Petersen, 'Denmark: A National Welfare State Meets the World', in G. Brochmann et al. (eds.), *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945-2010*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, p.104.

⁴⁸² C. Van Mol, H. De Valk, op.cit., p. 35.

Although many immigrants continued to come via family-reunification, Denmark started to experience a new form of migration in the late 1970s. The refugees running from the Vietnam War in 1975 and Iraq-Iran War in 1980 chose Denmark as a destination. Especially, starting from the mid-1980s, the European continent faced with one of the biggest-scale mass migrations, and like everywhere else in Europe, Denmark also received a lot number of asylum seekers.⁴⁸³ The outbreak of the wars in Yugoslavia forced many people to seek shelter in Europe, as well as the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe in 1990s. During that period, the residents of former USSR territories migrated either to Austria or Denmark.⁴⁸⁴ Denmark issued between 15% and 27% residence permits to foreigners who came as asylum seekers in between 1988-2001.⁴⁸⁵

Mouritsen addressed that the beginning of the millennium years started with impactful events, and one of the most devastating ones was 9/11 events. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11 caused to rise hate crimes, xenophobia, and Islamophobia in the rest of the world. Political parties also used the anti-immigrant and Islamophobic rhetoric in their discourses. Most of the immigrants in Denmark were coming from a Muslim background, these discourse change in policymaking also affected them. In 2001, Denmark had a general election and the Danish People's Party won the majority of the seats with its xenophobic propaganda and by spreading the fear of immigration; and right after the election, implemented quite strict immigration policies especially in the field of family reunification; therefore, 2001 elections of Denmark is seen as the one when Denmark lost its humanitarian fame.⁴⁸⁶

Few years ago, following the Arab Spring, the Europe witnessed the latest mass migration in its borders. Unprecedented number of Syrians decided to flee to Europe, and in order to reach their dreamed destination, on the way they put their lives in danger with perilous sea journeys, by cooperating smugglers and human traffickers, and struggling with the harsh conditions. The so-called "Balkan Route" was one of the main routes for Syrians to reach the gates of Europe. Their desire to seek a shelter in the Northern Europe was so

⁴⁸³ K. Wren, 'Refugee Dispersal in Denmark: From Macro- to Micro-scale Analysis', *International Journal of Population Geography*, Vol.9, No:1, 2003, p. 59.

⁴⁸⁴ A. Mazurkiewicz, 'Political Emigration from East Central Europe During the Cold War', *Polish American Studies*, Vol.72, No:2, 2015, p. 69.

⁴⁸⁵ P. Nannestad., *op.cit.*, p. 757.

⁴⁸⁶ P. Mouritsen, 'The particular universalism of a Nordic civic nation Common values, state religion and Islam in Danish political culture', in T. Modood et al. (eds.), *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship A European Approach*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 74.

high that they risked their lives on this route, facing with several dangers such as fences on the border, severe violence at the entrance, tackling with smugglers during the onward migration. The usual starting point of their journey was from Turkey, and if they could manage to arrive, they made the asylum application in Northern European countries. One of those countries was Denmark which is a Scandinavian country known for its “highly developed nation”, “cultural homogeneity”, “social trust”, “a universalistic welfare state-based on high levels of public provisions” provided for both citizens and the ones who have a legal resident permit.⁴⁸⁷ Taking into account all its Welfare state characteristics, Denmark received a lot number of asylum applications.

Table 17: Onward Migration from Syria to the Northern European countries (Denmark)⁴⁸⁸



Source: The Balkans Route, Refugees in Town, available at: <https://www.refugeesintowns.org/balkans-route>, accessed on: 26.12.2022.


In 2016, after the EU-Turkey Deal came into force, the asylum applications had a sharp decline in Europe, so did in Denmark. However, there were some other reasons behind this fall in case of Denmark. Increasing number of asylum applications made Danish

⁴⁸⁷ M. Pace, ‘Overcoming bordering practices through the arts: The case of young Syrian refugees and their Danish counterparts in Denmark’, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 1, No:22, 2017, p. 6.

⁴⁸⁸ Dark blue indicates the migrations in the first countries of asylum; light blue indicates the onward migrations

authorities to take two precautions: 1. Restriction of the rules on asylum and immigration, and 2. Reinforcing the integration of refugees.⁴⁸⁹

Table 18: Asylum applications lodged in Denmark | Citizenship: Syria



Source: Danmarks Statistik, *Asylum applications lodged in Denmark | Citizenship: Syria*, StatBank. Accessed on: 29.12.2022.

When the number of asylum applications made a pick in 2014, one year later, the government introduced a new type of temporary residence card with less rights targeting the Syrian refugees: this new type of temporary protection status (Article 7(3) in the Aliens Act) is given only for one year, and it is granted according to the general conditions of the refugees' country of origin. It means that if the conditions back at home ameliorates, the permit cannot be extended; otherwise, it can be renewed after two-years period following a careful evaluation. Besides, this new status does not give any right for family reunification for the first three years of their stay.⁴⁹⁰ Another initiative taken by the government was the

⁴⁸⁹ H. Thomassen, *The integration of refugees in Denmark*, Study for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, European Parliament, Luxembourg, 2019, p. 13.

⁴⁹⁰ M. Clante Bendixen, *More About Art. 7(3): Temporary Protection Status*, Refugees.dk, 30.09.2021, available at: <http://refugees.dk/en/facts/legislation-and-definitions/more-about-art-7-3-temporary-protection-status/>, accessed on: 28.12.2022.

“introduction allowance” which covers the reduction of the public allowance for the persons (including the citizens with Danish roots and foreigners) who has less than 7 years of residence in Denmark. According to Thomassen, with this initiative, it was intended to make the asylum application to Denmark less attractive and underline the fact that one should contribute to the Danish welfare system for a period of time before thoroughly enjoying it.⁴⁹¹ Apart from these initiatives, Denmark implemented more than another 100 restrictions on asylum and immigration including granting temporary residence permit for refugees, stricter changes on the rules on naturalisation, deportation of rejected asylum seekers, tightening the acquisition of permanent residence, harsh expulsion conditions; as well as seizing the assets worth more than 10,000 DKR from the asylum seekers in order to cover their expenditures while they are in Denmark based on the infamous “jewellery law”.⁴⁹² Denmark also changed its resettlement policy and started to implement 500 resettlement annual quota after coming to an agreement with the UNHCR.⁴⁹³

After receiving a large number of Syrian refugees in 2015, Denmark introduced a limited version of humanitarian protection to the asylum-seekers. The 4000 refugees who hold this new type of temporary protection status had to wait three-years to be eligible to apply for a family reunification.⁴⁹⁴ The families were separated from each other; in the meantime many other European countries adopted the same measures for the refugees’ family reunification. The European Court of Human Rights has a judgment on this exact topic with the Case of M.A. v. Denmark. A Syrian national Mr M.A. fled Syria in January 2015 and applied for asylum in Denmark in April 2015. He was granted the temporary protection status for 1 year and it kept extended for one year as it is expired. Mr M.A. applied for family reunification with his wife and two adult children, and his request was rejected by the Immigration Service because of the 3 years-time limit. When he made an appeal against the decision, the Immigration Service noted that they received the confirmation from the applicant’s wife that she was in good health; therefore, she did not require any help or care from external sources. After several other rejections, in April 2019, Mr. M.A.’s wife managed

⁴⁹¹ H. Thomassen, op.cit., p. 13.

⁴⁹² Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁹³ UNHCR, Country Chapters – UNHCR Resettlement Handbook Denmark By the Government of Denmark, July 2011, revised March 2016, p. 2. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3c5e57b07.pdf>, accessed on: 28.12.2022.

⁴⁹⁴ European Commission, *Denmark: European Court of Human Rights says three-year rule violates refugees’ right to family life*, 09 July 2021, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/denmark-european-court-human-rights-says-three-year-rule-violates-refugees-right-family-life_en, Accessed on: 18.08.2023.

to receive a resident permit and she could come to Denmark. The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life) has been breach.⁴⁹⁵ However, already in 2016, the European Commissioner for Human Rights communicated with the Danish government and told that implementation of the three-year waiting period is not humane, and she highlighted that reuniting with their family is a fundamental right for all refugees and furthermore, family reunification provides a secure and lawful pathway for Syrian refugees to reach the safety, while it is a very necessary condition for effective integration.⁴⁹⁶

Denmark was traditionally known as a “first mover” in terms of drafting, signing, and implementing the international and national humanitarian migration conventions and laws regarding refugees; however, in the last few years, Denmark stands totally at a different position as a “first mover” that now it takes the lead for creating the strictest asylum policies considering that the refugees are a burden to the welfare state and their culture contradicts with Danish mores.⁴⁹⁷

Table 19: Chronological developments on migration and integration in Denmark

Year	Key Actions	Basic Principles
1776	The Act of Indfødsret	Acquisition of Ius Indigenatus status for the children born on Danish territory of Danish parents and the territory of alien parents.
1898	The Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Indfødsret	The first general ‘citizenship law’ which determines the principles of naturalisation, renunciation, or loss of Indfødsret.
1950	Citizenship Law	Provision of the Danish citizenship
1951	Geneva Convention	Denmark became the first country to sign and ratify the Geneva Convention.

⁴⁹⁵ M.A. v. Denmark, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 9 July 2021, Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,60ec0ae24.html>, Accessed on: 18.08.2023.

⁴⁹⁶ M. C. Bendixen, New Ruling: Denmark Violates Refugees’ Right to Family Life, 23.07.2021, *RefugeesWelcome.DK*, Available at: <http://refugees.dk/en/news/2021/july/new-ruling-denmark-violates-refugees-right-to-family-life/>, Accessed on: 18.08.2023.

⁴⁹⁷ L. Bjerre et. al., Accessing the Danish Labour Market: Ont he Coexistence of Legal Barriers and Enabling Factors, in V. Federico, S. Baglioni (eds.), *Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers’ Integration in European Labour Markets A Comparative Approach on Legal Barriers and Enablers*, IMISCOE Research Series, 2021, p. 135

1954	The Nordic Council is founded	Free labour mobility intra Nordic Region between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
1967-1970	The Guest-Worker (fremmedarbejdere) Programme	Temporary employment of the workers from non-European countries
1973	Immediate stop to labour immigration and Family Reunification Provision	Only those who had been granted refugee status or right to family reunification with a Danish citizen or a foreigner residing in Denmark with a work visa were eligible for longer stay.
1973	Denmark joined the European Community	Free movement of workers within the community
1983	Aliens Act	Known as Europe's most liberal act for foreigners: wide rights granted for refugees, residence permit requirements were eased, family reunification rights established.
1983-1987	Restrictions to the Aliens Act	High number of asylum seekers resulted in revising the act and further restrictions on social assistance benefits for non-EU immigrants
1998	Integration Act	The first Act on the Integration of Aliens in Denmark
2002	"The new policy for foreigners"	Denmark starts to implement a extremely restrictive new immigration law
2005	A new chance for everyone	The Danish Government's integration plan: enhancing its integration efforts with a number of new initiatives.
2015	Changes on family reunification and housing payments	The family reunification application result will be announced minimum within 3 years; no more free-of-charge housing for refugees and immigrants.
2016	Jewellery Law	Seizing the assets worth more than 10,000 DKR from the asylum seekers in order to cover their expenditures
2019	Paradigm Shift	Main focus became the return to the countries of origin instead of integration. In place of integration, "self-support and return" started to be in use.
2020	Integration Action Plan 2020	The plan has 3 main goals to make refugees/immigrants ready for the labour market, prepare more diverse environment, and combat with antidemocratic values.
2021	Encourage for the return	Some parts of Syria were announced as safe for return

2022	A new migration plan	Denmark signed a declaration with Rwanda that the asylum seekers will be sent to Rwanda to manage their asylum claims there.
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Source: Author’s own compilation (2023)

So many refugees fleeing from Syria did not stay at the first country of asylum and continued their journey up to the North despite all the risks, and inconvenient situations that they faced with. This onward migration usually intended to end up with a legal status in a well-developed, welfare state. Denmark has been one of the aimed destinations. According to the Danish legislation, there are four different categories of residence permit to grant to refugees:

Table 20: Residence Permit Types for Refugees in Denmark

<p>Convention Refugees: This status is given to an individual who is considered as a refugee according to the definition of the Geneva Convention.</p>	<p>Refugees with protection status: This status is given to asylum seekers whose life is in danger because of their personal situation which may cause the risk of the death penalty, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment if they go back to their country of origin.</p>
<p>Refugees with temporary subsidiary protection Status: This status is given to asylum seekers whose life is in danger because of the violent situation of the country of origin where there is a direct threat to the civilians which may cause the risk of the death penalty, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment if they go back to their country of origin.</p>	<p>Quota Refugees: This status is given to an individual who is resettled in Denmark in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or another international organization which has the similar mission as the UNHCR.</p>

Source: Modified by the author on Ministry of Immigration and Integration, *International Migration – Denmark Report to OECD*, December 2021, p. 36.

5.2.3. Integration in Denmark

The concept of integration is not a new phenomenon in Denmark. According to the Danish Language Committee, “integration” has been in use in the Danish language since the 19th century priorly referring to “incorporate”, “absorb”, “assimilate” or “adapt” somebody or something into “a bigger whole”.⁴⁹⁸ However, the meaning of the word has changed during the history adjusting to the debates of the time. For example, in 1950s, the word “integration” was intensely used to make reference to European integration in terms of economic, political and military fields; in 1960s, it was in use for referring to the European Common Market; in

⁴⁹⁸ K. F. Olwig, K. Paerregaard, “Strangers” in the Nation, in K. F. Olwig, K. Paerregaard (eds.), *The Question of Integration: Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish Welfare State*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2011, p.6.

1970s, the usage of the word “integration” called attention to the pre-school education, and how to make the physical and mental disabled children a part of the state school system; in 1990s integration was started to be used in discussions regarding the social and cultural obstacles behind incorporating immigrants and refugees into Danish Welfare society; and in 2000s, integration has become a word which is used particularly referring to integration of refugees and immigrants into Danish society; hence, it was quite easy to guess what the newly established Ministry of Integration would be engaged for, and who would be their target group when it was created in 2001.⁴⁹⁹

Denmark is considered as the first country in the whole world to introduce a special Act which aims to integrate foreigners.⁵⁰⁰ The Act on the Integration of Aliens in Denmark (the Integration Act) entered into force on 1 January 1999.⁵⁰¹ Since then, the Act has been amended quite a few times, and it gives the responsibility of integrating foreigners to the municipalities.⁵⁰² The objective of the act is to make foreigners to become an active member of the society who can survive on his/her own and at the same time has the knowledge of the Danish fundamental values and norms.⁵⁰³

The integration strategy of Denmark has evolved in time: in 2000, the government introduced some actions under the name of Immigrant Package which involves early labour integration; in 2002, Danish language tests were set as a precondition to acquire citizenship; in 2006, integration and civic tests presented; since the backbone of the Danish integration policy and the most guaranteed way which leads to integration is the labour market integration, in 2010 employment was determined as a prerequisite to apply for permanent residence, and in 2016 for citizenship; in 2015, the government published a strategic document about the integration policy, and employment is still the key element in the social inclusion while language classes, formal education and skills assessment remain as the main supportive legs; in 2019, Danish government made a considerable move which is also known as the “Paradigm Shift”, and changed the policy directions from integration to return to the countries of origin.⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁰ E. Ersboll, op.cit., p. 112.

⁵⁰¹ Act (No. 474 of 1998) to integrate foreigners in Denmark, adopted on 01.07.1998.

⁵⁰² European Commission, *Governance of migrant integration in Denmark*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-denmark_en, accessed on: 07.01.2023.

⁵⁰³ E. Ersboll, op.cit., p. 112.

⁵⁰⁴ European Commission, *Governance of migrant integration in Denmark*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-denmark_en, accessed on: 07.01.2023.

The main driver unit of the integration in Denmark is the municipalities (about 200 units)⁵⁰⁵. They are responsible from arranging all the necessary steps of integration for the immigrants and refugees. The legal framework and the financing are prepared by the State, and the municipalities implement the framework for integration. In each municipality, there is a quota system, which means that while the result of the asylum application is being given, the municipality where the immigrant/refugee will be allocated in is also determined at the same time. As soon as the municipality receives the immigrant/refugee, they have equal access to public institutions and services, such as health care, schools, and education, with the same level as the other country inhabitants. The municipality must also offer housing for the refugees. Each and every refugee has a customized integration plan the duration of what can be up to five years; the main target is to make them qualified through the Danish language classes and activities to help the refugees become employable. A refugee can receive public benefits primarily in the form of “integration allowance” until they are able to support themselves.⁵⁰⁶

Thomassen pointed out that the core of the integration policy in Denmark lies in employment. This can be seen from the initiatives taken by the government in the recent years in terms of integration: For example, in September 2015, the government initiated a summit bringing social partners, business representatives, NGOs, researchers, and stakeholders together under the name of “Teaming up for Integration” to encourage more refugee employment. In March 2016, this summit gave two fruits: 1. An agreement between the Government and the social partners which aims to have an integration in the labour market, 2. An agreement between the Government and the municipalities which targets to give more flexibility and more efficiency to municipalities to implement the legal framework. Apart from these agreements, in recent years, many projects and practises have been initiated to deepen the integration of refugees and immigrants: “The Integrative Training Programme” (Integrationsgrunduddannelsen – IGU) is designed to improve the skills of refugees to increase their qualification and productivity for a job; “Industry Packages” (Branchepakker) aims to build a direct path to put the refugees and immigrants in contact with the local labour market; “Friends Pave the Way” (Venner Viser Vej) is a

⁵⁰⁵ Denmark is divided into 98 municipalities (kommuner) and five regions (regioner), each covering several municipalities. Only the municipalities are considered local authorities. The rules concerning local government are laid down in the Local Government Act. More: Ministry of the Interior, <https://english.im.dk/responsibilities-of-the-ministry/governance-of-municipalities-and-regions/about-municipalities-and-regions> (11 January 2023)

⁵⁰⁶ H. Thomassen, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

“buddy” programme whose aim is to create a relation between the refugee and a Danish citizen, and facilitate to overcome the refugees’ daily life problems, build a network, improve the Danish language; “The Copenhagen Model” – local integration strategies represents the city model integration plans and strategies. Since each municipality is in charge of accepting and assisting with the integration of refugees, they can determine on their own the key elements to conduct the Integration Act and State funding.⁵⁰⁷

As Thomassen indicated that although quite a few good practices have been developed to maintain a successful integration, there are some weak points to be addressed: Each and every municipality has a particular set of goals and priorities, and when the municipalities are compared to each other, not all of them achieve the equal success of integrating the refugees. Integration focusing on labour market access is usually seen as a strength of Denmark, however, there are several problems with this: For example, refugees’ skills and competences are generally neglected while allocating them to the municipalities during their stay at the asylum centres. Some also discusses that employment does not always end up with integration. It is highly acclaimed that the civil society actively take roles in integration processes, however, since the responsibilities are not clearly defined, the refugees usually get confused what to expect from the municipalities and from the civil society.⁵⁰⁸

In 2020, the Danish Government introduced the Integration Action Plan 2020. The plan consists of three key goals: 1. Having a full-time job or training and learning the Danish language become obligatory, 2. With “Ghetto Plan” it is aimed to diminish the parallel societies and maintain more socially, economically, culturally diverse environment, 3. The government prepared a new proposal to combat with anti-democratic values and norms such as forced marriages, refusal of divorces, radicalism, honour-related conflict, etc.⁵⁰⁹

According to MIPEX 2020 results, unlike most countries in the index, Denmark deteriorated its commitments to integration and lost 4 points. Its current score is 49 on the MIPEX 100-point scale and falls under the category of “Temporary Integration”. Currently, it is one of the least secure countries among the “Temporary Integration” countries. The main reason behind is that the access to fundamental rights and certain targeted assistance for equal opportunities are available to foreign nationals, but they lack the long-term security

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 14-17.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

⁵⁰⁹ European Commission, *Denmark: Government’s integration action plan*, 21 December 2020, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/denmark-governments-integration-action-plan_en, accessed on: 09.01.2023.

that would allow them to settle down permanently, make integration investments, and engage in society as full citizens.⁵¹⁰

5.3. Spain

5.3.1. Emigration and Immigration in Spain

Spain is located in the most southwestern corner of Europe and occupies the 85% of the Iberian Peninsula which hosted numerous cultures during the history. Spain has a unique position in the European Union having the one and only border with an African country. Characterized with its joyous people, rich cuisine, pleasant weather, a great variety of natural beauties, art, history and architecture, Spain not only become a favourite travel destination but also a target country for the immigrants. The immigration level to Spain was so high during the first decade of the 21st century that immigrations made Spain earn the title of “the most multi-ethnic country of the European Union” and “the second immigrant receiver country after the United States of America” in 2007.⁵¹¹ Just thirty years ago, if somebody told any Spaniards the fact that Spain would become the hub for immigration from all over the world, none of them would have believed it.⁵¹² For a long period of time, Spain just like most of the other Southern European countries, served as one of the main sources of emigration for the rest of the world.

Spanish emigration history dates as back as the 15th century, when Christopher Columbus was funded by the Catholic Monarchs of Spain to support his voyages which later paved the way for the extensive European exploration and colonization of Americas. Spaniards started to immigrate to the Americas in 1493 when Columbus organized his second expedition.⁵¹³ The immigrant selection was done so meticulously that neither troublemakers nor criminals could receive the permission to go to the Spain’s American territories, however, over time, the social and professional background of the immigrants grew quite diverse.⁵¹⁴ Latin America became the most popular immigration destination

⁵¹⁰ MIPEX Integration Policy Index 2020, Denmark Key Findings, available at: <https://www.mipex.eu/denmark> , accessed on: 09.01.2023.

⁵¹¹ Deutsche Welle, *España tiene la mayor tasa de inmigrantes de la Unión Europea*, 17.10.2007, available at: <https://www.dw.com/es/españa-tiene-la-mayor-tasa-de-inmigrantes-de-la-uni3n-europea/a-2829089> , accessed on: 13.01.2023.

⁵¹² R. Barbulescu, *Migrant Integration in a Changing Europe Immigrants, European Citizens, and Co-Ethnics in Italy and Spain*, University of Notre Dame Press, 2019, p. 124.

⁵¹³ I. Altman, Spanish Migration to the Americas, in R. Cohen (ed.), *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995, p.28.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.28-29.

among the Spanish communities that the waves of emigration reached its pick between 1905-1913 when 1.5 million Spaniards moved to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela.⁵¹⁵ During the World War First, the immigrations stopped in Spain, while the Civil War (1936-1939) boosted the internal migration within the country for the agriculture purposes.⁵¹⁶ After the end of the Civil War, emigration to the Latin American countries regained momentum, and only between 1946-1958, 624,000 Spaniards settled down in the Americas.⁵¹⁷ Over the 1960s and early 1970s, emigration direction shifted to the Northern and Western European countries upon the call for recruitment for the guest-worker scheme.

Emigration was seen as one of the most important strategies for the economic policy that remittances coming from the migrants constituted the basic financial source in Spain. In 1956, the Spanish Emigration Institute was established and became the main tool of the employment policy.⁵¹⁸ All the job offers came directly to the Spanish Emigration Institute from the labour agreement signatory states namely Belgium (1956), Germany (1960), France, Switzerland, the Netherlands (1961) and Austria (1966) and it was Institute's fundamental duty to organize the emigration of the potential migrants, by checking their background and skills to fit them into any country where Spain could maximize the benefit from emigration.⁵¹⁹ The post-war Spain was in an alarming state of poverty and isolation because of the human and economic losses, the lack of communication with the outside world, Franco's insist on self-sufficient economic policies; nevertheless, emigration to the Western and Northern Europe helped Spain to recuperate its economy, and adjust with the modernization.⁵²⁰

Although the research does not analyse emigration, it should be noted that Spain has become a host country by having one of the highest emigration rates of skilled graduates (to other EU Member States and overseas) since 2008, precisely as a response to internal unemployment. At the same time, the proportion of foreign language speakers among the Spanish population is low compared to the rest of the EU, which, according to surveys, is a serious disadvantage for the integration and employment of emigrants. However, this fact

⁵¹⁵ A. Kreienbrink, Country Profile Spain, *Focus Migration*, No.6, August 2008, p. 1.

⁵¹⁶ O. Bover, P. Velilla, *Migration in Spain: Historical Background and Current Trends*, IZA Discussion Paper No.88, December 1999, pp.6-7.

⁵¹⁷ A. Kreienbrink, *op.cit.*, p.1.

⁵¹⁸ O. Bover, P. Velilla, *op.cit.*, p.7.

⁵¹⁹ M. Hazan, Spain The Uneasy Transition from Labor Exporter to Labor Importer and the New Emigration Challenge, in J. F. Hollifield, et. al (eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 3rd Edition, Stanford University Press, 2014, p. 947.

⁵²⁰ Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, *¿Cuáles fueron las causas de la emigración?*, available at: <http://sauce.pntic.mec.es/jotero/Emigra3/causas.htm>, accessed on: 18.01.2023.

obviously has a positive impact on the labour market opportunities of multilingual immigrants to Spain. Moreover, the geographical direction of emigration (towards Spanish-speaking communities) has been determinant. This 'chain migration model' (migration towards better jobs from worse conditions) can be observed in Spanish context.⁵²¹

Until 1990, each year almost 15,000 migrants immigrated to the other European countries via the Spain's emigration programme; however, right after Spain's accession to the European Union in (1986) which allowed the Spanish to have free movement within the Union's border, there was a sharp decrease in the number of immigration through this programme.⁵²² This fact started to change in the mid 1980s, in 15 years of time, Spain became a target country for immigrants from Africa, Latin America, and Asia; hence, the immigration wave per year was so consistent and substantial that the number of immigrants trebled or quadrupled.⁵²³ Spain left its long-lasting emigration country tag behind and turned into an immigration country in the middle of 1980s resulting in the increase of the foreign population in the country. Spain's immigrant portfolio was quite diverse, especially given the fact that there were so different migratory flows after certain regional and international events. South-North flows from the "Third World", fall of the Berlin Wall, East-West flow from Central and Eastern Europe, retirement migration to warm and sunny Spanish cities from Northern and Western Europe brought new migration trends to Spain and contributed to the Spanish economic growth.⁵²⁴

Tezanos and Vázquez created three different migration categories to evaluate Spain's migratory models. The first model is the Transatlantic Model covering the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, second model is the North-European Model between 1960s and 1970s, and the third model is the Current Model which starts from the late 1990s and remains valid until the beginning of the 21st century.

⁵²¹ G. C. Enriques, H.L. Martinez, The weaknesses of Spanish emigration. Real Instituto Elcano Royal Institute., 2018, Available at: <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-weaknesses-of-spanish-emigration/>, Accessed on: 09.02.2023.

⁵²² A. Kreienbrink, *op.cit.*, p.2.

⁵²³ J. Arango, Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth Century: the Case of Spain, in R. King, et. al. (eds.), *Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe*, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, p. 255.

⁵²⁴ A. Kreienbrink, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

Table 21: Tezanos and Vázquez’s Migration Models for Spain

	Transatlantic Model	North European Model	Current Model
Time Period	19 th Century and the first half of the 20 th Century	1960s-1970s	The late 1990s and the beginning of the 21 st century
Historical and geographical context	Formation and development of new nations (United States, Australia, Canada, Latin American Countries)	Economic development of the North-European countries aftermath of the World War II. (Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, France etc.)	Globalized economy in an unequal world (the poorer people emigrate to the richer countries)
Philosophy of the Migration	“To make the America”, “To start a new life in a new world”	To find help, save and improve	To survive and have access to opportunities and social services (health, education for children, basic benefits, etc.)
Underlying socio-economic elements of the host countries	To build a sufficient population, recruit labour force (skilled and unskilled)	To temporarily have the help of a labour force (not that qualified) during the period of an economic expansion	To have a “reserved labour army” for low-quality jobs
Purpose. The goals of the immigrants	Improve their life prospects. Start a new era in a land of opportunities.	Save as much as possible to buy a house in the country of origin or start a business, etc.	To be able to live better or offer a future for their children and “maintain” or help relatives in the country of origin.
How and for what they go	A long trip (overseas) to settle down and stay	Leaving for a limited period, thinking of returning (in most cases)	A trip (sometimes without papers) with flows of round trips
Perspectives/aspirations regarding the country of origin	It is thought that they will leave the country of origin for ideological, political, religious, economic reasons, etc.	It is thought that they will come back	It is thought of a settlement without breaking moorings (double track perspective)
Host model in the receiving country	Ruled (with papers), controlled (Ellis Island) and entrenched (destination point is the acquisition of citizenship in a “country of immigrants”)	Legalized and temporary departure (based on the economic situation) (“guest worker” model)	There is no reception model, wide “legal” spaces (or not legalized) and economic-business opportunism
Immigrant attitude	They want to integrate	Temporary vision	They are straddling between two models and two cultures
Cultural ties they maintain	Relative and mixed (Italian-American, Greek-American, etc.) secondary identities are maintained at an	Strong and emotional (miscegenation is not applicable). The established “Houses of Spain” etc.	Strong, they do not integrate (nor are they “allowed to integrate”)

	almost “folklore” level in its precise sociological sense, and in their place of residence		
Communication with the country of origin	Sporadic and decreasing	Wide and constant. Repatriation of earnings and savings, etc.	Very wide and heterogeneous (fax, internet, telephone, periodic remittances, frequent trips, etc.)
Citizenship Model	New citizenship	Original citizenship is maintained	Multiple and diffuse citizenships (almost doubly dual)
Cultural Integration	Total	None or little (sometimes the language is not even learned well)	Partial (the language is learnt functionally but keep their own as well) Even previous cultural identities are reinforced.

Source⁵²⁵: J. F. Tezanos, S. T. Vázquez, La cuestión migratoria en España. Tendencias en inmigración y exclusión social, *Revista Sistema*, No. 190-191, 2006, pp. 28-29.


In 2000s, Spain already named as an immigration country and attracted a diverse background of immigrants from all over the world. However, not all the migrants choose a regular way to arrive to Spain. For a long period of time, irregular migration has been an issue to tackle with in Spain’s agenda. Irregularity does not always correspond to the undocumented entrance. Although immigrants use a regular way to entry to the country, overstaying of their tourist visa make them irregular.⁵²⁶ Over the past decade, immigrants have found Spain very appealing and there are several reasons behind this fact. First and foremost, a robust and somewhat active informal economy makes it easier irregular immigrants to get a job; in the second place, unlike other European countries, there is a comparatively favourable societal climate towards immigration; in the third place, the political climate of the Southern Europe has a long history of tolerating unlawful activities; and last but not least, Spanish legislations provide social rights for irregular immigrants, for example, free and equal access to the public health care services and education as the same base with Spanish locals.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁵ Translated by the author.

⁵²⁶ D. J. Kyle, R. Goldstein, *Migration Industries: A Comparison of the Ecuador-US and Ecuador-Spain Cases*, EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/15, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2011, p. 11.

⁵²⁷ C. González-Enríquez, Spain: Irregularity as a Rule, in A. Triandafyllidou, *Irregular Migration in Europe Myths and Realities*, Ashgate, Surrey, 2010, pp. 247-248.

Table 22: Immigration flow from abroad to Spain



Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Immigration flow from abroad to Spain*, available at: <https://www.ine.es/en/index.htm>, accessed on: 21.01.2023.

5.3.2. Irregular entries and protection

Data provided by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior has revealed that irregular immigration to Spain during the past year decreased by 25.6 per cent, from 41,945 arrivals recorded in 2021 to 31,219 in 2022. The same source states that the most pronounced decrease was in the entrances from the sea. At the same time, they show a general decrease on the coasts of the peninsula, Ceuta, the Balearic Islands, and the Canary Islands, both in the number of irregular immigrants and in the number of boats.⁵²⁸ On the other side, the number of recognised refugees is growing.⁵²⁹

Recognised refugees in Spain

Year	Refugees	Change (%)
2021	122,539.00	18.25%
2020	103,624.00	79.43%
2019	57,751.00	182.58%
2018	20,437.00	16.51%
2017	17,541.00	35.11%
2016	12,983.00	101.38%

⁵²⁸ Spain: Irregular Migration Decreased by 25.6 % last year, *Schengenvisa*, January 4, 2023 <https://www.schengenvisa.info.com/news/spain-irregular-migration-decreased-by-25-6-last-year/>

⁵²⁹ Macrotrends, *Spain Refugee Statistics 1961-2023*, Available at: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ESP/spain/refugee-statistics>, Accessed on: 03.01.2023.

2015	6,447.00	11.21%
2014	5,797.00	24.91%
2013	4,641.00	3.09%
2012	4,502.00	6.68%
2011	4,220.00	10.64%

The pressure of the irregular immigration and the illegal entry are more visible in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Spain has become the principal route for the immigrants who intend to go to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Arriving in “patera”, a small vehicle which is used as a sea transportation by immigrants, by crossing from the Morocco or the Western Sahara, or West Africa to the Canary Islands immigrants are sometimes forced to make a deal with the smugglers by risking their lives.⁵³⁰

During recent years, this territory of Spain, Ceuta and Melilla have witnessed a large number of “pushbacks”. The European Court of Human Rights case N.D. and N.T. v. Spain can be given as an example for this issue that the migrants were exposed to expulsion. A group of migrants tried to climb over the fences surrounding the city of Melilla and once they managed to cross the barriers, the Guardia Civil handcuffed them and returned them back to the opposite side of the border. Before that, the migrants did not go through any form of identification process and were not given a chance to explain their personal situations. They somehow could enter Spain without proper permissions and their orders for expulsion from the country were issued. Their attempts to appeal this decision as well as the asylum application of one of them were rejected.⁵³¹

Furthermore, from the immigration management point of view, the things were not always very smooth for the migrants who migrated to Spain. The family reunification could be an issue and they remained separated for various reasons because the authorities did not grant them the proper admission to enter Spain. The CJEU does not allow a standard minimum income threshold for family unification without conducting an individualized assessment, but over the years some national authorities practised it other way around.⁵³²

⁵³⁰ UNODC, *The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union*, New York, 2011, p. 9. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Report_SOM_West_Africa_EU.pdf, accessed on: 31.01.2023.

⁵³¹ N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, European Court of Human Rights, 13.02.2020, Available at: <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22002-12726%22%7D>, Accessed on: 19.08.2023.

⁵³² M. Bottero, Integration (of Immigrants) in the European Courts’ Jurisprudence: Supporting a Pluralist and Rights-Based Paradigm?, *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 2023, Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-023-01027-7>, Accessed on: 19.08.2023.

Spain has been one of those countries and it can be seen on the case of Court of Justice of the European Union, *Mimoun Khachab v Subdelegacion del Gobierno en Alava* that because of his lack of stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of the family as well as without any access to any social assistance in Spain, the family reunification could not be realized.⁵³³

The latest example of the irregular migration to Spain has taken place quite recently following the Arab Spring. Many Syrians who planned to claim asylum in Europe mostly choose either the Eastern Mediterranean route and/or the Balkan route. As previously mentioned, there was a sharp decrease on the border crossings after the EU-Turkey deal. However, when the unprecedented number of Syrians hit the way to seek a shelter in European countries, increasing number of them arrived in Spain via the Western Mediterranean route. This route has been associated with the North Africans such as Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian immigrants to pass the Mediterranean Sea to get to Spain.⁵³⁴ But, this fact radically changed in 2017; while the Syrians became the most common nationality of Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region to arrive to Spain, Syrians' second most popular entrance path into the EU came to be the Western Mediterranean Route.⁵³⁵ According to the UNHCR report on *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022*, Spain is among the 5 top countries which receive the most individual applications with 118,800 applicants.⁵³⁶

The report by the Mixed Migration Platform argues that Morocco and Algeria are the two countries on the Western Mediterranean route which Syrians have historical ties within the North Africa. For a long period of time, Syrians immigrated to Morocco in order to get a job in agriculture and well-drilling. Long before the crisis emerged, there have been already many Syrians living in Morocco, already adopted the Moroccan Arabic dialect and established a family by marrying a Moroccan. Likewise, medium, and highly skilled Syrian workers immigrated to Algeria to fill the labour demand in the sectors such as construction, oil, mechanic and electric industries, water, and gas during the 1960s to 1980s. When the war started and Syrians decided to seek a shelter, some reasons triggered them to immigrate

⁵³³ *Mimoun Khachab v Subdelegacion del Gobierno en Alava* (2016) CJEU C-558/14, Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,583ed1484.html>, Accessed on: 19.08.2023.

⁵³⁴ H. De Haas, *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*, Migration Policy Institute, 2006, p.1.

⁵³⁵ UNHCR, *Spain Arrivals Dashboard*, May 2017, p. 2.

⁵³⁶ UNHCR, *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022*, p.3, Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/global-trends-report-2022.pdf>, Accessed on: 19.08.2023.


to Morocco and Algeria. The most common reasons for them to find those countries attractive were expecting to find a job and already existing family ties. However, the expectations of Syrians who immigrated to those countries were not met and some deteriorating factors forced the Syrians to move onward. Those reasons can be mainly listed as that they had difficulty to have a residence permit or unable to extend them, consequently they could not access to health care, education, or employment. The Syrians were exploited in those transit countries because of the long hours of work, low payment, unqualified jobs, harder living conditions. Therefore, they took a decision for onward migration.⁵³⁷

The same report from Mixed Migration Platform states that the main onward migration destination for Syrians in the North Africa was Spain. Although there were some Syrians applying for regular ways to arrive to Spain, for instance via the EU emergency relocation scheme, the EU resettlement scheme, works permits and study permits, some tried to reach Spain irregularly. During the irregular migration from the North Africa to Spain, the Syrians used two main routes crossing six to eight different countries: 1. either they choose to first any MENA country, spent some time living there and continued to journey until arriving to the enclave of Ceuta Melilla or 2. they stayed in MENA country and later they moved onward through Mali and Mauritania crossing the Saharan desert to arrive to Algeria then travelling to Morocco finally ending up in Spain. The ones following the second route reported that they preferred to travel through this route because there were lacking visa to enter to Algeria which was introduced in spring 2015 and it was cheaper to travelling through this route because paying to smugglers were over their budget.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁷ Mixed Migration Platform, *From Syria to Spain Syrian Migration to Europe via the Westen Mediterranean route between 2015 and 2017*, November 2017, pp.18-19.


⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 3- 24.

Table 23: Overview of main routes used by Syrians who reached Spain irregularly.



Source: Mixed Migration Platform, *From Syria to Spain Syrian Migration to Europe via the Western Mediterranean route between 2015 and 2017*, November 2017, p. 20.

Table 24: Overview of main routes used by Syrians who reached Spain through legal pathways.



Source: Mixed Migration Platform, *From Syria to Spain Syrian Migration to Europe via the Western Mediterranean route between 2015 and 2017*, November 2017, p. 21.

The legal framework in Spain provides two international protection status: refugee and subsidiary protection. Article 13.4 of the Constitution establishes the right to asylum in Spain. Both the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the New York Protocol of 1967 were ratified by Spain in 1978. Law 5/1984 of 26 March which was enacted as required by the Constitution governs the right to asylum and refugee status. Law 12/2009 of 30 October 2009 regulates the right to asylum and subsidiary protection. This law was later amended and incorporated the Article 2.j) of Directive 2011/95/EU.⁵³⁹

People can apply for asylum in Spain at several different places: border check points (including the ports, airports and land border in Ceuta or Melilla), any Spanish territory, Immigration Detention Facility, penitentiary facility or any diplomatic missions and Spanish consular offices abroad.⁵⁴⁰ Once the application is done, the examination procedure starts which sometimes lasts up to 2 years. There is a specific identification card which is called “tarjeta roja” (red card), this card allows asylum seekers to stay in Spain during the 6 months and after the 6 months, it brings further rights to the applicant such as access to employment.⁵⁴¹

5.3.3. Integration in Spain

Unlike the long history of immigration, Spain started to deal with integration quite recently. By the end of the 20th century, integration was regarded to be a topic of concern, and the Spanish Parliament established comprehensive immigration laws whose significant portions devoted to immigrant rights and assimilation.⁵⁴² Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 on rights and liberties of aliens in Spain and their social integration is the first official document covering the integration theme in Spain. Law 2/2009 was just passed almost 10 years later than the first one, and it still constitutes today’s legal framework for integration. Although, there is still not any specific law for integration in Spain, Organic Law 2/2009 envisioned a

⁵³⁹ Spanish Ombudsman, *A Study of Asylum in Spain International Protection and Reception System Resources*, Madrid, June 2016, p.24.

⁵⁴⁰ UNHCR, *Seeking Asylum in Spain*, available at: <https://help.unhcr.org/spain/en/solicitar-asilo-en-espana/>, accessed on: 22.01.2023

⁵⁴¹ Asylum Information Database (AIDA), *Country Report: Spain*, 2021 Update, p. 18. Available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/AIDA-ES_2021update.pdf, accessed on: 22.01.2023.

⁵⁴² R. Barbulescu, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

multi-level governance of migration built on collaboration between central administration institutions, local governments, and civil society.⁵⁴³

Until today, Spain developed two integration strategies to encourage the immigrant's integration: 1. The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI⁵⁴⁴ I) for the period of 2007-2010 which is a State plan aiming to increase, strengthen and bring coherence to have an inclusive society in Spain.⁵⁴⁵ This plan also intended to adjust public policies to better meet the requirements of the immigrants in the areas of education, access to the labour market, social services, health care, and housing.⁵⁴⁶ 2. The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI II) for the period of 2011-2014 determined 11 policy areas covering reception, employment and economic development, education, health, social services and inclusion, mobility and development, peaceful coexistence, equal treatment and combating discrimination, children, youth and families, gender, participation, and civic education. The General Objectives of the Strategic Plan are listed as such:

1. Guarantee the full exercise, in conditions of equality, of civil, social, economic, cultural, and political rights.
2. Generate social, economic, and employment opportunities that guarantee quality of life.
3. Improve the levels of access and use of public services and benefits, especially education, health, employment, social services, and dependency, by the citizenry as a whole and in conditions of equity.
4. Adapt sectoral public policies and structures of public services to the challenges and demands of a diverse society.
5. Adapt the reception systems for people in situations of vulnerability and specialized reception throughout the national territory to the current needs derived from the evolution of migratory flows, ensuring that they provide them with a sufficient degree of autonomy for access to goods and services, exercise of rights and fulfilment of obligations.

⁵⁴³ European Commission, Governance of migrant integration in Spain, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-spain_en , accessed on: 24.01.2023.

⁵⁴⁴ Spanish acronym for "Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración"

⁵⁴⁵ Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (2007-2010) Executive Summary*, Madrid, 2007, p. 16.

⁵⁴⁶ European Commission, Governance of migrant integration in Spain, op.cit.

6. Promote comprehensive policies for equal treatment and opportunities and non-discrimination that contemplate the prevention and denunciation of all forms of racism and xenophobia as well as the protection and assistance to victims in all fields of social life, both in the public and private spheres.
7. Strengthen equity in all stages of the educational system, including university, permanence, and academic success.
8. Reduce the levels of social exclusion, marginalization, and poverty, with special emphasis on the child and youth population.
9. Contribute to the development of a democratic and participatory culture as well as institutional legitimacy.
10. Promote socio-community construction and development processes that promote intercultural coexistence, improvement of social, neighbourhood, and labour relations, respect for difference and diversity management in a shared project of society.⁵⁴⁷

Pasetti states that within the framework of PECE II, some initiatives were taken at the regional and local levels. For example, language courses were organized for the immigrants by the local governments and associations, the Ministry of Education, and with the help of Cervantes Institutes; civic courses such as “Education for Citizenship and Human Rights”, “Reports on Integration Efforts and “Know your Rights” were instructed by the schools, local governments, and associations; diversity was enforced at the national, regional, and local levels with the programmes such as “Program for Diversity Management in Companies (Programa de Formación del Empleado Público en Gestión de la Diversidad)” , “Program for the Promotion of Intercultural Co-existence in Neighbourhoods (Plan Barrios)”, “Training Program on Diversity Management for Civil Servants (Programa de Formación del Empleado Publico en Gestión de la Diversidad)” etc.; dual citizenship started to be accepted for certain countries; Spanish government signed a lot of international agreements for the sake of portability of social rights of the immigrants and political right such as voting in elections; Spanish government also came to an agreement with some countries to establish a partnership to foster the cooperation on culture and language for example with Morocco.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁷ Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración (2011-2014), Madrid, 2011, p.115.

⁵⁴⁸ F. Pasetti, *Country Report Integration Policies in Spain*, INTERACT RR 2014/30, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2014, pp. 10-12.

After the termination of the PECE II period, Spain did not announce any new plan for integration in 2015 and currently there is not any active programme for integration prepared for the immigrants.⁵⁴⁹ However, according to Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 2020, Spain collected 60 points on the MIPEX 100-point scale which is average country score 49. It is stated that Spain is found to have adopted a comprehensive approach to integration, and immigrants have more chances than challenges in terms of integration. Compared to other EU, Western European (EU15), and OECD countries, Spain's present policies are a little bit more inclusive. In Spain, immigrants can enjoy most of the fundamental rights as much as Spanish residents do. The only problematic area is access to nationality which requires 10 years of residency while only certain immigrants can obtain dual citizenship.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁹ European Commission, Governance of migrant integration in Spain, op.cit.

⁵⁵⁰ MIPEX Integration Policy Index 2020, *Spain Key Findings*, Available at: <https://www.mipex.eu/spain>, Accessed on: 24.01.2023.

“You have to understand, that no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land.”

From “Home”, by Warsan Shire

CHAPTER VI: RESEARCH ON CASE COUNTRIES

6. Interview Analysis

6.1. Turkey

6.1.1. Pre-War Situation in Syria

The triggering reasons to force refugees to flee their home country can be variable. In order to see how their living condition was like back in home country and to understand whether they had any intention to migrate anywhere prior to the war, the participants were asked to describe their lives before the war in Syria. All interviewees responded that the life was very nice and satisfactory in Syria for them and never thought about moving anywhere else outside of their cities before the Syrian Civil War started. They intended to continue their lives in Syria and planned their future accordingly.

There is no way to compare my life before in Syria and here in Turkey now. The life was much better and prettier for us. I was with my family and all my beloved ones were around me. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 001)

All participants reported that they were in a financially stable situation, and they all had a better living condition back in their country of origin. Some of the participants reported that they invested all their money and future in Syria by buying houses to stay in with their families and establishing well-functioning businesses. Two of the participants were students before the war, and they did not have any aspiration to change the country.

I was at the age of starting the life. I was 19 years old, in the second grade at the university. I got engaged with the girl I used to love. I am the only son of my family; I have two sisters and I was planning to live altogether in Damascus to help them and protect them when they need. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

They all emphasized that they had a better financial situation, and power of purchase back in pre-war Syria. Worsening economic conditions (minimum wage, difficulty to pay the rental fee, cover the expenses of their children etc.) was the common headline of their before and after war life. Some participants mentioned that they can hardly pay the rental fee in Turkey now while they used to have two flats to get a rental income back in Syria. Financial

loss was the main difference before the war in Syria when they compared with their current situation in Turkey.

Before the incidents started in Syria, my situation was beyond good. In contrast to today's conditions, we were living in prosperity, we had enough income to cover our needs and wishes. We used to have a high standard of life. My husband had a well-paid job in a finance company, we owned cars to drive. Now, I cannot even buy a paper notebook for my daughter to take notes in the class. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 003)

6.1.2. In the midst of war

When the protests were started, all participants thought that it was temporary, and the rising tension during the protests would go down and everything would turn back to normal very soon. None of them imagined that it would evolve something big in this scale. (The interviewees refer to events in Syria, i.e., incidents starting in March 2011, initially with anti-government demonstrations, inspired by events in Tunisia. People took to the streets to protest the authoritarian rule of the political elite, but initially the demonstrators were only demanding reforms, not regime change. Violent intervention by law enforcement officers led to rioting, followed by police firing live ammunition and the use of armoured vehicles to quell the unrest more quickly)

I am from Jaramana, the richest city in terms of ethnicity and religious groups in Syria. We all were impatiently waiting for Fridays to come because the protests were taking place on Fridays. We used to come home quickly to watch the news, back then we did not think that it would grow this much bigger. It was not serious at the beginning. My family used to make it sarcastic, sometimes we related the protest on the news with something funny in the house so that we did not stress about it. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

Unlike what they all assumed; the protests started to last longer than expected. Instead of getting better, the conditions became worse and eventually made harder to bear with. The reality of the war became a part of their daily life.

My mother had a pharmacy in the main street. Whenever I heard the siren of the fire engine, I was calling my mom to check if she was safe and sound. If she didn't pick up my call, I got very nervous. I was traumatised with the sound of siren, still it makes me remember those days when I hear it. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

Participants confirmed that it became unavoidable to ignore the crisis on the daily life activities. The feeling of insecurity was too visible in each corner of life.

I used to live in Damascus, it wasn't affected that much by the war. However, on the way to work or while I was coming back home, they were suddenly stopping and asking us to get off from the bus. They were checking our Identity Cards and treating us as a suspicious. My mother was too afraid of it. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 006)

There were several push factors to affect their decision-making process for immigration. The first motivation to move somewhere else was for the safety reasons. Each participant who responded their priority concern as safety had a violent incident in their street or neighbourhood. It caused a huge fear and hesitation about the security.

There was a checkpoint in our street. One day, it was bombed, and the glass windows of the house were exploded. My daughters were sleeping next to the window. I was very much afraid that something happened to them. We immediately moved to my husband's family house. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 005)

Most of the participants reported that the capital city Damascus was different from the other cities in Syria in terms of damage. It was not affected so much from the war since it was in the centre of the regime. However, as time went by, all aspects of life started to be found restricted. Especially, politically opponent citizens felt their lives were under threat during the Syrian Civil War.

When the protests were just started, I joined a protester group at the university. The police took my name in a list. Following days, while I was entering to the university, they started to stop me and question me asking why I joined that group, who I was supporting etc. One day, they took me into custody for 2 days. Normally, I am exempted from the military service because I am the only son of my family. My mother never wanted me to leave anywhere, but after the custody she encouraged me to move to another country. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

Restrictions, detentions, and the constant situation of war deteriorated the people's mental states. Particularly, the ones who got a direct involvement of the protests and had a custody-like experiences developed serious mental symptoms which affected the family member's decision on migration.

My husband got arrested one day. He stayed in prison for 30 days, for a whole month. They found nothing on him, not any single thing to accuse of. Eventually, he got released but later, he started to realize that he got really traumatized. My children and I were trying to adapt his situation. Like not to scream and not to make noise to

irritate him. We decided to move to another country to leave everything behind.
(Syrian Refugee 003)

Some participants unfortunately faced with the bitter façade of war. They were directly affected by violence. Although they were against the government, they did not have any intention to move until they loss somebody from the close circle. The tragic loss was the turning point to decide on immigration.

We were politically against Bashar. The war was so visible that we didn't have any single second without the voice of the flights in our ears. My sister died in an attack. After that, I was afraid that my children might die or something bad could happen to them. I didn't want to stand this anymore. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 002)

6.1.3. Deciding on immigration

When the situation in Syria deteriorated and became unbearable for them to leave, the vast majority of the refugees preferred to flee to the neighbouring countries. Geographic proximity plays an important role on decision which country to go. In the interviews, some of the participants mentioned that they took the distance between the country of origin and the target country into consideration while deciding where to flee.

Lebanon was the country where we used to visit frequently. The furthest point between Damascus and Beirut is not more than one and half hour. For us, going to Beirut is not counted as changing country. We could visit the family every weekend. For this reason, I went to Beirut with my sister. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 006)

Some participants sought cultural competence and relational closeness on the countries they aimed to immigrate. They took the decision considering that the similarities between the two countries and cultures would help them to live without difficulties.

Our first preference became the United Arab Emirates. We used to travel there a lot; we were familiar with the country. It is an Arab country. The language would not be a barrier. Additionally, they speak English there as if it was the first language. Just 1 month before they cancelled the visa for Syrians, we went there by flight regularly.
(Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

Social networks abroad also played an important role on the decision-making of the refugees. They indicated that they considered several different countries and the feedback provided by their social networks living in each country had a great contribution on their final destinations. Mostly, they thought that the first settlement, finding accommodation, employment as well as adaptation would be very easy with the support of the social network.

I had a list of countries. I have a relative almost all the countries in the region: Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan... You can speak Arabic in these countries. First, I was thinking to move to Egypt. But my friend told me that the life was hard there, it was even harder than Damascus (now it is vice versa). He said that if I had a patient to wait, I could overcome the problems there and he could also help me to find a job in the factory he worked. Another friend in Jordan recommended me to go to Jordan. He opened a supermarket; he offered me to work together. Before taking the decision, I also talked to my uncle in Ankara. And he convinced me to go there. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

Majority of the participants who consulted with their social networks, took the final decision according to their own parameters. Political safety in the chosen country was the priority for some respondents.

We were neither Bashar supporter nor against Bashar. We were in between. In Lebanon, there were a lot of Bashar supporters and there were some reporters as well. Some of our friends were killed or put in prison. I didn't want my husband to have a similar end. Under these circumstances, Turkey appeared to be the best choice. Nobody would question if we were Bashar supporter or not. My brother was in Ankara, so we decided to go next to him. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 001)

Fear of ethnic, and religious discrimination and persecutions had also an effect on their choice of destination.

I didn't want to go to Europe. There is racism. I wanted to stay in a Muslim country because I can at least perform my prayers anywhere and anytime without being judged. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

Among the interviewees, there was a unique case. It was a story of becoming second time refugee. The participant was a Palestinian lady who was a refugee in Syria and married to a Syrian man. When they decided to flee the country, they needed to make a decision according to her refugee status in the receiving countries.

Going to Lebanon should have been closer and safer. Syrians are like the half of the Lebanese population. But there is an unemployment situation, you cannot find job there. Since I am Palestinian, I can only go there for 15 days and then I must do another entry. I have to file my papers on the national security of Lebanon. It was more complicated than going to Turkey. Because in Turkey, when they asked me where I was from, I acted as Syrian, I didn't show any documentation such as passport. Since we were living in Damascus, we wanted to live again in the capital

due to the opportunities it can provide. Then, we came to Ankara. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 003)

There were also two onward migration cases among the participants. They encountered with some difficulties in the first country of asylum, and they decided to move on to seek shelter in Turkey.

My mother could not get used to the neighbourhood where we were living in Lebanon. It was a Christian quarter and she never felt belonging to the environment. She is a religious Muslim woman and she wanted to hear the azan for the five times of the day. When I got married to a Turkish man, she also came to Turkey as a temporary protected person. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 006)

Economic situation and maintaining a high education were also one of the main drivers of the onward migration.

In the United Arab Emirates, we spent so much money. In the first year, my mother could not find work for few months and my father didn't work, either. This means that we had to spend all our fortune and savings. We still have real estate property in Syria, but no one wants to buy damaged stuff, they are useless. After high school, I started to search for good universities, but they were extremely expensive. My auntie was living in Turkey back then. She motivated me to apply for the Gaziantep University. For this reason, I moved to Turkey. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

6.1.4. Arrival to Turkey

The participants who came to Turkey in the early years of the war, usually entered Turkey regularly. Before 2015, the participants took the flights when they were still operating between Syria and Turkey or travelled through highway and arrived in Turkey in the border checkpoints. The official authorities granted them the residence card for tourism purposes or if they had any education ties with the country, the residence card for education purposes were given to them. When the temporary protection status came into force, some preferred to convert their residence cards into identity card for Temporary Protection Identity. While some others would rather keep the normal residence cards which provide further rights in terms of naturalization and does not bring any travel restrictions unlike Temporary Protection IDs. On the other hand, as the situation in the region got even more complicated, and the number of displaced people kept increasing, the preferred way to flee to Turkey became more irregular. Some participants reported that they did not have any valid documentation to travel such as passport. Although they had knowledge about the route how to reach Turkey,

they needed to deal with smugglers because the smugglers knew better how to escape from the control points of Gendarmerie. It can be seen from the Table 22 that half of my interviewees from 2012-2016 were able to reach Turkey regularly, half irregularly, with the help of smugglers.

Table 25: Entry data of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Pseudonyms	Gender	Entry Date	Entry Type
Syrian Refugee Turkey 001	Female	2016	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Turkey 002	Female	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Turkey 003	Female	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Turkey 004	Male	2013	Regular
Syrian Refugee Turkey 005	Female	2012	Regular
Syrian Refugee Turkey 006	Female	2015	Regular
Syrian Refugee Turkey 007	Female	2015	Regular
Syrian Refugee Turkey 008	Male	2016	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Turkey 009	Female	2015	Irregular via smugglers

6.1.5. Life in Turkey and Unmet Needs

The most prominent narrative of the refugees during the interviews was the difficulty to find any suitable jobs to their professional background. Especially, the employment opportunities were very limited if they could not speak Turkish. They had to work in the low-qualified jobs regardless of their highly educated profiles.

When I arrived in Ankara, I started to search for a job. I didn't speak Turkish back then. I wrote in a piece of paper translated by the Google Translate that "I am Syrian, I want to work" and I also include "Yes" and "No" options. I walked around in every shop in Batikent, everybody was showing me "No". One barbershop said "Yes" but he said no salary, working hours from 9 A.M. till 9 P.M. He would teach me the job and told me that I could take tips from the customers. By this way, I could present myself, and maybe somebody could hire me. I accepted. I used to work as an x-ray technician in a hospital in Damascus. I was wearing white coat, and everybody was calling me doctor. And here, I was sweeping the hairs on the floor. I needed to start from zero in Ankara. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

Apart from the unmatching jobs to their profiles, some participants indicated that they had to work extra hours and the salary which they received was usually equal to the minimum wage.

I am a nurse. But my diploma is not recognized here. I try to work in project-based jobs such as cooking for charity sale. My husband came to Ankara 6 months before us. He is an accountant. He was rejected from every job due to the lack of Turkish knowledge. He worked in several places in very short-term periods. He was changing job every day. He worked as a porter and carried stuff up to the 7th floor. When I was in Syria, he never mentioned me that his job was like that. I thought that he was working in a good company located in skyscrapers like in the Turkish soap operas. I was calling him; he was not answering my calls. I was wondering which company makes their employees work for 14 hours and not allowing to use their cells. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 003)

Another employment related issue expressed by one of the participants is that even though their profession does not require local language knowledge, they encountered with several difficulties to find a job and getting a fair treatment.

My husband is struggling to find a job. Before he worked as a tailor but, unfortunately, they didn't pay him. He worked for long hours but there was not any compensation. He still tries to find a job, but they are telling him that he is old, and

they prefer to have young people to work. He is just 43 years old. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 002)

Three participants who came to Turkey early years of the war had a more stable situation regarding the employment. They speak fluent Turkish and currently run their own businesses.

When I came to Turkey, I started to work for NGOs in the case management field. The conditions were so harsh, I witnessed the worst cases. I could not take it anymore psychologically. I am originally a teacher. I worked in the schools and recently I have started my own business. Now I own a kindergarten, I have Turkish, Arab and foreign students. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 006)

Some participants who have children confirmed that the access to education in school-age in Ankara was not possible until 2017. The official education language of schools in Turkey is Turkish so at the beginning children had some difficulties to comprehend the lectures. The ones who cannot speak the language properly still struggle at the school while who has full control of the language does not experience any trouble.

My youngest daughter was just 2 years old when we came to Turkey. They grow up here. They speak like a native Turkish speaker; they behave as if they were Turkish. In the school they don't recognize that they are Syrians. I am happy with their education. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 005)

In the higher education, the respondents had satisfactory experiences. They could enrol in the departments free of charge following the official procedure, participate in the courses and even changed their specialization after couple of years taking necessary examinations.

I got accepted from the Environmental Engineering at the Hacettepe University. I failed two years in a row. I didn't have the basic physics and maths knowledge. I started to study for SAT, and I got accepted from the Nutrition and Dietetics Department at the Yıldırım Beyazıt University. Now, I am in my 4th grade, almost graduating. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

Although MIPEX 2020 key findings show that Turkey's health care is slightly favourable for the immigrants, access to healthcare was one of the main concerns for some participants.

My son is sick, he needs a constant consultation with the doctor. There is a lot of issues with the health care system. I cannot get an appointment easily. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 002)

High inflation and worsening economic condition of Turkey affect several different dimensions of refugees' lives. There is already an ongoing unemployment problem which

the majority of refugees face difficulties of finding a job in the country. Deteriorating financial situation forced some of the participants to change their housing because of the insufficient income to pay the rental fee.

The life was better in 2016. The prices were not high like now. The life is difficult because of the high prices. We had to move to another flat which is cheaper. My husband left Turkey and went to Greece to work. Some of my children has begun to work after school, as well. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 001)

The participants of the research indicated that Turkish citizens have started gradually not to show their initial friendly and welcoming attitude. During the open-door policy's first days, the authorities informed the Turkish society that the Syrians' stay would be temporary. As their stay has been extending due to the circumstances, some incidents started to happen. And the Syrians started to feel the difference.

Turkish people are not the same as we came here. Now they changed. We feel that we are guests, and we need to leave one day. It seems like that we are settling down here. Therefore, people's behaviour changed. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 002)

None of the participants has faced with discrimination but, all the participants complain about the generalization of the Syrians by the local society. The Syrians who committed a crime, act in violence or create insecurities usually shape the general image of the Syrian refugees in the eyes of the local society.

There was an incident. A Syrian guy killed a Turkish man. After that Turkish people don't want us here anymore. One bad person did this mistake, why the whole population should be punished? Turkish people don't like us no longer. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 001)

6.1.6. Aspirations for further migration

Syrian refugees participating in the research from Turkey have different perceptions about the migration aspirations for the near future. The ones who struggle to maintain stability, have difficulty to find a job, or low income set an intention for onward migration. Lack of employment opportunities play an important role on their onward migration decision despite the familiarity with the country.

I am going to move to France. If there happens a miracle and my financial situation get better here, of course I prefer to stay in Turkey. My children are already got used to the language, and the country. But things don't seem to ameliorate here. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 003)

Uncertainty about the legal status in the country also is a push factor for the onward migration decision. The fear of deportation and unforeseen future make them consider moving onward.

If there is an opportunity, I can move to any European Union country. Here, I live the life day by day. I am nervous. Maybe one day they will ask us to go back to Syria or somewhere else. (Syrian Refugee 002)

Lack of education opportunities for children and building better living conditions for them are the one of the primary motivations for onward migration for the refugee families with the children.

I don't want to stay in Turkey. I am here because I am obliged to. My husband is in Greece now. If I find any opportunity, I want to meet my husband in Greece or any other country. My children can get a better education. They can have a brighter future. I can also go to Norway, my brother and sister live there but unfortunately there is no family reunification for siblings. No legal way to go. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 001)

Some of the interviewees mentioned their aspirations to stay in Turkey. There are also various reasons to make them to take this decision. All of them indicated that they already feel integrated, and they developed familiarity with the place they live in and established strong social relations.

Now, I define myself as "Angaralı"⁵⁵¹. I got used to living in Ankara. I cannot even imagine myself living in İstanbul. I have friends. Turkish people treat us very well here. Even other Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon they don't treat Syrians this well. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 004)

All of the participants who aspire to stay are fluent in Turkish, and they are content with their living conditions in Turkey. All of them have a stable income and they have established their own businesses. Especially running a business created a stronger bond with the country and they aspire to stay for it.

Two years ago, I was thinking to do my masters in Germany, in France or any other European country. But I established a company; I had a big transition in terms of integration. You feel that you are contributing to the economy, your business is the same as others. It feels different and powerful. After having something to stick to,

⁵⁵¹ "Angaralı" means Ankaranian, a person who is from Ankara in the Central Anatolian dialect in Turkish.

right now, I don't see myself outside of Turkey in the near future. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 007)

The participants who have children prioritized the educational opportunities provided by the host country. Especially the families whose children came to Turkey at the very early age and start schooling in Turkey, they have aspiration to stay in the country.

I wish everything could turn back to normal and we could go back to Syria to our families and friends. But my children grow up here. I need to think about them. They have a good education here. For their future, of course I need to stay here. (Syrian Refugee Turkey 005)

Cultural affinity plays an important role for some of the participants' decision on aspiration to stay. Referring to the cultural similarities and welcoming attitude of the Turkish people, they express their will to stay.

The Turkish people resembles the Syrians from Damascus. If you speak to them in Turkish, they behave even friendlier. After all this time, I have never encountered with discrimination or racism. I want to stay here. I got used to living here. (Syrian Refugees Turkey 006)

None of the participants has an aspiration to return to Syria unless the regime changes. They have doubt about safety and security. One of the participants stated that for her home country means family and friends. Everybody left Syria around her circle, so for her there is no place to return. Some participants mentioned that especially after spending so much time in abroad and establishing a life in there creates hesitation to return to the Post-War Syria. For some, going back to Syria would be like starting from scratch.

6.2. Denmark

6.2.1. Pre-War Situation in Syria

Syrian refugees participating in the research from Denmark have a diverse background and their pre-war situation in Syria are different from one another. However, they all had a stabile life before the war and never thought about moving to another place. All of the participants were born in Syria, brought up there and studied at least until the high education in their own country. There are three prominent answers to the question of how their lives were in the pre-war period in Syria. The first and foremost outcome of this question is that some participants described their pre-war lives ordinary, subtle, and decent.

Basically, my life was like a regular life. I have a middle standard family, we had enough income, we had our own house, my daddy had also his own company. We settled down in Aleppo, I studied there, graduated, and grabbed the opportunity to gather work experience in and out of the country until they called me for the military services. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

The environment where people grow up usually influences their social, political, economic, and environmental development as well as shape their behaviour to certain events. Some participants underline the fact that since their childhood, they have had a high social awareness about what has been happening around them. Therefore, participating in the society and supporting the community was a priority for them in the pre-war Syria.

My mother was so active in helping poor people, people with challenges. She was engaged with the Islamic associations. I was born in this kind of environment. I wanted to do more impact in the society, help and support people. The situation in Syria was so frustrating and disappointing, corruption everywhere, no human rights. I wanted to do something meaningful, I studied law and started to work in the NGOs. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

Before the outbreak of the conflict, certain people were already impacted by the dispute between the regime and the opposition. Some participants noted that although all aspects of life were quite good for them, they could still feel the political pressure on them in the pre-war Syria.

I come from a very well-established family, financially we were good, I wouldn't ask for anything, I got everything I wanted. My family was very well-off. The only thing was that my family have issues with the government since my grandfather got shot by the regime in 1997. Usually, if you have one of your family that is up in the opposition of the regime, that means all the family is cursed or kind of like on the blacklist. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 004)

Before the conflict started, some Syrians already moved and settled down in another country within the framework of international migration. Some participants also disclosed that they moved to another country from Syria to several different points in the world for the purpose of employment during the pre-war period. Those participants who were already abroad directly came from the working/transit country to Copenhagen to apply for asylum. Among them, one respondent (Syrian Refugee Denmark 003) mentioned that after graduating from the engineering faculty, he found a job in Saudi Arabia and moved there in 2004 and never came back to Syria again. However, there were also the ones who moved back and forth to

Syria within the framework of circular migration until the war made the life unbearable to live there.

I started my job in 1989 in Dubai. Then, I went back to Syria in 2007 and made my own business in Syria, too. It was running very well. But I couldn't continue because the problem also splashed to our city. They started to arrest people who didn't do any wrong to the government. I didn't agree on that and that's why I went back to Dubai. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 006)

6.2.2. In the midst of war

The conflict which initially started with demonstrations protesting the government, gradually turned into a big scale war between the regime and the opposition. Although the residents regarded that as a temporary duration, the dire reflections of the crisis became more visible in all branches of life in country wide. In a situation of an armed conflict, it is common to find in people a well-founded fear of violence and/or chronic fear of being persecuted. Some participants mentioned that since they were supporting the opposition, there was a high risk of being seized by the regime and they were afraid of being subject to persecution, and uncertainties waiting for them.

My village is against the government. I was working in an electricity company. We cut the electricity of the places which were progovernment. I was feeling insecure. I was afraid of being arrested more than being killed. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 008)

During the time of armed conflicts, women and children particularly are one of the most vulnerable groups. They are affected as victims of violence and insecurity, while being much more exposed to negative consequences of the conflict situations. Even though they are not directly involved and participating the war, some participants confirmed that the level of insecurity was increasing each day for them and that made it difficult to live with it.

My brother was taken into the jail for 14 days. My mother paid lots of money to take him out and then she sent him out of the country first hoping that it would be fine for us. Girls and women are not very much under pressure but in our case the police were coming and annoying us like knocking on the door interrogating where he was, if he came back. It wasn't safe anymore for us. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 004)

According to the Syrian Constitution, Syrian men between the ages of 18 and 42 are subject to military conscription which lasts 18 to 21 months⁵⁵². Yet, since the start of the conflict, the majority of conscripts have not been released even after completing their required military service and have been forced to remain in the military. One of the participants (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005) joined the Syrian Army in 2010. By the time that his service would be over, he was asked to continue his service and it lasted 3 more years. He became a military officer. In the midst of war, he escaped from the regime's army and joined the Free Syrian Army.

I was so much against the regime, Assad, the army. I was talking publicly and risking my life at some point. We only watched the national Syrian TV, the regime's TV. They only talked about terrorists, bad people and civilians who want to destroy the country. I was in the picture, so I saw who's destroying the country. One day, soldiers arrested people from the city, and they brought them to the base, and they started torturing them. They found the pictures of the Syrian revolution flag and the songs of the revolution in their phones. I was at the edge of killing myself or shooting myself and I tried even to go out and to get shot by the Free Syrian Army just to get rid of that military base. I talked to a few soldiers in the base, and we escaped. Later, we joined to the Free Syrian Army. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

On the basis of the Syrian Constitution, some lawful possibilities are available to be exempted from performing the military service. There are certain categories such as students, government employees, medical cases, etc. One of the exemption groups is the ones who are the only male child of his parents. They have a right to be exempted from the military conscription. If the only sons' parents are divorced or one of them or both died, and if he has half-brothers or lost one or more of his brothers and as a result is now an only male child, the exemption can be still applied to him. The rest of the males shall perform the military service and they should be inducted into the armed forces. The main reason of seeking

⁵⁵² Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic (2012) Article 46: 1. Compulsory military service shall be a sacred duty and is regulated by a law; 2. Defending the territorial integrity of the homeland and maintaining the secrets of state shall be a duty of every citizen. see: <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/91436/106031/F-931434246/constitution2.pdf>

asylum for three participants were mainly not willing to perform a military service and avoided it.⁵⁵³

Military invitation was of course the main reason for me to leave Syria. When you experience this kind of situation, there is no time to plan anything. When you receive this paper, it means that you should just disappear. I needed to act quick, because when they put my name on the checklists on the checkpoints, I would not be able to move or to walk in any way inside the country. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

Although some participants were already exempted from the military service because of their current situation, they still urged to flee due to the feeling of insecurity.

I was studying in the university. They might have taken me to the military service to Bachar's army. They did not call me personally, but they could stop me in the street, ask my student ID and say that you are not student anymore, come with us to the army. I was afraid if they do this to me. Because I don't support them, I am with the 'Freedom'. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 002)

6.2.3. Deciding on immigration

All of the Syrian refugees participating in the research from Denmark lived in several different countries other than their country of origin before arriving in Denmark. Initially, they preferred to seek a shelter in the neighbouring countries. There were some elements played a role in taking this decision. First and foremost, existing social network in the target country had a strong influence on their choice of destination. Two participants first went to Lebanon, they both have a family member already living in there. However, they did not feel safe enough, and took the onward migration decision.

My wife had some relatives in Lebanon. The economic and political situation in Lebanon was so difficult. Economy was so bad. Hezbollah was supporting Russia and the Assad regime. I didn't feel secure. I was afraid of being arrested. Then, I decided to go to Turkey. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 008)

Some participants indicated that the first county of asylum did not promise any future for them. The lack of opportunities, low chance of finding job, worsening economic situation forced them to move on to new countries.

⁵⁵³ It was confirmed by the REFWORLD. see: Syria: Compulsory military service, including age of recruitment, length of service; occasions where proof of military service status is required; whether the government can recall individuals who have already completed their compulsory military service; penalties for evasion (2008-July 2014) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/54042353a.html>

My elder brother was living in Lebanon. I moved to Beirut. It was so expensive to live there. They also had a war almost 10 years ago. The economy was not good enough to gain money. I don't know how I lived there. You know I am young; I need job. I decided to go to Europe. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 002)

Prior to coming to Denmark, five participants noted that they were under temporary protection in Turkey. They preferred to come to Turkey mainly because of the geographical proximity and Turkey's open-door policy to the Syrian refugees which allowed them to enter without any visa or official document. Each had different experience and push factors to leave Turkey. Difficulty of finding a suitable job to their profile, long hours of work, cost of living was primary reasons for some to search for new destination where they hoped to find better living conditions.

I worked in the textile factory. My salary was too low, and 12 hours work a day. I could hardly bare to pay the rent. I changed the job, I worked as a translator, the salary was a bit better but this time I needed to spend extra money on transportation. Then, I started to give Turkish lessons to the Syrians. I also worked as a tourist guide in İstanbul. I felt that I was adult, and I needed to find my job. In Turkey for me no stability was at all. My family decided to send me to Europe. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

Syrian refugees are one of the most discussed topics in Turkish politics. A number of opposition parties call for refugee repatriation. Uncertainty about the legal status makes Syrians feel not secure enough and considering that future is unforeseeable for them, they take the onward migration decision.

I think I went to Turkey in the wrong time because it was the election time and everybody was talking about if the same government would stay or not, and what's the future of Syrians. Some of the Turkish oppositions they said, "the first thing we will do, we will send the Syrians back." I really got quite confused with this. At that time, I didn't know how politicians' nature were because we don't have experience with it, we have zero political experience in Syria. So that time, I was afraid because I felt like "oh it's nice to be here but I don't feel I'm safe. I don't know my future how would be especially with my family". I started to think about leaving. I also got so tired of this, and I thought maybe the best decision to do, to go to the other side of the planet like to go so far away. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

One of the most encountered problems that the refugees face with is that being victims of the discrimination in the host countries. Discrimination can make refugees feel isolated,

lonely and can cause a lack of confidence which later can end up with depression and lower the chance of integration. One of the participants underlined the fact that the discriminatory behaviour in the university made her to decide to migrate onward.

One day, he (the professor) was making a lesson and was recalling some things from the Turkish high school and for me it didn't make any sense. So, I just went to him and ask if there were any books that he would recommend for me because I could understand what he was speaking about. I was speaking to him in Turkish. He asked me where I was from. I said, "I'm from Syria" and he was like "what are you doing in here and well, you shouldn't be here, you should go back and take the Turkish high school and then come here. In the end, you are taking a place of a Turkish student." Then at that point, I was like I had enough, I was frustrated. Turkey is a very good country compared to Syria maybe, but there's still the thing about in the end I'm a girl, I'm a woman and there will never be a future for me. They announced withdrawal from the Istanbul convention. That night I talked to my friend in Denmark, and I decided to go there. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 004)

As previously mentioned, Turkey is the largest refugee hosting country in the world for the past years. At the beginning of the crisis, Turkish people had a welcoming attitude to the Syrian refugees, they showed sincere solidarity and built friendly relationship with them. Helping the needies is one of the core cultural values in Turkish society. However, the initial welcoming attitude and friendship started to fade away due to so many different reasons such as increasing number of refugees in the country, their extended stay, low wages that Syrians work for, criminal incidents the Syrians involved into, political discourse used by the politicians, etc. One of the participants complained about his neighbour's behaviour towards them in Turkey.

Our neighbours were very nice in the beginning. But after six months, there were many Syrians and they started making business, opened shops, etc. Many people, they came from the Gulf area who was working for a long time, like me, they started business in Turkey. I was working for 20 years in the Emirates. We all have money because we make money in the Gulfs. We also had two cars one for me and one for my wife when I was there. My children were going to a private school. So, Turkish people got angry with us because they said that we are living better than their life. Especially, they think that we are assisted by the government, we are getting more facilities than the local Turkish people, which is not the truth, which is all wrong.

But, when you go to a rich place where the people live in a high quality, it will be fine. That's why we decided to move to Denmark. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 006)

6.2.4. Arrival to Denmark

Only two of the Syrian refugees participating in the research came to Denmark via regular entry. (One of them came via the Resettlement Programme, the other one came via regular flight) The rest of the participants arrived in Denmark irregularly and with the help of criminal networks. The refugees tried to reach Denmark on life-threatening journeys, spending huge amounts of money. Smugglers used increasingly dangerous tactics as well as poor materials and/or vehicles which risked the refugees lives to a great extent. Refugees were exposed to maltreatment and humiliation by the smugglers. Some journeys lasted longer than promised/ planned which later increased the vulnerability level of the refugees e.g., lack of nutrition, hiding from the law enforcement forces of the transit countries in inhumane or degrading conditions and places, bad weather conditions, having health related as well as mental problems.

According to refugees' narratives, there are several means of transportation and a number of routes offered by the smugglers. All can be arranged according to the refugee's preferences and their budgets. The more you spend, the more comfortable and faster the journey becomes. Smugglers also prepare the fake documents to facilitate the refugees' entry to the target destination. The refugees participating in the research mainly followed three different routes. The first route is Lebanon-Libya-Algeria-Tunisia via several different vehicles (plane, tractors, desert cars) and then sailing to Italy (via rubber boats or wooden ships) which later follows driving until Denmark. This route is the cheapest route among all the other three options. The second route is Turkey-Greece (via robber boats), Greece-the Balkan route up to Denmark via several different vehicles (train, bus, flight, private car) depending on the refugee's budget. And the final route is having a direct flight from İstanbul to Copenhagen, which is the costliest one.

Table 26: Entry data of Syrian Refugees in Denmark

Pseudonyms	Gender	Entry Date	Entry Type
Syrian Refugee Denmark 001	Male	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 002	Male	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 003	Male	2018	Regular
Syrian Refugee Denmark 004	Female	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 005	Male	2014	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 006	Male	2014	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 007	Male	2020	Regular
Syrian Refugee Denmark 008	Male	2014	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Denmark 009	Male	2015	Irregular via smugglers

6.2.5. Life in Denmark and Unmet Needs

Recently, Denmark experienced a remarkable shift on asylum policy and refugee protection. Following the forming of a new Danish government in 2019, Denmark has started to be seen as one of the most difficult lines on asylum and migration in Europe in the last years. Denmark's 'paradigm shift' contains several legal and policy changes which brings a Danish interpretation to the traditional refugee protection. The focus shifted from integration to temporary protection and eventually repatriation. All of the Syrian refugees participating in the research from Denmark shared their observation about this policy change and talked about its reflection to their lives. Especially early comers (around 2015) can distinguish the differences quite rigidly.

Danish politics changed. Government changed. Situation changed. Civil society changed. People changed. It's serious, it's harder, it's a big shift. When I came here, government had some interest in supporting refugees, the society was active, there were a lot of projects, a lot of fund for that. The surprising thing for me the civil society is following what government is saying. The government said focus on climate change, the civil society jumped to that side, they are doing projects about how to be green, they are talking about CO2, climate change. It's so frustrating and disappointing for me. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

Policy changes and new legislations create an insecurity feeling among the refugees. Paradigm shift brings a deportation risk to the refugees already under protection.⁵⁵⁴ Some participants noted that this limbo causes a high level of stress which leads to serious health issues and mental related problems.

Every day you feel that you are unwanted, you are discriminated. People got tired mentally and physically. They have issues already because of the war in Syria and now their health doesn't function well. People started to develop ADHD (Attention-Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder) or PTSD (Post-traumatic stress disorder) issues. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

Some participants noted that their relationship with the neighbours and co-workers also deteriorated after the paradigm changed. In some cases, neighbours reported the refugees to the police for some trivial reasons.

We had a 'big brother' situation in our apartment. Our neighbours have taken pictures of my family carrying pizza and reported to the police. For them, refugees are the people who are barely living, they don't dress well, they don't speak well, they don't eat well. In the first year of my job, every first meeting I had with a client, the first question was not about my company. The first question was about myself and how I ended up in Denmark, why I was here, why I am not speaking Danish, how come I am working in Denmark with no Danish background. So, the first 50 minutes I was telling people my story. From my point of view, Denmark is a very small and closed community. Racist is a difficult word, but they are not 'refugee friendly'. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 003)

With the paradigm change, Danish people's behaviours towards refugees are also not very welcoming anymore. The attitude shown to Syrian refugees make them feel unwanted in the country.

I was with my wife in a garden to where our kids can play in a playground. We found two other parents with their kids and my wife said she didn't feel comfortable to be with locals like before. Because those people voting against us, and they don't want us to stay, and they object us, and they hurt us. These are not feelings, the highest

⁵⁵⁴ The New Humanitarian, How Denmark's hard line on Syrian refugees is an aid group's ethical dilemma, 11 January 2022, Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/1/11/how-Denmark-hard-line-Syrian-refugees-aid-group-ethical-dilemma>, Accessed on: 28.01.2023.

level of the country doesn't want you, it's about very clear and strong messages with the new laws and the new rules. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

Media has a powerful role in shaping public attitudes towards migrants and refugees. Negative media portrayals and discourses of far-right politicians can easily manipulate the people. When local people are constantly exposed to negative representations of migrants and refugees, people naturally develop concern and bias towards refugees. Syrian Refugee Denmark 003 reported that media does not shed enough light on the cases, and the public does not really understand the challenges, and they are guided by the government. Syrian Refugee Denmark 006 noted that media gives people bad ideas about the refugees.

I still think that in the core the Danish people are good. They're cursed by believing everything they see on their TV. And the media kind of highlights the negativity. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 004)

Denmark has started to revoke the residence permits of Syrian refugees claiming that some parts of Syria are safe enough to return back. While this decision receives so many criticisms from national and international community, Syrian refugees in Denmark are left in fear of deportation and instability.

The most negative thing in Denmark is refugees like us cannot put a strategy or plan for their family. You cannot create a future here, because we think that at any time they can say "bye bye, go now". (Syrian Refugee Denmark 006)

Living under the threat of deportation often results in serious consequences which usually risks the physical and mental health of the refugees. Uncertainty leads to vulnerable situations which sometimes end up with losing one's life.

This situation is a source of anxiety. We cannot live with a peaceful mind. One of my neighbours got a heart attack and he died because of the fear of deportation. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 008)

In Denmark, refugees are asked to sign an 'integration contract' within one month after they are placed in a municipality. Integration course includes different programmes ranging from language courses to job searching mentorship. With the paradigm shift, the duration of the course shortened from three years to one year, it can be extended up to five years if the refugee cannot find any job. Danish norms, values and culture are also presented in these courses. According to the participants' narratives, even though they are following the etiquette which has been taught them in the integration courses, in their daily life avoiding from discrimination has become impossible in the recent years.

In the integration course, they told us that if you don't reply to people's e-mail, it's means that you don't respect them. You must reply anyway, that's something so serious in Danish culture. If I write to municipality, if I write to other NGOs, if I'm looking for a collaboration with other NGOs or with the private sector, I will say 90% of my emails remain without any reply. it's making me feel like discriminated. One day I asked one of my Danish colleagues at the work to write to the same person, he got reply. It was for me really bad; it makes you feel that you are different. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

Integration does not have a universally accepted definition. The interpretation of the concept differs from country to country even on the individual level. Some participants drew attention to the fact that religious and cultural differences are regarded as a barrier in front of the integration by some Danish people.

I consider myself like integrated because integration for me I pay my taxes, I speak the language, I am married to a Danish. I don't need to eat for example pork to be integrated or to drink alcohol to be integrated. There are Danish people who don't drink alcohol, or they are vegetarians. Unfortunately, most of the racist people in Denmark they think integration is based on your preferences. If you don't eat pork, you're not integrated; if you don't go to nightclubs all the time every Friday, you're not integrated; if you don't drink alcohol, then you are not integrated. What you eat and what you drink it should be individual. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

One of the biggest challenges that the Syrian refugees encountered with in Denmark is finding a suitable job for them. According to the narrative of the participants, even though they have reached the minimum integration level, they speak fluent Danish, they have university degrees from Danish schools, difficulty to find a proper job. As per their saying, the main reason is not that they are not qualified enough but the cultural and religious background which they possess.

I'm a little bit depressed of the country itself because we are facing hatred and racism like on a daily basis from comments from the news, from politicians and even from neighbours. I am married to Danish girl. They sometimes accuse my wife and tell her bad stuff. They hate Muslims a lot here. When you are refugee, and you have a little bit darker skin, and your name is a Middle Eastern name, so you have almost like no chance to get jobs. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

Refugees come from distinct cultures with divergent norms, values, institutions, structures, and modes of thought. Some participants indicated that the difference between cultures creates a handicap for him to build social relations with the Danish people.

Danish people are not Oriental people. They are not welcoming. I was in a boarding high school. For three months, they didn't talk to me, and I didn't talk to them. I was shy. Here if you want to meet somebody, you need to take appointment one month in advance, they are always busy. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 002)

6.2.6. Aspirations for Further Migration

Syrian refugees participating in the research from Denmark have different aspirations for further migration. The current situation of Denmark and fear of deportation causes refugees to feel instable. The ones planning to migrate onward are the ones who are trying to get rid of this uncertainty. The first and foremost onward migration destination would again be a European country where they have a strong social network so that the family and/or friends could support and facilitate their settlement.

Danish government makes pressure on Syrians to leave the country with more restrictive legislations. I am struggling to renew my residence permit in Denmark. I will go to any place where I can get the permanent residence and citizenship. I have friends and family in every country in Europe. They will help me. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 008)

Although the circumstances are not optimal in Denmark and the refugees have a big hesitation what will be the next for them in the country, most of the participants indicated that they would like to stay in Denmark until at least they acquire the Danish citizenship. Acquisition of citizenship is crucial, particularly for refugees, because not only it fosters the integration, but also it creates a bond and makes refugees feel more secure and stable. Some participants also emphasized that having a citizenship in Denmark will take their life under "guarantee".

I will not leave Denmark until I get the citizenship. I need the passport in order to live a decent life where I'm not questioned about where I come from or if I'm gonna bomb the next country I'm going to visit. So, I want the Danish passport and I'm going to stay here until I take it. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 004)

Due to the current atmosphere in Denmark, although the refugees want to stay in the country, they are also aware that they can be asked anytime to leave. Some refugees commented that

they will stay in Denmark and meanwhile be prepared for any “forced” migration scenario if the authorities ask them to go.

The world is not small. It's not only that Denmark in the world, but there is also always another place. But I am happy here. I don't want to start again from the beginning because I come to the edge of almost 54 years. However, I keep options in my mind as plan one, plan two, plan three. I will not leave till they asked me to leave, to go from the country. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 006)

Revoking the residence permits in Denmark plays a crucial role in the migration aspirations of the refugees. They are face with the threat of losing their residency permits. Some participants indicated that in normal circumstances, this fact would be enough to leave the country; however, especially the ones with the family prefer to stay in Denmark for the sake of their children until they are requested to leave⁵⁵⁵.

My daughters like it here, they speak the language fluently, we have a family here. To be honest, if I was alone, if I was a single person, then definitely I would not stay here. But you know when you have a family, it's a lot more difficult, more complicated to make such decisions. You need to take responsibilities and you need to consider their situation. There's no point of hammering your head on the wall later. So, for now, we will stay. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 003)

Some participants who took a temporary protection in Turkey before coming to Denmark confessed that they are regretful to migrate onward after what they have gone through in Denmark. However, they would like to stay in Denmark, just because they have established a family in the country.

If I had a chance to stay in Turkey back then before I went to Denmark to Europe, I think I would choose to stay in Turkey. I was looking for security, seeking future and unfortunately the destiny brought me to Denmark. But I'm happy with my family and of course I will stay here for my and my family's future. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 005)

None of the participants has an aspiration to return to Syria unless the regime changes. The ones who express their will to return to Syria after the new government formation indicated that they preferred to stay in Denmark until then.

⁵⁵⁵ Similar cases are mentioned in press, for instance ‘Zero asylum seekers’: Denmark forces refugees to return to Syria. The Guardian, 25 May 2022 <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/25/zero-asylum-seekers-denmark-forces-refugees-to-return-to-syria>

If everything is over, I will fly back to Syria in the same night. That is a dream for me. All the things I did in Denmark and I'm doing right now, I want to do in Syria. This is a big part of the motivation for me to have a life and to create something here. One day I will use this experience in my home country. It will be the paradise for me. I hope I will see and witness that day. I wish so, I dream that. (Syrian Refugee Denmark 001)

6.3. Spain

6.3.1. Pre-War Situation in Syria

Syrian refugees participating in the research from Spain had a stable life in the pre-war Syria. Just like in the case of Turkey and Denmark, participants from Spain did not have any intention to move to another place before the war broke out. All of the participants were born, raised up, studied, and started their career in Syria. When it was asked to describe their lives in the pre-war Syria, they reported that it was peaceful, normal, and ordinary. For some, migration was a word which did not exist in their 'dictionary'.

We had a very good condition in Syria. We did not have any difficulties. We had a house; we had a car. We were wealthy enough. I was very young back then. I didn't know what the war means. I just wanted to play games, go to school, live a good life.

I never ever thought going one day to Turkey or Europe. (Syrian Refugee Spain 006)

Just like the participants in Turkey and Denmark, all of the participants from Spain emphasized that during their lives in the pre-war Syria, they had a great lively community lives; they had actively social gatherings; they were feeling as a part of the society before everything changed with the violence occurred with the outbreak of the war.

I had a very, very good social life in Syria. I was always busy all the time with friends, with people, with family. I have a very big family, and we used to meet once a week outside with the whole family. I used to meet at least once a week with my friends. Coming from this kind of social life, it was difficult for me in Spain in the beginning, I feel lonely most of the time here. (Syrian Refugee Spain 005)

It is a very well-known fact now in the psychological research that when a person experiences a feeling of shame and guilt, if he or she is abused emotionally or physically, if exposed to a traumatic event during their childhood, this can impact that person's adulthood and might cause problems and determine their choices later in their life. Most of the participants indicated that the outbreak of the war was their main motivation to flee.

However, one of the refugees participating in the research from Spain explained that an event which he experienced during his teenager years has a direct effect of his being a refugee now.

When I was a child, I was a bit rebellious. I didn't like the director of the high school and I wrote on the wall that "The director is a bad person". The Ba'ath Party was so strong in that time. No one could say any word because they would catch him and put in the jail. The director went to the police and say that I wrote these bad words against the Ba'ath Party. The police arrested me, put me in the jail, I was suffering. I was just a kid. Later, the director changed his statement. I got out and moved to another city. This is the beginning of my refugee history. (Syrian Refugee Spain 002)

6.3.2. In the midst of war

The first and foremost noticeable change in the midst of war for the participants from Spain has been the disappearance of the peaceful environment that they had been living in as soon as the war started between parties. Inevitably, cities became targets for bombs, fire and high explosives destroyed homes and apartments, families broke apart, jobs were lost, and unfortunately, some had to witness the loss of their beloved ones.

Our lives turned upside down when the war started. My father was a translator, his work stopped when the war broke out. After that, we started to deteriorate financially. Our city directly affected by the war, it got completely destroyed. We were forced to move a much safer place. We stayed in a small flat with my uncles for two years. We were three families at total in that small place. Each day was harder than before. (Syrian Refugee Spain 007)

Following the start of the war in 2011, the regime began to focus more on some sectors, one of those was Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The regime intervened with them by limiting their voluntary activities, targeting anti-regime staff members and volunteers, rejecting requests to grant new NGOs licences, selecting the locations and projects that would be carried out, preventing some beneficiaries from receiving assistance and services. One of the participants working in the NGOs sector narrated how it was for them in the midst of war and explained how it ended up with fleeing.

I worked for more than 13 years with the NGOs. These NGOs are specialized in the right of refugees in Syria. Our work used to depend on spreading the awareness of the basic rights for Palestinian refugees basically in order to empower them to defend their rights and to know their rights to life. After the revolution in Syria started, we

turned our activity from supporting refugees to supporting homeless people. All the homeless people, not only Palestinians. So, supporting civilian people. The government, the security forces of al Assad considered everyone who supported these people like they were supporting the terrorists. They started to pursue us, so it was dangerous for us, some of us passed away, some of us ran away and we left Syria. (Syrian Refugee Spain 005)

Just like in Turkey and Denmark examples, participants of the research from Spain, particularly young men who are at the age of military service explained how they were forced to join the army, and, in some cases, they were exposed to threats if they rejected to take part in the war.

I finished my military service on 1 March 2011, and the war started on 15 March 2011. They called me back to join the military to fight with them. I didn't want to fight with them, nor with another. Because I refused their invitation, they might arrest me or kill me. So, I decided to leave the country. (Syrian Refugee Spain 002)

6.3.3. Deciding on immigration

Most of the refugees participating in the research from Spain lived in another country other than their country of origin before coming to Spain. Only two participants arrived in Spain travelling directly from Syria. For the rest of the participants, when they decided to immigrate, their primary preference became the neighbouring countries due to the geographical proximity. However, it was not the only reason, there were other factors which effected their decision to move onward. Weak economic situation of the receiving country, lack of the legal status for the refugees, uncertainty about the future pushed them to think about other destinations.

In Lebanon, they didn't give me a refugee status. There is no status like that for us. The economic situation was so difficult. Lebanese people cannot live and don't want to stay there; imagine a refugee in Lebanon, suffering from many things, economic, social, health. I could not even enter a hospital like here in Europe. So, I decided to go to Europe. (Syrian Refugee Spain 002)

During the war, people may experience a wide range of traumatic events which rises the likelihood of experiencing mental health issues as a result. Some studies also show that there is a high prevalence for the people fleeing from war to develop serious mental illnesses. Deteriorating psychological state is also a push factor for migration. Some participants mentioned that witnessing the losses and damages every day made it unbearable to continue

living in their own city and they decided to get out of the country from the closest gate and the most legal way.

To be honest, I didn't want to leave Syria. But because of the war, I had very bad psychological problems for two years. So, I couldn't handle more seeing people killed in front of my eyes, victims all around us in our area. My house was destroyed, so me and my family we had to move to another place. It was like a big drama. I was not able to support people because I needed the support. So, I myself decided to go out and to leave and stay out of Syria. So, I didn't imagine myself that I would not go back to Syria like this. I didn't want to take an illegal way. The only open gate was Lebanon and due to work I had many people there, I knew the society, I knew the country. I couldn't find a job there. One of my friends living there invited me to there. (Syrian Refugee Spain 005)

Some states created a special legal status for the Syrian refugees. Turkey is one of those countries to provide temporary protection for the ones who seek for asylum coming from Syria. Although temporary protection is provided for the ones fleeing the war, it creates uncertainty and insecurity in the life of refugees. Temporary nature of the protection leaves them with the fear of repatriation. But this is not the only issue with it. One of the participants indicated that the temporary protection in Turkey didn't provide enough rights and security and besides, it brought limitation of movement, and the refugees could not enjoy the opportunities in the other cities.

The temporary protection is not useful for anything. The employer didn't pay me for 2 months, I worked for long hours without getting any remuneration. I applied for the police, but they didn't do anything. If you hold a Temporary Protection ID, you need to stay in that city where you are registered. I was in Istanbul, and I got an invitation from the Ankara University. I showed all the documents to the police, but they didn't allow me to go there. I used to work as a translator from Arabic to Turkish. Sometimes they called me from the other cities, but the police never let me to go there telling that I don't have a work permit to do so. (Syrian Refugee Spain 006)

Some participants complained about the long and complicated bureaucratic stages that they needed to go thorough while applying for the temporary protection renewal. One of the participants reported that the difficulty of extending their temporary protection duration, and the exposure to humiliation in the immigration office in Turkey made them to apply for a resettlement in any European country.

My father was applying for the renewal of his temporary protection. One of the racist police officers started to insult my father and pushed him back. My father fell down and started to cry. My father is an old man, he is in his 70s. He used to work at the Damascus University as an academics, he was a doctor, and he was respected all his life long. One of the Syrians waiting in the immigration office mentioned my father about the UNHCR resettlement programme. On the same day, they called us and few days later they asked us if we would like to move to Spain. (Syrian Refugee Spain 006)

Just like in the case of Turkey and Denmark, some participants from Spain also noted that finding a suitable job for them was one of the biggest problems encountered in the first country of asylum. The cost of living was so high, they needed to work in multiple jobs at the same time. Some participants indicated that they left school not only because they had to work more time but in order to continue to study, they needed to learn Turkish and just because of the difficulty to follow the courses in another language other than their mother tongue, the refugees could not continue to get their education and they intended to gain more money to cover their needs and expenses despite the bad working conditions and less compensation for their time and effort. However, this situation would not last for a long time and they decided to look for a future in another country.

When my brother died in the war, my little brother and I decided to go to Turkey. We didn't want to perform the military service because we would have the same end as my brother. When we came to Turkey, we started to work in the factories. We also received a scholarship to study. When we had a family reunification, things got even better. But studying in Turkish was so hard. We spent all our time with just studying. We decided to quit the school and dedicate all our time for work. But still our wages were too low, products were too expensive to buy. We really got into a terrible economic situation. My father asked us if we wanted to go to Europe. We thought that we were under temporary protection, we had a very bad financial situation in Turkey; if we went to Europe, we could have a residence permit, have a high-quality life. We said "yes" to my father. And we had 3 interviews with the UNHCR, later they sent us here. (Syrian Refugee Spain 007)

6.3.4. Arrival to Spain

Spain is geographically not close to the conflict zones of Syria. Therefore, we cannot talk about the geographical proximity for refugees who migrated there. Besides, the Western Mediterranean countries were not among the most preferred destinations of the Syrian refugees. Especially for the onward migration, majority of the refugees consider the rights, benefits, and opportunities that the destination countries can provide for them. This the reason why most of the refugees are attracted to secondary/tertiary/ or more migration to the developed countries and welfare states.

Unlike the participants from Turkey and Denmark, most of the refugees taking part in the research in Spain entered to Spain regularly. The Syrian refugees participating the research who entered Spain regularly had several different purposes for arrival to the country. Some of the participants came to Spain following the official channels such as the UNHCR resettlement programme. Some of them received an invitation from their Spanish national friends, applied for visa and flied directly from the first country of asylum. Some of them received a scholarship from a Spanish university which was eligible only for the Syrian refugees while some other use official channels of their multinational companies to relocate them in an affiliate in another country.

However, there were also some participants came to Spain irregularly with the help of smugglers. Those refugees followed the Western Mediterranean route stating that it was the one and only option to go to Europe without visa and without spending so much fortune. The ones who took this route usually travelled from Syria to Algeria, from Algeria to Morocco, and from Morocco to Spain.

Table 23: Entry data of Syrian Refugees in Spain

Pseudonyms	Gender	Entry Date	Entry Type
Syrian Refugee Spain 001	Male	2018	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Spain 002	Male	2018	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Spain 003	Male	2012	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Spain 004	Male	2015	Irregular via smugglers
Syrian Refugee Spain 005	Female	2014	Regular
Syrian Refugee Spain 006	Male	2018	Regular
Syrian Refugee Spain 007	Male	2018	Regular
Syrian Refugee Spain 008	Male	2018	Irregular via smugglers

6.3.5. Life in Spain and Unmet Needs

The most prevalent comment of the Syrian refugees participating the research from Spain regarding the life in Spain is the language barrier that they come across in every aspect of life. According to their narratives, the biggest obstacle is that there is not any established institution which facilitates learning the official language of the country. Once the refugees arrive to Spain, they are obliged to follow a 3-pillar-programme: In the first pillar of the programme, they shall be placed in a refugee camp; in the second pillar, they are supported to find an accommodation and receive a financial aid for the house-related expenses (rental fee, water, electricity, gas bills etc.). The second pillar covers the social and leisure activities such as travelling and doing sports. This is also the stage when the refugees start to learn Spanish. In the third pillar, they only receive legal and financial aid until the programme is over. Spanish language courses last more or less 1-year-long, but according to the refugees' experiences, the duration of the course is not enough to gain the full control of the language, it only helps them to learn the basics and communicate to meet daily needs. One of the participants emphasized that after their arrival to Spain, they are mentally not ready for learning new things. Psychotherapy should be included in the programme instead of rushing them to communicate in another language.

It was too difficult to learn a very different language in 1 year. It is a very short time and impossible to be like a native or to be perfect to find a job. If you don't know the language, you lose a lot of opportunities such as work, social life or making friends. In the camp, they taught us the minimum. I am an educated person; I am here more than two years and still don't know Spanish very well. Especially we are refugees, we were suffering from many things when we arrived here. We just need 1 year to forget our problems, get better psychologically, then comes learning the language.
(Syrian Refugee Spain 002)

Another biggest problem that the Syrian refugees encountered with in Spain is finding a job which matches with their educational and professional background. Employment opportunities is quite limited, especially if they cannot speak the local language in a good level. According to their narratives, speaking Spanish and finding a job are quite interrelated to each other in Spain. Some of the refugees also mention that another serious obstacle for finding a job is that their degrees and educational diplomas are not accredited in Spain.

Finding a job in here is too hard. Our degrees cannot be accredited here. Therefore, we don't have any profession, neither the diplomas to work. You need to have an experience here to get a job. In Turkey, we didn't have these kinds of problems, it was easy. Yes, the wages were too low, but we could find a job immediately. My Spanish is in advanced level, but there is a lot of competition in the job market in Spain. Many people come from Latin America, so they have a native level Spanish, there are also multilingual people who speak English very well. The competition is so high. This is why finding a job is not easy. (Syrian Refugee Spain 007)

Most of the refugees indicate that there are a lot of similarities between Syria and Spain in terms of weather, climate, people's friendly approach to each other. Nevertheless, there are some differences to be underlined between these two countries. Most of the refugees find the lifestyle in Spain much more open than Syria. Especially women participants noted that they feel more comfortable and can live much freely in Spain even comparing to other European countries, as well.

People are much more open minded here than in Syria. The Syrian society is much more conservative than here. The Spanish don't put their nose in your life here. They don't ask you why you do that. So, you feel much more comfortable. I don't feel that practicing my religion or not an issue here. You can do it, or you cannot do it. Nobody is asking you or forcing you to practice or not. No one cares. And this is really good. The good thing I think that you can do whatever you want. For example, if I were in Romania or Germany, I would not feel so comfortable like in Spain to practice my religion as a Muslim. (Syrian Refugee Spain 005)

However, still certain cultural differences make some of the refugees feel like an "other" in the society. Just like in the case of Turkey and Denmark, some of the Syrian refugees in Spain don't feel comfortable with their current situation in the country and noted that they feel insecure about their future.

At the end of the day, I am a foreigner here. It doesn't matter if I get the Spanish citizenship one day, I will still be a foreigner. I don't know if it is because that I am an Arab, or a Muslim or a refugee. I feel like a stranger here. For example, if a house is robbed, they point refugees as a target for this crime. I need to be very careful at work if I commit a mistake, they might fire me. I try so hard to obey the rules here unlike in Turkey where I had an informal employment. Here these things are very dangerous, I can become a criminal easily. (Syrian Refugee Spain 006)

In general, the participants are content with the accession to health care services in Spain. They can visit the doctor, do the necessary examinations, receive the medications free of charge if they visit the state hospitals. However, some refugees express their discontent about the long waiting period just to get an appointment which could result in deterioration of their health conditions.

We should be very thankful them that we can access the health services easily. But the problem is they are always very late. Very late to check your heart, to check your examinations. They give you an appointment for three, four months later. If you are sick, it can be dangerous for your health. (Syrian Refugee Spain 003)

6.3.6. Aspirations for Further Migration

Syrian refugees participating in the research from Spain have different aspirations for further migration. The ones who express their will to stay in Spain have several reasons behind their decisions. The first and foremost element which plays a crucial role in their decision is having developed a familiarity with the country and the language. They noted that they already feel integrated, established some cultural and social bonds, have a regular income and they are about to receive the citizenship.

I don't plan to change the country. I don't even plan to change the city. Barcelona is very multicultural and multilingual. The weather, the sea, the people... it feels like home. I am building a career here. I am building a life here. I cannot imagine myself going to Germany or Sweden where they really have completely different cultural component. I mean, here, you go down to the supermarket, and you talk to the lady there. Everybody is very open and friendly. I didn't have any problem up to now. I feel very welcomed. (Syrian Refugee Spain 001)

Some participants express their will to stay at least until they receive the Spanish citizenship. Just like in the case of Turkey and Denmark, the participants emphasized that they need to have an official document to feel more secure and stable. They are open to move to another country in the near future, but the primary condition for them to have the citizenship to come back to a safe place in case they need to return back one day.

I left Turkey because my economic situation was so bad. This is why I preferred to come to Europe. Turkish culture is much closer to our culture. I am waiting for the Spanish citizenship. Meanwhile, I will work and save some money. My plan is to establish a business here in Spain and move back to Turkey to live there. (Syrian Refugee Spain 007)

Some participants express their will to move onward in case of finding better opportunities. They noted that they can migrate anywhere where they are able to gain more income and have much higher living conditions.

If I find a good job, much better than this job in the other European country, I would like to move. For example, in Sweden there is a lot of snow and cold, there is no social life. But if I find a good job, good salary? Yeah, I am ready to lose the good culture, good weather, good social life in Spain. Because I have a horrible financial problem in Spain. I cannot think about my future, I am always thinking about how to get money. (Syrian Refugee Spain 002)

Among the participants, the refugees who came to Spain with their families have a higher will to move onward for the sake of their children's future. Although those refugees have a strong aspiration to move onward, their financial situations are not enough to cover the expenses of the migration. Furthermore, the Dublin regulation creates a great barrier before them to go freely to another European country where they could have a better living condition.

I came to Spain in 2015 with my family. The Spanish treated us well, but they didn't offer anything to help the family. They placed us in a small village, we had to walk a lot. There was no money, not even a little help. Then we decided to move to Germany. At that time, I didn't have any idea about the Dublin regulation. We moved to Germany in 2018 and we stayed there sometime until the police caught us. They sent us back to Spain. I am worrying about my family here. I cannot speak Spanish; I cannot find a job. Even if I think to move to an Arab country, I need money to travel, to buy flight tickets. It is like mission impossible. (Syrian Refugee Spain 004)

Unlike in the example of Turkey and Denmark, none of the participants from Spain mentioned their will and aspiration to return to Syria in near future, nor after the peace is set in the country.

6.4. Summary of the Empirical Findings

This qualitative research focused on the experiences, perspectives and aspirations of the Syrian refugees who have fled to three different countries namely, Turkey, Denmark, and Spain because of the Syrian Civil War. During the interviews, various aspects of the refugees' lives, from their pre-war situation in Syria to their decisions to immigrate and experiences in the host countries and aspirations for the future tried to be understood. The empirical data gained through the interview responses of a large number of Syrian refugees living in different countries provides insights into their thoughts, feelings, and actions throughout the displacement period, immigration process, their integration experiences as well as their aspiration for onward migration.

The Syrian refugees who sought shelter in Turkey described that their situations during the pre-war Syria were better, they were financially stable and majority of them had future investment plans in Syria including education, businesses, and family arrangements. When the crisis started, the participants thought that the protests were temporary and did not expect a big scale of a conflict. As the war got harsher, their daily lives were impacted, created insecurity, put restrictions, caused detentions and extreme violence which generated fear and a feeling of insecurity. As the safety was their main concern, especially after the violent incidents in their neighbourhoods, they took an immigration decision. There were several different factors which helped to shape their decisions on the choice of destination such as geographic proximity, cultural competence, social networks abroad and feedback from friends and family. For some, practicing their religion freely and refraining from ethnic or religious discrimination led them to immigrate to Turkey.

In the beginning of the war, refugees arrived in Turkey regularly, but as the war escalated, the irregular entry with the help of smugglers intensified. Depending on their arrival time to Turkey and changing policies, the Syrian refugees received different types of residence permits and temporary protection IDs. The employment opportunities in Turkey did not meet the expectations of the Syrian refugees and they had to work for low-qualified jobs while having high level educations with a low wage salary. Although their access to education improved over time, especially for some school-age children, lack of Turkish language knowledge keeps being a problem. Turkey's worsening economic conditions and high inflation have brought various challenges for the Syrian refugees. Participants highlighted that as their stay extended in Turkey and after some Syrians committed crimes, they started to feel some changes in the local people's behaviour towards them and this makes them feel not welcome anymore.

There are several determinants which play an important role on the onward migration decision of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Some of them can be listed as employment prospects, legal status, education opportunities for children and level of integration. Especially, uncertainty about their legal status and deportation fears influence their intentions for the onward migration. While some participants are willing to migrate to other countries with better conditions, some already having been feeling integrated and are content in Turkey. As long as the regime in Syria stay in power, none of the participants plan to return back to Syria.

The Syrian refugees who sought shelter in Denmark reported that they had stable family lives, education, and careers in Syria during the pre-war period. Some participants mentioned that they had political and familial ties to opposition movement already before the conflict broke out. As the protests against the government turned into a larger-scale war, the participants started to encounter with risks, insecurity and persecution because of their political views and activities. Especially, women and children became vulnerable during the escalation period of war. All of the participants lived in different countries before arriving to Denmark. Initially, social networks and family ties influenced their choice of first destination of migration. But deteriorating economic factors as well as the lack of opportunities made them seek other options where they can get better conditions.

The participants' way of arrival to Denmark differs and the ones who picked the irregular means, often travelled through dangerous journeys facilitated by smugglers. Those journeys usually were filled with various challenges and risks. Besides, the refugees faced with inhumane conditions and maltreatment until they reached to Denmark. The life in Denmark is becoming more challenging for the Syrian refugees because of the fact that Denmark's asylum policy went through a sharp shift towards temporary protection and repatriation. This resulted in so many difficulties to maintain a stable legal status. The refugees reported that they faced with discrimination, problems with integration and finding a suitable employment. Especially, media portrayal and political discourse affects them negatively, while creating unpleasant perceptions towards refugees in the local level. The policy shift created a fear of deportation, instability, and mental health challenges among the refugees in Denmark.

The uncertainties and policy shift in Denmark cause some refugees to aspire to migrate onward to any other country. However, acquisition of a Danish citizenship is still regarded as the most secure way on the way to a better future before they leave for an onward migration. The number of refugees who are not sure to go back to Syria due to ongoing

conflict and uncertainties is still high. While some participants plan to continue living in Denmark, few expressed their desire to return to Syria as soon as the political conditions change.

The Syrian refugees who sought shelter in Spain also had stable lives in the pre-war period of Syria. None of them had an intention to move somewhere else, since they had a peaceful, normal, and ordinary lives where they had a deep feeling of being a part of the community and having active social lives. Just like in Turkey and Denmark, as the conflict evolved into a big scale war, it started to impact negatively the participants' lives such as the destruction of homes, separation of families, loss of jobs and their beloved ones. Majority of the participants lived in other countries before arriving to Spain. When they decided to flee to any other country not only because of threats and danger but also war trauma and deteriorating psychological states, neighbouring countries became initially the first destinations due to geographical proximity. However, worsening economic situation, legal status and uncertainty about the future pushed them to migrate onward.

The participants arrived in Spain mostly using two different ways. While majority of the participants came to Spain via regular channels such as resettlement programmes, invitations, scholarships, or company relocations, some reached to Spain irregularly with the help of smugglers passing through the Western Mediterranean route. One of the biggest challenges that the Syrian refugees faced with is the language barriers in their daily lives in Spain. The Spanish language courses are not sufficient, and this fact has an indirect effect on their employment opportunities in Spain. Finding a job matching to their profiles is not easy; furthermore, foreign degrees are not easily recognized and accredited in Spain. This is another challenge before them to enter into the job market. The refugees' general opinion on Spanish society is quite positive and the participants claim that local people are more open and comfortable with them. However, still cultural disparities make some refugees feel different and outsider in some cases.

The participants in Spain have quite diverse aspirations for onward migration. Although none of them express their will to return back to Syria in the near future, some stated that they are content enough to live in Spain due to their level of integration, language knowledge and established lives. However, some participants still have an interest to move onward to another country (including to previous host country such as Turkey) where they can maintain better economic conditions as well as cultural affinity. The participants reported that no matter how much they want to migrate onward right now, they cannot realize it just

because they have limitations such as insufficient financial resources or unbreakable immigration regulations such as Dublin III.

During the interviews, the empirical research aimed to shed light on the diverse experiences of the Syrian refugees who are currently residing in the host countries namely Turkey, Denmark, and Spain. Regardless of where they are located now, all of the participants faced with serious challenges brought by the Syrian Civil War despite their pre-war conditions in Syria. Their lives were negatively affected and eventually all of them found themselves seeking a shelter initially in the neighbouring States and later in different countries. There are still some common factors in the host countries which keep impacting the refugees' lives such as integration challenges, language barriers, employment difficulties and discrimination. The onward migration aspirations of the participants are usually shaped by the components like economic conditions, level of integration and lack of comprehensive legal status. The interviews have highlighted that unmet needs of the refugees in the host countries and multiple aspects of integration have an influence on their decisions regarding the onward migration.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This empirical research focused on the migration and integration dimensions of the refugees in Turkey, Denmark, and Spain, by analysing each country's migration background, as well as policies and legislations within the framework of comparative analysis. The main aim was to shed light on the refugee's aspirations to move onward through qualitative analysis via in-depth interviews to evaluate the correlation between the integration and aspiration to migrate. This study highlighted the different dimensions of onward migration and tried to identify the common patterns which triggers refugees to decide on secondary migration.

The dissertation is constructed on seven chapters at total. In the Chapter I, the motivation and objective of the research is detailly discussed. The research questions are clarified, and the research hypotheses are formulated. The research methodology is thoroughly presented giving more information about the case study selection, data collection and data analysis. In the Chapter II, migration is presented as the Theoretical Part I, not only evaluating deeply the concept of migration, theories of migration, types of migration, but also giving an overview of regulatory aspect of migration, addressing the legal angles, picturing the onward migration in the EU, and discussing the resettlement and relocation programmes. In the Chapter III, integration is evaluated as the Theoretical Part II. This chapter presents the concept of integration and theories of integration, explains the indicators of integration, The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, and it tries to explain the connection between the temporary protection, integration, and onward migration. In the Chapter IV, the international context of the Syrian migration is drawn looking at the historical background of the events, analysing securitization of migration, externalizing of the EU borders, and delving into the EU-Turkey deal. In the Chapter V, emigration and immigration histories and the concept of integration and practices of the selected case countries are evaluated. In the Chapter VI, the empirical data collected via interviews are analysed carefully and the participants' aspiration for onward migration is tried to be understood. Last but not least, in the Chapter VII, the research conclusions are presented, and recommendations are provided. Thus, research can therefore also be interpreted in such a way that we can ask ourselves how the deficient integration system and the poorly functioning migration policies, legislations, programmes, and frameworks contribute to irregular secondary migration, what lessons can be drawn from the mistakes and dilemmas

of the countries chosen for analysis, which we could also approach through the life stories of the interviewees, not only with the help of statistical, legal, and administrative data.

As it was previously mentioned in the former chapters, international migration cannot be evaluated without taking the international relations into account. They are intertwined and have a huge influence on the migration management. For example, the major destination countries and the EU combine the migration control, migration/admission selection, foreign policy, international trade policy, and development regimes together. Therefore, by analysing the literature, reviewing some documents of the international migration management regime, and admission/integration schemes of the selected countries, as well as collecting individual data from the field (via interviews), I have had the opportunity to draw conclusion at the end also on the international cooperation.

This particular research revealed the fact that there is a strong complexity in refugees' decision making within the given context. Although the refugees possess a various motivation to move on, stay, or return, three main secondary migration aspirations of the refugees have been identified as a result of the analysis: 1. Staying in the host country, 2. Moving onward to another country or first country of asylum, 3. Return to Syria. In the forced displacement contexts, there are several different elements which have an influence on refugees' decision-making process: Integration dimension plays a crucial role on refugees' further aspiration of migration. Possessing certain rights, migration specific capital (e.g., obtaining some legal rights such as acquisition of passport/nationality, and having transnational networks) and satisfaction with the life in the host countries might affect the decision of further movements.

It is quite clear that once the refugees take a migration decision, the neighbouring countries generally comes first especially within the forced migration context. Geographical proximity of the target country plays an important role during the decision-making process. While evaluating which neighbouring countries to go, the refugee's social network abroad has a direct influence on the selection of the country. While positive feedback encourages migration, negative feedback might result in deterrence. Ensuring the physical safety is one of the biggest concerns during this phase of the migration. Once the necessary protection is maintained in the host countries, securing certain rights, accessions, and conditions come as priority for the refugees. In the lack of obtaining these priorities and States' failure to meet the needs of refugees, refugees consider moving onward to another countries.

In this research, it is seen that refugees are subject to different legal statuses in the case countries. Turkey and Denmark provided a new legal status for the Syrian refugees naming

it as the “Temporary Protection”. Although refugees are legally acknowledged and reside securely within the border of the host countries, as it is indicated on the name of the status, the protection is limited with time, and it has a temporary nature. Beyond that, this type of protection status usually gives cause for uncertainty and curtails access to rights to a certain extent. Therefore, uncertainty about the length of protection and barriers to enjoy some rights in the host country rises the refugees’ concerns about their stability. All of the participants of the research indicated that they would like to acquire citizenship in the host countries. They noted that after the acquisition of the passport, they might consider moving somewhere else. Most of the participants confirmed that unsecure legal status creates an uncertainty in their lives therefore, they prefer to migrate where they can maintain this right. Temporary protection is neither legally comprehensive nor sustainable; hence, it is one of the primary triggers of the onward migration of the refugees.

One of the key elements that the refugees focus on in the host countries is economic self-reliance. Ensuring economic stability has a powerful impact on participating in the receiving society. Lack of employment opportunities, and unmatching jobs to their professional profiles are among the biggest obstacles for the refugees in the job market in the host countries. The refugees are forced to accept the low salaries, and the employers abuse refugees with long working hours and less compensations. Employment has a direct effect on the social cohesion and acceptance in the society. For example, in Turkey case, although they do not have any other option than accepting, Syrian refugees’ consent to work for low salaries created a discontent among the local Turkish workers who cannot find a job because employers prefer low-waged Syrian workers to fill the vacancy. There are certain other issues to create a problem before the economic self-reliance of the refugees. Lack of local language knowledge causes difficulty to compete with the nationals in the labour market. Despite having all the qualifications and skills, invalidation, or challenges to obtain accreditation of their professional certificates and degrees put a barrier into joining the labour market. As it is seen during the interviews, the refugees who established a business, or maintained economic security tend to stay in the host country for a longer period. On the other hand, the unmet needs of employment and economic instability increases the aspiration of onward migrations.

Socio-cultural affinity is an important factor for refugees while deciding on onward migration. Although they are not satisfied with the living conditions in the host countries, socio-cultural and religious values might play a strong role on their aspiration to stay, or aspiration for return migration. Most of the refugees participating in the research from

Turkey noted that Turkey's cultural and religious familiarity with Syria motivates them to continue living in Turkey despite all the difficulties. On the other hand, socio-cultural and religious discrepancy with Spain and Denmark encourages refugees to consider moving back one day to Turkey or Syria for the sake of their family and children.

Lack of local language knowledge creates major obstacles for refugees to reach certain rights in the host countries. It is a great barrier in front of social inclusion, access to labour market, and access to education. It limits the refugees' interaction with the local people, and it might lead to differentiate/marginalize refugees from the society. Adequate local language knowledge fosters the integration and build bridges between refugees and local community while enabling refugees to achieve some living standards in the host countries. Learning language usually helps people to get to know the local culture. By this way, refugees who control the local language might develop familiarity with the culture of the host country to a certain extend. As it is seen from the refugees' narratives, the refugees who develop familiarity with the current place and maintained cultural accommodation to some level tend to stay longer in that host country despite all the negativities. Moreover, refugees indicated that going somewhere new means starting from scratch, getting used to a new life and a new culture which will bring new challenges. Therefore, most of them noted that they do not want to start from zero, prefer to continue living in the same host country. Strong local language knowledge and fostered cultural accommodation can be a deterrent for the onward migration.

Discriminatory rhetoric of the politicians and polarized discourse in the media usually cause refugees to feel excluded and unwanted in the host country. Refugees can easily become the target of xenophobia and discrimination by the local society. It can evoke distrust and scorn towards refugees and make them even more vulnerable. During the interviews, refugees noted that those rhetoric and discourses affect the behaviour and attitude of the local people towards them. Beyond that, it is seen during the analysis that those rhetoric and discourses generate some insecurity and fear of future among refugees which increases the aspiration for an onward migration.

Government changes in the countries may affect the asylum and reception systems, official admission as well as integration policies. During the interviews, it is clearly shown that revoking of the resident permits of the refugees in Denmark or even a possibility of realizing it caused a great fear of deportation among refugees. A structural or even just a change of principle, new country information or pressure from a less tolerant public opinion already inspires further migration (regular or irregular, even forced return) of refugees.

Refugees can move from an asylum country to another State which accepts them via the Resettlement/Relocation/Returning programmes as a legally offered “state controlled but narrow channel”. It is a protection tool for the refugees in the most vulnerable situations. Each year, resettlement countries determine an annual quota, and accept the refugees based on the individual protection needs. Resettlement process requires an interstate cooperation. It is more a legal option for refugees at the individual level, provided by States, for entry, residence, family reunification, employment, education, culture, medical treatment which can end up with permanent residency and/or naturalized citizenship. During the interviews, the refugees who benefitted from the Resettlement Programme reported that they were not asked for a preferred country, whereas the UNHCR offered one of the European countries which they shall either accept to go or not. Since there were not any other alternatives, they accepted but their satisfaction with the life in the resettled countries is very low and this fact triggers their aspiration to move onward. The “institutionalized solidarity” providing relocation/resettlement or assisted return means limited, late and centrally governed capacity instead of flexible and fast reactions to individual needs, using digitalization or platforms of interstate and regional cooperation.

As a sum of the conclusion of the findings, the results of the research hypotheses follow as: The priority of refugees who fled war is having a physical safety. After ensuring a certain extent of security, the new life in the host country, their socio-economic conditions, and integration prospects have an immense influence on their sense of satisfaction and contentment. If these factors cannot meet the expectations or fail to provide the basic needs, refugees are led to consider onward migration, searching for more promising future in another country. So, dissatisfaction has a great role to drive refugees to take onward migration journeys. Therefore, as a result of the analysis, the research concluded that the first hypothesis “The refugees’ extent of dissatisfaction with the life in the host country is directly connected with their aspirations and decisions regarding onward migration” is proven to be correct. Integration can be measured via the integration indicators. Easy and efficient access to job market as well as having a profession matching to their skills and education backgrounds; possession of a sufficient level of local language knowledge to access education, employment, and to build social interactions; access to health and social services; long-term stable legal status; sense of belonging and cultural interactions; not experiencing discrimination and social exclusion, they all are significant indicators of the level of integration. During the interviews, the participants of the research indicated that the opportunities and support given them and facilities which would accelerate their integration

into the host country are great determinants of their will to stay there or move onward in the absence of them. Thus, there is a nexus between the integration processes and aspiration for onward migration. Consequently, the second hypothesis of the research “Unmet needs, unfulfilled life expectations and lack of sense of belonging in the host country increase the refugees’ aspiration for migration.” is proven to be correct.

Based on the findings of the research, the recommendations are provided below:

- Migration is a part of the human nature; either by force or voluntarily, it will continue to happen just as it did during the history and pre-history. The problem is not migration itself, rather the unprepared technical infrastructure, unorganized socio-economic and political responses, and inadequate legislations. Instead of providing temporary solutions, enhanced policies, infrastructure, and legal status shall be meticulously prepared in a right-based approach within the framework of international human rights law.
- The basic needs approach is not sufficient to meet the refugee’s basic needs and achieve their long-term well-being. The policies and strategies designed to response the needs of refugees are not comprehensive and sustainable, either. Once the necessary protection is ensured, the welfare of the refugees should be prioritized. Employment is one of the main fields to address within this framework. Preparing and implementing an employment plan based on refugees’ skill sets and professional backgrounds facilitate refugees’ access to the labour market. Issuing proper work permits within the framework of labour law will decrease the informal work and discourage the exploitation of refugees with low wages. By this way, the refugees and the local workers will develop much more positive relations. Access to labour market with suitable jobs, proper work permits, and fair salaries will enable refugees to contribute to the host countries’ economies with their taxes, and it will lead to develop much stronger ties with the country.
- Building multicultural society is highly important for the countries hosting refugees. Cultural, ethnic, religious diversity should be boosted with comprehensive policies and practices. Social cohesion can only be maintained through respecting different identities, and distinct cultures. Activities should be arranged in the local level including both host society and refugee community to improve the knowledge of each other’s cultures, histories, and experiences. In this way, the common sense of

belonging can be achieved, and refugees feel themselves a part of host community and develop some affinity.

- Refugees were exposed to traumatic experiences both in their country of origin and during fleeing the war. When they arrive to host countries, one of their crucial needs is psychosocial counselling. Most of them have been traumatized and have developed mental health related issues. So, they are not at least cognitively ready to learn something new and practice a newly gained life skill activity. After maintaining their mental wellbeing, local language teaching shall be prepared in sufficient number of hours within a curriculum tailored towards the specific needs of refugees until they feel confident enough to speak, write, listen the language properly.
- As it is seen during the research, discriminatory rhetoric of the politicians and polarized discourse in the media can create a general antipathy towards refugees. In order to avoid that a media strategy should be prepared in the governmental level, and it should be monitored to combat the negativities which might cause anti-refugee sentiment. Trainings specifically designed for usage of peaceful and unifying language shall be given to press and media members who will work on refugee themes.
- It's important to highlight here that irregular secondary migration is a complex and multifaceted issue. As the refugees reported during the interviews, most of the times, they do not voluntarily choose the irregular means to migrate, rather they feel obliged to do so because of the lack of legal channels. If refugees are offered safe and secure paths and alternatives, it decreases the perilous and risky secondary migration. The resettlement programme can be one of the alternatives to spontaneous and perilous secondary migration in order to minimalize irregular secondary migration. How?
 - Resettlement/relocation/assisted return programmes shall be revised and refugee's preferences of country of destination should be evaluated, as well.
 - Capacity building of infrastructure in law, administration and finance directly aiming this manageable migratory movements, e.g., own coordinators, liaison officers, yearly quotas from the budget, transit-shelters and transport means, digital platform to collect data on needs, signals, and vacancies...
 - Establishing own regulation/regime instead of action plans or time-fixed offers.

- EU, IOM and UNHCR shall set up common standards on alternative road map reducing the attractive power of smugglers, abusive and exploitative or risky paths for displaced/protectable migrants.
- The programme shall be facilitated via the networking of international relations and solidarity between states. It is seen during the research that when individual and organised admission/resettlement is difficult and rigid, irregular, informal migration movements of individuals are intensified.
- The main of the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) has transformed into migration restriction and externalization. The intention with controlling migration ends up only shifting the routes. It is very crucial to adopt a human rights-centred approach that the MPF should be designed, implemented, and comply with the international human rights legislations. Improving the legal framework is really important, the MPF should focus on providing safer alternatives to irregular migration for refugees such as strengthening the resettlement programs and facilitating family unification and preventing the deportation.
- The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 should develop a special programme which only engages with the specific needs of the vulnerable groups such as refugees and unaccompanied minors. Providing the necessary assistance, services and resources, the EU can help refugees to overcome their challenges and diminish their vulnerability. Once their needs are addressed, in the long-term they can develop a sense of belonging and can build a stable life.
- None of the participants of the research intends to go back to Syria unless the regime changes and the country maintains peace and security. Since the return condition is not ready yet because of the unsafe circumstances, the aspiration of refugees to go back is naturally very low. Therefore, at least until the peace-maintenance is secured, all the actors including, States, international organizations and international community should not promote the voluntary return programmes.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet for Interviews (English and Arabic)



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Participant Information Sheet for Interviews (English)

Provisional Study Title:

Onward Migration Aspirations of Syrian Refugees, Integration Processes and Legal
Alternatives to Secondary Migration: A Comparative Study

Researcher: Ms. Tugce KILIC

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research.

What is the research about?

I would like to kindly inform you that the research I have been conducting is a part of the PhD programme and I have to submit a dissertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy (PhD) in the Doctoral School of Law and Political Science at the Faculty of Law in the University of Szeged. The research is nominated by the Ministry of National Education in Turkey and is awarded with a full scholarship by the Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarship Programme of the Hungarian Government.

The research focuses on the onward migration aspirations of Syrian refugees who needed to flee from their own country because of the Syrian Civil War. The primary aim of the seeking asylum in the first country of international protection for refugees is to ensure physical safety. After that, integration processes in the host countries have a shifting role in their migration aspirations. Once the refugees arrive the first country of asylum, obtaining some legal status, accession to certain rights and securing their life conditions become a priority. Hence, the refugees' satisfaction with the life in the host countries are correlated with the effectiveness of the integration processes. In lack of obtaining these priorities and States' failure to meet the needs of refugees, refugees consider moving onward to another countries. Thus, it is very important to create more comprehensive, liberal, responsive integration policies and they should be implemented in the national, regional, and international level. Therefore, this research aims to understand the aspirations for onward migration of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Denmark and Spain who flee from the war and sought protection in one or more than one country. By analysing refugees' migration trajectories, it is intended to understand the correlation between the integration of refugees into the host countries and their aspiration to migrate. The main motivation is to shed light on the refugee's aspirations to move onward and try to highlight the common patterns which

triggers refugees to decide on secondary migration, and to identify what could be the safer, less risky, and legal alternative to secondary migration.

It is a scientific research with an academic approach, for this reason, it does not have any aim to praise or criticize the current policies or governmental strategies. As a methodological design, qualitative approach has been adopted; therefore, semi-structured interviews will be conducted, and questionnaires will be completed with/by key individuals in the field. The research will be supported with the primary and secondary data obtained from these activities.

Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen for this research due to your expertise, duty, position, knowledge, and first-hand experience. This research has an aim to make a novel contribution to the literature, therefore your participation with your unique knowledge and experience will help to draw a clearer picture of the situation.

What will happen to me if I take part?

The interviewer will inform you about the on-going research, and in case you have any doubts or questions, you will have an opportunity to clear your mind. The time and place of the interviews will be arranged according to your schedule and preferences. The research will be twofold: questionnaire form and the semi-structured interview.

First of all, you will be asked to sign a consent letter. The questionnaire form will be distributed by the interviewer (or you will be sent an online link to fill-in the form) and you will be given enough time and flexibility to respond all the questions on the questionnaire form. After submitting the forms, the face-to-face interviews will be arranged according to your availability. (Due to the current Covid-19 pandemic, this stage can be arranged using online tools.) The semi-structured questions will be addressed to you during the interview. You can speak either in Arabic, English, Spanish, and Turkish. There will be an interpretation facility during the interview for the Arabic speakers. Before starting our conversation, I will inform you that I push the button on to start recording. Our interview will take approximately 1 hour. I will address you some semi-structured questions and naturally, some other questions may occur in the meantime. Once the interview is over, you will be informed that I stop recording.

Will my participation be confidential?

It is ensured that all the participants and the data obtained through forms and interviews will be kept strictly confidential. Each and every participant who takes part in will remain anonymised. Their name or any information related to their personal data will neither be asked nor shared during the research. The pseudonyms will be used in order to identify them throughout the research. It is guaranteed that the data and information will be obtained, stored, processed, and kept in line with the Data Protection acts, legislations and legal regulations as well as the policies of the University of Szeged.

The soft copy of the forms and recordings will be kept in a password protected laptop, while the hard copy documents will be stored in a locked and secure location. Only the researcher will know the passwords and have access to storages. In accordance with the legislations and legal regulations, the data obtained from the questionnaires and interviews will be protected until the end of research project. Since the aim of the data collection is solemnly academic, once the research is finalized, the documents and the recordings will be exterminated within the framework of the University's Recommended Practices for Destruction of Data.

What happens if I change my mind?

If you change your mind at any phase of the research, you can always withdraw from participation. Once the two-folded research is completed, the interviewer will ask your confirmation to proceed the given data. Even after the interview, you will have a right to withdraw. You just need to inform the researcher about the withdrawal request within 2-week-time-period after filling out the questionnaire. The contact details of the researcher will be given to you, so that you can send a withdrawal notification at any time. Once you withdraw, all the documents related to you will be removed from the storage and irreversibly destroyed.

Where can I get more information?

If you would like to get more information or share your opinions about the research and the process, you could kindly contact:

Doctoral School of Law and Political Science, University of Szeged, Hungary

Telephone Number: (+36) 62 544 196 / 544-293

E-mail Address: doktori.iskola@juris.u-szeged.hu

For any further questions and concerns, the researcher's contact details shown below:

Ms. Tugce KILIC

Doctoral School of Law and Political Science, Faculty of Law, University of Szeged

Telephone Number: (+36) 20 413 49 43

E-mail Address: tugce.kilic@juris.u-szeged.hu, tugce.kilic@coleurope.eu

You could also communicate with the scientific supervisor of the research whose contact details as follows:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Judit TOTH

Constitutional Law Department,

Faculty of Law, University of Szeged

Telephone Number: (+36) 625 444 87

E-mail Address: skula@juris.u-szeged.hu



جامعة سيزجد كلية الحقوق برنامج الدكتوراة للقانون والعلوم السياسية

وثيقة معلومات المشارك في المقابل ون

تتراقم تسارد :تيوناتلا ةرجهلا تيوناتلا لنادبلاو جامدنلا تايملعو نبيروسلا نينجاللا تيلبقتسما ةرجهلا تاعلظت
الباحثة: السيدة **Tuğçe KILIC**

يرجى قراءة هذه المعلومات بعناية قبل اتخاذ قرار بالمشاركة في هذا البحث.

ما هو موضوع البحث؟ في محور طأ مدقأ نأ بجيو هاروتكدلا جمانربنم عزجوه هتيرجأ يذلا ثحبلا نأ مكغلبأ نأ دوا
تيلك في تيساسلا مولعلاو نوناقل في هاروتكدلا تيلك في (PhD) تفسلفلا في هاروتكدلا تجرد تابلطتم في نزع عافيتسا
نم تلماك تيسارد تهنمب محنم متيو ايكرت في في نطولا مبلعتلا ةرازو لبق نم ثحبلا جشيرت متي. دجرس تعماجب قوقحلا
تيرجملا تموكللا عباتلا Stipendium Hungaricum تيساردلا جنملا جمانرب لبق

تيلهلأ برحلا بسبب مهلاي نم رارفا يلا اوجاتحا نينلا نبيروسلا نينجاللا ةرمتسما ةرجهلا تاعلظت يلع ثحبلا زكري
دعب تيدسجلا ةملاسلا نامض وه نينجاللا تيلودلا تيامحلا نم يولوا تلودلا في عوجللا بطل يساسلا فدهلا. تيروسلا
دلي يلا نينجاللا لوصو درجمب. ةرجهلا وحن مهتاعلظت في اريغتم اورد تقيضما نادلبلا في جامدنلا تايملع بعلت، كاذ
تيلولوا مهتايد فورظ نيمأتو تنيعم قوقح يلع لوصحلاو ي نوناقل عضولا ضعب يلع لوصحلا حبصيد، لولوا عوجللا
يلع لوصحلا مدع لظ في. جامدنلا تايملع تيلعقب طبتري تقيضما نادلبلا في قايطا نع نينجاللا اضر نإف، مذنمو
نم، يلاتابو. يرخأ نادلب يلا لاقتنلا في نونجاللا ركفي، نينجاللا تاجايتحا تيلت في لودلا لشفو تايولولوا مده
يولودلاو يميلقلاو ي نطولا يوتسما يلع اهذيفنت بجيو، تاجتساو تيلار بيلو لاومشر تكل لماكت تاسايس عاشن ادم هملا
اورف نينلا ايناسو كرامندلاو ايكرت في نبيروسلا نينجاللا ةرمتسما ةرجهلا تاعلظت مهف يلا ثحبلا اذه فدهي، كاذ
وه كاذ نم فدهلا نإف، نينجاللا ةرجه تاراسم ليحت للاح نم. رتكا وأ قدحاو تلود في تيامحلا اويلطو برحلا نم
يلع عوضلا عاقل وه سينرلا عقادلا. ةرجهلا يلا مهعظتو تقيضما نادلبلا في نينجاللا جامدنا نيب تادابتملا ةقلاعلا مهف
نأشب رارق ناختا يلا نينجاللا عفدت ي تلا تعناشلا طامنلا يلع عوضلا طيلست تلوامو امدق يضملا نينجاللا تاعلظت
تيوناتلا ةرجهلا تيوناقو ةرود لقلأو أناما رتكلأا ليدبلا نوكن نأ نكمي يذلا امو، تيوناتلا ةرجهلا

تاجيتار تسلا وأ تيلاحلا تاسايسلا داقتنا وأ حدم يلا فدهي لا ببسلا اذهلو، ي ميداك جهنم وذ يملع ثحب وه
تلسلا لامكتسا متيسو، تمظنم هبش تلايقم ءارجا متيس، كاذ؛ ي عون جهنم دامتعا م، يجهنم ميمصت. تيموكللا
نم اهيلع لوصحلا مدي تلا تيوناتلاو تيلولوا تانايبلا ثحبلا معد متيس. لاجملا اذه في نبيسيترلا دارقلا لبق نم / عم
تطشذلا مده.

لماذا تم اختياري؟

لقد تم اختيارك لهذا البحث بسبب خبرتك وواجبك وموقعك ومعرفتك وتجربتك المباشرة. يهدف هذا البحث إلى تقديم
مساهمة جديدة في المراجع، وبالتالي فإن مشاركتك بمعرفتك وخبرتك الفريدة ستساعد في رسم صورة أوضح للموقف.

ماذا سيحدث لي إذا شاركت؟

ةيفصلا ةصوفك يديل نوكتيس، ةلئسا وأ لوكش ي اوجو ةلاح نو، يو اجلا ثحبلا ةلباقملا عل جابم ناقلا لخرخي
ماهفتسا: سقش وذ ثحبلا نوكتيس. ك تلابضفتو ني نرا ك لودجلا اقفو تلاباقملا ناكمو تقو بيوت متيس. ك نهذ
مظنم هبشو

عل جابم ناقلا لبق نم لؤسلا جنومذ نو متيس. ةقفولم باطخ لي ع يفتوتلا كنم بلطيس، عدبي ذي دا
عيمج لي ةباجلا ةيفاكلا ةنور مللو متقوللا كنم متيسو (جنومذلا علمت نوتلا برع طيل لاسو متيس) وأ ةلباقملا
عابو لظن. لوفوتلا اقفو هجول أهجو تلاباقملا بيوت متيس، جامنلا لاسو مدعب. ماهفتسلا جنومذ في ةلئسلا

ةمظنملا هبش ةلئسلأا حج طم تيس (بتفرتلإا برع ت اودأ م ادختساب ةلحو ملا هذبه بيقو تن كمي ، لي احلا Covid-19 ت لايهستك انه نوكتس .ةيكوللو ةينا بسلاو ةين لجنلاو ةيوعلا تاغللاب ث دحتلا كنكمي .ةلباقملا عانثأ لك فيع ادبلر زلا لي عطغضأ ني نابك خأس ، انتداحم عدل بق .ةيوعلا ةغللاب بن قطانلا ةلباقملا عانثأ ةيوقلا ةمجرلا ، ل احلا ةعيبطو ، ةمظنملا هبش ةلئسلأا ض عيبم كبطاخأ فوس .ةدحو ةعاس لي او حانتلباقم قوختستس .ل يجستلا .ل يجستلا ن ع ف قوئأ ني نابك لو ابحل م تيس ، ةلباقملا عاهتنا وجمب .عانثلاً هذبه في كو خلا ةلئسلأا ض عبر ط دق هل ستكون مشاركتي مستأمنة؟

يتم التأكد من أن جميع المشاركين والبيانات التي تم الحصول عليها من خلال الاستثمارات والمقابلات محفوظة بسرية تامة. سيكون كل مشارك يشارك في العمل مجهول الهوية. لن يتم سؤال أو مشاركة أسمائهم أو أي معلومات تتعلق ببياناتهم الشخصية أثناء البحث. سيتم استخدام الأسماء المستعارة للتعرف عليهم خلال البحث. نضمن الحصول على البيانات والمعلومات وتخزينها ومعالجتها وحفظها بما يتماشى مع قوانين حماية البيانات والتشريعات واللوائح القانونية بالإضافة إلى سياسات جامعة سيزجد.

سيتم الاحتفاظ بالنسخة الإلكترونية من النماذج والتسجيلات في جهاز كمبيوتر محمول محمي بكلمة مرور ، بينما سيتم تخزين المستندات المطبوعة في مكان مغلق وآمن. الباحث فقط هو الذي يعرف كلمات المرور ويكون له حق الوصول إلى المخازن. وفقاً للتشريعات واللوائح القانونية ، ستتم حماية البيانات التي يتم الحصول عليها من الاستبيانات والمقابلات حتى نهاية المشروع البحثي. نظراً لأن الهدف من جمع البيانات أكاديمي بشكل رسمي ، فبمجرد الانتهاء من البحث ، سيتم إبادة المستندات والتسجيلات في إطار الممارسات الموصى بها من الجامعة لتدمير البيانات ماذا يحدث إذا غيرت رأيي؟

إذا غيرت رأيك في أي مرحلة من مراحل البحث، فيمكنك دائماً الانسحاب من المشاركة. بمجرد اكتمال البحث المزوج، سيطلب القائم بإجراء المقابلة تأكيدك لمتابعة البيانات المقدمة. حتى بعد المقابلة، سيكون لك الحق في الانسحاب. ما عليك سوى إبلاغ الباحث عن طلب السحب في غضون أسبوعين بعد ملء الاستبيان. سيتم تزويدك ببيانات الاتصال الخاصة بالباحث، بحيث يمكنك إرسال إشعار سحب في أي وقت. بمجرد الانسحاب، ستتم إزالة جميع المستندات المتعلقة بك من التخزين وإتلافها بشكل نهائي.

أين يمكنني الحصول على مزيد من المعلومات؟

إذا كنت ترغب في الحصول على مزيد من المعلومات أو مشاركة آرائك حول البحث والعملية، فيرجى الاتصال بـ: كلية الدكتوراة في القانون والعلوم السياسية، جامعة سيزجد ، هنغاريا
رقم الهاتف: 293-20413 49 43 (+36)

عنوان البريد الإلكتروني doktori.iskola@juris.u-szeged.hu

لأي أسئلة أو استفسارات أخرى، تفاصيل الاتصال بالباحث الموضحة أدناه:

السيدة Tuğçe KILIC

كلية الدكتوراة في القانون والعلوم السياسية، كلية الحقوق، جامعة سيزجد

رقم هاتف 20413 49 43 (+36)

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كما يمكنك التواصل مع المشرف العلمي للبحث الذي تكون تفاصيل الاتصال به على النحو التالي:

مساعد. الأستاذ الدكتوراة جوديت توث

قسم القانون الدستوري، كلية الحقوق، جامعة سيزجد

رقم الهاتف: 625 444 8 (+36)

عنوان البريد الإلكتروني skula@juris.u-szeged.hu

Appendix 2: Consent for Participation in PhD Research (English and Arabic)



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Consent for Participation in PhD Research

1. I agree to participate in the PhD research conducted by Ms. Tugce KILIC from the Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences, Faculty of Law, University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary.
2. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet sent to me previously and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
3. I have received sufficient information about the on-going research and understand my role in it. The purpose of my participation as an interviewee in this project and the future processing of my personal data has been explained to me and everything is clear.
4. My participation as an interviewee in this project is completely voluntary. There is no explicit or implicit pressure whatsoever to participate.
5. I have a right to withdraw without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. I understand that in case of withdrawal decision, I should inform the researcher within 2-weeks-time-period after submitting the questionnaire forms.
6. I have been given the explicit guarantee that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I understand that any identification related to me by name or function will be anonymous and pseudonyms will be used in the dissertation to identify.
7. I allow the researcher to take notes during the interview and I give permission her to have the recording of the interview and subsequent dialogue by audio/video tape.
8. I understand that Personal Data, the questionnaire forms, and interview recordings will be protected in a strictly secure and safe place. They will be kept in a password-protected-laptop and mobile phone during the research and will be exterminated within the framework of the University of Szeged Recommended Practices for Destruction of Data.
9. I have given all the contact information of the researcher, scientific supervisor, and Doctoral School for any questions, concerns, information, feedback, and opinion sharing purposes.

10. I confirm that I have carefully read and fully understood the points and statements of this form. I have satisfactory answers to all my questions, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

Participant's Signature

Researcher's Signature

Date

Date



جامعة سيزجد
كلية الحقوق
برنامج الدكتوراة للقانون والعلوم السياسية

دكتوراه بحث في المشاركة على الموافقة

- والعلوم القانون في الدكتوراه كلية من فليتش توتشي السيدة تجريبه الذي الدكتوراه بحث في المشاركة على أوافق ١
المجر ، سيجد، سيجد جامعة ، الحقوق كلية ، السياسية
٢ الأسئلة لطرح الفرصة لي وأتحت سابقًا إلي المرسله المشارك معلومات ورقة وفهمت قرأت قد أنني أؤكد
في كمقابلة مشاركتي من الهدف شرح تم. ذلك في دوري وفهم المستمر البحث حول كافية معلومات تلقت لقد ٣
آمن شيء وكل لي الشخصية لبياناتي المستقبلية والمعالجة المشروع هذا
الإطلاق على ضمني أو صريح ضغط يوجد لا. تماما طوعية المشروع هذا في مقابلة معه تجرى شخص مشاركتي ٤
للمشاركة
قرار حالة في أنه أفهم أنا. سلبية عواقب أي هناك يكون أن ودون سبب أي إعطاء دون الانسحاب في الحق لدي ٥
الاستبيان تقديم بعد الزمنية الفترة-أسابيع 2 غضون في الباحث أبلغ أن يجب ، الانسحاب
٦ الوظيفة أو بالاسم الصلة تحديد أي أن أفهم أنا. بسريتها الاحتفاظ سيتم ردودي بأن صريح ضمان أعطيت لقد
لتحديد أطروحة في مستعارة أسماء استخدام وسيتم مجهول يكون سوف
- / صوتي بشريط اللاحق والحوار المقابلة بتسجيل لها الإذن وأعطي المقابلة أثناء الملاحظات بتدوين للباحث أسمح
٧ فيديو
تماما ومأمون آمن مكان في محمية ستكون المقابلات وتسجيلات الاستبيان ونماذج الشخصية البيانات أن أفهم ٨
الممارسات إطار في إبادتها وسيتم البحث أثناء مرور بكلمة محمي محمول كمبيوتر جهاز في بها الاحتفاظ سيتم
البيانات لتدمير سيجد جامعة في بها الموصى
أو مخاوف أو أسئلة صورة في الدكتوراه ومدرسة العلمي والمشراف للباحث الشخصية معطياتي جميع أعطيت لقد ٩
المشاركة أغراض رأي أو تعليقات أو معلومات
وأنا أسئلتني جميع على اجبت. النموذج هذا في الواردة والبيانات النقاط تماما وفهمت بعناية قرأت أنني وأؤكد ١٠
الدراسة هذه في المشاركة على طوعية أوافق

المشارك توقيع

الباحث توقيع

التاريخ

التاريخ

Appendix 3: Questionary Form for the Syrian Refugees (English and Arabic)

QUESTIONARY FORM FOR THE SYRIAN REFUGEES							
السوريين للاجئين استبيان استمارة							
1. PERSONAL DATA شخصية بيانات							
1.	Gender جنس	<input type="checkbox"/> Male ذكر	<input type="checkbox"/> Female أنثى	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
2.	Age عمر						
3.	Place of Birth مكان الولادة						
4.	Ethnicity العرقى الأصل	<input type="checkbox"/> Arab عربي	<input type="checkbox"/> Kurdish كردي	<input type="checkbox"/> Turkmen تركمان	<input type="checkbox"/> Other آخر		
5.	Marital Status الإجتماعية الحالة	<input type="checkbox"/> Single أعزب /عزباء	<input type="checkbox"/> Married متزوج /متزوجة	<input type="checkbox"/> Divorced مطلق مطلقة/	<input type="checkbox"/> Wido w /أرمل أرملة		
6.	Number of Children الاطفال عدد						
7.	Age and Gender of the Children الأطفال وجنس عمر						
8.	Is there anybody in the family born in the host country? الأسرة في أحد يوجد هل المضيف؟ البلد في مولود	<input type="checkbox"/> No لا			<input type="checkbox"/> Yes نعم		
9.	Total number of the family members لأفراد الإجمالي العدد الأسرة						
10.	Education التعليمي المستوى	Literate متعلم <input type="checkbox"/>	Illiterate غير/أمي متعلم <input type="checkbox"/>	Primary School مستوى ابتدائي <input type="checkbox"/>	Middle School مدرسة اعدادية <input type="checkbox"/>	High School المدرسة الثانوية <input type="checkbox"/>	Universi ty مستوى جامعي <input type="checkbox"/>
11.	Current Occupation الحالية المهنة						
12.	Previous Occupation in Syria سوريا في السابقة المهنة						
13.	Which legal ID do you have to	<input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Protection ID		<input type="checkbox"/> Refugee Status ID		<input type="checkbox"/> Other ذلك غير /آخر	

	use to stay in the host country? القانوني الميعرف هو ما في للبقاء تملكه الذي المضيف؟ البلد	الحماية رقم/معرفة المؤقتة	صفة رقم/معرفة لاجئ	
14.	If other, please explain. يرجى ذلك غير كان إذا التوضيح.			
2. MIGRATION/ الهجرة				
1.	Entry date to the host country المضيف البلد إلى الدخول تاريخ			
2.	Where do you come from in Syria? محافظة؟ اي من سوريا؟ في اتيت اين من			
3.	Have you ever been in the host country before migrating? الهجرة؟ قبل المضيف البلد زرت أن لك سبق هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, when? متى؟ ،نعم إذا
4.	How many countries have you lived in before coming to your current host country? البلد إلى القدوم قبل فيها عشت التي الدول عدد كم الحالي؟ المضيف			
5.	Which cities have you lived in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في فيها عشت التي المدن هي ما			
6.	How long have you been living in the current city? الحالية؟ المدينة في تعيش وانت متى منذ			
7.	Do you have any family members or relatives in the current host country? البلد في الأقارب أو الأسرة أفراد من أي لديك هل الحالي؟ المضيف	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	
8.	Have you ever visited Syria after migrating? الهجرة؟ بعد سوريا زرت أن لك سبق هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, how many times? نعم الجواب كان إذا مرة؟ كم	
9.	Do you still have any family in Syria? سوريا؟ في عائلة لديك مازلت هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	
10.	Do you still have any property in Syria? سوريا؟ في ممتلكات أي تملك مازلت هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	
11.	Do you want to change your current host city? الحالية؟ المضيف مدينة تغيير تريد هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, to which city? إلى ، نعم الإجابة كانت إذا محافظة؟/مدينة أي	
12.	Do you want to change your current host country? بك؟ الخاص الحالي المضيف البلد تغيير تريد هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, to which country? أي فإلى ، بنعم الإجابة كانت إذا دولة؟	
13.	Do you want to move back to Syria when the war is over? الحرب؟ انتهاء بعد سوريا إلى العودة تريد هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	
3. INTEGRATION دمج				

3.1. Employment التشغيل/التوظيف			
1.	Do you have a work permit in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في عمل تصريح لديك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
2.	Do you have a job in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في عمل لديك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.	How did you find the job? وظيفة؟ وجدت كيف	<input type="checkbox"/> Via a facilitator organization عبر وسيطة منظمة <input type="checkbox"/> On my own بنفسك <input type="checkbox"/> Via a Syrian acquaintance عبر المعارف أحد السوريين <input type="checkbox"/> Other/ أخرى.....	
4.	Do you have a social security? اجتماعية؟ تغطية/ضمان لديك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
5.	How many times did you change the job in the current host country? المضيف البلد في الوظيفة بتغيير قمت مرة كم الحالي؟		
6.	How many hours do you work in a day? اليوم؟ في تعمل ساعة كم؟		
7.	How many days do you work in a week? الأسبوع؟ في تعمل يوماً كم؟		
8.	Are those hours within the framework of formal working hours? ساعات إطار في الساعات تلك هل الرسمية؟ العمل		
9.	Does the job match with your qualifications? مع الوظيفة تتطابق هل مؤهلاتك؟		
10.	Is the salary satisfactory? مرتبك عن راضي انت هل؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
11.	Do you need to do extra activity apart from work? (Eg. Volunteering/traineeship/studying in parallel) عن بعيداً إضافي بنشاط القيام إلى تحتاج هل / التدريب / التطوع :المثال سبيل على) العمل؟ (بالتوازي الدراسة)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
12.	In case you need to, would you accept to work irregularly? بشكل العمل تقبل هل ، ذلك إلى احتجت حال في القانون؟ إطار خارج/منتظم غير	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.2. Housing الإسكان			
1.	How did you find your current accommodation? الحالي؟ مسكنك وجدت كيف	<input type="checkbox"/> Via a facilitator organization عبر منظمة وسيطة <input type="checkbox"/> Via a real estate agency عن وكالة طريق عقارات <input type="checkbox"/> Via internet عبر الإنترنت	

		<input type="checkbox"/> Via a Syrian acquaintance أحد عبر السوريين المعارف Other/ أخرى:.....	
2.	When did you move into this place? المكان؟ هذا إلى انتقلت متى		
3.	How many times did you change your accommodation in the current host country? الدولة في إقامتك مكان بتغيير قمت مرة كم؟ الحالية؟ المضيئة		
4.	What is the situation of the accommodation? السكن؟ وضع هو ما	<input type="checkbox"/> Owner مالك <input type="checkbox"/> Rental tenant مستأجر <input type="checkbox"/> Shelter (I do not pay anything) المأوى (شيء أي أدفع لا)	
5.	How many people do you live in the same place? المكان؟ نفس في تعيش شخص كم		
6.	Is the accommodation big enough for your family? لعائلتك؟ يكفي بما كبير السكن هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No / لا
7.	Why did you choose to live in this place? (you can mark more than one) تحديد يمكنك) سكن؟/المكان هذا في العيش اخترت لماذا (خيار من أكثر)	<input type="checkbox"/> Because it is cheap الثمن رخيصة لأنها <input type="checkbox"/> Because it is close to where I work لأنها عملي مكان من قريبة <input type="checkbox"/> Because the neighborhood is safe لأن أمن الحي Because I have Syrian friends and family as a neighbor كاجوار سوريون وعائلة أصدقاء لدي لأن	
8.	Does the place you live in belongs to a formal or informal entity? (via facilitator organization e.g., NGOs/Church etc. or sharing with friends) تعيش الذي المكان ينتمي هل (ميسرة منظمة عبر) رسمي؟ غير أو رسمي كيان إلى فيه أو ذلك إلى وما الكنيسة / الحكومية غير المنظمات مثل (الأصدقاء مع المشاركة)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Formal) نعم (رسمي)	<input type="checkbox"/> No (Informal) رسمي غير لا
3.3. Education التعليم			
1.	How many children at the school age do you have? لديك؟ المدرسة سن في الأطفال عدد كم	Please indicate the grades. الدرجات إلى الإشارة يرجى	
2.	Do you/your children follow a local language education system? او أنت تتبع هل محلي؟ لغة تعليم نظام أطفالك	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.	Do you think local language education is sufficient for you/your children's academic learning? أطفالك لتعليم / لك كافٍ المحلية اللغة تعليم أن تعتقد هل الأكاديمي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
4.	Is the local education system appropriate for you/your children academic development? أطفالك لتنمية / لك مناسب المحلي التعليم نظام هل الأكاديمية؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No / لا
5.	Do you think Syrian children benefit the host country's education system?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا

	في التعليم نظام يفيدون السوريين الأطفال أن تعتقد هل المضيف؟ البلد		
6.	Are you satisfied with the education policies of your host country? المضيف؟ بلدك في التعليم سياسات عن راضي أنت هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No / لا
7.	Would you prefer to get education in your own language with Syrian teachers? هل مدرسين مع الأم بلغتك تعليم على الحصول تفضل سوريين؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
8.	Are you planning to attend a course or training either formally or informally? (e.g., learning IT, language, cooking, finances from a neighbor or friend) أو رسمي بشكل سواء تدريب أو دورة لحضور تخطط هل تكنولوجيا تعلم ، المثال سبيل على) رسمي؟ غير جار من المالية والشؤون ، والطبخ ، واللغة ، المعلومات (صديق أو	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا

3.4. Health الصحة

1.	Do you have any chronic illness to be followed regularly? يجب مزمن مرض أي لديك هل بانتظام؟ متابعته	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
2.	Can you access the health care services easily in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في بسهولة الصحية الرعاية خدمات إلى الوصول يمكنك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.	Do you pay your medical treatment on your own? بنفسك؟ علاجك تكاليف تدفع هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
4.	Do you go to the state funded hospitals or private clinics? أم الدولة من الممولة العمومية المستشفيات إلى تذهب هل الخاصة؟ العيادات		

3.5. Social Connections الاجتماعية الروابط

1.	Did you have any relatives or friends who came to the host country prior to you and helped you to come to the current host country? المضيف البلد إلى قدموا أصدقاء أو أقارب أي لديك هل الحالي؟ المضيف البلد إلى القدوم على وساعدوك لك سابقاً	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
2.	Do you organize/attend any events to keep in touch with the Syrians in the host country? مع اتصال على للبقاء أحداث أي تحضر / تنظم هل المضيف؟ البلد في السوريين	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.	Do you have any local friends or neighbor whom you see regularly? بانتظام؟ تراه محليين جيران أو أصدقاء أي لديك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
4.	Do you feel disturbed by living in the same neighborhood with the locals?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا

	السكان مع الحي نفس في العيش من بالانزعاج تشعر هل المحليين؟		
5.	Do you have any relative, acquaintance, friend living in another EU country? أخرى دولة في يعيش صديق أو معارف أو قريب لديك هل الأوروبي؟ الاتحاد في	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, do you plan to visit them in that country? فهل ، بنعم الإجابة كانت إذا البلد؟ هذا في لزيارتهم تخطط <input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا <input type="checkbox"/>
6.	In the future, do you plan to reunite, work or study with them in some other country? الدراسة أو العمل أو الشمل للم تخطط هل ، المستقبل في آخر؟ بلد في معهم	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.6. Language and Culture والثقافة اللغة			
1.	Do you attend any local language course? محلية؟ لغة دورة أي تحضر هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
2.	Do you speak the local language? المحلية؟ اللغة تتحدث هل	لا Not at all على اتحدث الاطلاق	A little قليلا Interme diate متوس ط Advanc ed متقدم
3.	Where did you learn the local language? المحلية؟ اللغة تعلمت أين		
4.	Do you think it is necessary to learn the local language? Why? ؟ لماذا المحلية؟ اللغة تعلم الضروري من أنه تعتقد هل		
5.	What is the biggest obstacle to learn the local language? المحلية؟ اللغة تعلم أمام عائق أكبر هو ما		
6.	Can you practice the local language with the locals? المحليين؟ السكان مع المحلية اللغة تحدث يمكنك هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
7.	Do you practice the local language in your family? عائلتك؟ في المحلية اللغة تمارس هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
8.	Do you think there is a common culture between Syria and your host country? والبلد سوريا بين مشتركة ثقافة هناك أن تعتقد هل المضيف؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	Please give some example <input type="checkbox"/> إعطاء يرجى بعض الأمثلة
9.	Have you changed your daily habits since you moved to your host country? المضيف؟ البلد إلى انتقالك منذ اليومية عاداتك غيرت هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
10.	Have you changed your eating habits since you came to your host country? البلد إلى أتيت أن منذ الغذائية عاداتك بتغيير قمت هل المضيف؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, how? ، نعم الإجابة كانت إذا فكيف؟
11.	Have you changed your dressing style since you moved to your host country? أن منذ بك الخاص الملابس ارتداء أسلوب بتغيير قمت هل المضيف؟ البلد إلى انتقلت	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا	If yes, how? ، نعم الإجابة كانت إذا فكيف؟

12.	Do you think religion is an important fact to ease the integration process? الاندماج؟ عملية لتسهيل مهم الدين أن تعتقد هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
13.	Would you like to marry a local person? Or would you agree if your children what to marry a local? أو المحليين؟ السكان من شخص من الزواج في ترغب هل المحليين؟ السكان من ابناؤك يتزوج ان على توافق هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
3.7. Safety and Stability والاستقرار الأمان			
1.	Do you feel yourself safe and secured in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في والأمان بالأمان تشعر هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
2.	Have you ever experienced any racism, xenophobia, discrimination in the host country? أو للأجانب كراهية أو عنصرية أي واجهت أن لك سبق هل المضيف؟ البلد في تمييز	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
3.	Have you ever fought with a local person for any reason which ended up in the police station? سبب لأي محلي شخص مع تشاجرت أن لك سبق هل الشرطة؟ مركز في المطاف به انتهى	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
3.	Have you ever fought with a local person for any reason which ended up in the police station? سبب لأي محلي شخص مع تشاجرت أن لك سبق هل الشرطة؟ مركز في المطاف به انتهى	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
4.	Have you ever experienced any maltreatment in the school or in the office? في أو المدرسة في معاملة سوء لأي قبل من تعرضت هل مكتب؟ اي	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
5.	Do you see a permanent stay in the host country? المضيف؟ البلد في دائمة بصفة الإقامة تنوى هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	No/ لا
3.8. Rights and Citizenship والمواطنة الحقوق			
1.	Do you encounter any difficulty to access the rights? الحقوق؟ بعض إلى الوصول في صعوبة أي تواجه هل	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
2.	Do the legal procedures applied by the state facilitate your integration to the host community? اندماجك الدولة تطبقها التي القانونية الإجراءات تسهل هل المضيف؟ المجتمع في	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا
3.	Do you consider applying for citizenship acquisition of the host country? البلد جنسية على للحصول بطلب التقدم في تفكر هل المضيف؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ نعم	<input type="checkbox"/> No/ لا

IN-DEPTH RESEARCH QUESTIONS

متعمقة بحث أسئلة

1. How was your life before the war in Syria and how do you see your own story since you left Syria? سوريا؟ مغادرتك منذ قصتك ترى كيف ,سوريا؟ في الحرب قبل حياتك كانت كيف

2. How do you feel in the country and city where you are right now? الآن؟ أنت حيث والمدينة البلد في شعورك هو ما

3. What are your plans for the next 1-2 years? Do you intend to stay where you live now and reside there forever? Or do you plan to go back home or move elsewhere? If so, why? إلى للعودة تخطط هل أو الأبد؟ إلى هناك وتعيش الآن تعيش حيث البقاء تنوي هل القادمين؟ للعامين خططك هي ما لماذا؟ كذلك الأمر كان إذا آخر؟ مكان إلى الانتقال أو المنزل