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Colonizing Cynicism in the Works of Rudyard Kipling

Ph.D.dissertation

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1. Introduction: The Ghost of Ruddy Baba

Eighty years ago, English-American poet W. H. Auden described a shift in the way people read Rudyard Kipling’s work in the poem “In Memory of W. B. Yeats” (1939), written three years after Kipling’s own death:

*Time that is intolerant*
*Of the brave and the innocent,*
*And indifferent in a week*
*To a beautiful physique,*

*Worships language and forgives*
*Everyone by whom it lives;*
*Pardons cowardice, conceit,*
*Lays its honours at their feet.*

*Time that with this strange excuse*
*Pardoned Kipling and his views,*
*And will pardon Paul Claudel,*
*Pardons him for writing well.* (44-45)

Even after all this time, the critical literature about his work shows the world has certainly not “pardoned Kipling and his views.” There is the rare voice who would whitewash Kipling’s colonial attitudes completely, such as John Derbyshire (2000), who ascribes the criticism of Kipling to “changes in public taste” (6), dismisses Kipling’s anti-Semitism as “ordinary everyday hypocrisy” (9), and writes that “if he sometimes used the ‘n’ word in private to refer to those whose sensibilities he so watchfully guarded in his work at the War Graves Commission, I see no reason to think any the less of him for it” (9). Setting aside such exceptions, the critical response has been steadily ambivalent, struggling to resolve the contradiction between Kipling’s frank exposure of the limits and failures of the empire in his writing and his unflagging support for its endeavors.

The critical conversation about Rudyard Kipling has undergone numerous shifts. He was first celebrated as a reporter, though his years as a newspaper writer have now been largely left out of criticism, with notable recent exceptions demonstrating a trend towards broader context for considering his other work and cultural impact (Gilmour 2002, Allen 2007, Scott 2011, Belliapa 2015). Although some of his most popular texts, during his lifetime and at the time of his writing, are his children’s poems and stories, Kipling has not been widely studied as a children’s writer, though one issue of *Children’s Literature* (2012) was devoted to Kipling, and one chapter in *The Cambridge Companion to Kipling Studies* is given to *The Jungle Books* and his other children’s writings (Montefiore 2011). In this chapter,
Jan Montefiore (2011) notes that “Kipling is neglected as a children’s writer because his reputation for imperialist racism and more recently, for warmongering makes him unpopular” with those who control canon for children (95). Charles Allen (2007) describes that contemporaries found Kipling to be first promising, then triumphant, as a fiction writer and described him as a new Dickens (127). Among later scholars, Bényei (2011) describes a movement from first reading Kipling in terms of the modernist mode of his work, then holding him up for censure as a mouthpiece of the imperial regime with the rise of postcolonial criticism, and then later reassessing this conclusion by identifying ideological contradictions and depth in his work (42). This has created a renewed interest in Kipling’s texts as providing insight into the intellectual framework of the colonialist enterprise and its interaction with the colonizer’s psyche, though these studies also tend to minimize Kipling’s importance in perpetuating imperialism. The current work will demonstrate that the two positions, that of the Kipling who lays bare the gaps in ideology and the Kipling who unflaggingly supports the British Empire, are not opposed but rather both serve to perpetuate colonizing work.

Postcolonial scholars identify what they describe as a jarring distinction between Rudyard Kipling’s fascination with transgressing the strict racial boundaries of colonizer and colonized and his unwavering support for the British Empire and its strict separation of those identities. It can be baffling that the same writer who produced “The White Man’s Burden” in 1899, with its exhortation to the colonizer to “Send forth the best ye breed— / Go bind your sons to exile / To serve your captives’ need” (2-4) had imagined an English soldier telling a low-caste Indian water carrier “Though I’ve belted you and flayed you, / By the livin’ Gawd that made you, / You’re a better man than I am” in 1890’s “Gunga Din” (83-85). When examined closely, this proves to be not a contradiction but rather a sign and result of ideological cynicism. Not only do “Gunga Din” and Kipling’s other literary output not threaten to destabilize imperial ideology, they are essential elements of it.

In the context of this study, ideology will be imagined the ways of understanding it that Slavoj Žižek (2013) offers. He presents several ways of thinking about the term, noting that its meanings range

from a contemplative attitude that misrecognises its dependence on social reality to an action-orientated set of beliefs, from the indispensable medium in which individuals
live out their relations to a social structure to false ideas which legitimate a dominant political power.¹ (3)

While the last speaks the most directly to postcolonial criticism, each of these functions can be readily identified working in the British Empire and appearing, presented with obfuscations and misdirections, in the work of Rudyard Kipling. Both the lived experience within the doubly-constituted structure of the colony and the ideas that legitimate the presence of the colonizer in that space shape and inform the British colonizer's actions in the colonized space.

This study has chosen Kipling for his unequaled importance in serving the British Empire's imperial ambitions through poetry and fiction. David Gilmour (2003) emphasizes the importance of Kipling for the British Empire, recounting that “Lord Esher . . . argued that Kipling had earned the Order of Merit for having accomplished as much for the British Empire as Kitchener or Lord Cromer, who had ruled Egypt for twenty-four years” (Kindle location 36-38). Kipling was the first English recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature and remains its youngest recipient. He played a unique role in the public life of the British Empire, and it is difficult to overstate his influence on the ideology of the colonizers. Andrew Hagiioannu (2003) stresses the central role of the creator of literature in shaping the world of readers in the colonial space, as to “be a writer in Victorian India was to exert a powerful influence upon administrative policy, but only at the cost of denying the normative constructs of European thought and representation that lay beneath the act of writing itself” (31). This, perhaps, is what many readers forget, as Kipling represses it through a carefully crafted impression of authoritative knowledge of India: that Kipling is an Englishman, and a diehard imperialist, and this subject position informs everything he writes about the colony. Medical, anthropological, and geographical publications², texts that have been associated with the colonization process by postcolonial thinkers, turned the wheels of the colony for readers in Great Britain, but it required writers like Kipling to provide the cognitive tools necessary for the individual colonizer to function in the colonized space itself.

¹ This develops a more nuanced version of Louis Althusser’s definition, as outlined in his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1971). He describes ideology as “the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (165).
² Robert J. Young (1994) provides an exhaustive overview of medical and anthropological texts from the 19th century, including such titles as An Investigation of the Theories of the Natural History of Man, The Races of Men (112), ‘Occasional Discourse on the N—Question’ (113, one word censored by me), Negro-Mania: Being an Examination of the Falsely Assumed Equality of the Various Races of Men, The Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races (117), and the competing Journal of the Ethnological Society of London and Journal of the Anthropological Society of London (63).
The colonizer’s desire for the repressed Other, the other side of the split subject, creates an impossible contradiction for the colonizer, one expressed in both the violence against the subaltern\(^3\) and in sexual impulses born of the desire to repair the divided self. As Jacques Lacan (2009) describes this as the essence of all desire, which “is always the desire of the Other. Which basically means that we are always asking the Other what he desires” (38), because the Other is the split constitutor of the self. This colonial binary, fundamentally constructive of the identity of the colonizer, becomes the deepest source of the trauma Tamás Bényei (2011) identifies as colonial intersubjectivity. The simultaneous fear of and desire for the Other is also mentioned by Zohreh T. Sullivan (1993), who writes “Kipling’s fallen colonizers are cultural reminders of nineteenth-century anxiety about the fluidity of sexual and racial Otherness, an anxiety that insulates itself by excluding that which is deviant, dirty, and effeminate” (83). Like all repressed signifiers, the Otherness of the colonized threatens constantly to remerge in a variety of uncontrolled forms, and thus the colonizer must turn to the ideological process of cynicism to contain its threat.

When Gustavo Generani (2016) writes about Kipling that “his stories frequently display a man-of-the-world cynicism which deconstructs both positions — British imperialism and Indianness — making it very difficult to determine their ideological status” (24), he neglects to consider that Kipling’s ideological position can very well be identified, and that his cynicism is the key factor in its relation to his work. When read in the light of Peter Sloterdijk’s (1983) and Žižek’s (1989) theories of the cynicism of ideology, it becomes clear that the seeming ambivalence expressed in Kipling’s texts negate the anxiety of Kipling’s colonial realizations that he at once makes emergent and silences through elisions and misattribution of the anxiety produced in the colonizer. This strategy is very briefly mentioned by Homi K. Bhabha (1994), writing that “[t]he success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace” (86). Kipling’s work always functions within certain clearly marked boundaries, and does so in the service of the ideology whose limitations they stage. In Kipling’s texts, the slippages, subversive liminal zones, and hybridities are always a threat. They do not destabilize colonizing ideology but rather threaten to. In the face of the threat these pose to the signifying system, Kipling’s colonizer adopts a

\(^3\) For the purposes of this study, the term “subaltern” is used in the sense that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) uses it, describing the silenced and marginalized individual or group that is denied a subject position by hegemony. “The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity” (76).
cynicism that privileges the neat divisions of the ideology over the transgressions that trouble its borders. In essence, Kipling shows the ideological borders of the Empire not to cross them, but to reinforce them and to warn of the danger of what can happen when they are penetrated.

This reading offers an explanation for an apparent contradiction that has been grappled with in studies of Kipling for decades. Generani (2016) succinctly sums up this perspective when he writes that Kipling’s “conscious support of the imperial project was corroded by tensions that arose, potentially from his unstable ideological position” (20). Salman Rushdie (1991) describes this as a fundamental opposition in Kipling’s identity, describing his as “a personality in conflict with itself, part bazaar-boy, part sahib” (74). He even names them, identifying “Ruddy Baba as well as Kipling Sahib” (75). This separation suggests Kipling as an early critic of the Empire, albeit perhaps an unwitting one, while also acknowledging his centrality to the production of imperialist ideology.

On the one hand is the direction Rushdie calls “Ruddy Baba,” Kipling’s keen interest in and fondness for the colonized, especially Indians, and his sympathy for their suffering under the often racist and brutal policies of the British Empire. Writers, including Mark Paffard (1989), Corinne Fowler (2007), David Sergeant (2013), and Alexander Bubb (2016), have identified ambivalences towards the empire in his work, suggesting that such stories and poems challenge contemporary modes of thinking about colonization by creating zones where the stark racial divides on which the colony depends are blurred, exposed as permeable, and transgressed. On the other hand is the colonizing vision of “Kipling Sahib,” the heavily stereotyped representation of the colonized in his work where, most tellingly, no space is ever opened for the prospect that the colony should or even could come to an end. Despite the variety of Kipling’s characters, they all reproduce an unquestioned belief in the essential separations between them according to their relative positions in the binary of colonizer/colonized.

Kipling’s personal love of India itself is beyond question. In his partial memoir, Something of Myself: For My Friends Known and Unknown (1937), Kipling writes about his time in India as a place of “light and colour and golden and purple fruits” with “friendly Gods” (1, 2). In contrast, he describes living in England in “a dark land, and a darker room full of cold,” the boarding house “a new small house smelling of aridity and emptiness” (4). In 1882, he returned to India, working first in Lahore and then in Allahabad as a newspaper writer and editor. He describes his return to India as “a joyous homecoming” (39). He describes a magical return of his knowledge of the language he had known in his youth, writing that he found himself “moving among sights and smells that made [him] deliver in the
vernacular sentences whose meaning [he] knew not. Other Indian-born boys have told [him] how the same thing happened to them” (39). It is as though he were washed clean of England, and he describes that his “English years fell away, nor ever, I think, came back in full strength” (39). In this moment of recognition by the land itself and reabsorption of his subjectivity, Kipling justifies his presence in and connection with India more than fifty years after the event in terms of intrinsic connection with the place and its language, both strangely disconnected from Indians themselves. Ashis Nandy (2009) tantalizingly briefly mentions that “Kipling merely produced new myths to consolidate these cultural ideas as a part of his own search for an integrated selfhood” (38), but does not develop this idea in detail. Whether Kipling personally ever achieved this integrated selfhood is not part of this study, though psychoanalytical theory would suggest not. How it affected his writing has been debated for decades.

Though critical commentary on Kipling goes back to the 19th century, a good starting point for this study is Edward Said (2003), for whom the stories and particularly the poems of Kipling serve as a prime example of the construction of the ideology of empire. For Said, Kipling teaches the supremacy of whiteness and the altruistic purpose of the colony, which Said calls “a long tradition of executive responsibility towards the colored races” (226). This context must be emphasized: Kipling’s writing comes towards the end of the strong Victorian tradition extolling the Empire as the enterprise of the good English humanitarian. As Newsome (1997) describes, “[t]he Victorians had a very strong sense of mission: not only to proclaim the Christian gospel, but also to civilize peoples of a totally different culture by the inculcation of Western standards and ethics” (134). The poem Said chooses, “A Song of the White Men,” is indeed a very simple enunciation of these principles. He is entirely in agreement with the theory of colonizing cynicism, however, when he writes that “[a]s he appears in several poems, in novels like Kim, and in too many catchphrases to be an ironic fiction, Kipling's White Man, as an idea, a persona, a style of being, seems to have served many Britishers while they were abroad” (226). In this, Said certainly touched on a critical distinction, and that is the special importance of Kiplingesque ideology for colonizers in the colony itself.

Other books examining Kipling through a literary lens come to much the same conclusion, that Kipling's feelings about colonized places are complex and anxious, and are reflected in his fictional work while being absent in his personal writings and correspondence. Sullivan's (1993) Narratives of Empire: The Fictions of Rudyard Kipling describes India, the land of Kipling’s birth and childhood, as “the troubled site of ambivalence and contradiction
in Kipling's discourse because India and empire are also the sources for his personal loss and oppression” (4). Sullivan's use of Said and Bhabha in developing what she describes as the ambivalence of Kipling's work underlies her fundamental argument that Kipling's stories reproduce colonial narratives in order to undermine them, especially the familial metaphor that figures Britain as mother-father and the colony as child. Sullivan sees Kipling as exposing the failure of imperial ideology, identifying ambiguities and anxieties expressed in his work, which “questions official structures and raises the possibility of repressed and alternative rereadings of official imperial mythology” (10). Kipling's work opens these spaces for addressing the failings and gaps in imperialist ideology, and Sullivan identifies them as expressing Kipling's ambivalent position as both a white colonizer and a child of India. For her, “Kipling's own subjective interpellations as master and child, as Englishman and native, and as the quintessentially divided imperial subject” (6). Thus, Sullivan suggests an equal tension between the two.

Following this trend, Stephen Arata (1996) locates Kipling among other writers questioning and subverting Victorian ideology at the turn of the century. He acknowledges that Kipling is usually read as an uncomplicated imperialist, even to the point of chauvinistically clinging to the empire when its demise seemed inevitable later in the 20th century, “Studies of the period, including the present one, have always stressed the transgressive quality of fin-de-siecle writing, its calculated and often spectacular deviances. Deviances require norms, however, and Kipling traditionally has been invoked as their most visible embodiment” (151) However, his fiction read in context reveals transgressive modes. Arata first writes about Kipling in terms of his resistance to the aestheticism of figures like Oscar Wilde (11), but counters the Kipling’s soldiers are often themselves figures of degeneracy (13). He argues that “[t]he notion that Kipling could at any time have been considered eccentric from late Victorian culture is likely to strike us as counterintuitive. In fact, though, the initial responses to Kipling were every bit as fraught, as contradictory, as revelatory, as the more celebrated ‘trials’ of many of his contemporaries” (152).

Phillip Mallett (2003) considers Kipling’s love of India proof of his love of and sympathy towards its oppressed people. He writes in detail of Kipling's racial and political views, extrapolating his actual thoughts on empire and England from his interactions with others, correspondence, autobiographies, and literary works of art. By contextualizing them in Kipling's experiences, Mallett seems to consider Kipling's imperial viewpoints the inevitable result of his surroundings and encounters, and implies in several places that, while Kipling publically supported brutal colonial oppression, his stories express privately-held doubts
about them. Mallett dedicates an entire chapter to *Kim*, and writes that the love between Kim and the lama is “entirely convincing, and untroubled by the racial difference” (120). His perspective on Kipling can be summed up with the final sentence of his book: “It remains for his admirers to add that when the tumult and the shouting die away, he remains our greatest writer of the short story” (200). In short, Mallett reads Kipling's life and work as praiseworthy, and his perspective on the dissonance between Kipling's often loudly stated opinions and the baring of problems in ideology in his stories is to consider the stories the manifestation of Kipling's doubts about the legitimacy of colonialism.

For Sergeant (2013), the essential division between Kipling's stories is one between two “blocks,” which he calls “authoritarian” and “complex” (4). He divides them as follows:

The first block of work is coercive, concerned with the inculcation of views derived from Kipling’s right-wing imperial agenda; it has ambitions on the world. The second relates less directly to such contexts, is more aesthetically sophisticated, and eludes definitive interpretation in a way that can be troubling to the right-wing ideology. (4)

By dividing Kipling's texts by mode and not by era, Sergeant separates the jingoistic *The Light That Failed* (1891) from *Kim* (1901), which he describes as having “a slightly miraculous feel, as if the talent lying dormant in Kipling’s mind had germinated in one effervescent rush” (152). Thus, Sergeant is able to sanitize Kipling’s output, often by categorizing different texts in one collection into either category, further perpetuating the idea that Kipling is in some way at war with himself.

Charles Allen (2007) sees Kipling’s youth in India as fundamental to his lifelong love of it. Allen's *Kipling Sahib: India and the Making of Rudyard Kipling* looks specifically at Kipling's childhood and early career in India, covering his later life (from 1899 to 1936) in a single, final chapter. Allen's approach explicitly connects the events of Kipling's life to his work, arguing that Kipling's stories directly express his personal opinions, though he never explains why, in this formulation, Kipling professed different opinions in his letters and personal writings. Allen supports this by arguing that “Kipling was incapable of compartmentalising his life and his work” (Kindle location 211-212) and demonstrating events in his life that are mirrored in stories written soon after. His study employs mostly Kipling's own writings and few postcolonial or other secondary texts. Allen is unapologetically reverential and separates the first half of Kipling's life, which he describes as perfectly expressive of public sentiment and artistically superior, from the second, when Kipling was, f says, past the age of his relevance. Allen's text is useful biographically, but its uncomplicated presentation of Kipling's love of India without considering its implications on his opinion of the British Empire means it must be read with a careful critical eye.
This trend of the conflicted Kipling has continued at least as recently as Krishna Daiya’s 2015 article “Re-assessing Kipling’s Imperialist Tendencies,” which argues that Kipling should not be dismissed as an imperialist, noting his intense fondness for and understanding of India, as evidenced by his affectionate descriptions of place and the complex characters he creates. She finds an ambiguity in Kipling’s depiction of India, contrasting his happy and nostalgic memory of his Indian childhood with his miserable and bleak time in an English school. She applies this pattern to *The Jungle Book*, separating the paternal “law of the jungle” from the maternal nurturing the jungle performs for Mowgli, whose eventual fate “as a dutiful native working for the British Empire fails to impress the readers who find him totally out of sync with the wild, carefree, vigorous, anarchic wolf-boy” (473). In *Kim* she finds a vision of a “fragmented, ruptured self” (474) she connects to what she imagines as Kipling himself being torn between two loves, of India and of Britain.

Challenging this revisionist tendency, the most complete examination of Kipling’s ideas about and role in the British Empire is Gilmour’s *The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling* (2002). Gilmore explicitly sets out to chronicle Kipling’s expressed opinions both private and public about the colonies of the British Empire and Britain’s relationship with them. He never denies that support for the Empire was fundamental to Kipling’s world view: “Imperialism and conservatism were in fact essential ingredients of Kipling’s life and of much of his writing: some three-quarters of the forty-five poems in *The Years Between*, which he regarded as his most important collection, have political or imperial themes.” (Kindle location 46-48). He also cites countless examples throughout Kipling’s life of his positions on the politics of the Empire. Though supporting increased self-rule and greater support for cultural expression in the colony, Kipling always viewed the end of the colony as a disaster for Britain, for India, and—it may be said— for himself.

Gilmour follows Kipling’s life from his childhood in India through his time in English schools and his newspaper work in India. Gilmour demonstrates Kipling’s implicit sense of possession of India, and illustrates his opposition to Indian home rule and advocacy for expanded direct British involvement in the subcontinent. At this time, Kipling changed from criticizing some individual British agents in the colonies to extolling idealized colonizers for their hard work and self-sacrifice. Gilmour argues that Kipling’s tone later turned from praising to elegiac, but his fundamental conceptions about the Empire did not change. In the end, Gilmour sees Kipling as a visionary of the Empire’s end, asserting that “Kipling was a prophet whose prophecies were fulfilled too often to be coincidences” (Kindle location 5947-5948).
Hagiioannu (2003) applies this perspective to a close reading of Kipling’s colonizing texts, examining much the same span of writing as the current study. According to his conclusions, Kipling’s texts follow the same pattern as many Victorian Gothic works, which develop contemporary anxieties about class, race, and gender in a way that represses and alienates them, but only partially. He performs a reading of Kipling’s poems and stories alongside a biography of him, demonstrating how his personal experiences meaningfully influenced each of his works. In reading personal frustrations, heartbreaks, anxieties, and ambitions into Kipling’s work, Hagiioannu performs a valuable contribution to understanding Kipling and his relationship to his own work, but it remains to be explored how Kipling’s texts influenced his contemporary readers, both “at home” and in the colony.

This relationship between the colonizer and colonized is explored in great depth by Bényei in Traumatikus találkozások [Traumatic Encounters] (2011), in which he particularly focuses on the anxiety created by the instability and ambiguity of the intersubjective relationship between the two. As he points out, Kipling’s colonial work expresses the deeply disturbing moment when this intersubjectivity is revealed to the colonizer. He demonstrates that this encounter is inherently unequal and oppressive, and he shows that the human element must necessarily be contained. Like Gilmour (2003), he positions Kipling as a colonizer who accurately understood his relationship with both colony and colonized, and also foresaw the end of the Empire as leading to bloodshed and instability.

Following these latter readings of Kipling as colonizer, a separation between Kipling’s relationship with colony and colonized must be made. While Kipling considered India a part of himself, the same did not extend to Indians. He held esteem for them, but always treated them as Other. In his 2015 introduction to his biography of Kipling, Andrew Lycett describes the relationship that formed between the Kipling and British India when he was a reporter, writing that

inspired by the dedication of the administrators and soldiers he met in the Punjab, he did indeed develop an enduring admiration for the servants and ideals of Empire. But there was more to his attitude than that. He was an astute critic of the Raj establishment, as is clear in his Plain Tales from the Hills. He reported sympathetically on all aspects of Indian life, including its festivals, opium factories and cities. He balked only at Indian politics, showing no interest in greater Indian representation, let alone independence. (xiii)

In these seven years, the patterns that would control Kipling’s representation of colonial space became fixed. In writings literary, political, and private, he reifies the individual agents of the Civil Service and soldiers who exemplify understanding of and care for India. His descriptions of Indians have an anthropological perspective, reproducing the colonial gaze of
the Anglo-Indian\textsuperscript{4} that seeks control of knowledge over the colonized that it represents the colonized as themselves lacking. He directs his criticism towards failures in the imperial administration, always preferring reforming English rule to the prospect of allowing Indians any measure of self-rule.

While Kipling writes of native Indians with great interest and variety, clearly taking pleasure in his knowledge of the colonized, the nature of this love is always patriarchal, the love of a member of a privileged class for his inferiors: at best condescending, at worst demonizing. In his personal writings, Kipling never expressed a doubt that the English were superior to native Indians by nature and would always be so. Gilmour (2003) describes that Kipling was convinced that Indians needed—and would continue for a long time to need—British supervision; as soon as that disappeared, ‘the old, old, racial ineptitude’ would reassert itself. In troubled times the ‘childish pride’, the ‘slackness of brain’ and the love of authority for its own sake would give way to ‘dazed bewilderment’. At moments he came close to suggesting that Indians were congenitally useless and inferior. (Kindle location 1258-1264).

Thus, the idea that there could be equivalence, let alone equality, between what he called the “white” and “black” races was contrary to Kipling’s stated beliefs. The English naturally ruled, and it would be so indefinitely, regardless of the nominal mission of the colony to advance the Indian people. As Gilmour points out, “it never seems to have occurred to him that permanent subordinates treated as perpetual children are unlikely to develop qualities of leadership and initiative” (Kindle location 1266). To Kipling, the system, not in practical function but in essence, was not only sound but preferable to any alternative.

Rather than forming a puzzling contradiction, “Ruddy Baba” and “Kipling Sahib” function together to perpetuate the cynicism of ideology identified by Peter Sloterdijk (1987) and Žižek (1989). According to David Mazella (2007), it was in Rousseau and with shifting attitudes towards philosophy and politics that cynicism acquired its modern meaning, as disenchanted with language (110). Sloterdijk (1987) defines cynicism in ideology as enlightened false consciousness. It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has labored both successfully and in vain. It has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to, put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered. (5)

\textsuperscript{4} I use this term in the way it was used by Kipling and his contemporaries, to refer to people of white, British origin living in India, usually as part of the Civil Service or the military. Today, it is used to refer to people of mixed British and native Indian blood, who during the Raj were called “Eurasians” by the colonizers. Recognizing the offensive nature of this latter term, I mention it only in Kipling's usage and with quotation marks to indicate this.
Thus, cynicism is not a literary device, such as irony or humor, but rather an ideological function, a positioning of the subject in terms of the ideological framework that simultaneously acknowledges the ideology’s gaps and prefers the ideology to the anxiety-producing threat of reality. Thus, the baring of gaps in cynical practice does not produce outrage and change, but rather reifies the ideology. Sloterdijk calls this turn “disillusionment,” defining it as when subject lose their belief in the reality of the ideology, but do not abandon it. This can be easily imagined as the newly-arrived English agent finds no altruistic utopia in the colony and yet continues to speak and behave—as indeed Kipling does, in literature as well as private correspondence—as though it were real.

Further defining cynicism, Žižek (1989) describes the history of what he calls kynicism and cynicism, the latter a response to the former. Kynicism, following in the Greek tradition, is the attempt by the subject of ideology to subvert ideology through irony, mocking the monolithic society that is the controlling influence in the subject’s life. As he describes, the hegemonic order’s response to this is to employ a mirroring act of cynicism, “the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical subversion: it recognizes, it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological universality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to retain the mask” (26). Cynicism employs the same devices that subvert ideology, irony in particular, but uses them to the opposite effect. Linda Hutcheon (1994) describes the many possible uses of irony, including that usually blurs ideological lines and deconstructs of hegemony, such as in the works of Salman Rushdie or V. S. Naipaul, where the full presence of the native subject disrupts the dominant discourse. However, Hutcheon also notes a function she calls “provisional,” a partial presence which she identifies with “hypocrisy, duplicity and deception” that accompanies desiring two incompatible choices and choosing both (48). An example of this can readily be seen in the colonizer who desires both to profit from exploiting the colony and to represent the colony as benevolent. While this can become “undogmatic” by transgressing the boundaries of the two choices, it can also create a pleasurable fantasy where both choices can be enjoyed simultaneously without contradiction (Hutcheon 1994, 49). This function of irony has been identified, but its exact form has not been shown in depth. This study will give a detailed description of its appearance in colonizing ideology.

5 Keeping in mind the semiotic objections of Althusser and others to this conception, this study uses “reality” in the way Deleuze (1977) does: “Real is what actually happens in factories, in schools, in barracks, in prisons, in police stations. And this action carries a type of information which is altogether different from that found in newspapers” (212). Sloterdijk (1987) and Žižek (1989 both also use the term in this way.
That two contradictory ideas can reinforce each other is key to cynicism. Žižek (1989) offers as a concrete example a person in Nazi Germany who has internalized the Anti-Semitic ideology of the ruling party but is friends with a Jewish neighbor. The subject in question dismisses the contradiction of this by saying that “it is exactly this hiding of one's real nature, this duplicity, that is a basic feature of the Jewish nature.’ An ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour” (50). Always contained within the fear of the Other is the threat that it poses by helping to constitute one’s subjectivity, whose “very formation is an appeal to the Other which contains its meaning” (Žižek 1989, 79). By provoking subjects’ fear of losing their own subject position in relation to ideology, cynicism uses the exposure of ideology not to undermine but to uphold. This precisely is the function of texts like Kipling’s. They point to, even at times explore in great detail, the gaps between the ideology that the colonizer is taught to expect and their lived experience in the colony, but in doing so colonizing texts drive the colonizer to prefer the ideology.

It is through misrecognition of their own actions that the subject is able to continue to function in spite of their experience. Despite their experience of reality and Kipling represents as the colonial encounter, the subjects of ideology fail to notice their own role in the continuation of the ideology’s apparatus. Žižek (1989) explains that [w]hat they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy. (30)

Others have identified Kipling’s work cynical, but have stopped short of developing in detail how that cynicism functions to teach a cognitive strategy to colonizers that aids them in their work. Throughout his text, one of Kipling’s favorite subjects to point to in order to misdirect the anxiety of the colonial encounter is the ruling elite of India. Paffard (1989) identifies Kipling’s sense of his generation’s loss of the grand narratives that had underpinned the imperialist system, describing that Kipling’s “partisanship did not prevent him from sensing that it was not just a small, decadent elite, but his period as a whole that had lost faith in the well-ordered society and was coming to look on life as a tense, isolated struggle for existence” (133). This is the point that Kipling’s characters and texts both arrive at, over and over: that one has no choice but to keep laboring, regardless of all they see.
Gilmour (2007) shows this general tendency among Anglo-Indians to recognize the nature of their endeavors: “Few Victorian imperialists would have claimed that Britain held India solely for the benefit of the Indians; and the ‘non-official’ Anglo-Indians, the businessmen and planters and other traders, were said to regard the sentiment as a ‘loathsome un-English piece of cant’” (24). Indeed, colonizers work not because they believe in the accuracy of this ideology but because they feel they must accept it regardless. As Žižek (1989) explains, “What is 'repressed' then, is not some obscure origin of the Law but the very fact that the Law is not to be accepted as true, only as necessary – the fact that its authority is without truth” (36). In Kipling, there is no other way for the colonizer in the colony. As his narrator expresses in “The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin” (1888), “in this country, where you really see humanity—raw, brown, naked humanity—with nothing between it and the blazing sky, and only the used-up, over-handled earth underfoot, the notion somehow dies away, and most folk come back to simpler theories” (93). The colonial experience is fundamentally different, but it is precisely that that reifies the strict categories of “simpler” racial hierarchies.

Given the function of ideology in privileging itself over the lived experience, it becomes incumbent to examine how this is performed. Žižek (1989) offers that “[t]he function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” (45), but does not go into detail about the mechanism through which this is achieved. This can be found instead in psychological research conducted on cognitive dissonance since the 1960s. Through the work of Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith (1957), Stephen J. Scher and Joel Cooper (1989), and Carrie B. Fried and Joshua Aronson (1995), it becomes clear that the anxiety produced by holding what the researchers describe as an ethical position but acting against it can be lessened through a process they refer to as misattribution.

Kipling well knew the criticisms levied against the British Empire and its actions in its colonies. He explicitly notes the widespread blame of actions performed in service of the empire, and warns against heeding it in his poems. In “When Earth’s Last Picture is Painted” (1892), he describes a heaven where “only the Master shall praise us, and only the Master shall blame” (9), presenting a utopia where the voices of such criticism are silenced even as he represents a God who tacitly supports imperialism. In “A Song of the White Men” (1899), his speaker exclaims “Now, this is the cup the White Men drink/When they go to right a wrong./And that is the cup of the old world’s hate—/Cruel and strained and strong” (1-4). Kipling heard the voices speaking against the Empire and urges his readers not to listen. Not
only do they not criticize imperialism, many of Kipling’s speakers resent those who do, and represent them as wrong. While this is ironic, to reiterate Žižek (1989), it does not subvert ideology, as irony often does, but supports it using the same rhetorical device. In this way, cynicism and irony are claimed by the Empire, and their use becomes itself a hallmark and supporter of imperialism. This specific variant of irony is described by Booth (1974) as “not designed to ‘deceive some readers and allow others to see the secret message’ but to deceive all readers for a time and then require all readers to recognize and cope with their deception” (106). Kipling not only exposes the deception he himself also propagates but he also offers a means for coping with it.

Kipling’s texts model a way to cope with the anxiety attendant to the colonial encounter by ascribing the effects of its anxiety to other causes. As the studies on cognitive dissonance by Festinger and Carlsmith (1957), Scher and Cooper (1989), and Fried and Aronson (1995) demonstrate, this not only lowers the subjects’ anxiety but reduces the chance of their changing their behavior. This misattribution, which in the case of the studies was directed towards the testing space itself, matches the methods used by Kipling, who points to the individual failure of ignorant administrators, to the inscrutability of the colonized, to the greed and foolishness of the English-educated Indian middle class, and even to the deleterious effect of the colonized space itself on the Anglo-Indian. By blaming these, the colonizer can direct the anxiety created by their own actions towards external factors, all of which are represented as naturally part of the colonial experience.

This study focuses on stories and poems Kipling wrote during his time in India and immediately after he returned to England in 1889, ending with the publication of *Kim* in 1901. While Kipling does mention the Empire later, such as in his *Just So Stories for Little Children* (1902), *Kim* is considered the end of the colonial phase of his literary output. Gilmour (2003), Mallett (2003), and Sergeant (2013) all identify a split in his production during and after his time in India. This is partly because he moves from writing to current or future colonizers to writing to a general audience, first British and then international. Gilmour (2003) identifies Kipling’s first audience as being fellow Anglo-Indians, an audience that later expanded to people “back” in England. He writes,

While in India Kipling preferred to write stories about men and women sent out by the military and the India Office in London. Afterwards the emphasis changed, a new tendency emerged, his stories became less interested in Anglo-Indian lives and characters than in the work they did and the cause of the Empire they served.(Kindle Locations 1551-1553)
This change in focus marks the end of the period studied here, and coincides with a general shift in attention away from stories set in British colonies to stories set at sea or in colonizing home countries.

Sergeant (2013) echoes the shifts in Kipling's readership, writing that Kipling’s “first block of work is coercive [is] concerned with the inculcation of views derived from Kipling’s right-wing imperial agenda” (4) after which he “moved from a readership drawn from the British in the north of India, to one drawn from the British in all of India, to one drawn from the mother country itself, and then beyond” (5). When Kipling leaves India for good in 1889, “his writing in London attempts to regain control over his medium in relation to this audience. There is a new emphasis on typological hierarchies, on punitive violence, and on Anglo-Indian suffering” (8). Mallett (2003) also describes the unique effect of Kipling's early work directed to an Anglo-Indian audience: “it exists in and for the group; its function is to call into play the values of the one uniquely understanding audience to which it is addressed, which are assumed to need no further justification or commentary” (27). As Kipling's audience changes, so, too, does his depiction of life in the colony: cynical depictions of flawed characters gave way to idealized colonizers familiar to the native British public. Gilmore (2003) describes Kipling's search for a wider audience upon leaving India:

He also needed a newer and larger readership than Anglo-India could provide. It was no longer enough to write for ‘Men ’neath an Indian sky/Cynical, seedy and dry’ – even if his opinion of them had improved. He still wanted to write about India, but now for a British audience, to tell his fellow countrymen what was going on in their greatest imperial possession. (Kindle location 1458-1460)

Later stories, catering to the British public's expectation of less complex colonizing heroes, contained fewer of these models for colonizing cynicism, as his audience neither required it for their own experience nor understood such representations—that is, unless they then traveled to the colony, when the ideology they framed came of use.

Kipling's later texts, particularly after Kim in 1901, simply reproduce colonial ideology in an uncomplicated way, the simultaneously presenting the colonized space as being developed by the colonizer and the colonized as being permanently separate and inferior to the white colonizer. These texts, written outside the colony and for an audience that mostly will have no direct contact with the colony, serve as easy ideological impetus to keep supporting a space that is far enough away to be contained entirely in textual representation. In these texts, this image can be maintained. But, when the colonizer expe...
double failure of this ideology, as both the violent oppression of the colony and the human encounter threaten to collapse colonizing ideology.

This dissertation will show how this literary strategy employed by Kipling exposes the fragility and permeability of the racial hierarchy on which the colonial enterprise and English subjectivity are both based. Judith Plotz (2010) argues that “[a]ll empires, especially the empires with a democratic metropole, are schizoid, simultaneously professing (and often believing in) the values of civilisation and ruling by violence” (49), pointing to the inherent need for this stabilization. Though its contradictions are acknowledged, the imperial order is ultimately championed by these texts as a necessary tool against the dissolution both of the colony and of the self, which is represented as needing the colony in order to cohere. This is accomplished through the following steps:

1. The racialized ideological justification for the colony is founded in the first place on the idea that the colonizer has total knowledge of the colonized space and an altruistic mission to bring technological progress and Christianity to the colonized. By exposing the gaps in the representative order of the colony, the literary works of art open a space in which there is no essential separation between the colonizer and the colonized and where the portrait of the altruistic colonizer who acts in the service of the colonized is exposed.

2. Next, the limitations in signification of colonizing ideology are represented as a threat to the Anglo-Indian subjects themselves, as a danger to their constructed subjectivity and a source of anxiety. Englishness requires this system to maintain the symbolic order whose cornerstone is the binary opposition between the European and the Other.

3. To contain this threat, the colony is represented as timeless and unchangeable, which is a relief to the anxiety activated by this danger to English selfhood and principles. The colony survives not for the benefit of the colonizer but because it is unthinkable for it to do otherwise. The end of the colony, in Kipling’s work, is the unthinkable. Thus, the text functions to reassure the colonizing reader and repair the gap.

4. Finally, at the end of each text, the familiar racialized ideology justifying the colony as altruistic and right has been proven to be essential to preventing the collapse of the representative order and the self, even when the cracks in that ideology are demonstrated. At the same time as it is exposed, the colony is simultaneously protected, and something else is provided to take the blame for the anxiety experienced by the colonizer. With something else to attribute their negative feelings to, the colonizer can continue their work in the colony.
Thus, even while exposing the colony's brutality and representational failures, Kipling serves to reinforce the colonizing reader's adherence to a system that models the justness of the colonial order. This threatens to cause anxiety in the subject, who recognizes the split in their self. Research on cognitive dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959, Scher and Cooper 1989, and Fried and Aronson 1995) explains a way that Kipling-esque texts dispel this anxiety through specific textual strategies that both expose the anxiety-inducing threat of gaps in colonizing ideology and illustrate strategies of silencing and misattribution to contain that threat.

The current chapter has demonstrated the contemporary representation of the ambivalence of Kipling’s imperial output. Since the 1980s, Kipling has been used by postcolonial scholars to question the previous notion of him as a simple imperialist mouthpiece. Elisions, disturbances, anxieties, and overlaps that disturb and even transgress the imperial ideology have been identified in his work. While it is clear that Kipling’s personal doubts about the method of British rule in its colonies surface in his writing, the psychological disciplines he employs to repress these doubts mold every appearance of Otherness in his fiction and poetry. These techniques are explicitly modeled in many of his stories and poems, and accounts of Kipling’s influence on contemporary British colonizers as well as the domestic British audience demonstrate their effect in shaping what can be called colonizing cynicism. By marking cynicism as a tool of colonial control, the cynical turn in ideology that Sloterdijk (1987) identifies comes to propagate the colonizing discourse, privileging what imperialistic European scholarship represents as the totalizing knowledge of colonized spaces. Cynicism itself is suggested to be imperialistic, even as imperialism reveals the deep and brutal cynicism at its core.

The following chapter provides a detailed investigation of the construction of the colonial Other. Subchapter 2.1 demonstrates how colonizing ideology is formed. It justifies itself through nominal totalizing knowledge of the Orient that comes from rationalized and academic knowledge of the space and its population. This ideology has within itself a number of contradictions that both constitute it at its essence and threaten to destabilize it if they are not counterbalanced. The essentializing separation into races described by Frantz Fanon (2004, 2008) and Said (1993) creates an artificial binary whose slippages and overlaps must be silenced through control of signification. Subchapter 2.2 shows how, simultaneously with the construction of the Other, the colonizer’s self is constituted. The threat of mimicry and hybridity described by Bhabha (1994) applies to the colonizer’s own subjectivity, though it is most often applied to the colonized, as the colonizer experiences the trauma of
intersubjectivity with the object of colonial repression, violence, and desire. This anxiety is repressed throughout colonial expression by a number of strategies, which are explored in depth. These include colonizers actively recreating the colony as it is represented in ideology, limiting exposure to the colonized to minimize the potential for the mutual recognition of co-presence, representing change in the colony as impossible partly through constructing a colonial Time separate from time in which the colonizer exists, and misattributing anxiety created by elisions in colonizing ideology to a failure in the colonized themselves, to the nature of the colonized space, or even to individual colonizers without whom the colony would function effortlessly.

The third chapter performs a detailed reading of most of Kipling’s major texts written up to and including *Kim* (1901). The first part demonstrates how Kipling deploys such techniques in his own writing. It particularly traces how his contemporaries responded to Kipling. Even as members of the military and Civil Service recognized themselves in his writings and even found themselves becoming more Kiplingesque as a result of this perceived recognition, audiences in Great Britain reacted with shock that often bordered on horror. In their reading, Kipling was far too cynical. It is shown that Kipling’s represented India is always a carefully constructed one, as it silences any inkling of the end of the British Empire at the same time as it probes the contrast between ideology and experience. Thus, Kipling creates a space in which imperial anxiety can be expressed, but always in a form that is curated so as not to challenge the permanence of rule. The slippages in ideology are shown to constitute a threat to the subjectivity of the colonizer, and madness or dissolution comes to those who come to it unprepared by a cynical attitude to the distance they discover between what is represented and what they find. In the end, the ambiguities and gaps are always closed and the ideology demonstrated to be safer and preferable to the reality, which is signified as a relief to the colonizer.

Subchapter 3.1 reads Kipling’s first book of collected fiction, *Plain Tales from the Hills* (1888). It explores a nuanced example of colonizing cynicism in “Lispeth.” In the story, the titular Lispeth is demonstrated to threaten to destabilize colonial order through her signification of being too close to white. This closeness between colonizer and colonized, though shown to be the ultimate goal of the colony, is represented as threatening to collapse the separation between the two signifiers completely, as Lispeth’s light skin, English accent, and education all suggest an uneasy washing away of distinction between her and the colonizers, especially the wife of the chaplain. The potential for this is closed by Lispeth’s encounter with an English traveler. The Englishman dismisses the chance of marrying Lispeth
as impossible, something which cannot even be contemplated despite his admission that she has everything a man like him is supposed to want in a partner. As a result of Lispeth’s disappointment and rejection of English customs, she is said to return to her true nature—a nature she had never expressed before this meeting. The threat to colonizing order is averted. “His Chance in Life” develops the threat of mimicry as described by Bhabha (1990), as a man of mixed race rises to a position of power. This threatening rise in status is reversed by the arrival of a white officer and the protagonist’s instinctive reversion to the colonial hierarchy. This chapter briefly demonstrates Kipling’s most direct display of colonial cynicism in “The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin,” in which the atheism an inexperienced and naive Brit new to the colony threatens to destabilize the ideological justification of the Empire, a threat that leads to his complete loss of signifying ability represented in his speaking gibberish. “Kidnapped,” like “Lispeth,” describes the romance of the colonizer and the colonized; however, in this the colonized is of mixed race, though this union is described as “impossible” (113) just the same. The need for intervention by the colonizer’s colleagues to prevent the marriage illustrates the very real possibility of such a marriage, and yet the story illustrates that it must be thought of as impossible in order to prevent disaster, which is represented in terms of damage to the colonizer’s career and reputation.

Subchapter 3.2 performs a reading of The Phantom Rickshaw and Other Eerie Tales (1888), demonstrating their use of the fear of the closure of the gap between colonizer and colonized and the reversal of the colonial hierarchy as the source of the eeriness of these stories. It focuses particularly on The Man Who Would Be King, a novella in which a pair of would-be colonizers make the mistake of attempting to conquer a native population without the use of racial ideology. Instead, they signify the inhabitants of Kafiristan as not only white but English, and the resultant dissolution of the separation between the colonizer and colonized leads to the complete loss of their own subjectivity. Thus, this text presents the most direct and visible threat to white identity in its detailed portrayal of a pair of men who lose not only their racial signifiers but their very names, both dying after losing their ability to represent any difference at all, and thus losing control of all semiotic signification. “The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes” depicts of the living dead guarded by invisible sentries who fire on anyone who tries to escape a carefully delineated zone. Thus, the story creates a space where indistinction becomes permissible, and into this space enters the titular Jukes, whose naive rejection of the hierarchy of colonizer and colonized precipitates the story. It is only when he perpetrates acts of brutal violence on the Indians living in this in-between state
that he is able to return to the colonial space outside, tellingly rescued by an act of service by his Indian servant of his Anglo-Indian master.

Subchapter 3.3 briefly touches on *Wee Willie Winkie and Other Child Stories* (1888), demonstrating that Kipling’s stories ostensibly for children produce the same effect as the stories examined so far. The titular story serves as a primer for colonial cynicism. The protagonist, a little boy, learns to lie and break the rules in order to serve the reality of the colony. Furthermore, he comes to associate natives with the enemy and to see his primary role as defending whiteness.

Subchapter 3.4 looks at each of the stories in *In Black and White* (1888). It shows that each of the colonized represented in the collection is depicted as deficient in some way, and that these deficiencies are shown to render that individual subject to the rule of a colonizer. “Dray Wara Yow Dee” and “The Judgment of Dungara” stage near-collapses of the racial binary, and it is nominally prevented in each story through the very same racial essentialism the narratives expose the gaps in. The chapter goes into particular detail about “On the City Wall,” long a source of particular interest for Kipling scholars, as its apparent moment of inversion between colonizer and colonized seems to suggest a failure of the symbolic order. A close reading demonstrates that no actual reversal has occurred, as both the narrator’s place within the colony and the continued rule of the British-led government are carefully preserved through a combination of stark violence and the repression of the possibility of a change in the signifying order.

Subchapter 3.5 examines *The Light That Failed* (1890). Receiving lackluster reviews and sales at the time of its release, the novel attempts to map a semi-autobiographical narrative of rejected love and self-sacrifice onto a colonial background. The narrator, having failed to secure a passive feminine Other to construct his own identity, is forced to return to Africa, where he dies in battle with native warriors. Thus, the novel represents a model of the colonial relationship mirroring the relationship between a Victorian man and woman, in which the man receives his position of authority over the signifying order from the willing subservience of the objectified feminine. When this fails, the narrator’s death is shown as a heroic self-sacrifice, and he receives by fulfilling an idealizing function of the colonizer the stable subject position he seeks.

Subchapter 3.6 studies *Life’s Handicap, Being Stories of Mine Own People* (1891), a book whose title refers not to native Indians but to the Anglo-Indians who comprised Kipling’s social circle. It looks in particular at three short stories. The first is “Without Benefit of Clergy,” in which an Anglo-Indian man’s union with an Indian woman ends in a
tragedy that is nevertheless represented as the preferable end, rather than facing the threat to
the colony such a hybrid union embodies. In the second, “The Mark of the Beast,” an ignorant
Englishman who defiles an Indian temple is subject to a curse by the temple’s priest. Though
the text endeavors to dismiss this as merely a case of rabies, the reader nevertheless gleans
what is so often demonstrated in Kipling: the careless colonizer who relies only on
knowledge gained from colonizing texts invites disaster. The third story to be examined, “The
Return of Imray,” first published as “The Recrudescence of Imray,” in which it is found that
Imray has been killed by his servant. The uncanny return of his body represents the return of
the repressed threat of rebellion that is nowhere else written of so explicitly in Kipling. The
threat of destabilization in this case is controlled by Strickland, the experienced member of
the Civil Service who is the voice of colonizing cynicism in so many of Kipling’s stories.
Strickland declares that Imray made a mistake in “not knowing the Oriental,” signifying
revolution as the result of the colonizer’s agency rather the colonized’s, even though the story
cynically reveals this to be a fabrication as the narrator finds himself shuddering as he
wonders his own servant could harbor such designs for him.

Subchapter 3.7 studies Departmental Ditties Barrack-Room Ballads and Other
Verses, which collects poems up to 1892. It touches on “Pagett, MP” and “Divided
Destinies,” which criticize the ignorant administrator who reads India according to ideology
and the Civil Service agent who longs to trade places with the romanticized Other,
respectively. It performs a detailed reading of “Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” a carefully-controlled poem
that approaches the dissolution of the imperial signifying order but ultimately squelches it
through the use of the very ideology it exposes, referring to principles of fair play and a
fictionalized camaraderie between fighting men.

Subchapter 3.8 applies these theories to The Jungle Books(1894 and 1895). The
chapter focuses mostly on the Mowgli stories, demonstrating that these stories mark the start
of Kipling’s transition from representing the lived experience of individuals in the colony to
presenting ideal archetypes, thus signaling the approaching close of Kipling’s colonial period.
The Mowgli stories are a colonizer’s ideal image of the colonial relationship: Mowgli learns
everything there is to know about India from the animals of the forest, who support him,
subordinate themselves to him, and recognize him as their natural superior. Mowgli himself
serves a white man, the Anglo-Indian civilian Gisborne, without even being prompted to do
so, providing absolute loyalty instinctively. Other stories in these collections follow this
pattern, such as “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi,” in which the native Indian animals are divided by species
into two completely separate categories: those who are willing to fight to the death for the
Anglo-Indian family, and those who seek to kill them. As such, all of these stories reinforce racial ideology in the face of the threat of revolution.

The thirteenth chapter examines Kim (1901). Though it was written significantly after Kipling lived in India, the novel is considered by many Kipling scholars to be the pinnacle of Kipling’s writing about the British Empire. It constitutes an imperial fantasy of the perfect colonizer, a boy who is at once white and perfectly at home in India, who has complete control of and access to knowledge of India and Indian identities. Through his manipulation of racial signification, he exerts a profound power. Through representing this ability as the sole purview of the white colonizer, the text reaffirms essentialized racial divisions and reasserts white hegemony over India.

Final chapter lays out the conclusions of the dissertation, drawing together all of the examined texts from Kipling’s colonizing period to demonstrate how colonizing cynicism functions as a whole. Returning to Sloterdijk (1986) and Žižek (1989), it seeks for a possible path out of this cynicism by pointing to the repeated need for repression in Kipling’s texts. As they continually silence the possibility of mutual recognition and the end of hierarchy, it finds the potential for the end to oppression in this shared humanity.

One major Kipling text has been left out of this study. Captains Courageous (1897), though reproducing the racial patterns Kipling uses elsewhere, such as in the Black cook of the We’re Here, falls more into the later trends of Kipling’s stories of the sea and sailing, including in its ideological constructions. Most of its characters are from the United States, and the themes focus more on coming-of-age and Victorian ideals of manhood than they do on colonial experience. No part of the narrative takes place in a British colony. Thus, it was left out. In general, short stories and poems that focus exclusively on white characters’ interpersonal affairs, such as Kipling’s numerous stories of marital infidelity among Anglo-Indians, were also passed over in favor of texts that engage more directly with colonial themes.
2.1. The Construction of Imperial Otherness

To understand how Kipling’s texts function in creating cynicism, it is important to establish how the ideological position, the “mask” in the terminology used by Žižek (1989), is crafted. This provides a useful means of thinking about the role of imperial ideology in shaping the behavior of colonizers both in the home country and in the colony in terms of their “imagined relation” to the colony and its function. It is vital that, even when in the space of the colony itself, the colony exists separately in the minds of the colonizers. Fundamentally, the colony for the colonizers is the colony as they imagine it, not as it is experienced. In fact, the former is mapped over the other, obfuscating and silencing it.

That imagined relationship is based in totalized separation into self and not-self, which is achieved through what Michel Foucault (2002) calls discourse, the historically-located social use of language by which signifiers simultaneously achieve meaning and face ruptures, shifts, and divisions. This understanding has shaped postcolonial understanding of the formation of systems contingent on historical moments. Foucault argues that the value of statements “is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation” (136). It is thus that the discursive ideas that shape the colonizing order are analyzed, not for their “truth,” but to examine how they are formed, exchanged, shaped, and altered. According to Foucault, any discursive unit is subject to slippages and alterations, and, while postcolonial criticism is mostly concerned with how this is achieved, this study examines how it is controlled in order to further a colonizing purpose, though not prevented.

The racializing discourse at the basis of colonialism posits and thus requires that there be a fundamental separation between the colonizer and the colonized. This justifies the colonial system by creating an essentialized separation between colonizer and colonized. Said (2003) and Bhabha (1990, 1994) in particular take Foucault for a basis when they explore the construction of racial ideology through the binary of the European colonizer and the Othered colonized. This study uses the term “Other” as Said (2003) does, such as when he describes Europeans using culture to “contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other” (48). Bhabha (1990) uses it similarly, arguing for example that “[so] long as a firm boundary is maintained between the territories, and the narcissistic wounded is contained, the aggressivity will be projected onto the Other or the Outside” (300). This hard separation is necessary for the colonizer not only to maintain the boundary between the two but to prevent the division itself from becoming visible.
For the imperialist, the Other is produced through a particular kind of text that creates totalizing, colonizing knowledge about the colonized space. In Foucauldian terms, the possibility of this discourse being disturbed, perverted, or fragmented is silenced. Kipling’s stories and poems both borrow from this tradition, representing a white man’s effort to present privileged information about India that encompasses all identities and experiences, and also demonstrate the slippage of its incompleteness in a way that will be demonstrated. Said (2003), Johannes Fabian (2014), and Bhabha (1994) present control of knowledge and knowing as the key to European dominance over the idea of the Orient. This is produced in the form of “book knowledge.” This is what Said (2003) calls the virtue “inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern … through superior knowledge” (48). It may at first seem strange that a culture like the British that prized post-Enlightenment humanism should perpetrate systematically racist practices in their colonies. The very concept of the universality of human rights seems to be predicated on a recognition of shared humanity in all, an understanding that would prevent such an oppressive enterprise.

The success of these colonizing texts depended on presenting them as the only legitimate text producing knowledge about the Orient. As Bhabha (1994) describes, the colonial apparatus, in establishing itself as inherently racially and thus culturally superior, seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of knowledges of colonizer and colonized which are stereotypical but antithetically evaluated. The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction. (70)

This justification is based in the establishment of control. The so-called Orient’s own textual production is dismissed wholesale as uncivilized and incapable of representation, thus leaving the European states as the only legitimized scribes of information about that colonized Space. According to this argument, the Orient lacks the tools to be able to produce knowledge about itself, the act of which Said (2003), Fabian (2014), and Robert J. Young (1995) identify as the key component of imperialist control over the Other. Thus, the Other becomes a subaltern, as only Western-style textual knowledge is accepted as legitimate knowledge about a non-Western space.

By presenting themselves as the ones with the most complete and rational knowledge of the Orient, colonizers situated themselves in a position of power over the colonized. Fabian (2014) explains the importance of this production of factual texts about the Orient to construct a totalized, hegemonic knowledge about that colonized space. Fabian describes the
tremendous amount of sheer data that was written about the Orient and identifies it as an implicit argument for imperial control. He writes that

the recommendations to use maps, charts, and tables signals convictions deeply ingrained in an empirical, scientific tradition. Ultimately they rest on a corpuscular, atomic theory of knowledge and information. Such a theory in turn encourages quantification and diagrammatic representation so that the ability to 'visualize' a culture of society almost becomes synonymous for understanding it. (106)

Thus, the written data reshapes the representation of the colonized space and culture in order to make it the sole domain of those producing that data, the colonizers.

Fabian (2014) refers to the colonizing process of creating physical texts as "visualism," conjuring images of charts, atlases, and diagrams that not only create knowledge of the imagined Orient but also define the relationship between the colonizer and colonized. Their existence is a tacit argument for their own authority. This production of texts is essential to the creation of imperial identity and certainly includes the creation of literature as well as nonfiction. By their very volume and visual representation of the signified space, these colonizing texts produced a powerful and implicit argument for their own authority. As he explains,

striking images, simplified outlines, and overwrought tables were fed to students in order to impress them with a degree of orderliness and cohesiveness which the fields of knowledge taught by these methods never possessed. Not the students’ simplicity but the teacher’s determination to maintain his superior position may have to be blamed. (121-122).

Thus, stories that focus on white experience in the colony function as sources and transmitters of ideological narratives in colonized space.

Mary Louise Pratt (2004) also examines the role of written texts in the production of the colonial imagination, showing how they ideologically connected the colonizing state to the colonized space. In her book *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, Pratt illustrates how travel writing in particular functioned to give the white subjects of the colonizing country not only moral justification for but also a sense of personal investment in the colony. This investment coincided with the personal justification to carry out the activities of colonization. She writes that

[tr]avel books... gave European reading publics a sense of ownership, entitlement and familiarity with respect to the distant parts of the world that were being explored, invaded, invested in, and colonized. Travel books were very popular. They created a sense of curiosity, excitement, adventure, and even moral fervor about European expansionism. They were, I argue, one of the key instruments that made people ‘at home’ in Europe feel part of a planetary project; a key instrument, in other words, in creating the 'domestic subject' of empire. (3)
For this “domestic subject’ of empire,” texts like Kipling's provided a similar vicarious sense of ownership of the colonized space. Rather than being told from the perspective of a traveler visiting a strange place, Kipling's stories and poems virtually all are presented through the lens of the experienced colonizer familiar with the lived reality in the Empire, providing an even more direct representation of totalizing knowledge of the colony to the reader, for whom Kipling’s narrators become expert guides.

By totalizing knowledge, colonizers shut all others out of imperial discourse. Said (2003) explains how this rational knowledge is used to control narrative by situating the colonizer as the speaking subject and the colony and colonized as the silenced object that is mapped and delineated:

The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a ‘fact’ which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’—the Oriental country—since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it. (32, emphasis in original)

The Orient, thus, is limited to the Western idea of it and interaction with it. The Orient becomes, for the purposes of constructing this ideology, the West’s texts about it. Thus, Europeans with no firsthand knowledge of the colony primarily experience “the Orient,” which exists only in Western minds, a simulacrum where racial separation and essentialism are absolute. This stable representation, consumed by writers, becomes the Orient they reproduce in their own work. Said (2003) describes this function:

Orientalism imposed limits upon thought about the Orient. Even the most imaginative writers of an age, men like Flaubert, Nerval, or Scott, were constrained in what they could either experience of or say about the Orient. For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. (43-44)

The idea of the colony was most stable far from the actual space of the colony. This demonstrates the means by which the way knowledge of the Orient was produced and distributed.

The European preference for scientific, rational, written texts not only privileged the limited, Western model of knowing but also silenced and dismissed other models of knowledge practiced by people who did not place the same value on what the West would recognize as representation. By thus denying colonized people the capacity for self-

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6 A term that orients itself explicitly by its geographical relation to the West.
representation, the European not found but created a white space on a map (a map created by a European cartographer) by clearing away the previous history, thus making all European knowledge of the Other palimpsestic. European cartography imagines this as *terra incognita* that can be inscribed with its own meaning. Walter D. Mignolo (1995) describes this process as it occurred in Central America under Spanish imperial rule:

Thus, the concern with the representation of the colonized focuses on the discourse of the colonizer, and one forgets to ask how the colonized represent themselves, how they depict and conceive themselves as well as how they speak for themselves without the need of self-appointed chroniclers, philosophers, missionaries, or men of letters to represent (depict as well as speak for) them. To ask how the Mexica represented the Spanish is a difficult question, first because of the lack of documentation and second because it is not clear that such a notion was established among the Mexica. It is unfair to ask members of a culture different from ours how they do something we do. It is not fair because it assumes that whatever we do has a universal value and, as such, every culture on earth has to do it, one way or another, if they pretend to be human. (332)

Thus, the European colonizers impose the dominance of the organizing role of their representation, which separates those who represent in their manner and those who do not, and take away the potential for any other practices to be valued. Even texts like Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1902) and E. M. Forster’s *A Passage to India* (1924), which ostensibly challenge, undermine, or problematize white colonization and the fraught contact between white colonizers and the colonized, are written from this white perspective and focus on the white experience. As Raymond F. Betts (1998) succinctly puts it, “history itself was European” (8). This reified the washing-away of any other form of representation and not only privileging the Western model but presenting it as the only model, frequently even presupposing that non-white people represent themselves in the same way—or will, when they have been brought to the same level of cultural progress.

Said (2003) demonstrates how such texts created the identity of the Oriental for the colonizer by taking away the potential for other interpretations or interactions that the colonizer could otherwise have engaged in when in the colonized space. He writes,

These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine. (42)

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7 This dissertation follows Said’s example in capitalizing this term.
In this way, it is impossible for a European prepared according to these rigid binaries to approach the colony and the colonized in any way but those prescribed by these constructed identities. Thus, the colonizer and the colonized always operate across a binary. In this binary, each requires the other to exist, and the role of each is determined just as much by the role of the other.

This racialized ideology that divides the European colonizer from the colonized relies on the notion of the essential superiority of the white race. Young (1994) identifies the modern form of white supremacy, based in ostensibly rational evidence provided by academia, as having originated in the 1840s. This construction develops a humanistic narrative of the empire that signifies the colonizer as a benevolent and self-sacrificing figure whose fate it is to labor for the betterment of inferior races, to extend civilization and its advantages, from the railroad to Christianity, to people who do not have it.

Rather than recognizing fellow speaking subjects sharing in the same representational system that constructed such Enlightenment thought, the opposite occurred in the creation of colonial practices: the West, representing itself as the sole possessor of rationality and thus humanity, used this sense of exceptionalism to disprivilege and silence colonized people as less than fully human. As described succinctly by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008), “[t]he European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice” (4). It is vital to understand how this humanism made possible its own nominal collapse through its system of valuing only one particular kind of thought, which set the European experience of the word as the only legitimate human experience. To put it in Aimé Césaire's (1972) terms, Europe believes “[t]hat the West invented science. That the West alone knows how to think; that the borders of the Western world there begins the shadowy realm of primitive thinking, which . . . is the very model of faulty thinking” (19). This “faulty” thinking is thus marginalized, invalidated, and silenced.

Europeans used the Enlightenment's reification of rationality to put forward that not only did Europeans have superior civilization but they were, in fact, the only ones to have it, which is to say to produce and possess culture⁸, and that it formed an essential part of the rationalization of imperialism. In Colonial Desire (1995), Young explains that “the reworking of the implications surrounding the anthropological notion of culture occurred when the term

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⁸ In this way, the Victorian production of rationality very much echoes the critiques of Horkheimer and Adorno about the modern production of rational culture, particularly in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (2002).
'civilization' no longer referred to the achievements of human progress in general but rather comprised the ideological project of imperialism: it was only at this point that liberal anthropology redefined 'culture' in such a way as to distinguish it from 'civilization' (47). Thus, the colonial enterprise was able to put forward that the colonized both lacked the civilized culture that would allow them agency and self-determination and the rationality to understand this.

To illustrate the British obsession with reproducing the theories of racial science, Young (1995) presents a staggering list of papers with titles such as “On the Ideas of Species and Race Applied to Man and Human Society” and “On the Commixture of the Races of Man as Affecting the Progress of Civilization,” which infuse colonial authority with racializing theory that set the British explicitly apart from and superior to the colonized. He writes that thus

the Anthropological Society promoted the new racial science that began to influence British thinking about empire and race. But as many of the titles of these papers make clear, the scientific racial construction was used as the basis of racial constructions about cultural topics. The idea of race as the determining factor in cultural difference very quickly became part of a ‘common knowledge’ which did not have to be sustained by any form of empirical evidence. (131)

As a result of the circular construction of this argument, which silenced the voices of those whose identities it gave itself sole power to signify, these texts created their own authority by means of delegitimizing all others, a totalizing science sans physical evidence.

It is revealing of the power of these totalizing texts and the will with which academia resisted lived experience contradicting its ideological position that, in the 18th century, many scientific papers either denied the possibility of the pairing of different races producing children or insisted that they would be infertile, using the example of the mule as evidence. It need hardly be said that by this time that both of those propositions was obviously belied by experience in the colony, and Young (1995) bluntly states that “[given] the large mixed-race population of the West Indies, few initially doubted the fertility of such offspring” (7). As this phrasing suggests, scientific theory nevertheless was put forward to counter what lived experience demonstrates. As the titles mentioned reveal, the idea of separate human species transformed into the much-discussed concept of racial degeneration from miscegenation. According to this theory, the children resulting from mixed parents would be genetically inferior to either parent and would, if such pairings were allowed with any frequency, lead to the decay of the human race. Such theories developed into the first half of the twentieth century into the eugenics movement. That there is no credible scientific evidence for this only
belabors the point about the self-referential construction of these arguments, using as their foundation the concept of European cultural ascendancy.

It is important, then, that colonizing texts are not merely creating an illusion of difference but are actually influencing and shaping the perception and reaction of those who enter the colony. The ideologies that make the concept of empire palatable to the colonizer also shape the behavior of the colonizer in the colony. The colonizer is prepared for the moment when the separation must be actively maintained. And, indeed, ideology serves the colonizer in the colony without anxiety or conflict so long as there is minimal contact between the colonizer and the colonized, so that the contact that does occur is read in terms of these texts. As Said (2003) writes, “[t]here is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read, and this in turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in advance by readers' experiences” (94). Texts were shaped primarily by what the writer, giving them a model to fit their lived experiences in the colony into. In turn, those who read colonizing texts came to the colony expecting to find those experiences they had read about and actively sought to replicate.

When the colonizers arrive in the colony, they come prepared to encounter a space which they already know from colonizing texts. A pamphlet, speech, book, or even poem read in London has a very tangible connection to the everyday flow of life in the streets of Lahore or Cape Town. In this manner, through texts like Kipling's, the colonizer is prepared for the colony with the cynicism they will need. Said (2003) argues that such texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. (94)

Said’s distinction is key in helping understand how colonizing fiction and poetry function to create imperial ideology. By the very act of producing texts about the colonies, such writers contribute to the growing discourse about them written by Europeans for Europeans, adding to the overwhelming amount of knowledge which in itself formed the bands that constrain and control the conversation about and interactions connected to the colony. The colonized, silenced and marginalized, are denied control of that discourse, which instead is spun into ever more complex shapes. Written only by the colonizers, the content of these texts—and therefore the content of the represented subaltern—is inevitably shaped by this single perspective and voice.
Though it is tempting to find a richness in Kipling’s characters and to suggest that he gives the colonized a voice, it is important to remember that all of his characters are constructed by an author deeply steeped in imperialist ideology. According to Sullivan (1993),

[t]he problem with the voice of the subaltern, the native or the “Other” as reproduced by Kipling is the degree to which that voice has been deformed and produced by the other voice of authority. The writer's dialogues, therefore, are not necessarily ‘dialogic’ in Bakhtin's sense of the term, because all apparently conflicting voices are guided and shaped, unconsciously perhaps, by the interests of the class in power and are active imaginings rather than reflections of voices.

Even though some of Kipling’s characters, such as Khem Singh in “On the City Wall” (1889), directly challenge British rule in the Empire, and others seem to press the boundaries between master and servant, colonist and colonizer, and “white” and “black,” they all are produced by a writer whose intense support of the British Empire cannot be questioned. In doing so, Kipling claims the voice of the subaltern, often inserting pro-imperial sentiments into the mouths of his colonized characters, such as when the old officer in Kim (1901) echoes the colonizer’s justification of violence by declaring, “if evil men were not now and then slain it would not be a good world for weaponless dreamers. I do not speak without knowledge who have seen the land from Delhi south awash with blood” (82). It is easy to imagine the effect of reading such sentiments coming from an experienced Indian who is “still a person of consequence” (73), creating an impression that is readily reproduced in the colony.

The tendency to re-create what one has read is described Gilmour (2003), describing the effect of Kipling's works on British imperial agents. He describes an “ingenious theory” that

suggests that officers who read Kipling somehow managed to mould their men so that they became like his soldiers. General Sir George Younghusband had served in India for many years without hearing the words or expressions used by the fictional men; puzzled, he asked his brother officers, who confessed that they too were ignorant of the diction. But a few years later he discovered that ‘the soldiers thought, and talked, and expressed themselves exactly like Rudyard Kipling had taught them in his stories … Kipling made the modern soldier.’ (Kindle location 1018-1022)

Used to seeing colonizers through the eyes of Kipling, colonizers came to see even themselves and their peers as Kipling characters when they spent enough time in the colony. Their unconscious habits thus were shaped by the colonizing texts they consumed. Said (2003) shows that

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9 According to Kipling’s formulation of race.
When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy . . ., the result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. (44-45)

This is the easiest way to preserve the distinction between the Westerner and the Oriental: to keep the Western conception of the Orient purely in the realm of Western-created documents and narratives, and to minimize the possibility of other realities intruding upon this. Said (2003) describes this preference for the simple textual representation to the subversive effect of real encounters: “It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human” (93). This separation is also more deliberate: the Western conception of knowledge and distinction, by privileging written knowledge over personal experience, insulates itself against ideological threats to its system of power. Arata (1996) identifies this tendency in Kipling, writing that, “[p]aradoxically,” despite his intimate knowledge of India, “Kipling’s imperial narrators also rely for their authority on the same bookish associations they so loudly reject. Far from being transparent representations, these stories continually read India through the lenses of previous stories” (165). Read in the light of the cynicism of ideology, this proves not paradoxical at all.

Bhabha (1994) describes how colonial experience threatens this textual authority, threatening to expose the role of the text itself as a “device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority” (115). According to Bhabha, the “nonsense” and loss of meaning that appears as confusion and noise throughout texts about colonial encounters represents the limit of that ideology exposed in the colony: when a gap is exposed in what can be adequately signified, language loses its signifying function and meaning falls away, creating “culturally unassimilable words and scenes (128). He writes: “What emerges from the dispersal of work is the language of a colonial nonsense that displaces those dualities in which the colonial space is traditionally divided: nature/culture, chaos/civility” (124). This, in his reading, stands as the failure of that totalizing European knowledge of the Orient Said (2003) speaks of. Bhabha’s focus is on the reception of the colonizing texts, and he imagines the questions of the natives as exposing the hybridity that limits as it engages British authority.

Through the work of writers such as Kipling, the British colonizer arrived in the colony armed against this effect. The crisis in representation Bhabha (1994) describes frequently appears as a subject in Kipling’s texts, which also models how to dispel the anxiety pursuant to it. It is this process of the colonizing text that interests this study: how the
works of Kipling stage their own limitations in a process that seeks to resolve this crisis. The first response of the colonizers, steeped in post-Enlightenment humanistic traditions and expecting a colony of missionary work and service for the benefit of the oppressed, is shock at finding a situation very opposite to what they expected. A dissonance results, the conflict of two simultaneously held but contradictory ideas. While conscience impels the colonizers to abandon their subject position, they soon find themselves faced with the impossibility of stripping that signifier. The European in the colony is necessarily a colonizer. To further complicate their position, to abandon that position is to lose the dialectic of European and Other upon which white identity is founded. Therefore, the colonizer must adopt a series of tactics to control this anxiety and solidify this contradictory subject position.

The first defense is isolation: physical and social separation of the colonizer from the colonized in European enclaves and by strict rules of behavior, preventing them from speaking. The social and professional lives of Anglo-Indians were, for the most part, confined to very small circles of fellow white people, a fact that did not escape Kipling’s cynical comment. In “The Phantom Rickshaw” (1890), the narrator provides a tongue-in-cheek description of just how small the social world of India was for a white person, describing that, “One of the few advantages that India has over England is a great Knowability. After five years' service a man is directly or indirectly acquainted with the two or three hundred Civilians in his Province” (489). It is characteristic of Kipling's cynicism that this comment willfully ignores that there is any India to know beyond the society of white people: for the English in India, India is English. When one is exposed to actual experiences of colonized space and people, these distinctions become ambiguous and permeable.

Fabian (2014) demonstrates that anxiety about the Other constructs this separation: “In the fundamental, phenomenalist sense this means that the Other, as object of knowledge, must be separate, distinct, and preferably distant from the knower” (121). The ideological explanation for this separation come in terms of white supremacy itself: the idea that contact with the Other will infect the white subject with the uncleanness—physical, mental, and moral—that is assigned to the Other. In India, this took the form of physical separation, as described by Elleke Boehmer (2005), who writes that in India

Social Darwinist ideas were popular, [and] it was generally believed that consort with dark peoples compromised white selfhood and threatened race purity. Especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, the post-Mutiny period [in India], colonizers strove to maintain a strict divide between themselves and the local population. ... [C]olonial society whether in India or elsewhere was built upon this fundamental separation. (65)
The loss of separation between classes is presented in terms of the white subject being infected by the Other, losing not only privilege but subjectivity.

A monolithic body of knowledge is more certain and stable than an unpredictable encounter between humans, which can never be entirely controlled or predicted. Jacques Derrida (1997) also describes this necessary separation for the creation of oppressive writing, as governments of oppression all make the same gesture: to break presence, the co-presence of citizens, the unanimity of 'assembled peoples,' to create a situation of dispersion, holding subjects so far apart as to be incapable of feeling themselves together in the space of one and the same speech, one and the same persuasive exchange. (137)

It is clear that the collapse of this separation brings with it the threat of a reemergence of this co-presence, an exchange between people represented as essentially different that would reveal the inauthenticity of this separation as demonstrated by simple human oneness. This contradiction, then, must also be addressed in colonizing texts: that the very production of ideology making the colony possible is endangered by the colonizer's actual presence in the colony itself. Thus, the colonizing texts must prepare and fortify the colonizer against the destabilizing effect of this encounter.

Preventing the formation of empathy and unity between the colonizer and colonized is best achieved through representing the impossibility of change in ideology itself. In Empathy and the Novel (2007), Suzanne Keen argues that fiction produces a nearly universal empathetic response in the reader. She includes the paradoxical point, however, that ideological difference “limits the extension of empathy to all human beings on the basis of perceived otherness” (164). The implied reader of many Kipling stories is made to empathize with the colonizer and not the colonized, even when the former clearly wrongs the latter.

When an individual colonizer encounters a colonized individual, there is always the threat that the colonizer will see something in the other that is not the Other—in other words, that they will recognize common humanity. Said (2003) describes this encounter, in which the Orientalist system of signification breaks down and an excess of meanings escapes: he describes it as

the human ground (the foul-rag-and-bone shop of the heart, Yeats called it) in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin, grow, thrive, and degenerate. To investigate Orientalism is also to propose intellectual ways for handling the methodological problems that history has brought forward, so to speak, in its subject matter, the Orient. (110)
According to Said (1993), the response of the colonial to experiencing the actual behavior of the colonized, which is so different from what the ideological apparatus would have presented it as, is disappointment. The colonizer’s response to this is to attempt to justify the difference by condemning the Oriental for the crime of being different from the way they were supposed to be, a constant frustration and dismissal of the actual colonized subject as being wrong and the textual Oriental as being right, thus privileging the written, Western-constructed figure over the one encountered in the physical space of the colony. He writes, “there is disappointment that the modern Orient is not at all like the texts” (100), and the colonizer places blame on the colonized for not matching the signifier assigned to them. If, Said writes, the colonizer can see this human as wrong, then the encounter can be dismissed as simply a failure by the colonized to perform their own role.

This becomes one of the themes of texts like Kipling’s: that of repeating the strangeness, the undefinable wrongness of the Oriental when seen through Western eyes. Thus, the “Orient is watched, since its almost (but never quite) offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always detached” (Said 2003, 103). This is seen nowhere more clearly than in “The Mark of the Beast” (1891), in which the characters face a supernatural horror in India that is beyond their European understanding, and suffer terribly for it.

This is never to say that Anglo-Indians did not recognize the ambivalence of their position. They often expressed it openly, as Louis Mallett, a member of the Council of India, did in 1878, writing that the two systems of democracy on one hand and rule through force on the other appear fundamentally incompatible:

We are carrying on... side by side an Imperial and a Democratic policy; in one part of our dominion proclaiming self-government and free institutions with the widest popular suffrage, in another maintaining our hold on vast populations only by a powerful administrative despotism supported by military force — at once a great Christian nation and the greatest Mahometan power in the world — in England so far secure in the strength of a loyal and united people; in India trembling at the mere whisper of a Russian pedlar in a native bazaar (Mallett 1905, 105-106)

It is a testament to the effectiveness of the cynicism of the colony that colonizers like Mallett could comment with such detached interest on the contradiction of their own actions. Nowhere in his writings does Mallett suggest that the Empire in general or he in particular should do things differently.

The Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, Lord Curzon expressed very similar sentiments, acknowledging the brutality of the British regime but celebrating it at the same time. According to Gilmore (2005),
Curzon was equally certain that either Providence or the laws of destiny had called Britain to India ‘for the lasting benefit of the human race’. He admitted that the British often made ‘great mistakes’, that they were ‘sometimes hard, and insolent, and overbearing’, but he believed that no government in the world rested on ‘so secure a moral basis’ or was ‘more fiercely animated by duty’. (48)

This representation of colonizers “fiercely animated by [their] duty” appears over and over in Kipling’s works, even alongside the at times horrifying violence they perpetrate for the sake of British rule.

The colonial text, then, plays a key role in the creation of the colony itself. Through its creation of knowledge of the colony, it adds to the construction of the colony. Through his poetry and fiction, Rudyard Kipling, like so many other writers, was allotted a degree of authority in addressing the limitations of the colony. He could portray the gaps in colonizing ideology up to a point and thus could also shape his narratives in such a way that controls and reinscribes signifiers in a way that prevents the colonizer from abandoning their subject position.

Despite the tendency to read ideology onto reality, the difference between the represented colony and the lived experience threatens the colonizer with a traumatic realization. Albert Memmi (2003) describes the immediate experience of Europeans upon arrival in the colony as shock at the difference between what they had been led to expect and what they discover. Not prepared for the destitution and misery that they encounter in the embodied experience in the colony, colonizers are shocked by the cynicism of their colleagues who have grown used to it:

It sometimes happens that a new arrival—astonished by the large number of beggars, the children wandering about half-naked, trachoma, etc., ill at ease before such obvious organization of injustice, revolted by the cynicism of his own fellow citizens (“Pay no attention to poverty! You'll see: you soon get used to it!”), immediately thinks of going home. Being compelled to wait until the end of his contract, he is liable to get used to the poverty and the rest. (63)

Experienced colonizers do not try to explain away or deny the existence of the institutionalized injustice that is so striking to the new colonizers. To do so would undermine the colony itself. Colonizers instead employ a double consciousness: they continue to make use of the system of representation created and primarily propagated by the academic regime of truth in the colonizing country, even though they see in daily experience that the
disenfranchised colonized not only do not need them but are actively harmed by their presence\textsuperscript{10}.

Experience in the colony presents a moral challenge to the colonizer armed only with humanistic ideology. Césaire (1972) demonstrates that “Europe is unable to justify itself either before the bar of 'reason' or before the bar of 'conscience'” (1), describing the acts of violence and brutality that colonizing nations enact. In doing so, he challenges European humanism using the very terms of its ideals. He goes on to write that Europe “takes refuge in a hypocrisy which is all the more odious because it is less and less likely to deceive” (1). It is regrettable that Césaire uses the passive voice here, because it would be vital to distinguish whether colonizers are able to deceive themselves or the colonized. The latter surely is impossible, but it is very possible and even likely for colonizers to deceive themselves.

That Victorian colonizers well knew the violence and brutality their enterprise entailed may find no more direct expression than in the cynical confession of the previously mentioned Louis Mallett (1891), who described in a letter to M. de Laveleye in 1878 that any colonization of Africa by Europeans would be accomplished “by missionaries, breech-loaders, and brandy” (111). Mallett argues against the colonization of Africa by European powers, but simultaneously sees no alternative but for the English to remain in India. Though he refuses the work of the colony itself, he sees England—though never himself, despite his active role as a member of the Council of India—as inextricably linked with its extant colonies. In his complaints, he describes first the moral compromises and thus degradations that the English colonizers must practice as part of their work. Soon, he moves to blaming this on the colonized themselves for their unremediated Otherness and on India as a space: “a people who hate us on principles which we do not believe” and “a country where we cannot live” (113) and finishes with “the duties and responsibilities of empire, once assumed, cannot be thrown aside” (114). Even rejecting every effect of colonization, Mallett calls for the continuation of the colony.

\textsuperscript{10} see Žižek (1999) and the “negation of negation”: “the 'negation of negation' is the insight into how the Beautiful Soul itself depends on - and thus fully participates in - the wicked universe it purports to reject” (77).
2.2. The Construction of Imperial Subjectivity

The importance of the Orient in creating the European sense of selfhood makes it impossible for the European colonizer to ever symbolically leave the Orient. To show how the colonizer learns to embrace the colony despite its abuses, Memmi (2003) invokes the figure of the “colonizer who refuses,” an ideological opponent of the colony who is completely ineffective in ending the empire. Even when colonizers place themselves in a subject position in opposition to the colony, they are unable to properly articulate themselves as a force that would end the colony, as to do so would be to undo themselves and their own subjectivity, constructed as it is by a need for the Other. Also, as Robert Johnson (2007) explains with remarkable bluntness, “British personnel in the colonies in the nineteenth century barely questioned their racial superiority because they could find few other explanations for their position of power” (72). To refuse the colony’s abuses would be to abandon the position of power it secures.

Seeing the horror that is inflicted, the colonizer tries to still exist separate and apart from the colony, and neither wants to nor can identify with those who suffer. Memmi (2003) describes the impossible position this leaves the colonizer who refuses:

The left-wing colonizer refuses to become a part of his group of fellow citizens. At the same time it is impossible for him to identify his future with that of the colonized. Politically, who is he? Is he not an expression of himself, of a negligible force in the varied conflicts within colonialism? His political desires will suffer from a flaw inherent in his own anomalous position. (85)

To abandon racial distinction would be to collapse their identity with that of the colonized. This fear lies behind the trauma of the colonial encounter, and it also demonstrates why, when representational gaps in colonial ideology not only become visible but threaten to make the whole system unsupportable, the end of that ideology poses a personal crisis for all colonizers.

Writers like Kipling use the colonized space as a means of producing the identity of their own culture. Young (1995) demonstrates the need for the Other in English literature’s construction of English identity:

If we consider the English novel, we find that what is portrayed as characterizing English experience is rather often the opposite, a sense of fluidity and a painful sense of, or need for, otherness. Perhaps the fixity of identity for which Englishness developed such a reputation arose because it was in fact continually being contested, and was rather designed to mask its uncertainty, its sense of being estranged from itself, sick with desire for the other. (2)
This eloquently demonstrates the depth of the need for the Other in the construction of that Englishness. The tremendous amount of colonizing texts produced by the colonizers is not only necessary to validate and perpetuate the colony but for English identity itself. Without the colony, the English would lose not only a source of wealth and power but the signifier at the heart of their subject position and interaction with the world as they know it.

As Bhabha (1994) describes, anxiety and gaps are a fundamental part of the colonial encounter. He explains that it “is in the emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains of difference—that the intersubjective and collective experience of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated” (2, emphasis in original). It is through contact with the Other in a liminal space that the self is created, a simultaneous establishment of subjectivity that denies the potential to be a speaking subject to one of those involved in the encounter, the subaltern Other.

This creation of subjectivity follows Althusser’s (1971) understanding of the moment of hailing as the defining moment of the interpellation of the subject. He argues “that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals... by... interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’” (174). The one through whose hailing the colonizer is transformed into a subjective is the colonized. Thus, the European self relies on one who is distanced, oppressed, and silenced.

As the subaltern is silenced and Othered, this representational order becomes trapped in a system of division and repetition. Bhabha (1994) explains that the fixity of signifiers must be maintained for racial division and essentialism, further forming an ideology of permanent positionality doomed to constantly facing its own sense of disorder, as an important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of otherness. Fixity as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition. (66)

Fixed representation addresses a basic impossibility inherent in colonizing ideology: if the purpose of the colonizer in the colony is to bring progress to the colonized, then the ultimate goal must be the equivalence of the colony with the colonizing power. If the colonizer succeeds in making the colonized share all of their signifiers, they would not only remove their justification for their continued presence in and exploitation of the colony, they would also accomplish a closure of the binary that constructs European identity: it would make the colonized white, and thus put an end to whiteness itself. This impossibility lies behind
Bhabha’s (1994) theory of mimicry, which presents the performance of the colonized as a movement towards something it can never be. He describes that

the very emergence of the ‘colonial’ is dependent for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself. The success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace. (86)

This double-bind reflects what Frantz Fanon writes in Black Skin, White Masks (2008) about the anxiety created by the sudden lacuna of the role of the white masters in constructing the subject position of Black former slaves. He represents the former slaves as lashing out in surprise and panic at the lost binary which, while giving them their humanity, has robbed them of the thing that defined them. In his representation of the colonial encounter,

[w]hen it does happen that the Negro looks fiercely at the white man, the white man tells him: “Brother, there is no difference between us.” And yet the Negro knows that there is a difference. He wants it. He wants the white man to turn on him and shout: “Damn n—.” Then he would have that unique chance—to “show them . . .” . . . The former slave needs a challenge to his humanity, he wants a conflict, a riot. (172, one word censored by me)

Building on what Fanon describes, it is important to note that it is not only the former slave who experiences a crisis in self-representation when they find themselves no longer signified by this Hegelian dialectic. The colonizer, too, simultaneously faces a loss of self.11

The realization of this threat emerges as horror and threat when one encounters the colonial subject; this is at the heart of what Bényei (2011) identifies as the “traumatic encounter,” which Bhabha also explains as a reinscription of identity returning from the colonized to the colonizer, a moment of recognition of the self-in-Other and Other-in-self that shakes the subject psychologically. Bhabha (1994) writes, “And this space of reinscription must be thought outside of those metaphysical philosophies of self-doubt, where the otherness of identity is the anguished presence within the Self of an existentialist agony that emerges when you look perilously through a glass darkly” (48, emphasis in original). The threat the human encounter in the colony represents is therefore an inherent problem of not only colonial but European identity as a whole.

Because of the fragility of this framework, the colonized, the very subject of not only the colony but of white identity, becomes an object of fear due to its inherent subversion of its own subjectification. Bhabha (1994) refers to this crisis in representation as “the ambivalent

11 Though with one key difference: while the Black former slave described by Fanon relied on a specific relationship with the colonizing French authority, the white European can find other Others—so to speak—in other spaces that, to this day, continue to be exploited and silenced through neocolonialism, and thus defer their own loss of self by shifting the Other from space to space.
‘turn’ of the discriminated subject into a terrifying, exorbitant object of paranoid classification—a disturbing questioning of the images and presences of authority” (111). He refers specifically to the books of Haggard, Kipling, and Forster, and writes that in reproducing the disturbance of this representational crisis they ask a series of questions beyond their role in producing colonial authority. He lists the questions the books ask of the colonial authority: “Was it a badge—an ornament—a charm—a propitiatory act? Was there any idea at all connected with it? It looked startling in this black neck of the woods, this bit of white writing from beyond the seas” (111). That white writing, which once seemed so certain “beyond the seas,” proves to be much less sure “in this black neck of the woods.” At the moment the colonizing text enters the colony, the narrative of white virtue and control enters crisis.

Any attempt to end the colony by an English subject is an attack on that writer’s own identity, threatening to destabilize the very thing that makes the position from which they criticize possible. In Positions (1981), Derrida demonstrates the semiotic contradiction in attempting to reverse a polarized and political opposition, arguing that “one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field untouched, leaving one no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the field effectively” (41). To neutralize the terms in which these oppressive relationships are contained is to make the conversation impossible. Because the signifiers remain, difference remains as well. To stop employing an opposition in discourse makes the conversation about ending it impossible, while to employ it even when attempting to frame its deconstruction is to perpetuate its distinction.

Violence is at the base of this relationship. Intersubjectivity is created through acts of oppression, and it is violence that over and over proves the last resort of the colonizer in Kipling. For him, the idea of separation from the colony invoked the trauma of his separation from India as a child. Zohreh T. Sullivan (1993) describes this as “Kipling's anxieties about self loss as he loses a sense of the geographical or structural boundaries defining his own community and himself” (5). Thus, any degree of violence becomes justifiable to retain the colony. As Fanon (2004) writes of the colonizer and colonized,

[their first confrontation was colored by violence and their cohabitation—or rather the exploitation of the colonized by the colonizer—continued at the point of the bayonet and under cannon fire. ... And consequently, the colonist is right when he says

\[12\] see Žižek (1999): “the first, immediate ‘negation’ of A negates the position of A while remaining within its symbolic confines, so it must be followed by another negation, which then negates the very symbolic space common to A and its immediate negation” (72).
he ‘knows’ them [the colonized]. It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject. The colonist derives his validity, i.e., his wealth, from the colonial system” (2, emphasis in original).

This threatens the colonizing subject with their own role in that oppressive regime and stand in the understanding of their past, present, and continued part in the purposeful harm caused to the human signified by the Other.\[13\]

All of this evidence points to the overwhelming need for a cognitive shift to control for the representational gaps in colonizing ideology and to manage the anxiety created in the colonizer by its recognition. As we have seen, not only is the recognition of the oppression of the colony and one's own role in it a source of potential horror, but the thought of ending the colony is even more massively troubling because the colony and its Other are inextricably tied to British subjectivity. Because to destroy the colony is to destroy the British self, the colony must endure, and a literature that underpins the ideological foundations of the colony provided the means to its continuation.

The strategy Kipling employs is a form of mimicry, which Bhabha (1994) calls “one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge” (85). Kipling’s texts escape the “immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers” posed by mimicry (86) by representing only enough of the threat to activate the reader’s anxiety, signaling the need to limit and suppress the threat of the colonial encounter while never truly risking it. The encounters in Kipling’s texts are carefully controlled to prevent any actual presence of the subaltern, suggesting the theory of a ritual designed to contain an irreconcilable gap in signification described by Victor Turner (1990). However, it must be said that the texts do not always accomplish this fully, as will be seen in the case of “The Mark of the Beast” (1891). British audiences reacted with horror to its representation of the brutal violence perpetrated by the Anglo-Indian characters on a native Indian priest.

Nowhere is there a clearer model for the ideological function of Kipling’s colonizing stories and poems than in the description of Žižek (1989) in the use of ideology as a means of manipulation, supported only through violence and the self-interest of the subject. He explains that

\[13\] It should be noted that some of the abuses of the colonizer must also be ascribed to truly self-interested motivations, as it is clear from actions such as those of Sir Bartle Frere in instigating war with the Kingdom of Zulu in 1879, against the express orders of the British crown not to take hostile action or provoke the Zulu into war. Although this is not within the scope of this study, a piece of an explanation might be found in the response to hegemonic ideological control that Žižek (1997) describes as “surplus-obedience.” While he is writing about Slovenian Communism, his description is apt for British colonialism, describing “a gesture of compliance which was accomplished out of a pure jouissance provided by their participation in the oppressive Communist ideological ritual” (68).
totalitarian ideology no longer has . . . pretension. It is no longer meant, even by its authors, to be taken seriously—it’s status is just that of a means of manipulation, purely external and instrumental; its rule is secured not by its truth-value but by simple extraideological violence and promise of gain. (27)

In the context of Kipling’s work, gain takes the form of the continued access to the colony’s markets, though this is rarely in the foreground. Instead, much more frequently, the promise of gain is reversed as the fear of loss, in the loss of subjectivity that the colonial encounter threatens. Kipling’s colonizers continue to employ the ideology of humanism and racial separation, but repeatedly turn to violence and self-serving cynicism to deal with the lived experience of the colony.

The self-representation of colonizers is thus fundamentally binary. Like Kipling’s experienced Anglo-Indian narrators, they represent themselves as both observing the colony and participating in it. In representing themselves as observer, colonizers recognize and even condemn the oppression of the colony, acknowledging the daily acts of cruelty and exploitation they see around themselves. In pointing out these abuses, they confirm for themselves their own adherence to the ideological moral system based in humanistic ideals that allow them to come to the colony and serve as justification for their acts there. By participating in that colony of which they are observers, however, they not only passively condone but actively support its oppression. The participation in the colonized and the maintenance of the colony, as Memmi (2003) observes, the essential action of all colonial activity. He writes that by

having chosen to ratify the colonial system, the colonialist has not really overcome the actual difficulties. The colonial situation thrusts economic, political, and affective facts upon every colonizer against which he may rebel, but which he can never abandon. These facts form the very essence of the colonial system, and soon the colonialist realizes his own ambiguity. (95)

In short, this contradiction is at the very heart of the colonizing practice, and propagating and teaching the acceptance and performance of this dual role is at the heart of imperialist ideology. Therefore, the communication and even teaching of this response is one of the most important functions of the imperialist text.

The psychological study of cognitive dissonance demonstrates that holding two oppositional ideas, as is the case with this form of cynicism, creates anxiety in the subject. These studies show how external stimulus can reduce this anxiety by attributing the anxiety to other causes, thus leaving the disparity between ideas intact. These functions will be demonstrated in detail in Kipling’s colonizing work.
The theory of cognitive dissonance was first proposed by Festinger and Carlsmith in 1957. Their groundbreaking article describes a common but flawed understanding of cognitive dissonance as “a person who privately holds opinion ‘X’ but has, as a result of pressure brought to bear on him, publicly stated that he believes ‘not X’” (203). Festinger and Carlsmith explain that true dissonance is not a lie but the actual simultaneous supporting of opposite ideas.

According to the experimenters, the feeling of dissonance is greater if the motivation to act against one’s beliefs is lower. They write that, “the magnitude of dissonance is maximal if these promised rewards or threatened punishments were just barely sufficient to induce the person to say ‘not X’” (204). As will be seen, this has bearing on how colonial experience is represented. The shift in beliefs is weaker where hegemonic power is most pervasive, such as in the port cities and capitals, while characters’ opinions and even self-image undergoes the most significant change when they are far from these centers of power, where the direct exercise of that power on them is weaker. When the characters move beyond the borders of the empire into the liminal zone of spaces that are neither the colonizing state nor the colony, the pressure to adhere to the colonizing ideology is weakest and the effect of the dissonance is particularly strong.

This effect is suggested by the experiment of Festinger and Carlsmith. Students from Stanford were given repetitive and monotonous tasks—emptying spools and turning pegs. Then, they were paid either one or twenty dollars to convince another student—actually a researcher—that the task was interesting and worth doing. The subjects were then asked by the research team about their feelings about the work they had done. The ones who were paid the least claimed most strongly that they did actually find the tasks interesting and important.

This closely matches what Homi Bhabha describes in *The Location of Culture* (1994), when he posits the Freudian notion of splitting as the conflict between two contradictory attitudes:

Splitting constitutes an intricate strategy of defence and differentiation in the colonial discourse. Two contradictory and independent attitudes inhabit the same place, one takes account of reality, the other is under the influence of instincts which detach the ego from reality. This results in the production of multiple and contradictory belief. The enunciatory moment of multiple belief is both a defence against the anxiety of difference, and itself productive of differentiations. (132)

What Bhabha calls the “enunciatory moment of multiple belief” is the essence of cognitive dissonance. As he argues, the enunciation of “multiple belief” guards against the anxiety
produced by split identity, and how this is achieved is also suggested by psychological research.

More recent research on cognitive dissonance demonstrates that what has been called hypocrisy is misattributed arousal of cognitive dissonance. This research is key to explaining the role of colonizing literature in dispelling the anxiety and personal crisis threatened by the colonial encounter. Fried and Aronson (1995) performed an experiment to confirm what they suspected from information hinted at in previous studies: that revealing cognitive dissonance induces anxiety, which does make the subject more likely to change their behavior, but it does cause them stress and trauma. Furthermore, they found that this anxiety can be dispelled by attributing the stress to other factors. In other words, when the subject has any other reason available for the stress they feel, they will assign causation to that reason before accepting the anxiety caused by conflicting principles.

In the experiment, subjects were asked to make speeches in favor of recycling, a behavior consistent with their belief in protecting the environment. Some subjects were asked about their own failure to recycle in the past, reminding them of their own hypocrisy. Furthermore, some subjects were told that the room the study was being conducted in was shown to cause psychological distress, giving the subjects a way to misattribute any discomfort they felt. They were then asked how many phone calls they would be willing to make to convince more people to recycle. The study showed that subjects who were reminded of their hypocrisy promised to make more phone calls in order to ease their guilty consciences, so long as they could not misattribute the distress this caused to other factors. Subjects in this condition promised to make an average of 7.42 phone calls, while those who could misattribute their feelings to the room’s conditions only promised to make 2.94 calls (929). This study reveals that the anxiety of contradictory beliefs can be mitigated by misattributing its cause, keeping both beliefs intact.

This tendency to misattribute the heightened emotions caused by cognitive dissonance to other factors is clear in colonialist experiences and culture. Bhabha (1994) describes the “intellectual uncertainty and anxiety that stems from the fact that disavowal is not merely a principle of negation or elision; it is a strategy for articulating contradictory and coeval statements of belief” (130). This splitting, then, can be mapped to the process of misattribution: one side being perceived as the self and the other as a result of the misattributed factor. This could take several shapes. For example, Memmi (2003) describes the colonizer’s need to attribute the failure of the colony to the failure of the colonized themselves. He writes,
How can usurpation try to pass for legitimacy? One attempt can be made by demonstrating the usurper's eminent merits, so eminent that they deserve such compensation. Another is to harp on the usurped's demerits, so deep that they cannot help leading to misfortune. His disquiet and resulting thirst for justification require the usurper to extol himself to the skies and to drive the usurped below the ground at the same time. In effect, these two attempts at legitimacy are actually inseparable. (96-97)

As he shows, the colonizer attempts to misattribute their feelings about their illegitimate place in the colony by blaming those they oppress.

According to Said (1993), the first impression the colonizer has of the colonized is shaped by the colonized’s constructed identity, one constructed by the colonizer’s texts. The second is that of the human, the lived encounter which threatens to distress the colonizer with the revelation of their cognitive dissonance. The third experience reinscribes the colonized with Otherness by focusing on the queerness (to use Said’s term) of the Orient, the Oriental’s own failure to match the ideological object constructed by the colonizer’s texts. The description of the colonized as strange and unable to be understood fulfils this function. Starting from being exposed as what texts do not prepare one for, the Orient can return as something one writes about in a disciplined way. Its foreignness can be translated, its meanings decoded, its hostility tamed; yet the generality assigned to the Orient, the disenchantment that one feels after encountering it, the unresolved eccentricity it displays, are all redistributed in what is said or written about it. (103)

This misattribution of the colony’s failure to transgressive colonized can be seen in Kipling's “The White Man's Burden,” in which the goals of the colonizer are brought “to naught” by “Sloth and heathen Folly” (line 24, 23). According to Gilmore (2003), the “heathen” in “heathen Folly” is the “well educated natives,” as Kipling is disturbed by “their hybrid nature, an unsuccessful product of superficial Western education grafted on to the obscurantism of the Subcontinent” (Kindle location 1285).

In addition to blaming the natives, Kipling also blames individual, incompetent British who lack proper knowledge of the colony for the injustices he perceives in India: “In Kipling’s eyes the real enemies of British India were British: zealous and misguided missionaries (secular as well as religious) and interfering politicians in England” (Gilmore 2003, Kindle location 1617-1618). This is demonstrated by the frequent appearance of foolish, cruel, and wholly inadequate agents of the Civil Service or Army. Examples of these range from the captain in “On the City Wall,” whose contempt and cruelty allow the escape of a prisoner, to the ignorant and sacrilegious Fleete in “The Mark of the Beast,” who is cursed by a native priest for drunkenly desecrating a temple of Hanuman. It is clear that each
of these constructions is a scapegoat, an individual blamed for the violence and cruelty of the system.

A third target of misattribution is the physical discomfort of the colonial environment and the effects of disease. Bhabha (1990) identifies even the weather as an explanation for the psychological strain on the colonizer. He describes the longing for the English weather expressed in colonial literature, contrasting these nationalistic longings with “the heat and dust of India; the dark emptiness of Africa; the tropical chaos that was deemed despotic and ungovernable and therefore worthy of the civilizing mission” (319). Thus, as Bhabha demonstrates, the colonized space itself was signified as a source of inherent anxiety for the colonizer, suggesting anxiety is a natural and inevitable response of the colonizer to that space. In Kipling, the most frequent effect of the colonized space is the ever-present “fever,” the malaria that is represented almost casually as striking just about every Anglo-Indian.

In order to ensure that these misattributions take place, Kipling’s texts also render the colony impervious to having colonial anxiety attributed to it. They do this through markers of the constancy of the colonial relationship, represented simultaneously by the idea of colonial Time and the constant metaphor of sport and the game used in British imperialism. The contradictory Time of the colony simultaneously declares the colony as existing in the past and also outside of the passage of time. Thus, it performs the function Foucault (2002) describes as throwing “back into the past” the fragmentation of meaning, fixing in a fictional past the instability of discourse it seeks to stabilize (78).

If the colony itself is represented as timeless and eternal, the colonizer’s doubts about its oppressive effects can easily be controlled, since they cannot be extended to the end point that an ethical belief would lead them to: the end of the colony. It manifests in two primary and related ways. First, the colony itself is denied as coeval with the colonizing country, depicted as existing in the past, less developed in every term defined by the colonizing Europeans as essential in the progress of a nation. These ideas presuppose several ideological positions that make this possible, such as that progress as movement from less to more advanced and modern takes place at all and can only occur along a single trajectory, which is the trajectory taken by colonizing European countries. Second, the colony is depicted as unchanging, and thus its end as impossible. Among other representations, this appears in the metonymy that signifies the colonized space as a tableau, a fixed scene in which humans, if they appear at all, are shown as still figures as much a part of the environment around them as the landscape itself.
The first representation, that of a less-developed and non-coeval space, gives a justification for the presence of the colonizer, whose action will bring the benefits of mechanized, post-Enlightenment, Christian, European modernity into this past space. The colony is represented thus as an undeveloped space entered into by Europeans from developed nations. Colonizers use the justification of bringing the colonized space forward on a continuum of industrial, economic, cultural, and political development from a position of “backwardness” to that of Europe, the most “developed” region of the world. Enrique Dussel (1993) defines the Eurocentric notion that all nations must develop along the same lines as the European ones as the fallacy of developmentalism, which

consists in thinking that the path of Europe’s modern development must be followed unilaterally by every other culture. Development is taken here as an ontological, and not simply sociological or economic, category. It is the ‘necessary movement’ of Being for Hegel, its inevitable ‘development’. (67-68)

In placing Europeans in a privileged position of knowing and understanding, this process marginalizes the colonized in their own familiar surroundings by suggesting that they are incapable of grasping, as the European does, the fundamental knowledge of their own existence, which includes the constructed knowledge of the advancement and superiority of Europe.\textsuperscript{14}

The other function of colonial Time serves a contradictory role: its represents the spaces of colonizer and colonized as non-coeval and thus denies the possibility of real influence between them. As people living at different points in time, they cannot influence one another. Furthermore, any suffering in the colony becomes divided from the action of the colonizer, as no action of the colonizer can affect the fixed colony. Memmi (2003) identifies the centrality of time in maintaining this gap, arguing that “once the behavioral feature, or historical or geographical factor which characterizes the colonialist and contrasts him with the colonizer, has been isolated, this gap must be kept from being filled. The colonialist removes the factor from history, time, and therefore possible evolution” (115). Once every other signifier of Otherness has been established, it is time more than any other factor that cements the colony and makes it unchangeable.

This denial of coevalness extends to the spaces of the colony and the colonizer state, which Fabian (2014) describes as “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of

\textsuperscript{14} It is worth noting that these ideas became strongly rooted in Darwin’s (1861) terminology, echoing contemporary sentiments about more and less perfect types employed by Darwin, such as when he writes, “The inhabitants of each successive period in the world’s history have beaten their predecessors in the race for life, and are, in so far, higher in the scale of nature” (801).
"anthropological discourse" (32, emphasis in original). As we examine the literature of colonizing cynicism, we discover this trope over and over again, used as a means to represent the impossibility of closing the gaps in oppositional ideology. To quote Kipling’s narrator in *Plain Tales from the Hills* (1888), “All kinds of magic are out of date and done away with except in India where nothing changes in spite of the shiny, toy-scum stuff that people call ‘civilization’“ (221). Such descriptions of colonized spaces, and India especially, appears throughout his work. This position is at once in the past and in a timeless, eternal state of changelessness. The function of “colonial Time,” then, is to represent an oppositional binary in which there are two possible identities, those identities are inherently and essentially opposed; one is assigned one or the other identity and cannot change it, and the conflict between the two is eternal.

Another ideological apparatus that creates the exact same binaries is the European model of sport. The metaphor of the game infuses and defines colonialist ideology, nowhere more explicitly than in the framing of the “Great Game”; like the idea of colonial Time, it at once establishes and ossifies the edifice of the colony. The rhetoric of a limited set of actions geared towards a specific goal, with a particular adversary against whom one wins or loses, forms an important part of particularly English ideology. The game is described explicitly as a model for life itself, and thus its rules and parameters are presented as elements of ordered living. As Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) writes, “The images of games were seen as a condensed formula of life and of the historic process: fortune, misfortune, gain and loss, crowning and uncrowning. Life was presented as a miniature play (translated into the language of traditional symbols), a play without footlights” (235). This framework brought with it the presupposition that life must be “played” by a fixed set of rules that cannot be altered, which further emphasized not only that the conditions of contemporary politics and economy—including, vitally, the existence of empire—could not be changed.

The role of sport and empire has mostly been studied in terms of the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized. Perhaps the most elaborate presentation of this relationship is in *The Games Ethic and Imperialism* by J. A. Mangan (1998). He argues that the sports taught so stridently in public schools imbued in boys the ethic required for their future roles as colonizers. “[The teaching of sport] was… a useful instrument of colonial purpose. At one and the same time it helped create confidence to lead and the compulsion to follow” (18). In other words, sport teaches young men that success, whose parameters are set by others, comes only through following an established pattern of behavior from which deviation both deserves penalties and is “unsporting.” Patrick F. McDevitt (2004) and others
further describe role of sport in the colonizing process. This idea is expressed throughout Kipling’s writing, nowhere moreso than in the famous “If—”, which extols as virtue that the listener should “make one heap of all your winnings And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss” (17-18). Sport, according to McDevitt, played a key role in defining the Otherness of the colonized subject and creating the image of English superiority.

The format of a game, with its winners and losers, is translated to the superiority of white people over people of color, and victory for the English comes at the cost of the “defeat” of the colonized. As McDevitt (2004) writes, “Games playing as defined by English rules and standards set the British and their subjects apart from effeminate continental Europeans, subjugated Africans, and effete Asians” (2). He shows that sport helped craft the sense of masculinity of British subjects, entrenching values of strength and competition. “Various communities of men in the British Empire used sport to construct, propagate, and maintain national conceptions of manhood” (2). Thus, sport not only created and spread but exported a particular model of Britishness, one that set in stone the oppositional relationship on which the colony is based.

Moving away from these models, which look at the relationship between colonizer and colonized in sport, it is also possible to see how essential sport itself is in maintaining hegemonic order. McDevitt (2004) examines sport as a means by which the imperialist powers attempt to spread their own culture—including the above-described belief in “proper” behavior—to colonized spaces. He argues that “[t]he British elites sought to win the hearts, minds, and bodies of their imperial subjects through the hegemonic propagation of imperial sport and the associated middle-class white values to the peoples of the Empire and the working classes” (139). It is just another step, then, to see how the culture of sport, which was so ubiquitous in the raising of the future generations of colonizers, helped instill these same values of competition, conquest, and fair play in them. This is mentioned by Robert Ellis (2014), who describes that playing a sport can shape the way that life in general is viewed. The metaphors of sport may also be said to come to exercise a shaping influence on that ideology. This [a given poem ] seems, in short, to be rather more than an opportunistic use of sporting imagery; sport is becoming a way of looking at the world and what it ‘means to be a man’ (quite deliberately using exclusive language here) in it. (131)

It is no wonder, then, that the language of sport appears so often in colonial discourse, echoing the entrenched traditions passed from class to class on the famous playing fields of the public schools. The identification of colonial combat with sporting appears, for example, in Kipling’s poem “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” (1892), in which the narrator describes that using rifles to
kill men armed with swords “was n’t 'ardly fair” (24). Perhaps most tellingly, the metaphor extends to the contemporary expression for the conflict over control of India between imperial powers, which came to be called the Great Game.

The construction of the timeless colony and the colonized who can, despite all representational perfection, never become a colonizer is necessary for preventing the ideation of the end of the empire. As has been shown, the threat of the representation of the colonial encounter to British identity makes representing the end of the colony impossible for the colonizer. The idea of the colony as a humanistic enterprise meant to transform colonized people into subjects in the European mold is incompatible with the continued function of the colony itself. In other words, the end of the colony brings with it the end of the colonizer. Simon Featherstone (2009) describes how the English failed to imagine what might constitute English identity after the end of the Empire,

[t]he significance of such 'double consciousness' was less clear to the English, however. The rapid, disorderly, and often bloody end of empire … precluded a thorough understanding of Englishness as imperial identity…. This was reflected in a contemporary intellectual inattention to the implications of empire. (22)

Even as politicians and writers wrote apocalyptic visions of the end of the Empire, it seemed that, to a deeper degree, they were unable to face the fundamental threat both the colony and its end represented to British identity. While much was written about the events surrounding the end of the colony, not much imagined life and Britishness after those events. Even imagining the collapse of the colonial system, they could not produce a coherent vision of time after its end. To do this would have been to imagine the colony as capable of change over time, when the timelessness of that colonized space forms an essential part of colonial discourse.

Since the binary of colonizer/colonized is so essential, it is deeply disturbing to imagine spaces that are neither, that must be made into colonies which are then represented as being eternally colony. In the texts that do address this transition, such as The Man Who Would Be King (1888), the anxiety created by this representational gap creates a semiotic crisis that, in that particular case, undoes the subject position and identity of the white characters who experience it entirely.
3. Kipling’s Cynicism of Empire

The purpose of the literature of colonizing cynicism is to first arouse in the reader the anxiety of cognitive dissonance, making them aware of the hypocrisy and representational failure of colonizing ideology, and then providing something to misattribute the anxiety to. Thus, the poems and stories in this mode reassert the hegemonic representative system that the colonial encounter threatens, even at the same time as they reveal that system to be permeable in ways that excite the anxiety of the white colonizer who makes up the audience. Rather than encouraging the reader to reject colonialism, these texts push them to more fully embrace it, even as they acknowledge its failure to totalize the representation of colonized spaces.

The colonizer’s anxiety is activated by partially—but only partially—exposing the gaps in colonizing ideology, creating a carefully modulated space in which representational failure can be allowed to emerge. In this partial emergence, the gaps are still controlled, and their destabilizing effects can be associated with undamaging causes, defusing their potential for ideological damage. This is what Bhabha (1994) describes when he writes that the “discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely 'rupture' the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence” (86). That a particular strategy of exposing uncertainty can stabilize rather than destabilize ideology is the essence of this argument. That this is done by a partial representation is crucial, and Bhabha writes that “the very emergence of the 'colonial' is dependent for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself” (86). The techniques Kipling employs in doing this through simultaneous emergence and misattribution of threat will be demonstrated in detail, illustrating the function of his work in buttressing colonial ideology through the very technique of exposing its gaps.

To understand how Kipling exerts this influence through his writing, it is necessary to first examine his own perception of the British Empire and its effects, particularly in India. Though Kipling wrote lovingly of the cities, the jungles, and the temples, and picturesquely of the native inhabitants, but always there is an Orientalizing distance between the Anglo-Indian and the native Indian. Any potential of the colonized to approach the British in terms of education, culture, or prestige he treated with disdain or alarm, and his political stance towards Indian independence was universally antipathetic. Gilmour (2003) emphasizes this on the subject of Indian self-rule through the Indian National Congress, since “At the age of 20 Kipling had no doubts about the nature and purpose of Congress – and he remained undoubting for the rest of his life. When he was in India he insisted that the organization did
not represent anybody except a small group of university-trained hybrids” (Kindle location 1297). He rejected categorically all cries by Indians for more political agency, and likewise was horrified at the prospect of an end to British rule.

Kipling expressed his own emotional distress at the abuses and hypocrisy of the colony, yet he never considered the idea of ending the British Empire as anything but disastrous. Though writing long before it was termed so, Kipling seems to express his own cognitive dissonance in a letter quoted by Gilmour (2003), written to “a leading American Presbyterian in 1895:”

It is my fortune to have been born and to a large extent brought up among those whom white men call ‘heathen’; and while I recognize the paramount duty of every white man to follow the teachings of his creed and conscience as 'a debtor to do the whole law', it seems to me cruel that white men, whose governments are armed with the most murderous weapons known to science, should amaze and confound their fellow creatures with a doctrine of salvation imperfectly understood by themselves and a code of ethics foreign to the climate and instincts of those races whose most cherished customs they outrage and whose gods they insult. (Kindle location 1638-1643).

In this letter, Kipling reifies the colonizing ideology of the altruistic imperialist while simultaneously acknowledging its inherent impossibility in practice. He considers his “paramount duty” to serve the Empire, yet in the very next thought expresses the harm the Empire causes to the colonized. He also recognizes the technology that, hand in hand with ideology, allows the perpetuation of the colony: the brutal weaponry in the hands of the British military subjugating the colonized population. Finally, he demonstrates the failure of the ideal of the benevolent colonizer bringing Christianity to the colonized, describing the true effects of this endeavor as “cruel,” and yet he does not entertain any thoughts of an end to this process.

Kipling’s method of representing the colony caused much surprise in Great Britain. Gilmour (2015) writes that Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, felt the need to insist to Queen Victoria herself that he not believe that India is as Kipling describes, maintaining the inaccuracy of “the unfair and rather malevolent impressions that have gone abroad and have received some colour from the too cynical stories of Rudyard Kipling” (Kindle location 1035-1036). It should not be forgotten here, of course, that this exchange took place far from India. As has been shown, Kipling’s representations could well be doubted in Britain.

The British reading public responded with particular surprise to the mirror that colonial texts held up to themselves, revealing to them their own identity as returned from the partially uncontrolled, un-British space of the colony. Confronted with this portrait of Britishness, Kipling's audience interpreted his position as cynical. In this term, we see the
recognition that Kipling's depictions are not, in the eyes of his readers, inaccurate so much as too accurate to the unfamiliar vision of self that they portray. Ian Baucom (1999) starts his book *Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity* by quoting a Salman Rushdie character, summarizing his insight as recognizing that English identity not only relies on the colony but is vulnerable to the influence of the colonial on itself. Baucom explains,

> The empire, Rushdie suggests through his sardonic mouthpiece, is less a place where England exerts control than the place where England loses command of its own narrative of identity. It is the place onto which the island kingdom arrogantly displaces itself and from which a puzzled England returns as a stranger to itself. (3)

England’s definition of itself relies by its very nature on a space that is not entirely under the control of the English, a place from which Englishness returns altered and unfamiliar. Kipling, however, maintains the ideal that England can maintain control of its narrative identity, as even the colonized in Kipling speak with the words of the colonizer. The subjectivity Kipling produces, while represented as unfamiliar to an audience in Great Britain, is meant to be one familiar and mastered by experienced colonizers.

That Kipling's contemporaries saw much of his writing as cynical is demonstrated by reviews of his work. They voice their surprise that someone so young and with personal experience with India would express such cynical perspectives on it. This is particularly interesting in that the reviewers, by expressing this surprise, imply that they believed someone who had firsthand experience in a colonized place would represent colonizing subjects not as cynical but rather as virtuous. This is a simple but profound indication of just how pervasive and invisible ideology can be. Even more significantly, this further exposes the division between the ideological position that is effective in the colonizing country and the one that perpetuates the colony best in the colonized space. Sergeant (2013) expresses his belief that the dissonance between Kipling’s personal views and his expressed framing in his stories is the result of attempting to soften his views to make them more palatable for his English readers, stating that in “the authoritarian stories Kipling often attempted to veil his political agenda, and in this period ‘doing a little work for one’s own country’ necessitates his new British public not being fully aware of the absoluteness of his imperial intent” (93). A review of contemporary responses to Kipling reveals, however, that the public clearly received his imperialistic messages.

The following reviews collected in Roger Lancelyn Green's *Rudyard Kipling: The Critical Legacy* (1971) reveal the surprise Kipling's represented empire caused in the United Kingdom, where the colonial encounter depicted in Kipling's work was not only distant, but
repressed and flattened by colonizing texts. Rather than depicting hardworking and virtuous agents bringing civilization, progress, and Christianity to India—a character he would later embrace after leaving India—Kipling showed his reading public white English in India who were lazy, selfish, stupid, and in many cases hypocritically exploiting their positions and having affairs. Sullivan (1993) describes these voices as “dissonant and self-contradictory, that war with the official voice and signify Kipling's ambivalences” (15). The confusion of and—to borrow Baucom's term—puzzlement of the English facing the returning sense of Englishness from the colonized space is clear in the critical responses to his work. It is worth noting that none of the reviews of Kipling's stories in contemporary Anglo-Indian sources examined for this study identify his works as cynical. It can be assumed that, for the colonizer in the colony, used to the human encounter, the colonizing cynicism of these stories is not surprising.

Andrew Lang reviews ‘Mr. Kipling’s Stories’ in the Saturday Review 1889: “He is so clever, so fresh, and so cynical that he must be young; like other people, he will be kinder to life when he has seen more of it” (44). It is interesting Lang associates Kipling's cynicism with his youth. Rather than suggesting Kipling's stories will be more accurate as he grows older, Lang writes that they will be kinder: this kindness implies that Kipling will choose to replace his representations with the uncomplicated, heroic colonial ideal of the efficient and virtuous white agent in India. As has been previously noted, this idealized depiction is actually less effective in building colonizing ideology in subjects: in 1889, as Gilmore (2003) mentions, Kipling is still writing to an “Anglo-Indian” audience.

Lang also includes in his review his opinion that “Mr. Kipling’s least cynical stories are those in In Black and White, stories of native life and character” (Green 1971, 44). The reviewer's note that Kipling's In Black and White, which tells half its stories ostensibly from the perspective of an Indian narrator, reads as the least cynical reveals the influence of the cognitive dissonance in the altered Englishness represented by his other stories. For the British reviewer, the stories that seem most acceptable were the ones in which a white author puts his words into the mouths of characters the British public is used to seeing Othered. The white characters, on the other hand, feel disturbing in their unfamiliarity.

Echoing the idea that Kipling's stories played a key role in shaping the British public's ideas about the colonies, a reviewer from The Times in 1890 writes that Kipling's best stories, including “one or two of the 'Black and White' series”, are so valuable because “they appear to lift the veil from a state of society so immeasurably distant from our own and to offer us glimpses of unknown depths and gulfs of human existence” (Green 1971, 51). Reflecting on
the short story “In the Matter of a Private,” in which a British soldier is driven past endurance by the heat and goes on a murder spree, the writer reflects, “Mr. Kipling has used to the full ... the novelist's power of bringing home a practical fact like this to his readers, and ... he will certainly not be unwilling that the British Government as well as the British people should come nearer to realizing what these terrible conditions of life actually imply” (52-53). The review does not condemn the soldier's actions, but instead stresses the effect of the “Indian heat” and “its effects on the minds and bodies of the Europeans who have to suffer it” (52). That the weather itself is identified as “Indian,” and thus linked to a space outside common British experience, demonstrates the reviewer's tactic for displacing blame and, by doing so, sidesteps the question of why the Europeans are there. Instead, it presents as granted that they “have to” be in the colony and experience the heat, including the occasional murder of natives that it might cause.

Other reviewers focused on their reaction to the cynicism towards the empire expressed by Kipling's characters, writing about it as though bemused that fictional characters could express such ideas. This is shown in a review by Lionel Johnson of Life’s Handicap: Being Stories of Mine Own People in The Academy, 1891:

The Empire, the Administration, the Government, become in Mr. Kipling’s hands necessary and yet amusing powers, in whose service Englishmen are willing to toil and sweat, knowing that il n’y pas d’homme necessaire, but content to go on, relieved by making cynical epigrams about life and death, and everything before, between, or after them. (95)

The emphasis on all of this being crafted by Kipling in his texts reveals the function of the defamiliarization with which the British public faces this cynicism. To them, it seems strange and unfamiliar, and yet they correctly identify the importance of cynicism in allowing the colony. As the reviewer goes on to write, “The consciousness of duty becomes the consciousness of mechanical necessity: the sentiment of loyalty is caricatured into cynical perseverance” (Green 1971, 95). The difference in home and colonial perspective is very well illustrated by this interpretation, in which cynicism is represented as caricature and loyalty—the virtue of the idealized colonizer—as fact.

This contrast between the imagined reality and what Johnson interprets as cynical fiction demonstrates how the cynicism in Kipling models an ideological position for the reader, indoctrinating them in the complex colonial positionality described previously. Over the course of this review, the reviewer appears to undergo the indoctrination into colonial thinking that colonizing texts are meant to cause in the reader. Johnson defers to Kipling's experience, invoking the tradition of creating colonizing texts that construct the impression of
totalized knowledge of the Orient: “Mr. Kipling has had experience of English life and work in India: his readers, for the most part, have not” (Green 1971, 97). While acknowledging this, the reviewer points out what he sees as a failure in the text: that the characters do not behave like the English in England, becoming strange to the audience back home: “But I would ask any reader, who has known English officers and civilians, before, during, and after their Indian service, whether he has found them quite so brilliant or quite so ill-bred, quite so epigrammatic or quite so self-conscious, as these creatures of Mr. Kipling” (97). Johnson appeals to the figure the reader expects, privileging the familiar over what he has already acknowledged is the product of someone more familiar with this environment in a clear example of cognitive dissonance. It is difficult for him to reconcile the cynical colonial with the image of the virtuous hero colonizing ideology has created.

Despite his confusion, the reviewer demonstrates the influence texts like Kipling's had on white readers in colonizing states. The reviewer even suggests the use of cynicism in the colonizing venture, asking,

Is it that before leaving home, or while home on leave, or when done with India, they are natural Englishmen; but that an Indian climate, and a share in Indian administration, turn them into machines: men who seem to talk like telegrams, and to think in shorthand, and to pose, each as a modern Atlas, helping to uphold the Indian Empire, and swearing pessimist oaths at its weight? (Green 1971, 97)

This is what this review is particularly interesting for: the colonizing agent it describes, even critically, exhibits the function that results from just such a colonizing text as Kipling's. Such a character models and instructs the creation of cynicism in both repressing and utilizing cognitive dissonance to embrace the work of empire.

It is fascinating that this suggests that the British public, or at least one reviewer, saw perfectly clearly that the cynical response to the colony functions ideologically only in the colony itself, and is necessarily removed from the experience of the Englishman in England. The reviewer's doubt about the authenticity of the character demonstrates that, while recognizing and learning it, the reader in England did not find that it obtained. This cynical model would instead have gained currency had the reviewer traveled to India.

It was not only Kipling's contemporaries in Great Britain who saw cynicism in his work. That Kipling himself saw cynicism as an essential part of the colonial experience is clear from his personal writings as well as his published work. Gilmour (2003) describes a “private verse” written by Kipling in 1884:

Who is the Public I write for?  
Men ’neath an Indian sky
Cynical, seedy and dry,
Are these then the people I write for?
No, not I. (Kindle location 444-448)

To this Gilmour adds the unnecessary “And yet they were” (Kindle location 448). In this poem, as well as in his stories, Kipling suggests that cynicism is both a universal and inevitable part of the colonizer's experience in the colony. Gilmour and other biographers stress the great sympathy with which Kipling wrote about the soldiers, Civil Service agents, and other Brits in the colony. As a newspaper writer and storyteller, he could hardly set himself apart from those whose lives filled his thoughts and work. His description of them in these terms is not a condemnation, but rather itself a cynical expression on himself and his fellow colonial agents.

The idea that British control of India could end appears in very few of Kipling’s literary output, and it never suggests an end to colonial rule in India but rather a usurpation of British power by another European country. The poem “Recessional” (1897), for example, is written as a warning to the Empire in its conflict with European powers in the form of a hymn begging the “God of our fathers” (1) for mercy and blessing for the sloth and folly of the British. Donald Davie (2014) argues convincingly that the “lesser breeds without the law” (22) it mentions are the other European colonial empires, and thus the poem situates the end of the British Empire as not the end of colonial rule in India but as the threat of a more powerful competitor taking a decadent and lethargic Britain’s colony away.

Critical response to this poem has often sought anti-colonial sentiment in its pomposity. Rashna B. Singh (2010) writes that “[t]he sardonic, almost mocking voice of Kipling’s poem signals a counter-narrative to celebrations of heroic deeds which, in turn, disrupts nineteenth-century race theories that elevated the Anglo-Saxon race and saw the British Empire as the sign of its aptitude to rule and the realisation of its historic destiny” (106). The poem, written for Queen Victorian’s Diamond Jubilee, would have had to be very clever to slip in such a meaning. “Recessional” does not predict the end of the British Empire so much as raise the specter of the ascendancy of Britain’s European rivals to galvanize the British into action. Thus, in the familiar binary of the Great Game, only European powers are legitimized as actors on the world stage, and the colonized space becomes emptied of political subjectivity except as an extension of the power of European states.

The function of “Recessional” is thus not to subvert the Empire but to reify it even with the prospect of its own demise. This derives from the need to not only repress the native Indian population through violence but to culturally pacify the Anglo-Indians through
legitimation. As Jean-François Lyotard (1979) writes of the imperialistic need for its own validation, “the entire history of cultural imperialism from the dawn of Western civilization ... sets it apart from all other forms of imperialism: it is governed by the demand for legitimation” (27). Thus, the colonizers in India themselves are the targets of cultural imperialism.

The failings the poem lists echo those Kipling employs in his fiction. It points to the arrogance of British colonizers in the lines “Lo, all our pomp of yesterday / Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!” (15-16) and “If, drunk with sight of power, we loose / Wild tongues that have not Thee in awe” (19-20). The poem figures the potential fading of the British empire in historical terms, but only ever as a warning, one to which the implied reader will no doubt listen, as it is bound up in terms of duty and religion. It also blames individual agents of the colony, describing them as having “heathen heart that puts her trust / In reeking tube and iron shard” (25-26). Like other Kipling texts, it represents the failures of the British Empire as shortcomings of the political system and individual agents.

The same ideological move controls the short story “‘Les Miserables’: A Tale of 1998,” published in 1886 in the Civil and Military Gazette and since republished in a collection of uncollected work in 2019, The Cause of Humanity and Other Stories: Uncollected Prose Fictions. The story takes the form of a dramatic monologue delivered by a French character explaining why British India fell to the French. It speaks volumes that the short story imagines that India would still be under imperial rule in 1998, and that it once again figures the end of the British Empire as a transfer of control from one European power to another.

This colonizing cynicism, which appears in some form in virtually every story and poem Kipling wrote to an audience in the colonies, simultaneously exposes the anxiety that springs from ideology and demonstrates the colonizer to the fact of their actions in the colony being in conflict with their principles, which in turn pushes the colonizer to justify and support the colony. This argument closely follows the mimicry model of Bhabha (1994), except that it does not follow his rationale that it is liberating. He describes that

the repetition of partial presence, which is the basis of mimicry, articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial and historical difference that menace the narcissistic demand of colonial authority. It is a desire that reverses 'in part' the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer's presence; a gaze of otherness, that shares the acuity of the genealogical gaze which, as Foucault describes it, liberates marginal elements and shatters the unity of man's being through which he extends his sovereignty. (89)
In Kipling, the marginal elements are not liberated, and being, though its cracks are illuminated enough to threaten, is not shattered. This is because Kipling’s subalterns speak with a voice given to them by the colonizer, and the “gaze of otherness” is instead the recursive gaze of the colonizer. The mimicry of the colonized is, in actuality, controlled by the colonizer, an act constitutive of pure power through colonial fantasy of projecting self onto the Other. The following sections explore these explicit contradictions in Kipling and how they function as part of the colonizing ideology of cynicism.
3.1. Plain Tales from the Hills

*Plain Tales from the Hills*, published in 1888, collects many of Kipling’s early short stories in his first book of published prose. It introduces one of the character archetypes that would become a staple in Kipling’s stories and poems alike, the incompetent and ignorant agents sent “from home who bungle their chances abroad” (Arata 1996, 159). Though Bhabha (1990) argues that mimicry “through the repetition of partial presence, which is the basis of mimicry, articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial and historical difference that menace the narcissistic demand of colonial authority” (89), these disturbances are always carefully controlled in Kipling, and function to make the reader aware of their threat and then to suggest ways to contain that threat. In this volume, unlike later, there are no stories of what happens when a colonizer fully fails to maintain the strict boundaries of colonial order. In each case, the impending disaster is averted. Thus, the stories represent the partial presence of mimicry as a reality of the colonial experience that is guarded against but not named, and offer misattribution to other factors as a means of alleviating the anxiety that recognizing the repressed violence of the lived experience creates.

The first story, “Lispeth,” develops a complex cynicism, in which a native Indian threatens to signify as white, representing a threat to the imperial order that must be dealt with. In choosing it as the first short story of his first volume of published stories, Kipling gave it a privileged place in his work, suggesting he selected it as the means to introduce his reader to India as represented by his pen. Appearing in the *Civil and Military Gazette* in 1886 and collected in *Plain Tales*, “Lispeth” opens with an ideological contradiction: it describes an Indian woman, Lispeth, who exhibits all of the markers of eminent whiteness. “Lispeth had a Greek face—one of those faces people paint so often, and see so seldom. She was of a pale, ivory colour, and, for her race, extremely tall” (1). The narrator presents a hypothetical meeting with the white reader in the colony, identifying Lispeth's clothing, given her by the colonizing Mission, as the only marker of her non-whiteness: “had she not been dressed in the abominable print-cloths affected by Missions, you would, meeting her on the hillside unexpectedly, have thought her the original Diana of the Romans going out to slay” (2). Thus, Lispeth threatens the white supremacy on which the colonizing system is based: the only difference between her and a white woman is the circumstance of her birth.

Lispeth's disordered subject position makes her a distressing figure for both white and non-white characters. Lacking markers of racial difference, colonizers find themselves unable to exploit her: “Her own people hated her because she had, they said, become a white woman and washed herself daily; and the Chaplain’s wife did not know what to do with her. One
cannot ask a stately goddess, five feet ten in her shoes, to clean plates and dishes” (2). Because the colony relies on difference, the absence of difference creates a crisis for the colonizers. Even beyond this, the hyperbolic praise of Lispeth's physical characteristics emphasizes that, evaluated in terms of physiognomy, Lispeth the ostensibly colonized ranks more highly than any of the colonizers around her.

There is a long history of feminizing the Orient in colonialist writing, and the choice to make Lispeth a young Indian woman directly engages the notion of a patriarchal colonizer dominating the passive, feminized colonized. Karyn Huenemann (2009) makes it explicit that “Kipling’s treatment of Indian women is complicated, because it is infused in the inescapable idea of a feminized India” (24). It becomes clear from this framing that the success of imperial ideology in the story will depend in the largest part on its ability to resolve the challenge Lispeth’s identity poses.

This conflict comes to a head when an unnamed Englishman, injured in an accident, is nursed back to health by Lispeth, who falls in love with him. The Englishman's response to finding out about this reveals his cynicism: he never even considers that he might marry her, and sees as his choice whether he wants to sleep with her. The chaplain's wife “spoke to the Englishman, and told him how matters stood in Lispeth’s heart. He laughed a good deal, and said it was very pretty and romantic, but, as he was engaged to a girl at Home, he fancied that nothing would happen” (4). It is interesting that the terms the Englishman uses to describe Lispeth's love for him, “pretty” and “romantic,” are patronizing and infantilizing, but the same terms a middle-class man might use for a young white woman in love in a Victorian novel.

The ideological cynicism that the story teaches is revealed not only in the implicit refusal of the Englishman and the Chaplain's wife to consider Lispeth's shared humanity and breach of racial separation, it is also explicitly described in the positioning of the Englishman as a source of knowledge about India. The narrator describes that the man “wrote a book on the East afterwards. Lispeth's name did not appear there” (5). This is particularly poignant as the “Chaplain christened her Elizabeth, and 'Lispeth' is the Hill or pahari pronunciation” (1). Even this lacuna, as well as the characters and even the narrator, consistently signify the character using the Othering form, while the given English name is left as the erasure beneath the palimpsestic Lispeth. The leaving out of Lispeth's signifier matches completely the model of the colonizer writing a totalizing text about the Orient as described by Said (2003), providing an uncomplicated and completely dichotomous portrait of the relationship of the colonizer and colonized. The refusal to signify the liminal, problematic colonized in an
ostensibly totalizing account of the colony represents the clearest cynicism of the story: in order to maintain ruling ideology, it is necessary to purposefully leave out that which would disturb it.

That the Chaplain's wife and the English agent both exhibit cynicism is clear in their shared unspoken belief that an equal relationship between the Englishman and Lispeth is impossible—and also in their understanding that the Englishman's deception to make Lispeth make love to him is passé.

The Chaplain’s wife thought this a profitable time to let her know the real state of affairs—that the Englishman had only promised his love to keep her quiet—that he had never meant anything, and that it was wrong and improper of Lispeth to think of marriage with an Englishman, who was of a superior clay, besides being promised in marriage to a girl of his own people” (5).

In other words, despite the physical markers that make Lispeth so problematic for Chaplain and his family, she is treated as colonized. Though she has the cultural, linguistic, and physical traits of the colonizer, she still has the clothing given to her by the colonizers that marks her as colonized, as well as the signifier of colonized, which the colonizers enforce. This makes it possible for the Englishman to lie to her, exploit her, and ultimately leave her without any fear of consequences or even moral condemnation.

The narrator, too, sides with the Chaplain's wife and the Englishman in failing to criticize their actions. The only outrage comes from Lispeth's mouth. She frames her subject position clearly in terms of the refusal of the signifier the colonizers placed on her, while simultaneously embracing her role as part of a colonized Indian ethnicity: “to my own people . . . You are all liars, you English” (6). All of the signifiers she now establishes her identity with are terms that connect her to the subject positions of other colonized. In a reversal that speaks to the cynical ideological position of the story, she identifies deception, familiar to the implied reader as a signifier of the colonized, with the colonizers. Despite this seeming condemnation, the text reveals that colonizers must be so in order to fulfill their functions.

The short story closes with a moment that further demonstrates the function of colonizing cynicism, emphasizing that what is in Lispeth's terms the lie of the English is told even to themselves. Colonizing ideology positions cultural conflict between colonizer and colonized as the result of an uncrossable and irreducible racial gap between the two. This idea is expressed by the Chaplain's wife, but exposed by the narrator, who demonstrates instead that it is the cynicism of the Chaplain's wife and the Englishman, not any actual, essential difference, that maintain the colonial relationships in the story despite the problem Lispeth's whiteness presents:
‘There is no law whereby you can account for the vagaries of the heathen,’ said the Chaplain’s wife, ‘and I believe that Lispeth was always at heart an infidel.’ Seeing she had been taken into the Church of England at the mature age of five weeks, this statement does not do credit to the Chaplain’s wife. (6)

This statement bears with it a bitter irony that demonstrates the high degree of the Chaplain’s wife’s misattribution. The narrator emphasizes that Lispeth has all her life been brought up by Christians, and that her reaction is based in that background, no different from the heartbreak a white woman would experience jilted by her lover. Beetoshok Singha (2015) develops this argument at length in her paper, writing that the story is used to expose the cruelty of the white characters, using the figure of a harmed woman to evoke sympathy in the reader. She argues that the “unchristian practice of the people, supposed to hold the great tradition of the religion, made Lispeth once again give ear to her instincts” (16). By mentioning Lispeth’s “instincts,” even Singha seems to adopt the narrative’s underlying signification of Lispeth’s true and essentialized nature. She demonstrates the loss of moral authority of the white characters, yet reproduces the ideological underpinnings of the story: that Lispeth is not, nor ever can be, white.

Thus, the story shows that Lispeth's identity was based neither in nature nor nurture, as she had both the physical characteristics and the cultural knowledge of a white person. The Chaplain's wife recognizes the threat this plays in her crisis that prevents her from putting Lispeth to work, but she ultimately retreats back to a simple ideology that is patently untrue in order to cover for herself the failure of her own signifying system. In other words, she misattributes the cause of the dissonance she identifies between Lispeth's behavior and the role she is assigned by the colonizing system. To do this, she turns to the terms of that system, which have been proven by this human encounter to be insufficient. To repair the breach in her signifying order, the Chaplain's wife attributes her own distress at the turn of events to a totalizing racial ideology, even though everything about Lispeth save her parentage signifies her as English. It is the actions of the unnamed Englishman and the Chaplain's wife that contain the threat of hybridity that Lispeth embodies, and Lispeth expresses this with clear understanding of the brutality behind the colonial encounter, saying, “You have killed Lispeth—there is only old Jadeh's daughter left—the daughter of a pahari” (6). Yet, in the Chaplain's wife's cynicism, this ideology even thus exposed proves more palatable than recognizing the truth this encounter threatens to reveal.

At the end of the story, Lispeth is described in fundamentally ambivalent terms. She appears to have reverted to type, her whiteness and value erased, but simultaneously she tells her story, refusing to be silenced as she is by the Englishman who left her as a lacuna in his
account of India. “She always had a perfect command of English, and when she was sufficiently drunk, could sometimes be induced to tell the story of her first love-affair” (7). The narrator stresses both her subversive control of the colonizer's language and that this was not her last love, contextualizing Lispeth's experiences in terms of her own life's course, not those of the English.

Huenemann (2009) identifies that Lispeth’s later appearance in Kim (1901) belies the narrator’s declaration that she “married a woodcutter who beat her after the manner of paharis, and her beauty faded very soon” (6). It could be said that Kipling simply changed his mind or altered Lispeth’s fate to suit his later narrative, but Huenemann’s suggestion that “it seems unlikely that a woman as strong in herself as Lispeth, with the advantages of learning and beauty that Kipling attributes to her, would end in such a way” (38) opens the possibility that the narrator of “Lispeth” either intentionally invents an ending to the story that suits his ideological position or, not knowing the end of her story, either relied on hearsay or invented an ending in order not to admit his own ignorance. Given the vast importance of knowledge of the Orient in validating the colony, this further demonstrates the fundamental need to contain the threat Lispeth represents.

The anxious conversion of the colonized from almost-European to nearly completely different is described by Bhabha (1994) as a tactic of colonial repression. He writes that the “ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry - a difference that is almost nothing but not quite - to menace - a difference that is almost total but not quite” (91). This anxious “not quite” is likewise contained in Lispeth's own name, which is rendered throughout the story as she herself would say it, constituting a moment of powerful self-naming that the narrator follows. The title of the story is apt: for the colonizing European, the reading of the story mimics the experience of meeting “Lispeth” herself.

Thus, even while exposing its fundamental instability and permeability, this literature reaffirms colonial ideology, demonstrating its necessity in shoring up gaps exposed by the colonial encounter despite its failure to obtain. When the narrator describes Lispeth at the end, he writes “[i]t was hard then to realize that the bleared, wrinkled creature, so like a wisp of charred rag, could ever have been 'Lispeth of the Kotgarth Mission“ (7). Yet the narrator does recognize who Lispeth is and what she signifies, and thereby represents Lispeth's story as what it entails for the colonizing system: a near miss, but also one that automatically sorts itself out through represented impossibility that the implied reader well understands.

The simultaneous threat of mimicry and its careful control through only partial reproduction of white identity is demonstrated in “His Chance in Life.” A mixed-race
“Eurasian” character very briefly manages a heroic moment in defense of his lover against a mob, courage that is represented as the result of the “white part” of his blood. Regarding the story, Indrani Sen argues that “given Kipling's sustained narratorial irony we can never be sure of hidden subversive elements in the figure of the black man who can momentarily summon up his 'white' identity at a moment of crisis” (21). Upon closer examination of the text, it becomes clear that this ostensibly subversive element does not actually threaten.

That racial essentialism shapes the behavior of “Eurasian” characters is signalled by the experienced narrator at the very start in typically Kipling fashion, who writes that in “Eurasians”“[s]ometimes the White shows in spurts of fierce, childish pride—which is Pride of Race run crooked—and sometimes the Black in still fiercer abasement and humility, half heathenish customs and strange, unaccountable impulses to crime” (66). Even actions undertaken by a “Eurasian” that seem to mimic white subjectivity can only do so in a limited and controlled circumstance, and to an incomplete degree.

The desire of colonizer for colonized that is demonstrated in the existence of the hybrid threatens to simultaneously subvert and cross racial separation. Young (1994) argues that it “consists of a bizarre binate operation, in which each impulse is qualified against the other, forcing momentary forms of dislocation and displacement into complex economies of agonistic reticulation” (25). That such a moment of dislocation occurs in the story is clear, as the riot suggests ideological breakage, and yet this displacement only occurs in a place where there is temporarily no white presence, as the white characters have gone away. In other words, what would be displaced by the hybrid has already been previously displaced by the functioning of the official government, and this displacement ends with the return of the white authority figure. Thus, the hybrid only functions as a mimic so long as there is no white presence to endanger.

The text demonstrates this in the climax, when Michele the “Eurasian” goes to the aid of Miss Vezzis, also of mixed race. For a man of mixed race to rescue a white woman is for the text unthinkable, and he is therefore offered a suitable match, the threat of miscegenation thus repressed not by circumstance but by the notion that such a man could only rise to save one whom he is in a position to marry, which he later does. This cynically silences the embodied argument to the contrary that all characters of mixed race demonstrate, that of sexual desire by colonizer for colonized.

The narrator insists that, as Michele restores order after a disastrous decision by a Sub-Judge incited a riot, “the heart of Michele D'Cruze was big and white in his breast, because of his love for Miss Vezzis, the nurse-girl, and because he had tasted for the first time
Responsibility and Success” (70-71). As is seen in so many other places, a character whose mimicry of nominally white courage and authority would otherwise threaten the imperial regime of truth is contained, as only actions that bolster the colony are represented as potentially white.

Afterwards, order is properly restored by the Assistant Collector, and “in the presence of this young Englishman, Michele felt himself slipping back more and more into the native” (71). With the arrival of a completely white character to truly complete reinstating colonial hegemonic control, it is suggested that it is natural for Michele to place himself under such control, instinctively not so much resuming his place as all along having fulfilled only the function his half-caste status allows him. Thereby, Michele can only ever be partially white, and that whiteness, regardless of its potential for destabilization, is always in support of the colony.

In “The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin” may be found an explicitly straightforward example of Kipling’s message to the potential colonizer, with one twist: the protagonist learns the importance of ideology, even when it does not match reality. The text signals its didactic purpose in the first lines, writing, “This is not a tale exactly. It is a Tract; and I am immensely proud of it” (92). The titular McGoggin, an educated young man freshly arrived in India from England, expresses convictions about the nonexistence of God which, while popular in England, are considered potentially disastrous in India, where acting on such beliefs could bring the whole system crashing down. The narrator recalls how McGoggin was received in India:

I do not say a word against this creed. It was made up in Town, where there is nothing but machinery and asphalt and building—all shut in by the fog. Naturally, a man grows to think that there is no one higher than himself, and that the Metropolitan Board of Works made everything. But in this country, where you really see humanity—raw, brown, naked humanity—with nothing between it and the blazing sky, and only the used-up, over-handled earth underfoot, the notion somehow dies away, and most folk come back to simpler theories. ... If the Empress be not responsible to her Maker—if there is no Maker for her to be responsible to—the entire system of Our administration must be wrong. Which is manifestly impossible. (93).

This passage perfectly captures the narrator’s cynical irony while also demonstrating the necessity of the ideology it ironizes. The last two words succinctly express that the knowledge that is manifested by lived experience requires that what is antithetical to the order of truth in the colony must be treated as impossible.

McGoggin annoys the other colonizers with his talk of atheism, and insists that everything can be explained with natural causes. The prospect of verbally acknowledging this
threatens the signifying order of the colony, though the narrator seems to accept that the nonexistence of God is tacitly true. According to Jo Collins (2010), the “dissolution of empire is allegorically implied in McGoggin’s terrifying decline, his realisation that those whom he wants to indoctrinate refuse to be subject to him or acknowledge his views” (84-85). The “terror of the failure and disintegration of the ideology of empire” is never directly written about (Collins 2010, 84). It is broached only in part, enough to demonstrate the danger it causes to all colonizers in the colony.

One day, as McGoggin attempts to explain some atmospheric phenomena, he suddenly is struck with the inability to make language. He finds himself babbling disconnected nonsense: “Perfectly conceivable—dictionary—red oak—amenable—cause—retaining—shuttlecock—” (96). His symbolic order, suited to life in Britain, has failed him completely in the colony, and he loses the ability to control signifiers at all. The doctor explains this with a laconic nautical metaphor, “you'll break down because you are over-engined for your beam” (95). McGoggin is simply not working the way he should. Over time, he recovers his ability to speak, but finds himself alienated from himself. He exclaims, “I'm quite sane; but I can't be sure of my mind, it seems—my OWN memory—can I?” (97). McGoggin is learning, shifting his own subjectivity to one better suited to the colony. Whatever reality is “perfectly conceivable,” he must learn to represent things as though the ideology all colonizers depend on were absolute.

However, his ability to resolve everything into this new system is incomplete, the partial gaps that have been opened by the text still occasionally visible, and the narrator reminds the reader that “This gave him a wholesome feeling of mistrust. The legitimate explanation, that he had been overworking himself, failed to satisfy him. Something had wiped his lips of speech, as a mother wipes the milky lips of her child, and he was afraid—horribly afraid” (97). When he is unable to accept the explanation the more experienced colonizers give him, one that would cynically chalk a complex semiotic phenomenon up to overwork, McGoggin again threatens to lapse into the crippling anxiety his realization of the difference between his education and his experience of the colony creates in him. It is this remaining fear, the knowledge that the problem can never be completely rationalized by church and ideology, that keeps McGoggin from making his semiotic mistake again. If he failed to see the gap in the ideology and embraced it wholeheartedly, he would again be vulnerable were that gap to be levered open by the colonial encounter. Keeping that in mind, he knows enough to instead use that ideology to paper over that gap, which he will,
contrarily, never be able to forget, a simultaneous absence and presence that wards against its own immanence.

Like “Lispeth” and “His Chance in Life,” “Kidnapped” directly represents the threat of hybridity to the British representative order in the colony. Read in the context of the collection as a whole, its position in the text after those two other stories suggests that, after the proper cynical positioning has been signalled, the short story illustrates the employment of this knowledge. In the story, a young Anglo-Indian man named Peythroppe, in love with a “Eurasian” woman, is prevented from performing what is represented as the disastrous decision of marrying her by his friends, who “kidnap” him to keep him from attending the wedding. Despite what other scholars have suggested about the ambivalence or irony of this text, it is never allowed that the decision by Peythroppe’s friends is anything but sound.

In fact, the story starts with an invocation whose irony, while overt, signals cynicism in service of ideology rather than doubt or ambivalence. This introduction insists that marriage must not be left to the young and unmarried, who are too lacking in experience to understand the implications of their actions, but that “mature, married, discreet people” should determine the proper match (111). Sen (2009) argues that the events of the story are characterized by the narrator’s “ambivalent irony,” and that the “underlying sympathy in the narrative for Miss Castries' dignity in grief is accompanied by submerged irony at the community's narrow racial prejudices” (22). These racial prejudices, however, are suggested to be sound and necessary. As is usual in Kipling's colonizing stories, the narrator's ironic comments, such as that there should be a “Matrimonial Department” (111) to arrange the marriages of all officers of the Civil Service, actually serve drive home a point about the discrepancy between the ideals of the homeland and those of the colony. While romance and love are privileged in Britain, they can lead the inexperienced to danger in India. The narrator criticizes the damage such an “alliance” would have for Peythroppe, identifying his career as the whole of his best interest, and writes that it would be “cheaper for Peythroppe to have assaulted a Commissioner with a dog-whip” (113) than to marry into the Castries family.

Though these comments strike those unfamiliar with the colony as ridiculous, those colonizers who understand its lived experience, including the implied reader, are put in the position of agreement with these sentiments. The narrator even parodies the inexperienced British position, suggesting that in viewing Miss Castries “innocent people at home” would refer to her “Spanish complexion,” while it is only implied—and left to the less-innocent implied reader, who is thus drawn into the narrator's circle—that her darker complexion
identifies her native Indian ancestry. Despite the narrator's seeming irony, it becomes clear that what he says is not ironic at all, but in perfect earnest.

Therefore, it can be see that there is no ambivalence about the utility of such cynical thinking. The narrator goes to great lengths not to say directly that the reasons against the marriage are racial in nature, so much so that his insistence and even stammering “[b]ut—but—but—” ensures both that it is understood and involves the reader in the colonial practice of silencing this truth, establishing the reader's role as providing the words of the ban the characters function according to. As the narrator explains, Miss Castries is “for many reasons... 'impossible.' Quite so. All good Mammas know what 'impossible' means. ... The little opal-tinted onyx at the base of her finger-nails said this as plainly as print” (113). Thus, the reader, like the experienced “Mammas,” joins the narrator in identifying physical evidence of racial ancestry, and drawing the desired conclusion. Sen (2000) identifies this as “an almost racist physiological categorisation” (21), but that it is racist is precisely its function. In the story, as throughout Kipling's stories and poems, blood will out and a biologically deterministic delineation can be drawn, even when the subject is “a very good girl and very pious” (113). Like Lispeth, who is said to revert to type after being abandoned, Miss Castries is literally marked by her racial identity.

Out of all of Kipling's stories, “Kidnapped” comes closest to representing a favorable romantic union between a colonizer and colonized. In addition to the narrator's high praise of Miss Castries, it is clear that Peythroppe genuinely loves her It is, however, precisely the narrator's insistence on Miss Castries's positive qualities that illustrates the racial significance of the story. Though the story does not explicitly express it, leaving it for the reader to provide that work from their own lived experience, the story makes it impossible for the reader to take any other position as regards the unsuitability of Miss Castries other than that it is caused by her race. In fact, that she is otherwise suitable is illustrated by the bitter irony of her response after being jilted, as the narrator describes that “she was refined enough to know that ladies kept their broken hearts to themselves” (116). As before, this phrasing carefully locates her as behaving exactly as a white “lady” but not actually being one. That the implied Anglo-Indian reader shares Kipling's narrator's feelings about the potential marriage is demonstrated in the ending of the story, with “little doubt that its first Anglo-Indian readers would have taken Miss Castries to be an 'impossible' match for a promising young British civil servant” (Havhold 2008, 62). The text does not suggest that the colonizer does not feel desire for the colonized, only that it must not be acknowledged openly through the formal
union of marriage, due to the disruption of the rigidity of racial hierarchy that this would create.

The misattribution that marks the diffusing of anxiety created by the representative gap exposed in the text of cynical colonial stories in this case falls on Peythroppe himself, and the narrator insists that it is only because of a temporary madness that an Anglo-Indian would ever consider marrying someone of mixed race, and that this is one of the “sudden madnesses [that] most afflict the sanest men” (113). Like the start of the story, which insists that young people have no business finding matches for themselves, this places the blame for the near-transgression of racial boundaries on inexperience. By the time implied readers get to the end of the story, they understand the importance of the misrepresentation of a wound inflicted by Peythroppe on one of the men who kidnapped him as “caused by the kick of a gun. Twelve-bores do kick rather curiously” (115). Here, misattribution proves to be an explicit lie. In Kipling, those with the most lived experience most see the value of repressing it by cleaving to neat ideological divisions. It is clear that Kipling found his mark in this. Dennis Kincaid (2015) identifies that Kipling's texts influenced the actual behavior of cynical officers in India when seeing a comrade romancing a woman of mixed race, writing that the occasional blushing subaltern, having met one of the daughters at a dance, would be entertained with stifling hospitality, while the rest of the station sneered and quoted Mr. Kipling’s apt descriptions of the wiles of such people and the snares that they set for the young unmarried officer. (303)

This clearly illustrates that, to the serving Anglo-Indians who were not so “blushing” and “young,” Kipling's texts served as a means of marking the delineation in racial boundaries and insisting on behavior that would privilege racial ideology.

*Plain Tales from the Hills* reveals patterns of racial signification that partially expose the ideology of the colonial system, threatening to destabilize the binary of colonizer and colonized that underpins the colonial system. This is only ever a partial exposure, however, and one that is made just enough for the threat to be palpable. It is then averted through a combination of cynical force and a return to an ideology that misattributes the source of this anxiety in order to prevent it from disturbing the implied reader, who is also a colonizer. In “Lispeth,” the white Civil Servant who is saved by Lispeth lies to and then leaves someone whose race makes him incapable of considering a potential wife, despite the narrator's demonstration that nothing else separates her from an English woman. The narrator misattributes this to Lispeth’s inherent “heathen” nature, even while suggesting this is an inaccurate thing to blame. “The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin” is even more direct, as an inexperienced Brit learns that India itself as a place will not allow one to question the
ideology of religion that validates the hierarchy of the British Empire. In “Kidnapped,” the irony of the narrator that Sen (2009) identifies as ambivalent proves to be quite earnest, as the story demonstrates the threat in the marriage of a white colonizer to a native colonized, and stages the need to lie about its circumstances for the sake of colonizer’s career, even when all involved understand its context. That such unions happened regularly in the colony is clear historically, yet Kipling never represents them as anything but a threatening potential which is prevented.

3.2. The Phantom Rickshaw and Other Eerie Tales

The Phantom Rickshaw and Other Eerie Tales (1888) opens with a preface from the author, who insists that the volume is “not exactly a book of real ghost-stories, as the cover makes believe, but rather a collection of facts that never quite explained themselves” (3). Thus, the text signals the reader from the first that it contains narratives that defy easy signification, in other words, that its stories fall in some way outside familiar ideological patterns. Kipling’s authorial persona goes on to explain that

[all the collector can be certain of is that one man insisted upon dying because he believed himself haunted; another man either made up a wonderful fiction, or visited a very strange place; while the third man was indubitably crucified by some person or persons unknown, and gave an extraordinary account of himself. (3)]

Here again the text playfully blurs the distinction between dependable fact and conjecture, suggesting the reader “can be certain” that, in one case, either one thing happened or another. Which choice readers must make in order to preserve their own identity and agency will be suggested by the text. In this manner, the book locates the reader as an arbiter in signification. Readers must decide for themselves what each story signifies, taking an active role in meaning-making that imparts to the reader the importance of actively reframing and misattributing sources of colonizing anxiety.

“The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes” has received much attention from Kipling scholars, and rightly so, as its story lends itself remarkably to postcolonial readings. In it, an Englishman stumbles across an encampment where those who are “the Dead who did not die but may not live” (41) are forced to reside, under guard by unseen sentries who fire on anyone who tries to leave. This place, between a steep embankment and a river, forms a clear zone of indistinction where the barriers between English and Indian, colonizer and colonized, and even living and dead become blurred. This blurring threatens both the symbolic order of the empire and the life of the titular Jukes, who only survives by abandoning his ideological principles to not harm those beneath him. As Gail Ching-Liang Low (2005) writes, “[t]he
formerly respectable and unruffled ‘average Englishman’ is in a short space of time effortlessly transformed into the voice of the murderous and violent Sahib of the village (113). In becoming so, he abandons the behavior of a man who believes in the altruistic enterprise of the colony, but he does not abandon the belief itself. “Morality is blunted by consorting with the Dead who are alive” (63). When he learns viciousness, he is rescued by his servant, the dutiful subaltern who, unlike the living dead of the colony, is signified as knowing his place. Thus, the story demonstrates both that colonizers must learn not to base their actions on their ideology, and also that colonizers rely on the colonized to uphold their position in the racial hierarchy, and are helpless without this clear separation of roles.

After an introduction by the frame narrator who insists that the village described “is known to exist” and names another like it, lending the legitimizing voice of the colonizer’s knowledge of the Orient to the story, Jukes’s narration opens with his telling of a fever that leaves him weak and delusional, entering into an unreliable frame familiar to readers of Victorian ghost stories and seeming to contradict the previous statements. Jukes describes that, in order to gain peace from the incessant baying of the local dogs, he had killed one and strung it up as a warning to the others, but that the other dogs all devoured it (42). This opening incident establishes the theme of casual and extreme violence to pacify others, and the parallels with the later story are clear. The native population is signified as brute animals, and their natural behavior—baying at the moon—is found to be annoying to the Englishman, whose act of violence is justified for the sake of his own comfort, given his illness. As in so many Kipling stories, malaria is referred to only as a fever, and its coming spoke of as if it were an expected and natural result of existing in the colonized space.

The narrator resolves to kill another dog from horseback with a hog-spear, creating a ghoulish image reminiscent of a cavalry charge, but his fever prevents him from controlling his pony properly, which gallops off with him. Jukes struggles just to stay on the pony, inflicting damage with his spurs on the animal, “as the marks next morning showed” (43) in order to remain in his place. Jukes loses consciousness, and wakes in a village of hovels dug into the sand reminiscent of graves, bounded by the river on one side and a steep “crater” on the other. The village, separated as it is from the rest of the world, represents a liminal space where the breakdown of colonial authority can play out in the story without threatening the colony proper. Because Jukes is able to both enter and leave this space, the threat is both geographically and ideologically contained.

When Jukes attempts to escape across the river, he finds himself fired on by a “regulation Martini-Henry ‘picket’” (45), the standard rifle of the contemporary Indian Army.
Thus, he finds his position in the colonial hierarchy reversed, fired on by an invisible agent of colonial order literally to keep him in his place. This is when Jukes approaches the villagers of the horseshoe-shaped crater and experiences the extent to which the colonizing order that grants him his status and position has been overturned. Jukes shows himself to be very conscious of the position he should nominally have as a result of his signified subject position within the colonial hierarchy. As he is “accustomed to a certain amount of civility from [his] inferiors,” he “approaching the crowd naturally expected that there would be some recognition of [his] presence” (45). When they laugh at him, this laughter is represented as more horrible than any other response—which it may well be, for the colonized to laugh at the colonizer, rejecting completely the ideological racial system of the colony.

This is immediately followed by an almost literal specter of colonial anxiety, a former mimic man, in the terminology employed by Bhabha (1994), stripped of the identity assigned him by the colonizer and become a monstrous figure. Gunga Dass, whose former mastery of English had allowed him to make puns, “a peculiarity which made [Jukes] remember him long after [he] had forgotten his services for [him] in his official capacity” (46). Postcolonial theory makes it clear why Jukes remembered him, and why it is such a figure who appears to him in this nightmare scenario. As Bhabha (1994) explains, the figure of the mimic man problematizes the Signs of racial and cultural priority, so that the 'national' is no longer naturalizable. What emerges between mimesis and mimicry is a writing, a mode of representation, that marginalizes the monumentality of history, quite simply mocks its power to be a model, that power which supposedly makes it imitable. (88)

Jukes describes that all of the signifiers that marked Dass as an agent of the colonial government, “[c]aste-mark, stomach, slate-coloured continuations, and unctuous speech” have all been removed from him, leaving him shriveled and filthy (46). Nevertheless, Jukes’s response to him is to turn to him to explain things. Here he demonstrates what is always an unforgiveable mistake for a colonizer in Kipling: not having complete knowledge of the colony, and especially of making himself vulnerable by turning to the colonized to correct that lack.

As Gunga Dass explains the situation, he makes it clear that they are in a place where the binary between life and death breaks down: “There are only two kinds of men, Sir. The alive and the dead” (47), though those dying of cholera fall into categories such as “only little alive” and “too lively” (48). To emphasize the breakdown of barriers and taboos that results from his liminal position, he makes a veiled reference to resorting to cannibalism in this place between life and death, saying that “Now I am a dead man and eat—... crows, and—other
things” (48). The extent to which all hierarchy of binary oppositions has been overturned becomes clear shortly. Low (2005) notes that “[i]n this grotesque and inverted world of the living dead, life is a mockery of colonial relations” (112). When Jukes draws from his pocket four anna coins, Gunga Dass threatens to kill him if he does not hand them over, which he does “as if it were the most natural thing in the world” (50). This in particular is crucial, as it represents the threat that, without the hierarchy of the empire, it is natural for the colonized to kill the colonizer with no compulsion. Jukes relates his horrified response to his racial background: “A Briton’s first impulse, I believe, is to guard the contents of his pockets” (50), but he surrenders the money, noting the impossibility of “differing with the one man who had it in his power to make me comfortable; and with whose help it was possible that I might eventually escape from the crater” (50). The colonizer finds himself at the mercy of the colonized.

The story hints, but does not fully lay bare, just how far Jukes has fallen from the position of imperial power. He notes that those around him “were lower than any beasts” (50), passing over his own place among them, though this is immediately followed by him accepting the food Gunga Dass provides. The narrator literally ends up eating crow. Gunga Dass describes him as being one of those who has entered the indistinct space between life and death: “you are dead, my dear friend. It is not your fault, of course, but, none the less, you are dead and buried” (51). His racial status and superiority are washed away, and no distinction made between Englishman and native Indian. “Here was a Sahib, a representation of the dominant race, helpless as a child and completely at the mercy of his native neighbours” (52). Gunga Dass threatens to force the narrator to catch crows for him, and together they will eat crows until the end of their lives.

The ultimate horror of the story is revealed when the narrator discovers that another Englishman had been to the crater before, and Gunga Dass had killed him with his own gun (59). Thus, the colonizer was killed by the colonized with the tool of violence by which he had maintained colonial law. The nameless dead Englishman had been engaged in measuring out an escape route with the barrel of his gun, the tool of his nominal control. In his notebook, he describes the distances in precise measures, mirroring the scientific knowledge employed in which colonial knowledge is based. When Jukes attempts to make use of the escape the dead man had planned, he commits the same mistake, falling back on a literal measure of Indian space reminiscent of the great Geographic Surveys. This demonstrates that Jukes has not learned his lesson, attempting once again to rely on the means of authority granted by imperial ideology and not on violence. Sergeant (2013) notes this same contrast, as Jukes
"seems to have gained a means of escape that utilizes the logical reasoning and practicality which justify and maintain both his profession and the Anglo-Indian position. And it avails him nothing" (47). The story suggests the gun cannot be used merely as a measuring tool, delineating what is safe through its scientific application. Indeed, Gunga Dass uses the gun barrel to attack and overpower the narrator. Gunga Dass disappears.

When the narrator wakes, he hears the voice of his servant Dunnoo calling him. Dunnoo dangles a rope down and the narrator uses it to escape the crater. Jukes’s other servants had refused to help, seeming to confirm Gunga Dass’s prediction that no help would come, but Dunnoo defies this, proving the importance of native loyalty to the survival of the colony. In the words of Low (2005), “[t]he good native is upheld as a fetish against the nightmarish conflictual relations of empire and allows the narrative to attain a degree of equilibrium. Dunnoo returns Jukes to a semblance of normality” (114). Normality, in this case, clearly comes with a shift in Jukes’s strategies of signification.

In the crater, finding himself in a space where death, life, colonizer, and colonized all threaten to lose their meanings, Jukes resorts to bare violence to force the control his lost imperial authority had granted him. The story unfolds deep colonial anxieties about the constructed racial hierarchy between colonizer and colonized, but only partially exposes this ideology, framing it in a zone of indistinction which is then escaped and forgotten. The anxiety the story raises is not entirely relieved, as Gunga Dass’s fate remains a mystery. He embodies the formerly repressed mimic man, who has control of English and thus wields the signifiers of imperial control, who has left the colonial hierarchy and threatens to destabilize it. He is contrasted against the loyal native, Dunnoo, upon whom Jukes also relies for his survival, demonstrating the interdependence between the two. Thus, the story positions the anxious colonizer as trapped between two forms of colonized, the resistant and the loyal, and having discovered a single way of exerting his authority in his direst need—bare violence.

The novella *The Man Who Would Be King* suggests what occurs when the anxiety created by the exposure of the dissonance between colonizing ideology and lived experience is not cynically repressed. Unlike any other story by Kipling, it depicts a failed attempt at colonization, together with the devastating and deadly consequences on colonizing subjects who fail to uphold the imperial racial signifying order. Even in this story, it is made clear that the ostensible colony in question is not actually a part of the British Empire, and the failure of the would-be colonizers only serves as a warning to actual colonizers. Even so, of all Kipling’s literary output it comes closest to representing the end of empire, and consequently it stages the most horrifying ending. While the protagonists of “On the City Wall” or “The
Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin” are pulled back from the brink of the complete dissolution of subjectivity that the end of the colonial regime of truth threatens, those of *The Man Who Would Be King* literally plunge over its edge.

As a result, this text guides the colonizer to a contradictory position to avoid this anxiety: even the colonizer who perceives the ideological impossibility of the imperialistic system of signification is led to supporting that system, as it is presented as the only bulwark against the dissolution of the Empire and the self, which are the same. Its principle characters experience the full force of the anxiety that threatens the colonizer in the colony, and their failure to dispel the representational crisis this presents leads to the breakdown of their own sense of self. In this, we see a curious case of a fundamental error in colonial signification: two erstwhile colonizers identify their subjects as English. To call this an error, of course, presupposes that there is a fundamental distinction in race itself, which is a necessary presupposition for colonial ideology to function. As has been discussed, the recognition of shared humanity that threatens in the colony must be misattributed by the colonizer if they would not be exposed to the destabilizing effect of cognitive dissonance. The story exposes that this is a construction, one dependent on language rather than an external, independent signifier, an imagined fundamental difference in skin. The power of this signifying process is revealed in the dire consequences of its breach: both of the men responsible for it not only die but lose their status as signified subjects, demonstrating a break even from their own names and senses of themselves.

In *The Man Who Would Be King*, Rudyard Kipling crafts the story of two Englishmen, Daniel Dravot and Peachey Carnehan, who travel into then-unknown Kafiristan in modern-day Afghanistan, where one of them briefly rules as king. While it would be tempting to read the story as a condemnation of the arrogance of empire, a closer reading reveals that the actual power of actual colonial discourse is never questioned, nor is its execution in British colonies. As Raymond Brebach (2010) shows of the pair, “their plan is the loafer's version of the European colonial enterprise, stripped of all pretensions to higher moral purpose or exalted ends” (77). What Brebach calls “pretensions,” however, is ideology, which proves to be the missing ingredient to this failed colonial endeavor.

Because of the characters’ failure to deploy colonial binaries, the novella creates a complex semiotic paradox: when the adventurers identify the natives of Kafiristan as English, the resulting crisis of representation leads to disaster for them, as they attempt to rule a nation they must treat as simultaneously white and non-white. In their effort to do so, they cause a collapse in the hegemonic order they attempt to construct, one which fragments along the
lines of racialized identity. By the end of the story, both characters have been divested of their own signifiers: Daniel Dravot’s decapitated head wears a meaningless crown and Peachey Carnehan is a raceless, nameless vagabond who dies after relating his narrative. Thus, the story reinforces the necessity of the colonizer-colonized dichotomy to allow the ideological construct of not only empire but European identity to exist.

This dichotomy requires both colonizer and colonized to fulfil their ideological roles, though by no means equally or with similar agency. This is demonstrated by Bhabha (1994), who calls on the examination of the “repertoire of positions of power and resistance, domination and dependence that constructs colonial identification subject (both colonizer and colonized)”(67). He calls this system of representation the “regime of truth” of colonial power (67). He observes that it is key to the success of colonial power that its subjects not recognize its functioning through the denial of the “play of difference”:

What is denied the colonial subject, both as colonizer and colonized, is that form of negation which gives access to the recognition of difference. It is that possibility of difference and circulation which would liberate the signifier of skin/culture from the fixations of racial typology, the analytics of blood, ideologies of racial and cultural dominance or degeneration. (75)

This liberation, if it can be called that, bursts to the surface in violence in Kipling’s novella owing to a physical trait that threatens to destabilize the racializing signifier of skin: the colonized subjects in Kafiristan, the subjects of Daniel Dravot’s crown, are white. This is first suggested when the adventurers read in the narrator’s office: “‘Dan, they’re a stinkin’ lot of heathens, but this book here [the Encyclopedia Britannica] says they think they’re related to us English’” one of them exclaims (Kipling 1888, 165). Even in the name of the Encyclopedia Britannica is an explicit exposure of the role of ideology constructed by the English to totalize and thereby colonize this space. The characters implicitly believe this tool of colonial knowledge. When they encounter the people of Kafiristan in person, this representation implanted in the English by the text becomes, as Said shows, the framework through which they experience the potential colony: “They was fair men – fairer than you or me – with yellow hair and remarkable well built” (171). Over time, the two Englishmen come to the conclusion that the Kafirs have followed the imagined path of racial improvement to the point that they have actually become not only white but English. In the colonial discourse, it is impossible for English to colonize other English, though this impossibility is never put into words by the two adventurers. It seems to be, however, their inability to perpetuate the racializing colonial gaze of the English subject in the colony that leads to their downfall, as
signifiers become tangled and the necessary division between colonizer and colonized, so strongly rooted in what Bhaba calls skin/culture, is violated.

That the story's conflict is based in a struggle to properly represent the subject position of those one encounters is visible from the very start. The story's epigraph reads, “Brother to a Prince and fellow to a beggar if he be found worthy”, to which the narrator remarks, “I have been fellow to a beggar again and again under circumstances which prevented either of us finding out whether the other was worthy” (161). At the very beginning of the novella, the reader is informed that the circumstances of the narrator’s life have prevented him from truly recognizing those who are signified differently from himself. The narrator, who has never been outside the space dominated by the British Empire, has never experienced an encounter beyond borders controlled by the imperial signifying system. It is only through listening to Dravot's story that he faces the representational gap that emerges at the limit of imperial power. Dravot and Carnehan have experienced what is beyond those “circumstances,” and both suffered what are shown as catastrophic consequences.

This violation makes it impossible for the adventurers to enact the colonial ideology necessary to exercise power over their subjects. The ability to reproduce the ideology that allows them to rule is necessary for any ruler. Power is rooted in ideology. As Louis Althusser (1971) writes, “reproduction of labour power requires... reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’” (133). The emphasis on language—‘in words’—is of foremost importance. It is in the semiotic ability to manipulate the ideological function of words that power is constructed. The colonial enterprise hinges on the language of empire, rooted so firmly in racialized terms.

To understand why the entire colonial system of signification breaks down so completely in the story, we look to the way the colonizer and colonized mutually signify themselves and each other. This includes the internalized other, the conception of otherness upon which the sense of self is based. This otherness exists within the heterogeneity of the subject as well, which seeks to represent itself despite its recognition of the ambivalence of its own names. Bhabha (1994) writes, “Both colonizer and colonized are in a process of misrecognition where each point of identification is always a partial and double repetition of the otherness of the self – democrat and despot, individual and servant, native and child” (97). While the colonized are represented through actual contact with the colonizers, the colonizers construct their own identity through their relationship with a created Other formed
by their own discourse. So we see how the course of the encounter in the novella erases each of the identities inscribed in Dravot and Carnehan: English, white, god, even their names.

The whiteness of the colonized Kafirs, like that of the adventurers, is constructed by the colonizers’ discourse. It is created by the colonizers’ control of ideology in the colony. The colonized themselves never claim the signifier “white.” What race they believe themselves to be is never in question; we could well doubt whether they have a concept of race at all, as their response to the otherness of the Englishmen is to represent them as gods.

It is never in doubt that the people of Kafiristan are not actually related by blood to the English, but this is not related to how race is produced. The crisis of representation that plays out in the mountains of Afghanistan is one that can only be made possible by the colonial regime of truth, which represents racialized identity not by origin but by the skin itself, skin which signifies no difference between colonizer and colonized in Kafiristan. In this place, the ideological framework of the colony becomes visible through its inability to accurately represent difference by marking a distinction between the Englishmen and their subjects. It is telling that a paradox appears: if the colonized are already English, there would be no need to colonize them, but this is Dravot’s returning ambition: to present Kafiristan as a new jewel in the crown of the Queen, the Empress of India. He explains his dreams to Peachey Carnehan: “When everything was shipshape, I’d hand over the crown – this crown I’m wearing now – to Queen Victoria on my knees, and she’d say: ‘Rise up, Sir Daniel Dravot’” (180). Dravot’s dream of bringing English mercenaries to the mountains to train himself an English nation comes to nothing, destroying itself like an Ouroboros of ideological self-contradiction.

Were the people of Kafiristan, unexplored by white people, simply white in a sense not connected to any outside existence, the novella might be categorized as utopia or satire, worlds in which it does tread. But this whiteness is never suggested to be factually true. In other words, this whiteness is not self-constituting, as no whiteness is, though this has no Other to use as object. It is worth adding to this, that the whiteness of the colonized is always represented through the eyes of the Englishmen. It is Dravot and Carnehan who declare the Kafirs to be “English.” Underlining this representation is the startling revelation that the people they meet are Freemasons, though they themselves have no concept of Freemasonry and only unknowingly repeat signs passed to them from previous generations. As Dravot and Carnehan are both high-ranking Masons, they exploit this knowledge to gain power over the others. Just as they dream of establishing a kingdom, they construct the idea of forming a Grand Lodge in the mountains, doubly marking the colonized as English through initiation into secrets that only the privileged may know:
The Chiefs and the priests can work a Fellow Craft Lodge in a way that’s very like ours, and they’ve cut the marks on the rocks, but they don’t know the Third Degree, and they’ve come to find out. It’s Gord’s Truth! I’ve known these long years that the Afghans knew up to the Fellow Craft Degree, but this is a miracle. A God and a Grand-Master of the Craft am I, and a Lodge in the Third Degree I will open, and we’ll raise the head priests and the Chiefs of the villages. (175)

This plan is also grounded in a contradiction in racial ideology, one in which the colonizing stereotype internalized by the white author himself and his audience may also be found: though they know the signs and handshakes of the Freemasons, the people of Kafiristan take the signs Dravot gives them as proof of his divinity. Transgressing what his own English identity would call on as a mutual recognition of Englishness, Dravot decides to play this role of a god, and his mortal being—indeed, the permeability of his very skin—proves to be their undoing when his bride, selected by force, bites him out of fear on their wedding day.

Another sign of this process of recognizing their subjects as white—deracializing or rather transracializing them, to coin a term—is that of the conflation of the identities of the chiefs with those of the white men the Englishmen have known in their travels. The signifiers of the men from Kafiristan are replaced with those of white men:

Then the Chiefs come round to shake hands, and they were so hairy and white and fair it was just shaking hands with old friends. We gave them names according as they was like men we had known in India – Billy Fish, Holly Dilworth, Pikky Kergan, that was Bazar-master when I was at Mhow, and so on, and so on. (177)

Although they are given the signifiers of Englishmen, these men do not become English, nor are they truly treated as English by the adventurers. Although they repeatedly insist that their subjects are English or have become English, Dravot and Carnehan rule like colonizers. In a sense, their subjects take on a heightened version of the identity of the Otherized subject. Thus, they are simultaneously under the ideological regime of their colonizers and of their own resistance to it, both identities determined by the power dynamic between them the colonizer and the colonized.

In granting the chiefs the names and distinctions of white men, Dravot and Carnehan make a fundamental error in representation, failing to preserve the narrative defined by the racial distinction between whiteness and non-whiteness. On the other hand, this gesture can also be read as the perfect culmination of the task of the Orientalist in crafting a defining narrative for the Orient, as discussed previously related to the Western construction of colonizing texts. As Said (2003) describes in Orientalism, it is
the professional Orientalist's job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of the Orient or the Oriental; fragments, such as those unearthed by Sacy, supply the material, but the narrative shape, continuity, and figures are constructed by the scholar, for whom scholarship consists of circumventing the unruly (un-Occidental) nonhistory of the Orient with orderly chronicle, portraits, and plots. (151)

The Orientalist practice of constructing and quantifying the Other is amply demonstrated by Dravot's immediate plot to take a survey of his dominions: “I’ll take a census in the spring if the priests don’t get frightened. There must be a fair two million of ’em in these hills.” (179). He at once puts this in terms of furthering the imperial ambitions of the English and putting his new subjects to the task of fighting for the Queen: “Two million people – two hundred and fifty thousand fighting men – and all English! They only want the rifles and a little drilling. Two hundred and fifty thousand men, ready to cut in on Russia’s right flank when she tries for India” (179). Ironically, the most ordered history that these men can create, one whose shape and figure is most in keeping with Western ideology, is that of the West itself—but in this they err, by removing the distinction between themselves and their subjects. As will be shown, this is simultaneously the disintegration of the colonialist project, because it takes away the ideological capacity to rule the colony.

Sharleen Mondal (2014) examines the novella in terms of British race theory and identifies this representational error as a “slippage,” one that exposes the inability of the colonial imagination to represent something that is simultaneously white—the most important signifier of the colonizer—and a colonized subject. She explores this failure in terms of the bodies of the characters themselves and the threat of miscegenation, itself an ever-present danger to the totality of the colonial distinction between ruler and ruled. “The same slippage between the Kafirs’ Englishness, on the one hand, and that they are not-yet-English-enough, on the other, manifests in Dravot’s desire to marry a Kafir woman” (743). As Mondal demonstrates, Dravot’s reference to the White Rajah of Sarawak—”Rajah Brooke” (Kipling 1888, 180)—reveals that “miscegenation” was a part of his plan from even before he set foot in Kafiristan. Like the white rulers of the Kingdom of Sarawak on Borneo, Dravot intends to use marriage to cement his hold of the region and produce a dynasty. As we will see, the piling up of representational failures leads to the crisis point at which the people of Kafiristan rise up against their erstwhile king and god.

When the representational crisis brought on by the ideological slippage of the Englishmen occurs, the ideological system that constructs the identity of the characters becomes destroyed on a personal scale. The characters, beyond the borders of the British Empire, can no longer rely on the ubiquity of the colonial signifying system. Instead,
colonizers have to carry the empire with them, in the form of the language that inscribes the bodies, discourses, and relationships of its subjects. Bhaba (1994) describes this discourse thus: “The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction” (70). These characters fail to do so.

When they enter into Kafiristan, Dravot and Carnehan revel in the idea of entering a space not yet marked by the colonial order of discourse, contrasting it with India, which they complain is ruined by the severity of colonial law: “The country isn’t half worked out because they that governs it won’t let you touch it. They spend all their blessed time in governing it, and you can’t lift a spade, nor chip a rock, nor look for oil, nor anything like that, without all the Government saying, ‘Leave it alone, and let us govern’” (163). It is particularly this speech act, delineating what is and is not allowed, that causes the pair to search for a part of the world not yet marked by imperial control, a white spot on the map they can inscribe with their own words and signifying order. Confoundingly, this white spot is already filled with white bodies, those of the fair-skinned Kafirs, and in this whiteness-that-is-not-whiteness lies another danger. The Kafirs, yet untouched by the colonizing gaze, are as white as the map, and in their unordered, unracialized identities rests the potential for a colonized subject other than the one universally signified by colonial rhetoric.

Dravot and Carnehan do not see that they bring with them the ideology of Englishness, which in part leads to their downfall when they misapply it to the people of Kafiristan. In entering the mountains of Kafiristan, blank though they may be on the map, the Englishmen bring with them their ideological matrixes of identities and signifiers. These owe their existence to the Other, the brown, inferior colonized identity that is “half savage and half child,” to quote Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden.” As Pratt (2004) writes, “…empires create in the imperial center of power an obsessive need to present and re-present its peripheries and its others continually to itself. It becomes dependent on its others to know itself” (4). Drawing from Bhabha, Bényei (2011) points out that what is at stake is not a universal system of representation but the European system of representation, which is fundamentally based in the language of racial Otherness. The British identity—as opposed to the merely English identity—particularly relies on its colonized Other for its own existence. In the case of the British Empire, it is vital that this Other is not only an imagined, constructed subject, which it is, but also that it is a collection of the specific bodies under British rule that are inscribed by the gaze of British signification. Without the signified colonized Other, the European identity breaks down.
This breakdown in identity is signaled by the fate of Peachey Carnehan, who returns to British India with his identity torn away, no longer signified even by his name. After the collapse of the enterprise and the death of Daniel Dravot, Peachey returns to India, where he meets the narrator again. There, the narrator fails to recognize Peachey, as he has been stripped of the things that signified him. Peachey, after first asking “Don’t you recognize me?”

reminds the narrator of his name. His name is all that is left to him, but even proves to have become detached from him, as he frequently refers to himself in the third person in his confused narration:

‘What did you and Daniel Dravot do when the camels could go no farther because of the rough roads that led into Kafiristan?’

‘What did which do? There was a party called Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan that was with Dravot. Shall I tell you about him? He died out there in the cold. Slap from the bridge fell old Peachey....’ (170)

Peachey’s use of which and not who in this instance is particularly telling. In his reading, “you,” rather than indicating the relationship between the speaker and the listener, instead seeks the name of Peachey Carnehan. This utterance has become separated from the person and therefore could signify any number of others, forcing Peachey to ask “which” of these the narrator could mean. Peachey describes Dravot’s fall as his own death, a symbolic destruction that brought with it the very real devastation of his signified self. The signifier “Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan” has lost its gesture at meaning within the signifying system it was meant to function in, revealing itself as a distinction separate from the body that returned from Kafiristan. The word which also suggests the question “Which Peachey?”, as he has moved between many: Loafer, warrior, king, and god, all defined by their whiteness, to the final—the wretch—who has lost even that unifying signifier.

The physical transformation of Peachey, stripped of his signifiers, visually reveals his condition when he is first (re)introduced: “...there crept to my chair what was left of a man. He was bent into a circle...” (169). He is bent in a circle, a closed system, unable to look forward or back or even to see anything beyond his own feet. This reflects his status as a signifier with no opposite to define itself in terms of, attempting to signify itself without a signifying chain and failing to do so. Lacan (1966) describes that no signifier exists on its own, but all exist within a network in which “only the correlations between signifier and signifier supply the standard”(121). Although he has not lost his ability to see, Peachey has lost his ability to differentiate himself from others. He confuses himself with Dravot, as though the fate of the two were one. In essence, this is the case: both have lost their role as
speaking subjects, though Carnehan continues to exist bodily for one last speech act: he passes on his narrative and then ceases to be.

This distinction between white and non-white has been a cornerstone of postcolonial theory since its inception. Through this creation of an essential racialized separation between the colonizer and the colonized, further representation becomes possible: the representation of the colonizer as the civilized and vindicated bringer of culture and the representation of the colonized as the “poor benighted heathen,” to quote Kipling’s poem “The Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” which is echoed in Carnehan’s own judgement that “they’re a stinkin’ lot of heathens” (165). In this ideology, it was not only acceptable but necessary to create the imperial system, one which inscribes its most fundamental tenet into the skin of its subjects, both white and non-white. In this way, the creation of the racial Other also created the white subject. As Kipling’s novella richly demonstrates, the destabilization of the Other simultaneously threatens the identity of the white characters themselves.

In the absence of the peripheral, Othered subject, Carnehan is held together only by the gaze of the narrator, the eyes of a colonizing Englishman in India. Peachey’s whiteness has not been taken away, but rather has lost its signifying power, as in Kafiristan he has no peripheral identity to set it against. As a result, he is left only as the most basic signified subject, that of the direct gaze. It is this alone that can give coherence to his identity, can grant him subjecthood, and he begs the narrator not to waver in providing him the constitutive power of his gaze: “‘I ain’t mad – yet, but I shall be that way soon. Of course I remember. Keep looking at me, or maybe my words will go all to pieces. Keep looking at me in my eyes and don’t say anything’” (170). Only through an act of making himself the subject of a colonizer’s gaze can Peachey not “go to pieces,” maintaining enough of an illusion of homogeneity to construct a unified narrative.

The unifying effect of the narrator’s gaze relies on Peachey’s ability to construct his own narrative, which is itself called into question by his badly cracked sense of selfhood, as his decentered idea of “Peachey” and himself demonstrates. This is shown in the next lines, in which the narrator threatens to disrupt the sequence of the narrative by noticing the marks of Peachey’s crucifixion. “I leaned forward and looked into his face as steadily as I could. He dropped one hand upon the table and I grasped it by the wrist. It was twisted like a bird’s claw, and upon the back was a ragged red diamond-shaped scar” (170). Peachey, in a panic, insists that the narrator must provide the imperial, white gaze that fixes his subjectivity, and begs him not to break the string of his constructed narrative: “‘No, don’t look there. Look at me,’ said Carnehan. ‘That comes afterwards, but for the Lord’s sake don’t distract me” (170).
The narrative Carnehan tells is rife with racial contradictions, revealing the impossibility of at once representing a group as English and also as colonized subjects. To be English, in the colonizing “regime of truth,” is to be a colonizer. To be colonized is to be non-English. When Dravot demands a local woman for his wife, Carnehan insists that he treat her as English, which he has been led to represent her as. He insists to Dravot, “‘Keep your hair on, Dan,’ said I; ‘and ask the girls. That’s how it’s done at Home, and these people are quite English.’” (180). As his quote shows, his ideological framework would allow him to treat a woman represented as English no different from an Englishwoman in England. English, after all, is English.

Although she is represented as white, the woman Dravot chooses to be his forced bride displays the religious ideological system of her polytheistic people. Dravot, who himself has adopted the role of a god, thereby renders the people of Kafiristan doubly his subjects: not only racially but as the mortal subjects of a divine being. She believes that she will die if she is exposed to Dravot’s true nature. As “Billy Fish” explains, “There are all sorts of Gods and Devils in these mountains, and now and again a girl marries one of them and isn’t seen any more. ... She thinks she’s going to die” (182). Despite the Englishmen’s attempts to convince their followers that they can decide not to kill her, they object that “she’ll have to” die. Once the Englishmen accept the role of gods—“if, after seeing us as long as they had, they still believed we were Gods, ‘twasn’t for me to undeceive them” (182)—they are bound to the rules of this identity.

As suggested by Althusser (2014), this failure of the system set up by Dravot and Carnehan can be explained in terms of its inability to be reproduced, to be passed with meaning in discourse. In a Foucauldian sense, the contradiction in the power positions—signifying subjects as simultaneously Englishness and nonEnglishness—fails “to structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 1982, 221), to create a coherent framework within which the potential behavior of others can be acted on, the “actions upon other action” (220). Perhaps the ultimate sign of the failure of the Englishmen to create a reproducible discourse is in their own reversion to standard imperialist signifiers when they turn to violence—which Foucault identifies as the limit of power—to make up for the failure to create a coherent signifying system.

According to Kaori Nagai (1999), the ideological basis of *The Man Who Would Be King* is in the Englishmen’s attempt to present themselves as gods. As the colonial regime of truth relies on the distinction between the white and the non-white, so it can be said that the division Dravot and Carnehan attempt to construct is that between the divine and the mortal:
gods ruling the English. For this to succeed, Nagai demonstrates the necessity of sending two white men: “Naturally, only one of the two becomes a king/god as he writes his name into this symbolic space. The other is left in the position of companion to, and observer of, the white king” (98). The importance of this observer is to provide a discursive space, an audience and a gaze to fix the signification of the god. In this, Carnehan fails: Dravot is never a god to him, and he is also unable to maintain Dravot’s signification of his godhood.

Although Carnehan’s narrative repeatedly stresses that physically there is no difference between the two English adventurers and the “English” they find in the mountains, these people become racialized when it comes to violence against them. Here, Carnehan readopts the racialized language of the imperialist conqueror, stressing the brownness of those they perpetrate hegemonic violence against. In this, the necessary racialization for the enactment of violence on the colonized subjects is aptly demonstrated, revealing another crack in the splintered matrix of ideologies and constructed identities they have formed. Indeed, this reveals the ultimate failure of the signifying system the two men have created: that they fall back on the familiar order, with its justification for white violence on non-white bodies, which their own representation of their subjects as white fails to do. We can mention that this testifies to the iterability of the colonial regime of truth: it is capable of being applied even to those whose bodies are white, exposed to it by their subject position as colonized.

When Carnehan fires his rifle at warriors who have become his enemies, he refers to violence specifically against their skin, firing into the “brown of” the men. In four separate instances, the narrator describes the protagonists “firing into” the “brown of” the Kafirs, such as when

Carnehan sights for the brown of the men half a mile across the snow and wings one of them. (173)
... we three Martinis firing into the brown of the enemy. (174)
...so I fired into the brown of ’em with an English Martini and drilled three beggars in a line. (184)
...old Peachey fired his last cartridge into the brown of ’em. (186)

This shows that the Brownness of the men is the target of the Englishmen’s aggression, as violence upon the race of the racialized body. The colonial construction of this Brownness is made clear by the two men’s insistence otherwise on the whiteness of those they now do violence to, whiteness that is only called into doubt amidst violence. The narrator sees no contradiction in insisting on the whiteness of the people of Kafiristan in one passage and then referring to their Brownness when they come into violent conflict; in fact, this is completely in line with colonizing ideology. It is necessary for their targets to be
Brown to justify this violence, so Brown they are, as racialization and separation into white and non-white is necessary to create the hegemonic hierarchy of the colony.

Furthermore, when the people rise up against the men who pretended to be gods, the Englishmen automatically frame it in terms of the colonial experience in India. “This business is our ’Fifty-Seven” Carnehan tells Dravot, referring to the Indian Rebellion (184). Cast in the role of rebels by Carnehan—and, notably, never of wronged English taking their revenge for the deception and the attempt to forcefully marry one of them—the people of Kafiristan are metaphorically connected with the subaltern subjects of India. When representing forces violently opposing their rule, the white Englishmen have no signifier to use but that of the resistant Other of the colony.

This violence towards the skin color that is the chief signifier of race also extends into the systems and the bodies of the white men themselves. As the situation of the two Englishmen becomes increasingly dire, Dravot exhibits greater degrees of violence towards his beard. He first pulls on it with both hands, and then—after admitting that he is no longer in control of the situation—chews it, as he does again when the people rise up and then when their attempt to flee fails. His beard is his chief signifier in the story, simultaneously signifying both his whiteness and his Englishness (so far as they exist apart from each other). Upon reencountering the pair, the narrator remarks, “There was no mistaking the eyebrows of the one or the beard of the other” (163). The beard, then, is Dravot’s most powerful signifier, one in whose color one sees not only the mark of his whiteness—a naturally red beard only occurs among those with European ancestry—and his Englishness, suggesting both one of the colors of the Union Jack and the color of the contemporary British army uniform. Therefore, violence to his beard is not only violence towards that which signifies his Englishness and whiteness, but to the greatest signifier of his self. It is the sign that Carnehan gives by which the narrator will recognize Dravot upon their first meeting, and it stands as a metonym for his entire body in the narrator’s office: “They certainly were too big for the office. Dravot’s beard seemed to fill half the room and Carnehan’s shoulders the other half, as they sat on the big table” (160).

When Dravot needs to think, he pulls on his red beard compulsively, as though literally drawing strength from this racializing signifier. As archetypal European ruling over colonized subjects, Dravot seems to be also seeking guidance in the ideology that has placed him above others, an ideology that pours meaning into his skin and hair. When Carnehan places the crown on Dravot’s decapitated head at the end of the story, the narrator again notes that red English beard on the head of the man who was briefly king of Kafiristan (198). To
become a god, Dravot had to repress his own physical existence, to remove his own flesh and blood—and capacity for bleeding—from the gaze of his subjects. However, he could not repress his own beard, and with it his embodied race, origin, and subjectivity. When Carnehan, who was unable to maintain this illusion for his friend, places the crown on his disembodied head, find a doubling of his failed role in signifying Dravot’s place as king.

Perhaps just as tellingly, when the woman Dravot seeks to marry bites him, it is represented as an attack upon his beard: “She shuts her eyes, gives a bit of a squeak, and down goes her face in the side of Dan’s flaming red beard” (184). As Mondal (2014) illustrates, this attack is not the act of desperation of a frightened and superstitious girl, the way Carnehan represents it, but rather the carefully planned and executed first blow of a rebellion. Through this act, the young woman targets the very thing that forms the center of the colonizing regime, the repressed body which holds within it the key to power. Mondal writes, “Those whom he [Dravot] has tricked, killed, or commanded to do his killing for him as their king and god are disabused of the illusion that he is a divine being” (743). To subordinate one race over the other, the colonizers must signify bodily differences, as we have seen, and in this act the red blood of Dravot illustrates this. This is not to say that the priests require this to be shown that Dravot is not a god. Mondal (2014) demonstrates that, as illustrated by the warning from “Billy Fish” well before the uprising, the rebellion was already in the works (741). The young woman also exchanges glances with the priests as she approaches with the wedding procession, suggesting their arrangement. Her act is a deliberate and carefully planned ideological attack which simultaneously signals the rise of organized rebellion.

Bényei (2011) cites several Kipling stories and poems that problematize the conception of humanness, describing the way characters gain or lose the signifier of “man,” as we see occurring in this novella. He notes that, in the case of “The Man Who Was,” it is an Indian’s ability to recognize the singularly English mode of crying of a wordless no-longer-man that he is recognized not only as an Englishman but as a human (43). Bényei briefly mentions The Man Who Would Be King as another instance in which this distinction is problematized, showing that in these stories racial signification is necessary for the signifier “man” to be used (43). When their racial identity becomes destabilized, characters become objects of disgust and revulsion, easily identified with the abject as described by Julia Kristeva (1982). I will return to this idea after establishing its context in the symbolic destruction of Carnehan.
To be a man in Kipling’s work, one must be subject to the signifying system, the colonial order of discourse that relies on recognitions and mutual representation for mutual comprehension. To see this in effect, we look again to the fate of Carnehan, who loses his ability to create coherent meaning through discourse. When the narrator finds him again at the very end of the story, Peachey is wandering the streets singing a hymn over and over. The narrator stresses that there is nobody to hear, rendering this action discursively futile: “There was not a soul in sight, and he was out of all possible earshot of the houses” (188). The “wretch” has lost his ability to recognize others, even the narrator, “whom he did not in the least recognise” (188). There is no more complete removal from the colonial order: Peachey is rejected, cast out, feared, abandoned, and finally left to die a physical death that has already been preceded by the destruction of his humanness, the man he was. In all of this final meeting, the narrator never refers to Peachey Carnehan by name, showing that he has lost this signifier even to the narrator who has constituted him to that point.

Peachey’s loss of name reduces him to a presence, something detected but not signified, wandering without entering into the symbolic order. Kristeva (1982) writes that abjection “is a vision that resists any representation, if the latter is a desire to coincide with the presumed identity of what is to be represented. The vision of the ab-ject is, by definition, the sign of an impossible ob-ject, a boundary and a limit” (154). Thus, we see the designified body of Peachey serving as the impossible, unrepresentable abject of the imperial system itself: the body with no race. In fact, Carnehan has become marked only by his wretchedness, his reduction to base classlessness and destitution in a scene that calls to mind the Biblical Lazarus: “I could hardly see whether he walked or crawled – this rag-wrapped, whining cripple who addressed me by name, crying that he was come back” (168). The skin of “what was left of a man” is never mentioned: whether he is white or non-white is unable to signify anything, so it is unspeakable. Mirroring the semiotic contradiction the Englishmen find in Kafiristan of white people who are not from the colonizing homeland, Peachey becomes a man from the homeland who is no longer white, no longer the conquering adventurer, explorer, and ruler his skin would signify him to be.

What better way to show the end of Peachey’s representation than in the narrator’s resigned final words: “And there the matter rests” (187)? The narrative, after all, is left unfinished, the fate of Dravot’s head and crown unknown. Though unfinished, the abjection of his subject makes it impossible for the narrator to continue. The wording of the final exchange between the Superintendent of the Asylum and the narrator reveals the extent to which Peachey has become abject, beyond knowing for the colonizing Englishmen:
... do you happen to know if he had anything upon him by any chance when he died?’
‘Not to my knowledge,’ said the Superintendent. (187)

The use of the word “knowledge” here demonstrates a key distinction. The Superintendent has no knowledge of what Peachey had with him because of the resistance to representation Kristeva (1982) explains. Whether Peachey still carries the head is meaningless, as the head and the crown represent nothing. The head is not the head of Daniel Dravot, the crown is not the crown of Kafiristan. Daniel Dravot has become abject, the failed colonizer executed in a grisly ritual by the people he sought to rule. There is nothing that the colonial imagination must suppress more than this: to speak of it would be to invite the dissolution of its system of representation. The crown, despite the gold and jewels it is composed of, carries no meaning: there is no king of Kafiristan, so it has no crown.15

The dissolution of self and white English identity that Kipling describes in The Man Who Would Be King presents the opposite experience what Fanon (2008) writes of the fate of the former slaves of the French colony who, upon finding themselves freed and told of their equality in humanity—by the same people who represented them as less human before—experience a traumatic loss of the dialectic that defined their self. By attempting to colonize those they represent as English, the pair in Kipling’s novella expose the threat that the lived experience in the colony carries for the English colonizing subject: that of the recognition of common humanity that threatens the racialized order that makes the colonial enterprise possible.

In looking at the impact of empire on individuals and their dialogue with it in Kipling’s work, it becomes clear how those texts function both to illustrate the (necessary) gaps in colonial ideology and model cognitive responses to those gaps that allow the colonizer to continue their work. As Bényei (2011) remarks, “I do not claim, therefore, that Kipling was ‘politically correct,’ but I will say that he is a great storyteller, whose texts symptomatically dramatize and embody the dynamics and the economy of the colonial encounter” (42, my translation)16. We can find in Kipling a depiction of the function of empire as an ideological system, and in this we discover a nuanced exploration of the effects and limits of this signifying system on both colonizing and colonized subjects.

15 The crown has no meaning, that is, except as a warning to other colonizers. As the narrator never mentions Peachey returning the head and the priceless crown to the bag after revealing it in the office, it may be said that the head and this significance remain literally, as well as figuratively, with the narrator.
16 In Hungarian: „Nem állítom tehát, hogy Kipling 'politikailag korrekt' volt, azt viszont igen, hogy nagyszerű elbeszélő, akinek szövegei szimptomatikus módon dramatizálnák, illetve testesítik meg a gyarmati találkozás dinamikáját és ökonómiáját.”
Written by a colonizer to an audience of colonizers, the text functions as a warning against the possibility of seeing no difference between the colonizer and the colonized. By failing to maintain this distinction, the English characters in the story not only fail in their endeavor but suffer a complete breakdown in their own selves, both dying namelessly as a result. This cynical perspective depicts as impossible the goal that the colony nominally approaches, which is the elimination of difference between the colonizer and the colonized. The text warns the colonizing reader about the fragility of colonialist representation and the threat of the human encounter’s violation of the boundary between selves. Thus, the colonizer, exposed to the reality of the colony that fails to match the ideological position they have been led to believe in, learns both to misattribute the anxiety this causes and to hold all the more tightly to colonial ideology.
3.3. Wee Willie Winkie

In the titular story of *Willie Willie Winkie and Other Child Stories* (1888), Wee Willie Winkie sees a subaltern named nicknamed Coppy kissing Miss Allardyce. Coppy tells Wee Willie Winkie that they are engaged to be married, which the boy believes and promises not to say anything about what he saw. Later, even though he is grounded by his father, the colonel, the boy leaves his house to follow Miss Allardcye “across the river” (14), where he fears she will come to harm, as that is where “Bad Men” live, whom Wee Willie Winkie associates with the goblins of George MacDonald’s 1872 children’s book *The Princess and the Goblin*. The simple binary of MacDonald’s fantasy, which separates good and evil into humans and goblins, is read onto the world of the colony, and the boy’s fears indeed come to pass when Miss Alardyce is set upon by natives. Breaking his mother’s ban in order to lend chivalrous aid to the young woman, the boy rides out on his pony, sending the pony back to the cantonment before he also falls into the hands of the natives. As the natives debate what to do with the two, the pony is found and the cavalry rides to the rescue, and the boy is praised as a hero for his actions.

The story, as all other stories in the collection, presents a far more simplified and impenetrable barrier between races than the other texts studied so far. In this way, it presages the divisions between animals presented in *The Jungle Books*, and it may be said that, as tales ostensibly for children, these stories frame race in a more straightforwardly ideological manner than Kipling’s other stories from this period.

The most ideologically interesting aspect of the story is that it recounts the events in explicitly militaristic terms. As he is the son of the colonel, the commanding officer of the cantonment, the boy is doubly inscribed into the patriarchal colonial order as both subject and son. Wee Willie Winkie’s grounding is represented as “deprivation of the good-conduct badge and, most sorrowful of all, two days’ confinement to barracks,” which the boy renders in similarly militaristic terms: “I’m under awwest” (13). At the moment of the story when the boy decides to leave the house to render aid to Miss Allardyce, the boy’s infraction is similarly described as “breaking arrest” and “mutiny” (14). In the story, India beyond the safety of the cantonment is a constant space of uncertainty and danger, which derives from the colonizer’s fear of native revolution. That this fear is immediately realized codifies the anxiety.

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17 Kipling uses the term to signify a low-ranking Anglo-Indian official. The postcolonial sense of the term was unknown at the time of his writing.
18 Whose title the text represents as *The Princess and the Goblins*. 

95
The child commits this violation of his father’s ban in service of a white woman, a chivalrous action most loved by Victorian audiences and hearkening back to the story’s epigraph, “An office and a gentleman” (9). His rebellion is “a crime unspeakable” (14), and in this way invokes the genuine fear of the Anglo-Indians, particularly after the Indian Rebellion of 1857. But this fear of mutiny becomes transposed into the story of a white boy rebelling against the colonizing order for the sake of rescuing a white woman, a rebellion that is no rebellion, while the native Indians are signified as undifferentiated villains, a constant source of threat identified with the space itself. As when Rikki-Tikki-Tavi breaks the white woman’s ban on entering the house in The Jungle Book, the actions of the “mutinous” boy, which are said to “cut him off from all sympathy of Humanity,” are represented as necessary for the survival of a helpless white person who does not recognize the danger of India. She, reading India with the ideological binary of the benevolent colonizer and grateful native, believes all of India to be safe for her to roam, secure in the privilege of her whiteness. That even a child, in his limited understanding, can see past this ideology is supremely cynical. Thus, the one with knowledge of the danger violates the letter of the rule in order to protect those whose understanding is limited just to the ideology of the safe, patriarchal colonized/colonizer dialectic.

When the boy threatens the men who have captured him and Miss Allardyce, the boy’s lisping English speech ceases as he speaks in an unspecified “vernacular” (18), and he adopts the persona of the colonizer. At first, he himself does fall into the trap of ideology, recognizing the men and their familiar language, and believing that those “who spoke that tongue could not be the Bad Men” (17). He is driven to action by a moment representative of genuine colonial anxiety, when the natives refuse to recognize him as their superior and laugh at him. “The man laughed, and laughter from natives was the one thing Wee Willie Winkie could not tolerate” (17). It is this laughter from those who should be subordinate to him that alerts the boy to the danger he is in. Employing racializing language that invokes the racial hierarchy of the colony, he insists, “I am the Colonel Sahib's son, and my order is that you go at once. You black men are frightening the Miss Sahib” (17). He stands over the fainted Miss Allardyce like the hero of a melodrama, and the comical figure of a boy taking on this role

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19 The idea that a boy “who could not yet manage his ‘r’s’ and ‘th’s’ aright” could speak idiomatically in the local language, effortlessly adopting the parlance of the imperial, is itself a reflection of the inborn status of colonizer that he embodies, and signifies the language of the colony as a language a child can easily master, reminding the reader of Kipling’s later infamous signifying of the colonized as “half-devil and half-child” (“The White Man’s Burden 1899, 8).
partially disguises, but only partially, the violence inherent in the colonial encounter that takes place between the white boy and woman and the natives.

When his threat is insufficient, Wee Willie Winkie follows it up with a threat of violence that, while comical coming from a small child, is deeply disturbing when read against the broader system of repression in which the boy has been raised, keeping in mind that he has most likely learned it from his father. He tells them, “if you do carry us away, I tell you that all my regiment will come up in a day and kill you all without leaving one” (18). One of the men, “the dismissed sais of the Colonel,” who thus has knowledge of the brutality of the colonizer, warns his companions, “if we touch this child they will fire and rape and plunder for a mouth, till nothing remains” (19). At the appearance of the regiment, the natives disappear, blending back into the Indian geography, “silently as they had appeared” (19). In this one sentence they are removed from the narrative, becoming one with the country itself as though they were inseparable from it, to remain as a constant threat.

The boy who had disobeyed the patriarchal and colonial rule in one, embodied by his father, is forgiven and praised for his actions. While he violated the strict code of behavior prescribed by the ideology of order, his actions, stemming from even a child’s knowledge of the reality of danger in India, led to the rescue of a helpless white woman. “His father assured him that not only would the breaking of arrest be condoned, but that the good-conduct badge would be restored as soon as his mother could sew it on his blouse-sleeve” (20). The story is finished as explicitly a coming-of-age, as the boy asks to be called by his given name, and “in this manner did Wee Willie Winkie enter into his manhood” (20). This lesson, though presented as a humorous story, has clear consequences if the boy is, as the text predicts, “future Colonel of the 195th, [who] had that grim regiment at his back” (18). He has learned that colonial authority must be enforced through violence, and he has learned to attribute the inherent instability and anxiety of the colony to its native population, which is represented as a constant and unknowable danger that only this violence can contain.
3.4. *In Black and White*

Kipling’s collection *In Black and White*, published in 1888, contains eight stories, four told from the perspective of a white narrator and four taking the form of monologues. The collection closes with two stories with white narrators, giving the colonizers literally the last word. The stories told by the Indian natives are presented in the moment by characters who lose control of what they attempt to signify, implicating themselves in crimes and falsehoods, while the white narrators record their memories of their experiences from a perspective of later reflection. Thus, these stories are all rendered into writing by white writers, either in recording narratives from the perspective of their own actions or in capturing words spoken to them. As such, the intentionality of each of these stories is presented through the lens of a colonizer who found the narrative worthy of not only recording but passing on to other white people in a similar position. Because each of these stories, whether nominally the narrative of an Indian or an English person, is selected and presumably edited by a white colonizer for a white colonizing audience, the value of these stories as propagating an ideology that is both useful and, to an experienced civil servant, familiar can be assumed.

The collection stages its own positioning in terms of race through an introduction nominally written by Kadir Baksh, Kipling's servant. “Baksh” writes that he collected the writings of Kipling and put them into the book, though he has no knowledge of what could be in them. He denies that Kipling could have written it about the “black men—common people” (9) of the country, because Baksh himself has made it his duty to prevent the “sahib” from any human encounter with them. He writes,

> Have I not, for several years, been perpetually with the sahib; and throughout that time have I not stood between him and the other servants who would persecute him with complaints or vex him with idle tales about my work? … Have I ever told the sahib about the customs of servants or black men? Am I a fool? (10)

This positions a man of color as, having internalized the imperialist racial order, consciously preventing a white man from having an experience that, as has been shown, would demonstrate the failure of the totalizing colonizing book knowledge that, in order to most easily continue colonizing work, the colonizer should preserve. Thus, the book open with a challenge: what must the colonizer do, when the distance required for them to do their work has failed?

All of the stories in *In Black and White* functions as a means of teaching and reinforcing colonizing cynicism. Each story engages with the contradiction of racial ideology, demonstrating the artificiality and limit of constructed race as well as firmly declaring the unspeakability of crossing or dissolving the racial separation on which the colony is based.
Thus, each story cynically depicts as impermeable the very distinction that it represents as porous, fragile, and imagined.

The first story, “Dray Wara Yow Dee” develops the contradiction between an essentializing racial separation and the universal emotional appeal of tragedy and revenge. A Pashtun tells the story of seeking revenge on his unfaithful wife and her lover to a white colonizer. The narrator describes every character in terms of their race and ascribes their actions to it, thus echoing the racial division on which colonial ideology is based. For example, he says of Daoud Shah, the man he seeks to kill, “a Hill-man will ever head back to his hills when the spring warns” (30). He racially essentializes everyone he describes, including himself.

As an effect of this essentializing, the narrator repeatedly insists that the listener will be unable to understand his motivation, which extends to the presumed white reader as well. The story, then, conflates the white reader with the unnamed listener, putting the reader in the role of the English colonizer in India. The narrator first lies about both the reasons for his sadness and the horses he tries to sell. When the unnamed Englishman reveals him in his lie, he does so an unwritten and thus implied part of the conversation. This places the reader in the position of inserting what the other character says, and by this self-insertion taking a subject position in terms of race and power in the text.

The narrator relates the story of his search for revenge. Also implied is the listener's offer of money to the narrator, who rebukes the white man by expressing his disappointment that this gesture demonstrates he is just like all white men. Ironically, his position reverses English colonizing ideology, presenting the English as being unable to understand honor and reducing virtue to money.

*Fire burn your money! What do I want with it? I am rich and I thought you were my friend; but you are like the others — a sahib. Is a man sad? Give him money, say the sahibs. Is he dishonored? Give him money, say the sahibs. Hath he a wrong upon his head? Give him money, say the sahibs. Such are the sahibs, and such art thou — even thou.* (18)

As this passage shows, the story begins with a statement that presents both an essentialist racial separation and a condemnation of the inability of the English colonizers to understand those they oppress.

The cynicism of this story is contained in the contradiction between the narrator's racial essentialism and his strong belief in the universal empathy his suffering and quest for revenge will create in his listener. He makes a universal statement about his motivation shortly after his remark on the essential difference between himself and “a sahib”: “Does a
man tear out his heart and make fritters thereof over a slow fire for aught other than a woman? Do not laugh, friend of mine, for your time will also be” (20). The suggested laugh demonstrates that the listener, at this point, does not agree that he could have this in common with the narrator, but the narrator’s cynical wisdom dismisses this.

Throughout the story, the narrator addresses the listener in warm terms of friendship and unity, in direct contradiction with his stated belief in their essentially dividing differences in race. For example, he calls the listener, “brother and friend of my heart's heart” (23). His ability to make this connection shows the danger of the human encounter to the persistence colony. In this encounter, the listener is suggested to discover shared humanity in the love, jealousy, and perseverance. By the end of the story, when the narrator speaks of the murder he has committed and plans to commit, he does so from this position, arguing that he is not bound by written law but by a universal truth. Responding to the listener's presumed interruption and insistence on the illegality of his actions, the narrator tells the listener, “Your law! What is your law to me? When the horses fight on the runs do they regard the boundary pillars...?” (24). His use of natural imagery strongly demonstrates the artificiality of the racial separation imposed by the imperialist ideology of the English. In creating the cognitive dissonance effect, this plays the role of signaling the subject as to the conflict between their assumed humanistic beliefs and the reality of the colony.

It is at this point that the choice of the narrative form of monologue becomes essential to the colonizing influence of this text. This positioning puts the implied words of the listener into the mouth of the reader, who has to imagine and provide the admonishment to the narrator for breaking the law of the English-ruled colony. In order to fill the gap left in the narrative structure left by the lack of written response, the text compels the reader to literally be the voice of colonizing ideology reaffirming the supremacy of imperial hegemony. The powerful effect of making the reader double for the voice of the English colonizer reasserting the empire echoes Wolfgang Iser's classical examination of the importance of the unstated gap in involving the reader in a text. In The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication (1978), Iser describes the role of such gaps in the work of Henry Fielding:

And just as the reader is to 'reflect' during these 'vacant pages', so too must he reflect during all the other vacancies or gaps in the text. The gaps, indeed, are those very points at which the reader can enter into the text, forming his own connections and conceptions and so creating the configurative meaning of what he is reading. Thanks to the 'vacant pages', he can reflect, and through reflection create the motivation through which he can experience the text as a reality. He forms what we might call the 'gestalt' of the text.... (40)
The role the reader plays in providing the dialogue for the colonizer is virtually exactly the same as the students were asked to perform in the studies on cognitive dissonance performed by Festinger (1957). It is particularly reminiscent of the study done by Scher and Cooper (1989), in which even those whose beliefs and actions were intended to oppose an action changed their perspective on an issue when they were made to think their actions actually helped the thing they were trying to stop. Whether the readers believe in the ideology they are put in the position of repeating or not, the very act of creating an argument for it pushes them closer to that positional point.

The stories of the collection, whether the narrator is English or a man of color, follow this pattern. The ideology of racial essentialism is described and represented as paramount and unquestionable. Then, in the course of the events of the story, this separation is demonstrated to be false, but in every story the humanizing and destabilizing effect of this is controlled for in some way, placing the reader and sometimes the characters in the position of abetting the colonial forces they themselves perceive the failure of. Despite the potential that the recognition of shared humanity and the artificiality of racial division will undermine the colony, in each of the stories the persistence of the colony is reiterated. This is done in a way that acknowledges the failure of the colony to match the humanistic ambitions ascribed to it by ideology, while also presenting the unspeakability of the end of the colony and the implicit involvement of the English in perpetrating the injustices depicted. The end of the colony, while acknowledged as possible, is represented as something that must not be spoken of or even thought, thus requiring cognitive processes to suppress. As has been shown, this misattribution of the causes of the perceived failure of the colony specifically triggers the effect of cognitive dissonance in the reader, changing the beliefs of the reader towards supporting the colony whose oppression the stories present.

In the second story, “The Judgment of Dungara,” describes the failure of “blonde, blue-eyed” (32) missionaries to convert Indians to European culture. The German couple is described as the kind of well-meaning European colonizers who believe it is their sacred duty to bring superior European colonization and advancement to colonized places. Their results are remarkable: they are able to indoctrinate the Indian population they are teaching to such an extent that the signifiers of race start to fade away. One particular girl at the mission school is used as an example of this threat: her clothes, writing, and behavior all signify her as white, threatening to dissolve the distinction between white and person of color. The priest of Dungara, the “God of Things as They Are,” tricks the missionaries into making garments for their students out of a plant that burns their skin. At the climax of the story, the Indians tear
off the clothing given to them mimicking the dress of the white people and throw themselves into the river, bewailing that they ever wanted to abandon their god and way of life. Through the failure of the missionaries to understand the thinking of the priest, they fail their earnest humanist goal of changing people seen as inferior to the nominally superior white race.

The conflict of the story is that the German missionaries, Justus and Lotta Krenk, genuinely believe that they, through humane Christian proselytizing and charity, can make the Buria Kol “civilized”—which is to say, like Europeans. The narrator describes the inevitable disillusionment of the missionary: “[a]s the day wears and the impetus of the morning dies away, there will come upon you an overwhelming sense of the uselessness of your toil” (33). That the Krenks are very rare in resisting this impulse is emphasized. The cynical alternative to their zeal is shown in the figure of the assistant collector, who gathers taxes from the colonized and controls them through the priest, and says, “When you have been some years in the country,... you grow to find one creed as good as another” (35). To do this creates a fundamental problem for the colonizing enterprise. Were the colonized ever to advance to the level (in their terms) of the colonizer, the justification for the continued existence of the colony would be abolished. According to colonizing ideology, it is impossible for one “civilized” population to continue to dominate another from which it is not separated in terms of technological or cultural “progress.” In a further threat to the European colonizers, the constructed difference between races would be erased, since it would invest the former colonized with all the signifiers of the colonizer. As European identity relies on this binary for its self-definition, this constitutes a threat to the European sense of self.

In the words of the narrator, the story tells “how the priest of the God of Things as They Are argued subtly with the priest of the God of Things as They Should Be, and was worsted” (39). This framing presents colonizing ideology, which the missionaries represent, as winning rhetorically when the two are matched, and certainly its emphasis on altruistic virtues makes it more palatable to the European audience. One of these tenets is the humanist justification for colonization taught by familiar ideology, that of the benevolent colonizer who seeks to bring European progress to the colony—what the colony “should be.” This ideology presents cultural progress as a single path along a continuity, the highest point of which is the state of the colonizing Western countries. It is the stated intention of this ideology to close the perceived gap between the West and the colony, which is represented as farther back along that progress of civilization, the higher point of which can only be achieved through matching the European states.
Simultaneously, the story represents the immutability of race, echoing Kipling's famous couplet “East is East and West is West.” Even in the face of evidence to the contrary, it cynically insists on the permanence of the separation of the West and what Said calls the Orient. This cynicism, based in the perception of colonizing oppression, incompetence, and complete failure to improve conditions in the colony, ironically is the one that depends fully on the concept of essential race separation and white supremacy. It ascribes the perceived failure of the colony to the impossibility of the colonized to ever become white. As the model of cognitive dissonance shows, this misattribution is caused by the psychological inability of the colonizer to acknowledge the truth of their actions: that they are, in fact, supporting the oppression, exploitation, and violence perpetrated on the colonized people. By attributing the failure of the colony to the essential differences between races and the failure of the colonized themselves, the colonizer is able to avoid the anxiety created by realizing their own support of a system whose cruel effects they disagree with.

Colonizing cynicism is voiced in the text by the assistant collector, Gallio, who enjoys his control over the colonized and accepts their way of life without making any gesture to change it, believing their ways to be essential to them. He is described as “[a] knock-kneed, shambling young man . . ., naturally devoid of creed or reverence, with a longing for absolute power which his undesirable district gratified” (37). Even in this is a description of colonial hegemony bared of pretence, and the assistant collector makes no attempt to change or “civilize” the Indians under his control. In this contentment is his cynical acceptance of the status quo of the colony, which directly serves his own needs and aspirations. When the previous missionary assaults the leader of a local temple and is beaten in retribution, Gallio refuses the missionary's insistence that he send military aid. Instead, he takes the role of the patriarchal white leader, talking to Athon Dazé “like a father” (36) and reassuring him that things will be restored to the way they were, preventing change and maintaining the colony's fixity in Time.

In a reversal that shows the text's function in spreading colonial cynicism, the other cynical character is the priest of Dungara, Athon Dazé. He calls those Indians who worship the Christian god “backsliders” (40), a word that reverses the continuity of cultural progress presented by colonizing ideology. This ideology instead presents two poles of culture, colonizer and colonized, in which movement from either direction towards the middle is presented as deviant. As such, colonizing cynicism presents an ideological alternative to the anxiety of human contact threatening the colonizer with the realization that their efforts lead to oppression and violence. This ideology acknowledges “Things as They Are” and represents
them as unchanging and unchangeable. Although it recognizes that the constructions on which colonialism is based are tenuous and vulnerable, it simultaneously shows them as being unbreachable, because to breach them would be to end the colony itself. The colony, as timeless and above all else, maintains itself through this cynical refusal to acknowledge that which it perceives.

When describing the effects of Dazé's ploy, the narrator's particular focus on a young female Indian, Nala, as “the pride of the mission” (42) further emphasizes this effect, reflecting the theory of Young (1995) that the shadow of hybridity subverts colonial ideology and white identity. Young describes that, while nineteenth-century medical and political texts expressed horror at the possibility of “miscegenation” between white people and people of color, many novels, including Kipling’s, are “concerned with forms of cross-cultural contact, interaction, an active desire, frequently sexual, for the other, or with the state of being what Hanif Kureishi calls ‘an inbetween’, or Kipling ‘the monstrous hybridism of East and West” (3). Young shows that women of color are particularly the focus of colonial ideology as the simultaneous object of sexual desire reflected in the fantasy of conquest of the alluring, passive other and of horror at the prospect of creating children who, being mixed race, expose the crucial notion of racial essentialism and separation. When she discards her clothing, the cynical Gallio is shown to exhibit an interest in her underwear that reads as prurient, until it is revealed that he is actually checking the material: “But Gallio was curiously regarding the maiden’s petticoat where it had fallen at his feet” (43). When it comes time to reassert the colony and return the racial relationship to “Things as They Are,” this is performed partially through the sexual gaze of the colonizing white man.

Through Nala’s character, the text exposes the limit of the claim it makes about race. Nala comes close to becoming white, and it is not through any essential separation between races but because of the intervention of Athon Dazé that she is prevented from successfully completing her humanistic education with the missionaries. In her reaction to the painful clothes can be read a reversion to the essentialist character of a savage: “Nala, once the pride of the mission, a maiden of fourteen summers, good, docile, and virtuous — now naked as the dawn and spitting like a wild-cat” (42). Not only does the narrator emphasize her nudity in a way that betrays the colonizer’s lustful gaze towards colonized women, it also betrays anxiety at the idea of a colonized woman expressing the virtues of Victorian womanhood, while demonstrating that her essential qualities of savagery return. This represents the image of the civilized Indian as a mask over a true, unchanging difference, and as such it underscores the essentialism and separation that the work of missionaries threatens to undo. In other words, it
reasserts as true and vital a difference it has also demonstrated to be fleeting and contradictory.

This insistence on the colonizing construction of race is also present in the final words of Gallio. The assistant collector is represented as the one who understands the situation in the colony the most, as he is both cynical and inflexible, unable to imagine that any change could come to the colony without disaster. Witnessing the mission turn to a shambles, he remarks, “Anybody but a naked Kol would have known it, and, if I’m a judge of their ways, you’ll never get them back” (44). Gallio positions himself as an expert in the situation in the colony, but he does not do this through the extensive texts produced by the colonizers, as was demonstrated by Said (2003) and others. The texts Said wrote about represent totalizing knowledge of the “Orient” that is endangered by actual contact with the colony. To support it, Gallio draws understanding from his cynical acknowledgement of the cultural differences between himself and the subalterns. He at once positions the end of the colony as impossible and fights against it coming to pass. As has been mentioned, the disaster the mission represents for the colony is not just the threat of violence but the threat of the loss of white identity and colony alike.

Once the Indians have fled the mission and refuse to return, there is a notion to take revenge on the missionaries for the pain and indignity caused to them, but it is handled by Gallio in a manner that illustrates the cynicism of his philosophy of rulership. The narrator explains, “An unofficial message to Athon Dazé that if a hair of their heads were touched, Athon Dazé and the priests of Dungara would be hanged by Gallio at the temple shrine, protected Justus and Lotta from the stump poisoned arrows of the Buria Kol” (45). In this, as with previous instances, events that threaten to destabilize and change the status quo of the colony are controlled by the two cynical characters, Gallio and Athon Dazé. This exposes the root of colonial power, ensuring as it does the survival of the colonizer on the naked threat of overwhelming violence.

The short story ends with a direct address by the narrator to the reader that openly advocates a cynical avoidance of any attempts to improve the lives of the oppressed by the colonizers. The narrator tells the reader, “If any one is anxious to convert the Buria Kol afresh, there lies at least the core of a Mission-house under the hill of Panth. But the chapel and school have long since fallen back into jungle” (44). In addition to representing those who wish to change the colony as naive and ineffective, the story also allies the assistant collector, the narrator, and the reader in cynicism. The narrator does not explicitly state that such a conversion mission would be foolhardy and futile, but the experience of reading the
story has ostensibly positioned the reader in the position of being able to see that this is the case. As the text did with “Dray Wara Yow Dee” and the other stories in this collection, this gap places the reader in the position of the cynical colonizer who demonstrates this colonial perspective. Thus, cognitive dissonance is again invoked to operate on the reader. The reader, who may have been inclined to sympathize with the Krenks and their earnest efforts to improve the lives of the Buria Kol, is now put in the position of completing the statement by the narrator. By thus making the reader support a position that, until the start of the story, was in opposition to the reader's assumed virtue of altruism, the story teaches a cynicism that, through cognitive dissonance, nudges the reader towards supporting the colony and its abuses—the “God of Things as They Are.”

The final short story of the collection, “On the City Wall,” takes a particularly cynical position on the violent and oppressive relationship between the British colonizers and the Indian colonized, even as it presents a story that is—to a degree—a celebration of the cleverness of the colonized, touching again on the impossibility of a colonizer fully comprehending the ways of the colonized. In the story, the white speaker recalls how an Indian prostitute named Lalun tricked him into helping an old Sikh freedom fighter, Khem Singh, escape from Fort Amara during a riot. Douglas Kerr (2008) briefly notes that in the story, “we can hear empire telling itself a story (contradicted, though, elsewhere in the tale) about its own powers of control” (58). Demonstrating that story of control while simultaneously contradicting it is one of the key steps in creating colonizing dissonance.

English soldiers in India preparing to quell a religious riot bemoan that they cannot do more violence to the colonized. The soldiers are “all pleased, unholy pleased, at the chance of what they called 'a little fun.' ... [W]hispers ran up and down the line: 'No ball-cartridge—what a beastly shame!'” (151). The characters boldly express their eagerness to harm whose protection they are ostensibly in India to ensure. One soldier directly describes the action in terms of his personal gain through the violence, saying, “'Hope I shall meet my money-lender there. I owe him more than I can afford'” (151). Thus, the soldiers not only express their own cynicism but also reveal that they implicitly believe that their fellow soldiers will see sympathize with their joy at being able to harm the colonized. The soldiers have no illusions about the colony and their role there. They all share a cynical understanding of the English oppression of the country and its people. Acknowledging this violence, they embrace it for its potential for personal gain.

The violence, implicit and explicit, that is always at the heart of colonial power is ironically highlighted throughout the story, in which the British characters cynically abandon
all vestiges of humanistic altruism towards colonized subjects when their hegemony is threatened and resort to rule by force. As the narrator rushes through the city, he encounters an English officer of the infantry, who presents the necessity of violence to enforce control of the colony in brutally simple and racial terms: “‘It is expedient that one man should die for the people,’ said Petitt, grimly, raising the shapeless head [of the man killed]. ‘These brutes were beginning to show their teeth too much’ (157). Petitt's dehumanizing use of the term “brutes” demonstrates the reality of the violence perpetrated by the soldiers on the colonized: to kill them is to deny their humanity completely.

This dehumanization is clear in the cries of the soldiers who drive the rioters before them with shouts echoing those used to drive beasts: “Hutt, ye beggars! Hutt, ye devils! Get along! Go forward, there!” (154). This exposes the most basic function of the colony, that of violence on humans through reducing them to less-than-human status. Fanon (2008) describes this dehumanizing reduction to the status of animals by white colonizers when he writes, “I begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me of all worth, all individuality... that I am a brute beast...” (73). By representing people of color as beasts, the colonizers not only strip them of their humanity and individuality but also make it possible for white soldiers to enact violence on the bodies of the colonized. They do this through exercising their hegemonic capacity to change the signification of an individual, which they are able to do for anyone who is not white. It is the white narrator's race which, at the end of the story, protects him from meeting a similar fate.

When the British soldiers enter the city to end the riot through force, the narrator reports that they hope mostly to find a way to perpetrate violence against the Indians, especially those who have some form of power over them. They say, “No ball cartridge — what a beastly shame!”... “Hope I shall meet my money-lender there. I owe him more than I can afford.”“Oh, they won't let us even unsheath swords” (151). The soldiers express no concern for the violence occurring during the riot. The artillerists of the fort go as far as to express “a wild hope that they might be allowed to bombard the city at a hundred yards' range” (151). At no point do the British say that they believe they are in any danger, either: their actions seem to be fed by nothing but racism and self-interest.

They also never associate the violence with anger caused by British colonial rule, but instead represent it as an inevitable result of the tension between the Hindu and Muslim population of the city. In the Timeless colony, riots are inevitable and disconnected from the question of colonialism, as is the response of the British troops to it. Given this
misattribution, the British view themselves as outsiders viewing a cultural event whose only role is to end the damage caused, without seeming to recognize that they do so by perpetrating even worse violence on the people of the city.

The soldiers do not explicitly acknowledge their own hypocrisy in gladly doing harm to those they are there to nominally protect, referring to those they attack as “beggars” and “devils” (152) to assign the blame for the disturbance to them. The narrator, however, does acknowledge the cruelty of the white soldiers, introducing this passage with “I am sorry to say” (151). He perceives that it is wrong for the soldiers to be glad to harm the Indians, but though this clearly bothers him he assigns them no blame. Instead, he associates his personal anxiety arising from the sequence of events to his becoming a servant of an Indian woman, recalling, “I had become Lalun’s Vizier after all” (159). Thus, he ascribes the disturbance of his emotions to the inversion of the colonial racial hierarchy, as a white man who finds himself unwittingly colonized by an Indian, instead of to the exposure of the violence the English perpetrate on the colonized. These same cognitive strategies, with variations, are repeated throughout Kipling’s stories and poems written during and shortly after his time in India.

In “On the City Wall,” the disturbance is partly ascribed to the irreparable animosity between Muslims and Hindus, and the blame for the violence falls on the misrule of individual colonizers, as riots break out “when the authorities are weak enough to allow it” (143). As he finishes the story, the narrator dismisses his own anxiety arising from the telling as the result of his having been doubly displaced by becoming the Vizier of Lalun, who is both Indian and a woman. Because fault is found in something other than the colony, the white colonizer does not have to face the moral implications of their own role in the violence inherent to the colony’s function. This cognitive dissonance plays an essential role in the continued existence of the colony, as it allows its agents to continue work their principles might otherwise prevent, pushing colonizers to shift their principles in favor of the colony while preventing possible damage to the psyche that this hypocrisy threatens.

Perhaps the most striking example of this cynical acknowledgement of the reality of the always-threatening violence under the system of colonial control occurs in a scene in which Khem Singh offers what he sees as a concession to the acting commander of the fort: “‘If my turn comes again, sahib, I will not hang you nor cut your throat.’ ‘Thank you,’ said the subaltern,” gravely, as he looked along the line of guns that could pound the city to powder in half an hour” (137). When a possible reversal of the positions of colonizer and

20 As before, used in Kipling to refer to a low-ranking Anglo-Indian agent.
colonized is mentioned, the officer's gaze turns at once to the guns, which testify to the overwhelming potential for violence at his command precludes the possibility of him and Khem Singh being on equal, human terms. This perfectly encapsulates what Bhabha (1994) argues as the limit of colonial mimicry, when “[t]he ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry—a difference that is almost nothing but not quite—to menace—a difference that is almost total but not quite” (91). Thus, the colonizer is protected by the cynical reality of the colonial situation from the anxiety of the human encounter. He does not have to recognize the human reality inherent in Khem Singh's words, which suggest that their relative positions are arbitrary and could change. Their positions, after all, are not relative. The officer has all the guns behind him.

In this scene, Khem Singh is depicted as making a gesture he believes recognizes shared humanity between himself and the white officer: he tells the officer he will not kill him “because you are of a pleasant countenance” (137), a personal valuation presented in explicit terms of his appearance, implying a common aesthetic of beauty. His belief in the inherent lack of difference between white and non-white people is also expressed in his rhetoric of his “turn” coming again: he believes British rule will be supplanted, and his use of “turn” shows that he subscribes to an ideology similar to game rhetoric. As McDevitt (2004) illustrates, sport served to provide colonized people an ostensibly even playing field to challenge colonizers, but in this short story Singh's framework and sport ideology is exposed as flawed. There is no equal contest between Britain and India: British military power is overwhelming. There is no possibility of an equal fight, and the conclusion of any military meeting is foregone.

Despite the recognition of shared humanity, the narrator thus treats as impossible that there could be any actually challenge to British hegemony. This is expressed through the words of the English-educated Wali Dad to the narrator, who explains that Khem Singh “fought you in '46, when he was a warrior-youth; refought you in '57, and he tried to fight you in '71, but you had learned the trick of blowing men from guns too well” (133). The shift in the nature of colonial Time, from passing to timeless, here is clear in the movement from possibility to impossibility of the breach of colonial control: there was a time the British colony could end, but military technology combined with brutal executions has closed that breach, and all further struggle for power is impossible. British rule is shows as impossible for any but the old-fashioned or those who fail to understand the power relationships in the colonized zone. That Wali Dad, with his English education, expresses this shows the totalizing effect of book knowledge on his ability to imagine a shift in Time that would end
the empire. In this lies the contradiction of colonial Time: what has not always been is now timeless, what once changed can never change again.

Khem Singh's hopeless position in attempting to reshape the system of colonial representation is demonstrated by his inability to find support once he is free of the prison: “Khem Singh could give them neither pension, decorations, nor influence — nothing but a glorious death with their backs to the mouth of a gun” (158). Khem Singh's inability to produce the money, distinctions, or power that would motivate others to follow him shows the effectiveness of the British system of indoctrination, as the Indians now desire the things the white colonial system presents as valuable. Khem Singh, in his refusal to adopt the ideological system of the colony, simultaneously puts himself into a subject position outside of that system that is thus unable to reproduce the objects valued by that system and those inside it.

The crisis of the story, and the reason for the narrator's development as a character as well as his failure to uphold colonial order, is the physical beauty of Lalun, which endangers the white supremacy necessary for the regime of truth behind the Indian colony. Wali Dad, the Indian poet, celebrates Lalun's beauty in a song that demonstrates the transgressive danger of a colonized woman's beauty: “the beauty of Lalun was so great that it troubled the hearts of the British government and caused them to lose their peace of mind” (Kipling 1899, 123).

This threat is complex: as is shown by the narrator's obsession, the possibility of a non-white woman challenging white beauty destabilizes colonial control. Young (1995) emphasizes the role of aesthetics in the construction of white supremacy, as Victorian scientists presented the white body as inherently beautiful and the non-white body as ugly: in the work of the physician Franz Joseph Gall, “[a]esthetic characteristics are generally most evident in depictions of physical differences, in which African faces, contrived to resemble apes as much as possible, are contrasted to European faces” (90). While Young's work focuses mostly on the contrast made between white and Black people, the applicability of this to the white/Indian dichotomy is clear. Sander Gilman (1985) illustrates the threat that the beauty of non-white bodies had for white culture, and connects it to the figure of the prostitute, as both transgressive female sexuality and the sexuality of the Other function to produce both desire and anxiety in white patriarchal culture:

The colonial mentality which sees 'natives' as needing control is easily transferred to 'woman'—but woman as exemplified by the caste of the prostitute. This need for control was a projection of inner fears; thus, its articulation in visual images was in terms which described the polar opposite of the European male. (237)
Thus, the figure of Lalun occupies a tripartite position as dangerous Other in relation to British colonial rule: she is a woman, she is Indian, and she is a prostitute.

The destabilizing impact of Lalun's beauty on the signifying system controlling the colony is immediately apparent in the short story, in which it takes a central role in the transgression of the rigid social order based on racial privilege. Wali Dad describes that he and the narrator, a colonized person and a colonizer, can meet in the home of such a person, saying, “it is curious to think that our common meeting-place should be here, in the house of a common — how do you call her?” (141). When the narrator objects to mentioning Lalun's profession, insisting, “Lalun is nothing else but Lalun,” (141), he unconsciously exposes her ambiguity in terms of the colonial hierarchy. If she is “nothing else but Lalun,” the signifiers necessary for her subjection to the imperial order—terms like “Indian” or “brown”—are denied. The result of this is the disturbance of the order itself that leads the narrator to unwittingly betray his government and become “Lalun's Vivizer after all” (159).

By expressing the idea of Lalun's beauty and destabilizing influence in song, Wali Dad recognizes the threat to the British colonial rule and simultaneously assumes the role of a speaking subject. His ability to take this position and enunciate this threat demonstrates how white control over representation is endangered. His capacity for doing this comes partially through his hybrid position. That he has been educated and has absorbed the material of English ideology is plain from the statement of the narrator that Wali Dad is “suffering acutely from education of the English variety and [knows] it” (123). As when the narrator describes Lalun's influence and occupation, here again he uses irony to demonstrate the way his experience in the colonized space seems to contradict this ideology.

Wali Dad's exposure to “books that are of no use to anybody” (123), including books of Greek philosophy borrowed from the narrator, do nothing to improve his position in colonial society. While this explicitly positions the narrator as providing an education that could potentially give Wali Dad greater subject autonomy, the narrator's cynical comments about the value of this education illustrate the limitation inherent in the concept of mimicry described by Bhabha (1994). While Wali Dad and the narrator share book knowledge, it can only lead the former to mimic the latter, because the boundary formed by racial dichotomy cannot be violated within the colonial system. Despite the narrator's symbolic kinship with him in their sharing of books, Wali Dad can never be white.

Wali Dad expresses the converse of the contradictory position of the Indian colonized subject by explicitly contrasting Khem Singh with his own generation in terms of influence and agency. He explains of Khem Singh,
He is an interesting survival... He returns to a country now full of educational and political reform, but, as the Pearl says, there are many who remember him. He was once a great man. There will never be any more great men in India. They will all, when they are boys, go whoring after strange gods, and they will become citizens — 'fellow-citizens' — 'illustrious fellow-citizens.' What is it that the native papers call them? (134)

As a young man educated with English texts, Wali Dad himself is “whoring after strange gods,” and he simultaneously recognizes the Khem Singh represents not only an active effort towards independence but the basic belief in an end to British rule. He expresses the contradictory insight that he recognizes that his own generation no longer recognizes the potential to be “great men;” the “educational and political reform” he speaks of, paradoxically, paralyzes India and renders genuine change in the relative subject positions of its occupants impossible. The colonizers remain colonizers, and the colonized see no possibility of doing anything about it. Wali Dad’s use of the expression “illustrious fellow-citizens” is thus deeply ironic, as the legal and simultaneously racial equality suggested by this is belied by the daily the experience of the characters in the story. The Indians of Wali Dad’s generation have been stripped of their identity, formed into voiceless hybrids who can only mimic British culture without claiming power or the position of speaking subjects.

This limitation is evidenced in the story when the narrator rushes to the aid of Lalun during the riot. He describes finding Wali Dad at the foot of the stairs to Lalun’s rooms, and the model of colonial hybridity has, in the violence of the riot and his torn identity, been torn by his crisis of identity which leaves him unable to act. He expresses his confusion about the chaotic potential of his hybrid identity by saying,

I might wear an English coat and trousers. I might be a leading Mohammedan pleader. I might even be received at the commissioner's tennis-parties where the English stand on one side and the natives on the other, in order to promote social intercourse throughout the empire. (141)

The cynicism of his final statement clearly underlines the unspeakability of commingling between the colonized and the colonizer in India. Though Wali Dad feels divided, he cannot actually ever assume or even approach a white identity.

The moment of crisis for Wali Dad comes in the form of the riot between Muslims and Hindus in the city. The conflict between two parts of his divided identity leaves him torn. With no proper English identity, lacking whiteness, and having lost his Indian identity due to his education, Wali Dad is reduced to an “agnostic and unbeliever, shoeless, turban-less, and frothing at the mouth” (157). In this moment can be found a depiction of the limitation of hybrid identity: when the different parts of Wali Dad’s complex identity literally clash, he
experiences a violent crisis that drives him to beat his own chest violently, muttering the battle cry of the rioters. The case of Wali Dad demonstrates the colonial cynicism taught by colonizing texts like In Black and White: despite the stated humanistic aims of the colonizers to bring European culture and “progress” to the colony, the colonized is represented as being only harmed by European education. The colony, in essence, can never truly change, and all change leads to disorder.

This point is brought home by Lalun's joy in finding the narrator rushing to her aid, and she cannily employs the narrator as her unwitting pawn in spiriting Khem Singh out of the city. The narrator's race makes him the perfect tool for this, as it ensures that he will not be stopped. The very fact of his whiteness makes all who encounter him assume he is acting in the interest of the colony: whiteness and the colony are represented as the same. The narrator describes Lalun's preference for his aid over Wali Dad's explicitly in terms of his whiteness when he writes, “Lalun had used me and my white face as even a better safeguard than Wali Dad” (158). While Wali Dad has gotten Khem Singh from the prison to Lalun's chambers, the narrator's freedom of movement in the colony afforded him by his race is necessary to help him escape the city completely.

While this story has been read as an example of differing attitudes towards the colony on the part of both colonizer and colonized, it should be remembered that it is a story told by a single narrator, and the effect of the text as a whole must be taken into account. Moore-Gilbert (1996) identifies “On the City Wall” as evidence that colonial agents were not as unified in their affective response to the colony as Bhabha (1994) suggests, citing the difference between the Captain of Fort Amara, a man of extreme and single-minded brutality, and the narrator, who demonstrates “tolerance to the local customs,” including prostitution, and “rejects metropolitan modes of knowledge and representation of India” (Moore-Gilbert 1996, 133). While this might be the case of the characters, it does not demonstrate that, as Moore-Gilbert claims, “there were competing definitions of imperialism on the coloniser's side and, consequently, struggles for control of the hegemonic discourse” (133). Rather, the play of this contrast between two characters should be recognized as part of the complex ideological construction of a colonizing text modeling cynicism.

The voice of the narrator is highly cynical, contrasting that of the captain, whose uncomplicated belief in the separation of races and white supremacy is, as the narrator insists, both incorrect and “bad form”: “The captain was not a nice man. He called all natives 'n—,' which, besides being extreme bad form, shows gross ignorance” (139, one word censored by me). This statement makes it clear that the narrator's ideological opposition to the captain is
based in a struggle for control of knowledge. The reference to bad form draws in concepts of fair play that brings echoes of the ethos of sporting. It also contains an implicit argument of national identity, in which the struggle for control of the concept of proper English behavior is played out. By illegitimating behavior that comes of the simple racist construct of book knowledge, the narrator demonstrates that the cynical shift that occurs as a result of colonial contact opens room for acknowledging moral ambiguity.

The cynical knowledge of the colony—the ideology required for the continuation of the colony—is not only contrasted against racial brutality but also against the concept of racial equality and the possibility of Indian self-rule. The narrator identifies the tendency of the English to work on improvements to the country for which Indians take credit as the reason so many believe—wrongly—that India is capable of self-governance: “Overmuch tenderness of this kind has bred a strong belief among many natives that the native is capable of administering the country, and many devout Englishmen believe this also, because the theory is stated in beautiful English with all the latest political garnish” (124). This provides a useful way to misattribute the anxiety that comes from the colonial encounter, in which the recognition of shared humanity threatens, through humanist values, to argue for the repressed truth that India does not need British rule. The use of terms like “beautiful English” and “political garnish” represent this idea as a result of written ideology which has not been complemented with lived experience in the colony. In this way, both the brutality of the captain and the potential for reform are represented as the result of book knowledge, which does not accurately reflect a situation which, if known, exposes the gaps in both. Instead, an ambivalent position is presented in which the intelligence and even attractiveness of the colonized is acknowledged, but the potential of this to lead to shared humanity is contained.

At the end of the story, the narrator describes himself as haven fallen into a compromising position due to the transgressive beauty and charm of Lalun. Rushdie (1991) describes this story therefore as “the most remarkable story in this collection,” explaining that “the two Kiplings are openly at war with one another; and, in the end, it seems to me, the Indian Kipling manages to subvert what the English Kipling takes to be the meaning of the tale” (78). However, this is a compromising position in which no actual compromise occurs. In this is, perhaps, the most cynical positioning of the story. Though the narrator has been tricked into helping a man who seeks the overthrow of British rule in India escape, there is no actual threat, because the overthrow of the empire is represented as impossible. Even with Khem Singh free, he is incapable of doing anything against the British Empire, and where he was once arrested for rebellion he now surrenders voluntarily.
The colony is thus represented as separate from the actions of its agents. It is a place where signification itself has become static. Khem Singh tells the captain, “Put no more guards over me. It is no good out yonder” (160). This creates an effect that is now familiar: it denies the possibility of existence outside the colonized space. While it acknowledges the existence of non-colonized space, it contradictorily asserts that it is “no good.” In the division of colonizer/colonized, there is no room for that which is neither, so it must be rejected and suppressed. It is important to note here, however, that in this story the imposition of colonial Time comes with a cynical turn. India, after all, has not always been “no good,” but it was the coming of the British that made it so and, at least for Khem Singh, stopped time.

The narrator, despite his cynical depiction of the brutality of the colony and expressed sympathy for Indian culture and beauty, implicitly supports the colonizing system and the racial separations on which the colony is based. Although the narrator demonstrates that he understands the violence and oppression that come with the hypocrisy of the stated colonial ideology of benevolence and progress of, he nevertheless continues to serve the colony. Even more tellingly, he imagines resistance to or change of it as impossible. Thus, “On the City Wall” is a telling example not only of directing the colonizing audience to be acted on by cognitive dissonance but also of demonstrating the effect of this in its character.

The function of cognitive dissonance in this story is particularly complex and, therefore, effective, so it is apropos that it closes the collection. At first glance, the narrator acts not only unknowingly but on the surface seems to act against the colony's interests: he is tricked into releasing a political prisoner who seeks war against the British. When studied more carefully, the narrator's actions prove to be in the interest of the colony, as Khem Singh's war is depicted as impossible and he returns peacefully to prison, accepting his fate and causing no more danger to the British. As the narrator says, “India will never stand alone, but the idea is a pretty one, and men are willing to die for it, and yearly the work of pushing and coaxing and scolding and petting the country into good living goes forward” (125). As psychological research into cognitive dissonance shows, realizing that one's actions have an effect opposite to one's beliefs causes one to change one's beliefs to align with the perceived effects of one's actions. In this case, the narrator of “On the City Wall” has changed his views to support the colony, despite his obvious recognition of the oppression and hypocrisy of the British colonizing agents as well.

In attempting to do a favor for Lalun, the narrator falls victim to the destabilizing influence of her beauty and charm. Because racial separation relies on the representation of the colonized, especially colonized women, as being bestial, the beauty she displays threatens
to puncture the barrier between races and calls into question white supremacy. Thus, in this
the most direct of the representations of the function of cognitive dissonance in
guiding both the narrator and the reader to supporting the colony, despite the narrator's clear
depictions of colonial brutality and hypocrisy.
3.5. The Light That Failed

Kipling wrote *The Light That Failed* (1890) before he had ever visited Africa, though its inciting event and denouement both take place in the Sudan. The narrator, Dick Heldar, is an artist who suffers a sword wound to the head while sketching scenes from battle in Africa. The majority of the novel sees his recuperating from this wound, attempting to paint and to court Maisie, the beautiful young woman he was raised with, as they are both orphans. As Maisie rejects him and his eyesight worsens, Dick sinks into deep melancholy, and finally decides to return to Sudan, where the First Mahdist War has broken out. Rushing to join the army, he heroically helps to fend off an attack on his train, but is then killed in battle.

Sergeant (2013) identifies two sources for the novel’s misogynistic portrayal of women. One is Kipling’s failed romance of Florence Garrard, a former object of his affection whom he had met again in London. The other is “is the gendering that attached to imperial and metropolitan worlds. Indians were associated with a sensual femininity and practical incapability that was both contemptible and dangerous” (92). In both cases, the narrator frames the problem as the failure of the feminine to submit to proper masculine authority. Maisie refuses him and the natives of Africa resist the British colonizer. As he elsewhere constructs a dichotomy between the cynical, masculine, effective Anglo-Indian and the lazy, feminized, and dangerously ignorant administrator in India, Kipling contrasts the traditionally-trained Dick and his art informed by his war experiences with the dandy artists of London, privileging the masculine cynicism of the colony over what he represents as soft and self-indulgent decadence.

Throughout the book, Dick explicitly contrasts his experiences of Africa with what people in England believe it to be like. The lived experience constantly threatens to unseat the convictions and world view of the protagonist, leading to the novel’s “need to define and validate a strongly hierarchical, typological universe” (Sergeant 2013, 90). The first-person narrator’s cynical perspective towards English education from books, with its essentialized construction of white supremacy, is obvious in his sarcastic description of the first battle, in which he says, “Then came the attack of three thousand men who had not learned from books that it is impossible for troops in close order to attack against breech-loading fire” (30). Though the British “know” it is impossible for the Hadendoa to reach and break the square, the Hadendoa themselves do not have this ideological construction and are therefore capable of doing it, exposing representational gaps in white supremacy.

After the culmination of the attack, which the protagonist describes in dehumanizing terms that also reflect his being overwhelmed with the words “a torrent black as the sliding
water above a mill-dam” (30), the narrator is traumatized. His personal crisis results from both a literal head injury and damage done to his worldview and sense of self caused by the violent intermingling of Black and white bodies, a sudden and undeniable equivalence of humanity and potential for violence that his ideology and sense of whiteness told him was impossible. In his own words, he is left dazed, his senses darkened, and he performs an act of fruitless violence against the space of colonial conflict itself. As he slips into this liminal gap, the narrator describes that “[s]omething seemed to crack inside his head, and for an instant he stood in the dark,—a darkness that stung. He fired at random, and the bullet went out across the desert” (33). This darkness that surrounds and hurts him reflects the violent, ideology-shattering Blackness that mentally and almost physically overwhelmed him. His attempt to repair the breach created in him by this event forms much of the plot of the rest of the novel.

Dick unconsciously channels his personal frustrations and anxieties into violence towards the Other, nowhere more clearly than at the end of the text. Having experienced personal failure in his inability to form a relationship with Maisie, facing a lack of critical success and the impending end of his career due to his failing eyesight, Dick decides to return to Africa, where, in his mind, he can at least be useful despite his failure in every other field of his life. It is clear that, to Dick, to do violence to the colonial Other is a noble act of courage and service to the Empire, and thus to a greater good. Sergeant (2013) describes the protagonist’s tendency to thus turn to violence, noting, that “the violent sentiments and actions in Kipling’s first novel, The Light that Failed, ... are not displaced from the main character but stridently attached to him” (68).

Arata (1996) demonstrates how the narrator’s encounters with these Others, whether artistic, feminine, or racial, all serve as ways to represent anxieties that are them harshly repressed. He writes that

[f]ascination with and fear of the exotic (particularly of the feminine exotic) is here combined with anxiety concerning the consequences of extended contact. A variety of physical ‘intimacies’ — sexual intercourse, combat, tattooing, execution, transmigration of souls - are courted, but always with the proviso that they finally be acknowledged as both brutal violations of self and ‘shameless betrayals’ of one's caste or race. (174)

However, unlike in any other Kipling text, the ending stages a dissolution, a destruction of the self in the face of the failure of the narrator to assert his position of dominance over the Others that have challenged his self. Lycett (2016) suggests that Kipling was trying to tackle issues in himself that he had not yet been able to master, calling the novel “quirky” and writing that, while it “provides a fascinating metaphor for Rudyard’s life at the time, its main
drawback is that it is a ‘grown-up’ novel by an emotionally immature man” (286). In this sense, the book can be read as an attempt to contain Kipling’s own anxieties in familiar ways, but it cuts too close to the bone, opening space for destabilizing representations that cannot be resolved. Thus, the narrative, like Dick’s own life, must be squelched in a final moment of chauvinistic heroism, dying in a faraway land for queen and country. Having come dangerously close to losing his privileged status as his signifiers of masculinity, whiteness, and artistic taste all threatened to collapse, Dick finds final vindication in a death that reaffirms all of these subject positions. As a war correspondent turned hero turned martyr, he regains in death the identities he came so close to losing completely in life.

Since these autobiographical elements of *The Light That Failed* cannot be overlooked, and so they can be read against Kipling’s success or failure in himself applying cynicism to quiet the anxiety created in himself by his experiences. As Arata (1996) concludes, “The divisions and tensions of *The Light That Failed*, its angers and anxieties and violences, can make for unpleasant reading, but the novel’s interest may lie finally in that very unpleasantness”. (175) In Arata’s reading, the novel is shaped by Kipling hiding his genuine, hybrid identity, ashamed of its ambivalence, attempting to construct out of his own personal failure a Victorian tragic hero who, in death, achieves a unity of subjectivity that repairs the breach in himself. As Kipling returned to short stories and poetry, his ability to deploy his strategies for containing the anxieties that almost got away from him in *The Light That Failed* developed into ever more complex and effective forms.
3.6. Life's Handicap: Being Stories of Mine Own People

Life’s Handicap: Being Stories of Mine Own People (1891) included the stories of Mine Own People (1891) with many others. Kipling dedicated it “To E.K.R.,” being Edward Kay Robinson, the editor of The Civil and Military Gazette, the newspaper where Kipling first worked, who encouraged Kipling and gave him his first real audience in his newspaper. As such, the collection is dedicated by a younger Anglo-Indian to an older and more experienced one, marking it clearly as the production of one colonizer for another. As one character says gloomily, after a series of deaths among his comrades and not sleeping for several days, in “At the End of the Passage,” “It’s an insult to the intelligence of the Deity to pretend we’re anything but tortured rebels” (195). But every single one of these stories does exactly that, recasting the events and misattributing the causes of anxiety in a way that reaffirms the Empire.

The stories all depict events in India from the perspective of the Anglo-Indian. In many, native Indian characters are peripheral or hardly mentioned at all, and the events center on interpersonal conflicts among the Anglo-Indians, depicting their jealousies, affairs, illnesses, and rivalries. Those stories that do include major native characters all do so in a way that exposes anxieties related to the gaps of colonizing ideology. The colonized, when not repressed, threatens to destabilize by a presence that each story demonstrates control of using a variety of strategies. In “Without Benefit of Clergy,” the union of an Anglo-Indian man and a native Indian woman, as well as the child this produces, threatens to expose the colonial desire at the heart of the empire, and the death of the mother and child is represented as simultaneously a tragedy and a source of relief for the colonizer. “The Mark of the Beast” stages a conflict between an ignorant Anglo-Indian with no respect for the native way and the country itself, represented by a priest and his insulted god. Though the curse the priest puts on the white man appears to be genuine, the colonizers’ insistence otherwise is shown to be wise, and the incident is presented as a lesson not to disturb the local gods. Of all Kipling's stories, this did the most to disturb the cynical ideology of the colony, as its frank and brutal depiction of colonizing violence was too much to be contained in the typically cynical closure of its ending. “The Return of Imray” stages the most key destabilizing danger to the colonial enterprise, the murder of the colonized by the colonizer, and carefully signifies it also as the

21 Robinson was also responsible for using the presses of The Civil and Military Gazette to print Kipling’s very first published work, Schoolboy Lyrics (1881), a collection of Kipling’s juvenilia put together by his mother when Rudyard was 15.
failure of the individual colonized to properly acquire and deploy understanding of the colony.

The events of “Without Benefit of Clergy” raise one of the key threats to colonizing ideology, that of the desire of the colonizer for the colonized. At the same time as the Orient is sexualized and feminized in ideology, the sexual desire of the colonizer for the colonized constitutes a deeply destabilizing effect upon the racial separateness that is required for white supremacy to justify imperialism. As Young (1994) argues, “The idea of race here shows itself to be profoundly dialectical: it only works when defined against potential intermixture, which also threatens to undo its calculations altogether” (18). While stories in Plain Tales from the Hills (1888) never crossed the boundary into representing an actual union between colonizer and colonized, and even The Man Who Would Be King (1888) stopped short at the ostensible wedding between Daniel Dravot and a woman of color, stories in Life’s Handicap represent the union of colonizer and colonized fully. While stories in the former are therefore characterized as near misses, stories in the latter come to be depictions of tragedy.

“Without Benefit of Clergy” performs a move that appears in many colonizing texts: while the union between an Englishman and an Indian woman is signified sympathetically, this representation only occurs once the threat embodied by the physical union of the two has been contained through death. In the story, Ameera, “a Mussulman’s daughter bought two years before from her mother,” and John Holden, “an Englishman” (131) are a couple and are expecting a child. Whether they can be said to be married is one of the story’s points of contention, containing as it does both Victorian fears of extramarital relations on one side and the legitimation of miscegenation on the other. Holden attempts to represent their union with European signifiers of marriage, describing the price he paid for her as “the dowry” (130), though Ameera recognizes that, in the colonial context, the money he paid purchased her. She answers, “What talk is yours of dower! I was bought as though I had been a Lucknow dancing-girl instead of a child” (130). For the subaltern, there is no mistaking or disguising her position within the order.

In a way, she is the ideal subaltern, acknowledging her subject position and embracing it even as she sees it. While Holden attempts to describe his love to her in terms of flowery romance, she insists, “My king, for all thy sweet words, well I know that I am thy servant and thy slave, and the dust under thy feet. And I would not have it otherwise” (142) and she touches his feet, a gesture of abjection in her Muslim culture. In her desire for him and her

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22“To Be Filed for Reference” and “Beyond the Pale” are also narratives of miscegenation, and it is handled the same way in all three.
jealousy of white women, however, she exceeds her assigned position, as in this way she does not accept being silenced or treated as an object with no agency. So long as her agency leads her to choose to subordinate herself to Holden, there is no incongruity. That becomes embodied in their child, whose existence is living testament to their mutual desire and cross-racial connection, a living reminder of the intersubjectivity that must be repressed for the sake of the colonial order.

A result of this mutual recognition, the narrator recognizes Holden’s intense love for Ameera, writing, “she was all but all the world in his eyes” (131), though Ameera doubts the permanence of his affection, thinking that “[t]he love of a man, and particularly a white man, was at the best an inconstant affair, but it might... be held fast by a baby’s hands” (132). She recognizes and speaks plainly the vulnerability of their relationship to social pressures, as their union, particularly with the addition of a child, represents an extremely dangerous ideological threat to the British Empire.

As the birth of the child draws near, Holden is called away to two-weeks temporary duty, as his superior officers do not know about his family and even remark that, being a bachelor, he “ought to think himself lucky in being a bachelor and a free man” (132). Holden, who has been keeping two residences, one a bachelor’s bungalow and the other his house in the city, is here contrasted against his colleague in whose place he is sent. The other man cannot go because he is tending to his sick wife (132). The legitimation of one union and the vulnerability of the other is demonstrated by the need for secrecy—the story stresses how many locks and gates protect the house in the city, while anyone can come and go in the bungalow—and Holden’s anxiety while away. As the story is told from his perspective, the reader follows his thoughts, knowing nothing of the other characters. As usual with Kipling, the perspective is automatically that of the Anglo-Indian.

He returns to find that Ameera has delivered their son. She again signifies the child as binding the two of them together like “a bond and a heel-rope” (134). Holden indeed starts to realize the position this family puts him in, reflecting “that there was some one else in the world, but he could not feel that it was a veritable son with a soul” (135). He gives Ameera’s mother money for the upkeep of the child, and Ameera recognizes in this a monetary transaction that would render her and her child objects, reminiscent of the price Holden paid for her. She objects, “I am his mother, and no hireling. ... Shall I look to him more or less for the sake of money? Mother, give it back” (136). As the story continues to develop, this conflict grows, as Holden struggles to resolve the tension between being part of his family and upholding his duties as an Anglo-Indian.
Holden goes through his work distracted, vaguely happy at the club, where his colleagues respond with confusion. When the time comes to name the child, Holden chooses a name “in thy [Ameera’s]—in the Mussulman tongue,” to which she objects, “Why put me so far off? ... Let it be like unto some English name—but not wholly” (140). In this scene, the ideological contradiction of the story plays out. For Holden, the child signifies as Other, and thus he cannot signify it as his own. Ameera, recognizing this, suggests a hybrid identity for him, but this would be a hybrid identity in the full sense used by Bhabha (1994), that of a destabilizing mixture of self and Other which threatens to collapse the separation between the two.

Like Carnehan and Dravot in *The Man Who Would Be King*, Holden faces the collapse of imperial signification through miscegenation. That the Other is required for the entire system of signification, including that of the self, is one of the most fundamental of the arguments of Bhabha (1994), who argues that “[t]he Other must be seen as the necessary negation of a primordial identity—cultural or psychic—that introduces the system of differentiation which enables the cultural to be signified as a linguistic, symbolic, historic realm.” (52). This is the reason Holden so struggles to understand not only the signification but the existence of his own child. By having a child with an Indian, he has created a life that threatens to recreate this “primordial identity,” a life that has no Other within it. By stripping away this constructive division that underlies imperialistic racial theory, the hybrid child threatens Holden’s status and his subjectivity.

Ameera foresees her death and the child’s death, dwelling on it throughout the story. Though she makes no prediction as to the way they will die, her consciousness of their untenable subject position informs this choice. She says that, after her death, Holden will marry a white woman, in a move that would return Holden to an uncomplicated position in the signifying order. She tells him, “Thou wilt in this life, later on, go back to thine own folk” (142), failing to represent herself as one of his people. Thus, the child that she hoped would tie them closer becomes a reminder of their respective ideological positions within the larger order. The hybrid becomes at once a challenge to power and a reification of it, casting light on the division it violates while directing the gaze back to the colonizer. As Bhabha (1994) describes, it “unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power” (112). This is evidenced when Holden playfully calls the child, Tota, a spark, to which Tota indignantly replies, “I am no spark, but a man” (145). This “made Holden choke and devote himself very seriously to a consideration of Tota’s future” (145). In
this declaration of subjectivity, Tota demonstrates the threat he poses. To this moment, the narrator cynically comments, “He need hardly have taken the trouble” (145), as Tota and his mother will soon die, and the problem will thus be resolved.

It is only after the death of his son that Holden realized how much he loved him, but with “the same imperious necessity for hiding all trace of it” (146). Now that the child is dead and Holden’s reputation and future are safe, he can grieve. The loss of the hybrid tie between them also causes Ameera to bewail their union, declaring that she wishes she had married a man of her own race, even if he beat her. To this, Holden replies with amazement: “Am I an alien—mother of my son?” (147). In this statement is encapsulated the ideological collapse of racial signifiers that the story enacts. To Holden, Ameera is no longer Other, but only after the death of their hybrid child can he declare this. Holden tells Ameera, “We be two who were three. The greater need therefore that we should be one” (148).

The story drives home its cynical separation between the ideology for the sake of the ruling class, separate from the lived experience of the streets of India and mostly in England, from the lives of Holden and Ameera. The narrator describes, as a coda to the tragedy that has befallen, a typically Kiplingesque administrator who foolishly sees nothing of what the reader has been shown, signifying everything in terms of the colonial relationship:

> the Member for Lower Tooting, wandering about India in top-hat and frock-coat, talked largely of the benefits of British rule and suggested as the one thing needful the establishment of a duly qualified electoral system and a general bestowal of the franchise. (149)

The MP, as is to be expected, departs the country in terror as soon as a cholera epidemic strikes. Kipling, as has been shown, was always fervently against any degree of autonomy for Indian natives. The text, having arrived at this point, leaves the clear contrast between the uninformed wish for Indian suffrage, which would bring India and England closer together, with the hybrid tragedy that plays out between Holden and Ameera, whose pathos only further emphasizes the point that any commonality between them can only lead to misery. The implied reader’s position is clear, positioned with the experienced colonizers and their cynical refusal of rights to the colonized.

As the cholera epidemic spreads, one of the civilians tells Holden, “You're a lucky chap. You haven't got a wife to send out of harm's way” (151). There is nowhere a clearer demonstration of the use of irony in a cynical turn. The implication is obvious. Holden begs Ameera to go, which would mimic the action of the wives of the other Englishmen, but she refuses, giving for evidence the broken link between them when she says, “For his sake, perhaps,—thou hast made me very English—I might have gone” (152). When Ameera dies,
for once colonial cynicism is deployed with sympathy. When Holden weeps, the narrator writes “Holden could not see for the rain in his face” (157), and it is revealed that all of the garrison has known of Holden’s family, and extend their compassion to him.

In the final move that repairs the colonizing system from the rift that partially but never fully was incurred upon it by the union of Holden and Ameera, the house is badly damaged in the rains, and the owner of the house denies Holden’s desire to keep it. “When the birds have gone what need to keep the nest?” he says, acknowledging that Holden will now never again have an Indian lover. His are the final words of the story, indicating that this incident will be completely wiped from living memory: “It shall be pulled down, and the Municipality shall make a road across, as they desire, from the burning-ghaut to the city awll, so that no man may say where this house stood” (158).

Though the tangible evidence is thus wiped away, the story remains, told by the narrator to the implied Anglo-Indian reader who may learn by it. The union between white and Indian must never take place, and—cynically—when it does, it must be silenced and repressed, for fear of the harm it embodies by its very existence to the colonizing order. As with all of Kipling’s colonizing texts, the silences speak the loudest: never once did Holden acknowledge his family nor consider bringing them into his own circle as a colonizer or sending them to England, where they would have been safer. David Rubin (1986) acknowledges this, writing that “[f]or all his genuine affection for India, Kipling is unwilling to challenge the fundamental racial prejudice of that British society any more than he will conceive of Holden and Ameera passing over into an Indian world where they and their child would be acceptable” (16). For all the threat of hybridity, Kipling’s narrator suppresses the notion that anything in the encounter would have made Holden live in Indian society or had made him more Indian. When read through the lens of colonizing cynicism, the events of the story in fact made him more English.

When this reading is applied to “The Mark of the Beast,” the cynicism is clear from the very beginning, which separates the world into two spheres, each with a different set of powers governing it. The narrator’s first words are,

East of Suez, some hold, the direct control of Providence ceases; Man being there handed over to the power of the Gods and Devils of Asia, and the Church of England Providence only exercising an occasional and modified supervision in the case of Englishmen. (209)

The story’s two main characters, the experienced Strickland and the newly-arrived Fleece, form a clear contrast. Strickland knows to respect the Indian way of life, which includes both the native Indians and the experienced Anglo-Indians, who have altered their way of life
based on their experience in the colony. When Fleete, staggering drunk, defaces a temple and is struck with a curse for it—a curse that Strickland and the narrator insist is rabies, but is suggested to be supernatural—the misattribution of the illness undoubtedly reflects the pattern that has been developed. By giving it a name that matches the world-view of European science, the characters seek to quell the anxiety that their realization of a power outside their own representative order could exist. This supernatural power also endangers the idea that Christianity could ever spread through British India, undermining one of the validations of the colonial enterprise. Of all Kipling’s stories, perhaps this one comes closest to genuinely undermining the imperialist order in a way that cannot be controlled by cynicism. To borrow the metaphor employed by Bhabha (1994), if mimicry that serves the colony can only partially uncover the truth, “The Mark of the Beast” may show too much.

As is usual in such stories, the perpetrator of colonizing violence is represented as different from the others, in this case by his exaggerated drunkenness. Fleete drinks six separate types of drinks in one night, including “four or five whiskies or sodas,” so that “when he came out, at half-past three in the morning, into fourteen degrees of frost, he was very angry with his horse for coughing, and tried to leapfrog into the saddle . . . so Strickland and I formed a Guard of Dishonour to take Fleete home” (209-210). The narrator and Strickland, being the more experienced colonizers, do not get so drunk or make Fleete's mistake of defacing a statue of Hanuman by grinding out his cigar on it. The text even suggests they would have prevented him from doing so, as he acts “[b]efore we could stop him” (210). That these characters know better becomes all the more disturbing, however, as the reader experiences the violence they turn to in order to cure Fleete of the curse the nameless priest puts on him.

As the curse takes hold, Fleete slowly transforms into an animal in mind, starting with eating raw red meat to being unable to even speak. His violation of the native Indian shrine threatens to break down the ideological subject positions of the characters. The text's framing reminds the reader that Fleete's transgression is not in his insulting or desecrating the native culture as such, but because his doing puts them in danger of retaliation, revealing the constant threat of violence from the colonized that the colonizers must ideologically suppress. As Strickland bluntly puts it, “we might all three have been knifed” (211). Thus, the text suggests that the colonizers tolerate native culture not out of respect, but out of cynical self-preservation. Through Fleete's drunkenness, this revelation is only partially revealed, as it is suggested that most will never be so drunk as to fall into this ideological gap.
At the end of the story, Fleete and Strickland brutally torture the priest, forcing him to reverse the curse and thereby tacitly acknowledging his supernatural ability. They lash the leprous priest to a bedstead and singe his flesh horribly with a gun barrel heated in the fire. The narrator attempts to justify this by referring to their friend who depends on it, writing, “I understood then how men and women and little children can endure to see a witch burnt alive; for the beast [Fleete] was moaning on the floor” (221). The reference to witch trials conveys a terrible suggestion of mass hysteria and unreasoning cruelty, and the fact that the leprous priest literally has “no face” but only a “slab [that] took its place” that conveys his agony only serves to further highlight colonial violence’s representation as being perpetrated on a faceless subaltern group. Arata (1996) develops how this shakes imperial ideology to the core, stating that “order is restored and a happy ending achieved, but at the cost of remarkable brutality. The narrative turns away from this brutality, since to represent it would be to reveal how firmly Strickland’s authority rests on violence and coercion, on the strong arm of the imperialist” (170).

As the characters perform the ritual to cleanse Fleete, Strickland expresses the extent to which the entire semiotic system has broken down for him and the others, signifying his subjectivity in terms of insanity, and wonders whether it may be a dream. He exclaims, “I've done enough to ensure my dismissal from the service, besides permanent quarters in a lunatic asylum. Do you believe that we are awake?” (222). Even Strickland, who throughout Kipling’s stories stands in for the experienced, cynical colonizer, begins to experience a breakdown in his sense of reality due to having experienced such an extent of bare violence on the native priest.

Just as the story threatens to destabilize the centrality of European knowledge and cosmology, the ending makes a move to repair it, though in terms that the text has exposed. The narrator insists that it is without question that there is no supernatural beyond the Christian cosmology. Strickland, who by this time seems to have been fully absorbed into proper Anglo-Indian society with a wife and family, has even become “a church-going member of society for his wife's sake” (224). After he and the narrator discuss “the incident dispassionately,” which can only be ironic, Strickland suggests the narrator write down the events (224). The narrator closes by writing,

I cannot myself see that this step is likely to clear up the mystery; because, in the first place, no one will believe a rather unpleasant story, and, in the second, it is well known to every right-minded man that the gods of the heathen are stone and brass, and any attempt to deal with them otherwise is justly condemned. (224)
The signification of these statements is a point of contention among Kipling scholars. Rubin (1986) argues that “the representation of the imperial project in the story as a whole implies a cracked system, built on shaky convictions, which cannot be repaired by these final, conventional words” (27). However, Generani (2016) reads the ending in the opposite light, stating that the “ending, which expresses a self-critical consciousness, can also be read as echoing the cynical voice of the establishment” (30). Following the pattern of the cynicism of the colony, it is not a question of whether the reader at the end believes that there indeed is no supernatural cause to Fleete’s malady and then his cure. It is only whether the anxiety the story has produced through suggesting this possibility has driven the implied reader to embracing the ideology over the reality, for fear of the consequences that have been partially revealed in the text.

That this particular story might have bitten off a bit too much to be able to control with its closing cynicism is indicated by the horrified critical reaction in England. Frederick Lawrence Knowles’s A Kipling Primer, published in 1899, records the reactions of journalists who reviewed the book. The Edinburgh review wrote that “[f]or pure horror, this tale is, perhaps, unmatched in English literature (144). This was echoed by the Pall Mall Gazette: “As a tale of sheer terror, ‘The Mark of the Beast’ could not easily be surpassed” (144). Yet the review of the Athenaeum suggests more than a sublime response: “‘In ‘The Mark of the Beast’ Mr. Kipling passes, as he occasionally does, the bounds of decorum, and displays a love of the crudely horrible in its disgusting details . . . which is to be deprecated; but the fascination of the story is incontestable” (144). And the most telling is the review of the Spectator, which complained, “‘The Mark of the Beast’ may be curious, but is also loathsome, and shows Mr. Kipling at his very worst” (144). These amply demonstrate that the story failed to completely dispel the colonial anxieties it exposed.

The third story to be examined in Life’s Handicap, “The Return of Imray,” is the Kipling story that deals the most directly with the constant threat of revolution in India after the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Sullivan (1993) highlights the importance of the Rebellion in Kipling’s work and in the imperial imagination in general at the start of her book, writing, “Kipling's writings about India are also produced by the larger historical strains of late nineteenth-century empire as it reacted with increasing authoritarianism to post-Mutiny (1857) fears of their own expulsion from the land they called their ‘jewel in the Crown’” (2). The story tells of a young Anglo-Indian officer “in his youth, at the threshold of his career” (225) who disappears, and is discovered to have been murdered by his servant. The even unnerves the narrator, as the potential violence of the colony that is usually repressed
threatens to come to the surface. As the repressed appears in abject and undeniable form, the ideological underpinnings of the Empire are shaken, and “the universal applicability of rationality which supports Strickland’s authority is disturbed and suddenly, there seems to be a disruption in the signs required for the recognition of colonial authority” (Low 2005, 119). This disturbance is not left unresolved, as the narrator and the reader find an answer to this threat in the cynical Strickland. Reifying the now-familiar trope that colonial power derives from the colonizer’s monopoly over representation of the colony, Strickland declares that Imray’s mistake was not knowing the character of Indians well enough. Thus, what is potentially the most destabilizing of prospects—that of the colonized killing the colonizer at any moment—becomes regimented and accounted for, represented as a failure of knowledge that can be corrected through proper familiarity with the people the British are ruling.

Although he does not explain exactly how he does it, Generani (2016) identifies that this represents a message from Kipling to other colonizers, as “Kipling strove to help readers avoid those mistakes made by... the missing agent of empire in ‘The Return of Imray’ (1888)” (23). By signifying a colonized murdering a colonizer as the result of the colonizer’s mistake, Kipling removes the agency of the colonized, representing the act as entirely the result of the action of the white man. This is both a warning and a comfort to colonizers, who are assured that, so long as they perform their duties in the correct way, their position and their lives will be safe. This cynically represses the idea that a person under imperialist rule would successfully rebel regardless of the actions or attitudes of the colonizer, leaving the subaltern’s own desire and agency in a gap of silence.

The story opens with the disappearance of Imray, who is briefly sought and then abandoned, as the work of the Empire must continue and cannot stop for one man, who is only a “microscopial” (225) part of it. The story employs the idea that the Empire exists as a vast entity separated from the existence of its people. After the search is abandoned, “the work of the great Indian Empire swept forward, because it could not be delayed, and Imray from being a man became a mystery — such a thing as men talk over at their tables in the Club for a month, and then forget utterly” (226). The narrator, writing with the familiar tone of the experienced and expert journalist, presents that the Empire can continue unchanged even in the event of the death of its agents. If anything, their sudden and violent death requires a minor shift in bureaucracy. This separation of human and Empire reifies the latter as an ideology removed from reality, whose existence owes little to the actual events within its geographic borders.
The narrator’s friend Strickland, as usual, is represented as both the most effective and the most experienced colonizer. Although it has been little mentioned in the critical literature, the relationship between Strickland and his dog is a transparent metaphor for the ideological construction of the connection between colonizer and colonized. This is clear from the narrator’s very first description of the animal, describing that the dog “spoke to Strickland in a language of her own; and whenever, walking abroad, she saw things calculated to destroy the peace of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, she returned to her master and laid information” (226). In the loyalty of an animal for her master to the exclusion of all other loyalties, the text signifies a fantasy of pure subject purpose subsumed to the function of the Empire. To solidify the identification between the dog and India, she is described as “an enormous Rampur slut who devoured daily the rations of two men” (226), words that echo the feminization and sexualization of the colony and signify Strickland’s ability to satisfy the colonized’s unreasonable needs.

Strickland demonstrates a unique ability to understand and cater to the needs of the dog, whose devotion to his master is to the detriment of his own health and wellbeing. When Strickland has malaria, the dog “made great trouble for the doctors, because she did not know how to help her master and would not allow another creature to attempt aid” (227). The violence of the colonized on the colonizer is thus represented as born of mixed loyalty and ignorance, and the violence on her in its turn as for the good of the colonizer: “Macarnaght, of the Indian Medical Service, beat her over her head with a gun-butt before she could understand that she must give room for those who could give quinine” (227). It is the dog’s inability to understand the academic knowledge of the Anglo-Indian medical professional—an inability that, given that she will never understand language, cannot be redressed—that forces the doctor to treat her in a way she does understand, and this violence brings a result to the satisfaction of both master and dog.

Later, when the narrator seeks the cause of Strickland’s murder, the dog “sits with every hair erect,” and is described as “watching an invisible extra man as he moved about behind my shoulder” (231). The narrator at the time is unaware of the identity of the murderer or of his proximity. The dog displays a knowledge that is both comforting and unnerving to the colonizing subject: she unfailingly protects the white men throughout the story, but has access to information about the danger they are in that they are ignorant to. Were she not a dog, but a thinking person with agency, this knowledge would demonstrate the failure of the colonizer—even of Strickland—to have complete mastery over control of knowledge of the colony and its people.
The short story follows a very clear course as the narrator learns a lesson in the proper way to signify the colony in general and the colonial encounter in particular. At first, unnerved by his experience with Strickland, he refuses to have anything further to do with him, in a clear expression of the anxiety he is attempting to repress that has emerged as a result of Imray’s disappearance and what it represents. As he puts it, he saw Strickland as “a man to whom unpleasantness arrived as do dinners to ordinary people” (232). Preferring not to think about the events, he finds Strickland’s frank efforts to resolve it disturbing. Despite the narrator’s discomfort about Strickland, he takes care to tell the reader he “liked him immensely” (232), making it clear his aversion is not personal, but comes from a less concrete source.

After the body of Imray is found by accident, Strickland seems to realize which servant committed the murder without any actual evidence, further positioning him as the master of colonizing knowledge through his apparently wonderful ability to ascertain guilt. Bahadur Khan, whom Strickland suspects, confesses to the crime literally at the end of a .360 Express rifle, casually turning to violence when the ideology that represents the murder of a colonizer by the colonized has clearly failed. Strickland explains that Imray’s death was caused by his ignorance of local ways. Imray had touched the head of a Muslim child, Bahadur Khan’s son, who then died of fever.

While it is true that “Khan’s specific stand on religious and cultural beliefs points to the limits and estrangement of Western models of explanation” (Low 2005, 119), this is represented not as the difference between colonizer and colonized, but as between Imray and Strickland. Strickland’s first response upon the suicide of Bahadur Khan is “This...is called the nineteenth century” (238-239). In this, he gestures towards the slippage of imperial control: to some, the date signifies the ascendancy of Western thought, but the experience they have just had in India has shown it to have gaps in the colonized space which are not apparent from Europe. It is fitting, then, that it is through Strickland that the story expresses the most cynical attitudes directly. Of the death, he declares it was, “Simply and solely through not knowing the nature of the Oriental, and the coincidence of a little seasonal fever” (239). It is he who gives voice to the misattribution that is key to all colonizing cynicism, shifting the cause of the anxiety the characters feel to a source that will not destabilize the signifying order of the colony and thus their own subjectivity.

To demonstrate that the exposure that has taken place partially, as described by the model for mimicry introduced by Bhabha (1994), has been dealt with, the story ends with a double move that is emblematic of the exact way mimicry works when presented through
Kipling’s colonizing writing. The intersubjectivity of the colonizer and colonized is again represented as the site of both desire and anxiety, as the colonizer’s need to be recognized and legitimated by the colonized mixes uncomfortably with the repressed fear of the latter’s violence. The instability of imperial subjectivity is that it relies on the Other, an Other that, while signified as the obedient and subservient supplement, has less need for the colonizer than the colonizer has for it. Low (2005) puts this into Lacanian terms, explaining that the colonizer experiences a subliminal need for recognition by the Other, and “the essentially narcissistic desire of the master that his servant recognise the fullness of his authority and conform to his image will always be in excess of the demand” (117). The colonized, having been represented as a voiceless subaltern with no agency, threatens to emerge as a monstrous agent whose actions could lead to not only the death of an individual but the collapse of the British Raj. In that moment the narrator wonders about his own servant as he puts on his boots, there is a recognition of the commonality between the seemingly obedient worker and the vengeful murderer. To return to one of Žižek’s (1989) salient points, the subject prefers the stability of the ideology to what Žižek calls the reality. To accept the reality would be to live with the anxiety that at any time the subject could be killed by those upon whom he depends.

Thus, the death of Imray, through the partial exposure of the potential in every colonized to kill the colonizer, makes safe this potentially devastating representational gap through careful misattribution. Imray’s flaw was, in the framing of the text, not that he was a white Anglo-Indian brutally oppressing those whose agency for retribution and self-actualization led to his death. He is instead represented as a failed colonizer, one whose inability to properly perform his duty in achieving control over knowledge of the colonized space and the people under his authority becomes reformed into a kind of neglectful suicide. The threat that “a native subordinate might throw off his servitude and slay his master by catching him unawares” which “links Imray to Strickland to the journalist narrator” is instead pointed entirely at Imray, serving as a warning to Strickland, the narrator, and the implied reader to be better colonizers (Low 2005, 117).

The powerful ideological doubling of this message is the essence of colonizing ideology. In its misattribution, it reaffirms the ideal of control of the colony through totalized knowledge, represented as factual understanding that only the Anglo-Indian has access to. As usual in Kipling, this goes beyond the representation of the colony familiar from academic texts and includes a cynicism of the lived reality of the colony, a recognition whose partial emergence serves only as a means of recognizing its threat and silencing it. The threat of
native revolution is still there, and in Kipling’s framework the warning is presented as a
cynical contradiction: though the blow will, in this fictionalized representation of the colonial
relationship, never come, the colonizer must at all times be ready for it. If it does come, it will
not be for reasons that would undermine the control of those whom it targets.
3.7. *Departmental Ditties Barrack-Room Ballads and Other Verses*

Kipling’s *Departmental Ditties Barrack-Room Ballads and Other Verses*, a book of verse, was published in 1892, a little more than two years after he left India. Most of its poems were written and originally published in journals when Kipling was still in India, and they deal with uniquely Anglo-Indian subjects. Some, like “Study of an Elevation, in Indian Ink,” “A Legend of the Foreign Office,” and “The Post that Fitted” develop one of Kipling’s favorite themes, that of the Anglo-Indian agent of the Civil Service, ill-suited to the position, struggling to fulfill the duties of the post and experiencing humiliation for the trouble.

“Pagett, MP” reproduces this theme with one of Kipling’s most often-used misattributions for the trauma of the colonial encounter, the ignorant colonial administrator. Fresh from England, the titular Pagett stumbles through India, expecting a place very different from the one he finds. The speaker describes Pagett’s horror of the death of illness that was so common in India:

> July was a trifle unhealthy, - Pagett was ill with fear.  
> 'Called it the “Cholera Morbus,” hinted that life was dear.  
> He babbled of “Eastern Exile,” and mentioned his home with tears;  
> But I haven't seen my children for close upon seven years. (21-24)

The speaker thus contrasts the English administrator’s fear for his own wellbeing with his callousness to the narrator’s own misery.

The poem ends with a tragic reflection on the speaker’s own position in regards to men like Pagett. This matches the claim of Generani (2016) about Kipling’s literary texts that “[a]lthough they were written from within Indian culture, they reproduced for British readers the problematically distant approach of those contemporary ‘armchair anthropologists’” (22). There is no “although” in this, however. The texts speak clearly to the Anglo-Indian reader as well as to the reader in England. Kipling’s speaker hints that, given the opportunity, he will continue to avenge himself in small ways on the bureaucrats who, leaving England, only make life more difficult for the Anglo-Indians who properly understand the lived conditions in India:

> And I laughed as I drove from the station, but the mirth died out on my lips  
> As I thought of the fools like Pagett who write of their “Eastern trips,”  
> And the sneers of the travelled idiots who duly misgovern the land,  
> And I prayed to the Lord to deliver another one into my hand. (29-32)

The message to the reader in England is clear: if you come to India, your ideological positioning must be different from what the poem presumes it is now.

Others poems, like “Divided Destinies,” are straightforward fantasies of colonial desire. In it, the speaker longs for the carefree life he projects onto a “Bandar,” or monkey,
foreshadowing the racial overtones of the carefree, careless Bandar-Log in *The Jungle Books*. After dreaming that the monkey has described for him every obnoxious ritual that a servant of the British Empire must endure, from wearing trousers to suffering the fevers of the jungle, the speaker nevertheless answers, “Gentle Bandar, an inscrutable Decree / Makes thee a gleesome fleasome Thou, and me a wretched Me” (25-26). It would be difficult to imagine a more straightforward racial separation or a more uncomplicated expression of colonial desire for the Other. Despite the speaker’s clear elucidation of the travails of the Anglo-Indian, he finishes by declaring that it is “an inscrutable Decree” that separates him from the fetishized identity he longs for. In this artificial binary, to be a human and, by extension of the obvious metaphor, a white man, is to be inextricably tied to be the “man of many clothes! Sad crawler on the Hills” (5), as the imagined Bandar puts it.

To press home the point, “Arithmetic on the Frontier” encapsulates the distinction between the ideology of the empire and what the civil servant is likely to experience in the indistinct region of the borderland, where that ideology is threatened by the encounter with the colonized. The poem contrasts the sure knowledge produced by Western academia with the lived experience of the colony. “No proposition Euclid wrote / No formulae the textbooks know, / Will turn the bullet from your coat, / Or ward the tulwar's downward blow. / Strike hard who cares - shoot straight who can / The odds are on the cheaper man” (19-24). In the colony, the tremendous wealth of the British Empire’s resources proves to be a hindrance, because the Anglo-Indian suddenly deprived of it faces the danger of an equal meeting with one used to being without this distinct advantage in power. Any new civil servant must come prepared with this knowledge. Keeping in mind that, although the poems originally appeared in Indian publications, “Kipling had one eye fixed on an audience at home, for a part of his purpose seems to be to bring to the bosoms of his readers the truth about Anglo-Indian life in all its harshness” (Page 1984, 166), it becomes clear that the texts serve to position this audience “at home” with a very straightforward warning and a model for cynical positioning towards colonizing ideology.

Thus, the book, reproducing imagined Anglo-Indian voices, is an example of a ritualized group processing of traumatic events, grappling with the simultaneous desire for the Othered native and the feeling of absolute obligation and racial determinism that ties the white colonizer to their role in the colony. The poem “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” is a particularly telling example of these poems’ approach to this ideological anxiety. In it, the English soldiers not only encounter the humanity of the people they are fighting but face the limit of their own signifying process when they fail to inscribe the warriors with colonizing signifiers. The
poem contains the threat of breakdown of all of these signifiers as the soldier speaker attempts to understand his encounter with an Othered enemy who is both colonized and not, in that he is fighting against the English for control of a nominally colonized space. The place the poem ends is one that reinforces the colonizing cynicisms of the soldiers who must enact the imperial violence on the bodies of their enemies.

The poem describes an encounter between British colonial forces and African soldiers. The events are told in retrospective, as the speaker reflects on the various soldiers the English have faced and decides that the so-called Fuzzy-Wuzzy, the Hadendoa warrior, was “the finest o’ the lot.” This evaluation is based on a single criterion: the effectiveness of the Hadendoa in battle, especially represented by the breaking of the British defensive square, which happened on two separate occasions during the Mahdist war. In praising the Hadendoa warrior, the British speaker reveals the destabilizing effect that this meeting has had on his own ideology, as it exposed the arbitrariness of the division necessary for the colonial ideology, that of the separation between the white British, who are represented as superior, and the colonized people of color whom they seek to rule.

It is worth noting that the nominal framework of the poem stages an action that, while impossible in a literal sense, represents a nightmare for the British colonial leadership: the prospect that it is possible for a British rank-and-file soldier to speak to the Hadendoa warrior, though, as someone living outside the Empire and not subject to its hegemonic system of representation, the Hadendoa is unsignified by the British. Maurice Blanchot (1993) describes the moment of potential violence that emerges when representation breaks down, when a subject fails to be signified and is reduced to “infinite presence.” For two humans to relate to each other, they must be accessible, which is to say signified within the same order. Without this, the two are left bare to each other, limiting their behavior to communication—attempting to negotiate representation, to make each other mutually accessible—or murder. Blanchot writes that when this occurs the walls have fallen: those that separate us, those too that permit us to communicate, and those, finally, that protect us by keeping us at a distance. In a sense, man is now the inaccessible, but the inaccessible is in a sense the immediate; what exceeds me absolutely is absolutely at my mercy. Here is man come forth in his presence; that is to say, reduced to the poverty of presence. ... [M]an facing man like this has no choice but to speak or to kill. (60,61)

In the actual encounter, the British soldier chose to kill. Now, recalling the incident, he imagines the other option. As the lack of a reply by the speaker’s target suggests, this speech act is, in its most simple function, doomed to failure. As Spivak would remind us, the
subaltern cannot speak. The fact that Kipling’s speaker seems to forget that for a moment speaks volumes about the potential of the human encounter, though as in all colonizing texts this potential is controlled, and the gap in signification it exposes is forcefully closed.

As one of Kipling’s *Barrack-Room Ballads*, the poem takes the form of a song sung by British soldiers. As such, we must consider the role such a poem or song plays in the ideological identity of its audience. As Turner (1990) argues, it is part of every culture to create a liminal space in which it is possible to address the anxieties created by the permeability of the binaries that shape the representative order of that culture. Turner identifies this with the ritual space, particularly with what he calls “life-crisis ceremonies”: “Life-crisis rituals portray and symbolically resolve archetypal conflicts in abstraction from the milling, teeming social life which characteristically and periodically throws up such conflicts. Society is, therefore, better equipped to deal with them concretely, having portrayed them abstractly” (11). As Turner notes, this resolution of conflict does not necessitate a redress of the crisis it is created to contain: such a ritual can also end in a “social recognition of irremediable or irreversible breach of schism” (9). He describes the function of theater as playing the third role of redressing a breach in culture or society as happens in ritual. It is this breach that causes the cognitive dissonance that makes the colonial agent increasingly identify with and support the colony. Thus, Turner’s positioning of theater at the point of redressing a recognized gap can be applied to poetry and fiction.

In a larger sense, this is the response that Kipling’s poem models: his soldier speaker sees and expresses the repressed contradiction necessary to the creation of colonial ideology. In addition to recognizing it, he describes an ideological position that offers a means of escape from the anxiety the contradiction creates. He presents his own cynicism as a natural part of the relationship between the English colonizer and the colonized subject, a “bargain” that acknowledges the impossibility of the position both are placed into.

To understand the poem and its key moment, the breaking of the British square, we must first understand the importance of the Hollow Square infantry formation in the British public consciousness. Its role in the Napoleonic Wars had become legendary, and the story that a properly-formed square could not be broken was firmly entrenched in the British mind. In its shape, the British infantry regiment in general and the Hollow Square in particular mirrored the ideological construction of Britain itself. Protected on all sides by armed British soldiers keeping the Other on the far side of the bayonets, the aristocratic officers and the regimental flags strongly resonated as the heart of white British identity. In the same way, the island nation represented itself as projecting its power and hegemony into hostile foreign
lands, guarding the core of its identity with the military might of its soldiers. Thus, the Hollow Square represented Britain and its empire in miniature.

By the time of the Mahdist War, the Hollow Square had become outdated in continental warfare, as the accurate, breech-loading rifle made such a close-packed formation with its emphasis on the fixed bayonet unfeasible and unnecessary. Michael Tyquin (2016) describes that it continued to be used, however, in colonial warfare:

In India and Africa the old tactics could still be used effectively, including against a numerically superior enemy. They could exploit one of the key strengths of the British army—discipline. ... There was nothing especially sophisticated about operations in Egypt and the Sudan.... On meeting the enemy, fighting tactics employed a hollow square. (62)

A huge square would be formed around the entire baggage train to protect it from attack by enemy infantry, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the soldiers faced by the British in contemporary African wars.

This was the case in the Mahdist War, fought from 1881 to 1899 to bring Sudan under the control of European powers. Salih (2012) provides a detailed history of the war. The Sudanese forces were commanded by Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah, called the Mahdi, the prophesied redeemer of Islam said to rule before the end of days. Egypt, under nominal Ottoman control but in actuality directed by the British, entered the war first, but their failure meant British troops were sent to directly intervene in 1884. The disaster of the defeat at the Siege of Khartoum in 1885 made the British pull out of Sudan, focusing on rebuilding Egypt, which was crippled by debt. The British re-entered Sudan in 1896 as part of an effort to head off Italian expansion in the region, and moved to conquer it completely in 1898. These dates are important to note, as “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” was written in 1892, between the British invasions, when Sudan was nominally free of European control. Thus, the poem represents an English subject discussing a failed attempt at colonizing, when the colonizing apparatus attempted to signify a space and people as colonized but failed to do so. As such, the poem models the response of a common soldier to these events, demonstrating his cognitive dissonance and how he is able to misattribute this—though it also suggests that he is not able to close this rupture completely.

In the first stage of the war—the one before the writing of the poem—there were two incidents in which a square was entered Hadendoa warriors. The first was at the Battle of Tamai, when a unit stationed on one side of a square left to engage Mahdist forces, creating a gap in the square that was exploited by a charge. In the second incident, the Battle of Abu Klea, described by John Hoyt Williams (1996), the British rolled a Gardner machine gun out
of their square formation to fire on the Mahdists, but the gun jammed and the Mahdists attempted to overrun it. When the gunners tried to re-enter the square, the confusion created a gap that was, again, used by the Mahdists to enter the square (46-48). It is in this battle that we see the square truly breaking. As the bulwark of British soldiers crumples inwards, forced open by a breach in discipline and by the pressure put on them by the Hadendoa, Black bodies penetrate the white boundary into white space. In this moment, the separation between whiteness and Otherness is collapsed into confusion and ambiguity, a violent mixture of undivided bodies.

The incident of the breaking hollow square formation, then, is the moment of trauma that the speaker of “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” returns to at the end of every stanza, using it as a tribute and also a protection against the potential of the violent encounter between would-be colonizer and African to create a human encounter that would jeopardize the colonial ideology of the English. In other words, it provides a guide for dealing with the cognitive dissonance of the encounter, demonstrating how it reinforces the commitment of the English speaking subject to the colonizing enterprise.

It was particularly the death of Colonel Frederick Gustavus Burnaby at Abu Klea that galvanized the Victorian imagination. Burnaby, a handsome swashbuckling figure beloved by the newspapers, was well-known to the British public, and his death during the confused action helped to bring home the battle to the public at home. Though he was not the commanding officer, his death is used to signify the breakdown in order as though he had been in Sir Henry Newbolt’s poem “Vitai Lampada.” The line “The Gatling's jammed and the Colonel dead” (11) in particular identifies the event in the poem as Abu Klea, and the death, suggesting panic and uncertainty, is used as a stage for re-establishing Victorian domestic values of perseverance and fortitude. The soldiers facing this traumatic intrusion of Black bodies into the white square are rallied by the voice of a “school-boy,” echoing the cry of the children at Clifton College, who learn to encourage themselves when facing tall odds in cricket with “Play up, play up, and play the game” (8). They repeat the same mantra on the battlefield of Abu Klea, declaring the same principle of sportsmanship and fair play a legitimate ideological frame for the colonizing battle in Africa. Ellis (2014) argues that sport, in many ways, took the place of religion after the crisis in faith of the Victorian era. He describes Newbolt's poem's function as “proto-spirituality,” and it may, perhaps, be better demonstrated to show a strength of ideology that rivals the power of religion to organize and control:
Here one might discern a kind of proto-spirituality which shows that sport has begun to generate, or expresses, a whole way of looking at life and the world. It was written after the heroic performance of the heavily outnumbered British army at Abu Klea in 1885 on their way to an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce Khartoum. The second stanza makes explicit reference to details of the battle. The refrain “Play up! Play up! And play the game!” connects the qualities and character of cricket at Clifton College where the poet Henry Newbolt was educated with the qualities necessary to win a war. (131)

In this case, as is the case with all colonial military encounters, the qualities needed to win a war are identical to those needed to maintain the colony itself, which relies on militaristic oppression to survive, whether by direct violence or by spectacle and other forms of projected power.

The speaker of Kipling's poem refers to the same principle of sport, though to markedly different effect, signaling that what is an earnest reiteration of difference in Newbolt is a cynical expression of anxiety and reinforcement in Kipling. The speaker acknowledges that, given his experience witnessing the imperial violence perpetrated on those he praises, he is tempted to condemn the colonizing endeavor, which brought him and his comrades to that bloody battlefield. In this, he recognizes the threat of the human experience to challenge the colonizing ideology with which he has come armed.

So 'ere 's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, an’ your friends which are no more,
If we ’ad n’t lost some messmates we would ’elp you to deplore;
But give an’ take ’s the gospel, an’ we ’ll call the bargain fair,
For if you ’ave lost more than us, you crumpled up the square! (33-36)

He fails to close the threatening gap created in his representative system, however. He recognizes as his own failure to condemn the empire, which he cannot do because to do so would be to abandon the colonizing ideology that gives the deaths of his comrades meaning. The magnitude of the loss he himself has suffered due to the death of his comrades clearly creates a cognitive dissonance in him that drives him to believe in the very thing he has identified as cruel. Thus, he returns to the ideology of the game, the same as the speaker in Newbolt's poem, though with a telling difference.

While Newbolt's speaker addresses a presumably English audience familiar with the games of boys in public school, the speaker in Kipling's poem ostensibly speaks to the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” for whom the “bargain” is most certainly not fair, and who therefore obviously has no part in the “we” that would identify it as such. Furthermore, by saying “we'll call the bargain fair” (my emphasis), the speaker emphasizes that it is in the speech act of signifying the exchange as fair that its potential for destabilization is controlled and averted.
The impossibility this signifier to hold for the encounter is made clear by the previous stanza, in which the sport metaphor is exposed by the speaker's acknowledgement that there was nothing "sporting" in killing Hadendoa with modern Martini-Henry rifles: “We sloshed you with Martinis, an’ it was n’t ’ardly fair” (23). Williams (1996) emphasizes the effectiveness of the Martini-Henry as used by the British in this conflict,

a single-shot breechloader firing a massive, low-velocity .45-caliber slug, and mounting a wavy-bladed, 22-inch sword bayonet. Most soldiers, out of healthy respect for the hard-charging Dervishes, had taken the time to notch their bullets, making dumdums out of them, to magnify their already awesome man-stopping characteristics. (49)

It is no wonder, then, that for “we” to “call the bargain fair” rings hollow—the Hadendoa would certainly not agree, and the English speaker contradicts himself about it. Thereby, this section identifies the cognitive dissonance preventing the English soldier from identifying with the wronged person of color that his own actions have caused to suffer. He offers as consolation the knowledge that the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy”“crumpled up the square,” which—while producing anxiety in the English—has no meaning to the defeated Hadendoa.

This example is a clear indication of the function of repressing anxiety in the colonizing rhetoric of this poem. The speaker, having already admitted that the conditions of the battle were “’ardly fair,” nevertheless falls back on insisting on “call[ing] the bargain fair.” The English soldier, having found himself participating in an action that goes against his beliefs, finds himself turning to colonizing ideology to dispel the threat it poses to his representational system. He insists he will call the bargain fair though he has already acknowledged that it is not, taking away the distress that recognizing his part in the cruelty of the battle represents. This illustrates the way cognitive dissonance pushes the colonizer, regardless of their actions, towards loyalty to the colonial practices, while referring to the ideological pattern of sport misattributes and thus dispels the resulting anxiety. The shock of the revelation of the dissonant beliefs and actions of the colonizer is explained instead as the disappointment of a sportsman finding an enemy who is more game than he realized.

The poem’s true purpose is underlined by its audience. The speaker of the poem is not actually speaking to the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” but rather is meant to be singing with other English soldiers in the barracks of the Barrack-Room Ballads. Thus, the poem functions not as an actual moment of communication between a white person and a person of color, but rather is a model for it, one that is presumably passed from more experienced soldiers to ones who have not yet experienced the threatening effect of the human encounter in the colony, colonizer to colonizer rather than colonizer to colonized. The poem suggests ways the other
soldiers can cynically misattribute their cognitive dissonance to grief over the loss of their comrades or trauma over the symbolic violation of the Hollow Square. In addition, the poem mentions typically colonizing strategies of bolstering the wavering belief in the colonial enterprise, drawing on the metaphor of sport and fair play.

The figure of the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” is shown to embody a representational gap in other ways, further emphasizing the destabilizing role this figure plays in the poem and even suggesting the vulnerability of this tactic for handling the cognitive dissonance the poem acknowledges. As a rebel against Egyptian-British rule, the Fuzzy-Wuzzy is an Other with no colonizer, a contradiction that exposes a gap in the simplified colonizer/colonized dialectic constructed by European imperialism. The poem was written in 1892, in the period between the British withdrawal from Sudan in 1885 and their return in 1896. Thus, the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” nominally addressed by the speaker has literally no way of receiving this information, as he is outside the British sphere of influence in which British speech acts might be communicated. Thus, the Hadendoa is a complete contradiction, a figure that colonizing texts have created no signifier for, a colonized-who-is-not-colonized. In the essential dialectic that separates “white” into colonizer and “Black” into colonized, the existence of a Black state outside of the colonial power of Europe represents a blank space that the colonizing texts of the British fail to mark. The Hadendoa exists in a space into which British colonizing power has been projected, and thus has been subjected to both the colonizing influence of British texts as well as military violence, and yet continues independently, subjected to violence without becoming a British subject, not “giv[ing] a damn” for the empire that has failed to materialize in his space.

As this failure of the attacked space to become a colony shows, the poem functions along another liminal division that threatens colonial ideology: it exposes the inherent violence required in representing a space as colonized, a violence that inevitably consists of organized military brutality against a group that seeks to protect “the missis and the kid” (21) “at [their] ’ome in the Soudan” (9). If colonizing texts represent the colony as being Timeless and unchanging, the lived experience of the British soldier fighting wars of conquest contradicts this completely. Not only has the colony not always been a colony, it is through the “unsporting” violence by people like the speaker on the Hadendoa that the colony is created. As this shows, a single incident of trauma, as seen in the breaking of the British square, destabilizes the whole ideological apparatus of the colonial enterprise. Yet Žižek (1989) suggests that it is exactly through such a speech act acknowledging the violence underpinning the ideology that the ideology may be protected against the other. He writes that
we deceive the Other by means of the truth itself: in a universe in which all are looking for the true face beneath the mask, the best way to lead them astray is to wear the mask of truth itself. But it is impossible to maintain the coincidence of mask and truth: far from gaining us a kind of 'immediate contact with our fellow-men', this coincidence renders the situation unbearable; all communication is impossible because we are totally isolated through the very disclosure - the *sine qua non* of successful communication is a minimum of distance between appearance and its hidden rear.

(41)

The poem represents a response to precisely this unbearable closeness and the disturbing effect it has upon the speaker as he realizes it.

By the end of the poem, the speaker resorts to nearly nonsensical, patronizing language to describe the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” all of which rings false. When speaker starts by saying “'E 's a daisy, 'e 's a ducky, 'e 's a lamb! / 'E 's a injia-rubber idiot on the spree” (41-42), the ridiculousness of his language in attempting to reproduce the infantilizing discourse applied to the colonized subject is illustrated by the innocuousness of the images he chooses for a warrior he has already stated is the equal of the English. The failure of this familiar signifying process can perhaps best be seen in the use of the image of India rubber, which is notably white, demonstrating the threat of racial deconstruction that this encounter has raised in the speaker.

In the end, the speaker acknowledges instead that the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” is “the on'y thing that does n't give a damn / For a Regiment o' British Infantree!” (43-44). In this declaration is found another contradiction: the speaker seems to recognize that the person he is nominally speaking to is the only non-white identity that has resisted the ultimate tool of British hegemony, which is the military’s ability to project violence into the colony. Regardless of what signifiers the speaker gives the Hadendoa, the latter is not in the least affected or altered. The Hadendoa is immune to British signification for another reason: he does not speak English, and certainly not the accented English spoken by the speaker of the poem. Bubb (2016) underlines this by remarking that “Kipling’s notions of otherhood and brotherhood turn out to be quite specifically demarcated and justified, and the latter is founded on place, lineage and—most importantly—language” (379). In “Fuzzy-Wuzzy,” any speech act by the speaker is doomed to fail in any meaningful act of mutual signification.

This ideologically difficult dichotomy is illustrated by the pair of contrasting identities the speaker gives the Hadendoa at the end of the poem. When he tells the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy”“You ’re a pore benighted ’eathen but a first-class fightin’ man” (46), he violates the fundamental racial division of white supremacy upon which the colonial system was based. If even in a fight that’s “hardly fair,” the Black soldiers fight better than the white, the entire
notion of racial superiority upon which the colonizing enterprise is based must be proven false. That this perceived victory is an explicitly racialized one can be seen in the image on which the poem ends: until then, the poem has not emphasized the race of the defeated square, but it finally says it plainly that the “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” “Broke a British square!” (48). To underscore just how much this threat to racial ideology is emphasized in the poem, the poem exaggerates the scale of the Hadendoa's success at Abu Klea. Although historically one side of the Hollow Square failed to hold back the Hadendoa soldiers, the square itself did not fall into disorder, and the British forces routed the Mahdists—a fact that is never mentioned in the poem, though it underscores another basic contradiction rooted in cynicism. The speaker is still alive, while the Hadendoa warriors he has fought are not.

As a poem written after and before British presence in a space that is neither colonizing nor colonized, “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” represents an ideological struggle in the English speaker who recognizes the violence and cynicism that exists in a potential colonized space that is an active space of violent conflict over colonial representation. In the text, an English soldier commends a Sudanese warrior for his fighting skill, and in doing this threatens a moment of mutual humanization. The poem starts by recognizing the act that caused the speaker to question the ideology that compels him and allows him to function as an agent of the British Empire: the idea that “give and take's the gospel” (35), exposing the inherent contradiction of supporting the colonial encounter—which is inherently uneven, in which one group with massive technological and military advantage oppresses and perpetuates violence upon another—with the language of sport and fair play. As a whole, thus, the poem creates a model for cynicism: it acknowledges the potential gaps in its representative system while presenting a portrait of a British speaker whose use of notions of fair play, martial camaraderie, and respect expose their own enactment. When the British returned to Sudan in 1896, even after saluting the Hadendoa for their military skill and courage, as well as recognizing their shared humanity, the British once again enacted terrible violence on them.
3.8. The Jungle Books

*The Jungle Book* (1895) and *The Second Jungle Book* (1896) are the most-recognized of Kipling’s prose writings and certainly the most adapted. The unit composed of the two books has been interpreted along two major paths, one finding it to be the site of Kipling’s own conflicted self, caught between Indian and English, while the other identifies it as a fantasy of empire that reproduces colonial ideology. Daiya (2015) describes “Mowgli’s crisis of identity caught between the ‘Law of the Jungle’ and the motherly nurturing of the motherland” (473-474). John McClure (1981) consider the stories “fable of imperial education and rule” (57), while Paffard (1989) writes that “the jungle is a kind of ideal public school” (93). When examined beside Kipling’s other stories and poetry from this period, it become clear that *The Jungle Books* are something of both, employing the anxiety of the divided imperial subject to construct a fantasy of perfect imperial ideology.

Kipling had been away from India since 1889, and the transition towards his imperialistic texts in which the cynicism of lived experience starts to give way to idealized fantasies of benevolent, paternal colonizers and submissive, doggedly loyal colonized.

In the words of Allen (2007), “the further he moved away from India in time as well as space, the stronger became that side of the head that was least Indian and most law-abiding and British” (Kindle location 6191-6193). In these books, as later in *Kim*, Kipling largely sets aside the staging of threats to empire in favor of creating two figures who embody an impossibly undivided colonial identity, Mowgli, the perfect colonized, and Kim, the perfect colonizer. Some traces of cynicism can still be seen in both, but in much diminished quantities and effects.

Putting paid to any idea that the ending of the Mowgli stories is “totally out of sync” (Daiya 2015, 473) with the boy he was, Mowgli’s first story tells how he suborned himself to an Englishman and aided him in the hunting of a dangerous tiger. This story is “In the Rukh” (1893), and this is the last Mowgli story chronologically. Mowgli meets Gisborne, a Forest Ranger of India, who hires Mowgli and puts him on the payroll of British India. In hunting the tiger, the pair symbolically conquer a savage and violent Indian beast, one who has violated the natural order by killing a human. “That is the Red One,” says a native man when a human is killed, “I knew he would turn to man in time, but surely there is game even for him. This must have been done for devilry” (*Many Inventions* 1893, 193). The pair, colonizer

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23 It must be noted also that these books are written increasingly to an English rather than an Anglo-Indian audience, and also that they are written more towards children.
and colonized, join together at the colonized’s suggestion to kill the tiger, the monster figure that dares to go against nature by eating its superior.

Mowgli calls Gisborne “Sahib” even before he learns the other man’s name, appearing out of the jungle with no explanation for why he offers his help. He needs no explanation for who or what the white man is, as the Anglo-Indians have always been present in the background of his life, as Mary Goodwin (2011) describes, writing that “[r]arely seen in the Mowgli stories, the English colonists exist as a kind of backdrop to the jungle, a somewhat more tolerable form of humanity than the native villagers, and certainly more powerful” (108). By way of introduction, he says he knows where the tiger can be found, and offers, “Shall I show the Sahib?” (194). He adopts the subaltern position apparently instinctively. Whatever anxiety might have been caused by a native Indian with such perfect command of knowledge of the jungle is calmed by Mowgli’s immediate, natural, and eternal loyalty to the agents of the Empire.

Gisborne, in turn, locates Mowgli in terms of the imperial production of knowledge, thinking to himself, “He’s a most wonderful chap... he’s like the illustrations in the Classical Dictionary” (198). Without hesitation Gisborne trusts Mowgli’s servility, who says without irony “The Sahib is in charge of this rukh” (201), and his trust is rewarded when Mowgli saves his life and they kill the tiger. This exchange creates an ideal of colonial intersubjectivity, in which the mimic identity of the native contains no transgression or excess, fully subjected to the Anglo-Indian ruler. As such, it creates a perfect version of what Lacan (2006) describes as the essential need expressed in the master/slave duality, which springs from the need for recognition by the other and results in the subsuming of the slave’s desires to the master’s (98-105). What Lacan describes as a permanent deficiency in what the master receives from the servant (133) is instead represented as a natural and gapless mutual recognition. Don Randall (1998) describes this as a model for the mutual identification the colonial relationship is reliant on, as

[only in the eye of empire can the lupine sovereign of the jungle fully appreciate his own charms. ... Mowgli repays Gisborne in the same coin, by offering himself, first, as a pleasing image-object of ideal imperial sovereignty (which finds in the other an obedient brother) and, subsequently, by returning the gaze. (104)

Mowgli and Gisborne both receive back from the other their own subjectivity in shared recognition.

Mowgli’s perfect command of the jungle, whose acquisition becomes the driving force of the later stories about him, is put to the purpose of the Empire. Mowgli becomes a perfect agent of the colonizer, his mystical connection to India emphasizing “the connection
between Kipling’s fiction and a scientific conception of the world” (Sergeant 2013, 101). Thus, Mowgli embodies an impossible colonial ideal, that of totalized knowledge, a native link to place, and legitimacy given by the space itself to an unquestioning servant of the Empire, who recognizes Gisborne as his natural superior and helps him unwaveringly.

While not every story in The Jungle Books even mentions Mowgli, the most numerous and best-known describe the education of a human raised first by wolves and then by the whole forest, who learns to speak the Master-words of the Jungle from Hathi, the elephant. Amrita Narayanan (2017) performs a psychoanalytical reading of the stories, locating in them a Lacanian fantasy of reabsorption of the mother, through which “colonialism is a grown up version of a child’s play that gratifies the child’s wish for an ever giving, completely conquerable maternal ecosystem” (68). This reading imagines The Jungle Books as an unconscious attempt by Kipling to repair his own childhood trauma, when he was removed from both his mother and India when he was sent away from the country as a boy to study in England.

Most of the Mowgli stories is presented as a lesson Mowgli learns from an individual animal, lessons that will eventually give him the mastery of the jungle he exhibits in “In the Rukh.” Each lesson is tied to the identity of the animal giving it, a fantasy of what wisdom each animal of the Indian jungle could offer not only to Mowgli but to the colonizing reader. In each story, animal species is signified as a single individual, whose names usually are the Hindi terms for the animal species they represent: Raksha the wolf, from rakšā; Baloo the bear, from bhālū; Bagheera the panther, from baghīrā, and Hathi the elephant, from hāthī. Each takes a different part in Mowgli’s upbringing and jungle education that is defined by the hierarchical representation of each given animal.

Each animal’s lesson is imparted according to their natures, which wholly signify their characters and roles in the stories. Baloo teaches Mowgli the Law of the Jungle, but it requires experiencing the Truce of the Watering Hole later for Mowgli to understand. Hathi is the strongest and most respected animal, representing the masculine and paternal Law of the Jungle, and it is he who imparts on Mowgli the creation myth of the animals in “How Fear Came” (The Second Jungle Book 1896, 13). The ability to synthesize and impart this knowledge constitutes power, and William Dillingham (2005) identifies that this intersects with ethics as well, as “[t]he heroic characters speak words charged with power whereas those

24 That the story is told from the perspective of an all-known Anglo-Indian is clear in the Othering descriptions of the natives, such as when the song of buffalo herders is described as singing “long, long songs with odd native quavers at the end of them” (77), which would certainly not seem odd to a native, nor would the signifier of native signify anything about the quaver, except to an audience for whom it is synonymous with strange.
outside this circle of heroism do not have access to the eloquence of truth and directness” (174). The control that knowledge of the jungle confers also brings with it the dispensation to deploy it as its holder sees fit. In the course of each lesson, Mowgli learns the same truth: that every animal is different, and must be respected and treated according to its nature.

In “Letting the Jungle In,” Mowgli demonstrates his mastery over both the human world and the animal, proving that he is more than any of the individual animals who have taught him. Mahinur Akşehir Uygur (2018) acknowledges this, writing that

> [t]he master position is attributed to Mowgli primarily because Mowgli as he grows up has to learn much more than the other animals about the laws of the jungle. Every animal has to know only the details that concern its type, but as Mowgli is not an animal he has to learn all the codes of the jungle. (135)

Having gathered all of the Master-words of the animals in the course of his jungle education, Mowgli makes use of the rarest and most powerful of all, that of the elephants. Bagheera at first doubts that Mowgli has the Master-word of Hathi the Silent, but it is through the panther’s eyes that the narrator is informed of the effect Mowgli is able to have on the animal who most embodies the ordered system of the jungle. When Hathi appears, “every line in his vast body showed to Bagheera, who could see things when he came across them, that it was not the Master of the Jungle speaking to a Man-cub, but one who was afraid coming before one who was not” (73-74). Mowgli calls on Hathi and his three sons to help him avenge himself on the village of humans, who have cast Mowgli out and abused his adoptive mother. In the way Mowgli has no hesitation or even compunction at involving Hathi and his people in his struggle, in which Hathi has no stake, is a reflection of the ideological naturalness of the command of those born into the higher order. Mowgli gives commands because it is his right by blood to do so, and in this instance he is able to do so because the animals have all bequeathed him their Master-words.

But it is not only the codes of the jungle that Mowgli learns, but the codes of the humans, which strike fear and awe into the animals who see its mastery in their companion. Even Bagheera, who is a fierce hunter and who fantasizes about breaking the Law of the Jungle when he is hungry, is cowed and mastered by Mowgli’s knowledge. When Bagheera threatens Mowgli with “I am Bagheera—in the Jungle—in the night, and my strength is in me. Who shall stay my stroke? Man-cub, with one blow of my paw I could beat thy head flat as a dead frog in the summer!” Mowgli has only to answer “Strike, then!” in the dialect of the village, not the talk of the Jungle” (68, emphasis in original) to stop Bagheera. These two words have a powerful effect on the panther, who is “flung back on his haunches that quivered under him” and, after a stare-down, Bagheera literally licks Mowgli’s foot without
another word (68). Mowgli’s deployment of language is identical to the colonizer’s claimed knowledge of the colony, which the colonized, despite being native to the space, has no access to and is inscribed by. In fact, none of the animals is able to gain the least degree of the human knowledge Mowgli so effortlessly masters. To him, the sahib of the jungle, it is possible to learn the ways of the animals, as they are naturally positioned beneath him, but they remain in ignorant fear of the ways of humanity, knowing only that they must submit to it.

When this happens, Mowgli employs the familiar colonizing move of misattributing anxiety, one that has appeared over and over in Kipling’s work. Here, it is offered to the colonized, as Mowgli comforts Bagheera and tells him, “Brother—Brother—Brother! ... Be still, be still! It is the fault of the night, and no fault of thine,” while Bagheera, adopting this strategy, misattributes his tension upon the revelation by insisting “It was the smells of the night” (68). Mowgli, who is himself a hybrid of colonizer and colonized, the master of the jungle who yet puts himself fully under the control of the white agents of the British Imperial Department of Woods and Forests, recognizes the anxiety in Bagheera at seeing that, in fact, they are not brothers, separated by the essentialized racial-analogue of species that grants Mowgli power that the animals can never hope to take. Though Bagheera first brought Mowgli to the wolf pack that raised him, his human identity has asserted itself, and the inevitable superiority of the human over animal has been established.

That Mowgli’s identity is never truly divided is demonstrated in “Mowgli’s Brothers,” the first story of The Jungle Book, and “Tiger! Tiger.” Though Mowgli learns from the animals of the jungle, it is his human instincts that set him apart and allow him to master the tiger. Despite his lack of human contact, the human in Mowgli asserts itself in a biologically deterministic manner.

It is in these stories that Mowgli fights, then kills Shere Khan, the only animal that dares hunt humans. The ban on killing humans is introduced immediately in colonial cynical terms, marking the story from the beginning as sharing colonial cynicism. The animals of the jungle give one reason humans must not be killed which matches the ideology of the hierarchy of their constructed world, but the real reason falls outside their ideology, and they acknowledge it but do not speak of it: it is that “man-killing means, sooner or later, the arrival of white men on elephants, with guns, and hundreds of brown men with gongs and rockets and torches. Then everybody in the jungle suffers” (5). The last statement demonstrates the ideological danger of the violence of the humans violating the hierarchy of the jungle and exposing all to a death that is not signified according to the strict Law of the Jungle. By using
the very Law it threatens to subvert to misattribute the ban on killing humans, the fear of the overwhelming capacity for violence that humans possess is suppressed by the substitution of the ideology, even though all the wolves know otherwise.

When Shere Khan appears in the cave of the wolves to claim Mowgli, he uses his claim on power through violence to assert his right to the boy. “What talk is this of choosing? By the bull that I killed, am I to stand nosing into your dog’s den for my fair dues? It is I, Shere Khan, who speak!” (7). When Raksha, the Mother Wolf, answers the tiger boldly, the text suggests she only does so knowing the cave mouth is too narrow for the tiger to pass. Yet she, too, invokes the power of her violence, saying, “By the Sambhur that I killed (I eat no starved cattle)” (9, emphasis in original). While she ostensibly matches him on his rhetorical level, the real reason that she can speak to him thus is not spoken of.

“Tiger, Tiger!” starts with Mowgli’s exile from the wolf pack, as he is adopted into the human village. He is visited by one of the wolves he grew up with, Gray Brother, who asks him “Thou wilt not forget that thou art a wolf?” to which Mowgli replies, “Never. I will always remember that I love thee and all in our cave; but also I will always remember that I have been cast out of the Pack” (71). That Mowgli associates being a wolf with loving the wolves indicates that, to him, his wolf identity is not incompatible with his identity as a human. He learns “the ways and customs of men” in the village, but continues to think like a wolf, reflecting that to kill the children who tease him would be unsportsmanlike (71). In doing so, he echoes the ideological—but not the real—reason given by his Pack for not hunting humans, that “Man is the weakest and most defenceless of all living things, and it is unsportsmanlike to touch him” (5). This moment shows the text’s interesting inversion of jungle and village. As has been shown, sportsmanship is a particularly English ideology, and certainly no angered wolf would hesitate to kill a defenseless child out of sportsmanship. In this way, jungle life in The Jungle Book has made Mowgli a better Englishman, not an animal.

It is also vital that when Mowgli is tasked with herding buffalo by the villagers, he does not talk to them, but rather hits “the buffaloes with a long, polished bamboo” (76). This demonstrates a vital separation of reality that takes place in all the stories of The Jungle Books. When he is with wild animals, Mowgli speaks to them, and they to him, but when he is with villagers, the personification of the animals ceases and they return to mute animal existence. Mowgli notes, “I cannot speak their language” (79). In the jungle, the binary division between human and animal becomes porous in a way that it is absolutely not
elsewhere, but it has been shown that this porosity is no threat: it serves instead as a gateway by which Mowgli gains knowledge and mastery of the jungle.

Even when the animals threaten him, Mowgli considers himself in little danger, with one exception: Shere Khan. In the lame tiger, as in the case of the tiger in “In the Rukh,” the image of the Indian creature who refuses the Law and threatensthe order of the jungle brings up the constant fear of the colonizer, that of the subaltern who refuses this signification with violence. The text heaps signifiers on Shere Khan that are familiar from representations of Indian natives whom Kipling’s texts mark as transgressive: the tiger is foolish, overconfident, cowardly, and cunning. All of these descriptions fall into familiar colonizing misattributions of inscrutable natives who does not allow themselves to be rightly colonized. Yet the threat of the tiger is clear, as Shere Khan has killed humans before, and even Hathi allows him one day a year to kill a human. Thus, there is a gap even in the otherwise rigid hierarchy of the Law of the Jungle, through which the rebellious tiger endangers the figure of the colonizer. For this transgression, there is never any doubt in Mowgli that either tiger must die.

Following a plan devised by Mowgli and at his instructions, Mowgli and the wolves together cause a stampede of the buffaloes which kills Shere Khan. In what might be an incongruous statement, as it exemplifies the jungle-creature’s contempt for the domesticated, Mowgli declares, “Brothers, that was a dog’s death” (83). But in this declaration, Mowgli makes a key distinction, marking Shere Khan as not of the jungle but of a separate classification, one which can be killed in an unsportsmanlike way. Thus, Mowgli makes use of violence to quell the threat of a creature that does not know its place and hunts what it should know as its superior.

In “Red Dog,” Mowgli joins his wolf pack in fighting a pack of savage dholes, enlisting the aid of Kaa the serpent in his effort. The story opens with a fantasy of the passing of power. Akela, the old pack leader who ruled when Mowgli was first brought into the pack, has grown old and slow, and a new leader is chosen at Council Rock. Mowgli is given a special status, recognized by all as their superior, and the narrator writes that strangers to that jungle refer to the pack as “Mowgli’s people” (176). Mowgli has assumed the position of patriarchal guardian, and “[i]f he chose to speak the Pack waited till he had finished” (176).

And Mowgli, adopted into the wolves, adopts their racial hatred of the dholes: “He despised and hated them because they did not smell like the Free People, because they did not live in caves, and above all, because they had hair between their toes while he and his friends were clean-footed” (179). The inclusion of the detail of the hair may seem incongruous, but the signifier “clean” is telling, redolent with the ideology of racial supremacy. In this way
also, *The Jungle Books* prove a fantasy of race and empire, as deterministic racial separation determines Mowgli’s allegiance, and the two sides are strictly delineated: all wolves are kin and linked in mutual cause, as is shown when it is a wolf from another pack, his family all killed by the dholes, who asks the help of Mowgli’s pack and receives it without question. Not a single one of the dholes breaks type, nor does a single wolf.

In the violence of the struggle between the two packs, Mowgli’s human nature plays the deciding factor, and the animals—as they invariably do in *The Jungle Books*—are helpless against his intelligence and capacity for violence through weaponry. The parallels with British soldiers fighting in colonial wars is clear, with Mowgli making use of regimented tactics and weapons. As Paffard (1989) notes of the battle, “One cannot miss the resemblance between the battle of the wolves against the red dogs and Kipling’s other great set-piece description of battle, the stand of the British square against the dervishes in *The Light That Failed*” (94). Upon inspection, the battle serves the same ideological function there as it does in the novel, and also as in the poem “Fuzzy-Wuzzy.” The battle is signified as the inevitable violent struggle with the Other that cannot be incorporated into the self, over which the ideology of the Law of the Jungle has no force, and which must therefore be destroyed. Mowgli, by means of a trick, gains the upper hand for the wolf pack, tricking the dholes into the river, from which they must make a difficult landing with the wolves defending the bank.

Mowgli, who wields a steel knife acquired from the human village through the story, makes its employment in violence the symbol of the victory, thus marking its as the victory of superior technology and knowledge over savagery. In the same moment, he reaffirms the Law of the Jungle, signifying the unbroken rule of the patriarchal order of the jungle in the face of the threat of savagery that would upset it. “*Thus we do in the Jungle!*’ The red blade ran like a flame along the side of a dhole” (202, emphasis in original). Mowgli demonstrates that he, like the colonizers throughout Kipling’s texts, knows to turn to violence as the final resort of power and the exercise of control.

The last scene of the story is also a reaffirmation of separation and natural superiority, as Mowgli’s humanity is testified to by the dying Akela. “I am a wolf. I am one skin with the Free People.... It is no will of mine that I am a man,” Mowgli tells him (204). Akela responds by mixing Mowgli’s signification into a hybrid form, saying, “Thou art a man, Little Brother, wolfling of my watching. Thou art all a man, or else the Pack had fled before the dhole” (204). Yet this is not true hybridity, which would destabilize colonial authority, only an assumption of an alterior identity by a superior one. Mowgli’s animal knowledge and ability to achieve animal signification is emblematic of “Kipling’s naturalisation of oppositional and
exclusive identity. In this case, hybridity, usually a cause of colonial concern about
degradation, is the result of a mixing that removes rather than adds corrupting elements”
(Nath 2009, 266). In this colonial fantasy, the proper sahib has full mastery of the Orient,
which lies open and completely bared to his scientific eye.

Like Kim, whose whiteness gave him the power to assume any non-white identity,
Mowgli can be a “wolfling,” but this does not subtract from or alter his superior identity. It is
a hybridity with no reduction of status or blood: Mowgli is all human, as Kim was all white.
The violence he has done is the proof of it. Though Mowgli professes that he does not want to
be human or to go to the humans, Akela is wiser, saying “Mowgli will drive Mowgli. Go
back to thy people. Go to man” (204). As is clear from “In the Rukh,” Mowgli does so, and
he marries the daughter of Gisborne’s butler, fitting himself into the colonial system. Having
learned from the animals that every animal has their own place, immutable and deterministic,
Mowgli takes his own.

Some of these stories in The Jungle Book, such as “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi,” are pure
ideological fantasy. In that story, a mongoose defends an Anglo-Indian family bravely from
the transgressive snakes that desire to harm them. The strict, binary delineation among
animals in the story is easily mapped onto colonial ideology. There are three categories of
beings in the story: the kind humans, who form an ideal familial unit of mother, father, and
child; the mongoose Rikki-Tikki-Tavi, who is loyal to the death in defending the humans and
wants only to be petted and cared for by the humans (133); and the snakes Nag and Nagaini,
who seek to kill the entire family. The snakes are described by the narrator variously as
“wicked” (128) and “savage” (131), marking them as the clear analogues of the Othered
subaltern who is the source of colonial anxiety.

The imagined paternalistic relationship between the colonizer and the colonized is
exemplified in the mother’s exclamation, upon the mongoose docilely making friends with
the boy Teddy, “Good gracious... and that’s a wild creature! I suppose he’s so tame because
we’ve been kind to him,” to which her husband replies, “All mongooses are like that” (125).
In this brutally simple model of the colonial relationship, one’s status within the colonial
system is determined by blood, and is universal to all of that species. Humans rule,
mongooses protect, and snakes seek to kill, and in this resistance to the order.

However, in this construction, the resistance of the snakes is no resistance at all, as
they are performing their own instinctive functions. The conversation between snake husband
and wife provides a distinctly anti-colonial sentiment to their killing, as they remember a life
before the humans when the garden was theirs and there was no mongoose, and Nagaini
reminds Nag, “remember that as soon as our eggs in the melon-bed hatch (as they may tomorrow), our children will need room and quiet” (138). Nag’s reply, that there is no need to kill the mongoose, only the humans, seems to suggest a common kinship among the animals, recognition of their shared status as colonized in the world of the bungalow. Thus, the violence of colonial authority becomes naturalized into essential functions built into the nature of each part of the order.

Reading “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” against stories like “The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes,” it becomes clear how Kipling’s representation of the anxiety of the colonizer about the constant threat of violence from the subaltern is shifting into a simplified binary in The Jungle Books. The mongoose, like Dunnoo or even like Mowgli himself, serves white people naturally and without prompting. When the mother complains, “I don’t like that... he may bite the child,” the father’s paternalistic insight into Indian life is expressed through his insistence that “Teddy’s safer with that little beast than if he had a bloodhound to watch him. If a snake came into the nursery now—,” accounting for the function of each within the colonial system (126). Teddy is left alone, and it is only through the mongoose’s actions that the boy is saved from Nag. The final blow struck by the father with a shotgun, so the right of execution remains with the colonizer (139).

In this story, the colonial relationship is essentialized into one of violence predicated on the nature of each member of that system. The rebellion of subjects, through the action of the cobras, becomes the product of their species. Though the story acknowledges that, in order for their young to survive, the cobras must kill the humans, this potentially destabilizing element is kept repressed. Even this conversation between the snakes is presented as overheard by Rikki-Tikki-Tavi, and the whole framing of the story is from the colonizer’s lens, locating the implied reader on one side of the immovable binary of the Empire and rebel. Thus, the snakes are signified as an elemental evil that must be killed whenever possible by the colonial system. This is nowhere more true than when, one by one, Rikki-Tikki-Tavi destroys the eggs of Nagaini, saving the last the bait Nagaini into the final fight (144). Read in the colonial framework in which it is steeped, this moment of the wholesale killing of the rebels’ unborn children is particularly telling of the violence of the imperial order.

In the final story of the first Jungle Book, “Servants of the Queen,” a British army gathers on the border to impress the envoys of the “Amir” of Afghanistan. In another fantasy of colonial knowledge, the narrator insists he has learned enough of the language of the animals, “not wild-beast language, but camp-beast language, of course” to be able to
understand the animals’ speech when a camel blunders into his tent in the middle of the night (188). He claims to have learned their language “from the natives,” having acquired controlling knowledge of India from its people, the way Mowgli learned from the animals (188).

The majority of the story takes the form of the individual animals in different roles discussing their work and their living conditions, each having their own part and status, and expressing their pride in being able to perform their duty. The animals all embody essentialized identities based on their roles in the military, such as the camels, who call the cavalry horses “my lords” and openly admit they could never be as brave (190). A breech-piece mule of the artillery speaks with the wisest voice, doling out punishment to the camels who blunder in the dark and disturb the other animals, who complain that they cannot properly perform their duties. The significance of a mule being chosen for this lies in its hybridity, as it can call on both of its bloodlines for access to all knowledge of the roles of animals and their proper stations.

At the end of the story, the envoy of the “Amir” asks a native Indian officer how the parade is performed so wonderfully by animals and humans alike. As before, Kipling places words of praise and duty in the mouth of a native when the Indian replies, explaining the role of the animals, with “Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his major... who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress” (208). Like Dunnoo, the servant of Morrowbie Jukes, and like Mowgli himself, this character has no conception that this order is anything but natural and good. When the Afghan chief complains that in Afghanistan “we obey only our own wills” (208), the native officer replies, “And for that reason... your Amir whom you do not obey must come here and take orders from the Viceroy” (209).

Animals, unlike humans, are indeed separated into species by their blood, and so make an ideal choice for Kipling to construct his colonizing fantasy, and there is no sign of cynicism in “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” or “Servants of the Queen.” The Mowgli stories still present colonizing cynicism, though in narrower bounds than previous works. As Dipika Nath (2009) writes, “Mowgli’s non-subversive transgression of animal-human boundaries undoes the threat of species blurring ... and allows Kipling to deploy Mowgli’s mythical yet (or perhaps therefore) natural animality in the service of the empire” (267) For Victorians obsessed with class and racial divisions, The Jungle Books suggest an ideal colony to rule, washing away sources of anxiety such as hybrid identities and the cynicism of rule. For Mowgli, his hybrid identity proves to be an addition rather than a mingling, a mantle he takes on over his
unaltered human supremacy. Montefiore (2011) agrees that “Kipling’s writing for children was undoubtedly fired by the pieties of empire and by the imperialist fantasy of mastering otherness” (108). India serves as Mowgli’s perfect colonial mother, imbuing him with all knowledge for the sake of his power. All animals who transgress their roles, whether Shere Khan through cruelty and arrogance or the camels in “Servants of the Queen” out of ignorance must be recovered to the colonizing order, whether through wholly justified violence in the former case or through education received from a social superior in the latter.
3.9. *Kim*

The novel *Kim* is, perhaps, the most complete elaboration of Kipling’s production of colonizing texts. These texts ritualistically open ideological space for the purpose of exposing gaps in colonizing representation, seeking to suture the potential for a breakdown in signification in order to preserve the colonial enterprise to British colonizing subjects. The importance of *Kim* in Kipling’s oeuvre can, perhaps, not be overstated. Its centrality in his writing and especially in his writing about India is summed up by Allen (2007): “Of the fiction, if we exclude his writing for children there are plenty of well-crafted stories but very little that really holds the imagination except in fits and starts, and absolutely nothing of worth linked to India. With *Kim* he had said it all” (Kindle locations 6201-6202). Kipling wrote *Kim* after leaving India. It was first published, in serial form, from 1900, and represents the last of Kipling’s fiction about India. It might be seen as a culmination, and as such has a unique place in Kipling’s ouvre. Unlike Kipling’s previous fictions, *Kim* is not chiefly addressed to the colonizer in the colony. Eddy Kent (2014) confirms this: “If the short fiction of the 1880s and 1890s addressed the tastes and reading habits of the Anglo-Indians, *Kim* was written for the empire by a man interested in Britain’s place in the world” (142). Thus, *Kim*’s place in locating Kipling’s ideology of racial hegemony is paramount. In it, a white character can experience and enjoy the potential for adopting a multiplicity of ethnic identities without endangering the white identity that bestows this power upon him. The potential to transgress racial divisions is demonstrated, but it is cynically represented as solely available to the white colonizer, canceling the threat to the racialized hierarchy that it poses.

*Kim* demonstrates that race is not fixed, but reserves the ability to take on new racial signification for the colonizing white characters. This plays a crucial role in the novel, such as in the climax, when the protagonists are separated from the world of familiar signification, only to choose to return to the same regime of truth, cancelling the potential for change and closing the representational gap exposed by the reality of life in the colony. As such, *Kim* exemplifies the cynical move of demonstrating the limitation of colonizing ideology and then denying the possibility of change, addressed now not only to colonizers with firsthand experience in the colony but to all who could potentially enter that space. Tim Christensen (2012) argues that in *Kim* “Kipling demonstrates conclusively that a hybrid identity based on the recognition of self-differentiality can, and has, been successfully deployed in the imaginative service of racism and imperial power” (26). Even while demonstrating that racial boundaries can be crossed, the hegemony of whiteness is reified.
In the text, the racial ideology that is so essential for the colony’s existence is presented as absolutely fixed, as characters are endlessly referred to in terms of their race and ethnic identity, which are treated as determining almost every aspect of their identities. The plot of the novel, however, relies on the ability of characters to fool others into reading them as members of other identities. That is to say, the success of each side in the colonial conflict depicted in the novel depends on the ability of agents to successfully adopt the signifiers of other identities. When the colony depends on the perfect separation of colonizer and colonized, “white” and “Black,” this fluidity of identity seems to expose both the racial essentialism of the rest of the novel and the ideology at the heart of the empire itself.

The first chapter of *Kim* depicts a scene that quickly establishes its cynical perspective on British colonial rule through its frank depiction of the successive regimes of imperial control over India as well as the military power required to establish these. The novel opens with the protagonist, Kimball O’Hara, sitting “astride the gun Zam Zammah” (1). It makes an explicit connection of control of the gun with control of India: “Who hold Zam-Zammah, that ‘fire-breathing dragon’, hold the Punjab, for that great green-bronze piece is always first of the conqueror’s loot. There was some justification for Kim… since the English held the Punjab and Kim was English” (1). His racial identity is established on the very first page and is identified as the source of his right to a position of privilege. Kim mocks a Muslim and a Hindu boy in turn who demand he get off the cannon, telling them “All Mussalmans fell off Zam-Zammah long ago!” and “The Hindus fell off Zam-Zammah too. The Mussalmans pushed them off” (6). The cynicism of this exchange is particularly driven home by the description of the Hindu boy, as the narrator writes, “His father was worth perhaps half a million sterling, but India is the only democratic land in the world” (6). The suggestion that democracy is not even present in the United Kingdom, of course, draws attention to the absurdity of this claim, as does the situation of the scene: a boy, drawing authority from shared racial identity with the military conquerors of India, establishes his claim on the symbol of control of the city that is, itself, an instrument of war.

This model of “democracy,” based in race and military supremacy, offers a cynical perspective on the colonizing ideology of the British, suggesting that the only democracy existing in the world is that contained in the most brutally simple arithmetic of soldiers and battlefields. It does not matter which of the children has the most wealth, so long as one is of the race of the colonizers, who control the military. In this, we can see a very model of Foucauldian hegemony in action: Kim enjoys the dominance constructed for him by the signifying system that India is part of.
Just as it draws back the veil from how the British control India, the first scene illustrates a truth that the British colonizing ideology must suppress: the idea that, in time, the British, too, might “fall off” Zam-Zammah; in other words, that British colonial rule in India might end, and another group might take over. Much of the plot of the novel revolves around the “Great Game,” the “Indian Survey Department” acting as a secret service makes moves and counter-moves against both Indians resisting British rule and foreign agents desiring control of India for their own countries. The work of the survey department in combining geography, ethnography, and spying richly demonstrates how knowledge of the Orient functions in establishing both control and justification for domination. The Colonel explains the work of the agent by offering, “I will give thee a hundred rupees for knowledge of what is behind those hills— for a picture of a river and a little news of what the people say in the villages there” (188). By engaging in the “Great Game” at all, British agents implicitly acknowledge that there is a chance of one of these forces gaining supremacy: part of all of India could become no longer subject to British rule. In the novel, the Russian agents fail in their mission because they lack understanding of India. This is the privileged domain only the English.

It is vital to understanding the role of a text like Kim in shaping and buttressing colonizing ideology, that every move of the “Great Game” is played out with disguise and duplicity, in which control over signification—especially being able to adopt the signifiers of non-white races and ethnic castes—is key to success. Bhabha (1994) demonstrates the importance of the stereotype to the subjectification of both colonizer and colonized. As he writes, “The stereotype… is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixed form of representation that, in denying the play of difference…, constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significance of psychic and social relations” (75, emphasis in original). As he shows, the stereotype is not incorrect so much as fixed, lacking in the nuance and capacity for change that all representation contains. To create a disguise to alter what one is signified as is to acknowledge that race is constructed and that signification is malleable, even to the point that one person can be signified as different identities, when of course the very stability and permanence of race are essential to the racist hierarchy on which the represented superiority of the British colonizer depends.

The free adoption of non-white identities opens a potential anxiety for the colonizer: the threat that a person of color could adopt a white identity. As has been discussed, if the colonized were to be able to erase the markers of difference in signification and become the colonizer, this would lead to the complete collapse of the colony and of white identity. This is
the threat that the text must contain. For one thing, at no point does a non-white character ever adopt a white identity, though every other form of racial border crossing is represented.

In marked contrast to the suggestions of racial mutability opened by the events Kim experiences, the novel’s narrator employs a very deterministic representation of race, insisting that characters’ behavior and attitudes are shaped by their racial identities. In doing so, the novel creates a nominal separation in race that it represents as visible, permanent, and essential. One example for this is in the narrator’s description of Kim’s fear of the snake he and the lama encounter in a farmer’s field. While the lama responds with peace, Kim’s response, according to the narrator, is determined by his race: “‘I hate all snakes,’ said Kim. No native training can quench the white man’s horror of the Serpent” (68). The novel has countless examples of this racial essentialism delineating and determining the behaviors of non-white characters, and it is important to note how many times it does the same for white characters. This appears to firmly fix the racial signification that white supremacy depends on.

Kim’s whiteness becomes a point of discussion at several points in the novel. The phrase “a Sahib and the son of a Sahib” is used to describe him four times in the novel. Its final use is by Kim himself, who uses it to describe his own positionality. Teresa Hubel (2004) stresses that “Kim assures those readers that Kim is fully white: the borders that protect white rule haven’t been breached” (239). The first time it is employed, the lama uses it to express his shock that Kim could be white; it is Kim’s knowledge of India and its people that the lama finds difficult to correlate: “‘A Sahib and the son of a Sahib—’ The lama’s voice was harsh with pain. ‘But no white man knows the land and the customs of the land as thou knowest. How comes it this is true?’” (144). This contrast suggests the difference between colonizing knowledge produced by the ignorant English colonizer and Kim’s casual, even playful familiarity with the identities he encounters. Of the novel’s construction of the proper English sahib, Hubel notes that “in this vision of imperialism, . . . a Sahib is not always a Sahib and not all Europeans have an equal right to rule” (235). Kim must learn, through his experiences in the novel, the right way to employ his whiteness and the privileged access to knowledge of India that it brings.

Despite the lama’s surprise, Kim’s knowledge of India echoes the colonizing knowledge used by the British to establish and justify their control over the colonized space. Kim’s experience growing up on the street has given him a familiarity with the place that he exploits throughout the novel, whether cheating ticket sellers or knowing how to flatter potential donors for the lama. This position, while available to both Kim and Kipling, would
As Mukund Belliapa (2015) explains, “[t]he typical colonial-era, Anglo-Indian Baba—especially a pre-school toddler—was likely to develop a social and ‘linguistic intimacy’ with servantclass Indians, which was denied to most white adults by the rigid strictures of Victorian Raj society” (210).

Kim demonstrates the ability of the Englishmen he is with to control signification, even his own. He describes himself as though there were no difference between him and the colonized. He tells the lama, “I am not a Sahib. I am thy chela” (429). By defining himself in his relationship with the colonized rather than acknowledging his privileged position as a white Englishman, he uses his connection and service to the colonized as justification for his presence, echoing the Victorian ideal of the altruistic colonizer. According to Hubel (2004), *Kim* reflects the English colonizer’s attempt to claim Indian identity and thus to totalize their power over and access to India. According to her, “*Kim* is Kipling’s one attempt to cross the racial boundary between the Indian and the British and envision an Indian identity for the white person” (248).

Kim himself doubts that his racial identity is fixed and essentialized. When Kim is asked what the English will do, he replies, “Make me a Sahib— so they think” (147). In his doubt is the budding of his cynicism, in which two possible meanings can be read which both contribute to this cynicism. He acknowledges the impossibility, in this representative system, of creating an identity that should nominally be fixed by the circumstances of birth. If it is possible to “make” a Sahib, then it is also possible that someone born to that role might not become one, which exposes the entire system of racial essentialism. He also suggests that they might fail, and he might not become a “Sahib” as defined by their system after all.

The scene on the train shows how each ethnic and gender role is played, as each character described falls into a separate identity, whose interplay becomes the basis of a series of interactions that take on an ethnographic cast. As such, they recall arguments made by Young (1995) and Fabian (2014) about the use of rational science to create the narrative of racial separation. The character include a Sikh artisan, a “Hindu Jat” and his wife, “an Amritzar courtesan,” “a fat Hindu money-lender,” and “a young Dogra soldier going home on leave” (43). An excellent example of the anthropological quality of their conversation is in their discussion of the service of soldiers of different castes, in which each character expresses their caste’s ostensible opinion of the other castes, seemingly in turn. The conversation serves to illustrate and thus establish the narrator’s complete and academic knowledge of India and its people, playing the role of the colonizing text purporting totalizing.
knowledge, and it also plays out the separation of identities while blending them together into a carnivalesque parade of ethnicities and socially constructed roles.

The model of the carnival as discussed by writers such as Bakhtin (1965), a space of both revealing breaches in signification and buttressing the signifying system that creates them. These carnivalesque descriptions in colonizing literature reproduce the carnival experience of dizziness, disorientation, and dissolution. Extended descriptions of smells, sights, crowds, and movement are meant to overwhelm the imagination in a cacophony of meaning that both represent the colony as a place of disturbed representation and Othered time.

In Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin (1965) describes the carnival crowning and uncrowning of the clown-king in François Rabelais’s The Life of Gargantua and of Pantagruel, whose ritual death and rebirth opens space for gaps in representation, making it possible to change from the old system to the new in a symbolic act of renewal. The ritual allows for the passage of time by opening an in-between space in which the usual order is overturned, facilitating the shift from one signifier to another without an anxiety-producing gap. Bakhtin stresses that the carnivalesque is a tool for revealing the signifying system in a way that does not threaten it.

Thanks to this process, popular-festive images became a powerful means of grasping reality; they served as a basis for an authentic and deep realism. Popular imagery did not reflect the naturalistic, fleeting, meaningless, and scattered aspect of reality but the very process of becoming, its meaning and direction. Hence the universality and sober optimism of this system. (211-212)

As previously discussed, the depictions of the Othered Orient in colonizing text is not intended to create change. Indeed, it is meant to cement the structure as it is, to open a space where signification may safely slip and then to close it again.

The crowd's role in the colonizing text serves both to express fear and to solidify control. In an entire chapter dedicated to the depiction of colonized “Crowds,” Kerr (2008) argues that the depiction of the size and variance of colonized people is meant to produce a sublime effect on the reader: “its cultures and histories too seemed so diverse and obscure as to make Indian people virtually beyond management, or comprehension, or even representation” (55). Kerr identifies the crowd with the visceral fear of being outnumbered by a potentially hostile Other as well as the anxiety of the colonizer in facing a space that cannot be fully captured representationally and therefore can never be completely controlled. He writes that the ubiquitous description of the crowd constructs a textual depiction of “the doubleness of colonial anxiety, which expresses the fears to which the imperial project is
exposed, but also solicits resolution, so that anxiety blocks and empowers at the same time the imperial will” (58). This doubled anxiety is precisely what is contained by colonizing ideology.

The passage about the Grank Trunk road creates such an effect of chaos, Otherness, color, and pageantry:

Here and there they met or were overtaken by the gaily dressed crowds of whole villages turning out to some local fair; the women, with their babes on their hips, walking behind the men, the older boys prancing on sticks of sugar-cane, dragging rude brass models of locomotives such as they sell for a halfpenny, or flashing the sun into the eyes of their betters from cheap toy mirrors. . . . These merry-makers stepped slowly, calling one to the other and stopping to haggle with sweetmeat-sellers, or to make a prayer before one of the wayside shrines— sometimes Hindu, sometimes Mussalman—which the low-caste of both creeds share with beautiful impartiality. A solid line of blue, rising and falling like the back of a caterpillar in haste, would swing up through the quivering dust and trot past to a chorus of quick cackling. That was a gang of changars—the women who have taken all the embankments of all the Northern railways under their charge. . . . (98).

This passage ends with the description of a traveling group of performers, including “a strolling juggler with some half-trained monkeys, or a panting, feeble bear, or a woman who tied goats' horns to her feet, and with these danced on a slack-rope” (98). This description clearly conflates animals with humans, presenting both colonized non-white people and trained animals on the same level, that of objectified Others subject to the evaluative gaze of the white protagonist, Kim, as well as the assumed white readership of the novel.

John Louis Lucaites and James P. McDaniel (2004) describe the way it becomes possible for the carnival to function towards maintaining a system of undermined representation. They identify carnival as existing at the heart of hegemony, able to construct power as well as to challenge it. They describe carnival-hegemony as

a performative style that can fund either hegemonic closure or carnivalesque opening, and it can unfold along both axes at once. The potential value of such an aesthetic is made clear when set against an analytical stance that separates the terms from one another. To stress only the element of hegemony-as-total control in the rhetoric of international relations is to fall into the trap of overdetermination and naive conceptions of power and ideology. To stress only the element of carnival-as-liberation is to slight the violence, perversities, and impostures of such rhetorics. Indeed, it is to neglect the very ways in which such ruptures themselves carry the forces of order. (23)

This process of simultaneous opening and closing makes room for the acknowledgement of insufficiency and doubt without allowing for the system itself to be altered. It is possible to
both open those representative gaps and open them at the same time, to illustrate what can and cannot be challenged.

The critical task, then, to which a notion of carnival-hegemony contributes involves recognizing both (a) the ways in which the social order actually depends upon spectacles of resistance or change for stability and (b) the ways in which hegemonic strictures actively produce their own conditions of impossibility or rupture, sometimes by way of a condescending gaze that doubles back on lookers to reflect their pathos. (Lucaites and McDaniel 2004, 23-24)

This gaze that doubles back on the lookers clearly demonstrates what occurs when the colonizing subject, when encountering the colonized, experiences a crisis in ideological construction. In exposing the white person's condescension towards and oppression of the abject colonized, the carnivalesque opens the space for that emotional reaction to play itself out. While this threatens to demonstrate the crisis of the legitimacy as colonizer, it also offers the potential for reintegration through the controlled experience manufactured by the text. This is what Bhabha (1994) describes as “a moment when the impossibility of naming the difference of colonial culture alienates, in its very form of articulation, the colonialist cultural ideals of progress, piety, rationality and order” (129).

In examining the representational role of the carnival in colonizing texts, it must be remembered that there is no order on either side of what is represented as the disordered state in the colony. As such, the colonial carnival is a liminal space of permanent breach. Order, according to this framing, does not exist elsewhere in time—before and after the carnival—but elsewhere in space, ‘at home’ in the colonizing nation.

Building on the effect of the carnival, the potential of change in the novel is represented beside the impossibility of it. The idea of a fixed race determined by racial essentialism is key to the identity of the colonizer. Bhabha (1994) employs Freud and Fanon to demonstrate how the stereotype functions as a fetish, covering up the clear limitations of the idea of the single race. He argues that stereotype functions as part of the timelessness and separateness of the colony, to defuse the anxiety of the colonizer. In Bhabha’s words, “The fetish or stereotype gives access to an ‘identity’ which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defence, for it is a form of multiple and contradictory belief in its recognition of difference and disavowal of it” (75). Thus, the subject is pushed towards embracing an activity contrary to their stated values, turning on axes of anxiety and mastery together. The colonizer at once recognizes the limitation of their racial imagination and buries it.
As has been shown, identity in *Kim* is repeatedly represented as fixed, visible, and essentialist; however, one of the major themes of the novel is the ability to alter how one signifies one's subject position, even to the point of adopting other identities. When asked about his own race, Kim casts doubt on a white priest’s, Father Victor’s, belief in the permanence of race: “He thinks that once a Sahib is always a Sahib” (140). This assertion is the root of the crisis of identity and signification in the novel. Characters adopt the costumes of different identities and play the part to varying degrees of skill, some perfectly, suggesting that not only can identity be altered but that one subject position can be performed perfectly by one whose own background should not, in contemporary racial theory, allow them to do so. The lama expresses this mutability of identity when describing the identities he has encountered Kim in: “As a boy in the dress of white men—when I first went to the Wonder House. And a second time thou wast a Hindu. What shall the third incarnation be?” (144).

Kim’s own racial identity appears mutable, and the way India is represented in his eyes shifts depending on how he sees himself. Sullivan (1993) explains that Kim’s relationship with India depends on his own understanding of his race, as

Kim’s numinous celebration of his journey on the multicolored, musical and jewelled Grand Trunk Road, “broad, smiling river of life,” for instance, is made possible by his chosen, temporary identity as Indian and beloved “chela” (disciple) to his lama; but that position is later reversed by his confirmed identity as an Englishman whose “fettered soul” will see only a “great, grey, formless India.” These contradictory images of shifting identities that construct different Indias are repeated in a series of other historically inscribed contradictions, chief among which are Kim’s desire to be loved by India as “little friend of all the World” and to be its master-sahib-imperialist. (11-12)

This relationship demonstrates both the changeability of racial identity and, paradoxically, suggests that this identity, while potentially self-defined, is just as essentializing as the set racial identity defined earlier.

One of the clearest examples of the shifting of race is the incident on the train when an agent of the “Indian Survey Department,” fleeing from those who have discovered him, reveals himself to Kim. The agent’s identity is represented even by the narrator as being one with how he signifies himself. The narrator calls him “the Mahratta” after he enters the car and is taken for one by Kim: “a Mahratta, so far as Kim could judge by the cock of the tight turban” (314). Because this is the way Kim reads him, it is the way the narrator names him, even after he reveals himself. The man’s comment about his means of putting on an identity also reveals the fundamental connection between representation, cynicism, and violence. When Kim urges him to turn to the government for help, the man replies, “We of the Game
are beyond protection. If we die, we die. Our names are blotted from the book. That is all” (317). In this statement, the agent called E.23 pairs a cynical acceptance of the violence of the Great Game with an explicit connection of existence to representation: death, to an agent of the “Indian Survey Department,” is no different from being removed from a list of names in a written text. In a list of names of the living from which the names of the dead are removed, there is a tangible demonstration of the controlling and totalizing power of colonial texts of knowledge of the Orient as Said spoke of them. The book, no doubt on the desk of some white official in a governmental office, both records information about and shapes human life itself in the colony.

Immediately afterwards, the agent explains that he was able to “change his face” and thus assume another identity. He says, “At Bandakui, where lives one of Us, I thought to slip the scent by changing my face, and so made me a Mahratta” (317). As mentioned, the fact that a subject crafted his own position (made himselfa Mahratta) and this is echoed by the narrator, who refers to him as “the Mahratta,” reveals the success of this moment of self-creation. By saying that changing his face made him something else, he explicitly connects appearance with signified identity. By successfully representing himself with the visual markers of identity, most of all race, he is able to make himself something else. Kim expresses this basic contradiction in his own words thus: “I do not understand how he can wear many dresses and talk many tongues” (253). As Bhabha’s (1994) theory of hybridity reminds us, the very possibility of this undermines not only the ideological basis of colonization but English identity itself, which relies fundamentally on the constructed separation of races. In the demonstration of cultural difference, what is represented as past and present meet, which “undermines our sense of the homogenizing effects of cultural symbols and icons, by questioning our sense of the authority of cultural synthesis in general (35). Multiplicity of cultures, all of which are accessible, threaten the sense of one superior culture that can make all others like itself.

The idea that blotting a number from a book signifies the death of a British agent further underscores how this play of putting on and taking off identities destabilizes the representation of self and subjecthood in Kim. A number in a book is, perhaps, the most stripped of identity any individual can be, signified only by an arbitrary signifier which in itself denotes only pure difference from other subjects. The number, after all, says only that the described entity is neither the thing before it or after it, separated only by this very act of separation. Thus, the roster book establishes itself as the ultimate authority of difference and fixes the agent in relation to its own function in controlling British power in India.
Like E.23, Hurree Chunder Mookherjee is described by a colonizer, Lurgan Sahib, as nameless. Lurgan Sahib tells Kim, “He is a writer of tales for a certain Colonel. His honour is great only in Simla, and it is noticeable that he has no name, but only a number and a letter—that is the custom” (253). While the events of the rest of the novel reveals that “Hurree Babu” does have a name, Lurgan Sahib’s description stresses that his name is separate from his subject position in the eyes of the colonizing power. In the fight over the control of the colonized space of India, the individual subjecthood of the colonized is irrelevant.

In fact, to give a name might even hamper the function of an agent, as to confer any form of representation to an agent would be to acknowledge their place within the racialized system constructed by the Europeans and thus make them subject to the fixity of race that that system demands. The number and letter—and nothing else—open the possibility for change, as a number and letter can be assigned to anyone, regardless of race, gender, age, or social status, and can represent with equal power any different point of positionality in those areas of representation. In this, the novel recognizes the limitation of racialized representation and affirms the vital importance of its maintenance.

The fact that never in Kim does a person of color play a white role demonstrates in this absence just how dangerous to imperialist ideology the revelation about the permeability of constructed boundaries in Kim is. Even amidst all the changing of costumes and painting of skin, which sees Kim take on the identity of an Indian, there is no movement in the opposite direction. While the novel opens the space for this possibility by demonstrating the potential for crossing all other boundaries of identity, never does it suggest the most destabilizing act that this could lead to. Christensen (2012) notes that “the limitations of essentialist notions of identity are projected onto racial others, while the freedom of self-creation derived from a performative notion of identity becomes the exclusive privilege of whites” (10). That the boundary between races is permeable only from the side of the privileged colonizer.

As has been demonstrated, the justification for the British Empire required a racial hierarchy that would have been torn up root and branch were it possible for a colonized subject to be successfully represented as a colonizer. This potential opening of the gap in colonial ideology is not explored on the page even in a colonizing text setting up an ideological position for the reader to be able to effectively take in the colony. The changing of one identity for another demonstrates that identity itself is constructed and permeable, though each is required to be unchanging for the ideology of the colony to work. This opens the potential for a breach in the system of signification upon which the colony is based, one which must be controlled.
The final scenes take place where the border between the British Empire and the uncolonized space that lies beyond is unclear. It is partially to map and thus define this space, to fill in this *terra incognita* on European charts, that the characters come there. In this space between empires where a border prince threatens rebellion against the British Empire, the potential for the destabilization of the colonial system is particularly high. Fowler (2007) shows how this space is used as a threat to colonial stability, writing that “[i]n Kim at least, merely stepping across the border entails entering a space where Afghans habitually, and with a quiet conscience, violate all that British colonials apparently hold sacrosanct” (58). By sending its agents, including Kim, there to stop the activities of a French and Russian foreign agent, the British intelligence service simultaneously inserts them into a zone of undefined identity and a place where that identity must be particularly shored up and fixed. It is here, amidst the violence and chaos created by the function of the borderland, that the lama achieves the goal he has sought from the start of the novel, to find the river which brings him to enlightenment.

Turner (1990) examines the liminal zone and its possibilities in challenging and simultaneously reifying representational systems. As he describes, the liminal space of ritual and drama—and, it might be added, literature as well—creates a possibility for change and renewal, breaking from familiar norms and constancy. He writes that

[liminality can perhaps be described as a fructile chaos, a fertile nothingness, a storehouse of possibilities, not by any means a random assemblage but a striving after new forms and structure, a gestation process, a feta
tion of modes appropriate to and anticipating postliminal existence. (12)]

Thus, the function of the text itself doubles the function of the space beyond the border of the Empire. In both, action takes place outside the limit of the laws, and the breach is simultaneously a trauma and a potential for change and redress. It is a trauma, as Bényei (2011) explains, because it forces the white individual to come into contact with the forces that constitute its subject position, those of intersubjectivity with the Other. It opens the possibility for redress, as previously noted, as part of the human encounter, demonstrating the violence at the heart of the colony. Thus, moving outside the Empire and its representational system opens the potential for either the dissolution of the self and the Empire itself.

This potential, later, is not only contained but redirected. Rather than changing the colonial system, the subject—in both text and the reader—is reincorporated into the regime of truth. Recognizing the damage caused by the subject’s own actions goes on to shift one’s beliefs, a movement echoed by the ideological work *Kim* performs on its reader. Thus, the novel represents the crisis of a white subject when experiencing the margin of a colonized
space, an area that is nominally subject to the British Empire’s regime of truth but also falls partially outside this control. The potential for a breach of that system of signification must be controlled.

Kim and the lama come through this experience in the liminal zone with their identities scrubbed clean of signification. Kim experiences this as a crisis of identity, questioning his own role in the colonizing enterprise as well as his entire selfhood. During the violent exchange between the British and the Russian agents, the lama is badly injured, and Kim carries him away and finishes the mission successfully. Left in the village and recuperating along with his master, Kim reflects that his next step would be to leave this idyllic place where the power of the British Empire is not felt.

The failure of British colonial power in this place is demonstrated through the woman at whose house he is staying. She expresses that she has met only one white man before, who said he would return to her and never did, suggesting the promise of progress the self-proclaimed virtuous colonizer makes to the colonized. It is telling, therefore, that the man never returned, neither to prove that what he represented as true—his promise—was accurate nor to symbolically return her to a place in the symbolic order of the Empire. Without explanation, this woman is identified in a single sentence by the name Lispeth, thus linking her back to the earlier short story of the same name: “The holy man would not stay though Lispeth pressed him” (Kipling 1902, 383). Linking the two stories further adds to the cynical positioning of her role: wronged by the racial hierarchy of British India and by the man who easily jilts her because of it, she nevertheless provides unquestioning aid to Kim. Still, her power and confidence at the end of this novel are a marked contrast to the miserable, abusive marriage the narrator describes for her at the end of “Lispeth,” and thus it is seen that the woman who could tell her story in a perfect English voice at the end of that story finds authority and agency in the space on the border of Empire.

Lispeth’s position as neither colonized nor colonizing further deepens the liminal nature of the space Kim finds himself at the moment of the undoing of his subjection. In this peaceful place, Kim thinks with regret, “I must get into the world again” (Kipling 1901, 447). To return “into the world”—the white-represented space in this case is represented as the entire world itself—would be to return to a place where separations are easy and clear.

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25 Her name does not appear in the first, 1901 publications in McClure’s Magazine or in the first book form by Doubleday, Page & Company published in the same year. In both, this sentence appears as “The holy man would not stay though she pressed him” (426). This illustrates that this naming is a deliberate choice to connect the two stories.
unchallenged by the destabilizing effect of the border zone. However, he does not go immediately.

Instead, Kim falls into self-doubt, repeating to himself his own name, become strange to him. In this border place, he faces his own self, come back strangely to him, echoing the “existentialist agony that emerges when you look perilously through a glass darkly” (Bhabha 1994, 48). Kim seems to have lost his ability to make meaning at all, looking at things as though he had no context to assign them signification. The narrator writes that he looks with “strange eyes unable to take up the size and proportion and use of things” (448). It is not the world but Kim's perception of it that has changed. He is unable to represent even his own thoughts, and has become a stranger to himself as well as to the most simple things around himself: “All that while he felt, though he could not put it into words, that his soul was out of gear with its surroundings— a cog-wheel unconnected with any machinery” (448). Interestingly, in the metaphor of the unconnected cog-wheel, there is the suggestion that Kim has not ceased to be potentially a part of a machine, but rather that the machine he properly fits is somewhere else. It is his context that is wrong, not Kim himself, who is out of place in a way that is simultaneously and equivalently geographical and ideological, removed spatially and mentally from the representational system that had previously given him meaning.

Thus, Kim ends up questioning even his own name and identity: he thinks “‘I am Kim. I am Kim. And what is Kim?’ His soul repeated it again and again” (448). As also occurs in The Man Who Would Be King, the English colonizer, having been exposed to a world in which the hard representational barriers constructed by the colonial system do not exist, faces a breakdown in his own identity. Kim has appeared to shift identities, and he is able to do so as long as he knows he does it for a power that understands the rules of the Great Game, a game he himself only vaguely guesses at even at the end of the novel.

The question Kim asks at the end of the novel as he experiences his semiotic break is precisely the same he asks earlier, when he is told that he is white and must be trained to be a Sahib.

‘Hai mai! I go from one place to another as it might be a kickball. It is my Kismet. No man can escape his Kismet. But I am to pray to Bibi Miriam, and I am a Sahib.’ He looked at his boots ruefully. ‘No; I am Kim. This is the great world, and I am only Kim. Who is Kim?’ He considered his own identity, a thing he had never done before, till his head swam. He was one insignificant person in all this roaring whirl of India, going southward to he knew not what fate. (186)

Here, it is a question of subject identity, while later it becomes categorical, as Kim questions not just who but what he is.
For Kim, it is enough to misattribute the source of his distress at encountering the fluidity of his identity to the general confusion that is, to his mind, India. By ascribing his feelings to the colonized space itself, which, as has been shown, is represented throughout the book as unchanging and unchangeable, Kim is able to open himself to accepting without further threat the identity offered to him. At this point, his question is answered by the Colonel, who gives him work spying for the British as part of the Survey. Having been invested with a subject position by the representative of the colonizing power, Kim is able to keep this anxiety at bay. It is only when he moved beyond that imperial power that he comes to a crisis.

Kim does not understand the mechanisms of this signifying system. It is when he is removed from that system, finding himself in a place where the color of his skin makes no difference, that the threat of dissolution that has followed him comes to bear. Thus, the anxiety that emerged from the colonial encounter is shown to result from a function of the space itself. Kim, physically exhausted and overwhelmed by the fight with the Russian agents, finds himself coming apart on the borders of the Empire.

Yet Kim’s potential to take on multiple ethnic identities and clear enjoyment of it is rooted in a subject position that he never truly loses, for it is the thing that allows him to adopt these different significations. As Christensen (2012) demonstrates, “Rather than fixing Kim’s identity within ethnic boundaries, or even multiple ethnic boundaries, the statement ‘thou art a Sahib’ apparently opens up endless possibilities. To be a Sahib is to be irreducible to any ethnic identity, or even any list of ethnic identities” (25). Thus, the gap in colonial representation is closed by power. Race is demonstrated to be mutable, but only to the colonizer, and the colonizer, even while shifting identities, remains ever the sahib.

Kim returns to himself through an expression of the anxiety and pain that this moment creates for him. The thing that brings Kim back to himself is crying, though he himself does not understand why he cries. As he expresses the trauma of the recognition this moment creates in him, he is pushed back into the system of signification that creates that trauma in him:

He did not want to cry—had never felt less like crying in his life— but of a sudden easy, stupid tears trickled down his nose, and with an almost audible click he felt the wheels of his being lock up anew on the world without. Things that rode meaningless on the eyeball an instant before slid into proper proportion. Roads were meant to be walked upon, houses to be lived in, cattle to be driven, fields to be tilled, and men and women to be talked to. (448-449).
The colonizer, glimpsing that the system is flawed and damaging, embraces it and the privilege it grants him. Kim signifies everything exactly as he did before his experience on the edge of the empire, reestablishing the same meanings. As Sullivan (1993) points out, the ideologies of the novel “draw Kim away from the margins and return him to the centers of imperial surveillance and power as a spy” (26). It is particularly significant that he does so according to himself, using his own positionality as a starting point from which to define everything else around him: “They were all real and true—solidly planted upon the feet—perfectly comprehensible—clay of his clay, neither more nor less” (449). Hagiioannu (2003) shows that he does this through deploying the European knowledge that plays such a key role in imperialism, as “Kim reasserts his ‘Anglo-Irish’ self by sheer force of will, and, in a gesture that seems to reassert the dependability of European knowledge and learning, seeks refuge in the mental recitation of the multiplication table in English” (31). He returns unchanged to the representational system he left even though, as has been shown, this system is that which creates the oppressive regime of the colony, which embeds hierarchical identities in every subject it creates. Kim has found that the identity the system grants him uniquely allows him the pleasure of adopting any of those ethnicities without abandoning the power of abandoning his own.

Sullivan demonstrates this ideological contradiction at the end of the novel, pointing out that Kim’s return as a reborn colonizer is “a colonial fantasy that suggests an impossible origin for a new colonialist, one with a split sense of the constitution of self, who disavows difference from the native, yet knows otherwise” (177). Kim knows that an oppressive colonial relationship exists in which his positioning is that of the colonizer, though he continues to claim kinship with the colonized. It is through this kinship that he gains legitimacy, as it connects him with India and with those that, as an Englishman, he is in a position of rulership over.

Kim’s movement out of and then back into the colonial system of meaning is contrasted in the novel against the lama’s attaining of and then giving up of enlightenment. When the lama achieves his quest of finding enlightenment, it is described in explicit terms of breaking free from the system of difference that defines human thought. The lama describes this as finding freedom from “the Wheel of Things,” a freedom that separates him from the regime of truth that constructs all knowledge, even from the first moments of awareness in which the self is separated from the Other. He describes the movement of his Soul beyond all things: “By this I knew the Soul had passed beyond the illusion of Time and Space and of Things. By this I knew that I was free” (458). The closer the lama’s soul approaches to the
Great Soul, the more his connection to all other things seems to fade, until he becomes one with all things, eternal: “Then my Soul was all alone, and I saw nothing, for I was all things, having reached the Great Soul. And I meditated a thousand thousand years, passionless, well aware of the Causes of all Things” (458). At this moment, he has become removed completely from the systems of language and meaning-making that define his life, to the point that speaking of his awareness or consciousness is even inaccurate.

The lama’s experience seems to be phrased in terms of escape from the system of *différence* as described by Derrida, in which the very essence of Being and meaning is based in the complex construction of what Derrida (1982) calls “the play of the trace,” which predates Being. As Derrida describes it, *différence*“can be called the play of trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, or the *différence*, which has no meaning and is not” (22). The lama experiences a state removed from even this “play of trace,” in which nothing is differentiated and everything is actually pure Being. As has been discussed, the fundamental grounds of colonial philosophy is the separation of races from each other: thus, the lama choosing to return to the world as it is simultaneously chooses to reintegrate himself into that system.

The lama chooses to return from enlightenment for the sake of Kim, whom he loves. In his description, he does this because he fears Kim will lose himself rather than remain on the path to good: “Then a voice cried: ‘What shall come to the boy if thou art dead?’ and I was shaken back and forth in myself with pity for thee; and I said: ‘I will return to my chela, lest he miss the Way’ (458). It is not Kim’s body that the lama worries about but his soul; he believes that only through his guidance can Kim eventually “gain merit.” Thus, the novel not only suggests that the experience of the Other and the colonized space serves as a means to moral improvement for the white colonizer, but also presents that to serve as a means for this can be the most important motivation of a colonized subject. As such, the relationship between colonizer and colonized is shown to be the most defining system of difference in the novel.

The way the lama returns to his own body reflects the process by which the signifying system is re-established in him, mirroring the universal way the self is separated from what becomes signified as the Other, the world outside the self: “Upon this my Soul, which is the Soul of Teshoo Lama, withdrew itself from the Great Soul with strivings and yearnings and retchings and agonies not to be told” (458). The retchings and agonies are particularly interesting as they reflect Kristeva’s (1982) description of the way the “I” is formed by the
violence of expulsion from the body of that which is subsequently not signified as part of the “I”: “During that course in which ‘I’ become, I give birth to myself amid the violence of sobs, of vomit” (3). Through pain and expulsion, the lama returns to himself and the regime of truth he has known all his life, one controlled by and in the service of the white colonizing hegemony.

The process of personal dissolution followed by reincorporation closely follows the anthropological model of the rite of passage first described by Arnold van Gennep (1908) and elaborated on by Turner (1967). Turner describes the liminal stage’s importance in the rite of passage from one status in a community to another, a stage in which “Undoing, dissolution, decomposition are accompanied by processes of growth, transformation, and the reformulation of old elements in new patterns” (99). Symbolically in these rituals it is important for the old identity to be removed so that the initiate can take on a new identity. Like Kim and the lama, the initiate loses the signifiers that fix their subject position, becoming no longer one thing and not yet another. Van Gennep (1908) describes initiation rituals of young men in which the subject “is considered dead” and weakened in a way that is “intended to make him lose all recollection of his childhood existence” (75). At the end of the ritual, “he is resurrected and taught how to live, but differently than in childhood” (75). Through this series of acts, the subject dies to one identity and reenters the signifying system inscribed as another.

The ritual is at once full of potential and threat. This liminal state, as Turner demonstrates, is an intentional crisis of identity and subjecthood. As he writes, “They are at once no longer classified and not yet classified” (96). This status is accompanied by an opening of possibilities and a transgression of boundaries: its purpose is to ease the trauma of change from one status to another, to make possible the violation of boundaries between identities that would normally be taboo. In a later article, Turner (1990) writes that this experience represents “a no-man’s-land betwixt-and-between the structural past and the structural future as anticipated by the society’s normative control of biological development. It is ritualized in many ways, but very often symbols expressive of ambiguous identity are found cross-culturally” (11). At the end of Kim, the same language of the loss of self and the opening of ambiguity is used, and the ritual connection with the lama’s quest for freedom and merit is clear.

The lama’s decision to return to Kim and the material world, then, can be interpreted as a failed rite of passage, or, more precisely, a defeated one. Rather than moving from one identity and life stage to another, the lama, like Kim does at the same time, moves into a
liminal space and then returns to the same identity he had before. For the space of time in which he divided his sense of self from his body and conscious mind, the lama wins a sense of unmediated and unsignified experience with reality that transcends one of language and ideology; however, in order to be able to communicate this information to Kim, the lama must reincorporate himself into the same system of signification from which he briefly won his freedom. This demonstrates the contradiction of escaping from ideology Derrida (1981) demonstrates, in which one must use the very signs of the signifying system in order to attempt to demolish it, making completely escaping from it very problematic.

The lama attributes his actions to his love for Kim and expresses his hope that, because of his decision not to embrace his freedom yet, he will be able to guide Kim to it as well. Though he knows enlightenment is freedom from attachment, his attachment to Kim—represented clearly as that of the colonized to the colonizer—causes him to call his internalized racism and oppression love. A further source of dissonance is the lama’s insistence that Kim needs him, while Kim has demonstrated repeated superior understanding of circumstances and ability to gain the advantage over others, mirroring the frequent representation of the relationship of colonizer and colonized as being that between parent and child. Donna Landry and Caroline Rooney (2010) argue that “the lama seems to signify that which Kim is supposed to leave behind or, at least, separate himself from” (63). In this final scene, Kim distances himself from the figure who has been his father and mother, thus ending a relationship contradictory to his intended role as colonizing patriarch.

There is an interesting note about this final exchange that casts a shadow of complication on the idea that the breach is closed and the danger of destabilization is averted. At the end of the text, it is not clear whether Kim will continue on his path and become an agent of the British Empire. The lama, who is the last character to speak in the novel, says he will help Kim to the same freedom he has known. “‘Son of my Soul, I have wrenched my Soul back from the Threshold of Freedom to free thee from all sin— as I am free, and sinless! Just is the Wheel! Certain is our deliverance! Come!’ He crossed his hands on his lap and smiled, as a man may who has won salvation for himself and his beloved” (460). If, as I have suggested, freedom in Kim is represented as freedom from the signifying system upon which the British Empire’s system of racial hierarchy is based, then the lama suggests that he might yet be able to help Kim achieve this and remove himself. Salvation, in this case, would be salvation from the limitation and control placed on them by the imperial system, which forces them into certain prescribed roles. David Scott (2011) identifies Kim as refutation of Said’s claim of Kipling’s Orientalism. According to Scott, the sympathetic depiction of the Buddhist
lama and his attainment of salvation represents Kipling’s privileging the lama over Kim, even identifying it as a potentially postcolonial move in which the colonized takes precedence over the colonizer (319). Contrary to what Scott argues, the novel does not finish with the lama exactly. The novel ends, “He crossed his hands on his lap and smiled, as a man may who has won salvation for himself and his beloved” (460). It ends looking towards Kim and what the lama has done for him.

If truly freedom from the signifying system of the colony is thus made possible, this suggests Kim will not only stop being an agent of the British, he will also shed his sense of self. Since identity is mutable and dependent on one’s exterior and actions, his whiteness could also be abandoned. In order for him to find the same enlightenment the lama has, it would have to be. The one element standing in contrast to this reading is, however, the racial essentialism described above: if the qualities of whiteness come out in Kim without ever having been taught or even represented to him, race can never really change. Thus, any fear of destabilization of the racial system of the colony is contained in the fictional separation of races in the novel. Sullivan (1993) agrees that at the end of the novel Kim is implied to embrace his future in the Civil Service, explaining that “this end is also a beginning, or rather a colonial fantasy that suggests an impossible origin for a new colonialist, one with a split sense of the constitution of self, who disavows difference from the native, yet knows otherwise” (177). Kim’s experiences have served to make him a better colonizer.

At the end of Kim, the colonized and the colonizer return to the system of meaning that signifies them as such. The novel ends with an ostensible gesture of love that is also a gesture to a basic and cynical truth: that, for the sake of the colonizing system, one must learn to privilege the ideal of racial separation and superiority over experiences that suggest the opposite. At the end of the novel, even the colonized subject learns to embrace their position, as the lama chooses to return to the signifying system of the colony after having left it, doing so out of love for a white boy and the regime of truth that he serves as an agent of the British Empire. Kim himself, having experienced and experimented with the capacity for altering his racial identity, has gained knowledge that will be valuable to him in fully embracing the waiting role of white sahib.
4. Conclusion: Deconstructing Kipling’s Colonizing World

What Kipling exposes to the reader, the representational crisis of the European subject unable to lose the colony for fear of losing the self, has no easy solution. Embedded at the very core of white identity are the oppressive practices of the colony. While much has been said about the decolonization of former colonies, a different crisis becomes visible: how shall the colonizer be decolonized? Memmi (2004) describes what he sees as a Europe in crisis, possibly even in Gibbonesque decadence:

In the face of an Islam that is sure of its values because of its relative youth, Europe no longer has a system of ethics capable of providing new guidelines. Skeptical and blasé like the elderly, it promotes an easygoing leniency, but the lack of civic pride is not freedom but anarchy. In every field of endeavor Europe has allowed itself simply to circumvent obstacles, while waiting for the oil wells to dry up and new forms of energy to be discovered. (Kindle location 1802-1805)

Removing the colonial relationship from the colonizing states promises to be a much more difficult proposition. To understand the shape and scale of this problem, it is useful to first look over the argument so far.

The construction of the racialized Other simultaneously created the Orient and the European subject in opposition to it. As Said (2003) explains, one of the primary roles of fiction and poetry in colonial and postcolonial cultures has been to problematize and challenge preconceived notions of race, gender, and other ideological constructions. Bhabha (1994) counters this is usually done in the Anglo-Saxon canon from the white perspective, staging the challenges to white identity and sense of subjecthood that emerged in colonized spaces; therefore, the colonial relationship can never be entirely abandoned by the colonizer. Because whiteness both depends on the racialized Other—to use Said's term, the Oriental—for its existence and attempt to silence and repress the humanity of this constructed Other, the colonial encounter is a profoundly troubling one for a white colonizer.

To create and justify the colonial system, an ideological system constructs an image of the beneficial colony dedicated to the improvement of the colonized, using the Eurocentric model of progress and humanism as a measure for the advancement and value of all humanity in the Hegelian tradition. This colonizer, to quote Memmi (2003), is a tall man, bronzed by the sun, wearing Wellington boots, proudly leaning on a shovel—as he rivets his gaze far away on the horizon of his land. When not engaged in battles against nature, we think of him laboring selflessly for mankind, attending the sick, and spreading culture to the nonliterate. (47)

In short, the process of colonization is represented as part of the general post-Enlightenment striving towards civilization and culture, “improving” a culture represented as being less
developed and less valuable. This represents the colony as being of benefit for the entire world—a world divided into colonizer, colonized, and nothing else—and Kipling’s (1899) speaker declares it is “well for the world when the White Men drink/To the dawn of the White Man’s day!!” (“A Song of the White Men”, 7-8). This model provides only one road towards improvement: that followed by European cultures. According to this ideological framework, the colonizer's presence in the colony is as part of a selfless and humanitarian undertaking transforming the “pore benighted heathen,” to quote Kipling’s “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” (1892), into a properly cultured, civilized, and educated subject—in other words, into a European.

The inherent contradiction of colonizing ideology is twofold. The first is that it assumes that the colonized can become like the colonizer: in other words, it presupposes the possibility and even desirability of the collapse of the distinction between white and Other. This is, as has been shown, incompatible with European identity, as the very basis of this identity is this constructed Other, “and never the twain shall meet,” to borrow another Kipling phrase, this time from “The Ballad of East and West” (1889). For one to become the other would be for white identity to be lost, along with the justification white supremacy gives to the colonizer: at the moment the nominal goal of the colony is achieved, the colony will become impossible.

The second contradiction is even more straightforward: it relies on creating an essentialized, racialized difference between colonizer and colonized that the colonial encounter threatens to undermine and even erase due to a mutual recognition of shared humanity. This moment is the basis of many of Kipling's poems and stories, in which a white character experiences the traumatic realization that an oppressed colonized subject and he—it is, in every text I have experienced, a white man or boy who makes this realization—share humanity and the distinction between them threatens to collapse in a way that would destroy the white subject's sense of selfhood, even to the point of losing his name, as Peachey does in *The Man Who Would Be King* (1888).

It is for the preservation of both the colony and the colonizer's sense of identity, based in and hedged by whiteness, that the destabilizing threat of this tendency must be accounted for and controlled. I have argued that a major way for this to occur was through what was, in past decades, called cynicism and hypocrisy, but which I argue can be understood as the visible function of cognitive dissonance. The psychological effect of cognitive dissonance describes the anxiety produced in a subject who holds two contradictory beliefs at the same time (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1957). The human mind, as the research of Scher and Cooper
(1989) shows, seeks to resolve the difference between what one believes and the effects one finds one's actions having. Contrary to what one might think, those who find that their actions have had an effect they find contradicts their beliefs do not condemn their past actions that have proved to be opposed to their values. Rather, their beliefs shift to the point that they coincide with the effect they perceive themselves having. The work of Scher and Cooper (1989) particular mirrors an effect displayed by colonizers after arrival in the colony. In the study, participants who wrote an essay that coincided with their personal beliefs changed their beliefs when told that the point at which a committee read the essay would, paradoxically, make them more likely to choose the other way. This suggests that even a colonizer morally opposed to the colony will embrace its principles when they find that their work furthers its cause.

In the colony, the effect of cognitive dissonance takes the form of simultaneously recognizing the contradiction of colonizing ideology and reaffirming the racial separation that is the basis of it. The aim of this cynicism, as Sloterdijk (1987) calls it, is to create a “consciousness [that] no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology,” refusing to abandon an ideology that has been exposed as wrong (5). Žižek (1989) goes even farther, demonstrating how acknowledging a gap can reinforce social structures, arguing that “in its very constitution, the symptom implies the field of the big Other as consistent, complete, because its very formation is an appeal to the Other which contains its meaning” (79). This cynicism, which Memmi (2003) recognizes in the mindset of all colonizers, appears not only in the depiction of colonizers in colonizing texts like Kipling’s but also in the function of the texts themselves on the reader and on the representative system them create. It is an important function of colonizing texts, including Kipling’s fiction and poetry written during and after his stay in India, to model this cynicism for the white reader and teach them a response that would trigger cognitive dissonance in them in a way that would push them to change their beliefs in order to justify and even support the oppression and horror created by the colony.

It is this function of colonizing texts that might have created the effect that Gilmour (2003) writes about as an “ingenious theory,” wherein “officers who read Kipling somehow managed to mould their men so that they became like his soldiers” (Kindle location 1018). Having come to Kipling's India before ever setting foot on the subcontinent, the soldiers unconsciously reproduce the simulacrum India in practice, replacing the lived India with its ambivalence and unstable boundaries with one they find both more comfortable and more familiar. It becomes clear how Kipling's own perception of colonizers in India became embedded in his writing and transmitted to others, who then reproduced it and, in turn,
created Kiplingesque characters in the colonized space through a function like a self-fulfilling prophecy. This cycle of expectation, preconditioned response, and performance shape not only the relationship of the white subject with the colony but also with the colonial enterprise itself, controlling for resistance and creating a culture of cynicism and support in which the idea of the colony is represented as timeless, unchanging, and unchangeable. To change the colony would be to abandon the self, ending up like Peachey Carnahan in *The Man Who Would Be King* (1888), who refers to himself sometimes in the third person and sometimes as his dead companion, and demands of the narrator in a panic, “Keep looking at me, or maybe my words will go all to pieces” (170). Peachey, having experienced a world without the colonizing regime of truth, has indeed gone to pieces.

The pattern of this in Kipling is particularly interesting, as it reveals how entrenched ideology is disguised even while other tensions are presented, demonstrating possible paths for misattribution as part of the cognitive dissonance response. Throughout his texts, the racial tension created by the human encounter is played out as a recognition between a white character and a non-white one. To put it another way, this is a recognition by a white character, whose response and evaluation of the non-white character and their relationship is the whole focus of the story: the non-white character frequently remains mostly voiceless, their own evaluation of the encounter not explored.

Moreover, when this recognition takes place, it is a recognition by the white character of white characteristics and virtues in the person of color. As the speaker says in “Gunga Din” (1890), “for all 'is dirty 'ide, / 'E was white, clear white, inside” (44-45). The value of people of color is represented in terms of discovered whiteness in the eyes of the white observer. In this way also the fundamental separation of races and white supremacy upon which both the colonial system and white identity are based is preserved, even as ideas that would fundamentally subvert it are reincorporated into it and represented using its signifiers. Though the speaker tells Gunga Din “You're a better man than I am, Gunga Din!” (85), he first affirms that even in the afterlife, “'e’ll be squattin’ on the coals/Givin’ drink to poor damned souls/An’ I’ll get a swig in hell from Gunga Din!” (78-80). Even despite both the speaker’s recognition and death itself, Gunga Din is never freed from serving to his colonizer’s benefit, even in Hell. The speaker expresses his anxiety at this disturbed colonial relationship between colonizer and colonized by connecting his pain to the literal pain of his wound, which he represents as a reversal of proper positions: “I dropped be’hind the fight/With a bullet where my belt-plate should 'a’ been” (57-58). The speaker focuses his suffering at the disturbing situation not on his recognition of Gunga Din’s shared humanity but on his belt-plate, a
standard part of the British soldier’s uniform, having been replaced by a bullet fired by someone fighting the colony.

Such misattribution of the anxiety caused by cognitive dissonance can be seen in many such colonizing texts, especially in their representation of people of color whose own voices argue for the importance of the colony for the welfare of the colonized and the naturalness of the racial hierarchy. They often blame the violence and abuse of the colony on the colonized themselves, attributing the failures of the colony to the refusal of people of color to collaborate. One such example appears in *Kim* (1901), when the old Indian officer describes the Indian Rebellion of 1857 as created by sudden irrational behavior among the colonized:

A madness ate into all the Army, and they turned against their officers. That was the first evil, but not past remedy if they had then held their hands. But they chose to kill the Sahibs' wives and children. Then came the Sahibs from over the sea and called them to most strict account” (83).

In representing the Rebellion as “a madness,” the officer separates the violence from its source, the injustices perpetrated by the British on the colonized Indians. Stripped of its context in this framework, the Rebellion becomes senseless, violence whose only significance is in threatening British rule in India. In keeping with the ideological positioning of the colony as timeless, this presents the idea that British rule could end as madness. To conceive of a change in hegemony in the colonized space is in itself an evil which must be corrected, its threat of breach repaired.

It can be seen that one of the key functions of colonizing texts written to colonial agents is to help them cope with the moral implications of the effects of their role in the imperial system. This functions in a simultaneous double-binding of meanings. On the one hand, it represents changing the colony as impossible. The colony, in this framing, exists outside the actions of any human colonizer. Like the officer who places his hand on the cannon when speaking to an Indian revolutionary in “On the City Wall,” the colonizing subject depersonalizes the violence of the imperialist system in a way that makes it both overwhelming and impervious. On the other hand, the misattribution offered by these texts positions the anxiety of the colonizing agent as arising not from their own actions but from the disordering influence of the colony itself, and the ideology as the only means of preventing this threatening dissolution.

In the same vein, *Kim* (1901) is obsessed with boundaries and distinctions, from the ability to transform one's caste and race learned by the protagonist to the struggle for maps of
the spaces just beyond the border of British India that the final scenes of the novel revolve around. In that liminal world beyond the border, where the relationship between colonizer/colonized no longer exists, Kim and Teshoo Lama, white and non-white, both experience a loss of self-signification. The story attributes this not to the effect of that laying bare the cognitive threat of the colony has on them, but on the mental exhaustion and physical strain the colony places on them. The colony becomes a place of threat that can be countered by relying even more firmly in the apparatus that has already been exposed to be a fabrication.

Kim sees that the world exists according to the rules he has been taught, and the speaker of “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” unselfconsciously says of the slaughter of native people with modern weaponry in the Sudan both “it wasn’t ‘ardly fair” (23) and “we’ll call the bargain fair” (35). Although it has been shown to be inaccurate, the apparatus nevertheless functions to totalize, and colonizing cynicism redraws lines over borders that have been shown to be permeable and unstable.

This presents a complex model for the function of what we call cynicism in the colony, or indeed in any enterprise that is morally reprehensible but which people are made to perform. Furthermore, it challenges the reader to recognize a new way of encountering the colonizing function of texts published not just explicitly talking about colonization but all texts that serve “The God of Things as They Are”, to quote one of Kipling’s poems, “When Earth's Last Picture is Painted” (1892), as well as “The Judgement at Dungara” in In Black and White (1888). This undermines the idea that colonizers do not understand the consequences of their actions. They are not under the impression that they do not contribute to the harm the colony does. Instead, it suggests that the colonial agents' very awareness of those consequences, including their semiotic threat to their own self, impels them to believe in the justness of their actions, even as texts soothe them by reassuring them that their anxiety over it is not actually their fault. Colonizers have been forewarned and forearmed by texts such as these stories and poems to process this information in a way that will make them into even more willing servants of the colony.

This is not to say that Kipling did not foresee the collapse of the Empire. As Gilmour (2003) writes in his biography of Kipling, “Other people accepted that the Empire was in transition or in decline, but Kipling knew it was going to disappear; almost alone of his contemporaries, he would have been unsurprised to learn that the whole thing... would have gone within a generation of his death” (311). Kipling knew the Empire could not be sustained, and yet the possibility of the former colonized ruling any part of the British Empire
never appears in his works. The closest he comes is the bungled attempt of the two adventurers in *The Man Who Would Be King*, and of all Kipling’s fiction it is also the story with the most devastating consequences for its protagonists.

The implications of these readings is that, when they are thus established, colonizing functions can be recognized in other texts and attitudes. They represent the colony as existing in the past, echoed by the countless depictions of oppressed spaces as less “advanced”. One example is George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant” (1936), in which the narrator describes shooting an elephant that has broken loose and killed a native. He writes that he does so because of the weight of the gaze of the colonized who stare at him, demanding action. Thus, he shifts the blame from himself and his own problematic presence in harming a valuable, unthreatening thing to that of the colonized themselves, who are most kin to the elephant and stand to lose through its death. He describes that

even then I was not thinking particularly of my own skin, only of the watchful yellow faces behind. . . . A white man mustn’t be frightened in front of “natives”; and so, in general, he isn’t frightened. The sole thought in my mind was that if anything went wrong those two thousand Burmans would see me pursued, caught, trampled on and reduced to a grinning corpse like that Indian up the hill. And if that happened it was quite probable that some of them would laugh. That would never do. (165)

The cynicism of the final statement is clear in its bitter irony. The narrator claims to be more afraid of losing face in front of natives than of being killed. It is interesting that, in his biography of Orwell, D. J. Taylor (2004) suggests the incident may not have happened at all, at least not to Orwell (79). Therefore, it is possible that Orwell, having internalized Kipling’s technique, reproduces the essential parts of colonizing cynicism through a fictionalized episode.

The frame of colonizing cynicism promises to shed new light on other texts written in the same era about the colony from a Eurocentric perspective, such as Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1902). The ending of the novel may be read not as a destabilization of Western identity but rather as the threat of transposing the cynicism of the European colonist from the colony to the homeland, as London seems to be transformed into a vision of the unknown and threatening landscape of Africa, and “the offing . . . seemed to lead into the heart of an immense darkness” (182). It is not the colony itself that spreads as the returned repressed to England, but the colonial attitude having been adopted by those with lived experience there. Marlowe, having learned this from Kurtz, then practices it on Kurtz’s intended, silencing his actual last words and instead choosing to maintain the illusion of the selfless colonizer dying romantically thinking of her.
C. Jan Swearingen (1991) identifies this as the first in a series of lies Marlowe will make, writing that Marlowe “exploits her love in order to protect—deceive—her, and in so doing undermines the canons of trust and truth in much the same way that he has observed Kurtz corrupted” (252). He indeed violates her trust and that of Kurtz, but Marlowe justifies himself by insisting “she knew. She was sure” (252). His lie is for the purpose of maintaining an ideology whose gaps he has lived firsthand. Thus, he finds himself practicing in London the cynicism he learned from Kurtz in Africa.

Even contemporary texts about exploited spaces repeat this representation of the colonizer unable to end their involvement in the colony. They, like Orwell, assign the blame for the injustices perpetrated against them on the victimized themselves. In his 2004 book *Decolonization and the Decolonized*, Memmi briefly mentions the role of former colonial empires in perpetuating inequality, but writes that it is more important to focus on corruption, violence, religious oppression, and the brain drain in the decolonized areas. He writes that “[w]aiting for salvation from a colonial power, now a former colonial power, is as illusory as it is for women to expect to attain their liberation through male goodwill” (Kindle location 1902-1904). This finds an echo in the sentiments of Lord Cromer, the consular-general of Egypt, who ruled Egypt de facto under the British occupation, when he wrote in 1910 that it will be well for England, better for India, and best of all for the cause of progressive civilization in general, if it be clearly understood from the outset that, however liberal may be the concessions which have now been made, and which at any future time may be made, we have not the smallest intention of abandoning our Indian possessions, and that it is highly improbable that any such intention will be entertained by our posterity. The foundation-stone of Indian reform must be the steadfast maintenance of British supremacy. (47)

Studying colonizing cynicism suggests that, as long as the colonizer benefits both materially and personally from the existence of the colony, there is no way to demolish it.

The ubiquitous depiction of suffering people who are starving or violent in oppressed spaces similarly misattributes the anxiety resulting from the knowledge of this suffering. Starved bodies with haunted eyes face the camera stripped of historical and geopolitical context. Like the people on the Grand Trunk Road in *Kim*, they seem to exist to be seen and responded to by colonizing eyes. The misery is presented as an intrinsic part of that space. “It has always been that way” becomes the familiar response to images of horror emerging from spaces torn by conflict, ever more present in media. The Western colonial powers' legacy of brutality, starvation, and deprivation is misattributed to the essentialized nature of the colonized themselves, about whom it is said that, “They are by nature a violent people with an evil religion,” thus echoing Kipling’s narrator in “On the City Wall” (1899), for whom it is
enough to say of Muslims and Hindus that “both creeds belong to the fighting races” (189). The violence thus becomes both impossibly distant and immediate, shocking without being challenging. Spivak (1988) reminds us that “[t]he contemporary international division of labor is a displacement of the divided field of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism” (83). The exploitative relationship of colonizer/colonized continues to be represented as unchangeable, and the colonizer as both separate from the function of the colony, the suffering caused by the brutal relationship misattributed to other factors.

As this violent racism and cynical exploitation have, as Young (1995) argues, become a part of British identity, it remains to be asked whether the removal of the colonized from the colonizer is possible. If it is possible to escape from the trap of colonizing cynicism and face the anxiety that the loss of the colonial relationship would create by abandoning the dialectic of white/nonwhite and colonizer/colonized, it becomes necessary to imagine the construction of a non-oppositional identity in Britain. This raises the fear that we have to accept Césaire's (1972) prediction that “capitalist society, at its present stage, is incapable of establishing a concept of the right of all men” (3).

There is, then, the final step that Kipling’s narrators can never take, that of abandoning the privileged position created by the binary opposition of colonizer/colonized. When the speaker in Gunga Din (1890) praises the Indian for being “clear white inside” (85), he does so without abandoning the privilege whiteness brings, merely extending a posthumous, honorary whiteness to the dead subaltern, representing it as a mark of distinction. As Žižek (1999) shows, “if one is to get rid of the oppressive Other, one has substantially to transform the content of one’s own position” (72). Derrida (1997) demonstrates that, once a semiotic dichotomy exists, its very address leads to its perpetuation by employing the terms and distinction one seeks to demolish. To illustrate just how difficult it is to signify a world without this fundamental framework, Betts (1998) suggests that separate narratives and thus identities are no longer possible. As history has a permanent and indelible mark on space and ideology alike, he writes, “[i]mperialism and colonialism, attitudes of arrogance mobilized into doctrines of need and deed, markets and morality, have changed the world” (110). Because the histories of former colonizers and colonized are thus forever linked now, only a narrative that includes both can ever capture the complexity of contemporary existence. He argues that

[t]here should therefore be admitted various readings, different voices, other perspectives. Juxtaposed, if not complemented, these expressions of the human condition might allow a rich and balanced appreciation of what occurred and of what might yet become. (110)
This is as much as to suggest that the European can never shed the self-inflicted wounds of the identity of the oppressor.

The direction suggested by the current study is that, if there is to be escape from this destructive framework that simultaneously results from and is produced by the empire, the empire itself—including its all of its neocolonial apparatus—must be deconstructed. Memmi (2004) describes this as unlikely, saying,

It is not certain that the powerful of yesterday have truly understood that they must, from now on, do a better job of sharing wealth, even the wealth they themselves produce. Man is like every carnivore, he will jealously defend the hunk of meat between his paws. (Kindle location 1953-1955)

This is a monumentally difficult proposition. It is only when the real power difference that has entrenched Western dominance in the world has been nullified that the semiotic frame of its construction will lose currency. By examining and understanding how texts like Rudyard Kipling’s contribute to the production of this ideological framework, it is hoped that a renewed purpose in exploring postcolonial possibilities reaching into the “dark and opaque” spaces “beyond imagination” (189), to quote Boehmer (2018), may result. Perhaps in this we can echo Memmi (2004) again: “if we can play some role in it, no matter how small, it would be unforgivable for us not to have tried” (Kindle location 1958-1959).
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